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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

Volume XIV

Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955

Editor in Chief John P. Glennon
Editor Carl N. Raether

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Preface

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign plicy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.

b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.

c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.

d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.

e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government.

The Center, in coordination with geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

Carl N. Raether of the Office of the Historian compiled this volume under the supervision of John P. Glennon. Paul Claussen provided planning and direction and Nina J. Noring conducted the initial editorial review. Harriet D. Schwar assisted in final preparation for publication. Lynn Chase and Bret D. Bellamy prepared the lists of sources, names, and abbreviations.

Althea W. Robinson performed technical editing under the supervision of Rita M. Baker. The Twin Oaks Indexing Collective prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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Department of State

1. *Indexed Central Files.* Papers in the indexed central files of the Department for the years 1955–1957 are indicated by a decimal file number in the first footnote. The following are among the most useful of these files for the preparation of this volume: 120.1580, 396.1–GE, 474.008, 601.0084A, 611.61, 611.74, 611.80, 611.84A, 645W.74322, 674.84A, 684A.85322, 684A.86, 774.00, 774.5–MSP, 774.56, 780.5, 784A.5274, 786.00, and 874.2614

2. *Lot Files.* Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows:

Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documentation on official visits by ranking foreign officials and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1953–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1955–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

INR–NIE Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

IO Files: Lot 71 D 440

Master files of classified records and correspondence of United States delegations to sessions of the U.N. General Assembly for the years 1945–1965, as maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518

Top Secret records pertaining to the Near East, and in particular to Project Alpha and the Anderson Mission, for the years 1954–1957, as maintained by the Office

of Near Eastern Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA Files: Lot 58 D 722

Files maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs for the years 1954–1956, relating to the Middle East Watch.

NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 246

Documentation on the Jordan Valley Mission for 1955, as maintained by the Office of Israel and Arab–Israel Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254

Files for 1954–1955 pertaining to the Eric Johnston Mission and for 1945–1963 concerning the Jordan Valley Waters (Yarmuk) Project, as maintained by the Office of Israel and Arab–Israel Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438

Miscellaneous Top Secret records concerning the Middle East for the years 1955–1964, as maintained by the Office of Israel and Arab–Israel Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collections of the minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff meetings during the years 1952–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417

See State–JCS Meetings.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence, and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat for the years 1947–1963.

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Top Secret records of meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State for the years 1951–1959 and selected problem

files on the Middle East for the years 1954–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224

Miscellaneous country and subject files relating to political issues before the United Nations for the years 1943–1956, including the Collective Measures Committees, Palestine, and Suez, as retired by the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237

Subject files of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs for the years 1946–1957.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Records of John Foster Dulles, 1952–1959, including General Memoranda of Conversation, Meetings with the President, General Telephone Conversations, and White House Telephone Conversations.

President's Daily Appointments Record

Records of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, Daily Appointments, 1953–1961.

White House Office Files

Several White House office collections, including files of the Office of the Staff Secretary, and Project "Clean Up."

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles–Herter Series, Eisenhower (DDE) Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the International File.

Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey

Dulles Papers, Dulles Daily Appointment Book

Daily log of the meetings and appointments of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for the years 1953–1959.

List of Abbreviations

Editor's Note: This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

A, airgram
AA, anti-aircraft
Achdut Haavoda, Israeli Socialist Labor Party
ACSP, Arab Collective Security Pact
AFSC, American Friends Service Committee
AKA, Attack Cargo Vessel
AL, Arab League or Arab Legion (Transjordon)
ALCSP, Arab League Collective Security Pact
ALO, series indicator for military telegrams
AmEmb, American Embassy
AMS, Agricultural Marketing Services, Department of Agriculture
AP, Associated Press; Atlantic Pact
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARAMCO, Arabian-American Oil Company
ARMATT, Army Attaché
ASRP, Arab Socialist Resurectionist Party (Syrian)
B/D, barrels of petroleum per day
BG, David Ben Gurion
BIS, Bank of International Settlements
BJSM, British Joint Services Mission or British Joint Staff Mission
BMEO, British Middle East Office
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
BSFMC, Bilateral San Francisco Memorandum of Conversation
CA, circular airgram
CARE, Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere
CASU, Cooperative Association of Suez Canal Users
CCS, Combined Chiefs of Staff
CE, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army; Central Europe; Council of Europe; Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State
CF, Conference File
CHMAAG, Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIA/LC, Central Intelligence Agency, Legislative Counsel
CINCAL, Commander in Chief, Alaska
CINCARIB, Commander in Chief, Caribbean
CINCFE, Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, Atlantic
CINCNELM, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCONAD, Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific

CINCSAC, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, United States Air Force, Europe
CINCUSAREUR, Commander in Chief, United States Army in Europe
circ, circular telegram
cirtel, circular telegram
COM, communications
comite, committee
CONAD, Continental Air Defense Command
CONADR, Continental Air Defense Command Regulation
ConGen, Consulate General
Contel, Consulate telegram
CRO, Commonwealth Relations Office
CS, Chief of Staff
CSA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
CSAFM, Chief of Staff, Air Force Memorandum
CSS, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture
CVA, Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVS, Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft Carrier
CX, Naval Reserve Captain, Captain, or Commander
CZ, Canal Zone
DA, Development Assistance
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DD, Destroyer
DEFREPAMA, Defense Representative Army Attaché
Del, Delegation
Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly; also used to refer to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
Dento, series indicator for telegrams sent from the Denver White House
Depcirgram, Department of State circular airgram
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
Deptel, Department of State telegram
desp, despatch
DEW, Distant Early Warning
DIB, Defense Intelligence Briefing
DirGen, Director General
DL, Demarcation Line
DRN, Division of Research for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Department of State
DRS, Division of Research for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Department of State
DRW, Division of Research for Western Europe, Department of State
Dulte, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
DZ, Demilitarized Zone
E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
EARIS, Egyptian–American Rural Improvement Service
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
E–I, Egyptian–Israeli
EIMAC, Egyptian–Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission
E.J., Eric Johnston
Embdesp, Embassy despatch
Embtel, Embassy telegram
ES, Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly
ES–I, First Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly
ESS, Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi Pact
ETW, Eden Talks, Washington
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EURATOM, European Atomic Energy Community
EXIM Bank/EX–IM, Export–Import Bank
FAF, French Air Force
FAO, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FAS, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FinAtt, Financial Attaché
FLO, Foreign Liaison Office
FN, Division of Financial Affairs, Department of State
F.O., Foreign Office

FOA, Foreign Operations Administration
FonMin, Foreign Minister; Foreign Ministry
FonOff, Foreign Office
FPSC, Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee
FRC, Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate
FSD, Division of Fuels, Department of State
FTC, Federal Trade Commission
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State
G–2, Army (or Marine) general staff section dealing with intelligence at the divisional level or higher
GA, United Nations General Assembly
GAA, General Armistice Agreement
Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
GHQ, General Headquarters
GMT, Greenwich mean time
GOE, Government of Egypt
GOI, Government of Israel; Government of India
GOL, Government of Lebanon
GOS, Government of Syria
GSA, General Services Administration
H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Department of State
Herut (Tenuat Haherut), Israeli political party
HICOM, High Commission(er)
Histradut, General Federation of Jewish Labor in Israel
HJK, Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom
HJK–IMAC, Jordanian–Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission
HKJ, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
HM, His/Her Majesty
HMG, His/Her Majesty's Government
HQ, Headquarters
IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IC, Division of International Conferences, Department of State
ICA, International Cooperation Administration
ICA/W, International Cooperation Administration, Washington
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization
ICJ, International Court of Justice
IDAB, International Development Advisory Board
IDF, Israeli Defense Forces
IDF–FLO, Israel Defense Force–Foreign Liaison Office
I–E, Israeli–Egyptian
IEG, Imperial Ethiopian Government
IFC, International Finance Corporation
IG, Israeli Government
IIS, Israeli Intelligence Service
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INS, International News Service
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/OES, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
IO/OIA, Office of International Administration, Department of State
IPC, Iraq Petroleum Company
IRD, International Resources Division, Department of State
ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs or the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; also Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
ISMAC, Israeli–Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission
JCS, Joint Chief of Staff
Jlem, Jerusalem
JSPC, Joint Strategic Plans Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSSC, Joint Strategic Survey Committee
Jugs, Yugoslavs
JVP, Jordan Valley Plan; Jordan Valley Proposal
K, kilometer
kw, kilowatt
L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/E, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State

L/NEA, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
LE, Egyptian pounds
Leb, Lebanon
Lon, London
MA, Military Attaché
MAAC, Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC, Mixed Armistice Commission
MAG, Military Advisory Group
Mapai, Israeli Labor Party
Mapam, Israreli United Workers' Party
MATS, Military Air Transport Service
MC, Memorandum of Conversation; Office of Munitions Control, Department of State
MCM, Milliard Cubic Meters
MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
ME, Middle East
MEEC, Middle East Emergency Committee
MEPPG, Middle East Policy Planning Group
MinDef, Minister or Ministry of Defense
MinFonAff, Minister or Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MP, Member of Parliament (United Kingdom)
MSA, Mutual Security Agency/Act/Assistance
MSP, Mutual Security Program
MSTS, Military Sea Transport Service
mytel, my telegram
NAC, North Atlantic Council; National Advisory Council
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NE, Near East; Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
NEA, Near East and Africa; Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
NEACC, Near East Arms Coordinating Committee
NH, Note to Holders
Niact, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at *any hour of the day or night*
NIC, National Indications Center
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
Noforn, not releasable to foreign nationals
NSC, National Security Council
NUP, National Unionist Party of Sudan
NZ, New Zealand
O, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OFD, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
ONE, Office of National Estimates
ORM, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSP, Offshore Procurement
PAO, Public Affairs Officer
PCC, Palestine Conciliation Commission
PIO, Public Information Officer
PL, Public Law
PLG, Paris Liaison Group
PM, Prime Minister
PMCG (NY), preparations for the Meeting of the Chiefs of Government (New York)
POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the Office of the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council to the Department of State
POM (NY) MC, preparations for the October Meetings (of the Foreign Ministers) (New York) Memorandum of Conversation
PPS, Parti Populaire Syrien, Syrian National Party
PriMin, Prime Minister
PTS, proposed talks with the Soviets
R, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
R&D, Research and Development
RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
RAF, Royal Air Force

RCC, Revolutionary Command Council of Egypt
RCT, Regimental Combat Team
reftel, reference telegram
Res, Resolution
RGT, Army Regimental Combat Team
RLG, Rome Liaison Group
RMA, Reimbursable Military Assistance
RO, Reports and Operations Staff of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/PV, Security Council/Procès-Verbal
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-RO, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SA, Saudi Arabia
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SAG, Saudi Arabian Government
SC, United Nations Security Council
SCUA, Suez Canal Users Association
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEATO, South East Asia Treaty Organization
Sec, Secretary
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences
Secy, Secretary
SFIO, Sociéte Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (French Society of International Socialists)
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOCONY, Standard Oil Company of New York
SOSUS, Sound Surveillance Underwater System
SPC, Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly
SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party)
SS, submarine
SY, Division of Security, Department of State
SYG, Secretary-General
T/O & E, Table of Organization and Equipment
TAPLINE, Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company
TC, Truce Commission (in Palestine); United Nations Trusteeship Council
Tedul, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
Toden, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Denver White House
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences
TS, Top Secret
TSO, Truce Supervisory Organization (United Nations)
TVA, Tennessee Valley Authority
TWA, Trans World Airlines
U, Office of the Under Secretary of State
U/MSA, Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State
U/PR, Office of the Chief of Protocol, Department of State
UJA, United Jewish Appeal
UK, United Kingdom
UKG, United Kingdom Government
Umma, Umma (Independence) Party of Sudan
UN, United Nations
UNA, Office of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNMIS, United Nations Mission
UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State
UNRRA, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine and the Near East
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
UNSCOP, U.N. Special Committee on Palestine
UNTS, United Nations Truce Supervisor; United Nations Treaty Series
UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization

UNSYG, Secretary–General of the United Nations
UP, United Press
urtel, your telegram
USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USAREUR, United States Army, Europe
USARMA, United States Army Attaché
USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe
USDel, U.S. delegation
USG, United States Government
USGADel, United States Delegation at the United Nations
USIA, United States Infomation Agency
USIS, United States Information Service
USLO, United States Liaison Officer
USMC, United States Marine Corps
USNMR, United States National Military Representatiave to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
USOM, United States Operations Mission
USRO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations
Wafd, Egypt's principal political party
WE, Western Europe; Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
WFTU (WFTCU), World Federation of Trade Unions
WH, White House
ZI, Zone of Interior

List of Persons

Editor's Note: The identification of persons in this list is limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. Historical personages alluded to in the volume and certain minor officials are not identified in this list. All titles and positions are American unless there is an indication to the contrary.

In this and in other editorial material throughout the volume (document headings, footnotes, and editorial notes), every effort has been made to provide recognizable and consistent transliterations of names of individuals from countries using non-Roman alphabets. The transliterations adopted for proper names were those commonly used by the Department of State at the time, or in documents or official publications of the countries concerned. (In the case of Arabic names, differences arise in the transliteration of vowels. The editors have generally rendered the definite article as al- rather than el-, and have omitted diacritical marks.)

Aldrich, Winthrop W., Ambassador to the United Kingdom until February 1, 1957

Allen, George V., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, January 24, 1955–July 26, 1956; Ambassador to Greece, October 12, 1956–November 13, 1957; Director, United States Information Agency, from November 15, 1957

Alphand, Hervé, Permanent Representative of France at the United Nations until August 24, 1956; Ambassador to the United States from September 10, 1956

Amer, Gen. Abdel Hakim, Egyptian Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; Minister of War and Marine; Chief Commander of the Egyptian–Syrian Joint Command from October 23, 1956

Anderson, Dillon, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, April 2, 1955–September 1, 1956; White House Consultant from June 29, 1957

Anderson, Robert B., Deputy Secretary of Defense until August 4, 1955; Special Emissary for the President to the Middle East, January–March 1956, and again in August 1956; Secretary of the Treasury from July 29, 1957

Bailey, Ronald W., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States until October 25, 1957

Barbour, Walworth, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until November 20, 1955; Deputy Chief of Mission in the United Kingdom, November 20, 1955–February 23, 1956; thereafter Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Barco, James W., Senior Adviser on Political and Security Council Affairs at the Mission at the United Nations until June 16, 1955; thereafter Counselor of the Mission

Barnes, Robert G., Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, June 12–August 1, 1955; Director, August 1, 1955–March 11, 1956; thereafter Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs

Beale, Wilson T.M., Jr., Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, until July 3, 1955; Deputy Director, July 3, 1955–September 30, 1957; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Beeley, Harold, Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States until May 19, 1955; Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, May 19, 1955–June 1956; thereafter Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office

Ben Gurion, David, Israeli Minister of Defense from February 17, 1955; also Prime Minister from November 3, 1955

Bergus, Donald C., Officer in Charge of Israel–Jordan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Bernau, Phyllis D., Personal Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles

Black, Eugene R., President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Bohlen, Charles, Ambassador to the Soviet Union until April 18, 1957; Ambassador to the Philippines from June 4, 1957

Bowie, Robert R., Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until October 18, 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, August 10, 1955–October 18, 1957; Department of State member of the National Security Council Planning Board, August 28, 1955–October 18, 1957

Bulganin, Nikolai A., Soviet Minister of Defense until February 1955; Chairman, Council of Ministers, Presidium Member of the Soviet Communist Party, and Head of Government

Burdett, William C., Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo–Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until October 9, 1955; Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, October 9, 1955–October 7, 1956; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, October 7, 1956–August 11, 1957; Acting Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, August 11–November 3, 1957; thereafter First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Burgess, W. Randolph, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs until July 1957; Permanent Representative to NATO with personal rank of Ambassador from July 3, 1957

Burns, Maj. Gen. E.L.M., Canadian Army Officer; Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization until November 1956; Commander, United Nations Emergency Force, from November 1956

Burns, Robert L., Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State, from April 11, 1955

Butler, Richard A., British Chancellor of the Exchequer until December 1955; Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, December 1955–January 1957; thereafter Home Secretary

Butterworth, W. Walton, Minister of the Embassy in the United Kingdom until February 1, 1956; thereafter Representative with personal rank of Ambassador at the European Coal and Steel Community at Luxembourg

Byroade, Henry A., Ambassador to Egypt, March 10, 1955–September 10, 1956; Ambassador to the Union of South Africa from October 9, 1956

Cabell, Lt. Gen. C.P., USAF, Deputy Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Caccia, Sir Harold, Deputy Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office until November 1956; Ambassador to the United States from November 9, 1956

Chamoun, Camille, President of Lebanon

Cole, William Edward, Jr., Consul General at Jerusalem, July 28, 1954–August 1957; thereafter Counselor at the Embassy in the Sudan

Coulson, Sir John Eltringham, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, until October 1955; Minister of the British Embassy in the United States from October 27, 1955

Crosthwaite, Ponsonby Moore, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations Security Council; Alternate Representative at the General Assembly; Alternate Representative on the Disarmament Commission

Daridan, Jean Henri, Assistant Director General of Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry, until February 1956; Assistant Director of the Cabinet of the Minister, February–July 1956; Director General of Political and Economic Affairs from July 5, 1956

Dillon, C. Douglas, Ambassador to France until January 28, 1957; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from March 15, 1957

Dixon, Ben F., Acting Politico–Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until August 26, 1956

Dixon, Sir Pierson John, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations

Dorsey, Stephen P., Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until June 2, 1955; Acting Director, June 2–September 11, 1955; detailed to the International Cooperation Administration as Deputy Regional Director for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, September 11, 1955–August 12, 1956; thereafter International Cooperation Administration Counselor and Director of the United States Operations Mission in Lebanon

Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State

Eban, Abba, Israeli Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative at the United Nations

Eden, Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister until April 6, 1955; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, April 6, 1955–January 10, 1957

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States

Elbrick, C. Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until February 14, 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Faisal, ibn al-Aziz, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister

Faisal II, King of Iraq

Fawzi, Mahmoud, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs; Chairman of the Egyptian Delegation at the United Nations and Representative at the General Assembly

Flemming, Arthur S., Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, until February 1957

Foster, Andrew B., Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Gay, Merrill C., Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until March 11, 1956; thereafter Special Assistant, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs

George, Walter F., Democratic Senator from Georgia until January 3, 1957; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee until January 3, 1957; Special Ambassador to NATO, January 3–August 4, 1957; died August 4, 1957

Geren, Paul F., Counselor of the Embassy in Jordan until November 14, 1955; Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, November 15, 1955–summer 1956

Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J., USA, Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer to the President; became Brigadier General on January 1, 1957

Graves, Sir Hubert Ashton, Minister of the British Embassy in the United States, October 5, 1955–July 2, 1956; thereafter British Foreign Office

Gray, Gordon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 14, 1955–February 27, 1957; Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, from March 14, 1957

Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs until February 14, 1957; Ambassador to the United Kingdom until February 14, 1957; thereafter Minister of Foreign Affairs; Representative at the 12th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1957

Gruenther, Gen. Alfred M., USA, Supreme Allied Commander, NATO, until November 1956

Hammarskjöld, Dag, Secretary-General of the United Nations

Hanes, John W., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until April 1957; Staff Member, Secretary of State's Public Commission on Personnel, until 1956; Special Assistant to the U.S. Representative on the Suez Canal Conference at London (August 16–23, 1956); Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from April 8, 1957

Hare, Raymond A., Ambassador to Egypt from September 25, 1956

Hart, Parker T., Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until June 30, 1955; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Egypt

Heath, Donald R., Ambassador to Lebanon from March 9, 1955

Henderson, Loy W., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration from January 26, 1955

Herter, Christian A., Governor of Massachusetts until 1956; Consultant to the Secretary of State, January 14–February 21, 1957; thereafter Under Secretary of State

Herzog, Col. Chaim, former Israeli Military, Naval, and Air Attaché of the Embassy in the United States; Commanding Officer of the Jerusalem District

Hollister, John B., Consultant to the Secretary of State, May 2–July 1, 1955; Director of the International Cooperation Administration, July 1, 1955–September 15, 1957

Hood, Viscount Samuel, Head of the Western Organization Department, British Foreign Office, until September 4, 1956; Assistant Under Secretary of State, September 4, 1956–September 1957; thereafter Minister of the British Embassy in the United States

Hoover, Herbert, Jr., Under Secretary of State until February 21, 1957

Humphrey, George M., Secretary of the Treasury

Hussein, Ahmad, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States

Hussein ibn Talal, King of Jordan

Jernegan, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs until October 9, 1955

Johnson, Lyndon B., Democratic Senator from Texas; Senate Majority Leader from January 3, 1955

Johnston, Eric, Chairman of the International Development Advisory Board, Foreign Operations Administration (after 1956, International Cooperation Administration)

Jones, G. Lewis, Jr., Counselor of the Embassy in Egypt until June 27, 1955; Counselor of the Embassy in Iran, June 27–November 9, 1955; Minister–Counselor, November 9, 1955–July 27, 1956; Ambassador to Tunisia from October 4, 1956

Karame, Rashid, Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, September 19, 1955–March 15, 1956

Kirk, Roger, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until May 5, 1957; Second Secretary of the Embassy in Italy from June 16, 1957

Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone A., British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Lawson, Edward B., Ambassador to Israel

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., Permanent Representative at the United Nations

Ludlow, James M., Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, until November 4, 1956; thereafter Acting United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

MacArthur, Douglas II, Counselor of the Department of State until November 24, 1956; Ambassador to Japan from February 25, 1957

McCardle, Carl W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until March 1, 1957

Macmillan, Harold M., British Minister of Defense until April 6, 1955; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, April 6–December 20, 1955; Chancellor of the Exchequer, December 20, 1955–January 10, 1957; thereafter Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury

Macomber, William B., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, January 10–November 16, 1955; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, November 16, 1955–August 15, 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations

Makins, Sir Roger M., British Ambassador to the United States until November 15, 1956

Malik, Dr. Charles, Lebanese Ambassador to the United States until October 1955; Representative at the United Nations, 1956–1957; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Education from November 19, 1956

Mansfield, Mike, Democratic Senator from Montana; member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Senate Majority Whip from January 3, 1957

Meir, Golda, *See* Myerson, Golda

Menderes, Adnan, Prime Minister of Turkey

Merchant, Livingston T., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 7, 1956; Ambassador to Canada from May 23, 1956

Molotov, Vyacheslav M., Soviet Foreign Minister until June 1, 1956; Chairman of the Soviet Delegation at the United Nations and Representative at the General Assembly, 1955; First Vice Chairman, Council of Ministers, until July 5, 1957; Minister of State Control, November 21, 1956–July 4, 1957; Ambassador to Mongolia from August 1957

Moose, James S., Jr., Ambassador to Syria until June 30, 1957

Morris, Willie, First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States from August 1, 1955

Mossadeq, Mohammad, former Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Iran

Murphy, Robert D., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Myerson, Golda (Meir, Golda), Israeli Minister of Labor until June 1956; Foreign Minister from June 18, 1956

Nasser (Nasr, Nassir), Gamal Abdul, Egyptian Prime Minister; also President from June 24, 1956
Nehru, Jawaharlal, Indian Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs; Head of the Department of Atomic Energy
Nixon, Richard M., Vice President of the United States

Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, Shah of Iran
Persons, Maj. Gen. Wilton B. (Jerry), USA, Deputy Assistant to the President
Phleger, Herman, Legal Adviser of the Department of State until April 1, 1957
Pinay, Antoine, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 1955–January 1956
Prochnow, Herbert V., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, November 7, 1955–November 11, 1956

al-Quwatli (Quwaitli, Quwatly, Kuwatly), Shukri, President of Syria from August 18, 1955

Radford, Adm. Arthur W., USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 14, 1957
Riad, Gen. Mahmoud, Egyptian Army; Egyptian Ambassador to Syria
Richards, James P., Democratic Congressman from South Carolina until January 3, 1957; Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee, until January 3, 1957; Special Envoy of the President to the Middle East, March–May 1957
Robertson, Reuben B., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, August 5, 1955–April 25, 1957
Rockefeller, Nelson, Special Assistant to the President until December 31, 1955; Chairman, President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization; Vice President (representing the President) of the Operations Coordinating Board, 1955–1956
Rose, Michael, Head of the Levant Department, British Foreign Office, from January 17, 1955
Rountree, William M., Counselor of the Embassy in Iran with personal rank of Minister until October 9, 1955; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, October 9, 1955–July 26, 1956; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs
Russell, Francis H., Counselor of the Embassy in Israel until May 17, 1955; Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, May 17–September 25, 1955; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, September 25, 1955–October 7, 1956

Salim (Salem), Maj. Salaheddin Moustafa, Egyptian Minister of National Guidance and Sudan Affairs until 1955; Chief Editor of the newspaper *Al-Chaab* (The People) from 1955
Saud, ibn Abd al-Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia
Sharett, Moshe, Prime Minister of Israel until November 2, 1955; also Foreign Minister until June 16, 1956
Shaw, John F., Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, July 3, 1955–September 23, 1956; thereafter Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs
Shepilov, Dmitri T., Soviet Foreign Minister, June 1, 1956–February 15, 1957; Chairman of the Soviet Delegation at the United Nations, 1956
Shiloah, Reuven, Minister of the Israeli Embassy in the United States

Shuckburgh, Charles Arthur Evelyn, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, until June 25, 1956

Stassen, Harold E., Special Assistant to the President from March 22, 1955; Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission from August 2, 1955; Director of the Foreign Operations Administration and Chairman of the Foreign Operations Council, Foreign Operations Administration, until June 30, 1955; also member of the National Advisory Council of International Monetary and Financial Problems, 1955

Stevenson, Adlai, Democratic Candiate for President, 1952 and 1956

Trevelyan, Sir Humphrey, British Ambassador to Egypt from August 1955

Tyler, William R., Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until February 14, 1957; thereafter Director; also member of the Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly from September 9, 1957

Vallat, Francis A., Deputy Legal Adviser of the British Foreign Office and Alternate Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations

Wadsworth, George E., Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

Walmsley, Walter N., Counselor of the Embassy in the Soviet Union with personal rank of Minister until October 8, 1956; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Whisenand, Brig. Gen. James, USAF, Deputy Director of Plans, Offfice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Air Staff, Department of the Air Force, 1956–1957; Director from 1957

White, Gen. Thomas D., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force until June 1957; Chief of Staff from July 1, 1957

Whitman, Ann, Secretary to the President

Wiley, Alexander, Republican Senator from Wisconsin; member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Judiciary Commitee; ranking Republican member of those Committees

Wilkins, Fraser, Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, July 3, 1955–July 28, 1957; Counselor of the Embassy in Iran, July 28–September 16, 1957; thereafter Minister-Counselor

Wilson, Charles E., Secretary of Defense until October 8, 1957

Wilson, Evan M., First Secretary and Consul General of the Embassy in the United Kingdom until September 1957; Adviser of the U.S. Delgation to the Suez Canal Conference at London (August 16–23, 1956), and the Suez Canal Conference at London (September 19–21, 1956)

Wilson, James M., Jr., Chief, Foreign Military Rights Affairs, Office of Special International Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Zorlu, Fatin Rustu, Turkish Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative to NATO

Arab-Israeli Dispute

U.S. Efforts To Obtain a Settlement Between Egypt and Israel; the Beginnings of Operation Alpha, January 1–August 26, 1955 [1]

1. Editorial Note

On January 4 and 13, 1955, the United Nations Security Council continued its consideration of the case of the *Bat Galim*, an Israeli flag ship which had been seized by Egyptian authorities at the southern end of the Suez Canal on September 28, 1954. The Council had taken up the matter in October 1954 at Israel's request. For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, volume IX, Part 1, pages 1660–1741 *passim*.

On January 4, the Representative of Egypt informed the Security Council that his government had released the crew of the *Bat Galim* on January 1; that his government intended to release the ship and suggested that the vessel's cargo might be placed aboard a neutral vessel for shipment to Haifa; and that a subcommittee of the Egypt–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission should discuss arrangements for the ship's release.

The Representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Brazil, with the support of the Representatives of Belgium, Peru, and New Zealand, commended the dismissal of charges against the *Bat Galim*'s crew but disagreed with Egypt's interpretation of the provisions of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 to justify its refusal to allow free and unobstructed passage of Israel's ships through the Suez Canal. They maintained that Egypt's action was also contrary to the Security Council's resolution of September 1, 1951, which had called upon Egypt to terminate its restrictions on the passage of international shipping through the Suez Canal. (U.N. doc. S/2322) (The

[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 875 ff.

Constantinople Convention of October 29, 1988, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1887–1888*, volume 79, pages 18–22, and in *The Suez Canal Problem, July 26–September 22, 1956.* (Department of State publication 6392; Washington, 1956), pages 16–20.)

Discussion of the matter concluded on January 13, 1955, when the Security Council's President indicated that it was the consensus of the Council's members to regard the Council's resolution of September 1, 1951, as having continuing validity and effect. For the record of the two meetings on January 5 and 13, see U.N. documents S/PV 687 and S/PV 688.

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2. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State [1]

Baghdad, January 5, 1955—10:09 a.m.

408. Although Embassy pouching [2] its detailed observations on Department's CA–3378, November 22, [3] a brief telegraphic summary of our views on subject may be helpful.

We agree attempt at settlement Arab-Israeli problem needs again be undertaken and concur in specific objectives cited in reference instruction. We strongly urge, however, that concept of regional defense on one hand and of Arab-Israeli settlement on the other be kept apart with priority of emphasis assigned to former. While we recognize area of overlap exists, fact remains they are basically distinct problems, and deserve to be pursued separately even if concurrently. Any effort unnecessarily entangle them likely impede progress in forging regional defense.

We recommend, too, that Iraq no less so than Egypt be among states with which initial discussions on subject are to be begun. As leading contender with Egypt for hegemony in Arab community, any approach to one alone is likely be seized upon by other to push its

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1–555. Top Secret; Limited Distribution—Alpha. Received at 10:09 a.m. "Alpha" was the Department of State's code word for materials pertaining to a U.S.-British effort, initiated in November 1954, to develop proposals for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Concerning this effort, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IX, pp. 1683–1741 *passim.* Distribution of documents labeled "Alpha" was highly restricted; see *ibid*, pp. 1730–1731.

[2] In despatch 296 from Baghdad, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1–455)

[3] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 1695.

own case for leadership in Arab community. Conversely, realization of this possibility likely cause either state be reluctant participate in settlement talks unilaterally. If these two states are approached jointly, possibility exists of fusing any "Arab side" which does not really exist at present time but which appears to us be necessary prelude to possible utilization Trieste technique.

Various inducements cited in instructions all have value, but none by itself likely be compelling. We believe that cardinal point in any projected settlement will have to be willingness on part of US Government, no less so than UK, to give public undertaking to underwrite terms of settlement, employing unusual measures if necessary. US–UK cooperation in projected efforts seems desirable, but participation by any other state (including Turkey) had best be avoided in initial phases.

Gallman

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3. Letter From the Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office (Shuckburgh) to Francis H. Russell [1]

London, January 7, 1955.

MY DEAR RUSSELL: Thank you so much for your letter of December 21, [2] which I ought to have answered long ago. I have no doubt that you will have seen the various messages which have passed between the Foreign Office and our Embassy in Washington since then. You will know by now that I propose to turn up in Washington on January 20 bringing with me Mr. G.G. Arthur. [3] I hope this will enable me to have a talk with Mr. Johnston before he leaves Washington on the 23rd and to hear from him his estimate of

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Memos, etc. preceding actual meetings (Dated 11/15/54 thru 1/27/55). Top Secret.

On December 20, 1954, Secretary Dulles assigned Russell responsibility for reviewing Arab-Israeli issues, formulating proposals to facilitate the conclusion of a peace settlement in Palestine, and developing a concerted diplomatic strategy with his British Foreign Office counterpart, Charles Arthur Evelyn Shuckburgh. Russell officially remained Deputy Chief of Mission and Counselor of Embassy in Israel until May 17, 1955.

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 1733.

[3] Geoffrey George Arthur, British Foreign Service Officer in the Permanent Under-Secretary of State's Department in the British Foreign Office.

the prospects of his forthcoming tour in the Middle East. I hasten to assure you (in the light of a message which I received through the Embassy here)[4] that I have never thought we ought to delay Mr. Johnston's further efforts to reach an agreement on the Jordan Waters. When I wrote my paper for Sir Anthony Eden[5] I was not aware that Mr. Johnston was about to visit the Middle East again. There is no doubt that if he has a success over his business it will immensely facilitate our own wider task. If he does not achieve the results he hopes, then we may have to fall back on some procedure such as I suggested in my paper.

I suppose I should expect to remain in Washington for about a week or ten days? I hope to arrive with some rather more precise suggestions under the various headings in my paper. No doubt you will have many ideas too for me to look at. I will, of course, stay as long as it seems profitable for the sake of getting our ideas clear.

We must do our best about the secrecy side. I am quite sure it will be no good trying to pretend that we have not discussed the Israel/Arab dispute at all. The right line, I think, is to admit that this is naturally one of the topics which I shall be discussing with my opposite numbers in Washington but to deny absolutely that there is any "joint solution" being worked out between our two Governments.

Yours ever,

Evelyn Shuckburgh

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[4] For documentation regarding U.S. interest in the development of the water resources of the Near East and the negotiations of Ambassador Eric Johnston, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 1345 ff. Johnston was to resume his negotiations in January; see the memorandum of December 20, 1954, *ibid.*, pp. 1727–1730. Telegram 3456 to London, January 3, instructed the Embassy to discuss the Johnston mission with Shuckburgh, emphasizing that the Department considered that his efforts complemented the Alpha project and that it believed British support was essential to the plan's success. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1–355)

[5] Reference is to Shuckburgh's memorandum of December 16, 1954, to Eden. See *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 1719, footnote 1.

4. Despatch From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

No. 413 *Tel Aviv, January 7, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Arab-Israel Settlement

The following comments are submitted by the Embassy in pursuance of the Department's request transmitted in CA–3378 of November 22, 1954. [2]

A. General Observations

It has been the Embassy's observation, based on comments made by Israel leaders to Embassy officers over a period of some months, that the Israel Government itself believes that a rapprochement between Israel and Egypt is a prerequisite to a general Arab-Israel settlement. Prime Minister Sharett recently commented to an Embassy officer that "it may be taken as axiomatic that Egypt is the key to the problem". Defense Minister Lavon in a conversation with an Embassy officer at the beginning of November said that if Israel could reach an understanding with Egypt "things would rapidly fall into their proper position elsewhere". He added that Israel had no outstanding problems with Lebanon which was merely waiting for one of the stronger Arab states to set a precedent; Jordan was a mess but could be straightened out by the British if the Egyptian problem were solved; and Syria was so weak and divided internally that it really didn't constitute such a problem (to Israel) anyway.

Secondly, there is extreme skepticism among Israel Government leaders of the ability of the Nasir regime to survive and, therefore, of its ability or willingness to face up to domestic and Arab League pressures to the extent necessary to negotiate a settlement with Israel on terms acceptable to the latter.

Thirdly, the period of discussion envisaged by the Department, i.e. February–April 1955, is the time period when the Israelis will be entering vigorously into a campaign period leading up to the general elections scheduled for July of this year. It is quite possible that before the end of that period the coalition Government here will have been dissolved and a Government of a quasi-caretaker character established. It does not follow from this contingency that negotiations during that period would prove impossible. It is unlikely,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1–755. Top Secret; Alpha—Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lawson and White. Copies were sent to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, London, and Ankara.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 2.

however, that such a caretaker Government would be prepared to present to the Knesset an agreement unless its provisions could be successfully defended as having on balance specific advantages to Israel.

Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that from the standpoint of either country much progress could be made in the general atmosphere prevailing today. This would point to the need of a modus vivendi which would permit the establishment and maintenance of a period of relative calm while the United States and United Kingdom were discussing permanent settlement matters with the two parties individually. This observation would point to the conclusion that pending current issues between the two countries which are now occupying such prominence in the press of Egypt and Israel, such as the *Bat Galim* case, spy trials,[3] and recurrent destruction of the Israel pipeline near the Gaza strip, would have to be taken out of the limelight. In order to establish a period of calm it would appear necessary at the same time as an approach is made to Nasir to make an approach to Prime Minister Sharett, explaining to him on a confidential basis the purpose of the exercise, the ultimate objectives we have in mind, and the techniques we plan to use in attaining such goals. This discussion should be accompanied by a request for a commitment from him that Israel would pursue a course of action during the period of discussions designed to assist rather than to retard the course of negotiations. The limits of this course of action might include commitments (a) to permit the Suez Canal and Gulf of Akaba issues to remain dormant; (b) positive support to UNTSO in border matters; (c) restraint on military and police activities along the Gaza strip; and (d) the exercise of unusual restraint in the public statements of Israel leaders regarding Egypt. A comparable list of commitments on the Egyptian side would also appear to be necessary if real progress is to be made. In this connection, Prime Minister Sharett will be under considerable pressure from the more militant members of his Cabinet to show some measure of progress in lessening restrictions on the movement of Israel goods through Suez as a condition precedent to active negotiations. The *Bat Galim* case in its present status is a handicap to the obtention from Israel of a constructive approach to the problem of Israel-Egyptian relations.

Finally, the Embassy believes that the participation of the British Embassy here in any discussions with the Israel Government will serve a useful purpose. The position of the United Kingdom with

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[3] On December 11, 1954, Egypt's Supreme Military Tribunal began the trial of 13 persons charged with spying for Israel and attempting to incite insurrection in Egypt. The trial ended on January 5, 1955, but no verdict was announced at that time. Documentation relating to this case is in Department of State Central Files 774.00 and 784A.5274.

the local public and with the Israel Government has been greatly strengthened by the remarks of Foreign Secretary Eden in the House of Commons on November 2, 1954, particularly by his policy statement that the United Kingdom would continue to keep a balance in arms deliveries "as between Israel and the Arab States collectively". With respect to the question of French participation, the Department is aware of the special problem existing here. The solution suggested of keeping France generally informed but without her active participation would lead to unpredictable results as regards the use the French Mission here might make of the information at its disposal.

B. Specific Comments

[Here follow specific comments on the questions in the reference airgram.]

For the Ambassador:
Ivan B. White
Counselor of Embassy

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5. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, January 14, 1955.

SUBJECT

Military Aid to Egypt in Relationship to Alpha

Attached (Tab A) is the message to Nasser on military assistance approved by the Secretary which stated "Grant military assistance now depends on new Congressional appropriations which in turn will be influenced strongly by public and Congressional attitudes towards current Egyptian policies." [2] that a paper be prepared for

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 1. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution.

[2] Tab A, attached to the source text but not printed, was a draft message from Secretary Dulles to Prime Minister Nasser. John D. Jernegan initially sent a draft of this message to Dulles under cover of a memorandum dated December 31, 1954. In his memorandum, Jernegan recommended that Dulles approve this message for transmission to Prime Minister Nasser. For text of the memorandum, see *Foreign*

(Continued)

discussion with the that a paper be prepared for discussion with the Secretary on January 17 regarding the relationship of arms aid to Egypt upon Alpha. [3]

Whether we should use Egypt as the main instrument in the Alpha operation is still unresolved and must await the discussions with Shuckburgh. If it is decided to do so, it may be necessary to provide Nasser with arms assistance under arrangements which he can accept. Nasser strongly desires arms aid; arms are necessary to bolster the position of the RCC, particularly with the key Army group; there is little else which we can offer now which would be sufficiently attractive. Although Nasser might proceed with the first meetings with an Israel representative, he is unlikely to adopt a position permitting progress without some material advantage to Egypt. A détente with Israel offers few advantages to Egypt and many dangers to her present leadership. If Alpha is to have reasonable prospects of success, we must provide positive balancing factors. Some form of arms aid may be indispensable to an answer to this question. Arms assistance would probably also affect the degree of cooperation which Egypt will extend on the Afro-Asian Conference.

We suggest the following procedures:

(1) In return for Nasser's taking effective initiative in working toward settlement with Israel, offer to extend to Egypt credit (up to $20 million) under Section 106(b) of the MSA [4] for a term of 3 years to purchase military equipment; (2) If negotiations on the Israel question proceed favorably, offer Nasser a standard MDAP agreement and funds at least sufficient to cover the credit previously extended.

One objection to the course suggested is the reaction of Israel and her supporters in this country to what could be labeled a stratagem to avoid a standard MDAP agreement. The objection could be met by the answer that we have in effect, through our economic and other aid programs to Israel, extended credit to her to enable her to purchase military equipment; and that the action is being taken specifically as part of a program that contemplates an end to a state of war between Israel and Egypt. (The Israel Govern-

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(Continued)

Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 2322. Although Dulles authorized this course of action, no documentation has been found in Department of State files to indicate if the message was transmitted to Nasser.

[3] Presumably the memorandum printed here, together with the recommendations in Attachment B to the memorandum, *infra*, fulfilled Under Secretary Hoover's request.

Regarding the January 17 meeting, see footnotes 7 and 8, *infra*.

[4] Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, which became Public Law 665 on August 26, dealt with the sale of military equipment, materials, and services. For text of the act, see 68 Stat. (pt. 1) 832.

ment has always taken the position that peace between the Arab countries and Israel should precede arms to the Arabs.)

The Department of Defense has asked our consent to the release of the $20 million in military assistance funds tentatively allocated to Egypt to meet needs in Pakistan and Iran. We propose to agree to the release but also to warn Defense that political developments in the area may make it necessary to obtain funds for grant military assistance to Egypt before FY 1956 appropriations become available.

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6. Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs [1]

Washington, January 14, 1955.

SUGGESTED MAIN POINTS OF APPROACH TOWARD ISRAEL-ARAB SETTLEMENT

1. *Prospects*: While the basic obstacles to Israel-Arab peace still exist, there are a number of reasons for believing that special efforts to induce the parties to take steps toward a settlement of their major differences might bear fruit. These include: an improvement during the past two years in the attitude of important segments of the Arab world toward the West and particularly toward the United States; the promises of the Egyptian government to take steps toward a settlement with Israel following the completion of the Suez base negotiations; the intense concern of Israel over its security and its desire for a treaty arrangement with some major Western power; the Turko-Pakistan [2] and Turko-Iraq agreements; [3] and the comparative lull of the past few months.

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[1] Source: NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Memos, etc. preceding actual meetings (Dated 11/15/54 thru 1/27/55). Top Secret; Alpha. Russell forwarded the memorandum to Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Hoover on January 16 as an attachment to a memorandum which noted the paper "reflects discussions with, and has received the concurrences of, Mr. Hare, Mr. Jernegan. . . ." (*Ibid.*)

[2] On April 2, 1954, Turkey and Pakistan signed an Agreement for Friendly Cooperation, which among other points provided for consultation and cooperation on certain defense matters.

[3] On January 12, following discussions between Turkish and Iraqi officials in Baghdad, a joint communiqué was issued stating that Iraq would conclude a military alliance with Turkey which other Middle East states would be invited to join. Text of the communiqué is printed in Noble Frankland (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs, 1955* (London, Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 286–287.

2. *Immediate Context*: Regardless of the amount and variety of material inducements provided, they alone may prove insufficient to break the present stalemate without the addition of a psychological trigger. Psychological shocks have been applied to area problems in the past with success, for example, the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950,[4] and the military assistance agreement with Iraq of April 21, 1954.[5]

The announced intention of Iraq and Turkey to conclude a collective defense agreement against aggression from *inside* and outside the area could provide the necessary impetus. However, this development involves dangers and should be handled with delicacy. A worried Israel could react by aggressive moves on her borders. She will probably press with renewed insistance for some sort of security commitment or statement from the U.S. Egypt may resent the announcement which she will regard as a threat to her area leadership and as endangering the Arab League. At the same time the development may stimulate Egypt towards an agreement with Turkey during Menderes' visit in March. In brief, the Turko-Iraq agreement may serve as a catalyst for further developments in the direction of the Alpha objective.

3. *Basic Approach*: U.S. and U.K. should formulate the elements of a fair settlement. An effort should then be made through various channels, including direct talks where possible, to get the parties to work toward such a settlement or an agreed variation of it. This is suggested in lieu of relying upon direct talks exclusively, and in lieu of a strict following of the Trieste approach. Direct talks may be impossible in some instances and a solution in the present case will require substantial contributions of an economic, political and security nature by outside countries. It is contemplated that different types of approaches would be made with different countries.

4. *Principal Elements of Settlement:*

a. *Permanent recognized boundaries between Israel and neighboring countries after frontier rectifications.* The principal boundary provisions would be:

(1) Division of the demilitarized zones between Israel and Syria.

(2) Minor readjustments of the armistice lines between Israel and Jordan to give villages some of the lands formerly belonging to them so that they may be economically self-supporting. In return for this Israel would receive the Latrun

[4] For text of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886.

[5] For documentation regarding the negotiation of a military assistance agreement with Iraq on April 21, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 2, p. 2384. For texts of the notes exchanged between representatives of the United States and Iraq, see TIAS 3108; 5 UST (pt. 3) 2496.

salient and a portion of the demilitarized zone in this area, thus placing the old Jerusalem road wholly in Israel.

. . . . . .

b. *Security on the border and cooperation in control of infiltration.*

c. *Termination of Suez Canal restrictions and of the Arab secondary boycott,* recognizing that the primary boycott would be one of the last points of friction to disappear.

d. *Agreements on repatriation and resettlement of refugees.* This would be accomplished through: (a) agreement with respect to the Gaza strip refugees . . . ; (b) resettlement of refugees in the lower Jordan valley under the Jordan River Development Plan; (c) possible resettlement under other similar development plans; (d) turning UNRWA funds over to the governments of Arab states having refugees and placing the responsibility for the refugees upon them. (This would have to be done gradually and with safeguards.)

e. *Agreement on compensation of Arab refugees.* Israel has declared her willingness to pay compensation but is financially unable to do so without outside assistance. A neutral international body—possibly a "Palestine Refugee Compensation Commission"—could be set up to administer the compensation plan. Israel could issue debentures to the total present evaluation of Palestine refugee real property in Israel (estimated by the PCC at $300 million), the proceeds of which would be utilized to pay the compensation. Working capital in the form of non-interest loans could be provided to Israel by the U.S., U.K., France and other interested governments.

. . . . . .

g. *A free port at Haifa for Jordan and free route across Israel linking Egypt with Jordan.*

h. *Agreement on the Unified Development of the Jordan Valley.*

5. *Inducements and Psychological Factors in Security Cooperation.* The inducements and psychological factors which can be utilized in securing the cooperation of Israel and the various Arab states are summarized in attachments A through E.

6. *Order of approach to Arab countries:* Our first approach should be to Egypt, with the realization, however, that if Egypt is to take effective action it must be accompanied or closely followed by action on the part of Jordan. It would be hoped that Lebanon could follow as the third cooperating Arab country. Only after some progress had been made with these three countries would it be worthwhile to make any approach to Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The nature of such an approach would depend upon the circumstances existing at that time. The approach to Egypt should be in such terms that Egypt does not obtain a veto power over an alternative approach if one becomes necessary.

7. *Intra-Area Security*: Steps to create a sense of security on the part of Israel could be:

a. Early statement by Secretary Dulles similar to Sir Anthony Eden's concerning current validity of the Tripartite Declaration.[6] The Secretary's statement should follow the Tripartite Declaration more closely than Eden's did and should not refer to a "balance of arms".

b. If the British are prepared to do so, a treaty of mutual assistance between Britain and Israel. Israel is at present suffering from a severe feeling of isolation because of the various treaties and agreements between Arab nations and one or more of the great powers while Israel has no such ties (her policy until recently was to avoid such ties). It is unlikely that Israel can be counted upon to engage wholeheartedly in an effort toward area peace in the absence of a treaty with some outside power. The I.G. does not regard a unilateral undertaking by one or more outside powers, to which Israel is not a signatory, as adequate although they would undoubtedly welcome such a commitment if it were supplementary to a treaty arrangement. There appear to be greater objections to a treaty between Israel and the United States, France or Turkey than to one with Britain.[7]

c. If (b) proves impracticable, or if Britain makes a treaty with Israel but desires a supporting arrangement, an agreement in treaty form by the U.S., Britain, France and Turkey that if the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of Israel on the one hand or of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq on the other is threatened by any act of the other it would be considered that it constituted a danger to the security of the participating states. In such an eventuality the signatory states would take effective action both in and outside the United Nations in accordance with their respective constitutional processes to meet the common danger.

It will be noted that (a) above is a "holding operation". If (b) proves possible but Britain desires some kind of additional supporting agreement from the United States, but it does not appear possible for the U.S. to give the kind of commitment indicated in (c) above, it might be possible to devise some form of supplemental treaty which would take care of Britain's requirements.

As a further alternative to (b), the United States, the United Kingdom, and possibly France and Turkey might enter into an

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[6] For text of Eden's remarks, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 532, cols. 324–335. Further information is in Department of State, Central File 684A.86

[7] At a meeting on January 17, Dulles considered the proposals advanced in this memorandum and ordered that the Department officers involved in the forthcoming discussions with Shuckburgh "take care not to appear to propose that the United Kingdom enter into a treaty as suggested under 7b with Israel." The Secretary had no objection, however, if Russell and his colleagues asked if "the British Government might itself favor entering into such an arrangement." (Undated and unsigned typewritten memorandum; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Memos, etc. preceding actual meetings (Dated 11/15/54 thru 1/27/55))

arrangement with Israel for her defense against extra-area aggression along the lines of the Manila Pact. It is assumed in connection with this suggestion that the Western states would have already entered into this kind of association through a regional defense arrangement including at least one Arab state (Iraq). We might associate ourselves with the Turko-Iraq treaty with a proviso that we would be concerned under it only with external aggression. This type of arrangement would probably be somewhat less attractive to the Israel Government than (b) but with (c) it might meet their psychological needs. [8]

8. *Relation between Alpha and Area Security*: We should progress simultaneously toward the two major U.S. objectives in the area—area defense and Arab-Israel settlement—adjusting tactics so that progress toward one objective will assist, or at least not unduly impede, progress toward the other. It is assumed that the Northern Tier is our immediate approach to area defense but that we hope to expand the defense plans eventually to include the effective use of the armed forces and facilities of Israel, Egypt and the other Arab states.

9. *Arab League*: . . . our approach is not based upon utilizing the Arab League . . . . At the same time we should bear in mind the desirability of economic cooperation among the Arab states, and the eventual possibility of federation between two or more Arab states.

[Attachment] "A"

ISRAEL

Inducements and Psychological Factors in Securing Cooperation

1. Israel urgently desires assurances that would strengthen her security and position within the area militarily and politically. She would prefer these assurances in a formal treaty with a strong Western power, either the United States or the United Kingdom, although an alternative arrangement as set forth in paragraph 7 of the covering paper might be satisfactory. If the possibility of one of these arrangements should be decided upon, it should be proffered to Israel as a prize to be won through complete cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom in the negotiations for a general settlement.

[8] At the January 17 meeting, Dulles "inquired whether it might be helpful, if in this connection with paragraph 7c, U.S. in conjunction with the U.K., France, Turkey, Israel and the Arab states enter into a treaty commitment embodying the principles of the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950. . . . This treaty would be a formal one calling for ratification by the Senate." (*Ibid.*)

2. The plan for the unified development of the Jordan Valley, with all that it offers to Israel economically and in commencing a solution of the Arab refugee problem, should, at an appropriate time be linked into a general settlement. More specifically, U.S. willingness to provide funds for Israel's water development could be made contingent upon I.G. cooperation.

3. Israel would prize highly assurances from the United States that the economic future of the country is a matter of more than routine interest. We might express to Israel our continued willingness to cooperate with her in striving for economic viability without, however, committing ourselves to any specific level of continuing aid.

4. The point can be made to the Israel Government that there is little prospect of effective Israel-Western collaboration in the field of area defense until a general settlement has been achieved.

5. United States Jewry could, at an appropriate time, play an important role in influencing the I.G. to cooperate. Jewish donors to Israel will be interested in a program which holds promise of reducing the high annual level of their contributions to Israel as a result of peaceful conditions. Moreover, they would probably be responsive to the argument that Israel-Arab tensions, in the absence of a plan to which both sides must make concessions, will be an increasingly disturbing and troublesome obstacle to Free World security in the Middle East.

6. We can point out to the I.G. that the substance of our proposals is not at all unfavorable to Israel, nor, in many respects, much at variance with suggestions the Israelis themselves have made in the past. This is particularly true of our suggestions with respect to such problems as refugees, the Jordan River, the future status of Jerusalem, and Israel's frontiers, the Suez blockade and the secondary boycott.

7. While in its early stages Operation Alpha must be secret, there will come a time when it must be made public that the United States and the United Kingdom are exerting direct efforts to improve intra-area relationships. At that time a high level United States–United Kingdom statement of the immeasurable advantages of peace to all concerned might be voiced in a way to serve as a lever for moving the Israel public, and perhaps the Arabs, forward.

[Attachment] "B"

EGYPT

Inducements and Psychological Factors in Securing Cooperation

1. The settlement itself provides little attraction to Egypt. We are already committed to continue certain programs in Egypt regardless of her attitude towards Alpha. Specific returns which we now receive include: general support of Western position on world questions; assistance on the Johnston Mission; agreement to the UNRWA–Sinai project. [9] Because of the relatively limited supply of "carrots" available it will be necessary to space them out avoiding too heavy an expenditure during early stages of negotiations.

2. Egypt is primarily interested in military aid without any commitments, at least in the early stages. At the time of the initial negotiations we might agree to extend credit for the purchase of arms under Section 106(b) [10] (credit for 3 years to be paid back in dollars), possibly in the amount of $20 million. Depending on GOE performance during the negotiations, we could later offer a standard MDAP agreement which would cover the amount of credit extended plus an additional sum. Nasser's domestic position might permit signature immediately following the first substantial arrivals of U.S. equipment. Alternatively, if the Egyptian domestic situation made it imperative, we could provide grant aid under Section 401, [11] consequent to a special determination by the President. (In this connection, it may be noted that Israel's objections to arms aid to the Arab states have been based largely on the state of war existing between Israel and the Arab countries. If arms aid to an Arab country were offered in connection with a program for negotiations for peace and was to be in whole or in part conditional upon the success of the negotiations, a large part of the Israel case against the arms aid would fall.)

3. We could in any event consider a substantial increase in the number of positions allotted to Egyptian students in U.S. military

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[9] Reference is to an agreement between representatives of UNRWA and the Government of Egypt to search for practical development projects in the Sinai Peninsula as well as in the Gaza Strip to enable Palestinian refugees to become economically self-supporting.

[10] Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, which became Public Law 665 on August 26, dealt with the sale of military equipment, materials, and services. For text of the act, see 68 Stat. (pt.1) 832.

[11] Section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 authorized the President to extend special grant assistance to individuals or nations when he determined that such assistance would contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area or to the security of the United States.

schools and the assignment of high priority to Egyptian purchases of U.S. military equipment. A start could be made on the present order for 54,000 helmets which Defense informally estimates might be delivered within one month.

4. Special economic aid inducements in addition to current programs might include:

a. Committing the Executive, subject to Congressional appropriations, to allot a specific amount as grant assistance to the High Aswan Dam project as soon as engineering studies are sufficiently advanced to permit useful expenditure of the funds. The amount might be $20 million.

b. Depending on Egyptian performance during negotiations, committing the Executive to provide additional grant sums to assist in subsequent phases of the High Aswan Dam project. The amounts provided by the U.S. might be such as to cover the gap between Egypt's borrowing capacity as determined by the IBRD and the yearly cost of the project, possibly $20 million per year for five years.

c. Concentration of the Atomic Energy project for the Middle East in Egypt. This would include:

(1) Expanded assistance in establishment of the radioisotope laboratory now underway.

(2) Establishment of, and necessary training for, an atomic reactor.

d. Using U.S. food surpluses to assist Egypt. Wheat is the main requirement.

e. Assisting Egypt in marketing her cotton crop. This would include consideration of the U.S. cotton quota and special attention to the effect on Egyptian markets of disposals of U.S. cotton surpluses.

5. We should participate on a major scale in the international fair planned for January 1956 in Egypt.

6. We could consider steps which might be taken to support Egyptian area aspirations, such as using Egypt as a center for telecommunications, air, or other regional activity, bearing in mind that involved in this matter is Egyptian rivalry with Iraq and the desire of both for area leadership. A security arrangement by which Egypt would be accorded recognition similar to that now given Turkey and Pakistan could have a great effect in this respect.

[Attachment] "C"

JORDAN

Inducements and Psychological Factors in Securing Cooperation

1. The status quo in the Near East is not in Jordan's interest. Her economy can never be properly developed in the present situation. All Jordan's neighbor states contain elements which entertain notions as to Jordan's future which do not coincide with Jordan's interests. In the absence of a general settlement of the Palestine issue Jordan can only remain as a semi-isolated entity with an uncertain future dependent on external support. Whether Jordan decides that her future lies in continuing as an independent and fully sovereign entity or as a member of a voluntary federation with another Arab state or states, it is to her interest to strengthen herself. Should she wish to enter a federation it should be as an equal partner in fact as well as in name.

2. It could be pointed out to Jordan that she is bearing a heavier burden as a result of the Palestine hostilities than any other Arab state. In the day-to-day life of the area almost the full brunt of sporadic hostilities falls upon Jordan. It is Jordan's trade and communications with the outside world which has been the most thoroughly damaged. Jordan therefore has the most to gain from a resolution of the Palestine difficulties. It is time for Jordan to look to her own interests and to select a course of action which will benefit her the most. The United States and the United Kingdom could then cooperate with Jordan in persuading other Arab states of the necessity of Jordan's participating in a just and equitable settlement of the controversy. Past experience has shown that Jordan's leaving the initiative to the Arab League is a fruitless and dangerous course.

3. In the type of settlement which we have in mind Jordan will receive a great deal of what she has demanded. There will be provisions for territorial adjustments, repatriation of some refugees, rehabilitation of the rest, and arrangements for compensation. The United States would likewise be prepared to support Jordan in obtaining facilities through Israel for communications with other Arab states and the outside world. . . . Jordan is already aware of our active support of the proposition that the HKJ must have her full share of the waters of the entire Jordan–Yarmuk system.

4. The United Kingdom and the United States would express their continued willingness to cooperate with her in striving for economic viability without, however, committing themselves to any specific level of continuing aid.

5. We fully appreciate that any settlement at all, no matter how just and equitable, would arouse considerable opposition among certain extreme elements in Jordan's population and create a serious internal security situation. To this end we would be prepared to consult with the Jordanians on ways in which we can be of assistance in dealing with this problem during the transition period. We would also be prepared to speak to Israel in the strongest terms of the necessity for a tranquil border situation.

[Attachment] "D"

LEBANON

Inducements and Psychological Factors in Securing Cooperation

1. It will not be possible to induce Lebanon to consider moving toward a firm settlement with Israel unless either Egypt or Jordan has already done so. Indeed it is probable that Lebanon will not make a settlement unless both Egypt and Jordan have already done so. If Egypt and Jordan move toward a settlement, and the Government of Lebanon is aware that this is so, the following inducements would help to persuade the Lebanese to follow the Egyptian and Jordanian lead in undertaking a settlement. Each should be offered to the Lebanese conditional upon their actually following the Egyptians and Jordanians in undertaking a settlement. Irrespective of such positive action as Lebanon might take it is to be foreseen, on the basis of past experience, that the Lebanese would probably be disposed to exert constructive efforts behind the scenes, particularly in respect of Jordan.

2. The Lebanese are most anxious to receive military aid from the U.S., which they desire primarily for internal security and prestige reasons, and as a sign of the recognition by the U.S. of the importance of Lebanon. The cost to the U.S. would be perhaps $5 to $10 million.

3. The Lebanese would like to receive economic aid on a much larger scale than at present (in FY 1954 they received $6 million economic assistance; the figure for FY 1955 will be much smaller). The Lebanese would like us to finance a significant portion of the Litani River development project, and they would like large scale help for example, with their road program. An offer of some $10 million for these or similar purposes, over and above our "normal" technical assistance and economic aid, would be genuine inducement.

4. Like the other Arab states, Lebanon fears that Israel unless held in check may some day attempt to expand at Lebanon's

expense. The Lebanese fear that Israel some day may attempt by force of arms to establish control over the waters of the Litani River for the benefit of Israel. A Western security guarantee of Lebanon against the possibility of an attack by Israel would be most welcome. A quadripartite guarantee of Lebanon's borders against Israel aggression (and vice versa), as suggested in 7 (c) of the covering paper, conditional upon a Lebanon–Israel peace settlement, would thus constitute an effective inducement.

5. A basis fear of the dominant Christian element in Lebanon is that some day the country may lose its separate identity through absorption into the neighboring Moslem states, particularly Syria. At the time of the Tripartite Declaration, it was stated orally to one or more of the Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, that the Declaration would be interpreted by the United States as applying to an act of aggression by one of the Arab states against another, as well as to an act of aggression by Israel. A reaffirmation of this to Lebanon would be well received there. In taking such a position, however, we should make it clear that we are not against voluntary federation by two or more of the Arab states.

[Attachment] "E"

SYRIA

Inducements and Psychological Factors in Securing Cooperation

1. Syria, like Iraq and Saudi Arabia, will be far more hesitant than Egypt, Jordan or Lebanon to move toward a settlement with Israel. The mood in Syria at the present time is so negative, so violently anti-Israel, so anti-Western that it is inadvisable to approach Syria regarding a Palestine settlement at least until some time after the approaches to Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon have been made, and have produced results. Under these circumstances, however, Syria might consider moving toward a settlement. Syria has a common boundary with Israel, and certain territorial aims in the demilitarized zones and desires changes in the present armistice line which might be realized in part by a settlement with Israel. Syria has more reason to make a settlement than either Iraq or Saudi Arabia.

2. Under the changed circumstances, the most effective inducements for Syria would be the same as in the case of Lebanon: military aid sufficient to strengthen significantly the Syrian Army; economic aid (for such projects as roads, port development and irrigation work on the Euphrates); and a quadripartite guarantee of Syria against Israel aggression.

7. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, White House, Washington, January 17, 1955 [1]

OTHERS PRESENT

Mr. Eric Johnston, Colonel Goodpaster

Mr. Johnston indicated he was soon taking a group to the Near East in a further attempt to reach agreement on the Jordan Valley Project. [2] He expects to be gone until the end of February. [3] The three chief problems on which agreement has yet to be attained: the division of the water among the four states (Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan); Israel's proposal to divert its water out of the basin and into the Negev coastal plain; determination of the auspices under which the authority should function (U.S. preference is the U.N., World Bank, U.S. in that order, but Israel and the Arabs object to the U.N.).

He indicated that Syria gets relatively less out of the project than do the others, and special considerations may be required.

He indicated that he regards the chances of getting agreement as fairly good, and that if agreement is achieved, other advances, such as opening of borders to tourists and to trade may be anticipated.

Mr. Johnston indicated the possible desirability of providing atomic power plants for Syria and Israel.

[Here follow Ambassador Johnston's analysis of the New Orleans Conference on private investment for Latin America and his report concerning the construction of atomic power plants overseas.]

The President asked Mr. Johnston to convey his personal greetings to the top officials of the Near Eastern states during his coming visit there.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries. Drafted by Goodpaster.

[2] Ambassador Johnston and his party departed for the Near East on January 23 to resume negotiations between the Arab States and Israel for development of the Jordan River Valley.

[3] Ambassador Johnston returned on February 25.

8. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 21, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Unified Development of the Jordan Valley

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh, Undersecretary for Middle East Affairs, British Foreign Office
Mr. G.G. Arthur, British Foreign Office
Mr. Ronald Bailey, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Eric Johnston
NEA—Mr. Allen
NEA—Mr. Gardiner
FOA—Mr. George Barnes
FOA—Mr. Wayne Criddle
UNP—Mr. Ludlow
NE—Mr. Troxel
NE—Mr. Bergus

Messrs. Johnston, Allen and Gardiner outlined the points on which Mr. Johnston hoped to obtain agreement in the forthcoming round of negotiations among the riparian states of the Jordan watershed.

These points included:

1. *Share of waters*. The basis of division was the average annual flow of the waters of the Jordan system. Storage facilities were required in order to make maximum use of these waters. The engineers of the Baker–Harza firm who had thoroughly examined the situation in Jordan at the request of that Government had come to the conclusion that Jordan required 760 MCM annually to irrigate 513,000 dunums. [2] The Charles T. Main report had stated that

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Minutes [by U.K. & U.S.] of meetings, Jan. 21 thru Feb. 1. Confidential.

Shuckburgh, representatives of the British Embassy, and officers of the Department of State met, January 21–February 2, to discuss operation Alpha and to consider other subjects of mutual concern. Both delegations prepared summary minutes of these meetings. These documents, as well as other papers drafted in connection with these meetings, are *ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 1, and *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Memos, etc. during progress of meetings (Dated 1/24 thru 2/4), Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Memos, etc. preceding actual meetings (Dated 11/15/54 thru 1/27/55), and Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Minutes [by U.K. & U.S.] of meetings, Jan. 21 thru Feb. 1.

[2] On January 14, the Harza Engineering Company of Chicago, Illinois, and Michael Baker, Jr., Inc., of Rochester, Pennsylvania, acting on behalf of the Government of Jordan, published these conclusions in an "Interim Report: Yarmouk–Jordan Valley Project."

Jordan's requirements were 829 MCM annually.[3] The "Arab Plan" had called for over 900 MCM for Jordan.[4] The United States Government was convinced that the conclusions of Messrs. Baker and Harza were sound and based on the best available engineering technique and proposed to support them. The allocation to Syria was 132 MCM annually, and to Lebanon, 35 MCM annually. These figures had already received general acceptance from both Israel and the Arab riparian states, and no difficulty was anticipated on that score. This left 454 MCM annually for Israel. Of Israel's allocation, 150 MCM would be diverted out of the basin for irrigation on the coastal plain.

2. *Where to store the water*? The Baker–Harza report had rejected the Maqarin site on the Yarmuk. The report recommended the construction of a dam further down the river at Wadi Khalid. There were two alternative heights to that dam—40 or 60 meters. The lower dam would cost $11 million and store 47 MCM, the higher would cost $17.5 million and store 118 MCM. Twenty thousand kilowatts of electricity could be generated by facilities constructed at the higher dam. The remainder of the necessary storage would have to take place in Lake Tiberias, which was the only feasible site, and in which storage facilities could be constructed without undue cost.

3. *How to guarantee the enforcement of the division of waters*. There would have to be some form of international control of the division of the waters. This had been a difficult point in the negotiations. The Israelis were most sensitive over their sovereignty and did not like the idea of an international agency exercising control over installations in Israel territory. The Arabs were distrustful lest at certain times of the year, Israel could defy an international water master and not be brought to terms until crops on Arab lands had been ruined. It was mentioned that the final plan provided some means of retaliation by the Arabs. Furthermore, the storage on the Yarmuk could be used as a reserve for this contingency.

4. *Extra-basin use by Israel*. The U.S. position was that once the allocations to the riparian states had been agreed upon, any of the sovereign states concerned could use the allocated water anywhere it desired in its territories. This meant that Israel could proceed with the construction of the diversion works at Jisr Banat Ya'aqub.[5] The

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[3] In 1953, at the request of the United Nations, Charles T. Main, Inc., of Boston, Massachusetts, presented its conclusions in a report entitled *The Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley*.

[4] Reference is to the Arab League's *The Arab Plan for Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley* (Cairo, 1954).

[5] On September 2, 1953, Israel began construction of a canal to divert the waters of the Jordan River at Jisr Banat Yaqub in the demilitarized zone dividing Israel and Syria. Work was suspended after 3 weeks due to Syrian objections. The matter was taken to the U.N. Security Council in October 1953. For documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 1303 ff.

Arabs did not like this, and we were not sure of the outcome of negotiations on this point, but we had cautious grounds for optimism. The resolution of this point would mean the removal from the agenda of the Security Council of a very troublesome item.

. . . . . .

There was a brief discussion of the problem of making the benefits of the development in Jordan available to refugees. Mr. Johnston pointed out that this was outside his own frame of reference and that the plan was that UNRWA should finance the works in Jordan under arrangements whereby significant benefits to refugees would emerge. He was meeting Mr. Labouisse, UNRWA's Director, in Athens to discuss this particular aspect of the matter. [6] It appeared that only about 12% of the land to be irrigated in Jordan belonged to the State and that there were between four and five thousand landowners owning the remainder. Some of the private tracts were reasonably large. It was doubtful whether Jordan would be in a position to undertake a full-fledged land reform aimed at establishing family-sized farms all over the Valley. We would probably have to be content with something less than that.

Mr. Shuckburgh expressed his appreciation for the very thorough résumé of the position which had been given him. He undertook to relay this information to the Foreign Office and to British diplomatic missions in the field. The latter would be alerted to the forthcoming arrival of Mr. Johnston and instructed to give his mission general help. If the U.S. wanted further assistance on specific matters at appropriate times and places, it should ask the British Government for such help.

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[6] Ambassador Johnston and his party met with Labouisse and his associates in Athens on January 25. Summary minutes of this meeting are in Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, Johnston Mission Minutes of Meetings.

9. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 27, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

Report on Discussion with the British on Alpha

PARTICIPANTS

United Kingdom:	*United States:*
Mr. Scott	Mr. Hoover
Mr. Shuckburgh	Mr. Russell
	Mr. Hare
	Mr. Jernegan
	Mr. Burdett

Mr. Russell presented a summary of the discussions with Mr. Shuckburgh on operation Alpha, making the following points:

1. Despite the difficulties involved, it is worth making the effort. It is impossible to assess accurately ahead of time all the factors, particularly the psychological ones, which may bear on the final result. We should go ahead and be in a position to take advantage of every favorable development.

2. The first approach should be made to Egypt. Among the inducements which may be extended are:

a. Help to the RCC to stay in power.
b. Support for Egypt as a focal point of power in the Middle East to enable her to play her rightful role in the area and in the world.
c. Military aid in the context of a peace settlement.
d. Assistance towards the High Aswan Dam.

(Mr. Hoover inquired whether Egypt would be approached as the leader of the Arab states, observing that the Arabs now seem to be quarreling among themselves. Mr. Russell replied that the appeal would be to Egyptian nationalism rather than to Egypt as an Arab leader.)

3. A security guarantee is essential. A treaty by the US and the UK, and possibly Turkey and France, is envisaged with Israel and a separate one with Egypt. Other Arab states could adhere to the Egyptian treaty or separate treaties could be concluded with each. The treaty would refer to the various provisions of the settlement but could be invoked only in case of a real attack by the Arabs or Israel on the other. All the provisions of the settlement would not be

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Memos, etc. during progress of meetings (Dated 1/24 thru 2/4). Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Burdett on January 28.

guaranteed and the guarantors would not be expected to act in case of minor frontier incidents or even raids on the scale of Qibya.[2]

(Mr. Hoover inquired whether a new agency was contemplated to settle disputes between the two parties. Mr. Russell replied that the UNTSO would continue to perform this function. He added that staff talks might be held with the two parties regarding the implementation of the security guarantees.)

4. Territorial changes symbolic of a retreat by Israel are necessary. However, careful examination of the problem reveals no practical opportunities for large cessions of territory. The following might be considered: Lebanon—no change; Syria—minor adjustments along the lines of previous Syrian-Israel discussions under UNTSO auspices. If the Johnston Mission succeeds, the changes would have to be within the framework of the Unified Plan. Jordan—a series of frontier modifications to unite Arab villages with their lands now in Israel hands. The bulk of the Latrun demilitarized area would go to Jordan, but the old Jerusalem road would be given to Israel. Jerusalem—no change except for a division of the No Man's Lands . . . . The Negev—Egypt has demanded that Israel cede a portion of the Negev to unite her with Jordan. Arrangements could be made whereby Egypt would receive a small wedge of territory in the Negev a few miles north of Elath. This wedge would come to a point on the Jordan border and would not cut the Israel road to Elath. Both Israel and Arab traffic would be permitted to cross the junction point, perhaps by means of a bridge and underpass. A track across the Sinai Desert could be developed to provide communication from Egypt to Jordan.

(Mr. Hoover mentioned that it might be important to provide also for oil pipelines to cross.)

5. The Arabs would be expected to terminate the secondary boycott of Israel, but would not be pressed to trade directly with Israel. Egypt would be asked to remove restrictions on Suez Canal traffic.

6. France and Turkey would not be informed of the plan at an early stage. Whether they should be parties to the treaty guaranteeing security would depend on the views of the Arabs. Israel would certainly like at least Turkey to participate.

Mr. Russell concluded that the above points will form the basis for further study and that working parties would be established to consider details.

Mr. Shuckburgh explained that the basic difficulty would be to persuade the Arabs that it is worth their while to make peace. It

[2] For documentation on the Qibya incident of October 17, 1953, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 1361 ff.

would be necessary to overcome psychological inhibitions. Territorial adjustments, repatriation of refugees and compensation would all help. The question of territory was particularly difficult. Mr. Shuckburgh felt there might be a divergence here between the US and the UK views. He thought that Israel should cede all the territory east of Lake Tiberias and of the Jordan River. He concluded that all things considered, there was barely enough in the plan for the Arabs to make it worth-while going ahead.

Mr. Hare observed that one set of "gimmicks" was needed to appeal to Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. These might include the territorial changes, refugee repatriation and compensation. These items would not appeal to Egypt for whom a different set of "gimmicks" would be required, which might consist of economic and military aid.

Mr. Shuckburgh pointed out that the settlement provided more for Israel than for the Arabs and listed among her benefits the security guarantee, . . . improved trading opportunities and peace. To obtain this he felt that Israel must make some sacrifices.

Mr. Hare stated that instead of saying that Israel wants peace it might be more accurate to state that she wants arrangements which will permit a consolidation of her position. The Arabs are not ready to accord this.

Mr. Shuckburgh explained that it was planned to see first whether Nasser[3] is ready to play. Then, the plan would be explained in detail to Israel. If the negotiations break down as a result of her intransigence, the interests of the US and the UK in the Middle East require that responsibility should rest on Israel. Mr. Russell observed that when Mr. Eden stops in Cairo about February 20 he might in his talks with Nasser help create an appropriate atmosphere but would not reveal the plans as such. After Ambassador Byroade[4] arrived he would require a few weeks to establish his position before broaching the question of Israel to Nasser. Mr. Russell stated that it was planned to resume the talks with the UK in London about February 21 and that the approach might be made in mid-March or the first of April.

In assessing the possibilities of success, Mr. Hare explained that the present impasse was the result of all the forces and imagination which have been applied to the problem in the past. It was necessary to see if some new element was now present. The indications of

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[3] On January 17, the Department instructed the Embassy in Cairo that henceforth it was to spell the Egyptian Prime Minister's name "Nasser" instead of "Nasir". (Telegram 1113 to Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 774.13/1–1755)

[4] Byroade remained Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs until January 25, one day after being appointed Ambassador to Egypt.

receptivity on the part of Egypt, the greater readiness in certain quarters of the Arab world to take a broader view of the matter and the relatively favorable reception given Eric Johnston, might constitute such new factors. In addition, something was needed to crack the problem open. Perhaps, this impact had been supplied by the Turk-Iraq announcement. Also, the US and the UK were now prepared to go further than in the past by guaranteeing the settlement and by directing their assistance programs specifically towards an agreement. Even considering all these possibly favorable factors he was not overly encouraged over the prospects. He felt that the chances were only moderate. Mr. Shuckburgh stated that it was best not to do anything until after Mr. Johnston's return. If he came close to obtaining an agreement it might be better not to disturb the situation by the present project. Mr. Russell suggested, however, it might be useful to take advantage of the momentum gained.

Mr. Russell agreed with Mr. Shuckburgh's observation that it would be very dangerous if the Western Powers came up with something at which Israel leaped and which the Arabs regarded as another sell-out. Mr. Jernegan also stated that this was the big danger in the undertaking. Mr. Russell thought it might be wise to go a little further with Nasser in the first discussions with him than had originally been planned before broaching the plan to Israel. Mr. Hare expressed the opinion that it was advisable to work gradually and not put forward the whole package at once on a take it or leave it basis. Mr. Shuckburgh stated that many of the elements are interdependent. For example, Egypt would not want to lift the Suez Canal restrictions unless she received some benefit elsewhere. In addition, once an offer was made by the Western Powers it would be difficult to take it back.

Mr. Hoover stated that in view of Israel's strong desire for a security undertaking it would be difficult to withdraw the offer once it were made. He wondered if some one other than the US or the UK could explore the problem with Israel.

Mr. Russell listed Israel's desires as: Direct talks with the Arabs; a security pact with a Western Power; participation in regional defense and no arms shipments to the Arabs. He stressed that Israel did not want others to work out a peace plan.

Mr. Hare stated that Egypt was the key to the project in that it was the largest Arab country and therefore could move more independently and could be appealed to with items not directly a part of the Palestine settlement. Mr. Shuckburgh recalled that Mr. Sharett had always had the idea of approaching the weakest Arab state first, i.e., Jordan. In reply to a question he added that the UK felt there

was a good chance that Jordan might be the second Arab state to reach a settlement.

. . . . . .

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10. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 27, 1955, 4:05 p.m. [1]

SUBJECT

Operation Alpha

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. C.A.E. Shuckburgh, CMG
The Secretary
Under Secretary Hoover
Mr. John D. Jernegan
Mr. Francis H. Russell
Mr. Raymond A. Hare
Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. Parker T. Hart

Mr. Shuckburgh expressed appreciation of this opportunity to make a joint progress report to the Secretary regarding the conversations which he and his associates had been holding with officers of the Department regarding the prospects of Arab-Israel peace. All had reached the general conclusion that it was worthwhile to proceed with the "package" idea, to be tried out separately on the two parties to the dispute. One of these parties, Israel, desired a settlement while the Arab side showed little desire for a settlement. It therefore followed that incentives were needed on the Arab side. These must include some sacrifices by Israel as well as supplementary inducements furnished by the United States and the United Kingdom. Among the Arab states, Egypt appeared to be the most likely prospect for a move toward settlement. We were therefore primarily concerned with the question of the attractions which a settlement might have, or be made to have for Egypt. These attractions appeared to fall into two categories.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955; Memos, etc. preceding actual meetings (Dated 11/15/54 thru 1/27/55). Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Hart between January 29 and February 1. According to Secretary Dulles' appointment book, this conversation concluded at 5:13 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

The *first category* consisted of the following elements:

(1) Territorial adjustments in favor of the Arabs.
(2) Some repatriation of refugees.
(3) Compensation to refugees not repatriated.

The *second category* consisted of a necessary US–UK guarantee of whatever settlement might finally be reached.

The most important specific attraction to Egyptians seemed to be an offer by the US and the UK to increase Egypt's influence in the Middle East via military and economic aid. It was thought that the recent move by Iraq toward a treaty with Turkey might assist in spurring Egypt in the desired direction.

Special factors in our efforts toward a settlement must relate to the refugee problem: (1) the Johnston Mission with its prospects for large refugee resettlement in the Jordan Valley; (2) repatriation of some refugees to Israel; and (3) the development of labor-absorbing programs in those Arab states harboring refugees, in order to draw refugees from the camps and make them self-sustaining. . . . an increase in Israel's territory would require that Israel compensate by releasing other territory; for example, a wedge of land to Egypt above Elath to create overland communication between Egypt and Jordan. (At this "pinpoint" contact Israel and Jordan traffic would cross under some form of international supervision); territorial concessions by Israel to Jordan, including adjustments to reunite Jordan villages with their lands to the extent possible without excessively narrowing the "waist" of Israel . . . .

The Secretary asked what was planned for Jerusalem. Mr. Shuckburgh replied that it was expected . . . to push for a decision on the Holy places along the lines of the Swedish resolution; [2] to maximize the presence of international authorities in Jerusalem at Government House; . . .

Mr. Russell indicated that a plan for US–UK guarantee of borders was being worked on by the Legal Adviser's office of the Department. [3]

The Secretary asked what the views of the group were regarding procedure and timing. Mr. Russell replied that it was planned to hold the next meeting in London, perhaps in late February. Mr. Eric Johnston would return to the United States in late February. Ambassador Byroade might be able to make his first approach to Prime

[2] For information concerning the Swedish draft resolution dated December 5, 1950, on the Jerusalem question (U.N. doc. A/AC.38/L.63) which was submitted to the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly, see the editorial note and footnote 3, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1071 and 1074.

[3] Documentation concerning the preparation of a joint plan to guarantee borders is in Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha Treaty: Successive drafts of Legal Aspects—Forms and Guarantees.

Minister Nasser by mid or late March allowing necessary time to establish himself and develop contacts following his arrival in Egypt toward the end of February. He remarked that Ambassador Byroade did not wish to make the first subject of business with Nasser the problem of settlement between the Arab states and Israel. Sir Anthony Eden would be going to Bangkok via Cairo in late February.

The Secretary inquired how the group expected to keep Jewish leaders in this country quiet during this period of preparation. Mr. Russell replied that it was thought that the Secretary himself might inform the Israelis that Israel's security would be taken care of in any measures we might adopt in the area and that in addition he might at a press conference give some reassurances along the lines of Eden's statement to the House of Commons or alternatively merely indicate that he was working on the problem. It was also thought during his visit to Cairo Sir Anthony might tell Nasser personally that the West desired to make Egypt become a greater focus of strength. All had agreed that the first real approach to Operation Alpha would be made by Byroade to Nasser. The fact that Nasser was approached first would serve two purposes: It might be flattering and it would in any case indicate the possibilities of progress from thereon. Israel would not be approached first. . . . However, if Israel were approached in second place and she reacted badly, the onus of failure would be on Israel. . . . Israel is the petitioning power. The Secretary rejoined that this was not clear to him. Mr. Russell further explained that certain factors in the plan would be unattractive to Israel. . . . However, Israel would not wish to appear to be the party who wrecked the project. . . .

The Secretary remarked that this procedure seemed complicated. After Egypt and Israel, what came next? Mr. Russell replied that Jordan would then be approached since she had "built in" inducements to make a settlement. Lebanon would come in third place among the Arabs. Mr. Shuckburgh remarked that it would be necessary to consult Nasser on all subsequent approaches to Arab countries if he reacted favorably to the plan.

The Secretary remarked that it was desirable to have alternatives in the case of an early rejection in order to convince Egypt that the US and the UK meant business and that the present situation would not be allowed to continue. The Arabs must be made to comprehend the continued power of American Jewry and the fact that if Arab attitudes continued to be unreasonable the balance of focus may shift from their side. Mr. Shuckburgh remarked that pressures on Israel would be indispensable yet difficult to apply. The Arabs were in a favorable position. They could sit by and if, after Israel made concessions, they rejected these we might be at an impasse. The

Secretary rejoined that Nasser should not be allowed to feel that he can say *no* and that matters would then stand until he was ready to say *yes*. The United States Government rode out the recent Congressional elections at a sacrifice. Whether it could ride out a Presidential election is uncertain. After 1955 the Arab-Israel problem would be in US domestic politics and if the Republicans failed to offer measures acceptable to American Jewry the Democrats would surely promise them. The Administration had succeeded in deflating Israel in order to make a reasonable settlement possible. As a result the Israeli position was now weaker than it ever had been, but by 1956 it was likely to gain new strength. The Arabs should be reminded of this and shown that now was the best time for them to negotiate from a position of strength unless they were prepared to see Israel once again undertake faits accomplis at their expense. The US was now in a position to put pressures on Israel. If Israel rejected a reasonable proposal, it would jeopardize public and private aid to Israel from the United States, for American Jewry was not disposed to throw its money away recklessly on a bad venture. The Secretary had been given to understand that the Banat Yaqub affair had had a bad effect on Israel's bond sales in the US. To both sides there should be an immense attraction to make a settlement now with the indispensable Anglo-American guarantee to that settlement. That guarantee was necessary since there was genuine fear on both sides. How far the US could go in such a guarantee was a serious question. The Secretary felt that the Senate would probably go pretty far despite the fact that it was not America's practice to guarantee the territories of other countries, because of American domestic considerations pertaining to Israel. Mr. Russell asked whether the extent of Congressional willingness to back a guarantee should be verified in advance of the first approaches on Operation Alpha. The Secretary advised against approaching any groups in Congress or Defense at the present time.

Mr. Shuckburgh inquired whether if Israel should complain of parts of the "package" the US and the UK would stand firmly behind the "package". In order to clarify this question, the Secretary asked whether it was intended to obtain Nasser's general concurrence to the plan and then discuss the specific elements of the "package" with Israel. Mr. Shuckburgh replied in the affirmative.

The Secretary suggested that Sir Anthony Eden might during his visit to Cairo discuss with Nasser the general situation in the United States as he had just outlined it to Mr. Shuckburgh pointing out the wisdom of making a move now toward a settlement with Israel. The Secretary felt that the real issue with Nasser would be whether Egypt could live with any concept of peace with Israel. Mr. Shuckburgh responded that current plans did not include a formal peace

treaty but rather a settlement. The Secretary inquired how it was possible to make a Western guarantee without a peace treaty. Mr. Russell pointed out that the parties would be agreeing to final boundaries and that that the US and UK would guarantee only those final boundary lines. There would be a settlement of other issues which we would not guarantee, such as refugee repatriation, resettlement, compensation of refugees, elimination of the secondary boycott against Israel and of the Suez blockade. The Secretary felt that the absence of peace would make very difficult the obtaining of a guarantee from the United States. For example, what would be done about extraditing nationals of one side found in the territory of the other. Would they be treated as alien enemies? Mr. Russell replied that this point had not yet been faced. Mr. Shuckburgh stated that it would be necessary to put an end to the present state of war and particularly to end the Suez blockade. The Secretary inquired whether Mr. Shuckburgh was confident that there was no use in trying for a formal peace. Mr. Shuckburgh replied in the affirmative and gave his view that the chances were only 51 to 49 in favor of achieving a settlement short of formal peace. The Secretary concluded that Operation Alpha was worth undertaking but again pointed out that the US Government would have trouble on the guarantee provisions unless it could be said that peace had been achieved between the parties. Mr. Russell pointed out that Ambassador Eban and Prime Minister Sharrett of Israel desired a guarantee *before* peace in order to be able to negotiate from secure strength with the Arabs.

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11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, January 28, 1955—2:29 p.m.

426. Eban called on Deputy Under Secretary January 27 re death sentences (Jerusalem's 175). [2] Was told Dept would review matter. [3]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/1–2755. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Burns and approved by Jernegan who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Cairo.

[2] On January 27, Egypt's Supreme Military Tribunal made public its sentences in the case referred to in footnote 3, Document 4. Two of the defendants were tried in absentia and one committed suicide during the trial; of the remaining 10, 2 were sentenced to death, 2 were acquitted, and 6 were sentenced to hard labor for terms varying from 2 years to life. Telegram 175 from Jerusalem, January 27, reported that Sharett told White that Ambassador Eban had been instructed to appeal to President

Same evening Dept officer phoned Eban US making another effort with Egyptians.[4] Prominent American Jewish leader also advised (American Jewry had approached White House on matter).[5]

As yet no publicity here re clemency appeals to White House or Dept, neither of which intend volunteer public statement. If asked comment however will state everything which could appropriately be done re sentences has been done.

Dulles

Eisenhower for his assistance in urging Nasser to moderate the sentences and that he had asked Ambassador Johnston for his help in obtaining the President's assistance. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/1–2755)

[3] No record of Eban's conversation on January 27 with Murphy has been found in Department of State files.

[4] For text of the message sent to Cairo, see *infra*.

[5] No record of such conversations has been found in Department of State files.

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12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, January 27, 1955—9:06 p.m.

1196. Reurtel 1040.[2] Please urgently deliver following confidential message to Fawzi personally:

"As the Government of Egypt well knows, the President and the Secretary of State have been giving careful study to ways and means of lessening the tensions that have unfortunately existed in the Middle East, and they feel that some constructive progress has been made. The Secretary is much disturbed lest the execution just now of the prisoners recently convicted might seriously affect these efforts. The Secretary therefore has asked me to convey informally to you his hope that the Government of Egypt might find it possible commute the sentences of the two condemned.

This hope is expressed without any thought of questioning the procedure or verdict of the court or of intervening in the internal affairs of Egypt. It is intended solely to recall an international aspect

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5274/1–2755. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Jernegan; cleared by Murphy and Hoover; approved by Jernegan, who signed for Dulles.

[2] Dated January 27, not printed. (*Ibid.*)

of the matter which the Secretary is sure is a matter of concern to you as well as to him." [3]

Dulles

[3] Telegram 1052 from Cairo, January 28, reported that Jones delivered the message as instructed. It quoted Fawzi as saying that he would "personally, informally, and urgently" put the Secretary's message before the head of state and members of the Egyptian Government but that he did not like "to arouse any unwarranted hopes". (*Ibid.*, 784A.5274/1–2855) Telegram 1070 from Cairo, January 31, reported that the executions had taken place that morning. (*Ibid.*, 784A.5274/1-3155)

13. Memorandum From Francis H. Russell to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, February 2, 1955.

SUBJECT

Discussions with Shuckburgh

Attached is the final summary of points of agreement reached on an ad referendum basis in the discussions with Mr. Shuckburgh during the past ten days. I would like to obtain your comments and to discuss projected next steps with you when you have a few minutes. [2]

It is presently planned to resume the discussions in London around the last week in February.

F.H.R.

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 1. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Russell also transmitted copies of the attachment under cover of separate memoranda on February 2 to Murphy, MacArthur, Allen, and Byroade. (*Ibid.*: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Memos, etc. during progress of meetings (Dated 1/24 thru 2/4))

[2] No record of such a discussion has been found in Department of State files.

[Attachment]

POINTS OF AGREEMENT IN DISCUSSION ON ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT

I. General

1. The present is as favorable a time as is likely to arise in the foreseeable future for an attempt to achieve a settlement of the dispute between the Arab states and Israel.

2. An attempt at a general settlement will allow us to present a balanced set of proposals which might permit us to dispose of some problems, such as boundaries which are resistant to solution in isolation.

3. An effort to reach a general settlement should therefore be made soon; but this should not interfere with attempts being made to solve the problems of Jordan Valley development.

4. The method which offers the best chance of success and involves the least risk is that the United States and United Kingdom Governments should work out the general terms of a reasonable settlement and then by separate discussion with the parties concerned, and if possible through direct talks between them, attempt to get them to agree to the settlement or to an agreed variation of it.

II. Method and Timing of the Approach to the Parties

1. The first approach should be made to Nasser by Sir Anthony Eden on his way through Cairo. It would be left to Eden's discretion to determine how fully he would develop the subject. If Nasser's reaction warrants, he could give him a general idea of U.S.–U.K. thinking, but not reveal the existence of a plan. Eden would endeavor to ascertain what steps Nasser is willing to take, what role he is willing to play with respect to the other Arab states and how Nasser believes the U.S. and U.K. should approach the other Arab states. Eden would emphasize the confidential nature of his discussions.

2. The exact nature of the next step would depend upon the results achieved under 1. It will probably be necessary to follow up the Eden–Nasser conversations by developing further the substance of the proposals. If Nasser indicates a desire to proceed immediately, an officer could be sent from the State Department for this purpose. Otherwise the discussions could be carried on by Ambassador Byroade. In view of Mr. Eden's first approach Ambassador Byroade could raise the matter shortly after his arrival. (Should the Johnston discussions still be in progress at the time of Mr. Eden's arrival in Cairo, the extent of his discussions with Nasser would have to take into account the possible effects on the Johnston Mission.)

3. The U.K. would outline our intentions to Jordan. This approach is necessary prior to discussions with Israel because of the special treaty relationship between the U.K. and Jordan.

4. Indication of the intentions of the U.K. and the U.S. would be given to France and Turkey simultaneously with the approach to Jordan and before the approach to Israel.

5. As soon as possible after stage 4 above, the nature of a general settlement would be discussed in detail with Israel. We would indicate that Nasser was prepared to consider a settlement and that we have drawn up as a basis for discussion a set of ideas which we consider offers prospect of progress toward a settlement. We would state that if Israel is ready to pursue discussions on this basis, we were prepared to continue our efforts. If it should be necessary, we would make clear to Israel the effects of a refusal on her part to cooperate, mentioning particularly that under such circumstances we would be unable to extend the security guarantee she has requested, and that she would have to bear the onus for failure of our efforts to progress toward peace.

6. The approach to Lebanon, Syria and Iraq would be determined in the light of the discussions with Egypt.

. . . . . .

8. It is essential that we retain the utmost flexibility and endeavor to maintain secrecy. We must always be ready to exploit quickly any unexpected opportunity for progress. Each step should be taken cautiously; and in the early stage of the negotiations we should avoid actions which might commit us more deeply than necessary to formal support for a rigid plan.

III. Inducements and Psychological Factors

1. The terms of the settlement itself will contain inducements to the parties, but these will probably be insufficient to overcome the Arabs' resistance to any settlement and Israel's reluctance to make the concessions required of her. Outside inducements will therefore be necessary: e.g., military and economic aid, and security guarantee.

2. Since no Arab state is likely to participate in a settlement unless it knows that Egypt is sympathetic, Egyptian cooperation is of first importance in any attempt at a settlement. We shall therefore need to offer inducements to Egypt. The following are the main possibilities:—

a. The flattery implied in the fact that we have chosen to consult Nasser first and cannot get on without him.

b. The suggestion that if Egypt will take the lead in solving this problem it will eventually strengthen her position in the Middle East

and enable her to play a more important role in cooperation with the West. The solution of the Palestine problem will eliminate a major impediment to such cooperation.

c. Military assistance, the extent and conditions of which will in any case depend on the state of the relations between Israel and the Arab states.

d. The prospect of support for Colonel Nasser's plans for the future of Egypt.

e. Specific offers of economic aid, for example, on the High Aswan Dam project.

f. The offer of a security guarantee.

3. Inducements to Israel include:—

a. A security guarantee.

b. Elimination of factors creating tension between Israel and her neighbors.

c. Removal of Suez Canal restrictions. Termination of the secondary boycott.

d. Continued U.S.–U.K. interest in Israel's economic future.

. . . . . .

f. Military assistance.

g. Brighter prospects for Israel's association in area defense arrangements.

IV. Elements of Settlement

A. *Territorial Adjustments.*

1. Israel must make concessions. The Arabs will not reconcile themselves to her present boundaries. But we cannot expect large transfers of territory: the concessions will be partly symbolic and partly designed to produce a frontier which could last with a minimum of friction.

2. We cannot make final recommendations on the North Jordan Valley and Lake Tiberias area until the results of Mr. Johnston's mission are clear. . . .

3. The No Man's Land areas between Israel and Jordan should be divided. The aim should be that most of the territory should go to Jordan but the question of awarding the tip of the Latrun salient to Israel to permit the restoration of the old Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road should be studied further.

4. On the Israel–Jordan frontier, Israel would be asked to agree to adjustments based on the principle of reuniting farm lands with Arab agricultural villages. Further study must be given to the possible magnitude of such adjustments and their strategic and economic effect before the United States and United Kingdom can make firm recommendations.

. . . . . .

6. In the discussions with Egypt, the Egyptians should be asked to comment on disposition of the Gaza Strip. . . .

7. In the southern Negev Israel would be asked to relinquish a small triangle of territory north of Elath. This triangle would have its base on the Israel-Egyptian frontier and its apex on the Israel–Jordan frontier so as to provide over-land communications between Egypt and Jordan. The triangle would be located at a point where the Israel road to Elath from Beersheba and Sodom runs close to the Jordan frontier. At the junction of the Israel north-south road and the Arab east-west road there might have to be some form of international supervision and control.

8. Terms of reference for the study group on this matter are attached. [3]

B. *Refugees*

1. Israel would offer to readmit those refugees who wish to return up to a certain figure, say 75,000. This figure might run up to 150,000 if the Gaza Strip were ceded to Israel (see IV, A. 6. above). It would be understood that refugees returning to Israel, would come as Israel citizens.

a. The Israel Government would donate land and UNRWA would finance the development of that land to permit the rehabilitation in Israel of those refugees choosing to return there.

2. Israel would undertake to pay compensation for Arab refugee real property and establish a fund for the purpose. Some kind of trustee organization would be set up to handle the payment of compensation.

3. Israel would borrow money from the Western Powers to help pay the compensation. It is however desirable that some part of the money should come directly from Israel herself: and German reparations and contributions from World Jewry might be used to this end.

4. In the payment of compensation individual claims would be scaled down. Persons receiving more than a fixed amount would thereby relinquish all claims on UNRWA for relief and rehabilitation. Some arrangement would be needed to ensure that large sums paid to individuals were invested in the area and used to promote employment for the refugees. In general compensation should be so

[3] Attached to the source text but not printed. An undated and uninitialed document entitled "Recommendations Of Working Group On Frontiers", which presumably was the study group's report, is in Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438, Project Alpha 1955.

applied that it would make as many refugees as possible independent of UNRWA assistance.

5. Of the refugees who remained a charge to UNRWA after the payment of compensation, it is hoped that 100–150,000 could be settled in the Jordan Valley when the development scheme was completed, and 50–75,000 on the Sinai project. Those refugees in Syria and Lebanon who did not return to Israel would stay in their host countries which would gradually integrate them into their societies, possibly with the help of lump sum payments by UNRWA.

6. In Jordan, and possibly Gaza, UNRWA would have to continue relief until the further economic development of the area or resettlement schemes create opportunities for the remaining refugees. UNRWA relief would be made less attractive as these opportunities became more promising.

7. Terms of reference for the safety group on this matter are attached. [4]

C. *Jerusalem*

1. The U.S. and U.K. would inform the parties that they were prepared to sponsor a U.N. resolution on the lines of the Swedish proposal of 1950 on the supervision of and access to the Holy Places; . . . .

2. Israel would be informed that following agreement upon a settlement and pending the adoption of such a resolution, the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors would start to call at the Israeli Foreign Office in Jerusalem, ...

3. The aim should be to eliminate the No Man's Land in Jerusalem by agreement between Israel and Jordan. Government House would become the seat of the international authority charged with the supervision of the Holy Places and possibly other U.N. agencies.

4. Jerusalem to be demilitarized along the lines of plans which have been discussed by the Consuls-General of Britain, France and the U.S.A. [5]

D. *Communications Arrangements*

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[4] Attached to the source text but not printed. Undated and uninitialed documents concerning compensation, repatriation, and resettlement of refugees in Arab States, along with additional documentation incidental to the efforts of this study group, are *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Arab Refugees: Memos—U.S., U.K. working party papers on Compensation, Repatriation, Resettlement, and *ibid.*, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438, Project Alpha 1955.

[5] The consuls general of Great Britain, France, and the United States initiated their discussions in 1954. Documentation concerning their deliberations is *ibid.*, Central Files 684.85, 784.00, 784.5, and 784A.00, as well as *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha: Status of Jerusalem.

1. Israel to offer Jordan free port facilities at Haifa and free access to the port.

2. Mutual overflight rights for civil aircraft of the parties.

3. Israel to permit the restoration or construction of telecommunications between the Arab states across her territory.

4. Israel to accord to Egypt or Jordan the right to construct a road across the Southern Negeb and to allow free transit without inspection in peace-time (but see A above).

5. Some mixed or U.N. authority to be established to hear complaints on the infringement of communications rights.

E. *The Boycott*

1. The Arab states would:

a. remove restrictions on transiting the Suez Canal, including those on Israel vessels,

b. cease the "secondary boycott", defined as attempts to prevent trade between Israel and non-Arab countries, including termination of all pressure on non-Arab firms trading with Israel,

c. abolish the Arab League Boycott offices and all legislation rising therefrom.

2. The Arab states would not be pressed to engage in direct trade with Israel.

V. The Form in Which a Settlement Might Be Embodied, and the Guarantees to the Parties

A. *Instruments of Settlement*

1. Permanent frontiers should be established by re-negotiation of the Armistice Agreements in accordance with the provision in the Agreements for modification by consent of both parties. The UNTSO should continue to supervise the boundaries as long as necessary. The new frontiers should be noted in any guarantee decided upon.

2. The whole settlement need not be covered in a single document. Different means should be used for the different components, possibly as follows:

a. *Territorial.* The territorial settlement to be embodied in a revision of the Armistice Agreements (see above).

b. *Jordan Waters.* A separate agreement would be made between the parties on the development of the Jordan Valley and the operation of the unified scheme.

c. *Refugees.* A settlement providing for repatriation and compensation could be contained in a letter from the Israel Government to the Secretary-General of the U.N., referring to the 1948 resolution [6] and giving details of Israel's intention to carry it out.

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[6] On November 19, 1948, the General Assembly unanimously adopted, at its 163d plenary meeting, General Assembly Resolution 212 (III), which granted relief assist-

d. *Jerusalem.* Arrangements for Jerusalem and the Holy Places would be the subject of a U.N. resolution.

e. *Communications.* Free ports and transit arrangements would be the subject of direct agreements between the parties.

f. *The Blockade.* The Arab states would dissolve the Arab League Boycott Committees and give informal assurances that they intended to put an end to their secondary boycott.

g. While treaties of peace between Israel and the Arab states remain our ultimate objective, the state of Arab public opinion does not make it feasible to insist upon such treaties as an immediate objective. We should endeavor to bring about to the maximum extent possible permanent arrangements which would provide the substance, as distinguished from the form, of peace. It should be our objective to obtain the termination of the state of belligerency between the countries both to remove the basis for the Suez Canal blockade and the secondary boycott and to justify to the U.S. and U.K. public and law makers the security guarantees and substantial financial contributions required. The termination of belligerency could be provided for in the revision of the Armistice Agreements (see a above) and would involve the revocation of any Arab legislation based on the existence of a state of belligerency.

B. *Security Guarantees*

1. It will be necessary for the United States and United Kingdom and possibly Turkey and France, to guarantee the frontiers to be established between Israel and the Arab states against alteration by force. (See attached draft treaty which will require further legal study.) [7]

2. The Guarantee would not cover other aspects of the settlement. Nor would it come into operation in the case of frontier incidents not involving the occupation of territory. Such incidents, however, if sufficiently serious would bring into operation the commitment of the parties to consult together. The guarantors might inform the Arab states and Israel that they are prepared to discuss the means of implementing the guarantee.

3. The participating powers might offer one treaty to Israel embodying the guarantee and a separate similar treaty to each Arab state. Should the Arab states be unwilling to sign treaties with the Western Powers, a unilateral guarantee might be extended to them and the offer of a treaty left open. Should the Arab states refuse to accept a settlement involving a treaty between Israel and the Western Powers, other means of guaranteeing Israel's security would be considered.

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ance for the period ending August 31, 1949, to Palestine refugees of all communities. For text, see U.N. doc. A/PV. 163.

[7] Attached to the source text but not printed. Documentation concerning the preparation of plans to guarantee frontiers is in Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha Treaty: Successive drafts of Legal Aspects—Forms and Guarantees.

4. Any guarantee of the division of Jordan waters required would be considered separately in connection with the Jordan waters agreements.

VI. The Roles of France, Turkey and the United Nations

1. France should not be included in the planning or initial approach to the parties but should be informed of the proposals at the time of the approach to Jordan. (See II, 4, above.) France should be included in the arrangements for the final settlement and should participate in the guarantees, unless the Arab states or Israel reject her participation.

2. Turkey would not be included in the planning or in the initial approach to the two sides but may be informed at the same time as the French. It would be desirable for Turkey to participate in the guarantee envisaged unless this is resisted by the parties.

3. The U.N. would be involved in the machinery of a settlement, for example in supervision of frontiers and Holy Places. The U.N. should therefore take note of the settlement at some stage, perhaps by accepting a P.C.C. report on it. But the U.S. and U.K. guarantees would have to provide for their execution independently of U.N. action.

VII. Cost of the Operation

A. As inducements to a resolution of the Arab-Israel problem, it is anticipated that it would be necessary for the United States and the United Kingdom to provide assistance in addition to present and already projected commitments (development assistance, UNRWA relief and rehabilitation, and the unified development of the Jordan Valley). Such new assistance might include:

1. U.S.–U.K. participation in the financing of compensation by Israel to certain of the Palestine refugees.

2. Economic inducements such as substantial grant aid for the High Aswan Dam, accelerated release of sterling balances by the U.K., etc.

3. Military aid to the cooperating countries.

14. Telegram From Ambassador Eric Johnston to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 3, 1955—11 a.m.

1098. Johnston three. Negotiations in Israel [2] were extremely difficult, marked by Israel's resistance to basic assumptions on which our proposals necessarily depend. While we were convinced of genuine interest among influential Israelis in seeking favorable conclusion, actual negotiations hit repeated snags both on points of principle and details of water calculations.

Main points of difficulty were: (1) The quantity of river water proposed for Israel; and (2) use of Lake Tiberias.

Concerning (1) Israelis insisted Jordan underground supplies estimated by them at 100 to 200 MCM be included in Jordanian share. Israelis also took strong exception to B-Harza [3] allowance of only 3 percent for uncropped land in irrigable area. Israel also rejected thesis that all Arab lands should be served and Israel receive remainder. It was evident that GOI looks for a larger share than we prepared admit, equivalent to substantially all the upper Jordan flow. Re (2), which may be just as important as quantity, it was evident GOI feared Tiberias storage might be used in some way as a lever to force territorial concessions or adjustments unfavorable to Israel. Furthermore, Israeli engineers now claim total Tiberias storage capacity required to meet needs of Israels own water development program and that accommodation Yarmuk surplus in Tiberias would compel Israel construct excessively expensive storage facilities elsewhere.

GOI emphasized that function of water master would have to be strictly limited to mechanical control.

In effort meet Israel partially on quantity, Johnston proposed diversion allocation from rivers of 430 MCM plus Huleh reclamation water approximating 62 or total 492 for Israel, permitting Israeli diversion ex-basin at Banat Yaqub. This proposal unacceptable to Israel.

With respect incorporation groundwater in Jordanian allotment Johnston proposed that Israel agree to presently proposed share for

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/2–355. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris. Ambassador Johnston assigned his own numbering system to most of his personal telegrams. Incoming telegrams bear the Ambassadors' signatures.

[2] Summary minutes of Johnston's discussions in Israel, January 27–31, and related documents are *ibid.*, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, Johnston Mission Minutes of Meetings.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 8.

Jordan with assurances US Government would undertake exhaustive explorations for groundwater during given period, and that any amount thus derived would result in release of river water to Israel.

To assuage Israel's apprehension re polit implication Tiberias storage Johnston assured GOI he prepared give Prime Minister a letter stating no such implications exist and further to incorporate in all agreements a firm proviso that Tiberias storage would neither prejudice status quo nor provide basis for future efforts to do so. We understand this assurance has had marked effect on Israel's attitude toward Tiberias use, but no definitive understanding was achieved. While Israel may later agree on basis such assurances GOI's present position remains unfavorable to use of Tiberias.

GOI indicated it would be interested in considering plan for partial allocations leaving unallocated balance to be divided after three to five years. Johnston did not signify interest but privately feels some such approach in final showdown may be productive if Arabs objection total plan are serious.

While in Jerusalem Johnston, Gardiner and Barnes called on General Burns to explain plan and progress.[4] In course general discussion General Burns stated that proposed diversions at Banat Yaqub and Adasiya are directly linked in his present opinion and that permission to go ahead with one would necessarily be coupled with similar permission for the other. This assumed in both instances that necessary assurances would be given as to protection of local property rights, water use and similar factors. Burns also said that after study he would not be able to supply earlier Bennike finding re milit advantage to Israel. If obligated to make decision now on Banat Yaqub it probably would be favorable to project resumption. However he had no intention making any decision at present and certainly not while Johnston ne[illegible]tions under way. In event of any future Security Council action he said he would be guided by positions of France, Britain, United States and would be disinclined to move unless these countries indicated they wished him to.

Comment: Sharett's attitude so far more hopeful than those of technicians and advisers. Sharett however seems to be in some difficulties with his colleagues and the country in general. Cabinet crisis impended due dispute over current budget, and because of alleged failure of Sharett's foreign policy. Israelis are disturbed at recent events in Egypt, Iraq and Syria and even more concerned at policy of United States which appears to them to be one of appease-

[4] A summary record of Ambassador Johnston's conversation of January 31 with General Burns is in Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/1–3155.

ment of Arabs regardless of Israeli rights and interests. Problem remains to convince Israelis that their interests lie in solving JISR Banat Yaqub problem through agreement and in otherwise accommodating themselves to measures that will permit equitable division of water to be enforced to satisfaction of all interests concerned.

Cairo conversations began today. [5] Johnston privately assured by Fawzi of Egypt's continued good offices.

[5] Johnston arrived in Egypt on February 1.

15. Memorandum From Francis H. Russell to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, February 4, 1955.

SUBJECT

US–UK Discussions on Israel-Arab Settlement

The talks with Shuckburgh resulted in agreement ad referendum on the lines which a settlement should take and the approaches to the parties. Firming-up talks begin in London February 28.

It was agreed, ad referendum, that:

1. The Turko-Iraq agreement has resulted in a shake-up of Arab state relations, upon which we may be able to capitalize—or which might set us back. In any event we should be ready to act quickly.

2. While treaties of peace between Israel and the Arabs remain our ultimate objective, the state of Arab public opinion might not permit such treaties at present. We should, therefore, aim for: (a) termination of the state of belligerency, and (b) permanent arrangements which would provide the substance, if not the form, of peace.

3. A U.S.–U.K. (and possibly French and Turkish) guarantee of the frontiers to be agreed upon is essential as an inducement and should take the form of separate treaties with each of the cooperating countries.

4. The settlement should include:

a. Territorial adjustments with some cessions by Israel, including a small triangular piece near the southern tip of the

[1] Source; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Washington Talks, Jan.–Feb. 1955: Memos, etc. during progress of meetings (Dated 1/24 thru 2/4). Top Secret. Hoover and Murphy initialed their concurrences. Russell initialed for Allen and Hare, who also concurred.

Negev with an overpass for a road from Cairo to Amman involving no substantial interference with Israel's interests there.

b. Repatriation of Arab refugees by Israel numbering up to 75,000.

c. . . . .

d. Compensation to Arab refugees by Israel for their expropriated real estate, at reduced scale and to be paid in such a way as to promote area development.

e. U.S. and U.K. to work for adoption by UN of resolution similar to former Swedish plan for international supervision of Holy Places . . . .

f. Egypt to drop Suez blockade and all Arab countries to end secondary boycott (i.e., sanctions against firms of third countries doing business with Israel).

5. The time table for the launching of the effort for a settlement would be:

a. Sir Anthony Eden is visiting Nasser in Cairo on February 20 on his way to Bangkok and will indicate to Nasser our desire to see Egypt develop into a position of increasing influence, which requires a solution of the Palestine problem. He would indicate also (in accordance with your suggestion to Shuckburgh) the benefits to the Arab countries of acting toward that end now.

b. Byroade, who arrives in Egypt the end of February, will follow through with a presentation of the U.S.–U.K. views to Nasser during March.

c. If Egypt proves cooperative, the U.S. and the U.K. would inform France and Turkey of the general nature of our efforts and seek their support. Approximately at the same time an approach would be made to Jordan.

d. A day or two later we would approach Israel telling them that we have reason to believe that the Egyptians will prove cooperative and urging the Israelis to agree to a settlement along the general lines that have been formulated.

6. For the purpose of keeping the Israelis as calm as possible during the next critical couple of months, you might send a message to Prime Minister Sharett along the lines of the attached draft. [2]

It is recommended that:

1. You send the Sharett message. (Tab A)

2. Indicate whether the line of action outlined above has your approval.

3. Indicate whether you approve discussions on a restricted basis with Defense, the Bureau of the Budget and possibly the NSC on the form of the security guarantee; economic and military aid which would follow, or possibly accompany, the settlement; recommended territorial changes; Jerusalem; and a program of compensa-

[2] The draft message, drafted by Russell and dated February 4, is not attached to the source text but, together with a revised draft dated February 7, is *ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot D 417, Alpha Volume 1.

tion to refugees:—in order to have as firm as possible a U.S. position at London.

F.H.R.

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16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, February 9, 1955—11:58 a.m.

446. For Ambassador and White. Dept currently engaged in formulating proposals for consideration in further US–UK discussions re Arab-Israel problem. Among topics are refugee repatriation, compensation, resettlement. Your considered replies to fol questions wld be most helpful:

1. Assumption has been postulated Israel can be persuaded, in context general settlement, accept between fifty and seventy-five thousand Arab refugees for settlement in Israel (possibly up to one hundred fifty thousand if Gaza strip ceded to Israel). Such refugees could not be "repatriated" in sense returning their former homes. However they might be usefully settled in parts Negev and on terraced hillsides in Northern Israel. Cld you assist us in pinpointing actual sites such agricultural resettlement? Any opportunities for refugees some of whom skilled find urban livelihoods?

2. Proposal made Israel wld provide land for returning refugees with UNRWA providing funds develop such land. Do you think this feasible? What wld be realistic figure for UNRWA contribution to Israel on a per family basis? Wld UNRWA be safe in turning money over to GOI with accounting on post audit basis only?

3. Wld it be practical or feasible urge Israel extend special guarantees re civil and other rights to returning Arabs?

4. Wld appreciate Embs further thoughts re amount nature and timing of GOI contributions to refugee compensation fund. On assumption total of $300 million to be paid out over five year period what cld Israel economy contribute by way of goods readily translatable into cash?

Mark reply top secret–alpha–limit distribution. Dept. emphasizes necessity restricting knowledge contents this telegram to Ambassador and White. Would appreciate reply by Feb. 14.

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–955. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Jernegan, who signed for Dulles.

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 10, 1955—4 p.m.

1141. From Johnston. Cairo negotiations ended February 7 with understanding Arab Committee members [2] would transmit to respective governments alternative Water Division proposals representing Johnston position. Committee unempowered make decisions but talks clarified technical realities and established basis Arab Committee judgments and recommendations. Question now entirely in political sphere with utmost importance attaching forthcoming discussions political leaders in respective capitals starting Amman February 10.

To summarize position end Cairo talks, solution Water Division unresolved but reduced to two formulas on which Johnston prepared stand. First, contemplating immediate allocation of total estimated supply, proposed 35 MCM Lebanon, 1320 Syria, 520 Jordan, remainder over 400 Israel. Second, contemplates partial allocations 35 Lebanon, 132 Syria, 375 Jordan, 350 Israel, leaving about 200 MCM to be divided after three-year experience period. These quantities are all from rivers only, not including locally developed resources. Arithmetical summation of quantities depends on complex calculations of return flows, explaining differences in amounts of two proposals.

Arabs agreed in principle on need make use Tiberias but insisted on greater security storage on Yarmuk than economy alone justifies. Six Yarmuk storage may be principal bargaining point Amman. Syria disappointed power potential proposed by B–Harza [3] and some alternative power proposals may have to be discussed Damascus.

No serious questions raised as to neutral authority. Although this subject not discussed in detail, Arabs acceptance of necessity was clear.

Syrians exhibited genuine interest seek workable solution water shares and appeared accept implications respecting completion Banat Yacub diversion with equanimity.

Both in Cairo and Tel Aviv negotiations thus far have been mainly holding line technical aspects against all manner objections

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–1055. Confidential. Received at 5:34 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Baghdad, Jidda, Ankara, and Brussels.

[2] The discussions in Cairo began on February 2 and concluded on February 7. Summary minutes of these conversations are *ibid.*, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, Johnston Mission Minutes of Meetings.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 8.

and counterproposals. This necessary exercise may now be behind us, with Johnston position clear to both sides.

Political factors will dictate final decisions, with strong forces on both sides disposed try agree with Johnston despite serious political hazards both in Israel and Arab states.

Following was country representation Cairo: Jordan—Khairy, Minister Economy; Farhan, Deputy Minister Economy, Taher, Deputy Minister Agriculture, Younes, Irrigation Department; Syria—Ostowani, Secretary General Foreign Minister; Maxloum, Director Irrigation Department; Colonel Kotrash, Senior Delegate Ismac; Lebanon—Chargé d'Affaires Escqiro Dimechkie, Abdel Al, Undersecretary Public Works; Egyptian—General Riad, Chairman; Selim; Mahmoud, Director Legal Department, FonOff; Engineer Farag; Gohar, Director Palestine Department War Ministry.

Johnston and staff have consistently refused press comment. On February 7, however, Doty *New York Times* informed Johnston he had full details from other sources and intended file despatch. [4] Assuming he has done so, Department might take position information came from sources other than Johnston who declined comment.

Jones

[4] The article in question, "Parley Advances On Jordan Accord", by Robert C. Doty, appeared in the *New York Times* on February 8, 1955, p. 10.

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18. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 11, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Operation Alpha

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Director General of the Foreign Service
Mr. John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. Francis H. Russell, NEA
Mr. Parker T. Hart, Director, NE

Mr. Russell inquired as to the Secretary's views on the letter drafted for him to transmit to Prime Minister Sharett in order to

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 1. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Hart.

reassure him of the Secretary's continued personal study of the problem of Israel's security position.[2] The Secretary replied that the letter seemed too optimistic and, as a holding operation, inadequate. He asked what basis we had for using the word "encouraging". He did not know of any developments in the Arab-Israel situation that justified the use of this term. Did we mean simply that we were encouraged by our own mental processes? Mr. Russell replied that the purpose of the letter was to assure the Israeli Prime Minister that he was not being given a "run around" but that the Secretary himself was at work on the problem. The Secretary inquired as to whether it would not be desirable instead of a letter to issue a public statement, perhaps similar to that given some months ago in Parliament by Sir Anthony Eden. Sharett had kept the lid on the situation pretty resolutely and the borders were quiet. The Secretary suggested that he might say that we were working on the problem; that there was a lot to be done; meanwhile, in view of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, which he herewith reaffirmed, no one should feel that he could commit aggression with impunity. Both Mr. Russell and Mr. Hare felt that reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration even in this form needed a "peg" which was missing at the present moment.

The Secretary then inquired whether there was not a good deal of risk vis-à-vis the Arabs in sending a letter only to Sharett. Would it not be desirable to send a letter to Prime Minister Nasser as well? There followed a discussion of the possible contents of a personal letter to Nasser and what Anthony Eden might say to Nasser in Cairo on his way to Bangkok. The Secretary felt that it should be stated to Nasser that the United States Government had been able to provide military aid to Iraq because the latter commanded bases highly strategic in any defense concept for the Middle East and because Iraq had no common frontier with Israel. With respect to other Arab states, however, the U.S. Government was sharply limited in the possibility of providing arms aid due to: (1) Israel's understandable apprehensions and (2) Arab preoccupation with the Palestine problem to the point of subordinating to it the Communist danger. It was finally agreed that Ambassador Lawson at Tel Aviv would deliver a message from the Secretary by means of a Note Verbale or an Aide-Mémoire. Delivery would be accompanied by a special request to Prime Minister Sharett to observe not only the secrecy of its content but secrecy of its existance.

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[2] Reference is presumably to the February 7 draft cited in footnote 2, Document 15. It is identical to the message sent on February 14 (see Document 22), except the last two sentences which read as follows: "You may rest assured that I will communicate with you on a more concrete and detailed basis just as soon as our study of the problem permits. In the meantime I felt that you should know of the encouragement which I feel as a result of our work to date."

Mr. Russell raised the question of possible discussions within the U.S. Government prior to his own forthcoming visit to London. Should the London trip take place without some assurance of: (1) a treaty of guaranty of the type discussed during the Shuckburgh meetings at Washington; (2) special economic aid as inducement to the Arabs; notably aid to Egypt for the High Aswan dam; (3) U.S. contribution in the form of a long-term loan to Israel to enable Israel to pay some $200 million in compensation to the Palestine Arab refugees and (4) military aid to Egypt? Mr. Hare interjected that Egypt would have to be "bought" by this type of aid. The Secretary indicated that there should be no discussion with other branches of the U.S. Government until after he had talked to the President. He inquired how compensation to the refugees would be financed.

Mr. Russell replied that he had in mind a loan from the U.S. Government, contributions by American Jewry and a diversion or funding of German reparations. A discussion followed regarding figures submitted by Mr. Russell on the projected costs of present aid programs in the Near East and the additional estimated costs of operation "Alpha", the grand total being over a billion dollars. The Secretary felt these figures to be depressingly large but asked that they be prepared for him to use in a discussion with the President on Monday in a form which would clearly show (1) what the U.S. Government would be expected to pay in various forms of aid to the Near East in any event and (2) what the additional costs of Alpha would be. He asked that no letter be sent to Prime Minister Sharett until he had talked to the President.

Mr. Hare asked whether the suggested approach by Sir Anthony Eden to Nasser should proceed as planned. The Secretary replied in the affirmative assuming that the President concurred as he expected he would.

The Secretary also asked that in preparation for the Monday conference with the President he be furnished a paragraph on the question of the Treaty of Guaranty of a boundary settlement. [3]

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[3] Russell on Monday, February 14, submitted a memorandum to Dulles for his conference with the President. Specifically, Russell suggested that the Secretary might wish to say that the American and British officials who had been discussing the prospects for an Arab-Israeli settlement had concluded that the United States and United Kingdom would have to negotiate separate treaties guaranteeing the agreed borders of all the parties, and that an Alpha settlement would require the United States to make substantial additional economic contributions in the Near East, totaling over $1 billion during the next 5 years. (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 1)

19. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the President's Special Representative (Johnston), at Amman [1]

Tel Aviv, February 12, 1955—2 p.m.

105. As of possible background use while you are conducting negotiations Arab capitals, Embassy submits following preliminary forecast Israel Government reaction two formulas set forth second paragraph Cairo's 1141 to Department repeated Tel Aviv as 154: [2]

While it is correct that there are some Israel political elements disposed reach water agreement (or at least to avoid onus failure negotiations), there is little evidence that this disposition extends to point of "giving up" any substantial amount of Jordan water to the HKJ. Reasons for lukewarm character response Israel moderate elements appear to be:

1. In view assertions Israel experts (who have both technical and political influence) that HKJ actual irrigable area lower than our estimates and that inadequate provision made for underground water potential, neither Sharett nor other Israelis appear convinced validity river allocation to HKJ set forth your January 30 proposal. [3]

2. Resistances both from Mapai "old guard" and from large segments public would be very strong to large waiver Israel of Jordan water, which would be interpreted as permanent sacrifice precious part of national patrimony. This factor especially important at moment when Israel entering election campaign period.

3. With evolution US policy in the area at a transition point where it appears (to Israelis) to jeopardize Israel's security position, there is little or no compensatory weight to (1) and (2) above from standpoint considerations improving Israel's relations with US and the Arab states.

The tentative conclusion reached from foregoing is that the chances are negligible of obtaining Israel concurrence to total allocation formula.

On the other hand, a partial allocation approach would appear to hold greater promise of acceptance in Israel. The immediate and foreseeable objections which Israelis may raise to your precise formula are: (1) Total allocations for Lebanon and Syria but only partial for Israel, (2) small amount of "new water" to Israel, and (3) bad precedent for future allocations inherent in Israeli acceptance of 39.2 percent ratio under partial allocation.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/2–1255. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to the Department of State, which is the source text.

[2] Document 17.

[3] Johnston summarized his water allocation proposal, which the Israelis found unacceptable, in Document 14.

Nevertheless, partial allocation has several attractions to Israel, including prospect US financial participation with resultant acceleration getting water on the land, amicable settlement Banat Yaacov controversy, and avoidance onus obstructionism before world opinion. In terms short-term economic development, your partial allocation Israel would permit (assuming Hula drainage savings equate Hula Basin diversion) allocation 130 MCM triangle–Tiberias–Beisan areas, with balance 220 diversion to Beit Netufa for use coastal plain and northern Negev. This is all Israelis could possibly utilize next several years and much more than they will if left to their own devices and funds. It is reasonable to expect that during that period actual experience in lower Jordan (as well as with storage possibilities Beit Netufa) may bring views of interested parties closer together re distribution unallocated balance.

Lawson

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20. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, February 14, 1955 [1]

[Here follow discussion of current relations with the Republic of China; a discussion of the merits of granting a loan to Mexico's national oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos; a review of Secretary Dulles' draft of a speech he planned to deliver to the Foreign Policy Association in New York on February 16; and a determination to invite Prime Minister U Nu of Burma to visit the United States in June.]

5. I discussed with the President the substance of the memorandum from Francis Russell on February 14, pointing out that before proceeding we should know in a general way whether the President might consider it feasible to recommend, if a settlement were arrived at, that the U.S. and U.K. would in effect jointly guarantee the territorial stability and if we would be willing to increase our contributions to the area to an amount which would in substance double them from the present rate of around $100,000,000 a year to about $200,000,000, or in other words $1,000,000,000 over say a five-year period. The President said, of course, he did not want to

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

commit himself and that he felt somewhat appalled by the mounting total of requests for foreign aid. However, he agreed that we should make an all-out effort to get a settlement, if possible, before the elections of '56, and he felt we might proceed to develop further the project. This was not, of course, any committal; that he would have to study the plan in detail and hear the views of Treasury, Budget, etc. I said we did not want or expect any committal at the present time, but that we had not wanted to proceed to develop the project beyond the present U.S.–U.K. study without his knowing in general what it might entail.

[Here follows discussion of training Cambodia's military forces; factors involved in issuing Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union an invitation to visit the United States; and the current French parliamentary situation.]

JFD

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21. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, February 14, 1955—4 p.m.

396. Johnston 7. My reception in Amman [2] has been most cordial, and in complete contrast to events in October 1953. Following formal visit to King [3] on February 11, which provided opportunity to discuss program fully, King arranged luncheon my honor next day with important cabinet ministers. King already well informed on our proposals, and took lead in cabinet meeting when they were fully discussed. He is definitely favorable to a settlement and his leadership has led wavering members of cabinet to take constructive stand. Talks with cabinet members have also been on friendly and constructive basis. Press has switched from bitter opposition and theme of Mission's failure to cautious reports of my success, apparently as result government efforts condition public.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/2–1455. Confidential. Received at 3:36 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, London, Paris, Brussels, Ankara, Jidda, and Baghdad.

[2] A memorandum summarizing the results of Johnston's discussions in Amman, February 10–13, is *ibid.*, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, Amman, Jordan—Discussions 2/10–13/55.

[3] Hussein.

This atmosphere had led Mission to hope that Jordanians might accept allocations and other provisions of undertaking pursuant Cairo talks, thus forcing hands of Syria and Lebanon. There were some indications that this might be outcome Amman visit until yesterday, when Lebanon cabled to HKJ requesting no action until completion talks in Damascus and Beirut where it is planned reassemble Arab committee, including Egyptians, about February 18, for further discussions which may lead to definitive Arab position.

Jordanians are caught in web of Arab league politics, as criticism of Iraqi action in case Turkish pact has made it difficult for Jordan to move on water problem without support of some Arab colleagues.

Jordanian reluctance come to terms with ME is not to be interpreted as diminution of their interest in valley project.

Moose

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22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, February 14, 1955—6:17 p.m.

456. For Ambassador. Please convey personally and orally to Prime Minister following message from Secretary:

Begin Message—Some time has passed since, upon Ambassador Eban's telling me of your concern over Israel's sense of isolation and insecurity, I asked him to inform you of my sympathetic awareness of that problem and my intention to give it my careful study. I am sending you this message so that you may know that the problem has had my continuing personal attention and that we are making good progress in formulating the possibilities of appropriate and effective steps which the United States might take. I need not emphasize to you the many questions which arise in the course of such an analysis and the study and discussions which are required. In view of the constitutional requirements involved in a foreign policy dealing with long term American security commitments and the attention which must be given to the interests of all countries, which, if we are to have success, would be involved, any solution to this problem is, of necessity, a time consuming process.

Nor need I stress, I am sure, how essential it is that the approach to this problem take place in a period of relative calm. The policy of moderation which you have been pursuing has been, and

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–1455. Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jernegan and approved and signed by Dulles.

will continue to be, most helpful to us. Progress in the present discussions on a Unified Jordan Valley Plan will also be of great importance.

You may rest assured that I will communicate with you on a more concrete and detailed basis just as soon as progress on the problem permits. *End Message*

Impress upon Sharett necessity of holding this message and fact it was sent in strictest confidence.

Dulles

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23. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, February 14, 1955—6 p.m.

683. We submit the following comments regarding questions raised numbered paragraphs Department's telegram 446 February 9. [2]

1. GOI thinking reveals no interest in and little sense of obligation toward resettlement Arab refugees in Israel territory and it may be assumed, therefore, that acceptance proposal to resettle any large number in this country would be contingent on other phases general settlement being so favorable to Israel in tangible terms improved security, lifting Arab blockade, opening up of nearby markets, et cetera, as to make "sacrifice" desirable in national interest. Department in better position than Embassy to weigh these considerations as well as the advantages of timing any approach on this point with overall policy developments.

With Negev unusable except with water which is being developed for Jewish settlers and coastal plain already largely settled, best prospect Arab settlement would be on hillsides in the north near Lebanese border. Some Arabs have been withdrawn from these areas for security reasons but change of policy GOI possible in framework general settlement which might tangibly reduce security problem. Any pinpointing these sites or estimate of settlement capacities would require survey work not possible under security limitations Arab-Israel project.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–1455. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:45 a.m., February 15.

[2] Document 16.

Opportunities for refugees find urban employment believed to be very limited and would depend largely expansion general level Israel economic activity which might prove possible if enough external funds poured in here next several years [as result of] implementation united water development and as result accelerated industrial activity responsive to removal Arab economic boycott. Modest opportunities absorption might result from redefinition eligibility under "reunion of family scheme", which however resulted in admission to Israel only 2382 Arabs between 1949 and 1952.

Re Gaza strip, we doubt whether any country really wants this area under current circumstances because there are no resources to go with people located there. Only economic possibility permanent settlement any large number Gaza strip would appear to be along lines making some Litani floodwaters available to that area. This possibility mentioned only because Sharett's recent discussion with Johnston indicated that Israel might not be averse to use its reservoir and transit system for Arab refugee purposes and because Lebanon might not have same strong objection use of Litani waters for Arab refugees as it has for use in Israel. [3] While Litani water applied Gaza strip would be expensive it might not be much more so than Jordan waters which will be applied by Israel to contiguous Negev area.

New obstacle resettlement here Arab refugees is the resumption of large-scale immigration to Israel. Finance Minister Eshkol in budget address last week said that Israel population would increase 100,000 this year, of which 60,000 new immigrants. This change GOI policy directed primarily at transfer here of North Africans due to deterioration political situation Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco. Although joint statement yesterday Jewish-Agency-Cabinet indicates financial limitations may result smaller number than target, it is apparent that Israel's absorption capacity will be severely strained this new movement. It may be taken as axiomatic that in distribution available land, water and other facilities, these Jewish immigrants will have priority over any Arab refugees.

In any analysis prospects Israel cooperation in settling or easing refugee problem it seems clear that no GOI will make concessions which will oppose its present basic policy of accepting persecuted Jewish immigrants. If Israel agrees to use what it considers its water for purposes aiding Arab refugees it is likely to consider request for resettlement refugees in Israel as additional concession its part.

2. We believe GOI would find financing through strengthened USOM setup more acceptable than through UNRWA with which Israel has severed all connections and which is regarded here as having Arab viewpoint. (We understand that Johnston contemplates

[3] See footnote 2, Document 14.

under unified development plan US financing through UNRWA for Arab side but directly through USOM Israel side.)

In view different living standards and way of life do not believe Israel settlement costs are useful in connection Arab resettlement. Suggest instead that as a rule of thumb Department use family cost estimates prepared by UNRWA for Jordan Valley settlement.

3. We believe that the most obtainable from Israel would be a statement that it would extend to returning Arabs the same civil and other rights enjoyed by Arabs already resident in the country.

4. With US or UNRWA financing raw material and fuel import components Embassy believes it would be possible for Israel industry to contribute added value $5 million the first year rising gradually to $10 million in final year or total net contribution $35–$40 million. Greatest possibility appears to be in field of building materials, including cement, glass, plywood and masonite, and plumbing fixtures, which presumably could be absorbed in the Arab resettlement projects outside Israel. There also appears to be some unused capacity in textile production. Jeeps could be made available from Kaiser–Willys assembly plant although added value would be much smaller than 30 percent average used by Embassy foregoing calculation. Translation goods into cash case of building materials would presumably take the form of payment by US or UNRWA into a fund from financial appropriations made available for resettlement with possible redistribution cash to refugees on an individual basis according to their valid claims for compensation.

Lawson

24. Despatch From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

No. 2354 *London, February 15, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Transmitting Text of Sir Anthony Eden's Brief for His Visit to Cairo

With reference to the Embassy's Top Secret telegram dated February 15, 1955 [2] there is enclosed the text of Sir Anthony Eden's brief for his visit to Cairo on February 20, 1955. The brief is in the form of a Memorandum from Mr. C.A.E. Shuckburgh, Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, to the Foreign Secretary (referred to as the "Secretary of State") and contains Mr. Shuckburgh's suggestions as to what Sir Anthony Eden might say to Colonel Nasir regarding a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. The record of Mr. Shuckburgh's meeting with Secretary Dulles referred to is the Department's Memorandum [3] which was furnished to the Foreign Office by the British Embassy in Washington. The Department will recall that during Mr. Shuckburgh's visit to Washington it was agreed that the Foreign Secretary's brief when prepared would be given to the Department for any possible comment.

For the Ambassador:
Evan M. Wilson
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure

"BRIEF FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO CAIRO

"Prospects for a Settlement of the Arab/Israel Dispute

"I attach copies of my telegrams from Washington Nos. 311 and 312, and of the record of my meeting with Mr. Dulles and members of the State Department on January 27. I suggest that you might speak to Colonel Nasser on the following lines.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–1555. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Wilson.

[2] The Embassy in London informed the Department of State of its receipt of Eden's brief and the British Foreign Office's request that the Department submit any comments it had about the brief by February 18. (Telegram 3626; *ibid.*) The Department replied that the British Embassy had been notified on February 16 of the Department's approval of Eden's brief. (Telegram 4253 to London, February 18; *ibid.*)

[3] Document 10.

2. Effect of the Arab/Israel dispute on the Middle East

You are concerned at the damage which the tension between the Arab states and Israel is doing to the Arab world. Its most obvious effect is that it draws out the sufferings of nearly a million Arab refugees; but its concealed workings are wider and even more serious. It offers unlimited opportunity for Soviet designs on Arab society and on the freedom of the Arab countries; and it blinds the Arab peoples and many of their statesmen to the real danger which threatens them—communist infiltration. As long as the Arabs nourish an active resentment against Israel's very existence, their responsible leaders will find it very difficult to turn their full attention and energies to the positive tasks of reconstruction and to create the conditions of stability out of which powerful nations might emerge.

3. Removal of the main obstacle to fruitful cooperation with the West

H.M. Government want to see a strong and progressive Egypt exercising a constructive influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. You admire Nasser's efforts to develop the country and pull it together, and you are genuinely anxious to help him. The same is true of the United States Government. But the dispute with Israel hampers our efforts to help them in many ways. For example, both the Americans and we are anxious to help Nasser over military supplies, but our hands are tied whilst the dispute with Israel continues. We have to defend ourselves against the charge that we are encouraging an arms race and increasing the instability of the Middle East, and we are liable to have to justify every delivery of arms to Israel's immediate neighbours. Egypt suffers particularly from this, for she has a common frontier with Israel.

The continued dispute with Israel also makes it difficult for us to assist Nasser in his plans to develop Egypt's economy.

If Nasser could help you and Mr. Dulles work for a settlement, the main impediment to Western cooperation would be removed and his aims for Egypt's future would be greatly furthered.

4. An appeal to Nasser

You have not spoken of this possibility to any other of the parties to the conflict. You believe you can speak frankly to Nasser because you know he has the realism to recognise that Israel has come to stay, and you believe that he has the courage to lead the Egyptians and other Arab peoples away from their sterile recriminations towards a settlement that will release their energies and strengthen their self-confidence.

It is clear from his talks with Mr. Nutting last year that Nasser understands the damage that the dispute is causing. You have been

glad to see Egyptian influence used effectively to bring the other Arab states to adopt a positive attitude to Mr. Eric Johnston's proposals for the Jordan waters. This has raised Egypt's stature in the eyes of the world. The task of achieving a wider settlement is a challenge to Nasser's statesmanship, as it is to the statesmanship of Britain and the United States. If all three of us worked together we would have a chance of achieving something.

You therefore ask whether Nasser would be disposed to accept the kind of settlement that is now practicable and to help us work for it. You are not trying to impose anything on him: you are convinced that a settlement is an urgent necessity and need his help. He can rely on our discretion and we are trusting his, for secrecy is vital at this stage.

5. The argument for urgency

Nasser may well accept all this in principle but say that the time is not ripe. The following arguments may be used to convince him of urgency:

(a) Events are moving fast in the Middle East, and not all of them are favourable to peace. We can not afford much longer to run the risks which this dispute entails. Political weakness in Syria and Jordan might become very dangerous, and some act of Israeli impatience is always possible.

(b) The policy of the present United States administration had had the effect, over the last two years, of deflating Israel to a large extent. They have refused her arms and resisted her attempts to obtain defense agreements and guarantees. Financial assistance from the United States, both public and private, has fallen off. As a result, Israel is probably more likely now than at any previous time to contemplate a reasonable settlement.

(c) But this policy, though it survived the recent Congressional elections, cost the Republican Party many votes. It is very doubtful whether it can be maintained firmly through the next Presidential election. In 1956 Palestine will again be a factor in United States domestic politics, and there is a danger that the Republicans will be forced to match Democratic promises of measures to please American Jewry. It is in the Arabs' own interest to take advantage of the present situation in which the United States is able to put pressure on Israel, by working towards a settlement this year. If they do not do so, Israel may get what she wants out of the United States without having to earn it by making concessions.

(d) You realise, of course, that gestures will be required from Israel. You are not thinking of a one-sided move by Nasser. All you are saying is that you believe the next six or eight months to be probably the most hopeful in which to secure reasonable offers from Israel; and that, *if* he is interested, you are prepared to pursue this further.

6. Further discussion depending on Nasser's reaction

(a) *If Nasser is receptive*

You do not want to make definite proposals at this stage. But now that you know he is interested, you will give instructions for something to be worked out with the United States and let him know what we think as soon as possible. You could say that Mr. Dulles' ideas on the subject coincide pretty well with your own. In general you have in mind a slightly smaller Israel, but do not think the Arabs could expect large transfers of territory—certainly nothing like the U.N. partition resolution of 1947.[4] There would have to be arrangements for the compensation and resettlement of the refugees and a specific guarantee of the frontiers would have to be given to both sides by the Western powers. The Arabs would have to abandon their economic warfare, including restrictions on transit through the Suez Canal. But they would not necessarily have to enter into direct relations with Israel, and we would do all we could to make the settlement as palatable as possible to Arab opinion. The Israelis would find it difficult to make the necessary concessions, and we should obviously have to discuss these with them first, unless Nasser feels that he can negotiate directly with the Israelis. However we tackle it, secrecy will be of the essence; and we should be glad to hear Nasser's view on the best means of conducting negotiations and what roles we and he can play.

(b) *If Nasser refuses cooperation or insists on delay*

In this case you might say that you understand his difficulties and do not wish to press him for a quick answer. You hope he will consider the matter seriously and bear in mind its urgency; and that he will be prepared to discuss it further with Sir R. Stevenson and Mr. Byroade in strict confidence and frankness. You rely on his statesmanship in this and hope to be able to show him that it hold[s] advantages for him. Between us we settled the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, which once seemed very difficult, to everybody's advantage: let us see whether we cannot approach the Palestine problem in the same realistic spirit."

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[4] For text of General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) concerning a future government for Palestine, which the General Assembly adopted on November 29, 1947, see U.N. doc. A/519. Text is also printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. V, p. 1709.

25. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, February 17, 1955—noon.

691. Re Deptel 456, February 14. [2] Message delivered personally and orally to Prime Minister who although seemingly somewhat harrassed as result of past few days quizzing by Foreign Affairs Committee and Security Committee of Knesset was obviously very much pleased at receiving Secretary's assuring words. He expressed his appreciation of message which he said was very helpful. He regarded it as token of understanding by Secretary of Israel Government's position and indication that formula was being sought for relief of Israel's sense of isolation and insecurity. He expressed pleasure at recognition of his policy of moderation and his efforts to maintain a period of calm.

He accepted opportunity of replying to the two principal points of the message, that is (1) need for period of relative calm, and (2) progress in unified Jordan Valley plan negotiations.

With respect to the first item, he said he fully appreciated the need for calm and hoped that situation would continue but was confident it could not continue indefinitely. He said that whereas Israel was maintaining calm attitude "positive actions were occurring all around Israel, in which Israel was not participant and which further emphasized her isolation". (He was obviously referring to the Turco-Iraqi pact and the US supplying arms to Iraq.) He said he had no conception of what plan Secretary Dulles might have in mind nor was he pressing for any details or indications at this time. However, he was hopeful that a plan would develop which would be useful for area peace and would also be acceptable to Israel.

He stated that Israel's self-restraint had been particularly difficult recently and hoped that too great a strain would not be put upon Israel people for too long a time. He commented at some length on the fact that the Syrian-Israel border had become very active recently and concluded that this represented action approved by Syrian Government. He arrived at this conclusion on grounds that heretofore border had been very well policed by Syrian troops thus preventing irregulars and marauders to operate to any great extent. At all times the Syrian military forces had been well disciplined. Now, however, it was the Syrian military forces which were causing the trouble and obviously this was done with the approval

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–1755. Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 10:37 a.m.

[2] Document 22.

of the Syrian Government. The Prime Minister said he was under considerable pressure as result of these developments and the Israeli public is asking the government whether it is not time to "give the Syrians a lesson".

Most of the Jordan–Israel border had been quiet with exception one sector he said. The Prime Minister was quite upset over a MAC decision which condemned both Jordan and Israel for an exchange of military action recently whereas there was no question but that the action was started by Jordan. (Presumably reference Jerusalem's 187 to Department).[3] "What do they expect us to do when we are attacked—do they believe that we should run away and not respond to such attacks? This we do not believe should reasonably be expected nor do we feel that it would improve the situation. I am going to speak to General Burns about this matter as soon as he returns to Jerusalem as we feel it is unfair on the part of MAC to censure us in cases of this kind." Following these remarks he said he thought that it was highly essential that increased efforts to maintain a "period of relative calm" on the border should be made by the Arabs and in that connection was it not possible that the "US Ambassador in Damascus appeal to the Syrian Government to control their border troops."

With regard to the unified Jordan plan, he was very much discouraged. He said that he was "shocked" to learn that the plan which Ambassador Johnston had left with him prior to his departure for the Arab capitals had now been changed radically to the disadvantage of Israel. Although the Israel Government was not prepared to accept the plan (January 30)[4] as it stood he considered that it was a basis from which negotiations could start but now apparently Ambassador Johnston had discussed with Arabs a plan which would give Israel even less water. The Prime Minister said, "it would be a sad day if Ambassador Johnston and I should have to part company as result of our inability to agree on an equitable plan for the distribution of Jordan water but Israel cannot give away its vital resources. At no time have we ever agreed that we would supply sufficient water to irrigate every square inch of land in the Jordan Valley. We believe that our estimates of Jordan's need for water are correct and we believe that not sufficient provision was made for the future use of underground water which is available to Jordan.

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[3] The Consulate General in Jerusalem reported in telegram 187 on February 10 that the Mixed Armistice Commission, meeting in emergency session the previous day, had decided that both Israel and Jordan should share responsibility for incidents that had occurred on January 26 in the Beit Awwa area. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/2–1055)

[4] On January 30, the Israelis outlined their objections to Johnston's Jordan Valley plan; see Document 14.

Furthermore there are large quantities of water from the Litani River in Lebanon which are going to waste and it seems to us that a fellow Arab state could divert that water for the use of Jordan rather than Israel being required to supply some of its meager water supplies to Jordan". He fully appreciated the importance of a successful negotiation of a unified plan but at the moment it was obvious that he was greatly discouraged at the prospects.

He made it clear that in offering these comments on the two principal points involved he did not in any way wish to discount his great appreciation of the Secretary's action in sending him this personal message.

I said I was pleased to note his appreciation that maintaining a period of calm until a satisfactory formula has been worked out is vital; and that time is necessary to develop such a formula; and that an agreement on the Jordan River plan is of great importance. I assured him that his efforts toward moderation were understood and appreciated and expressed hope they would be successfully continued.

Lawson

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26. Telegram From Ambassador Eric Johnston to the Department of State [1]

Beirut, February 20, 1955—11 a.m.

836. Johnston 8. Verbatim text tentative agreement reached Beirut [2] with Foreign Ministers Lebanon, [3] Syria, [4] Jordan, [5] Prime Minister Lebanon [6] in presence Riad representing Egypt follows as Johnston 9. [7]

Should emphasize this agreement tentative, not binding, and it was made clear to Arabs that while will do best obtain Israeli

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2055. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:53 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Jidda, Baghdad, Brussels, and Ankara.

[2] Ambassador Johnston arrived in Beirut on February 17. The summary record of Johnston's negotiations in Beirut on February 19 with the Arab Committee, along with text of the agreed memorandum, was transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 486 from Beirut, February 24. (*Ibid.*, 683.85322/2–2455)

[3] Alfred Naqqash.

[4] Khalid Pasha al-Azm.

[5] Walid Salah.

[6] Samih al-Sulh.

[7] *Infra.*

agreement, may be necessary return to Arab States some time in April for further consideration of issues.

My decision to identify agreement in this manner assured Syrian acquiescence, despite lack of authority of present Cabinet not yet approved by Parliament.

In brief summary Arabs have on this basis accepted division of waters proposed by me, with Jordan taking deduction of 16 MCMs from rivers based on present estimated supply from wells. Satisfactory conclusion reached on storage and path paved for detailed discussion control authority. Decisions regarding hydroelectric development of special interest to Syria and some interest to Jordan necessarily deferred until further engineering calculations available.

Embassy will report on discussions Lebanese aid program indirectly connected negotiations which were limited to commitments continue 1955 and 1956 programs at about $5 million level largely on loan basis. [8]

Mission leaves for Jerusalem today, for talks there and in Tel Aviv in which understand Ben-Gurion will participate.

Talks in Damascus were necessarily inconclusive and will be reported in despatch. [9]

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[8] Documentation concerning the Lebanese aid program is in Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322.

[9] No record has been found in Department of State files of Johnston's conversations in Damascus.

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27. Telegram From Ambassador Eric Johnston to the Department of State [1]

Beirut, February 20, 1955—noon.

837. Johnston 9. Following is verbatim text of tentative agreement of February 19 referred to Johnston 8: [2]

Begin verbatim text.

As a result of discussions between representatives of the Governments of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt and of the Govern-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2055. Confidential. Received at 9:35 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Baghdad, Brussels, and Ankara.

[2] *Supra.*

ment of the United States, relative to the development of the Jordan River Valley, preliminary understanding has been achieved with respect to major elements of the proposed plan.

The purpose of this preliminary memorandum of understanding is to set forth points on which substantive agreement has been reached. It is understood that this formulation is not conclusive and that certain questions remain to be discussed and resolved at a later date.

Principles and elements of the proposed program upon which tentative agreement now exists are the following:

I. Storage

Water of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers will be stored and regulated (A) primarily through reservoir facilities to be constructed on the Yarmuk River and (B) through the operation of Lake Tiberias as a reservoir.

The importance to Syria and Jordan of the full utilization of the Yarmuk through the construction of a storage dam on the Yarmuk creating a reservoir with a capacity of up to 300 MCM was recognized. In view of the relationship between storage and security for Arab crops and lands, Ambassador Johnston will recommend that the United States contribute $21,600,000 toward the cost of this dam. Flood waters exceeding the storage capacity of this reservoir and irrigation needs will be spilled into Lake Tiberias for release to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.

Arrangements concerning the control of the waters shall in no way alter existing territorial rights and claims.

II. Supervision

A neutral body acceptable to all parties will be established to oversee withdrawals and releases of water. Details will be the subject of further discussion.

III. Division of the Waters

(a) Of the requirements of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, 537 MCM of water annually will be withdrawn from the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. This is in addition to internal resources of wells, springs and wadies within the Kingdom of Jordan.

(b) The requirements of Syria totalling 132 MCM will be withdrawn from the river up to the following amounts—20 MCM from the Banyas, 22 MCM from the Jordan and 90 MCM from the Yarmuk. Provisions will be made for the protection of established irrigation and power interests at Boteiha.

(c) The requirements of Lebanon will be met through withdrawal of 35 MCM annually from the Hasbani River.

It is understood that all quantities expressed above are based upon average annual supply as indicated by existing records of the discharges of the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers, and may be subject to adjustment, depending upon hydrologic conditions of these 2 rivers.

End verbatim text.

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28. Telegram From Ambassador Eric Johnston to the Department of State [1]

Rome, February 24, 1955—5 p.m.

3068. Johnston number 10. Negotiations Israel frankly disappointing. [2] In three days strenuous discussions I was able extract preliminary possible statement on water division and use Tiberias which is probably inadequate on both points so far as possible Arab acceptance concerned.

On water division we required minimum 131 MCM of Jordan River water to meet Arab adjustment 520 MCM from river. Israel offered guarantee 50 unconditionally at JX plus additional 50 recoverable by Israel if adequate wells supplies developed in Jordan. While Jordan would have prior claim to second 50 conditions imposed by Israel relating to recoverability would in my judgment virtually preclude chance obtaining Arab assent.

Re Tiberias Israel position improved somewhat from earlier insistence to storage Yarmuk water in Lake. Now prepared to accept subject to certain conditions which probably but not certainly can be met. Tiberias question deeply involved politically and probably figures more importantly in Israel thinking than quantities.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/2–2455. Confidential. Received at 3:05 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Baghdad, Brussels, and Jidda.

[2] Johnston had discussions with Israeli officials, February 20–22. Summary minutes of these conversations are *ibid.*, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, Johnston Mission Minutes of Meetings.

Re supervision Israel reiterated insistence on minimum possible since present trend is toward division formally leaving control of Jordan and Yarmuk to Israel and Arabs respectively, there is reason believe Israel can be satisfied on this point.

It was evident Sharret, Eshkol and others worried by internal political problems which compel them proceed carefully on Jordan River question. Hard bargaining position may have been effort convince Cabinet their toughness and I was informed privately by Kollek and others that final attitude will be more favorable. It is quite possible that Ministers' inability to make decision on such vital matter without prior approval Cabinet and Party leadership. If this is the case we may have clearer picture of actual position in few days. I have asked Lawson White comment local political aspects separately. [3]

In my judgment despite rigidity Israel leadership wants accept proposal ultimately and we have not yet heard their final word.

In discussion Sharret evening prior departure he inquired pointedly about Syrian attitude toward agreement, asking whether I was sure agreement in April would include Syria. In ensuing discussion he said it would be essential for Israel resume work Banat Yacob project not later than June prior Cely [*July*] elections. Sharret and Eshkol asked my opinion what would happen if this were done without agreement being concluded.

I attempted evade reply, but when pressed said I assume that matter would result Security Council action with Russia vetoing decision to leave matter to Burns. Result of resumption in these circumstances might be to draw Syrian fire with obvious possible consequences. My opinion produced dead silence. [4]

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[3] See Document 32.

[4] On March 1, Ambassador Moose, in telegram 450 from Damascus, commented: "Syrians may still be expected react strongly against unilateral Israeli resumption work Banat Yacub diversion project." (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–155)

29. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, February 24, 1955—9 p.m.

Dulte 4. At lunch today (February 23), Eden said he had discussed Arab-Israel problem with Nasser. Nasser did not react unfavorably but said any settlement would have to be on overall basis and could not be just a settlement of Jordan frontiers. Nasser implied Egypt has open mind but said problem was one of timing. Eden seemed to think what Nasser had in mind here was Iraqi-Turkish Pact, which apparently is consuming his attention. Nasser did advance thesis that territorial contiguity with other Arab states was important to Egypt and he indicated that idea of corridor was unsatisfactory.

I told Eden US was prepared to assume responsibilities and obligations to bring about settlement this problem (along lines suggested recent Washington talks) but that it must be consummated within next twelve months, and explained why this consideration of timing affected US approach.

I told Eden we would like to be able to give Nasser support for position of leadership to which he aspired in Arab world but that we could not do this until Arab-Israel problem was settled. I said we had been able to help Iraqis because they had no common border with Israel but that rendering additional assistance to Arab states contiguous to Israel prior to an Arab-Israel settlement was quite a different matter. I said Nasser should take these considerations into account.

Eden said he would advise London on urgency of moving ahead. I mentioned that Russell was going to London to follow up recent Washington talks.

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–2455. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London. Received at 3:31 p.m. Secretary Dulles was in Bangkok attending the first meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers, February 23–25.

30. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, February 24, 1955—midnight.

Secto 13. Following account luncheon conversation between Secretary and Eden on Eden–Nasser talks:

Eden said that [he] was agreeably surprised with friendliness of reception accorded him by Nasser. This was first time he had been in Egypt since conclusion Anglo-Egyptian agreement, [2] and he had not been sure just how he would be received. Eden was more convinced than ever that Suez Canal base settlement was worth all it had cost. They had discussed Middle East defense problem with Nasser, and General Harding [3] had outlined British thinking on Middle East defense strategy. Eden had taken line it was in Egypt's interest to have Middle East defense based on Caucasus rather than Suez just as in Europe UK wished its defense on Elbe and not the Channel. Everything had gone smoothly with Nasser agreeing with their ideas until Iraqi-Turkish pact came up. Nasser had been completely impervious to all arguments about desirability this treaty. His general attitude was that Egyptian people would never condone Iraqi-Turkish pact and that it was not in best interests Arab cooperation with West. Anglo-Egyptian agreement had been a very good beginning toward Arab-Western cooperation, but Iraqi-Turkish treaty was completely in wrong direction.

Nasser had said that Menderes [4] had suggested possibility of visiting Cairo, but he, Nasser, did not think it would be good idea unless Menderes would scuttle Turkish-Iraqi treaty. Eden said he told Nasser he felt sure Menderes would not do this and suggested that Nasser should accept treaty as step in right direction and assume leadership in building support for further cooperative defense efforts. His arguments had been to no avail.

Eden believed situation hinged on question of leadership in Arab world which Nasser obviously desired to assume. His opposition to Iraqi-Turkish treaty really stemmed from fact that another Arab nation had taken lead in concluding collective defense arrangement. Eden said he had concluded that while Nasser was bound to cause trouble, Iraqi-Turkish treaty should go ahead as desirable step in Middle East defense arrangements.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BA/2–2455. Secret. Received at 11:27 p.m., February 25. Repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, Ankara, and Baghdad.

[2] The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement Regarding the Suez Canal Base was signed in Cairo on October 19, 1954. For text, see 210 UNTS 3.

[3] Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.

[4] Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey.

Secretary asked how Eden expected trouble from Nasser to be manifested. Eden thought Nasser would denounce treaty at time of signature [5] and that there would be Egyptian efforts in Iraq to bring about downfall of Neri, [6] on whom Nasser had centered all his antagonism. In response to Secretary's further question, Eden said he doubted Egyptians had capacity to be successful in these activities within Iraq.

. . . . Eden said French had also been causing considerable difficulties in regard Iraqi-Turkish pact although French Ambassador London had denied when British raised this with him. Eden thought it might be wise for us to make representations to French to effect that treaty should be encouraged as step in right direction.

Eden said that when he came through Karachi, Mohammed Ali [7] had discussed Turkish-Iraqi pact. As means of getting over difficulty with Egypt, Mohammed Ali suggested possibility enlarging Turko-Pakistani treaty to include Arab nations as possible means bringing about solution difficult problem. Eden had advised him that, while this might be good idea at later stage, he felt Turkish-Iraqi defense cooperation should not be delayed but moved ahead resolutely.

Subsequently at dinner Mohammed Ali spoke to Secretary about Turkish-Iraqi pact. He said he did not think that Egypt had any right to challenge defensive buildup of the northern tier and felt that the treaty should go ahead. He also spoke of Iranian participation. The Secretary said he had the impression Iran would join as soon as it felt that it could contribute and not be in an inferior position. Ali said that he had the same view.

Dulles

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[5] Prime Minister Menderes of Turkey and Prime Minister Nuri Said of Iraq signed the Turkish-Iraqi defense pact at Baghdad on February 24. For text, see 233 UNTS 199.

[6] Presumably reference is to Nuri Said.

[7] Prime Minister of Pakistan.

31. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 1, 1955—noon.

1256. At 8:30 last night Israeli force crossed DL east of Gaza and attacked GOE forces. Following details from Gohar: Israeli strength two platoons. After crossing DL they split up into three squads. First squad blew up pump installations at edge of Gaza town which have only recently been rebuilt after previous attack. Four Egyptian soldiers killed.

Second squad attacked GOE Army camp adjacent to pump, blew up all buildings with TNT and sprayed ruins with light automatic fire. Eleven killed including captain. Sixteen injured.

Third squad took height beyond camp.

Israelis also used light mortars.

At about 10:15 p.m. GOE reinforcements advancing from south of strip on road to Gaza town ambushed by Israelis using Molotov cocktails. Twenty-two killed, fourteen injured, including lieutenant commanding platoon.

Totals thirty-seven killed, thirty injured, include one civilian killed, one wounded. Late report says one more civilian killed and one more wounded.

GOE has filed complaint requesting investigation and called for emergency MAC meeting.

Doty of *New York Times* got confirmation of story from Gohar at a.m. [*sic*] and took off by GOE military plane for Gaza with Hewett of AP at 10:15 this morning.

Comment: Gohar describes this as "most serious incident since signature armistice agreement", as "butchery" and "sneak attack". Asked if he had any ideas regarding reason for attack, Gohar said "No, things have been quiet recently along DL but Israelis were preparing for this." He then said Reuters despatch received 4 a.m. here carried statement issued by Israeli Army spokesman four hours before attack accusing GOE intelligence agents of intensified activity in Negev. [2]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–155. Confidential; Priority. Received at 2:01 p.m. Repeated priority to London, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and USUN. Although appointed Ambassador to Egypt on January 24, Byroade did not present his credentials until March 7.

[2] Reference is to an article entitled "Egypt Blamed in Raids" in the *New York Times*, March 1, 1955, p. 2.

Gohar denied any knowledge GOE decisions which may be taken as result attack. He personally thinks matter should be taken to SC after MAC meeting.

Byroade

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32. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 1, 1955—4 p.m.

738. Embassy submits following comments in pursuance Ambassador Johnston's request Rome's telegram to Department 3068 (Johnston 10 [2]):

1. Division of waters. Embassy believes that Johnston's position (that he should not return to area until Israelis have agreed to formula for which there is reasonable chance acceptance Arab States) is a sound one and should be maintained. His suggestion that he endeavor obtain Jordan agreement acceptance 482 MCMs river water with balance to 520 to be made up well drilling appears equitable; would give Israelis the allocation they suggested at working level their June 28 memo; [3] and would provide GOI water availabilities necessary completion economically sound projects Jordan water with some balance for projects which appear marginal from cost standpoint.

2. Use of Tiberias. Key is to find formula which GOI can present to public as representing no further derogation exercise its sovereignty lake and adjacent areas. This explains Israelis insistence delivery be at point beyond Tiberias and reason GOI might not have similar strong objection control point in demilitarized zone which is already subject measure UNTSO control. Embassy informed by Kollek GOI considering sending Weiner to Washington for consultation with Bureau of Reclamation engineers "friendly to Israel" re control formula. Danger this approach is that Weiner will come up with formula bearing stamp approval USG technicians which would prove unacceptable Arab side. Suggest, therefore, that if Weiner's

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–155. Confidential. Received at 10:09 a.m., March 2. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, Ankara, Baghdad, Jidda, Rome, and Brussels.

[2] Document 28.

[3] Not printed.

trip materializes, Bureau of Reclamation technicians be integrated Johnston's staff and all discussions be held under supervision his staff.

3. With Finance Minister Eshkol, Kollek and Sapir all converging on US and Washington next few days,[4] inter-relation water negotiations and other aspects US economic policy toward said program in Israel assumes special importance. Israelis interested obtaining (1) surplus commodities increase stocks, (2) surplus commodities to meet abnormal requirement arising drought conditions here, (3) additional allocation fiscal year 55 economic aid, (4) and largest possible allocation fiscal year 56 aid. GOI with four years US economic aid behind it tends to regard this operation as separate one not closely related other US economic objectives in the area. Furthermore, GOI has become used to working through a number of channels in Washington.

In view of foregoing and taking into account obvious and legitimate USG interest relation local sales proceeds and counterpart to any US financial participation water development, conclusion reached is that at this juncture it is of utmost importance that USG speak with one voice in all economic and financial discussions with Israelis.

Lawson

[4] See Document 49.

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33. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 1, 1955—5 p.m.

740. Tekoah, Chargé Armistice Affairs, Foreign Ministry, has given Embassy following interpretation genesis combat action Gaza Strip last night.

1. Israel action was an explosion of pent-up feeling which has been mounting for some time and which reached conclusive point with February 25 murder Israel cyclist 40 kms. inside Israel territory,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–155. Confidential; Priority. Received at 2:56 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and Jidda.

plus conclusive evidence Egyptian operations in Israel were being directed by central organization of Egyptian Government.

2. These were acts of war and had convinced Israelis that Nasser, Gohar, Salem, had meant what they said in recent statements that state of war existed between Egypt and Israel. Furthermore Egypt had taken position before Security Council in *Bat Galim* case that state of belligerency existed between the two countries.

3. Tekoah concluded by saying that Israel had filed a complaint and requested emergency meeting Egyptian-Israel MAC on the grounds action last night had commenced by attack on Israel army unit as per IDF communiqué. (Embtel 737 [2]).

Lawson

[2] Dated March 1; it transmitted reports concerning the military action the previous night, including the text of an IDF communiqué. (*Ibid.*)

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34. Editorial Note

On March 1, the Representative of Egypt informed the President of the United Nations Security Council that on February 28 an Israeli armed force had crossed the armistice demarcation line east of Gaza and attacked an Egyptian military camp. As a result of that attack and of the ambush of Egyptian reinforcements, 37 members of the Egyptian Armed Forces and two civilians had been killed; another 30 members of the armed forces and two civilians had been injured. (U.N. doc. S/3365) On March 2, Egypt's Representative addressed another letter to the President of the Security Council requesting that the Security Council urgently consider this act of "violent and premeditated" Israeli aggression. (U.N. doc. S/3367)

On March 3, the Representative of Israel, in turn, asked the Security Council to place on its agenda a complaint alleging that Egypt had employed the following techniques to violate the terms of the Egypt–Israel General Armistice Agreement as well as the provisions of various Security Council resolutions: 1) attacks of regular and irregular Egyptian Armed Forces against Israeli Armed Forces; 2) assaults of raiders from Egyptian-controlled territory on lives and property in Israel; 3) failure of the Government of Egypt to adopt and enforce effective measures against such acts of violence; 4) assertion by Egypt of the existence of a state of war and the exercise of active belligerency against Israel, particularly the enforcement of

blockade measures; 5) warlike propaganda and threats against the territorial integrity and political independence of Israel; and 6) refusal of Egypt to seek agreement by negotiations for an effective transition from the present armistice to peace. (U.N. doc. S/3368)

On March 4, the Security Council, at its 692d meeting, placed the Egyptian and Israeli complaints on its agenda and then adjourned consideration of the matter until it had received the report of Major General E.L.M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 692) Meeting again on March 17, the Security Council considered the Chief of Staff's report. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 693) In this document, Burns informed the Security Council that on March 6, the Egypt–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission had found Israel responsible for the attack at Gaza and had decided that it was a violation of the General Armistice Agreement. Reviewing the situation along the armistice demarcation line, the Chief of Staff said that the number of casualties prior to the Gaza incident reflected the comparative tranquillity which had prevailed in the area during the greater part of the period from November 1954 to February 1955. However, repeated minor incidents had helped to create a state of tension of which one of the main causes, though not the only cause, had undoubtedly been infiltration from Egyptian-controlled territory. In order to decrease the tension along the demarcation line, General Burns suggested that the two parties should examine in an informal manner the possibility of agreeing on certain measures: 1) institution of joint patrols along sensitive sections of the demarcation line; 2) negotiation of a local commanders' agreement; 3) erection of a barbed wire obstacle along certain portions of the demarcation line; and 4) manning of all outposts and patrols by regular Egyptian and Israeli soldiers. In conclusion, the Chief of Staff said that he was of the opinion that, if an agreement were effected along the lines he had suggested, infiltration could be reduced to an occasional nuisance—"a kind of thieving which Israel must probably regard as inevitable"—as long as there were large numbers of poverty-stricken refugees on its border. (U.N. doc. S/3373)

On March 28, the Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted to the Security Council two draft resolutions referring respectively to the Gaza incident and to general conditions along the armistice demarcation line. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 694) On March 29, the Council unanimously adopted the first resolution. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 695) In this document, the Security Council noted that the Egypt–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission had determined that Israeli authorities had prearranged and planned an attack by Israeli regular army forces against Egyptian army forces in the Gaza Strip on February 28, condemned that attack, and called

upon Israel to take all necessary measures to prevent such actions. (U.N. doc. S/3378)

On March 30, the Security Council met again and unanimously adopted the second resolution. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 696) In it, the Council requested the Chief of Staff to continue his consultations with the Governments of Egypt and Israel with a view to introducing practical measures to preserve security in the area, noted the concrete proposals already made by the Chief of Staff, and called upon the two governments to cooperate with the Chief of Staff with regard to his proposals. (U.N. doc. S/3379)

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35. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 1, 1955—7 p.m.

1261. Shortly after my arrival I received word that Gamal Abdel Nasser would like to meet with me secretly at an early date and without regard to waiting my presentation of credentials. I met with him last night for a lengthy discussion in a private home. He was accompanied by Zakaria Mohieddin, Ali Sabri, and Major Touhami.

Entire evening devoted to discussion of Turk-Iraq pact and Egyptian line fully reported in messages prior to my arrival. I sensed an intense dislike for Nuri Said as a person that I had not previously taken into account in my attempt to assess present emotional situation. Nasser himself was more restrained than his colleagues and I got impression he was either tired of talking about problem or realized that RCC were out on a limb from which it would be hard to crawl back. He seemed at times to be aware that Egypt had suffered a defeat and made frequent references to "what is done is done and there is no point in assessing blame. Instead we should all think in terms of the future".

I am unable at this early stage to understand fully the apparent depth of Egyptian feeling. There is no doubt in my mind that Nasser sincerely feels he was cast aside by US in favor of Nuri of Iraq. I believe he feels that he had presented a definite alternative to the West, although in our logic any plan he has spoken of in the past has been entirely nebulous. I believe he had conceived that his task

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123-Byroade, Henry A. Secret. Received at 7:51 p.m. Repeated to London.

was to bring all the Arab States as a bloc towards the West as quickly as Egyptian and Arab public opinion would permit. He conceived this task as being accomplished without any additional formal agreements, relying instead upon present arrangements of the US and British with the Arab world. This bloc would gain strength with our assistance and we would rely upon our trust in them as individuals to assure ourselves that they would be on our side in event of war. The injection of an actual new treaty arrangement of one Arab State with Turkey (i.e. West) he interprets as a great set-back to his own plans of bringing into being a genuine pro-Western sentiment among the people.

I did not feel in this first meeting in the presence of his advisers that I should speak fully about what the United States can and cannot support as a practical matter in this area. In their present mood they probably would have interpreted my remarks as threats from the US. I did attempt to set the record clear as to what the US had and had not done and as to why, in our view, developments beginning with Pakistan in the northern area were beneficial. In the general line of my exposition I made certain they are under no illusions that we can support a unified Arab Army under present circumstances in the Middle East.

The meeting was in a friendly atmosphere and ended by Nassar saying he wished another talk "on the future" in 4 or 5 days. I suppose he chose this timing to allow Salah Salem return from the other Arab States prior to further conversations with me. [2]

Byroade

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[2] Major Salah Salem, Egyptian Minister for National Guidance, arrived in Damascus on February 26 to discuss an Egyptian proposal for a defense pact among those Arab States that opposed alliances with non-Arab powers. On March 2, the Syrian and Egyptian Governments signed a communiqué indicating that they had agreed to refrain from joining the Turkish-Iraqi pact or any other alliances, to establish a joint Arab defense and economic cooperation pact, and to advance these objectives with other Arab States. Salem then visited Jordan and Saudi Arabia seeking support for the accord. On March 6, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia released the communiqué, which subsequently became known as the ESS Pact. For text, see Noble Frankland (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs, 1955*, pp. 326–327.

36. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 1, 1955—8 p.m.

1263. Shortly after my first formal call on Fawzi today (Embassy telegram 1262 [2]) he requested I return to discuss incident last night at Gaza. He reported they had decided take matter immediately to Security Council. He wished me to know as a friend of their contemplated action and requested Washington be informed as we [*sic*] members Security Council.

Fawzi stated this first really serious attack this border since armistice agreement and was far more serious than Qibya, as this an attack by armed forces against armed forces. He stated they were in dilemma as on one hand they wished observe rules and did not believe that two wrongs can make one right. On other hand they had to take note their position before world, and particularly at present moment before other Arab States, if they suffered direct attack on their armed forces by Israel and took no action. I counselled moderation to which he agreed but added that he was personally greatly concerned there might be other events.

I left copy of message from General Burns (Jerusalem Embassy telegram 210 [3]) which Fawzi had apparently already received and answered. He informed me he had expressed his deep regrets to Burns and promised immediate investigation.

If fuller investigation verifies facts substantially as believed here now, am at complete loss to understand timing of Israeli action. As seen from here this act may do much to reunite the Arab world minus Iraq and could even spur along to success Salah Salem's pressuring toward the creation of a unified Arab army.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–155. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:16 p.m. Also sent priority to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and London. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Paris, and USUN.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/3–155)

[3] Telegram 210, March 1, transmitted a message from Burns to Fawzi assuring him that an investigation of the "deplorable" incident at Gaza was being initiated, informing him that Burns had received a report of an attack on the MAC Office by "a riotous crowd" in Gaza, and requesting adequate police protection for U.N. personnel in the future. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/3–155)

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 1, 1955—10 p.m.

743. Prime Minister has invited me to "private luncheon" his residence Thursday March 3. I assume this is one of "informal personal talks" which we recently agreed to hold from time to time. There has been no indication of subject to be discussed but from timing I anticipate he will raise subject combat action at Gaza Strip night February 28 (Embassy telegrams 737, 739, 740, 741 [2]) explaining Israel's side. It seems likely he will also raise subject of Israel's foreign relations situation and conditions which make moderation extremely difficult if not impossible to follow unless there is a more definite basis for relief of Israel's feeling of insecurity due to recent developments in area.

It is too early to definitely assess Gaza Strip action in terms Israel's foreign policy but in view that action Department may wish send me guidance prior my talk with Sharett. [3]

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–155. Confidential; Priority. Received at 7:32 a.m., March 2. Also sent to Cairo and Jerusalem. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and Jidda.

[2] These telegrams, all dated March 1, concerned the military action in the Gaza Strip the previous night. For telegrams 737 and 740, see Document 33 and footnote 2 thereto. Telegram 739 transmitted the text of a U.N. communiqué of that date and a report on the IDF briefing the night before. Telegram 741 reported information received from the Chairman of the Israel-Egypt Mixed Armistice Commission. Both are in Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–155.

[3] On March 2, Ambassador Lawson received the following instructions from the Department of State: "Since Department has not yet received news EIMAC decision Gaza strip incident, suggest you confine your comments this incident to communicating impression Department gravely concerned over preliminary reports. Case coming before Security Council March 4. FYI US attitude will be governed by MAC findings." (Telegram 486 to Tel Aviv, *ibid.*)

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38. Editorial Note

On March 3, at the 239th meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, discussed the Gaza incident during his briefing on significant world developments

affecting United States security. According to the memorandum of discussion, it was his opinion that:

"This action had been apparently precipitated by the Israelis, though their reasons for doing so at this particular time were difficult to fathom. The resort to force, thought Mr. Dulles, might simply reflect the return of the strong man, Ben-Gurion, as Minister of Defense; but again, there was no clear and precise motivation which could be cited." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

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39. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 4, 1955—noon.

1279. For the Secretary. Absence of USG comment re Gaza attack beginning to be noticeable here. Headline this morning *Egyptian Gazette* gives British position as follows:

"Britain blames Israel: attack premeditated". Article quotes authoritative British sources in Foreign Office attributable mostly to Nutting. Radio Ankara last night took same line for Turkish Government. British Embassy locally has now found ways of letting their feelings leak to press. Embassy has not commented to press.

The above and other factors will cause US position in SC to be reviewed with extraordinary scrutiny.

Department will of course be aware that all this bodes ill for operation Alpha and timetable at least will have to be readjusted. Egyptian authorities (with exception of the travelling Salah Salem) are exercising remarkable restraint re attack and its aftermath of refugee rioting but will be some time before they forget their dead and be willing to cooperate with us in finding overall solution.

I told Eban prior to my departure [2] that I would work on Egypt as quickly as possible to advance general relations between Israel and Egypt, the lifting of the blockade, et cetera as I knew this to be in interests my own country as well as Israel. I strongly urged restraint on their part on matters relating to Egypt in order that we might have climate here in which to work. I told him past experi-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–455. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 11:39 a.m. Repeated to London and Tel Aviv.

[2] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

ence had led me to fear however that just as we felt we were getting into position to accomplish some gain an act of Israel might make such progress impossible.

This Embassy will of course utilize any and every possible opening to accomplish the intent of operation Alpha. Department must of course weigh other aspects in arriving at a course of action on the Gaza incident bearing in mind that a strong stand will greatly assist us here. Needless to say stand taken will also greatly affect our general position in this country and in other neighboring states at this rather critical time.

Byroade

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40. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 4, 1955—8 p.m.

754. Re Embtel 743, March 3 [*1*]. [2] At private luncheon with Prime Minister today I found him more relaxed and calm than at any time since my arrival in Israel. Although last night he had given important foreign policy review before Knesset he showed little tenseness over that experience and more significantly I believe, reflected no serious compunction over Gaza strip event.

The sole subject of discussion which produced luncheon invitation appeared to be the Turkey–Iraq pact. In that connection he immediately drew attention to his Knesset speech on subject and responsibilities on US deriving from American policy in Middle East which supports pact. He repeated in general the principal points reported Embtel 753 [3] but underscored US responsibilities. He said exchange of letters between Iraq and Turkey amending pact [4] came

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–455. Confidential; Priority. Received at 10:40 a.m. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Jidda, London, and Paris.

[2] Document 37.

[3] Dated March 2, it reported remarks on the Turco-Iraqi Pact which Sharett had made that day in the Knesset. (Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–355)

[4] In letters exchanged at the conclusion of the Turco-Iraqi Pact on February 24, Prime Ministers Nuri al-Said and Menderes pledged close collaboration to repulse aggression against either country and to secure the implementation of all U.N. resolutions pertaining to Palestine and forming the basis of the Arab position vis-à-vis Israel.

as surprise as he had received definite assurances . . . there would be no statement in pact referring to UN resolutions. This was most important objection of Israel to original communiqué on pact.

. . . . . .

Sharett admitted quite frankly that terms of exchange of letters not likely to be put into practical effect. He said, "This would mean a bloody war and there is not going to be a bloody war." Nevertheless, he said, the psychological effect on the Arab world is tremendous. Fact that Turkey endorses anti-Israel policies of Iraq must give tremendous boost to Arab anti-Israel campaign and attitude. His remarks in this field followed closely those reported by Embassy and in fact he implied desire that his main points Knesset speech be transmitted to Department.

In reply to my direct inquiry he admitted that pact had brought deterioration in Israel public attitude towards the US although there had been no change in Israeli foreign policy with regard to US as result of pact. It merely meant, he said, that Israel's isolation and exclusion from Middle East defense system became more highly emphasized in minds of people and government and that latter felt more strongly, "that it recognizes its contractual responsibilities with regard to the defense of the state".

Also in response to my direct inquiry as to whether pact had altered Israel's foreign relations policy with regard to Arab states and in fact changed government's recent past policy of moderation, he replied in the negative. In this connection, he introduced, and apparently without premeditation, the Gaza strip incident and told me emphatically that there was no direct connection between the pact signing and the incident. As he put it, the direct reflection of the signing of the pact occurred in the field of public opinion which universally supported the Gaza strip action of Israel's military forces but was is no way the actuating instrument.

I then inquired directly whether timing factor had been involved and if so, why had the Gaza incident taken place at this particular time. He showed amazement that there should be any suggestion of timing of the incident and then engaged in a discussion of the final factors which led up to the high pressure for action under which the IDF had recently been existing. The principal reason being in his terms the fact that, "We have definitely traced recent act of sabotage, espionage and murder to the Egyptian Government Intelligence center at Gaza." (It is interesting to note that at no time in discussing this subject did he claim that the incident was retaliatory in nature following Egyptian military attacks upon Israel military forces, as has been claimed by IDF.) He seemed to be placing the

basis of the action on an "explosion which had to come after a build-up of tension and might have occurred at any time." Throughout this discussion of this dramatic incident he showed one [*none?*] of the usual emphatic and over-tense treatment of the subject.

I then asked him, also directly, whether the Gaza strip incident was indicative of a change in policy and was in fact the embarkation on a more activist policy, or whether the fact moderation policy which he had been fostering would continue. He told me that there was definitely no change in policy in that respect. He admitted that his efforts to encourage the policy of moderation were not now so effective and it was more difficult for him than in the past to follow this line, but that in principle there had been no change insofar as he was concerned. He described the incident, "as merely an episode—an episode which could occur again but which we hope will not have to recur." In subsequent discussion he again referred to the Gaza strip incident as an "episode". He admitted that the incident had been carried somewhat further than originally intended and that there were considerably more casualties than had ever been anticipated. This he ascribed to the high pitch of tension under which the military forces operated.

I then spoke of the rather popular impression in certain quarters and what appeared to be rather logical under the circumstances, that is, that the incident was co-incident with the return of Ben Gurion to the government, and thus was indicative of the beginning of a less moderate policy as result of his return to the government. This he denied strongly but he did make this somewhat ambiguous statement, "I am not saying that this incident would not have occurred had Ben Gurion been outside the government but it could have occurred just as easily. Ben Gurion and I are in complete accord." He then made it a point of suggesting that I might call on Ben Gurion at the Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv especially since Ben Gurion had invited me to visit him some weeks ago. I gathered from this suggestion that BG might be able to support and explain the governments actions and policies under present conditions as Sharett himself had endeavored to explain them to me. Just before I left after lunch he again assured me that the return of Ben Gurion to the government has had no effect on the government's foreign policy.

In discussing the detrimental psychological effects of the Turkish-Iraq pact to Israel's position, the Prime Minister expressed the opinion that [garble] obvious fear of Arab and especially Iraq's reaction to a Turkish-Israel trade agreement conference, also put Turkey in an unfavorable and weakened position with regard to Iraq. This would greatly encourage Arab action against Israel.

Embassy comment: It seems likely that Prime Minister was presenting GOI cases in light in which he desired USG to regard them. While not acceptable as presented, complete evaluation will involve consideration many factors and Embassy will present considered comments as soon as possible.

Lawson

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41. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 4, 1955—8 p.m.

757. Re recent Cabinet change and return of Ben Gurion to direct participation in government (Embtel 698 [2]), Gaza incident (Embtel 737 [3]), and my talk with Prime Minister Sharett March 3 (Embtel 754 [4]).

Embassy's current appraisal portent of events follows: Consensus is that Gaza incident was the result of a Cabinet decision (probably Sunday, February 28) and attack had full government approval. It was not only carefully planned, timed, and executed, but full consideration was given to resultant impact. Objective use officially determined and force necessary for success of operation carefully chosen.

Prime Minister's statement to me that incident had been carried somewhat further than originally intended, seems proof of government planning even though action may have been more "successful" than originally conceived. Sharett's statement he and Ben Gurion were in complete accord, reinforces belief that action was result of Cabinet decision, despite fact above assertion was included in an ambiguous statement to me suggesting incident could have occurred even if Ben Gurion had not been in government.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–455. Secret; Niact. Received at 6:58 a.m., March 5. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Jidda, London, and Paris. Repeated niact to USUN.

[2] The Embassy in Tel Aviv notified the Department on February 18 that the Israeli Government the preceding evening, February 17, had announced Lavon's resignation as Minister of Defense, and that he had been replaced by Ben-Gurion, whose appointment "had not been anticipated." (*Ibid.*, 784A.5/2–1855)

[3] See footnote 2, Document 33.

[4] *Supra*.

I understood Sharett's explanation that Gaza action did not represent any change in policy toward Arab States, but was simply an "episode" which could happen again but he hoped would not, designed to convince me that this was not to be a continuing policy. On the other hand, it was obvious that he was leaving matter open, that the Israel Government was maintaining its right to freedom of action and that there was no real assurance that there has not, in fact, been a change in policy.

Israel motives, as reconstructed by Embassy, probably included:

(1) On international front, attack designed to show UN, US and Great Britain that Israel Government was reaching the end of its rope in following policy of moderation. The signing of Turco-Iraq pact had left it isolated in the area; it felt a sense of frustration because its views were being ignored in the west's long-term planning; its relative strength vis-à-vis the Arab world was about to suffer; time was running against Israel; there was need to regain initiative and to set stage dramatically in Security Council for reconsideration of *Bat Galim* and other matters by broadening of issue. Israel Government, therefore, felt it had to respond to [*by*] showing world that it would not hesitate to meet "its contractual responsibilities to the defense of the state" as Sharett told me.

(2) As for Arabs, the action seems to have been designed to show once again Israel's belief that only way to make Arabs come to terms is through force and that Israel is ready to return to a more openly "get tough" policy if Arabs make the mistake of interpreting past restraint as sign of weakness.

(3) On domestic front, IG knew that move would be popular in all sectors and quell criticism of government in some; among border settlers it would serve to calm increasing nervousness and assure them of government concern for their safety; it would serve to strengthen the Mapai party position which had suffered by recent Cabinet crisis; it was an effective pre-election move.

The influence of Ben Gurion in the government, his dynamism and his response to public opinion are reflected in the action taken and the foregoing analysis of probable Israel motives. Even Sharett has admitted this indirectly by telling me that in principal there has been no change in the moderation policy he had been fostering "insofar as he was concerned", but that his efforts to encourage it were not now so effective and it was more difficult than in the past for him to follow this line. His statement to me that, "Ben Gurion and I are in complete accord" might well mean that he now agrees with Ben Gurion's tougher attitude.

The choice of Egypt as a target may have been based on the following considerations:

(a) As the strongest of the Arab states, it was the most suitable target for a devastating raid which would lower the prestige of its army in the eyes of the Arab world.

(b) Following *Bat Galim* case, Cairo trial and spy executions there was a popular demand to do something to Egypt.

(c) Egypt's claim that the state of belligerency with Israel still exists offered good excuse to take limited military action to show Egypt what the implication of that claim meant.

(d) Egypt's refusal to comply with UN resolution of freedom of passage through Suez Canal [5] is the most damaging of all Arab economic boycott measures and the one which Israel wants most to eliminate. If the Arabs applied economic boycott measures without restraint and indulged in cold-war propaganda without curb, Israel would show Egypt and the Arab world that it could use the weapon best suited to its purpose, armed force.

Lawson

[5] Reference is to the U.N. Security Council resolution adopted on September 1, 1951. (U.N. doc. S/2322)

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42. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 4, 1955—8 p.m.

760. Two events past week are relevant to any planning looking towards Arab-Israel settlement.

Firstly, sands of time ran out on Israel moderation policy before basic concept had been developed to point where it could be discussed with Sharett along lines suggested Embdes 413, January 7, [2] fourth paragraph, section A. Gaza Strip action, in our judgment, is symptomatic of shift in Israel attitudes and tactics how to deal with Arabs and, possibly, with the US. Problem creation quiet and unemotional atmosphere has shifted from one of urging improvement Israel moderation, to much more formidable one of obtaining reversal new activist trends.

Secondly, Prime Minister in address to Knesset March 2 set forth thesis that guarantee (by western powers) of Israel's borders and of defense against aggression is not enough and that help was necessary to "increase our defensive potential". (Paragraphs 5 and 6,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–455. Top Secret; Priority, Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 8:51 a.m., March 5. Repeated priority to London, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Ankara, Jidda, Jerusalem, and Damascus.

[2] Document 4.

Embtel 753 [3].) It has thus become matter of public record, as well as of stated policy, that GOI basic "requirements" include maintenance balance military power as between Israel and Arab states, as well as stronger guarantees.

It is our view that Israel still regards Egypt as key factor in any rapprochement with Arab states and that Gaza Strip action may have provided for the time being the emotional and political (domestic) outlet apparently needed to compensate for *Bat Galim* failure, hanging two Israel spies, accumulation grievances along the border, and Turk-Iraqi pact especially exchange of letters. Whether this action leaves any hope early approach to Egypt and other Arab states resettlement problem in question we will leave to US mission Cairo and other missions Arab capitals. It is our judgment, however, that GOI will not be prepared to give serious consideration to specific proposals, such as resettlement of refugees, compensation for them or border adjustments, unless US is prepared simultaneously to discuss Israel security requirements as per preceding paragraph.

Lawson

[3] See footnote 3, Document 40.

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43. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, White House, Washington, March 5, 1955 [1]

OTHERS PRESENT

Mr. Eric Johnston
Colonel Goodpaster

[Here follows Ambassador Johnston's account of his activities at the recently concluded Inter-American Investment Conference in New Orleans.]

Turning to a discussion of his negotiation with the Arab nations and the Israelis concerning the project for development of water resources in the Jordan area, Mr. Johnston reported that before his trip he had thought he could obtain Israeli agreement but would have great difficulty with the Arab states (since he had revised his plan to give 40% of the water to Israel). After considerable difficul-

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries. Drafted by Goodpaster

ties, he had brought the Arabs to a point where they were ready to agree; however Israel then insisted upon 50% of the water, and although he got them to lower this figure, he could not get them below a figure of approximately 43%. He discussed the intensity of feeling on both sides, and discussed also possibilities for obtaining Israeli agreement.

G
Colonel, CE, U S Army

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44. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, March 9, 1955—3 p.m.

3930. From Russell. 1. As a result meetings past ten days [2] (attended by Shuckburgh, Beeley, Rose, [3] Arthur, Vallat, Simpson [4] Berncastle, [5] Belgrave [6] and others Foreign Office; by myself, Burdett, Gardiner and Troxel for Department; Wilson and Mak for Embassy) we have agreed (on ad referendum basis) upon the elements of a settlement between Israel and Arab States which US and UK might at proper time and in appropriate ways urge upon the two sides. Eden has asked to discuss Alpha with me this afternoon. [7] I will arrive Washington Saturday. [8]

2. Israeli raid on Gaza has, of course, greatly increased difficulties of launching Alpha. Shuckburgh and I feel, however, that US–UK should continue to make the acceptance and implementation of what we believe could be an equitable settlement one of the guiding considerations in our policy toward the area during coming months.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–955. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 1:12 p.m. Repeated to Cairo.

[2] Summary minutes of these meetings prepared by British officials are *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, London Talks, Feb.–March 1955: Minutes of Meetings held Feb. 28 thru March 10 (Mimeo).

[3] Edward Michael Rose, Head of Levant Department in the British Foreign Office.

[4] Presumably Kenneth John Simpson, Assistant Head of Levant Department for Economic and Social Development in the Middle East in the British Foreign Office.

[5] J.M. Berncastle, an official of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine.

[6] Thomas Robert Dalrymple Belgrave.

[7] See Document 46.

[8] March 12.

3. With respect to Israel, we suggest that US–UK take position that because of overriding need which must concern all of us, including Israel, we intend to continue with our policy of strengthening the Middle East against outside aggression by working out agreements based on the northern tier approach. Because of the state of Arab feeling toward Israel, not improved since the Gaza raid, it is not possible to consider associating Israel with these area defense arrangements at this time. First essential is to get these arrangements into shape. When this has been achieved and when state of Israel's relations with the Arab States permits, we would be prepared to consider discussions with Israel about its role in area defense. Concerning Israel's need for intra-area security we should say that, as IG has already been informed, this problem is receiving our active consideration; that we are not disposed to assume obligations with respect to the security of a border which is continuously marked by border raids and military actions and that we therefore are giving consideration to steps that could be taken to produce a genuine reduction of tension as a prelude to security undertakings. The IG's Gaza raid has obviously set back for sometime the possibility of success in this effort but we intend to press forward with it, and, in view of Israel's need for security guarantees, we entertain the hope we may receive more cooperation in the future than we have in the past in our efforts to reduce tensions. (With respect to economic aid and the supplying of military equipment, e.g. British tanks, French planes, and US small arms, we might tighten up or delay somewhat but gauge our restrictions by the likelihood of their promoting IG cooperations.)

4. Shuckburgh and I continue to believe that Egyptian Government is the one through which efforts to obtain Arab agreement should be initiated, difficult as this may appear at the moment. There appear to us to be four possibilities: (a) Give our representatives in Cairo discretion to approach Nasser at an early date (but bearing in mind state of UK–Iraq treaty negotiations [9]). As point of departure, they could make use of Gaza raid as symptomatic of situation which weakens Egypt's position at home and abroad; and then make points outlined in brief prepared for Eden's talk with Nasser; or (b) wait two or three months for present tensions to relax and then make approach to Nasser; or (c) if at end of four or five months approach to Nasser has not proved feasible, explore possibilities of approach to Jordan; or (d) if none of above prove possible

[9] The United Kingdom and Iraq were engaged in negotiations which led, on April 4, to the signing of an agreement terminating the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and securing British adherence to the Iraqi-Turkish pact of February 24. Two days thereafter, on April 6, the new Anglo-Iraqi agreement came into effect.

publicize some such plan as Alpha as a solution advocated by western powers. A variant would be to try to arrange Pakistan-Turkish sponsorship ostensible authorship.

5. In Security Council consideration of Gaza incident, it will, of course, be difficult for any resolution which may be passed to avoid urging parties to move toward settlement. Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that in view of Arab sentiments toward UN role in Palestine they would be predisposed to reject Alpha proposals at outset if they believed US–UK effort at over-all settlement stemmed from Israel use of force at Gaza and from resulting UN recommendation. From this point of view, it would be preferable to have any reference to settlement go no further than those in previous resolutions.

Aldrich

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45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, March 9, 1955—4:09 p.m.

510. For Ambassador. You should call upon Sharett soonest and give him following oral message from Secretary:

"1. I had been led believe that present Government of Israel was sincerely interested in the reduction of tension in the area and to that end was pursuing a policy of restraint and moderation. The recent incident in Gaza raises questions as to the validity of this assumption.

2. The USG has consistently opposed reprisal raids. The facts have shown that such raids dangerously heighten existing tensions. The very insecurity of which Israel complains is aggravated by such a policy.

3. You will recall that since August 1954, at your Ambassador's urgent request, I have been personally engaged in the study of possible measures looking toward the alleviation of the feelings of apprehension and isolation which, according to the Israel Govern-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–956. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bergus and Hart and cleared with Secretary Dulles by Allen, who also signed for Dulles. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, and USUN.

ment, were besetting the people of Israel.[2] I advised you on February 14[3] that good progress had been made in this study and pointed out the necessity for continued calm in the area and the helpful effect of Israel's policy of moderation. The Gaza incident, which has re-inflamed hatreds, will of necessity require reorientation of this study to take account of existing facts.

4. Our common interest requires that there be a reduction of tension in the Near East as a means of strengthening the area for defense against the Communist threat. It is the firm intention of the USG to continue to work toward these objectives and our policy toward Israel will be formulated in the light of this intention. I bespeak Israel's full cooperation in this endeavor. I have not been reassured by the characterization of the Gaza incident as 'merely an episode' which presumably might recur."[4]

Dulles

[2] For summaries of the Secretary's conversations of August 4 and 7, 1954, with Ambassador Eban, see telegrams 61 and 72 to Tel Aviv, August 4 and 7, in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 1600 and 1604, respectively.

[3] See Document 22.

[4] Lawson informed the Department on March 13 that he had delivered the Secretary's message on March 12 to Sharett, who reiterated his previous statements that the Gaza incident represented no change in Israel's basic policy; that Israel would continue to pursue a policy of moderation; but that Israel had used forceful methods in this instance to protect its national security interests. (Telegram 777 from Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–1355)

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46. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State[1]

London, March 10, 1955—6 p.m.

3958. I accompanied Russell in discussion of Alpha yesterday with Eden and Shuckburgh.[2] After hearing outline of proposed settlement Eden stated it seemed to him to be on right lines.

Re timing Eden said he attracted by idea of early approach. He expressed concern about Nasser's internal position in light recent events and desires to do what possible help him. Approach along lines proposed might provide Nasser way out his present dilemma. Eden suggested consulting Stevenson and Byroade regarding ap-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–1055. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; Received at 7:10 p.m. Repeated to Cairo.

[2] The British summary record of this meeting with Foreign Secretary Eden on March 9 is *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, London Talks, Feb.–March 1955: (1) Memo of Conv. of 3/9 with Eden; (2) FHR's letr of 3/10 to Byroade.

proach at present time. If their advice favorable they might be given discretion test ground. Important, however, bear in mind avoiding actions which might enable Nasser cause difficulties over conclusion new UK–Iraq treaty. Meeting agreed Byroade should make first move.

Eden felt it preferable not to use Egypt's possible dilemma over Gaza incident as basis of approach but stress unique position of Egypt in Arab world and important role Nasser could play in helping towards settlement. He thought brief prepared for his visit to Cairo could be drawn upon by Ambassadors.

Eden agreed in general with suggested US–UK position towards Israel described paragraph 3 Embassy telegram 3930 [3] but thought it should contain stronger condemnation policy of reprisals as damaging to Israel's whole position and her relations with West.

Russell outlined Byroade's views re proposed Egyptian pact with Syria and Saudi Arabia (Cairo's 1312 to Department) particularly point 9 C. [4] Eden agreed with general proposition we should avoid unnecessary condemnation Egypt's plans until we see how they worked. He felt however we must not allow Egyptians to spread belief our support Turk-Iraq pact weakened; moreover, effectiveness Turk-Iraq arrangements would be weakened if Syria permanently excluded. Eden added he did not wish to attack pact unnecessarily and had avoided questions in Commons so far re Egyptian pact but it might be difficult to continue to do so. [5]

Aldrich

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[3] Document 44.

[4] In telegram 1312, March 8, Ambassador Byroade recommended to the Department that while the United States could not support Egypt's efforts to conclude a security agreement with Syria and Saudi Arabia, public expression of disapproval would be counter productive. Subparagraph 9(c) reads as follows:

"Tell Egyptians we take realistic and practical view of Middle East defense problem and are adopting a wait and see attitude as to how new arrangements will shape up and under what rules." (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–855)

[5] Ambassador Aldrich subsequently informed the Department that Eden "said he was encouraged at the progress made so far and seemed quite hopeful about the future prospects for this operation [Alpha]." (Telegram 3972 from London, March 11; *ibid.*, 684A.86/3–1155)

47. Record of a Meeting, British Foreign Office, London, March 10, 1955, 10:15 a.m.[1]

PALESTINE SETTLEMENT

United Kingdom
Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. Simpson

United States
Mr. Russell
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Burdett
Mr. Mak

A. The Timing of Alpha

Mr. Shuckburgh recalled that when the Secretary of State received Mr. Russell on March 9[2] he had been favourably impressed by the broad outlines of the Alpha settlement and had thought that an early approach to Colonel Nasser might be desirable. It would be necessary to seek the views of the United Kingdom and United States Ambassadors[3] in Cairo as to whether the balance of advantage was for or against sounding Nasser in the context of the present difficult political situation. The Foreign Office were ready to send a suitable telegram to Sir Ralph Stevenson at the appropriate time.

Mr. Russell said that immediately on his return to Washington he would report personally to Mr. Dulles and would inform him of Sir Anthony Eden's views. He would recommend to Secretary Dulles that simultaneous telegrams be sent from Washington and London to the two representatives at Cairo asking for their joint views and emphasising the need to avoid disturbing the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty negotiations.[4]

It was agreed that meanwhile, as soon as the agreed documents resulting from the present meetings were ready, Mr. Russell would write to the United States Ambassador in Cairo[5] and Mr. Shuckburgh to Her Majesty's Ambassador, in order to inform them fully and let them know that their views might shortly be required on the question of timing.

As regards informing other representatives of the two Governments, it was pointed out that the first object would be to give them

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, London Talks, Feb.–March 1955: Minutes of Meetings held Feb. 28 thru March 10 (Mimeo). Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.

[2] See *supra*.

[3] Sir Ralph Clarmont Skrine Stevenson and Henry A. Byroade, respectively.

[4] See Document 52.

[5] A letter of March 10 from Russell to Byroade is in Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, London Talks, Feb.–March 1955: (1) Memo of Conv of 3/9 with Eden; (2) FHR's letr of 3/10 to Byroade.

warning that approaches were being made which might intimately affect their relations with the local Governments (e.g. at Tel Aviv, Amman and Bagdad); a secondary object would be to obtain their personal views on the substance of the Alpha settlement. It was essential, however, that no hint of the operation should be given before Colonel Nasser was sounded.

Mr. Shuckburgh said that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Amman [6] knew the broad outline of the settlement, although he had no papers. It would be desirable for the Head of the British Middle East Office at Nicosia [7] and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad [8] to be informed also at an early date.

It was agreed that, if the representatives at Cairo reported favourably on the question of approaching Colonel Nasser, and before instructions were sent to them to do so, Top Secret and Personal messages might be sent to the United Kingdom and United States representatives at Tel Aviv [9] and Amman [10] and to the Head of the B.M.E.O. at Nicosia informing them in general terms of what was afoot. Mr. Russell gave his agreement subject to the views of Mr. Dulles.

It was also agreed that no detailed Alpha documents would be sent out to these posts until it was learned that Colonel Nasser's reaction to the approach was sufficiently constructive to justify the assumption that progress would be made.

B. Documents and Maps

It was noted that the main document entitled "Points of Agreement" was now ready; [11] Appendix 2, on refugees, would shortly be run off; the final draft of Appendix 1, on frontiers, was being prepared; Appendices 3, 4 and 5, i.e. the three draft treaties, would also shortly be run off. [12]

As regards maps, the State Department would provide copies of the overlay for the Foreign Office; [13] this would serve the purpose of Her Majesty's representatives at the affected capitals, who would all have the necessary 1:100,000 maps of Palestine. The State Department would also try to produce maps on which the proposed

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[6] Charles Beresford Duke.

[7] Sir John Cecil Sterndale Bennett.

[8] Sir Michael Wright.

[9] John Walter Nicholls and Edward B. Lawson, respectively.

[10] Charles Beresford Duke and Lester D. Mallory, respectively.

[11] *Infra.*

[12] None of the five appendices is printed. Copies of these documents are in Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, London Talks, Feb.–March 1955: *Points of Agreement . . .* of Arab–Israel Settlement (Hecto) (5 appendices).

[13] Copies of the maps are *ibid.*

changes had been drawn; preferably both a small-scale one (say 1:750,000) and a larger-scale one which might be in more than one sheet (say 1:250,000 or 1:500,000).

C. Johnston Mission

It was noted that the State Department would inform the Foreign Office of the result of Mr. Johnston's report to Mr. Dulles and about any attempt it desired the United Kingdom to make, at a high level, to modify the attitude of the Israel Government towards the Jordan waters scheme.

D. Provisional Tactics When Alpha Is Launched

Assuming that Colonel Nasser reacted favourably and was inclined to adopt the Alpha recommendations, *it was agreed* that the preparatory warning approach to the Governments of Jordan and Iraq should be made by the United Kingdom representatives at Amman and Bagdad after full consultation with their American colleagues. It would be important to consult Colonel Nasser about the method of approach to the other Arab governments.

It was agreed that, in order to lend weight to the approach to the Israel Government, the two Secretaries of State might send written messages to Mr. Sharett, setting out the Alpha proposals in broad detail and commending to him the arguments which the two Ambassadors at Tel Aviv would use. It would probably be desirable for the two Ambassadors to travel unobtrusively to Cyprus for briefing, possibly by Messrs. Russell and Shuckburgh, and they could then be given the signed letters from their Secretaries of State. If Mr. Sharett agreed, the Israeli Ambassadors in London and Washington [14] should be informed; and it would be desirable to make some approach at about the same time to prominent members of the Jewish community in the United States and the United Kingdom. It would be desirable for subsequent detailed discussions of Alpha to be held with the Israelis in London. The Egyptian Government might agree also to similar detailed discussions which could eventually be transferred to London. The object would be in due course to get the two parties into the same room.

It was agreed that the French Government should be informed in Paris possibly by Mr. Shuckburgh with reference to his recent conversation with M. Roux, [15] in which he had spoken in general terms about the desirability of settling the Palestine problem. The

[14] Eliahu Elath and Abba Eban, respectively.

[15] Henri Roux, officer in charge of Africa–Levant affairs in the French Foreign Ministry.

Turkish Government should be informed in Ankara, preferably by the American Ambassador.[16]

The present meeting concluded the series of talks in London.

[16] Avra M. Warren.

48. Points of Agreement in London Discussions of Arab-Israel Settlement [1]

London, March 10, 1955.

I. General

A. While initiating the project at present is complicated by the still unfinished Johnston negotiations, the ferment in the Arab world created by the Turk-Iraq Pact which may be increased by UK adherence to the Pact and by the new Israel attack on Gaza, it is probable that the current year is as favorable a time as is likely to arise in the foreseeable future for an attempt to achieve a settlement in the dispute between the Arab states and Israel.

B. An attempt at an overall settlement will allow us to present a balanced set of proposals which might permit us to dispose of some problems such as boundaries which are resistant to solution in isolation. Indeed, Egyptian Prime Minister Nasser recently stated to Sir Anthony Eden that no solution was to be found in partial settlements.

C. The method which offers the best chance of success and involves the least risk is that the United States and United Kingdom Governments should work out the general terms of a reasonable settlement and then by separate discussion with the parties concerned, and if possible through direct talks between them, attempt to get them to agree to the settlement or to an agreed variation of it.

D. Success of the Johnston Mission would be most helpful in creating a favorable atmosphere for Alpha, but the Alpha inducements, particularly the security guarantee, should not be extended to secure acceptance of the Unified Development Plan alone.

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, London Talks, Feb.–March 1955: *Points of Agreement . . .* of Arab-Israel Settlement (Hecto) (5 appendices). Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. The following handwritten date appears on the source text: "3/10/55".

E. The present proposals have been worked out on an ad referendum basis.

II. Method and Timing of the Approach to the Parties

A. The first approach should be made to Egypt, difficult as this may appear at the moment. . . .

B. Two alternatives with respect to the precise timing of the approach to Egypt are foreseen.

1. In the immediate future (but bearing in mind the state of the UK–Iraq treaty negotiations). The argument in favor of this approach is that Egypt has now been aroused by the Gaza incident, is confronted in an acute form with the problem of Israel, and might be willing to make arrangements which would prevent a repetition and further damage to her prestige.

2. Postponement of the approach for two or three months in the belief that the Gaza raid has so aroused Egyptian hostility to Israel that she would be unwilling to contemplate a settlement with Israel at present. In addition she would not wish to open herself to accusations from Iraq during her present quarrel with that country of following a pro-Israel policy.

The advice of the two ambassadors in Cairo should be sought regarding which course is preferable.

C. Other possibilities are:

1. If at the end of four or five months the approach to Nasser has not proved feasible, explore the possibilities of an attempt through Jordan.

2. If none of the above prove possible, publicize some such plan as Alpha as a solution advocated by the Western powers. A variant would be to try to arrange Pakistan-Turkish sponsorship and ostensible authorship.

D. In either event consideration should be given to parallel letters to Sharett from Mr. Dulles and Sir Anthony Eden covering the following points:

1. Because of the overriding need which must concern all of us, including Israel, we intend to continue with our policy of strengthening the Middle East against outside aggression by working out agreements based on the northern tier approach. Because of the state of Arab feeling toward Israel, not improved since the Gaza raid, it is not possible to consider associating Israel with these area defense arrangements at this time. The first essential is to get these arrangements into shape. When this has been achieved and when the state of Israel's relations with the Arab states permits, we would be prepared to consider discussions with Israel about its role in area defense.

2. Israel's security problem is receiving our active consideration, but we are not disposed to assume obligations with respect to the security of a border which is continuously marked by border raids and military actions. Therefore, we are giving consideration to steps

that could be taken to produce a genuine reduction of tension as a prelude to a security undertaking.

3. The Israel Government's Gaza raid has obviously set back for some time the possibility of success in this effort.

4. But we intend to press forward with it and, in view of Israel's need for a security guarantee, we entertain the hope that we may receive more cooperation in the future than we have in the past in our efforts to reduce tensions.

E. In view of the fact that Sir Anthony Eden has already mentioned the problem to Nasser, Ambassador Byroade should broach the matter next probably along the lines of the brief prepared for Sir Anthony. In determining how far he should go Ambassador Byroade would be governed by consultations with Ambassador Stevenson and by Nasser's receptivity.

F. In revealing the proposal to the parties we would not be too specific at first and would not present the plan as a whole. The purpose would be to develop the proposal gradually so that the solution should appear to emerge from the discussions with the parties rather than to have been worked out fully by the UK and US Governments in advance.

G. We should inform the French and Turks in very general terms of our intentions to make some approaches as soon as we are satisfied from contacts with Nasser that progress can be made and thenceforth we should keep both governments informed in a very general way of our discussions with the parties.

H. The UK would outline our intentions to Jordan after headway had been made with Nasser and immediately before the approach to Israel. This is necessary because of the special treaty relationship between the UK and Jordan. [2]

I. We should inform Iraq of our intentions at about the time we inform Israel in order to ensure that she did not make it difficult for Egypt to cooperate by accusing her of following a pro-Israel policy. We should seek an assurance that Iraq would accept whatever Israel's Arab neighbors accept and if necessary we should relay that assurance to Egypt. The Iraqis themselves need not be involved in the negotiations or the settlement.

J. After steps G, H and I above, which we contemplate should not take more than two or three days, the plan would be discussed with Israel. We would indicate that Nasser was prepared to consider a settlement and that from discussions with him we had reached the conclusion that we were justified in putting forward as a basis for discussion a set of ideas which we consider offers prospect of progress toward a settlement. We would state that if Israel is ready

[2] Reference is to the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance, signed at Amman on March 15, 1948. For text, see 77 UNTS 77.

to pursue discussions on this basis, we were prepared to continue our efforts. If it should be necessary, we would make clear to Israel the effects of a refusal on her part to cooperate, mentioning particularly that under such circumstances we would be unable to extend the security guarantee she has requested, and that she would have to bear the onus for failure of our efforts to progress toward peace.

K. Mr. Johnston should continue his efforts to secure Israel acceptance of a Unified Development Plan but Alpha need not be delayed until after a possible trip by Johnston to the area in April or May. If Mr. Johnston is unsuccessful the Unified Development Plan should be incorporated as one of the elements in Alpha.

III. Inducements and Psychological Factors

A. The terms of the settlement itself will contain inducements to the parties, but these will probably be insufficient to overcome the Arabs' resistance to any settlement and Israel's reluctance to make the concessions required of her. Outside inducements will therefore be necessary: e.g., military and economic aid, and security guarantees.

B. Since no Arab state is likely to participate in a settlement unless it knows that Egypt is sympathetic, Egyptian cooperation is of first importance in any attempt at a settlement. We shall therefore need to offer inducements to Egypt. However, we could not acquiesce in Nasser's attitude towards the Turk-Iraq Pact as an inducement to him to move towards a Palestine settlement. The following are the main possibilities:

1. The prestige implied in the fact that we have chosen to consult Nasser first.
2. The suggestion that if Egypt will take the lead in solving this problem it will eventually strengthen her position as an influential power and enable her to obtain the advantages of cooperation with the West. The solution of the Palestine problem will eliminate a major impediment to such cooperation.
3. Military assistance, the extent and conditions of which will in any case depend on the state of the relations between Israel and the Arab states.
4. Prospects of support for Colonel Nasser's domestic plans for the future of Egypt.
5. Specific offers of economic aid, for example, on the High Aswan Dam project.
6. The offer of a security guarantee.
7. Elimination of the possibility of constant clashes with Israel.

C. Inducements to Israel include:

1. A security guarantee.
2. Elimination of factors creating tension between Israel and her neighbors.

3. Removal of Suez Canal restrictions. Termination of the secondary boycott.

4. Continued US–UK interest in Israel's economic future.

. . . . . .

6. Military assistance.

7. Brighter prospects for Israel's association in area defense arrangements.

IV. Elements of a Settlement

A. Territorial Adjustments

1. Israel must make concessions. The Arabs will not reconcile themselves to reaching a settlement with an Israel with the present boundaries. However, we cannot expect large transfers of territory. The changes proposed should be such that in presenting them to Israel they can be made to appear as "frontier adjustments" which Sharett has stated Israel would be prepared to make. From the Arab point of view they will reunite village lands. They will be designed to produce a frontier which could last with a minimum of friction.

2. No change is proposed in the border between Israel and Lebanon; it should continue to follow the old international boundary.

. . . . . .

4. The Jordan frontier should be adjusted so that Arab villages on the Jordan side recover a portion of their former lands from which they are separated by the demarcation line, certain Arab villages lying at the border are placed within Jordan and a more rational border is established. All modifications would be in favor of Jordan with the exception of the Latrun salient which would be relinquished to Israel to permit restoration of the old Tel Aviv–Jerusalem Road and eliminate an awkward salient. Israel would give up small areas, generally not containing Israel settlements, along most of the present line. . . . The changes suggested would not affect Israel adversely either militarily or economically and the total area would amount to about _____ square miles . . . .

. . . . . .

7. Israel would cede to Egypt and Jordan two small triangles of territory in the southern Negev based respectively on the Egyptian-Israel, and Jordan–Israel frontiers with their apexes meeting on the present or proposed Israel road to Elath. The purpose would be to permit a land connection between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. International supervision would be provided at the intersection.

8. Appendix 1 describes the changes in detail. [3]

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[3] See footnote 12, *supra*.

B. Refugees

1. To prove acceptable to the Arabs the proposals must contain provision for repatriation of Arab refugees and the payment of compensation. In practice only a small number of refugees probably wish to return to Israel and in general it would not be desirable to increase too greatly Israel's Arab population.

2. Israel would be asked to repatriate as Israel citizens up to 75,000 refugees over a five-year period. This could be done through a non-renewable quota system providing for the admittance of 15,000 yearly with priority given to refugees from the Gaza strip. Persons readmitted would be settled by the Government of Israel in the same manner as new Jewish immigrants and UNRWA would provide financial assistance to this end.

3. The eventual resettlement of all refugees depends upon the general economic development of the area as well as upon specific UNRWA projects and freedom of the refugees to move in order to take employment. In the long run the best prospects are provided by the economic development program under way in Iraq. A very rough forecast of resettlement possibilities is as follows: Syria, 80,000; Lebanon, 40,000; Iraq, 60,000 (initial increment); Jordan Valley including the Unified Development Plan, 200,000; Sinai Project, 70,000; Israel, 50,000 (it is very doubtful that the full 75,000 would want to return); total, 500,000.

4. Compensation.

a. Both the Arabs and Israel will advance large claims and counter-claims which will prove almost impossible to evaluate. These will include: on the part of Israel claims for abandoned Jewish property in Jordan, war damage and Jewish property sequestered in the Arab states; on the part of the Arabs, movable property, tenant's rights and loss of use and rents on property. The most practical approach is first to negotiate with Israel a fixed figure which will represent the net amount to be paid by Israel for compensation after all claims and counter-claims have been taken into account. The suggested figure is £100,000,000. This is the PCC estimate, which is understood to be conservative, of Arab immovable property abandoned in areas of Palestine now held by Israel.

b. It is important for psychological reasons with respect to the Arabs as well as to minimize the financial burden on the US and UK that Israel contributions to compensation be as large as possible but it [is] recognized that unassisted she is unable to finance such a large sum. In view of the time which will be consumed in determining individual claims, the difficulty of providing funds and the low economic absorbative [*absorptive?*] capacity of the area payments should be made over a ten-year period. Of the total Israel and world Jewry combined should pay 30 per cent and 70 per cent would have to be provided by the world community, primarily the US and UK, in the form of loans to Israel. Israel should accept responsibility for repayment and servicing of the loans.

c. The funds available for compensation should be distributed through a quasi-judicial process to persons who are able to

establish title to real property. Persons otherwise entitled to compensation would be paid even though repatriated to Israel. To avoid double payment any claims would be reduced by the value of real property or equipment provided to a resettled refugee by UNRWA. Large claimants, estimated at 11,000, should be paid on a deferred basis to reduce dangers of inflation and provisions should be made to encourage maximum investment of the funds in the area. All refugees should receive some payment. This could perhaps be done by dividing the value of common land, to which title is difficult to determine, among refugees with no claims and those with very small claims.

d. A special UN agency should be established to administer the program: UNRWA would make the actual payments.

e. The value of Arab lands returned by Israel to Jordan in the frontier adjustments would be deducted from the compensation total, while the value of land acquired by Israel at Latrun would be added. Payments for property in the demilitarized zones on the Syrian border would be handled separately.

f. Appendix 2 describes in detail the suggested compensation, repatriation and resettlement programs.[4]

C. Jerusalem

1. The US and UK would inform the parties that they were prepared to sponsor a UN resolution on the lines of the Swedish proposal of 1950 on the supervision of and access to the Holy Places . . . .

2. Israel would be informed that following agreement upon a settlement and pending the adoption of such a resolution, the US and UK Ambassadors would start to call at the Israeli Foreign Office in Jerusalem, ...

3. Government House would become the seat of the international authority charged with the supervision of the Holy Places and possibly other UN agencies.

4. Jerusalem would be demilitarized along the lines of plans which are being discussed by the Consuls-General of Britain, France and the USA.

5. If France is willing to support the present plan she should be invited to participate in the negotiations on Jerusalem and to use her influence with the Vatican. If she does not favor the plan she should not be included and other means of influencing the Vatican and the Catholic States should be sought.

6. No approach should be made to the Vatican at this time.

D. Communications Arrangements

1. Israel to offer Jordan free port facilities at Haifa and free access to the port.

2. Mutual overflight rights for civil aircraft of the parties.

3. Israel to permit the restoration or construction of telecommunications facilities between the Arab states across her territory.

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[4] See footnote 12, *supra*.

4. Some mixed or UN authority to be established to hear complaints on the infringements of communications rights.

E. The Boycott

1. The Arab states would:

a. remove restrictions on transiting the Suez Canal, including those on Israel vessels,

b. cease the "secondary boycott", defined as attempts to prevent trade between Israel and non-Arab countries, including termination of all pressure on non-Arab firms trading with Israel,

c. abolish the Arab League Boycott offices; repeal all legislation based on the existence of a state of belligerency.

2. The Arab states would not be pressed to engage in direct trade with Israel.

V. The Form of a Settlement and Guarantees to the Parties

A. While treaties of peace between Israel and the Arab states remain our ultimate objective, the state of Arab public opinion does not make it feasible to insist upon such treaties as an immediate objective. We should endeavor to bring about to the maximum extent possible permanent arrangements which would provide the substance, if not the form, of peace. It should be our objective to obtain the termination of the state of belligerency between the countries both to remove the basis for the Suez Canal blockade and the secondary boycott and to justify to the US and UK public and law makers the security guarantees and substantial financial contributions required. The termination of belligerency could be provided for by inserting in the preamble of the revised Armistice Agreements the phrase "recognizing that the state of war (or belligerency) between them has come to an end, the parties, etc."

B. Instrument of Settlement

1. Permanent frontiers should be established by re-negotiation of the Armistice Agreements. These contain provisions for modification by consent of both parties. The UNTSO should continue to supervise the boundaries as long as necessary. The new frontiers should be noted in any guarantee decided upon.

2. The whole settlement need not be covered in a single document. Different means should be used for the different components, possibly as follows:

a. *Territorial*. The territorial settlement to be embodied in a revision of the Armistice Agreements (see above).

b. *Jordan Waters*. A separate agreement would be made between the parties on the development of the Jordan Valley and the operation of the unified scheme.

c. *Refugees*. A UN resolution should be passed incorporating the provisions for repatriation, resettlement and compensation

previously agreed to and calling upon Israel and the Arab states to comply. The resolution could also provide for the creation of a new agency to handle the mechanics of compensation. Israel and the several Arab states could indicate their intentions to comply by separate letters to the Secretary General.

d. *Jerusalem*. Arrangements for Jerusalem and the Holy Places would be the subject of a UN resolution.

e. *Communications*. Free ports and transit arrangements would be the subject of direct agreements between the parties.

f. *The Blockade*. The Arab states would dissolve the Arab League Boycott office and repeal domestic legislation based on or presupposing a state of war. This would remove the legal basis for restriction on Suez Canal traffic and the boycott. We would if necessary make it clear to the Arabs that we were not insisting on removal of prohibitions on direct trade with Israel provided these were not based on legislation claiming the existence of a state of belligerency.

C. Security Guarantees

1. It will be necessary for the US and UK and possibly Turkey and France to guarantee the frontiers to be established between Israel and the Arab states against alteration by force. This could be accomplished by separate treaties between the guaranteeing powers and Israel and the Arab states. The operative clause might read: "The parties to the present treaty will jointly or separately take appropriate measures for the maintenance or restoration of the agreed boundaries."

2. The Guarantee would not cover other aspects of the settlement; nor would it come into operation in the case of frontier incidents not involving the occupation of territory. Such incidents, however, if they constituted "any threat of an attack by armed force" would bring into operation the commitment of the parties to consult together. The guarantors might inform the Arab states and Israel that they are prepared to discuss the means of implementing the guarantee.

3. The participating powers might offer one treaty to Israel embodying the guarantee and a separate similar treaty to each Arab state. Should the Arab states be unwilling to sign treaties with the Western Powers, a unilateral guarantee by the Western Powers might be extended to them and the offer of a treaty left open.

4. In the proposed Treaty with Jordan a special article might be included stating that rights and obligations under the Anglo-Jordan Treaty are not affected.

5. Draft treaties are attached. [5]

VI. The Roles of France, Turkey, and the United Nations

1. France should not be included in the planning or negotiations but should be informed of the proposals prior to the approach to Israel. In order to avoid offending her she would not be informed of the project as a complete plan worked out by the US and UK, but

[5] See footnote 12, *supra*.

its various components would be revealed gradually to her as they are unfolded to the parties. If France were prepared to cooperate, she might be included in the negotiations on Jerusalem. (See IV.C.) The participation of France as a guaranteeing power would be considered in the light of the reaction of the guaranteed states and the general situation at the time.

2. Turkey would not be included in the planning or in the negotiations but would be informed at the same time and in the same manner as France. The question of Turkey's participation in the guarantee would be considered in the light of the reaction of the guaranteed states and the general situation at the time.

3. The UN would be involved in the machinery of a settlement, for example, in supervision of the frontier, and UN resolutions would probably be required, for example, in connection with Jerusalem and the refugees. The UN should not be informed of the project until negotiations with the parties are well advanced.

4. The possibility should be borne in mind that Pakistan might play a useful part in including the Arab states to accept the proposals.

VII. Cost of the Operation

A. As inducements to a resolution of the Arab-Israel problem, it is anticipated that it would be necessary for the United States and the United Kingdom to provide assistance in addition to present and already projected commitments (development assistance, UNRWA relief and rehabilitation, and the unified development of the Jordan Valley). Such new assistance might include:

1. US–UK participation in the financing of compensation by Israel to the Palestine refugees.

2. Economic inducements such as substantial grant aid for the High Aswan Dam, etc.

3. Military aid to the cooperating countries.

VIII. Conclusions and Agreements of a Subsidiary Nature Are To Be Found in the Minutes [6]

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[6] See footnote 2, Document 44.

49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, March 11, 1955—7:22 p.m.

521. Eshkol, Kollek and Sapir of Israel Govt Jerusalem and Shiloah of Israel Embassy called on Johnston New York March 10 at their request to discuss Jordan Valley negotiations. [2]

Eshkol and Shiloah emphasized that question use Tiberias without infringing upon Israel sovereignty was far more important than remaining difference on quantity of water. Problem constant automatic delivery specific amount of water to Jordan from Tiberias was discussed at some length. Israelis were informed steps being taken determine feasibility such delivery but that some variation in flow likely be required on clear basis agreed in advance by all concerned. Johnston assured Israelis every effort would be made meet Israel desire for simple operation which minimizes judgment watermaster and he expressed belief engineering arrangements satisfactory to Israelis can be worked out. (Proposal that Wiener come US to participate in technical analysis this problem was discussed informally with Kollek and understanding reached Department would advise Israelis when Wiener's presence would be useful.)

Johnston then brought discussion back to question division water, assuming problem of use Tiberias solved. Eshkol reserved formal position subject approval his Government but increased best offer made during recent negotiations Jerusalem from 50 to 65.5 and then to 75 mcm (figures compare with 131 mcm in Johnston 10 Feb. 24 [3]). Johnston maintained firm line stating conviction that Arabs could not be brought to accept less than 100 mcm. Eshkol inquired whether US would be willing assist Israel in developing Mediterranean sea water project if agreement all parties reached and Johnston gave assent.

Advance in Eshkol's position permits some optimism that Israel will make offer on quantity which will permit negotiations to proceed if satisfied on arrangements for use Tiberias. Inquiry concerning US willingness assist with Mediterranean sea water project was first time in long months negotiation that Israelis have expressed interest in help US might be willing provide if agreement

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–1155. Confidential. Drafted by Troxel and approved by Gardiner who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Amman and pouched to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, Baghdad, and Jidda.

[2] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Document 28.

reached. Eshkol undertook to present Johnston proposals again to Cabinet next week.

Dulles

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50. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 16, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Jordan Valley Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Governor Stassen
Ambassador Eric Johnston
Assistant Secretary Allen
Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner—NEA

Ambassador Johnston reported on the nature of the negotiations undertaken in January and February in Israel and the Arab States which involved three principal elements: storage sites, neutral control of the waters, and the division of the waters in quantitative allotments to the various states.

On his first visit to Israel, Ambassador Johnston thought that the Israelis might accept 40 percent of the River as their allocation but instead he found that the Israelis wished at least 50 percent. He had left Israel for Egypt to meet with the Arab Committee where the conversations were important but had led to no understanding. In Jordan the King had been extremely helpful, and it was probably his influence which had led the Jordanians to take a reasonable and constructive view in later negotiations which culminated in a tentative agreement with the Arab States in Beirut. Ambassador Johnston kept the Beirut understanding tentative as far as he was concerned to keep open his negotiating position in Israel. On his return to Israel, there was a slight modification in the Israeli position. To meet the Jordanian requirements of 131 mcms of Jordan water, the Israelis agreed to find 50, and another 50 but with conditions attached which Mr. Johnston considered not negotiable on the Arab side. Mr. Johnston was prepared to try to persuade the Arabs to reduce their

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–1655. Secret. Drafted by Gardiner.

claims on the Jordan itself from 131 to 100 million cubic meters, however.

Since his return to the United States Mr. Johnston had met with Mr. Eshkol, the Israeli Finance Minister in charge of the negotiations, and there were indications that Israel might remove the conditions which they wished to attach to the second 50 mcms of Jordan water. [2] Mr. Eshkol had undertaken to seek Cabinet approval of such a course. Still unsettled in Israel were technical questions underlying the use of Lake Tiberias as a storage reservoir for the Arabs, but these problems were not insuperable.

Mr. Johnston then referred to a conversation held in the morning with Mr. Eban. [3] Mr. Eban reported a conversation he had held on March 14 with Mr. Allen. [4] According to Mr. Eban, Mr. Allen had threatened to withhold aid from Israel unless the Israelis came to terms with Mr. Johnston. Mr. Johnston emphasized that it was not his role to consider the Department of State's policy in such matters, but that Mr. Eban had advised him that such a course would be harmful to the Jordan Valley negotiations and that he had therefore not reported his conversation on this matter to his Government. Mr. Johnston continued to point out that he felt that Mr. Allen had rendered a very helpful service in indicating to Mr. Eban the extent of support within the United States Government for the Jordan Valley program.

Mr. Allen then outlined the course of his conversation of March 14 with Ambassador Eban. Eban had called to discuss the Gaza incident and to seek our support in including on the agenda of the Security Council a list of Arab incursions, as well as the Israeli attack on Gaza. The conversation then turned to the Jordan Valley program, which Mr. Allen indicated had his full support. Mr. Eban then raised questions regarding the remaining $10 million of aid which Israel is expecting from FOA in 1955, the problem of surplus foods to Israel to be made available under Public Law 480, [5] and the level of aid to Israel in 1956. Mr. Allen stated that he had advised Mr. Eban that agreement on the Jordan River problem would furnish a useful basis for aid, as we could point out to the Congress that our aid was providing a permanent benefit to Israel and her neighbors. He had informed Eban that we had taken a similar line in dealing

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[2] See *supra*.

[3] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, Framework of the Fourth Mission—No. 18 (Jan. 1955–April 21, 1955)

[4] The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/3–1456)

[5] Reference is to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, which became Public Law 480 on July 10. For text, see 68 Stat. (pt. 1) 454.

with aid to Iran during Mossadegh's regime. [6] Mr. Allen thought that Eban had emphasized the negative point of view in interpreting his conversation; whereas Mr. Allen's remarks were intended to be positive.

Mr. Johnston then stated that whatever course of action might be taken on aid should not be attached to the present Jordan Valley negotiations. This he felt would be a great mistake at this time, as he hoped for a favorable decision by Israel in two or three weeks. Governor Stassen pointed out there was no great urgency in reaching a decision on 1955 aid funds; this could be taken any time prior to June 30. The aid could be allotted now, or later, or the amount could be split for release at different times. Mr. Allen referred to Ambassador Eban's opinion, that withholding 1955 aid would have a detrimental effect on his Government's attitude on the Jordan Valley plan. Mr. Johnston stated once again that it would be unfortunate to use the status of the Jordan Valley negotiations as a reason for our failure to allot aid. Mr. Gardiner pointed out that in the case of surplus foods Israel intended to use the proceeds for irrigation projects, and a decision in this case was less urgent as the foods in question are intended to build up Israel's stockpiles.

The Secretary inquired as to the cost of the Jordan Valley project. Mr. Gardiner indicated that the estimates for the elements in Jordan itself were $90 million, and that we could hopefully look for contributions from other countries to diminish the U.S. burden as it was intended to carry out the project in Jordan through the UNRWA. Estimates in Israel total $45 million to be spread over three or four years. The additional $60 million which Ambassador Johnston had been authorized to discuss, intended for Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, had been used by Ambassador Johnston only in part. Ambassador Johnston then related his negotiations with President Chamoun of Lebanon, which primarily involved loans of $5 million in 1955 and $5 million in 1956, which the Lebanese probably would wish to apply to road construction in Lebanon. Otherwise he had not availed himself of the $60 million fund, but he thought that a further sum would be required to assist in financing power installations in Syria. U.S. funds might be required for equity money, and the Syrians might be able to finance the remainder of the prospective power project from the IBRD. The Syrians anticipated obtaining a substantial block of power from the Yarmuk. This might not be possible, for technical reasons, and a substitute project might be necessary to assure Syrian support.

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[6] For documentation concerning U.S. policy with respect to the question of extending military and economic assistance to Iran during Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq's administration, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, volume X.

Mr. Allen and Ambassador Johnston then pointed out that the best argument for the plan lay in refugee resettlement. This plan is the best one we have to help solve the refugee problem, and it would go far to break the log jam posed by the attitude of many of the refugees. Governor Stassen observed that if some constructive action is not taken there might well be a war for the Jordan waters.

The Secretary asked about the cost of the project in Israel. Mr. Johnston said that appeared to be a matter of little concern to the Israelis, who seemed to feel that they would obtain their money sooner or later from their backers in the U.S. and elsewhere. He indicated that strong forces were at work in Israel encouraging the Government to start work at Jisr Banat Yaqub before July, and there would be much trouble if the Israelis did resume operations in the demilitarized zone. This was a factor in Israeli desires for a settlement of the problem in the near future.

The Secretary in congratulating Mr. Johnston on the progress that he had made, summed up the conversation by stating that the immediate issue appeared to be the proper line to take with the Israelis. Mr. Allen suggested that the appropriate techniques were a combination of the carrot and the stick. Mr. Stassen indicated his willingness to support whatever line the Secretary adopted.

The Secretary then determined that we should allocate the remaining 1955 aid funds of approximately $10 million to bring Israel's total for the year up to $40 million, that we should move slowly on the surplus food program as there appeared to be no urgency in this case, and that as far as aid for 1956 was concerned Israel's allotment should be kept secret and buried in a regional total.

51. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 17, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Summary of London Meetings on Alpha

PARTICIPANTS

U—The Under Secretary, Mr. Hoover
G—The Deputy Under Secretary, Mr. Murphy
Mr. Russell

I summarized the main points of my meeting with Eden (*cf.* Minutes of London meetings for March 9). [2] I said that Eden had given the proposals his approval and that he was in favor of taking them up with Nasser at the earliest possible moment.

Mr. Murphy said that he had read the summary of agreed recommendations [3] resulting from the London discussions which I had sent to him attached to my memo of March 16. [4] The Under Secretary said that he had read the general summary but not the papers attached to it. The Under Secretary and Mr. Murphy expressed their approval of the recommendations.

The Under Secretary and Mr. Murphy had also read the draft telegram to Byroade [5] attached to the memo of March 16 and gave their concurrence to sending it following receipt of word that the Foreign Office was prepared to send a similar telegram to Stevenson.

I outlined the alternate methods of initiating Alpha if Byroade recommended against approaching Nasser at the present time, and they agreed with them.

The Under Secretary said that he wished me to bear in mind the possibility of obtaining, from any of the countries receiving benefits under Alpha, rights for the U.S. to construct communication centers on their territory. The grant of such rights would cost these governments nothing and would be of some value to the U.S.

Both the Under Secretary and Mr. Murphy expressed concern that it would be necessary for the U.S. to make financial contributions of the amount summarized in the memorandum which I prepared for the Secretary, dated February 14, 1955, which they

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518; Alpha—memos, etc., beginning after return from London—Mar. 11 thru April 26. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell.

[2] See Document 46.

[3] Document 48.

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—memos, etc., beginning after return from London—Mar. 11 thru April 26)

[5] *Infra.*

read.[6] I pointed out that at the London meeting the figure which was suggested for the amount of the U.S. loan to Israel to make possible compensation to the refugees was $140 million, or $60 million lower than the figure mentioned in the February 14 memorandum.

The Under Secretary suggested that the question should be raised with the Secretary, after his return from Ottawa,[7] as to broadening the base of approval within the U.S. Government on U.S. financial commitments in connection with the Alpha project, and also on the proposed treaty of security guarantee.

The question should also be raised with the Secretary whether to inform Ambassador Johnston. It was agreed that it would be recommended to the Secretary that Ambassador Johnston be told that the Secretary was interested in following up agreement on the Unified Jordan Valley Plan with other steps toward settlement of differences in the area, and also giving consideration as to the form that such steps might take. No details of the London agreements would be given to Ambassador Johnston.

[6] See footnote 2, Document 18.
[7] Secretary Dulles was on an official visit to Canada, March 17–19.

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52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

Washington, March 19, 1955—11:18 a.m.

1531. As a result of meetings in London, Dept and FonOff have agreed on terms of what they believe would constitute equitable settlement between Israel and Arab States (copy pouched to you from London[2]). We are agreed, moreover, upon desirability of exploring most carefully whether an approach can be made to Nasser in the immediate future. We concur with Eden that we might wait in vain for a better time; that indeed there might be deterioration in area relations and possibly also in Nasser's domestic position in absence of measures to improve situation.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–1955. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell; cleared with Hoover, Murphy, and Allen; and approved by Russell, who signed for Hoover. Repeated to London.
[2] Presumably reference is to Document 48.

We are fully cognizant of difficulties in an approach to Nasser on Alpha at this time but we are inclined to resolve doubts in favor of an approach rather than in favor of further delay. We therefore desire you discuss question with Stevenson and advise whether you and he believe an early approach to Nasser is feasible. It is contemplated that, in event approach is made, you would make it and use arguments contained in brief prepared for Eden's talk with Nasser [3] and in London Points of Agreement. You could assure Nasser we would make every effort maintain complete secrecy and that we would be prepared to work out with him how a settlement would look before determining whether to proceed further.

The exact time and manner of the approach would have to take into account: necessity of not saying anything to Nasser which he could use to hurt Anglo-Iraq negotiations for new treaty, status of Security Council action on Gaza raid, status of negotiations on Unified Jordan Valley Plan, and, of course, Nasser's participation in Asia–Africa Conference. [4]

Should initial approach be favorably received, we envisage thorough briefing for you and, at appropriate time, other key US and British representatives in area by Russell and Shuckburgh. Would appreciate any suggestion you may have as to place and timing in order assure meetings would be secret.

You should make no approach to Nasser until you receive further instructions which would follow receipt of your reaction to above. This message coordinated with UK and Stevenson receiving similar instructions.

Hoover

[3] See Document 24.
[4] The Asia–Africa Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, was held April 18–24, 1955.

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53. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 21, 1955—3 p.m.

1379. Deptel 1531 (repeated information London 4775) [2] received

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–2155. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 2:04 p.m.
[2] *Supra.*

and discussed with Stevenson although we had discussed subject several times since my arrival. Our joint conclusions being sent separately.[3] Deeply regret necessity those conclusions as know how important this subject is to Department and Secretary.

As a supplement to our agreed message following might be useful.

(a) Do not believe at this particular time Nasser would find it possible to proceed even if he himself were in agreement. This is because of Gaza, internal position, complications re position before other Arab states just at time this important in view developments following Turk-Iraq pact, etc.

(b) On this particular subject there is at present danger of causing serious misunderstanding with him as to nature of US policies and methods of operation. He has not believed, but acquiesced for local and other reasons, in propaganda instigated by Saleh Salem that real motive of US behind northern tier and Turk-Iraqi pact matter was indirect method of forcing settlement and integration of Israel into defense. If at this stage Nasser were to be confronted by fact that the US and UK have been working for some time on specific plan for settlement of Arab-Israeli dispute there is great danger he would conclude Saleh and others may have been correct.

While I thus feel strongly type of approach Department has in mind to be out of question at this stage, do not believe it necessary to avoid discussion of subject within next few weeks as opportunities rise with Nasser personally and alone on strictly informal basis. After such soundings (during which I can stress my own view that it is Egypt's interest move forward on this problem) we may be in better position to advise as to future timing, etc. Department cautioned however not pin much hope on real progress being made here in near future in view general situation.

Byroade

[3] *Infra.*

54. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 21, 1955—4 p.m.

1378. I have discussed Department's 1531 [2] on March 19 with Stevenson. Following is our joint considered opinion.

Begin verbatim text:

1. Nasser is sore and suspicious. It would be both unwise and useless to make official secret approach to him at the present time for following reasons:

(a) Approach would tend to persuade him of truth of his colleagues assertions that Turco-Iraqi pact was part of deep laid plot aimed by the US and UK at splitting the Arab world and softening Egypt up.

(b) His recent diplomatic defeat over Turco-Iraqi pact forces him for the present at any rate into a more nationalistic and thus less realistic attitude. He would therefore be quite unreceptive.

(c) Effect on [*of*] Gaza incident has not scared Nasser. It has merely increased his hostility to Israel.

(c) [*sic*] Inducements on Arab side of proposed settlement re all extraneous and [*aid*?] would have to be increased to an unacceptable extent to cause him even to consider them at this time.

2. A premature approach would risk setting back indefinitely any hope of settlement. But we think that if present Arab squabble can be to some extent smoothed over and Nasser broadens his horizon a little by his attendance at the Afro-Asian conference it may be possible for Ambassador Byroade to sound him out informally and unofficially after his return at the end of April.

3. US and UK Governments should do what they can to restore Nassers confidence in us and in himself as he remains best hope of promoting eventual settlement.

End verbatim text.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–2155. Top Secret; Alpha. Received at 2:39 p.m. Repeated to London.

[2] Document 52.

55. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 24, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Status of Alpha Project Following London Meetings

PARTICIPANTS

S—The Secretary
Mr. George V. Allen
Mr. John D. Jernegan
Francis H. Russell

I outlined the present situation with respect to Alpha according to my Notes (attached). [2] I mentioned the "package" which was worked out in London in general terms (showing the Secretary the map with suggested border provisions). [3] I said it had received Eden's approval and that Eden had favored pressing ahead with Nasser. The Secretary made no specific comment but nodded generally.

The Secretary made the following points:

1. He believes the northern tier should be confined to the northern-tier countries. They are the ones which are required from the point of view of the military defense of the area. Jordan, Lebanon and Syria are not important from a military viewpoint. Their adherence to the Turko-Iraq Pact, on the contrary, would have two adverse effects: it would further isolate and embitter Nasser, and it would give the IG the occasion for claiming that the US had put its political and diplomatic weight behind Israel's Arab neighbors and therefore against Israel. Even though the US did not itself adhere to the Turko-Iraq Pact, Israel would claim that we have close relations with Turkey and with Iraq and were therefore backing the whole arrangement. The Secretary said that it looks as though the UK had grabbed the ball on the northern-tier policy and was running away with it in a direction which would have the above unfortunate consequences.

2. The Secretary indicated that he attaches a high priority to the Alpha undertaking and that he sees no leader in the Arab world through whom it can be initiated besides Nasser. He believes, therefore, that we must pursue policies in the area during the next few months that will help build up Nasser and will give us the opportunity to say to him that we are prepared to cooperate with him in strengthening his position but that it must be accompanied by his cooperation in Alpha. The Secretary asked the officers present to give active thought to proposals that would accomplish this and come back to him with them soon. He himself suggested casually

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—memos, etc., beginning after return from London—Mar. 11 thru April 26. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Russell.

[2] Not printed.

[3] See footnote 13, Document 47.

the possibility of a conference of some kind in Cairo that would give Nasser a little prestige.

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56. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 24, 1955—3 p.m.

1396. ReDeptel 1581. [2] We believe GOE has no intention retaliate for Gaza. GOE has sent regular army and National Guard reinforcements to El Arish area and moved up some equipment and barbed wire. All indications are that this action taken to provide against another Israeli attack.

Rumors circulate re secret preparations for retaliation in event another attack. These may have been stimulated for propaganda purposes to stop opposition elements from alleging GOE soft re Israel.

Another Gaza-like attack by Israel combined with an outcome in SC considered unsatisfactory to GOE would probably cause Egyptian frustration to reach breaking-point, particularly if combined with increased sense of isolation from Arab world and idea Egypt abandoned by US. In such circumstances we believe it possible that RCC might consider a desperate adventure in southern Negev.

Comment

Ironically enough, there is some similarity between the Egyptian and Israeli feelings of frustration and isolation. These feelings give rise to same inherent danger in both countries; i.e. if pressed too hard, they may pull the temple down.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–2455. Secret. Received at 3:30 p.m. Repeated to USUN. Repeated the following day priority to Tel Aviv. (Telegram 558, March 25; *ibid.*)

[2] The Department on March 23 requested the Embassy in Cairo to assess the likelihood of Egypt's retaliating for the Gaza incident. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/3–2155)

57. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 25, 1955—11 a.m.

818. According to information supplied by Israel Foreign Office and IDF–FLO at 23:45 March 24, two hand grenades thrown into room where wedding party in progress at Pattish (MC 108–82) and later two bursts of automatic fire directed against party. Foreign Office reports one woman killed, two severely wounded, sixteen slightly wounded. IDF–FLO report one woman killed, nineteen persons wounded, four seriously. Three empty Sten guns cartridges found; safety pin from Mills-type grenade and tracks of two barefoot men allegedly leading in direction Gaza border some 20 kilometers west of Pattish. UN investigation requested. [2]

Comment: This incident, again demonstrating deep penetration into Israel, which was one of actuating factors of the Gaza incident, bound to cause flare-up in smoldering passions.

Lawson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–2555. Limited Official Use; Niact. Received at 6:39 a.m. Sent priority to Cairo and repeated to Jerusalem, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, and Damascus.

[2] In telegram 824, March 25, the Embassy in Tel Aviv further informed the Department that U.N. observers had traced the trail of the two men responsible for the Pattish incident and reported that their tracks led across the demarcation line into the Gaza Strip near Sheik Nabham. (*Ibid.*)

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58. Letter From the Ambassador in Egypt (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) [1]

Cairo, March 27, 1955.

DEAR GEORGE: I am sending the attached by letter for two reasons. The first is that I do not at this point know whether to attach any great significance to this talk with Fawzi. I have the feeling that he was talking as Fawzi the Intellectual Cosmopolite—as contrasted to Fawzi the realistic Arab Politician. He does, I find, play

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—memo, etc., beginning after return from London—Mar. 11 thru April 26. Top Secret; Alpha.

both roles and the former can be quite disarming. Nor do I know whether Fawzi was speaking with the knowledge and authority of Nasser. I kept wondering during this conversation if he were under instructions to find out whether the United States did in fact have a peace plan it was contemplating trying to impose upon the area as has been charged here in recent critical articles. I do not believe this to be the case but this thought made me somewhat cautious. On the other hand one might speculate that the Egyptian Government is at last really getting concerned about the impression they have been giving the United States recently. This refers of course to their desire for continued and increased assistance from the United States. If one thinks in terms of normal Middle East suspicions and politics one might also conclude that, with the uncertainty here at present, Fawzi had decided he might benefit in the future personally by appearing reasonable in the US eyes.

There is just a chance, however, that this conversation could be the beginning of something important. The RCC has been forced to do a lot of thinking recently as to their place in the scheme of things and this has probably included a good deal of map gazing. How, they wonder, can Egypt serve as an important base area for a forward defense when there is no land connection between Egypt and that area? There is probably an increased awareness here that Egypt is in fact isolated geographically. Even Salah Salem, in his wild ravings, told me that the Israeli problem lay at the root of all the difficulties of organizing defense of the area. If a solution could be found to this problem which would reconnect Egypt to the forward area he thought everything else would fall in line.

All of our thinking on Alpha contemplated me dealing directly with Nasser only. If Nasser would however let Fawzi have a hand in this it could be a great advantage. While he might not be allowed any authority as regards decision, he is, on the other hand, a good technician and far more knowledgeable about many aspects of the general problem than Nasser is likely to be.

I plan to follow through on this discussion unless you see some reason why I should not. Perhaps next time I can find out whether he is speaking with Nasser's authority. I wish to caution again, however, that this one conversation should not lead to great expectations in the Department. I am afraid the joint conclusions of Stevenson and I will still prove to be valid as regards getting very far at this time. I have told Stevenson of this conversation with Fawzi. He agrees that I should follow through on the matter but is not hopeful as to the results.

The other reason I am reporting this by letter is the question of secrecy. Three years in the Department on this subject has made me believe that it is impossible to keep the Israelis from finding out

matters we are working on of real interest to them. I feel certain, for instance, that they know more about Alpha than we suspect. Such knowledge, in my opinion, could even have been one of the motives for the Gaza raid—although of course this is speculation.

Unless you and the Secretary disagree (and barring rapid developments that would make such a course unwise) I would prefer reporting on this subject by Top Secret letter. I would of course wish the Secretary to see such letters, or if overly long, a summary you might produce. Communications to him probably should be hand carried by Rod [2] or Johnny [3] for reasons Jack [4] can tell you about. All of this of course is for you to decide and I hope you do not think I have become overly cautious regarding secrecy. I just think the task itself will be well nigh impossible even without any unnecessary complications.

My deepest appreciation for the patience the Department has exhibited since my arrival here. I am certain there have been times when you felt like letting the whole area have a great blast of righteous US indignation. Patience, however, I believe is beginning to pay dividends and I am, in general, much less discouraged than even a week ago.

Sincerely,

Hank

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of a Conversation, American Embassy, Cairo, March 26, 1955 [5]

I met this morning with Dr. Fawzi at the Foreign Ministry at his request. The meeting lasted an hour and ten minutes.

I opened the conversation by stating I would appreciate an expression of his general views about the current situation. I told him of my recent long talk with Nasser in which Salah Salem participated in part. [6] I stated I hoped I had been able to erase some

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[2] Roderic L. O'Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

[3] John W. Hanes, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

[4] John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

[5] Drafted by Byroade.

[6] On March 20, Byroade informed the Department:

"Yesterday Nasser invited me for unannounced and locally quite secret meeting with him today outside Cairo. Conversation, almost entirely on matters arising from defense organization, lasted 6 hours without interruption. Had set as my goal

of the suspicions from Nasser's mind but was certain I had failed as regards Salah Salem. There followed a general discussion in which Fawzi stressed the need for a calming down period. He had felt things were going in that direction until the brutally strong démarche by Turkey to Syria.[7] This had only resulted in keeping emotions alive.

I asked if he felt Egypt's draft for the proposed new arrangements with Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen would, in fact, contain language which would orient the pact as being hostile to defense arrangements in the north, and Iraq particularly. He replied that if we read the "whole document", he thought we would not be too alarmed as a way would be left open for eventual cooperation between these new arrangements and those in the north. At one point he used the phrase, "if there is a pact at all". I did not follow through on this subject because of the extremely interesting remarks he then volunteered on the subject of Israel.

Fawzi stated he believed some of the trends in the Middle East were becoming extremely dangerous and he felt that current frictions within the area must somehow be eased as quickly as possible. He listed these as: (1) Inter-Arab quarrels; (2) The Arab-Israeli problem; and (3) The recent renewal of old suspicions and hostility between Turkey and the bulk of the Arab World. He stated it must be a great source of satisfaction to Russia to watch these developments. To my surprise, he said he felt it an equal source of satisfaction for India. The motives of India, he said, might be different than those of the Kremlin but the end result turned out to be the same.

In the ensuing discussion Fawzi did not return to points 1 and 2 above but concentrated his remarks on the Arab-Israeli problem. He stated there were widely varying schools of thought as to when a real effort should be made to solve this problem. He personally was inclined to think that there was no time to lose. As far as Egypt was concerned there were two main problems, i.e., refugees and frontier rectifications.[8] As regards refugees, he felt Egypt's views more realistic than many of the Arab States. They realized that most

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convincing Nasser unwisdom from Egypt's point of view, of pursuing Saudi-Syria-Egyptian Pact. While am certain he convinced move unwise was unable devise with him any method by which proposed pact would be called off. He reiterated, almost in sadness, Egypt now too committed to change course and meetings for finalization would probably be soon." (Telegram 1373 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/3–2055)

[7] Reference is to a Turkish aide-mémoire of March 13 to Syria; it objected to the provision in the March 2 Egyptian-Syrian communiqué pledging the two governments to refrain from joining the Turkish-Iraqi pact and charged that Syria was turning away from friendship with Turkey in favor of Egypt's negativism and hostility. (Despatch 454 from Ankara, March 14; *ibid.*, 674.83/3–1455)

[8] Note: Fawzi chose to ignore the internal political problem which doing anything about Israel constitutes for the RCC. [Footnote in the source text.]

refugees could not return to Israel and that there could not be compensation for any but material losses. The Egyptians of course wished that the total amount of such compensation would come out of Jewish pockets but they realized this was not practical. He felt Egypt could be brought to accept the concept that others would pay through Israel. As regards territory, he said he felt it imperative that a land link be re-established between Egypt and the rest of the Arab World. By this he was not speaking of merely a "corridor" as this would only provide another artificial ambush trap for the future. He did not know the size of the strip that should be considered but felt that it should swing up in an arc to include Gaza which could be ceded to Jordan. Gaza was only a liability to Egypt and she would be glad to get rid of it.

Fawzi stated he realized any politician in Israel would be hard put to accept such a solution but he felt it basically to be in Israel's long term interests and it might help the position of their Government if they could say it was, in fact, imposed upon them. He realized as well that many Arab politicians were using the Palestine issue for their own personal advantage and this created a great problem. He felt that Lebanon and Libya probably felt about the same as Egypt. In the remaining Arab States there were only smaller circles who would be reasonable on the problem.

I asked Fawzi what he thought the United States could usefully do in this situation. I told him it had been a temptation during my four years of work on the Middle East to assemble our most able experts and work out what we felt to be the most practicable and acceptable solutions for each major specific problem in the Palestine question. The problem had always been what to do with such concrete views if we did make such an effort. What did he suggest the United States could do? He replied that probably the first point to be decided was whether the United States alone, the United States and other selected nations, or the United Nations itself should make the effort. He asked what were my views. I replied half jokingly I supposed the United States would get the blame in any event and then more seriously agreed that this was a problem to be studied.

Whatever his motive, Fawzi exhibited a sense of urgency that surprised me and his desire to continue the discussion seemed real. I told him something of the personal concern of the President and Secretary of State on this question. This included their general views as to the detriment to the entire area of this continuing feud, the difficulties it imposed upon constructive development and the building of strength in the area, and a bit of the domestic problems it caused for us at home. When I spoke of the personal conviction and

political courage of our two leaders on this subject, he warmly indicated his agreement and expressed his great personal admiration.

I told him I was certain that both of these individuals would wish me to have extremely frank and quite secret talks on this subject here in Egypt. I did not know what decisions my Government would make as to the role it could play but knew they would welcome a thorough and frank exchange of ideas with Egypt prior to deciding what role, if any, the United States could play. If we proceeded in talks of this nature, I could assure him that for my part they would be in utmost secrecy. He agreed completely upon necessity for secrecy.

Fawzi then stated that we must find a way in which politicians on both sides of the armistice line could state there had been definite gains out of cooperation on this problem. His general thesis was that in order to be able to take such steps they would have to be able to point to specific, as contrasted to vague, examples of resultant benefits in their individual countries. In this he felt economic development assistance was of primary importance, with some military aid as well as necessity. I told him I of course without instructions on such specifics but it might be—if we reached that stage—I would be given authority on such matters.

We agreed to think over each others remarks and continue the conversation at a later date.

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59. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 30, 1955—7 p.m.

842. Two incidents reported Embtel 839 [2] together with report Syrians used for first time anti-aircraft guns March 29 against Israel planes flying over demilitarized zone Israel-Syrian border (Damascus

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–3055. Secret; Niact. Received at 3:57 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Jerusalem, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, London, and Paris. Passed to the Department of Defense.

[2] Dated March 30, it reported that early that morning Egyptian troops in the Gaza Strip had opened fire on an Israeli patrol and that a platoon of Arab Legion regulars early that morning had crossed into Israel from Jordan and exchanged fire with an Israeli patrol. (*Ibid.*)

telegram 537) [3] seem to indicate emergence certain new factors to be considered any appraisal unstable border situation.

1. Arab States, especially Egypt, seem to be stiffening their attitude against Israel.

2. If facts reported to Embassy by FLO correct, action with Jordan took place in relatively quiet zone, significant number of troops were apparently used by both sides, and action involved a crossing of demarcation line by Arab Legion in numbers. This would seem to signify change of policy by Legion which was known to have been under orders not to cross line into Israel.

3. Possibility that these three actions occurring at about same time may not be independent exists and may show coordination between Arab States.

4. Israelis following a policy of being aggressively alert, and fact that FLO reports this was an army patrol engagement indicates IDF has taken over responsibility for guaranteeing portion of border formerly assigned to border police.

5. Public emotions are mounting to a higher level following continued press build-up of incidents. The special cabinet session (Embtel 836 [4]), Ben Gurion's visit to Pattish (Embtel 829 [5]), and the apparently genuine agitation on part of Prime Minister over developments (Embtel 828 [6]), show degree to which government has been aroused. In this connection, Ben Gurion visit to Pattish may be significant because of danger inherent in his emotional reaction thereto contributing further support to activist sentiment within GOI and IDF. [7]

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Lawson

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[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 683.84A/3–3055)

[4] In telegram 836, March 30, the Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that the Israeli Cabinet met in extraordinary session on March 29 to consider the Security Council proceedings and to discuss the situation along the borders. In this connection, the Embassy observed that if Egypt failed to institute measures which would control effectively the activities along the border of its own people and the refugees, Israel would respond with military action. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/3–3055)

[5] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/3–2955)

[6] Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

[7] On March 31, in telegram 569, the Department informed the Embassy in Tel Aviv that it "sees no evidence of coordinated Arab action against Israel". (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/3–3055)

60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, March 31, 1955—10:14 a.m.

1643. Since receiving Embtel 1373 [2] Dept has been considering at top level possible measures which would provide Nasser way out of impasse resulting from his attack on Turk-Iraq Pact, permit him to gain new prestige and influence in Middle East, and thus enable him to take initiative in launching Alpha. Obviously area defense arrangements are involved in such a review. We would hope to convince Nasser that we attach great importance to Egypt's position in the Middle East and to his influence and cooperation; that we are desirous of extending our support and assistance—political, economic, and military—to Egypt and in general of assisting Egypt to achieve the international standing to which she is entitled to aspire.

There are two basic prerequisites to our extending such support:

(1) There must be continued progress toward firming up the Northern Tier (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan). This is required by the interest of the Free World in maintaining the integrity of the Middle East against assault from the Soviet Union.

(2) There must be a realistic and reasonably early prospect of a settlement of the major issues between Israel and Egypt as US cannot otherwise adequately help Egypt.

In other respects there is wide flexibility and we would welcome suggestions by Nasser. One approach which you might suggest to him before his departure for Asian-African Conference or after his return would be that Egypt and US and UK cooperate along following lines:

1. Northern Tier concept to continue as grouping of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and UK. Adherence of additional Arab states at this time to Turk-Iraq Pact will not be sought by US directly or indirectly.

2. Egypt to participate in Middle East defense, possibly through adherence to Turk-Pakistan Pact. Since this agreement more loosely worded than Turk-Iraq Pact and poses less specific obligations on parties, it more likely prove acceptable to Nasser.

3. Nasser initiate steps towards settlement principal Arab-Israel issues (Alpha). In your presentation you would include considerations mentioned para 2 Deptel 1531. [3]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–3155. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell; cleared with Dulles, Hare, Allen, and Jernegan; and approved by Russell, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London.

[2] See footnote 6, Document 58.

[3] Document 52.

4. In any conference of Arab states (Damascus Embtel 524)[4] US would hope GOE would work for a constructive orientation which would make possible increased US support for Arab states.

Basic pattern would thus be: (a) tightly-knit military cooperation by states along northern tier; (b) association by Egypt with Turkey and Pakistan in a looser form of association appropriate to remoter area; (c) concentration on Arab development through constructive inter-Arab cooperation.

The above would be put to Nasser not as definite US policy but as response to his request for suggestions for way out of his impasse (Embtel 1373). It could be pointed out that such a program would achieve his objectives of increasing solidarity of Arab world and orientation of Arabs toward Free World (Embtel 1261).[5]

Dept is informing British Embassy here of this message and you are authorized in your discretion to discuss it with Stevenson. You should not, however, make any approach to Nasser along above lines without further instruction which would follow your comment.

Dulles

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 786.5/3–2555)
[5] Document 35.

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61. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State[1]

London, April 1, 1955—8 p.m.

4351. Reference Embtel 4350[2] immediately preceding, in conveying Foreign Office concern at apparent divergence views of US and UK re Northern Tier, Shuckburgh also referred to proposal in Deptel 4997,[3] of which Foreign Office had learned from British Embassy Washington, that consideration be given to approaching Nasser re Alpha before Afro-Asian Conference and to talking to him about Middle East defense along lines indicated Department reference telegram. Shuckburgh said he must point out it had been agreed following recommendations of Ambassadors Stevenson and

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–155. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 6:17 a.m., April 2. Repeated to Cairo.
[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/4–155.)
[3] Printed as telegram 1643, *supra*.

Byroade that approach to Nasser would not be made until latter's return from Afro-Asian Conference. He pointed out Nasser departing April 8 and it not advisable in British view approach him before that time.

Shuckburgh said he was coming more and more to regard it as urgent that Alpha be put into operation as soon as possible after Nasser's return from Bandung, but not before. Moreover, when this step taken it should be done in formal and considered fashion and all tangible and intangible benefits should be presented to Nasser, though not necessarily all details. British did not favor another oblique approach to Nasser such as Eden had made.

He also saw some inconsistency between (1) Department's apparent preference that Northern Tier be limited to Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and UK at this time, and (2) suggestion that Egypt be urged participate in Middle East defense through adherence Turkish-Pakistan Pact.

Shuckburgh added that in his view it would be extremely unwise to inform Nasser that we were thinking of advising Jordan or any other Arab State against joining Turkish-Iraqi Pact since this would put us in the position of giving Nasser what he wanted before getting anything from him. British were aware of need for doing something for Nasser but had just released certain military equipment to Egypt which should take care of immediate problem.

Aldrich

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62. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 3, 1955—3 p.m.

1458. Eyes only for Secy and Amb. Contents this message will be better understood after receipt Top Secret letter to George Allen from me dated March 27 [2] which should arrive Monday. [3] In summary that letter records discussion with FonMin on March 26 in which he himself surprisingly indicated desire to discuss possibility of Arab-Israeli settlement. For reasons outlined in letter I felt it wise

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–355. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Received at 10:03 p.m. Repeated to London.

[2] Document 58.

[3] April 4.

to be cautious this first conversation on subj, particularly with Fawzi. Discussion however seemed possibly be of such significance that I decided for purpose of secrecy to communicate to Dept by ltr. General nature of conversation given to Stevenson who as well reported by ltr. Am now reporting by cable as find Top Secret pouch too infrequent but hope greatest security precautions will be taken. In interval between conversation reported my March 26 [*27*] ltr and today's conversation reported below, Fawzi indicated to me in aside at social gathering that Nasser and only Nasser would be informed our talks this subj. This of course significant and led Stevenson and me conclude I should at appropriate time explore matter further.

I called on Fawzi this morning to comply with Dept's tel 1648.[4] This discussion (reported separately)[5] led naturally to exploration possibilities Alpha-type operation.

I asked Fawzi if he had considered further desirability more fundamental approach to Arab-Israeli problem. He stated that he had devoted considerable time this subj recently and had number talks with Nasser. He had cancelled his scheduled meetings with other Arab reps this morning, hoping we might explore matter further. He particularly interested my reactions and second thoughts following our earlier talk. I was faced with choice of backing away from subj or going ahead. I chose latter course.

In two-hour discussion which followed I presented our views along lines general approach that had been prepared for Eden and available to Dept.

Specifically, I said:

(1) Had been greatly encouraged by his earlier remarks re need for early comprehensive settlement.

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[4] The Department on March 31 informed Byroade and Lawson that it wished to use the U.N. Security Council resolutions on Gaza "as points departure for determined effort arrest growing chain incidents Israel border particularly vicinity Gaza strip." It instructed Byroade and Lawson to approach Fawzi and Sharett and, "using firm language", make "clear it inconceivable to US that either side would permit situation get out of hand." They were to emphasize that "events flowing from Gaza attack demonstrate conclusively fallacy doctrine retaliation as means bringing about improvement Arab-Israel situation"; that both sides were responsible for failing to take adequate measures to control local elements in the Gaza area; and that the "ominousness of situation requires that top officials both governments devote personal attention to problem." (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–3155)

[5] Byroade informed the Department on April 3 that he had "strongly presented Department's views this morning supplemented by points from various cables from Tel Aviv re danger of provoking Israeli in their emotional state following SC action", and that Fawzi had expressed his appreciation for the "concern of US Government", "hoped every effort would . . . be made by both sides to strengthen armistice machinery", and "said GOE ready discuss and cooperate on 'practical system' whereby the armistice machinery can be strengthened." (Telegram 1461 from Cairo; *ibid.*, 674.84A/4–355)

(2) Secy had recently reached same conclusions as he re necessity for prompt action—and for much the same reasons as put forward by him. In discussions with Eden Secy found him very much of same mind.

(3) In view of above and staff work that had followed, I felt in position to talk with some assurance re views USG which I felt substantially shared by UK.

(4) Fawzi well aware dangers present situation which he himself had so well expressed. These elaborated upon briefly.

(5) Besides these dangers, this dispute preventing constructive development of Arab States and area generally. We wished to see strong and progressive Egypt. We admire Nasser's efforts that direction and wished be of all possible assistance. The same was true of UK. Arab-Israeli dispute hampered us all greatly in assisting Egypt and in getting on with constructive efforts towards stability and strength of area.

(6) Because of Egypt's position in ME and her realism US and UK had decided talk with her first. Egypt has taken positive attitude re Jordan valley proposals. This has raised her stature in eyes of world. Task of achieving wider settlement is great challenge of statesmanship to all of us.

(7) What we hoping, therefore, is that Nasser and Fawzi will be disposed accept practical realistic settlement and will help us to work for it.

(8) There were, we believed, special arguments of a tactical nature for selecting this time to make effort. US has been following tough policy of deflating Israel. We had refused arms and Israel's attempts obtain defense agreements and special milit arrangements, including guarantees. Our financial assistance had fallen off. There many examples moves of this nature, taken under great difficulty by US. We believed net result was to inject realism into Israeli thinking. This policy had, however, made Israel feel frustrated and insecure. One must judge with great care how far it profitable carry such a course. Personally felt it extremely dangerous for all ME to attempt maintain this policy much longer even if we were in fact able to do so. All in all, this seemed best time to try for settlement.

(9) We must face realities and administration, while always faced with difficulties this subj, obviously freer now than later on in midst of campaign.

(10) Our view is that we should work out with Egypt a basic plan and then tactics. If this went well we could then determine manner in which Israel and other Arab States should be approached.

(11) In a general way what we had in mind was slightly smaller Israel. He must know that we did not believe practicable any radical frontier change along lines 1947 UN resolution. If general settlement could be reached with more practical border believed security guarantee from Western nations might be possible on question of maintenance those borders. In conjunction general settlement this should have great calming effect upon whole area. We believe in adequate compensation plus resettlement of refugees. Arabs, of course, would have to abandon econ warfare. Problems of utilization of Jordan waters, Jerusalem, communications, ports, transit areas, etc would all have to be gone into. We were not seeking over-night direct relations between Arab States and Israel and would do all possible

make settlement palatable Arab opinion. Nor were we striving for one comprehensive agreement neatly bound in pink ribbons. Elements of problem might be approached separately and quite differently. The UN for instance might be used to record in resolution agreements reached on matters such as refugees and Jerusalem. We felt most strongly, however, that end result all agreements and arrangements must be clear end to state of belligerency or pretensions such belligerency.

Fawzi said he was in complete agreement re general approach and timing. He particularly agreed timing. Stated he believed "iron was now hot". He felt that with delay, events and dispositions might change in unfavorable fashion. He said 1955 held greatest possibilities for success; if things were left to drift until next year he himself had little hope of averting disaster in ME.

Re UK, he agreed that US, UK and Egypt must work together for day when meeting of minds achieved in complete secrecy among Cairo, London, Washington and Tel Aviv. Suggested that he and I both should let Stevenson know we working in exploratory way on this subj.

Fawzi made point that solution must be found which both sides can advertise as a victory but that secretly both sides would consider equally unsatisfactory. This best that could be hoped for. Criticism and emotions would be raised against us all and Egypt would certainly receive her share but we must proceed with determination and conviction that we are working in best interests of all concerned. If plan carried through we could at least feel that for future generations we had ended misery million people and had eased most dangerous problem of insecurity. Crucial of course would be Israel reaction when time agreed for them be approached.

Fawzi then reiterated Egyptians' views on refugees and territorial adjustments as given me previously and reported by letter. I told him, altho from practical viewpoint Negev relatively worthless territory, could not conceive of Israel agreeing any territorial concession there beyond minimum necessary for practical connecting ground link for Egypt with Jordan. Fawzi recognized this but felt that old strictly corridor approach would not be enough for Egypt. He realized GOE idea of larger link might present US with impossible problem but did not want it ruled out of discussion.

Fawzi stated we embarking task in which those working on problem should first be convinced themselves of both wisdom and possibility of going forward. With this in mind he suggested it would be profitable for me to develop matter in similar fashion with Nasser when I see him alone on Monday night. After that he felt we should wait until after Bandung.

I asked how he felt future conversations should be carried on. This was large undertaking. Could he himself devote the necessary time to serve as technician on the many complicated aspects of the problem? He replied after Bandung we should try to reach a meeting of the minds as to whole general approach. If this should prove possible, we could then consider necessity using a minimum of carefully selected experts to develop some of the more technical aspects.

This terminated discussion this subj.

Plan to discuss subj generally along with other matters with Nasser on Monday night. This may give us far better clue as to what possibilities are and will withhold further comment until after that meeting. In meantime, Dept again cautioned (as in letter) we unable as yet to weigh significance of what appears on surface to be extremely encouraging development.

Have let Stevenson read this cable. In view length and detail told him I would recommend Emb London do likewise at appropriate level FonOff. [6]

Byroade

[6] The Embassy in London reported that Shuckburgh had seen the contents of this telegram and "was favorably impressed both by Byroade's presentation and by Fawzi's reaction which Shuckburgh thought was as good as could be expected." (Telegram 4388 from London, April 5; *ibid.*, 684A.86/4–555)

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63. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, April 4, 1955—11 a.m.

263. According to Hommel, Israel and Egyptian forces engaged in firefight yesterday between 4:30–6:00 p.m. in vicinity Nahal Oz at kilo 95, on Gaza strip DL. E–I MAC meeting scheduled to discuss previous incidents at kilo 95 MAC house had to be postponed as Egyptian positions at kilo 95 were under heavy mortar fire from Israel positions. Two Egyptian dead and two wounded. Wounded not yet seen by observers. Israelis allege two Israelis dead and 16

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–455. Confidential; Niact. Received at 7:14 a.m. Repeated priority to Tel Aviv and Cairo, and to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, London, and Paris.

wounded, 4 seriously. Egyptians allege penetration of Gaza strip by Israelis. UN observer was at kilo 95 when Israel mortar fire commenced.

Re my telegram 262[2] Ely, assistant to Hommel, reports five Israel casualties on April 2 as result mining of track near Gaza DL. This was fourth mining incident in week and sixth of recent date.

Sabini

[2] The consulate general in Jerusalem, in telegram 262, April 2, informed the Department that Egyptian and Israeli forces earlier in the day had exchanged fire at a point south of the city of Gaza, where Wadi Gaza crossed the demarcation line, and that another mining incident had occurred when an Israeli vehicle on patrol in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip had hit a mine. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/4–255)

64. Editorial Note

On April 4, the Representative of Israel submitted to the Security Council a complaint alleging that Egypt had launched repeated attacks against Israel, including 1) the armed assault at Pattish on March 24; 2) repeated attacks by mining and gunfire on Israeli army units patrolling the Egypt–Israel border at the Gaza Strip between March 26 and April 3; 3) the attack on an Israeli army patrol and on the village of Nahal Oz on April 3. (U.N. doc. S/3385) On April 6, the Security Council met, heard statements by the Israeli and Egyptian representatives, and adjourned pending receipt of the findings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. (U.N. doc. S/PV.697)

On April 14, Major General E.L.M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, reported to the Security Council that the most important factor contributing to increased tension following the action at Gaza had been the mining of tracks used by Israeli army vehicles. To reduce these incidents and improve the situation in the Gaza area, Burns urged the immediate institution of joint patrols. Egypt had notified him of its willingness in principle to establish such patrols, but he had not received a final reply from the Israeli authorities. Both sides, he reported, were prepared to effect a local commanders' agreement and had given verbal assurances that they were employing only regular army and police personnel along the demarcation line. The Israeli authorities favored the erection of obstacles to help prevent infiltration, and the Egyptian authorities, while seeing difficulties in connection with that

proposal, were prepared to consider ways and means of carrying it out. Lastly, Burns reported that, at Egyptian request, he was posting additional United Nations Military Observers on the Egyptian side of the demarcation line. (U.N. doc. S/3390 and Add. 1)

On April 18, the Egyptian Representative informed the Security Council that Egyptian military authorities would soon begin construction of barbed wire fences within Egyptian-controlled territory along the line running through certain essential positions on the demarcation line. (U.N. doc. S/3393) On April 19, after a brief discussion by the Council, the President of the Council observed that the majority apparently saw no need for any new action, since the possible measures to avert incidents in the area of the demarcation line had been fully covered in the Council's resolutions of March 29 and 30. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 698)

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65. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 5, 1955—3 p.m.

858. Saw Prime Minister in Jerusalem at his urgent request afternoon April 4. Neither British nor French Ambassadors were called in. Almost immediately Sharett, more disturbed than I have ever seen him, spoke in substance as follows:

Situation has gone from bad to worse, is now completely untenable. Egyptians are employing two established tactics (1) placing mines inside Israel territory along Gaza border, when necessary under covering fire from positions on their side—Israelis had "surprised" mine-laying parties and on two occasions, ascertained that they were Egyptian soldiers (2) were opening fire on any Israel patrol that came within sight apparently on standing instructions to do so. Here Prime Minister digressed briefly to describe incident reported in Jerusalem 262 to Department. [2] He denied categorically and with some heat the report that Israel had fired first and expressed displeasure over wording of UNTSO communiqué giving possible inference Israel forces started shooting. He emphasized the

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–555. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:38 p.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, London, and Paris.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 63.

fact that Israeli forces were on completely open and exposed ground with no place for shelter that the patrol was completely surprised by the Egyptians and this accounted for the considerable number of casualties on the Israeli side. He stated that the Israelis returned the Egyptian fire and signaled for rear support which fired upon the Egyptians position to destroy it and at the same time permit the Israeli patrol to remove their injured and dead. Then, Egyptian support positions in rear of original Egyptian attack position directed artillery fire at Israel support positions, an action which he believed was the first of its kind between the Egyptian and Israeli forces. Finally Israel forces crossed the border to destroy the original source of attack but found that the attackers had retreated.

The chain of events is not going to "fizzle out", but "will either continue or be immediately and sharply stopped." "We are not going to withdraw our patrols. They are there to protect our settlers. If they were not there the settlers could not work in their fields and they could not harvest their crops. They would soon be overrun by people from the Gaza strip. Our patrols take their lives in their hands every time they go out. We cannot permit them to go out without protection and we are going to supply that protection." As long as this situation remains "we shall have to hit back." Nothing in UN charter precludes nation acting in self-defense. If present state of affairs goes on "then it is goodbye to the armistice agreement." Such will be the inevitable outcome. We do not wish this to happen, you do not want this to happen.

I interrupted to inject question "with regard to the contemplated GOI action in the event provocative conditions continue on the border, I take it that such action would be purely defensive." He replied "defensive action involves a reply to a provocative attack and often involves crossing of the line to destroy the source of attack, then the other side comes into our territory and the situation builds up to a major action."

(He again briefly digressed to state Egyptians had in effect declared GAA void by their aggressive declarations, their Suez blockade, and their actions in present situation.)

Prime Minister then declared: "Nasser must be talked to as never before if he doesn't want hopeless trouble. This must be stopped. The Egyptians must be ordered to cease firing on our patrols without provocation. Are they asking for trouble?"

Sharett continued: According GOI information Egyptians have brought special para-military unit about 1,000 strong to Gaza strip. This unit ("fidayun" Arabic for "self-sacrifices" a unit designed for offensive action people capable of carrying out attack such as Pattish, he stated) had been employed against British in Suez Canal Zone, now is being used for acts of terrorism from Gaza base.

Egyptians must withdraw this unit. They are guilty of carrying out a deliberate aggressive plan as long as it remains there. I gave no other purpose. Sharett added that the Egyptians were being so "deliberate" that they were using "primitive" mines designed to disguise their army origin.

Sharett then said in substance: Having pondered your government's message (my talk with him regarding Deptel 571,[3] see Embtel 848[4]) I am going to take a leaf out of your own book. I am asking your government to seek to arrange a meeting between top level Egyptian and Israel representatives to consider means whereby the present state of affairs can be prevented from "deteriorating into disaster" to "bring under immediate control a situation pregnant with infinitely grave possibilities."

I then asked directly "was this extraordinary meeting of the cabinet (Embtel 855[5]) called solely to discuss the Gaza border situation or for other purposes also?" He replied in substance as follows: Yes, solely to discuss the Gaza situation to review our position and "the conclusions to be drawn from the present situation." To consider my approach to your government as I am now making it to point up the untenable situation existing, and the necessity for us to defend our patrols and settlers, and to request strong and emphatic action by your government with the purpose of influencing the Egyptians to stop their provocative actions. The cabinet fully approved of this action on my part as well as our specific request for the good offices of the US in promoting top level discussions between the Egyptian Government and the Israeli Government.

"We had already decided to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the deteriorating border relations between Israel and Egypt with special reference to the Pattish murder operation, the continuous mining of our territory by trained Egyptian mine layers and the firing on our patrols by Egyptian military forces. Instructions along these lines have been sent to Ambassador Eban."

I then asked the Prime Minister if I could briefly summarize the points he had made which were as follows: (a) The persistent mining of Israel territory by Egyptian military personnel or others trained in

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[3] Same as telegram 1648 to Cairo; see footnote 4, Document 62.

[4] In this telegram, Ambassador Lawson reported on April 2 that he had conveyed the Department's message contained in telegram 571 to Prime Minister Sharett, who indicated "Israel's general willingness to cooperate with UNTSO." (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–255)

[5] The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported on April 4 that the Israeli Cabinet had met that morning for the second time within the week "to discuss Egyptian border problem . . . [which] indicates gravity with which GOI views situation and that issue further retaliation being seriously debated." (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/4–455)

mine laying must cease; (b) Egyptian military forces firing on Israel military patrols without provocation, which he emphasized was persistent, frequent and indicated definite instructions on the part of the Egyptian Government to do so must cease; and that he claimed that this was the pattern which the GOE apparently had decided to continue and if that were true it meant trouble; (c) The assignment by the GOE of the "suicide group" of irregulars to the Gaza strip for terrorist purposes was an action which in itself supports the GOI belief that the present pattern of provocative actions is organized and ordered by GOE, and that this body of irregulars must be withdrawn; (d) GOI agrees with USG opinion that the situation is ominous and that the problem should be handled by top-level officials of both governments and that the GOI was making the positive suggestion that the USG do what it could to bring about an immediate conference between Israeli and Egyptian high officials with the objective of removing current trouble making conditions on the border.

I then asked the question "is it your intention to limit these discussions to the problem of border trouble?" He replied "Yes ["] limited solely to that question no reference to be made to the overall peace settlement to *Bat Galim* or other current problems with Egypt.

The Prime Minister confirmed the points of my summary.

Sharett concluded the interview by saying gravely and with apparent sincerity; "I would be the happiest of men if within 24 or 28 hours I am able to tell my colleagues this meeting will take place and there will be quiet on the Gaza border."

I promised Sharett that I would convey this request to my government.

Reply niact would be appreciated. [6]

Lawson

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[6] Document 68.

66. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 5, 1955—4 p.m.

859. Embassy submits the following comments in regards to Sharett's presentation yesterday as reported Embtel 858: [2]

1. Consideration of the Egyptian problem at four Cabinet meetings, two of them extraordinary, within a nine day period creates the presumption that the situation is regarded here as of such gravity that it cannot be placed in the same category as the recurring "crises" which have characterized Arab-Israel relations since the armistice.

2. In the Embassy's judgment, the majority of Israel Cabinet members believe the situation along Egyptian border has become intolerable and that something will have to be done soon.

3. Sharett yesterday afternoon gave the impression of a man under great emotional strain who had been subjected to strong pressures from his colleagues during the morning Cabinet session. His demeanor and his words gave the impression that he may have been given a last chance within a limited time period to achieve a settlement with Egypt, failing which military means might be adopted to effect a transition from an armistice to a peace arrangement between Israel and Egypt.

4. In view of Israel's past record of using dramatic means to obtain western power assistance in various projects vis-à-vis the Arabs, Embassy has not excluded the possibility that moves adopted yesterday to obtain action through the USG and the SC have a tactical purpose. Certainly this demonstration of willingness to use pacific means should prove most useful to Israel from standpoint world opinion in case open warfare with Egypt ultimately occurs.

5. Nevertheless the preponderance of the evidence here points to conclusion that GOI and Israel people are indeed earnest and it would be unfortunate if the GOE pursued a course of action based on the assumption that most that could happen would be localized retaliation and counter-retaliation.

Firstly, the IDF, GOI and Israel people generally share the view that time is working against them; that US–UK policy and program in the area will ultimately result shift balance military power which will enable Arabs to do what their leaders have consistently said they would do; namely, push Israelis into the sea. The effect of this psychosis is to remove the normal caution which deters military actions through fear that they might lead to something bigger.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 174.84A/4–555. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:56 p.m., April 8. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, Paris, Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Baghdad.

[2] *Supra.*

Prevailing mood is that if there has to be a second round much better to have it now than later.

Secondly, sources available to the Embassy within and without government point to the conclusion that Ben-Gurion, supported by the IDF and such Mapai "old guard" members as Aranne and Eshkol, is dominating the formulation of foreign policy. Their activist propensities may be somewhat strengthened during this election period by the growing appeal to the younger voters of Achdut Haavoda with its militant foreign policy program.

Thirdly, members of the government are known to have been giving close consideration to the Arab political situation generally, and it is a reasonable assumption that they have arrived at the conclusion that divisive forces growing out of the leadership contest between Iraq and Egypt are so great as to minimize the possibilities of collective Arab military action in any short period of time and from military standpoint the IDF may feel that a short period is sufficient to deal with Egyptian forces north of Suez.

Finally, the failure of Sharett to make any reference to the portion of the Department's message [3] dealing with General Burns program may be symptomatic of a general Israel feeling, particularly within the IDF, that UNTSO is not and will not be in the future an effective instrument and that real stability on the border can only be achieved by creating the will among the Egyptians as the Israelis say they have already done in the case of the Jordanians to control effectively the borders situation. This tendency discount in advance Burns efforts may also reflect basic attitude among Mapai leadership as became apparent during Johnston water negotiations that UN efforts in area were infringement Israel sovereignty and that time had come to decrease rather than increase UN responsibilities.

While the Embassy does not want to be unduly alarmist, its conclusion is that I–E situation has changed from static to dynamic one and that the possibilities military operations should not be minimized if Sharett's new effort through USG and security council does not result quick and effective improvement border situation.

Lawson

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[3] Presumably reference is to telegram 1648 to Cairo; see footnote 4, Document 62.

67. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 5, 1955—8 p.m.

1482. Bulk of discussion of meeting with Nasser (Embtel 1480 [2]) fell about equally on Arab States matters and Alpha, with the two becoming often rather hopelessly enmeshed. I repeated to him substantially my presentation to Fawzi (Embtel 1458 repeated London 310 [3]). Found him less forthcoming than Fawzi but with agreement that matter should be developed further after Bandung. He aware that this subject is basic cause of most of present day difficulties. He unable to see, however, his really taking initiative until things had calmed down somewhat in Arab world. Felt enemies would even accuse him of falling into deliberate plot to further weaken Egypt's position in Arab world. However, he desperately wished land connections from Egypt to other Arab states.

It was too much to expect him to be decisive on Alpha at a time when he unable to be certain of Egypt's general role on Middle East matters as a whole. I do not regret, however, launching Alpha at this stage. There was really no alternative. He wants relationship between the West and Egypt to be one of "no surprises". Am certain he will have more trust and confidence if we don't try to be diplomatically cautious as to our own requirements. While the joint estimate of Stevenson and myself is still probably correct as to what Nasser can and cannot do at present, I believe there no harm our laying our cards on the table as to what we really want.

We now have to wait and see. Am inclined to believe, barring some new external developments, that he will be willing to see planning go forward after Bandung in secret but without commitment. [4]

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–555. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Received at 7:18 p.m. Repeated to London.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 774.00/4–555)

[3] Document 62.

[4] The Embassy in London reported that Shuckburgh had been informed of the contents of this telegram, and that he concurred with Byroade's recommendation to delay Alpha's launching until after Nasser returned from Bandung. (Telegram 4416 from London, April 6; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–655)

68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, April 6, 1955—5:01 p.m.

1696. In call on Assistant Secretary Allen April 5 Eban made roughly same points covered by Sharett (Tel Aviv 858 [2]). He urgently requested US assistance in arranging high level meeting between Israel and Egyptian representatives to discuss frontier situation in Gaza area.

He said Israel was sincerely desirous have such meeting and foresaw direst developments if present conditions continue. He declared proposed meeting was "not a propaganda gimmick". Expressing appreciation for Egypt's difficulty with public opinion, he said Israel was willing for meeting to be kept secret with agenda strictly limited to discussion frontier situation Gaza area. Israel willing to meet Egypt either at Kilo 95 or some place in Europe. Eban imagined Egypt might prefer European meeting as easier protect secrecy there. He said representatives of Egypt and Israel should have sufficient authority commit governments to specific proposals for relief border tensions. He pointed out that Israel could convoke meeting under Article 12 GAA [3] but was willing to meet secretly to avoid putting Egypt on the spot.

Jerusalem should inform Burns urgently of foregoing and say US Government considers situation explosive. We suggest he consider calling high level representatives of Egypt and Israel to meet with him on subject. Cole should reaffirm to Burns that US desires support him in all possible ways and would strongly press Egyptians and Israelis to attend meeting under his auspices. [4] FYI Department plans approach Hammarskjold today along same line and ask that he

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–555. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hart and Bergus and approved by Allen, who signed for Dulles. Also sent niact to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Repeated niact to USUN.

[2] Document 65.

[3] Egypt and Israel signed a General Armistice Agreement at Rhodes on February 24, 1949 (U.N. doc. S/1264). Article 12 provided, among other things, that either Egypt or Israel could request the U.N. Secretary-General to convoke a conference of representatives of Egypt and Israel for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the agreement's provisions, with the exception of Articles 1 and 2.

[4] Consul General Cole in Jerusalem cabled the Department on April 8 that he had spoken with General Burns the previous day about arranging a high-level meeting between Egyptian and Israeli representatives. Burns informed Cole that Israeli Foreign Ministry officials were anxious to have such a session. (Telegram 268; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–855) Cole subsequently informed the Department that he had had another meeting with Burns on April 8, at which time Burns stated he would consider calling a high-level Egyptian-Israeli meeting and would inform Cole of his decision. (Telegram 270 from Jerusalem, April 8; *ibid.*)

communicate with Burns in support our suggestion.[5] End FYI. Department will of course be most interested in receiving any comments or additional information Burns may have.

Cairo should inform GOE of Israeli request and bring urgently to attention GOE seriousness of border situation as described Tel Aviv's 858 and other reports and emphasize dangers of explosion. Should say we are consulting General Burns re possibility his calling meeting under his auspices and if GOE prefers this procedure we will give it our strong support. Meanwhile think it of utmost importance Egypt refrain from all actions which might worsen situation.[6]

Tel Aviv inform Sharett we concur in need for urgent action to relieve Gaza frontier situation. We are transmitting his request to Egyptians but since UN has continuing responsibility, we are also consulting Burns re possible immediate steps and will support him fully. Meanwhile we would take extremely serious view of any Israeli action which might lead to explosion.[7]

Immediately on receipt of word Burns is calling meeting, Cairo and Tel Aviv should emphasize to respective governments our full support for his action and urge complete cooperation. Embassies should explain we taking similar action at other capital.

Dulles

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[5] The Department instructed the Mission at the United Nations to approach Secretary-General Hammarskjöld along the lines indicated in this telegram. (Telegram 574 to USUN, April 6; *ibid.*, 674.84A/4–655) Although Hammarskjöld had misgivings about pursuing this course of action, he informed members of the Mission that he would instruct General Burns to proceed with the suggestion to call a meeting of high-level Egyptian and Israeli representatives to discuss the dangerous situation in the Gaza area. (Telegram 665 from New York, April 7; *ibid.*, 674.84A/4–755)

[6] Byroade reported that he had carried out the Department's instructions on April 7, but that Fawzi refused to commit the Egyptian Government to attending a high-level meeting with Israeli officials. He did say, however, "that Government of Egypt could consider further Israeli idea of meeting when meaning 'high level' known." (Telegram 1496 from Cairo, April 7; *ibid.*)

[7] Lawson delivered the substance of the Department's telegram to Sharett on the evening of April 7. (Telegram 866 from Tel Aviv, April 8; *ibid.*, 674.84A/4–855)

69. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 6, 1955—7 p.m.

1492. My talk with Nasser (Embassy tel 1481 [2]), . . . information from Egyptian War Department (Embassy tel 1471 [3]) when read in conjunction latest cables from Tel Aviv make it clear that Egyptian-Israeli tension reaching, or has reached, new and dangerous high. Incidents are rarely clear cut, but am convinced Egypt has no interest in touching off war with Israel at this time. I believe Nasser's statement this effect and that within limits human endurance he will exert his influence in direction of caution and restraint of hot heads. On other hand, he cannot take another Gaza-like attack by Israelis lying down without seriously jeopardizing his leadership on Egypt.

There probably has been some skulduggery from Egyptian side since Gaza, in addition intelligence gathering which Nasser admitted. Altho Israelis may continue to insist otherwise, believe history of border indicates some time required for area to calm down after Israelian military action.

Have made Department's views unmistakably clear to both Fawzi and Nasser and have supplemented this démarche by warning re situation inside Israel. Today we received more evidence that they took our approaches seriously.

Can not help but associate final para Tel Aviv's 855 [4] re fluctuating attitude Israeli Govt towards Nasser regime. One fact I think we must weigh carefully is whether there will be Israeli attempts by

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–655. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:33 p.m. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, Paris, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda.

[2] Byroade reported on April 5 that he had had a discussion the previous evening with Nasser, who, among other points, "gave me his personal word that Egyptian Government not involved in Pattish incident or land mine cases"; that "he did not want war with Israel and Gaza not worth fighting for"; but that "if there was another Israeli attack upon his armed forces he would have to react other than through United Nations." (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/4–555)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.83/4–455)

[4] The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported on April 4 that one element within the Israeli Government, largely within the Foreign Ministry, believed Nasser's survival was in the long-term interest of Israel, while another element had adopted the contrasting attitude that Israel's interests would be better served if Nasser's regime fell and was replaced by a weaker government. It was significant, the Embassy believed, that both groups assumed that the "position RCC is a fragile one and that Israel military action might be decisive in leading to its collapse." (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/4–455)

aggression to destroy present Government of Egypt. Nasser would have two alternatives (a) to take it lying down or (b) launch counter-operations which would without doubt end in defeat for Egypt. I doubt that United States could save Nasser in either event.

Of even more importance is our own position vis-à-vis Middle East as whole if there is repetition of Gaza-like attack or as appears, possibly a worse incident. United States position in Arab States will suffer drastically in event we unable to take some dramatic act in addition to normal UN recourse.

Have just received Tel Aviv's 187 and 188.[5] It should be recalled Egyptians have promised cooperate with General Burns on carrying out recent Sugar Charlie [SC] resolution re border situation. This probably far easier for Nasser in period following Gaza than for him send high level emissary to meet with Israelis. If Department decides comply Sharett's request for use our good offices arranging such a meeting believe it important that we take position General Burns be present as observer. While I hesitate make recommendation, am inclined to think we should tell Israelis SC has just passed resolution on best way to deal with borders situations and that Egyptians have promised to cooperate. We could separately thru UN urge Burns arrive on the spot without delay.

In addition US and UK can again talk even more sternly to both sides. We might in addition consider strengthening Burns' hand thru UN by immediate increase his facilities including more observers, helicopters and own logistics facilities.

If above not sufficient to deal with situation believe United States Government, in conjunction UK and perhaps others, faced with most difficult decision. Perhaps nothing will suffice but some act implying a willingness use measure of force, not necessarily military but perhaps with implication this ultimate possibility.

Byroade

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[5] Printed as Documents 65 and 66.

70. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, April 7, 1955.

During the course of a conversation with the Secretary this afternoon, Sir Roger Makins said he gathered that the Alpha exercise was proceeding satisfactorily. He said that the British fully supported Byroade's initiative in his recent talk with Nasser [2] and had sent a message to Stevenson to express support for the line Byroade had taken with the Egyptians. The British felt that Byroade's action had been constructive and were pleased that there had been no violent reaction from Nasser. The Secretary agreed that Byroade's talk had been useful and explained that it had come about in the course of a long dinner and conversation with Nasser, and not as a result of instructions to Byroade specifically to raise this question. Sir Roger indicated awareness of this and repeated his assertion that the British thought this had been useful.

The Secretary then commented that there seemed to have been a little difficulty with respect to Jordan and the Northern Tier, but he understood that this was now straightened out. He had sent instructions that we were neither to encourage nor discourage Jordan or the other Arab States from joining the Turk-Iraq Pact. Sir Roger said he was familiar with the instructions we had sent and felt they were satisfactory.

The Secretary then said that there was one very real difficulty we have which he was not entirely certain the British were aware of. He said that if Jordan now joined the Turk-Iraq Pact, it would not only increase the difficulty in giving any military assistance to Jordan but would also very substantially increase the difficulty of the US in giving any military aid to Iraq. The US Government had been under heavy pressure from the Jewish elements in this country for extending military aid to Iraq. It had justified such aid on the grounds of the Northern Tier concept and the fact that Iraq and Israel were not territorially contiguous. If Jordan joined in an alliance with Iraq, the justification for giving military assistance to Iraq would be seriously compromised. Sir Roger said he could well understand our problem. The concern of the British Government had been that if the US took a position that Jordan should not join the

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 2. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Addressed also to Murphy, Bowie, Merchant, Allen, and the Executive Secretariat.

[2] See Document 67.

Turk-Iraq Treaty, the Egyptians would be encouraged to continue and to step up their efforts together with the Syrians and the Saudi Arabians at the expense of Iraq and the general situation in the area.

D MacA

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71. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 8, 1955—4 p.m.

1502. During period of expected quiet regarding foreign affairs matters while Nasser and Fawzi absent from Egypt, will review Embassy conclusions with view towards furnishing any possible new recommendations regarding general Arab States situation. In general discussions with Nasser all aspects of Deptel 1643 repeated London 4997, [2] naturally developed except suggestion that Egypt might adhere to Turko-Pakistani pact. While we might eventually find such association by Egypt useful, am very doubtful idea should be broached in near future.

While it is tempting here to seek authority inform Nasser we will use our influence prevent additional Arab State adherence to northern tier, believe this would be mistake and that Department's "hands off" position is correct. Nasser now believes this to be our position. Considering however how things may develop in future, have sought to leave impression Nasser's mind that it would be most difficult for United States to discourage further participation if states concerned voluntarily decided such to be in their own best interests. He understands logic of this and that we would not desire do anything dampen enthusiasm for northern tier approach. Believe, unless Department has other views, this best way to leave things for present.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–855. Top Secret; Alpha. Received at 12:15 a.m., April 9. Repeated to London.

[2] Document 60.

72. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, April 11, 1955—4 p.m.

277. Reference: mytel 270. [2] Met with General Burns today. Following summarizes position relative his calling Egyptian-Israeli meeting:

Burns agrees with USG estimate that situation sufficiently serious warrant his prospective action in calling high-level meeting. Burns has seen Eytan who thought participants might consist of himself and the Egyptian Ambassador to Syria [3] or Jordan. [4] Next move is now up to Eytan since he is to provide Burns, presumably very soon, with Israel's suggestions for agenda. Upon receipt these suggestions Burns will determine whether proposed agenda items would constitute sufficient basis for calling meeting. If so, he expects sound out Egyptians through UN channels.

Burns regards danger major clash sufficiently imminent to require some action without delay. He has therefore today telegraphed to UNSYG asking latter draw attention GOE to deterioration frontier situation. While recognizing best efforts both parties needed avoid serious trouble, Burns' communication contains appeal Egyptian commander issue appropriate orders to army units and lists ten instances Israeli complaints against Egypt since March 28 of mining and shooting incidents.

Burns expects to see Dayan later today about possibility establishing joint patrols Gaza area. [5]

Cole

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684.84A/4–1155. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:05 p.m. Repeated priority to Tel Aviv and Cairo, and to London and Paris. Repeated to USUN.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 68.

[3] Brigadier Mahmoud Riad.

[4] General Mohamed Ibrahim Seifeddin.

[5] Cole subsequently informed the Department that Burns saw Dayan on April 11 and proposed that steps be taken to establish joint Egyptian-Israeli patrols in frontier areas. Dayan said he would refer Burns' proposal to Ben Gurion, but indicated considerable skepticism about the latter's reaction. (Telegram 281 from Jerusalem, April 14; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1455)

73. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 12, 1955—5 p.m.

881. The following is a message from the Prime Minister to Secretary of State Dulles in reply to the personal messages from Secretary which I gave Sharett in pursuance of Deptels 456 [2] and 510. [3]

The Prime Minister said that the following document would be formally presented by Ambassador Eban tomorrow [4] but that he thought in the meantime the Secretary would like to have the opportunity to study its contents.

Following is message from Prime Minister Sharett to Secretary of State Dulles:

"My reply to your personal messages which I very deeply appreciated has been delayed in view of your absences from Washington and the succession of events within the region which called for a reappraisal of the situation on our part.

"It was gratifying and highly important for us to learn from you direct that you were fully alive to Israel's anxieties and personally concerned to find ways and means of allaying them.

"We are vitally interested to see the defences of democracy strengthened everywhere and our own region safeguarded against the dangers threatening it. Yet we cannot but be acutely mindful of the perils with which certain defence alliances are fraught for our own security.

"The Middle East is beginning be a network of pacts from which Israel is excluded not only as a participant but even as a candidate for participation. In the case of the Suez Zone agreement she is singled out for not being even a beneficiary. All the Arab States concerned are active enemies of Israel. They profess a fierce desire see Israel obliterated. Their 'peace terms' spell Israel's doom. Their association in a western defence system without a prior change in their attitude inevitably hardens their intransigence. Their arming is a direct threat to Israel's survival.

"The Turco-Iraqi pact is a notable case in point. Far from abating her hostility to Israel, Iraq has managed through the pact to wring from Turkey a commitment to support the anti-Israel case. This can hardly advance the cause of peace in the Middle East.

"We fully agree that the region's defences against the possibility of outside aggression must be buttressed but we cannot contem-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1255. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 5:39 p.m. Sent as telegram 1783 to Cairo, copy pouched to London, April 14. (*Ibid.*)

[2] Document 22.

[3] Document 45.

[4] For a summary of Secretary Dulles' conversation with Ambassador Eban on April 13, see Document 75.

plate with equanimity this being attempted at the expense of our security and international position within the region. That the regional balance of strength should not be upset to our detriment is to us of paramount importance. We were therefore happy to learn that some form of security commitment to Israel was under your active consideration. What we would welcome is the conclusion of a defence treaty between the United States and ourselves, such as would guarantee the territorial integrity of Israel and assure us an arms supply corresponding to that offered to the Arab States.

"As things stand, the sense of isolation prevalent amongst our people is deepening. It is partly against that background that the Gaza incident—in itself a reaction to extreme provocation and the result of the breakdown of patience long maintained—should be viewed. This isolated and exceptional occurrence must be considered as an act of self-defense of a beleaguered nation surrounded by enemies and increasingly encircled by the growth of military alliances either ignoring her existence or actively directed against her.

"What you said about the Gaza incident in your second message has received our deepest attention. The Government of Israel is as ever resolved to do its utmost to reduce existing tension. It cannot naturally divest itself of responsibility for the defence of its territory and population. As I write, the loss of life amongst our troops and settlers as a result of Egyptian offensive action is a weekly occurrence and the restraint of our people is again severely tried. Egypt must be prevailed upon to put an end to murderous aggression. For our part, it is our determined policy faithfully to observe the armistice agreement in the expectation that the other side will be induced to act likewise. You will appreciate that a continued and systematic one-sided violation of the armistice agreement is liable to reduce it to naught.

"The situation is complex. It would be of great help if you could possibly take me into your confidence as to the action the United States intends taking in the near future for the Middle East and in particular as to the exact steps contemplated regarding Israel. Advance knowledge might be helpful in achieving a common policy or would at any rate eliminate unnecessary misunderstanding. Your intermittent discussions with our Ambassador, as you indicated, have been in progress since last August, and I hope I will not be pressing you unduly by saying that an early clarification of the position and prospects would be extremely valuable.

"As for Ambassador Johnston's mission, you are doubtless aware that he has succeeded, by dint of skillful and painstaking negotiation, in narrowing considerably the gap between conflicting claim and clearing up some of the points at issue between him and ourselves. I am now soberly hopeful of an early solution which would satisfy Israel's minimum water requirements without interfering with her sovereignty or imperilling her territorial integrity. Coupled with a fair share of the waters these are the prerequisites of any agreement to which we should be a party.

"I must apologize for the length of this message, in the composition of which I was encouraged by the sympathetic understanding which you have always brought to bear upon the examination of our problems both before and since you took office.

"With greetings and best wishes for your health and strength and for the success of the great work in which you are engaged on behalf of the entire free world."

Lawson

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74. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 14, 1955—8 p.m.

1551. There are so many local and external factors that will have a bearing upon success or failure of operation Alpha that it probably useless speculate on chances at present time. It seems to me, however, in contrast many convincing apparent reasons against, there are at least 2 factors which might cause Nasser go forward. Strangely enough these 2 factors have become accentuated as result of events which have followed signature Turk-Iraqi pact. It would be optimistic indeed to say that some good may yet come out of situation which has been locally one of deterioration. Yet there is just a chance, if we play our cards right, this could yet turn out to be the case.

1. The first of these is that Nasser is now aware that Egypt, or any grouping of states under leadership of Egypt, will not receive really effective backing and material support from the West, and particularly from the US, because of Arab-Israeli situation.

He sees that other states, more fortunate this respect in geographical locations of the North, can be enticed away from Israeli preoccupations (this probably not as true as he believes) and materially benefited by association with the West. He sees Egypt, geographically separated by Israel be [*from*?] northern tier, beginning to fall in entirely different light as far as interest of the West is concerned. These feelings of frustration could, on the one hand, lead him to seek neutrality and general non-cooperation with the West. We would under these conditions be confronted with increasing resentment regarding combination of Israeli and West generally, as he would consider this combination basically responsible for box in which Egypt finds herself. On the other hand, these same feelings of frustration could conceivably lead to decision to correct Egypt's

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1455. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 4 a.m., April 15. Repeated to London.

position by going ahead with Israeli settlement and turning far more openly to West for support. Influencing the choice between these 2 alternatives seems to be our greatest task in Egypt to date.

2. The 2nd of these factors, closely enmeshed with 1st, is an increased desire in Egypt to see line of communications reestablished between Egypt and other Arab States. There has been a growing realization that Egypt is in fact isolated by geography and that this will affect the importance of her role in Middle Eastern matters.

Stevenson and I have discussed general problem several times. We believe that a corridor, or triangular arrangement such as embodied in Alpha, will not be accepted by Egypt. In my last discussion with Nasser[2] we discussed Negev sufficiently for me to conclude he would think Alpha proposal extremely unrealistic. In conversation with Stevenson just prior his departure, Fawzi stated Nasser wished US to work up specific proposal during his absence, but reiterated Egypt could not accept corridor and that whole of Negev south of Beersheba was only answer. Stevenson cautioned of course this extremely unrealistic. It occurs to me that Alpha proposal probably based primarily upon psychological and propaganda desirability of symbolic relinking Arab world. Nasser, however, is thinking in terms (which believe he over-emphasizes in practical importance) of actual effective land communication. When considered in this light Alpha proposals, due terrain and road considerations, are in fact unrealistic as study relief map shows.

Stevenson and I hope Department and Foreign Office will continue search for possible alternatives. In this connection, recall discussion with Haim [*Nahum*?] Goldmann[3] in Department some 2 years ago. He volunteered his feeling that a corridor type approach to Negev would be unworkable, and even if accepted, would merely set up ambush trap for future. He stated furthermore approach should be one of trying to get peoples to work together locally rather than drawing of new lines to keep them apart. His own view was that we should seek joint Egyptian-Israeli administration of entire Negev. I remember my surprise at suggestion and queried him as to whether he thought Ben Gurion would accept such a proposal. At that time he stated he believed there was such a possibility.

For obvious reasons would recommend that idea not be further developed with Goldmann. Nevertheless it seemed this might be of interest to Department and Foreign Office in exploring new possibilities. Egyptian position, as stated to Stevenson recently, is certain to be that Negev south of Beersheba should go to the Arab States. Our

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[2] See Document 67.

[3] Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive and Chairman of the World Jewish Congress.

guess is that they will hold to this position stubbornly unless we can find a better compromise position than present Alpha proposal.

In discussing Goldmann's suggestion with Stevenson he made following points with which I concur:

(1) If such arrangement were possible it would as well solve problem of Gaza which is otherwise an awkward one.
(2) Joint Israeli-Jordanian administration would probably be more feasible than Israeli-Egyptian.
(3) Some type of minimum international supervision probably would be required, at least initially.

Returning to objective Alpha itself, it will be recognized this message does not attempt deal with internal problems which will affect chances for Alpha. Some of these are grave and could well assume such proportions as to dwarf those foreign affairs considerations mentioned herein which give some reason for hope.

Department of course realizes if coming talks go well day will come when net advantages to Egypt and Arab world generally will have to be placed in very specific terms. The cost will not be light as there are few apparent advantages for Arabs in Alpha proposals themselves. We assume here Department fully aware Arab-Israeli settlement, if possible at all, will be costly but believes as we do that net advantages fully justify such expenditure.

Byroade

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75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, April 14, 1955—6:21 p.m.

605. Eban called on Secretary April 13 [2] to deliver letter from Sharett [3] and summed up Israel policy as follows:

1. Israel takes affirmative attitude towards US efforts create area defense against outside aggression but desires to know what her place will be in security arrangements.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1455. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Russell, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Cairo and London.

[2] A memorandum of the conversation is *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

[3] See Document 73.

2. Her policy based on maintenance of armistice agreements despite Gaza incident.

3. Israel desires see Jordan River Development plan succeed and thinks solution should be sought in Washington before another Johnston field trip. Israel engineers sent here for this purpose. [4]

Eban emphasized Israel's need for security agreement, in view of network of pacts being woven in area and said Sharett merely requesting that Secretary take him into his confidence re US thinking.

Secretary replied that heart of problem was arranging some form of security treaty between US and Israel. He pointed out that except in Western Hemisphere only security treaties signed by US directed against Soviet communism. In case of Manila Pact [5] we expressly excluded regional controversies. Security treaty requires consent of Senate which in turn depends upon settlement major issues between Israel and her neighbors. Although all problems between Israel and Arab states might not be settled for long period we could attempt this year solve major ones such as border adjustments, water arrangements, refugees and others. Our investigation indicated basis for settlement exists although settlement will not be wholly acceptable to either side. Summing up Secretary said security treaty must guarantee stability and not war; settlement of major issues not unobtainable; and we must decide now on procedure and timing. Although Israel might think plans too ambitious progress of kind indicated necessary to get type of treaty Israel wanted. Otherwise some interim device such as renewed and possibly strengthened Tripartite Declaration would have to suffice.

Secretary stated he felt approach should be made on substantially simultaneous basis to Israel and Arab states. Among latter US thinking of approaching Egypt first. Gaza incident and Nasser's trip to Bandung had upset time-table. Secretary added that Israel might have ideas on tactics. He hoped that shortly after Nasser returned from Bandung presupposing quiet along border we could make up our minds definitely whether to approach Egypt.

Eban stated Secretary's remarks opened new vistas. His Government also felt Egypt offered best opportunity. Fundamental point was whether assurances regarding Israel's security would have to wait settlement with Arabs. He urged that present agreed frontiers be guaranteed. Regarding procedures Eban thought Johnston's meth-

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[4] Telegram 604 to Tel Aviv, April 14, stated that Israeli water engineers were in Washington for technical discussions concerning the Jordan Valley development proposal. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/4–1455)

[5] The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed at Manila on September 8, 1954. For text, see 6 UST (pt. 1) 81.

od proved effective on water question and could perhaps be used again.

In reply to any additional inquiries from GOI Embassy Tel Aviv should state further elaboration of US thinking at this time not possible. Essential point is restore calm on frontiers and establish suitable atmosphere for progress.

Department informed British Embassy April 14 of above conversation.

Dulles

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76. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 15, 1955—7 p.m.

1559. Am glad Secretary talked to Eban as he did on April 13 as one would hope this would serve help stay their hand for a time. Much relieved, however, to note final paragraph Deptel 1781 [2] makes it clear we cannot expand on subject to Israelis at this time. Hope all concerned will brace themselves against certain Israeli efforts obtain such expansion. News we thinking of border adjustments may well excite them greatly.

Newspaper articles inspired by Govt of India [*Israel*] or political groups inside Israel have at times in past frustrated Department's efforts make progress on aspects Arab-Israeli problem. Suggest therefore Secretary may wish send word to Eban and Sharett if anything of this kind now happens future progress will be jeopardized and Israelis would have only themselves to blame. Israel agrees Egypt may yet be key which would unlock door leading to progress. From viewpoint talks here can think nothing more disastrous than having some newspaper story touch off a wave of discussion on subject of United States intention and/or plan bring about peace settlement. As we agreed upon utmost secrecy and particularly as I assured him (allowed I believe by Alpha instructions) he could proceed with assurance Israel would not know of talks until we saw whether progress was possible here. Nasser would interpret such a

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1555. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 12:33 a.m., April 16. Repeated to London and Tel Aviv.

[2] Printed as telegram 605 to Tel Aviv, *supra*.

story as our breaking faith with him. It would be. Public disavowal of Egypt's involvement followed by stoppage of talks likely result.

Reference Eban's suggested use Johnston procedure, am certain Department agrees public emissary, certain to be labeled "peace maker" and subject bitter attack of press with resultant difficulty dealing Middle East politicians not best tactics on this one. It will be recalled Johnston had to live down impression he embarking on Alpha type operation before progress made.

Byroade

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77. Letter From the British Chargé (Scott) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, April 15, 1955.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In the absence of H.M. Ambassador [2] I am writing to you on Mr. Macmillan's instructions to say that he considers it would be very valuable if Mr. Francis Russell could visit London for further talks on the Middle East problem.

Mr. Macmillan believes that we should try to persuade Colonel Nasser that the territorial concessions demanded of Israel under existing Alpha planning are sufficient (combined with such "outside inducements" as can be offered to Egypt) to justify an attempt to reach a settlement on these lines. From Colonel Nasser's reactions to Mr. Byroade's approach it looks very probable however that he will reject the proposal for a land link between Egypt and Jordan and will insist on a larger concession in the Negev as a price for his cooperation. Her Majesty's Government would like to agree in advance with the United States Government what to do in such circumstances.

A further matter of concern to Mr. Macmillan arises from the solution we have had in mind in respect of the Gaza Strip. Since the plan was drawn up, this area has become the most dangerous of all and the refugee population in its present state of excitement would constitute a standing threat to any settlement. This is another matter which Mr. Russell might discuss in London.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 3. Top Secret.

[2] Sir Roger M. Makins.

In view of the urgency, Mr. Macmillan would be glad to know whether it would be possible for Mr. Russell to proceed within a few days to London so that the further examination could be completed during the next two weeks. [3]

Yours sincerely,

R.H. Scott

[3] On April 18, Russell transmitted this letter to Secretary Dulles as an attachment to a memorandum recommending acceptance of the British proposal of consultations. Dulles approved the recommendation. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—memos, etc., beginning after return from London—Mar. 11 thru April 26)

The Department subsequently notified the Embassy in London that Russell would arrive on April 23, and that discussions about Alpha would begin on April 25 at the Foreign Office. (Telegram 5371 to London, April 20; *ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/4–2055)

78. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 15, 1955—5 p.m.

887. British Ambassador [2] and I met this morning with General Burns to exchange views regarding the Egyptian-Israel situation relative to the Security Council's second resolution and to Prime Minister Sharett's proposal. The consensus which Burns is transmitting to the UN Secretary General and which Nicholls and I undertook to transmit to our governments follows:

1. First priority should be given to obtaining from Egyptians a firm commitment regarding their willingness to participate in high level talks in meetings which would be held under General Burns' auspices.

2. Re problem of agenda it is suggested that this be defined as discussion of General Burns' proposals in pursuance Security Council resolution and any other proposals for the reduction of tensions on the border which in the opinion of the two parties should be discussed.

3. Re level of representation it is suggested that the Egyptians be informed that the Israel Government expects to be represented by

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1555. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:32 a.m., April 16. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, Paris, and Jerusalem.

[2] John Walter Nicholls.

the Director General of the Foreign Ministry [3] that presumably he would be accompanied by the IDF Chief of Staff. [4]

4. Although it was recognized that the IG might take the position that not one of General Burns' proposals should be resolved until a general meeting is held, the proposal for joint patrols in view of its importance at this moment, should immediately be pressed as vigorously as possible by Burns with his regular IG contacts with US and United Kingdom diplomatic support.

It appeared to us in today's discussion that in order for Security Council to act intelligently on the Israel complaint to that body (Department telegram 596 [5]) it was necessary to know before hand whether in fact the Egyptian Government was prepared to participate in high level meetings along the lines set forth above.

As preamble to discussions which led to foregoing suggestions General Burns gave us the following appraisal situation. Majority incidents since February 28 Gaza action have been chargeable to Egypt. As these were largely sins of omission rather than commission he assumed that any Security Council decision on Israel complaint would be somewhat milder than SC condemnation of Israel for February 28 incident.

He appraised attitudes two parties as result preliminary discussions as follows:

a. Joint patrols—Egypt favorable. Israel rather strongly opposed but has not closed door.

b. Barricades along demarcation line—Israel desires but Egypt somewhat opposes.

c. Both sides agreeable to use trained soldiers only in area one kilo each side demarcation line.

d. No insurmountable obstacles to eventual local commanders agreement.

As we were leaving, Burns said that accompanied by Chief of Staff Dayan, he was visiting this weekend a number of the Israel border settlements near the Gaza strip.

Lawson

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[3] Walter Eytan.

[4] Moshe Dayan.

[5] The Department informed the Embassy in Tel Aviv in telegram 596, April 11, that earlier in the day Israeli Embassy representatives had requested U.S. support for an urgent Security Council meeting to continue consideration of Israel's complaint against Egypt, had urged U.S. backing for Israel's contention that Egypt was responsible for the current situation along the frontier, and inquired as to the U.S. attitude toward Burns' efforts to initiate high-level Israeli-Egyptian discussions. The Americans responded that the Department fully supported Burns' efforts and that it thought a Security Council meeting would prejudice prospects for their success. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1155)

79. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Prime Minister Sharett [1]

Washington, April 16, 1955.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I have received, through your Ambassador in Washington, the text of your letter to me of April 12, 1955. [2] Your statement of the problems which the present situation in the Middle East presents for Israel is most helpful, and I welcome the clear and constructive manner in which you have presented your Government's point of view.

Ambassador Eban will have advised you that I discussed with him in some detail the points raised in your communication and let him know the direction which my thinking has been taking in dealing with the problems of peace and security in the area.

I am particularly pleased by your reference to the question of the division of the waters of the Jordan valley. We believe the Jordan Development Plan should stand on its own merits and not be dependent on other solutions, but if this question could be resolved, we would all be encouraged to hope that a broader settlement of outstanding issues might be possible.

I feel I should let you know quite frankly our difficulties with regard to the security arrangement which you suggest. Up to the present time, the United States has not entered into any security treaty, except in the Western Hemisphere, unless the treaty was directed against the expansionist threat of international communism. We have steadfastly avoided involvement in regional controversies. For instance, we insisted that the Manila Pact stipulate that the "aggression and armed attack" referred to in that Pact should apply only to "communist aggression". A security treaty with Israel would require the consent of the Senate. If we presented to the Senate a treaty with Israel today, many Senators would feel that they were not being asked to guarantee stability but, rather, to guarantee United States involvement in a highly inflammatory dispute. In order to obtain the Senate's consent, I feel confident that the major issues between Israel and her neighbors would have to be brought measurably nearer solution.

I have been giving the matter serious study for the past few months, and have come out with the following basic conclusions:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1655. Secret. Transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 608, April 16. Repeated to Cairo and pouched to London. (*Ibid.*, 611.84A/4–1655) Lawson delivered the Secretary's letter to Sharett on the evening of April 20. (Telegram 902 from Tel Aviv, April 21; *ibid.*, 684A.86/4–2155)

[2] See Document 73.

1. No formal treaty guarantee of Israel or her neighbors would meet with the approval of the United States Senate or the American people unless there were a reasonable chance of stability in the area. This would require substantial progress toward a settlement of the major outstanding issues.

2. In our view, such a settlement is not unobtainable.

3. The United States Government is ready to exert every effort to achieve such a settlement and is giving earnest thought to the questions of procedure and timing.

I am confident you will agree that a favorable outcome of our endeavor could be jeopardized by any public intimation of our efforts at this time. Success will also depend, of course, on the maintenance of an atmosphere of tranquility in the area during the crucial period ahead.

I shall be glad to receive further thoughts from you at any time, by letter or through your Ambassador here.

With every good wish and my heartiest personal greetings, I remain.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles [3]

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

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80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, April 16, 1955—3:54 p.m.

1792. Re Palestine in SC: Gaza. UNSYG has informed us that, contrary to his understanding and ours that Israelis desired high-level discussions which would be limited to Gaza border situation, Israeli position has now apparently developed into one requesting full-scale discussions with Egypt on high political level in addition to Gaza border talks under Burns. UNSYG also indicated his view Israelis seeking to relegate Burns' role in possible high-level discussions to secondary or minor one. He has informed Burns he supports him fully on limiting discussions to those provided for in March 30

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1655. Secret. Drafted by Ludlow on April 15; cleared with Burdett, Hart, and Jernegan; and approved by Popper, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Tel Aviv, USUN, and Jerusalem.

SC resolution.[2] We share UNSYG's concern and today have informed Israeli Embassy our view we believe Israel should cooperate fully with Burns' efforts and that discussions, if arranged, should be limited to SC resolution.[3] FYI We believe Israeli efforts to broaden basis discussions may be prelude to formal Israeli request, possibly at SC meeting scheduled April 19, for talks under Article 12 Egyptian-Israeli general armistice agreement. End FYI.

Following for action posts as indicated:

1. USUN requested inform UNSYG we support fully line he has taken with Burns and have already informed Israelis our view discussions should be under Burns and limited to March 30 resolution.[4] Such discussions in our view have obvious priority over any other possible negotiations. This position may be taken with other delegations and in SC meeting if necessary.

2. Tel Aviv should inform Israelis our position indicated above.[5]

3. Cairo should inform GOE, and USUN should inform Egyptian delegation we continue support Burns' effort under March 30 SC resolution. Should indicate however our view Israelis may possibly call for talks under Article 12 of general armistice agreement. If Israelis make such request we earnestly hope Egyptians will not reject it but instead will be prepared indicate as promptly as possible it will consider such talks but believes cooperation with Burns on carrying out March 30 resolution has priority.[6]

4. Jerusalem may inform Burns of developments and our views.[7]

Dulles

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[2] The Mission at the United Nations on April 14 furnished the Department of State with texts of Burns' messages to Hammarskjöld and the latter's reply. (Telegram 689; *ibid.*, 674.84A/4–1455)

[3] Ludlow conveyed the Department's position to Kollek on April 15. (Memorandum of Conversation by Ludlow; *ibid.*, 980.7301/4–1555)

[4] Secretary-General Hammarskjöld was informed of the Department's position on April 18. (Memorandum of Conversation, by John McSweeney of the Mission at the United Nations; *ibid.*, UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237)

[5] See Document 82.

[6] The substance of paragraph 3 was delivered to the Egyptian Foreign Office on April 19. (Telegram 1577 from Cairo, April 19; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1955)

[7] On April 18, Cole discussed the substance of these instructions with General Burns, who responded that he had had no indication that the Israelis intended to relegate him to a secondary role. (Telegram 289 from Jerusalem, April 18; *ibid.*, 674.84A/4–1855)

81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, April 19, 1955—7:37 p.m.

1813. Secretary's remarks to Eban (Embtel 1559 [2]) followed Dept's receipt of information that activist sentiment in IG was increasing in belief that trend of Western policy was toward support of Arabs and in absence of any real belief that security guarantee from US and UK likely. Secretary's remarks designed to convince IG it can obtain security guarantee if it will cooperate in maintaining calm in area and work toward settlement of some of basic Israel-Arab issues.

It should be noted Secretary did not mention US–UK discussions nor existence of Alpha plans. Dept concurs fully with you on necessity of holding firm line against premature disclosure additional info re Alpha and any efforts by IG to assume a role in discussions of settlement that would prejudice settlement itself. We have informed IG of essentiality of Israel abstaining from initiating any publicity about discussions and jeopardy to possible security guarantee which would result from it.

In order assure that Nasser will have no grounds for feeling you have not been frank with him you may wish say when you see him that GOI recently renewed its request to US for a treaty guaranteeing present Israel boundaries and that Secretary informed Eban US could only consider a security treaty in context of settlement of major Israel-Arab issues, expressing his hope and belief that an equitable settlement in near future might be possible. You could inform Nasser there has been no discussion with IG concerning form or terms of any settlement.

FYI: Russell probably going London April 24 for week's discussion with Shuckburgh on next steps re Alpha and review existing Alpha recommendations re Gaza and Negev. Your Alpha tels have been most helpful and suggestions urtel 1551 [3] will be carefully considered although Dept inclined doubt feasibility either of joint administration or international supervision of Negev. Would appreciate any further thoughts you may have re any aspect of Alpha.

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1555. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell and approved by Jernegan, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 76.

[3] Document 74.

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 21, 1955—3 p.m.

904. When I called on the Prime Minister yesterday he said "You find me in a very discouraged mood" referring to the SC decision in meeting April 11 [*19*] to postpone Israel complaint against Egypt. He said effect throughout Israel certain to be bad with press and public speakers stressing severe unfavorable attitude toward SC. The SC failure to act was a "manifest instance of partiality" and "will encourage further acts of hostility against Israel". "What are we supposed to do?" he asked. "Egypt takes these actions against us and we are told not to shoot but refer matter to UN. MAC condemns Egypt which continues actions and we refer matter to the SC which takes no action against Egypt." "What can one expect the public of Israel to think?" In reply to my question as to his idea of the reasons for the SC failure to act he said he could only surmise that "they were afraid a condemnation of Egypt might jeopardize the plan for high-level talks." Called his attention to fact that the subject could be raised again but he countered with question of whether I expected Israel would ask for reopening of matter and again receive slap in the face.

Sharett also raised subject of MAC report on shooting of American (Jerusalem's 291 on Department [2]) and Chairman's failure to specifically identify killer. This could only be interpreted as fear of displeasing Jordan and thus must be regarded as prejudice. This had already aroused ire of Israel press and he regretted attacks on "an American military officer" but it reflected attitude of public toward UN's action.

I gathered from his postponement of my original morning appointment and other comment that he had been closeted with Ben Gurion and others of [garble—Cabinet?] all morning for discussion of SC matter and government policy in light of that disappointment; the issuance of a public statement on the matter to be released at once; [3] the proposed high-level meeting with Egypt and General Burns as outlined in latter's letter to Prime Minister (Jerusalem's 261 [4]) and other pressing policy matters.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2155. Secret. Received at 5:49 a.m., April 22. Repeated to Cairo and London.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 285.1113 Harris, Charles B./4–1855)

[3] See footnote 2, *infra*.

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/4–155)

Regarding high-level meeting he volunteered information that he was accepting the Burns proposal (Jerusalem's 262 [5]) but wanted to make it clear that proposal for high-level meeting he made originally (Embtel 858 [6]) had now been "superseded by the Burns proposal" and there would be only one program of high-level talks and not two. When I enquired as to his thinking as to the level of the talks he said GOI was willing to have them at ministerial level or even at "just below ministerial level" (meaning Secretary General of Foreign Office I believe). He remarked that if Egypt insisted on lesser level he would be very displeased with idea. I feel that the Prime Minister would not be surprised if Egypt would find itself with no one in the high-level categories with authority to participate in such talks in absence of Nasser, Salem and Fawzi but he indicated willingness GOI proceed without delay. He said letter accepting Burns proposal had been drafted but he gave no details of content.

When I enquired whether it was correct to assume that the discussions were to be limited strictly to the improvement of the situation in the border area and he agreed that the meetings were to be held under the auspices of General Burns, he said the first assumption was correct but he had not given the second point definite thought. However he "felt that point could be worked out". I then told him that "it is the view of the US Government that the discussions should be under the chairmanship of General Burns; should be limited to the SC resolution of March 30; and that such discussions have obvious priority over other possible negotiations."

Lawson

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[5] See footnote 2, Document 63.
[6] Document 65.

83. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 23, 1955—noon.

915. Embassy queried American section Foreign Ministry this morning re IG public position joint patrols reported Embtel 908 [2] inquiring whether this was final position Israel Government. Foreign Ministry replied that this was position IG at the moment. "Of course joint patrols is subject which can be discussed at high level talks and thing we are pressing for at the moment is to get these started. Furthermore Egyptian Government is continuing to use Palestinian irregulars and other non-regular troups in the Gaza strip and this is a matter which should also be discussed at high level meeting."

Embassy comment: Embassy attributes development reported Embtel 908 and foregoing comments to following: Firstly, IDF basically opposed to joint patrols as matter of principle and this is opposition which could only be overcome by Foreign Ministry by gains on other fronts. Secondly, IG regards Egyptian statement on barricades as evasion of proposal which it will be recalled originated with Chief of Staff [garble] and IG concurrence joint patrol proposal at this juncture would greatly vitiate case for joint talks.

Conclusion reached is that door has not been closed to joint patrol proposal but that a good deal of effort by Burns and concessions by Egyptians on other points would be necessary to obtain IG cooperation. [3]

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2355. Confidential. Received at 11:23 a.m. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem, London, and Paris.

[2] On April 22, the Embassy reported that the Israeli Government, in a public statement, had accepted three of General Burns' four proposals designed to ease the border situation. The Israelis agreed to the erection of physical barriers, wished to negotiate a local commander's agreement, hoped to have the frontiers policed by regular forces only, but rejected the suggestion of joint Israeli-Egyptian patrols. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/4–2255)

[3] The Department informed the Embassy in Tel Aviv on April 27 that the previous day Department officials had spoken with representatives of the Israeli Embassy and urged Israel to accept General Burns' joint patrol proposal. (Telegram 628 to Tel Aviv; *ibid.*, 674.84A/4–2755)

84. Letter From Francis H. Russell to the Ambassador in Egypt (Byroade) [1]

London, April 29, 1955.

DEAR HANK: As you know, I have been in London the past week resuming the discussions on Alpha with Evelyn Shuckburgh and his colleagues at the Foreign Office. [2] The enclosed copies of our agreed minutes will indicate to you the direction our talks have taken. The parts which will be of most interest to you are those dealing with the Negev and with the line to be taken when an opportunity offers to follow up the discussions which you and Stevenson had with Nasser before he left for Bandung. None of the specific suggestions, of course, have been reviewed or approved by the Secretary but it is my opinion that they are in accordance with the general views he has expressed. I will take them up with him when I return and give you any further thoughts that may result. In the meantime, I think that, if you concur and as you have the occasion, you would be safe in proceeding along the lines suggested in the enclosures.

I intend, when I get back to Washington, to suggest to the Secretary that the time will come within the next few weeks to broaden the base of Alpha within the American Government. The British are somewhat further advanced in this. They have referred the parts relating to a compensation scheme to their Treasury. A summary of Alpha has been circulated to the Cabinet members. In Washington, the Under Secretary and the Secretary have kept fully abreast of the discussions and developments and the Secretary informed the President in very general terms. We are, however, reaching a point where a delicate balance must be maintained between the considerations of secrecy, which you have well stressed, and the need of making sure that the Pentagon, the Bureau of the Budget and the National Security Council will give the various elements of Alpha their support. The best time for raising Alpha with them, I should think, would be after you obtain any hope of cooperation from Nasser and before we approach the Israelis.

I gather from the telegrams from Cairo that you and Stevenson have been working closely and that Nasser must have the impression

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after 2d London Talks—April 26–June 30, '55. Top Secret; Alpha. Russell sent a similar letter the same day to Ambassador Lawson in Tel Aviv; a copy is *ibid.*

[2] Discussions among Russell, representatives of the U.S. Embassy, and officers of the Foreign Office were held April 25–29. British officials prepared summary minutes of these meetings; documents are *ibid.*, London Talks, late April 1955: Minutes of Meetings held 4/25–4/29, incl.

that the US and the UK are coordinating their views. I assume therefore that it will be best to leave it to you and Stevenson to decide between you the role that each will play in getting our ideas across to Nasser.

We do not minimize the difficulty of your task but our hopes at the moment are slightly higher than they were a month ago.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

Francis H. Russell [3]

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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85. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, April 29, 1955—5 p.m.

306. General Burns left with me April 28 copy aide-mémoire he had given Eytan same day re Israel's refusal participate joint patrols Gaza area. Aide-mémoire states that while no reasons given for refusal Burns assumes they may have been based on thoughts expressed article *Jerusalem Post* diplomatic correspondent April 22 (Tel Aviv telegram 908 to Department [2]) upon which Burns proceeds to comment. Summary herewith.

Begin Summary:

(1) Egyptians have informed Burns officially that only regular troops are in positions within one kilometer of DL. Burns offers investigate Israeli allegations to the contrary and requests details.

(2) Position expressed by Egypt about erecting barbed wire fence along certain parts of frontier would not appear rule out discussions regarding erection effective continuous obstacle along the DL.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2955. Confidential. Received at 5:22 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, USUN, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus.

[2] The *Jerusalem Post* article of April 22 justified the Israeli Government's rejection of joint patrols on the grounds that this would foment popular indignation, would infringe upon Israel's sovereignty, would reflect adversely upon the competency of the Israel Defense Force, and would make the Israeli Government a party to the deception that Egypt was fulfilling its obligations to implement General Burns' proposals. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/4–2255)

(3) Referring *Jerusalem Post* reasoning against joint patrols, Burns expressed opinion that if joint patrols had been established following discussions begun last December incidents, which Israeli complained to SC on April 4, would not have occurred. He points out that Israeli patrols adjacent DL are peculiarly vulnerable. Such patrols further back would be less exposed and more effective; while joint patrols would show those evilly-disposed toward Israel that Egypt cooperating preventing violations. On the contrary, Israel's refusal accept joint patrols plus continuance Israel patrols along DL possibly indicative Israeli refusal cooperate efforts relieve tensions, prevent further incidents.

(4) Argument that joint patrols infringe sovereignty is unrealistic since for all practical purposes patrols would be moving along the DL and would not infringe territorial rights.

(5) Finally, statements in newspaper believed to carry official views to effect Egyptians acting in bad faith respecting measures they have accepted may well endanger possibility arranging the "high level conference" which Israel professes to desire; since Israel's refusals consider one of the proposals which Egypt has accepted may result in latter's withdrawal of her agreement to the other proposals. This would destroy basis for holding conference.

End Summary. [3]

Pouching text. [4]

Have informed Burns regarding Deptel 125. [5] He considered Shimoni's [6] observations numbered paragraph 5 as "erroneous." [7]

Cole

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[3] The Embassy in Tel Aviv informed the Department that the Israeli Foreign Ministry on the evening of May 2 had replied to Burns' aide-mémoire, saying that Israel "(a) was prepared to have this question included in agenda for joint talks, but (b) that its position on joint patrols was one of opposition." (Telegram 933 from Tel Aviv, May 3; *ibid.*, 674.84A/5–355)

[4] Reference is to despatch 168 from Jerusalem, May 2. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/5–255)

[5] Also transmitted to Tel Aviv as telegram 628; see footnote 3, Document 83.

[6] Ya'acov Shimoni, Counselor of the Israeli Embassy in Washington.

[7] When Department officials spoke with representatives of the Israeli Embassy on April 27 and urged Israel to accept Burns' joint patrol proposal, Shimoni justified Israel's refusal on the grounds that Egypt had in fact only accepted Burns' proposals for joint patrols and a modified form of his suggestion to erect physical barriers, but had failed to agree as well to the conclusion of a local commander's agreement or to the exclusive use of regular forces along the frontier. (Telegram 628 to Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2755)

86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, May 3, 1955—7:15 p.m.

1906. Secretary has approved approach to Nasser [2] along lines set forth minutes Russell–Shuckburgh meetings London except that no reference should be made at this time to proposal in section 12 of minutes of meeting Apr 25 11 am [3] re northern triangles. Dept informing Brit Emb here. After coordinating with Stevenson and unless you or he see objections, you are authorized resume discussions with Nasser soon as practicable.

Re Embtel 1638 [4] representatives of IG at various times have said that as part of general settlement IG would be prepared create free port in Haifa and guarantee right of Jordan citizens and vehicles travel between Jordan and Haifa. Russell suggestion envisaged IG guaranteeing similar rights on road from El Auja to Hebron and from El Auja to Sdom (and projected road on east side Dead Sea).

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–355. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell; cleared with Jernegan; and approved by Russell, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London.

[2] At a meeting on May 3, Secretary Dulles approved this approach to Nasser. No account of this session, however, has been found in Department of State files. According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, the meeting began at 11 a.m. and, in addition to the Secretary, those present were Allen, Russell, MacArthur, Hart, Jernegan, and Hare. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[3] Section 12 of the summary minutes of the meeting recorded that Russell and Shuckburgh had agreed that Byroade and Stevenson should attempt to secure Nasser's agreement to the principle of the double triangle without initially indicating any particular triangle solutions. If Nasser expressed interest in the principle, they should explain the details of the proposal for a double triangle in the southern Negev; if this suggestion was unacceptable, they could tentatively and unofficially advance the concept of a broader triangle solution in the northern Negev. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, London Talks, late April 1955: Minutes of Meetings held 4/25–4/29, incl.)

[4] Byroade on May 3 noted that Russell, in his session with Shuckburgh on April 25, had suggested that the "original proposals for Negev might be supplemented by Israel guaranteeing transit rights between Egypt and Jordan on the Beersheba–Hebron road and on another road to South." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/5–355)

87. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, May 5, 1955—10 a.m.

940. The Prime Minister has given me a letter dated May 4 to Secretary Dulles in reply to the Secretary's message transmitted Deptel 608 April 17. [2] Original of letter being airpouched. [3] Sharett, however, requested that text be telegraphed so that Secretary would have opportunity to study it prior his departure for Europe. [4]

Verbatim text is as follows:

"Dear Mr. Secretary, Your prompt and friendly reply to my message was deeply appreciated. The terms of your letter and of your oral explanations to Ambassador Eban have received our most careful consideration.

My Government was profoundly impressed by your statement to Mr. Eban that you accept the principle of a security treaty with Israel and that the crux of your program is to create conditions to make that possible. To Israel with its grave security problem this comes as a most constructive and encouraging departure.

The difficulties indicated by you as lying in the way of such an association between the United States of America and Israel are well understood by us. Yet on closer examination not only do they not appear insuperable but of themselves would seem to constitute a reason for hastening its achievement.

Israel is already faced with a series of developments within the region which have seriously upset the balance to her detriment. I allude, first, to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which has resulted in a major access of military and geo-political strength to Egypt whilst denying to Israel the benefit of its protection; secondly, to the Military Aid Agreement between the United States of America and Iraq, a country avowedly and violently hostile to Israel occupying a pivotal position in the anti-Israel-Arab front; and finally to their Iraqi-Turkish pact sponsored by the United States of America now impressively strengthened by Britain's adherence, which again singles out Israel for exclusion and which otherwise carries within it

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–555. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:53 a.m. Repeated to London and Cairo.

[2] See footnote 1, Document 79.

[3] Enclosure to despatch 691, May 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–655)

[4] Dulles departed Washington on May 6 for Paris, where he met on May 8 with the French and British Foreign Ministers to discuss plans for a Four Power Conference with the Soviet Government and to attend the North Atlantic Council sessions, May 9–11. Dulles proceeded to Vienna on May 12 for the signing of the Austrian State Treaty and returned to Washington on May 16.

definite anti-Israel implications. For all these far-reaching departures, adversely and cumulatively affecting Israel's security, no compensatory measure of assistance to Israel has been offered. Israel was the first state in the Middle East to seek American military aid. Its application, dated February 1952, has remained unanswered. [5]

Thus our discussion proceeds against the background of a security situation thrown markedly out of balance against Israel and aggravating the state of siege to which she is anyhow subjected by her neighbours. This disequilibrium, which may be only the beginning of a process, seems to us a compelling argument for an immediate measure of redress in Israel's favour.

The obstacles you envisage to the conclusion of a security treaty with Israel are twofold:

(a) The deviation it implies from the USA line of not involving itself in intra-regional conflicts and concentrating solely on anti-Communist defense;

(b) The probable reluctance of the USA Senate to sanction a security commitment so long as the present unsettled situation within the Middle East continues. Your conclusion is that substantial progress must be achieved towards the settlement of major issues outstanding between us and the Arab States before such a security treaty can be submitted for the Senate's approval.

On the first count it seems to me that the handicaps today in the effective organization of the Middle East for anti-Soviet defense are on the one hand the inhibitions which prevent certain Arab States from adopting a pro-western orientation; and on the other the ever smouldering Arab-Israel conflict threatening to erupt into conflagration if the Arab States should come to regard Israel as hopelessly isolated and forsaken, while Israel for her part were forced into a mood of desperation.

A security treaty with Israel would go a long way towards meeting these issues. By proving conclusively that the US is determined not to leave Israel in the lurch, but on the contrary, to make the most of Israel's association, the treaty would give Israel a sense of poise and stability. It would at the same time promote a more realistic spirit within the Arab States and bring them nearer to peace. It would also make the reluctant Arab States eager to secure for themselves the advantage accruing from an association with the US which would have come within the grasp of Israel. It would thus be a skillful throw, killing two, or even three birds with one stone. Moreover, for us in Israel, and we think for many people outside, it is hardly conceivable that the region can be effectively mobilized for

[5] For documentation regarding Israel's attempt to obtain U.S. military aid in February 1952, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 894 ff.

resistance to a possible Soviet aggression or subversive penetration without the participation of the one state within it to whom democracy and spiritual liberty are the very breath of existence and whose military and industrial potential is patent.

The second consideration, with all its cogency, is liable to produce deadlock. The root of the trouble is not the insolubility of the problems at issue between us and the Arab States, but the deliberate refusal of their leaders to tackle them. That refusal is only likely to harden still further once they realize that by proposing any compromise they can prevent Israel from getting a security treaty with the USA. This result will be bad enough, but if the USA goes further and proceeds to indicate the specific lines along which a settlement is to be sought, a worse complication is bound to arise.

You said to Ambassador Eban on the 13 April [6] that when the USA Government comes out with its proposals for a settlement, Israel will probably not like some of them and the Arabs will not like some others. I must admit that this prediction has filled our hearts with an anxiety not less serious than the one you are so earnestly endeavoring to allay. We are prepared to accept the status quo whereas the Arabs are out to change it to our undoing. We do not claim their territory. They claim ours. We do not ask that Jewish refugees from Arab lands be repatriated. They insist on the return to Israel of Arabs who fled. In these circumstances, what they will not like is their failure to get what they do not possess, whereas what we shall not like is to give up what is ours.

Should proposals of this nature be presented, the following results will ensue. Israel will have no alternative but to reject them. The Arab States will regard them as a premium upon their intransigence in which they will persist hoping to extract larger concessions.

To sum up this part of my argument, if the treaty is made contingent upon a prior settlement, there will be no treaty; and if the settlement is predicated upon one-sided concessions, there will be no settlement. A double vicious circle may well be created. I am certain that our desire is to avoid such a political impasse and it is to the same end that my present observations are directed.

In all earnestness I would appeal to you to give further urgent thought to the crucial question of whether the conclusion of a defense treaty should be deferred till after tangible progress towards a settlement has been achieved or whether it should not rather be proceeded with at once and itself pave the way for such progress. I am encouraged to press this view in the light of your own statement to Ambassador Eban that you envisage a program leading to the

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[6] See Document 75.

conclusion of a treaty within the current year and that you do not intend to make it dependent on unattainable conditions.

In this context I would be failing in my duty of candour towards you if I did not make it clear beyond any possibility of misunderstanding that there can be no question for us of cession of territory or the return of Arab refugees. The United Nations compromise of 1947 was annulled by Arab aggression which deserves no reward. Any reversion in that direction is now political and physical impossibility. This does not of course exclude the technical demarcation of the frontiers at a peace settlement which may entail minor and mutual adjustments nor the continued application for the benefit of Arab refugees of the reunion of families scheme.

All this does not mean either that we envisage a rigid continuation of the present deadlock till suddenly peace comes about at the waving of a magic wand, or that we are prepared to contemplate with equanimity a further deterioration of border security regardless of its ultimate consequences.

Nothing is farther from our thoughts and on the contrary, we do believe that gradual progress towards a settlement such as would result in some interim modus vivendi, is indeed possible. On the question of the Jordan waters I can only reiterate the hope that an agreed solution may well be within our reach and as regards border security, given a firm resolve on the Arab side to check disorders, a great deal can be done to prevent armed attacks and incursions and reduce the incidence of marauding to a tolerable minimum. For our part, and without committing ourselves in advance to the endorsement of every and any proposal, we shall be only too eager to collaborate with the UN and the Arab States concerned in the implementation of this program. Furthermore, we would be ready to proceed to the payment of compensation for refugee lands—necessitating possibly a special loan to us, repayable over a period of years—provided Egypt lifted the Suez Canal blockade and the Arab States discontinued their threats and reprisals against foreign firms, aviation companies, etc., operating in Israel. Finally, we offer cooperation with the Arab Governments in the mutual checking of hostile propaganda and in the adoption of other concerted measures aiming at the reduction of tension.

For the attainment of these objectives we should welcome the assistance of the USA, just as we have welcomed Ambassador Johnston's mission. Such assistance, to be successful, need not be accompanied by the formulation of definite proposals for a peace settlement, either complete or partial. Indeed, for reasons explained, the prior enunciation by the USA or by any other third power, of specific terms is liable to wreck the chances of a settlement. We feel convinced, for instance, that the attempt to prejudge the outcome of

the water negotiations by the prior formulation of the main report added needlessly to Ambassador Johnston's difficulties which he subsequently managed partly to overcome only by dint of high skill and unlimited patience. In the case of such decisive problems as territory and population, the setting forth by a third party of concrete terms in advance may lead to fatal results and should at all costs be avoided.

If the approach here outlined commends itself to your judgment, I would suggest that discussions be initiated without delay concerning the exact scope and terms of a Security Treaty. At the same time soundings might be undertaken with regard to the possible discontinuance of Arab economic warfare against Israel's readiness to take in hand the payment of compensation in respect of Arab lands abandoned.

I should be grateful for an early intimation of your reaction to the views expressed in this letter.

I assume that these lines will reach you on the eve of your departure for Europe and I take this opportunity of again wishing you the fullest measure of success in your efforts for the sake of peace and freedom.

With best wishes cordially yours Moshe Sharett Minister for Foreign Affairs." [7]

Embassy comments will be transmitted in following telegram. [8]

Lawson

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[7] On May 5, Russell transmitted a copy of Sharett's letter to Secretary Dulles as an attachment to a memorandum suggesting that since Sharett had taken several weeks to reply to Dulles' letter of April 16 (Document 79), an early answer was not necessary and recommending that the United States and United Kingdom proceed with Alpha according to plans. (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 16)

The Embassy in London reported on May 6 that the substance of Sharett's message had been conveyed to Shuckburgh, whose initial reaction was one of "considerable concern." (Telegram 4917; *ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/5–655)

[8] It commented that Sharett's reply reflected the fear of U.S. and British insistence that Israel make "unacceptable sacrifices especially in the fields of territorial concessions and refugee repatriation". (Telegram 941 from Tel Aviv, May 5; *ibid.*, 684A.86/5–555) The Embassy commented further in the despatch cited in footnote 3 above.

88. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, May 5, 1955.

After the NSC meeting today the President asked me to stop in his office with Dillon Anderson for a brief review of the Alpha Project.

I gave the President Mr. Russell's memorandum to read, which he proceeded to do out loud for Mr. Anderson's benefit. At the conclusion of a brief discussion the President stated that he realized the extreme difficulties incident to this project but was also aware that we were doing everything possible to bring it to a successful conclusion.

I am attaching the original of Mr. Russell's memorandum herewith.

H.

[Attachment]

Memorandum From Francis H. Russell to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [2]

SUBJ

Present Status of Efforts to Secure Israel-Arab Settlement

Following the informal discussions between the Secretary and Eden in Paris last November, Evelyn Shuckburgh, who is Under Secretary for Middle Eastern Affairs in the British Foreign Office, came here for two weeks in January. I went to London for two weeks in February and again last week. As a result of these discussions and the background work done by the Near East offices in the Department and the Foreign Office, agreement has been reached between the Department and the Foreign Office on the elements of what it is believed would constitute an equitable settlement of the major issues between Israel and her Arab neighbors, such as borders, refugee resettlement and compensation, Jerusalem, economic relations and political relations, Gaza, and Egyptian rights

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President, Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution.

[2] Drafted on May 5.

of transit across the Negev. The plan assumes the success of the Jordan Valley Development Plan.

Agreement has also been reached on the best ways of securing Arab and Israel agreement. Discussions to sound out Egyptian cooperation will probably take place between Ambassador Byroade and Nasser next week. If they are successful, approaches would then be made to Jordan and Israel. If Nasser will not cooperate, alternative approaches have been agreed upon.

One of the assumptions has been that a requisite element in any settlement would be a guarantee by the U.S. and the U.K. of the border between Israel and the neighboring Arab states, and a draft of a treaty has been worked out and agreed upon.

It is also assumed that the larger part of the funds necessary to compensate the Arab refugees would have to be provided by the U.S. and the U.K., and that substantial economic and military assistance to the cooperating countries would have to be contemplated. (See attached memo of February 14—Tab A.[3]) The above proposals have been approved by Foreign Minister Macmillan and Prime Minister Eden. In the U.S. Government, the plans have been discussed as they developed with George Allen and other officers in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, with you, and with the Secretary. On February 15 the Secretary discussed the plans briefly with the President. (See attached memo of February 15—Tab B.[4])

[3] See footnote 2, Document 18.

[4] Reference is to an extract from Dulles' memorandum of conversation, Document 20.

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89. Memorandum From Francis H. Russell to the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) [1]

Washington, May 5, 1955.

SUBJ

Views of British Foreign Office on Northern Triangle

You will recall that at the meeting in his office the other afternoon,[2] the Secretary disapproved the suggestion of two north-

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 16. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted on May 5. No date of transmission is indicated.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 86.

ern triangles in the Negev as a basis for meeting Nasser's desire for contact with Jordan. The British Embassy has just handed me the attached statement of the Foreign Office's views on the northern triangle proposal.

If the Secretary and Macmillan do have a chance to discuss Alpha in Paris, I believe it will be useful for them to exchange views on this point.

F.H.R.

[Attachment]

Following is substance of a telegram from Mr. Macmillan to Sir Roger Makins dated May 4, 1955.

The Foreign Office explain that the northern triangle proposal is not designed to improve Egypt's military situation (though the larger triangles would presumably be easier to defend) nor to provide better transit rights for civilian traffic. From the Egyptian point of view its main advantages over the southern triangle proposal would be :

(a) it is based on the 1947 partition line on which the Arabs take their stand. This makes a good sales point;

(b) it involves a fairly large cession of territory by Israel. This, together with (a) above would make it easier for Nasser to defend to his own people and the other Arab States;

(c) it joins the Gaza strip as well as Egypt to the rest of the eastern Arab world and might thus help to ease the pressure of the refugees there by giving them eventually the opportunity to disperse eastwards;

(d) it is served by a road across Sinai which already exists.

2. The plan avoids taking from Israel any of the irrigable land or known mineral deposits in the Negev and leaves them in full control of the port of Elath and its hinterland. If this solution were adopted the concessions demanded of Israel in the area south of Hebron and in the demilitarized zone of Ein Gev could be reduced.

3. Mr. Macmillan will be happy to discuss the northern triangle proposal on the lines above with Mr. Dulles next week if time can be found. He is glad to see that Mr. Dulles has not ruled out the possibility of using it with Colonel Nasser at a later stage. Mr. Macmillan agrees that it would be very difficult to sell to the Israelis; but it may be found that something like it is Nasser's minimum price for settlement.

4. Meanwhile Mr. Macmillan is instructing Her Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo not to put the proposal to Colonel Nasser for the present.

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90. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 5, 1955—6 p.m.

1654. Discussions with Nasser regarding Alpha probably will not be resumed for about a week. Unless he takes initiative consider it best my first discussions with him be on other matters such as Bandung, local problems, and situation in Arab states. Further, do not wish push rapidly for discussion on any detail in absence of Fawzi. While Fawzi lacking real authority, he is one of few here knowledgeable on elements of problem falling outside of purely Egyptian-Israeli aspects.

Am prepared resume discussions on basis Department telegram 1906, repeated London 5626, [2] but Department should now consider eventual failure almost a certainty if no more appealing proposal regarding Negev can be developed than cross-triangles approach in extreme south. [3]

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–555. Top Secret; Alpha. Received at 8:34 p.m. Repeated to London.

[2] Document 86.

[3] The Department informed Byroade on May 9 that the Foreign Office had informed the British Embassy that Stevenson was not to approach Nasser until after he had commented on the approach suggested in the minutes of the recent London meetings and had in turn received further instructions from the Foreign Office. Therefore, Byroade was "authorized exercise your discretion re timing and scope your further talks with Nasser on Alpha in light above." (Telegram 1949 to Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–555)

91. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (O'Connor) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, May 6, 1955.

RE

Alpha

Byroade is scheduled to make his approach to Nasser "this week or next". Mr. Hoover just spoke to me and is quite concerned that once Byroade moves ahead, we may be caught up in a series of developments which will involve us in commitments which might run up to a total of $1,000,000,000 without any opportunity to say no.

Hoover knows that you have assured the President that the initial discussions will be only exploratory and that we will make no commitments without the President's express approval. However, Hoover is afraid that once Byroade starts his conversations, we may as a practical matter be committed so deeply that the President's approval becomes academic. Hoover, therefore, thought it would be wise if you took this matter up with the President today. [2]

R.O'C.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.

[2] According to the Secretary's memorandum of conversation with the President on May 6, Dulles said the following to Eisenhower regarding Alpha:

"I discussed with the President the 'Alpha' project for the Near East. I recalled our previous talk and the fact that matters had progressed to a point where it was deemed useful to have Byroade talk to Nasser. I did not want to take this further step without clearing it with the President. I mentioned that I thought it would be indispensable within the next few months to come out with some project which would indicate reasonable conditions under which we might be prepared with the British to give a guarantee of Israel against her neighbors and vice versa. I mentioned that this project had rather heavy financial implications and might involve 'jumping up' our contribution to the area by another $500,000,000 or thereabouts over a five-year period, or a total for the five years of around $1,000,000,000. The President indicated he thought it was in order for Byroade to speak to Nasser on the assumption, of course, that he would skillfully avoid anything like a definitive commitment." (*Ibid.*)

Subsequent to this meeting, Dulles evidently made the following marginal inscription on the source text: "Pres. says go ahead. But no firm commitment".

92. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 10, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Israel's Need for Security Guarantee, Proposals to Lessen Arab-Israel Tension

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
NEA—Mr. George V. Allen
NE—Mr. Donald C. Bergus

Ambassador Eban opened the conversation by stating that he felt that good progress was being made in the negotiations with Mr. Eric Johnston. Mr. Eban hoped that Mr. Johnston could now secure Arab agreement in his forthcoming trip to the area.

The Ambassador referred to the letter of May 4, sent by Prime Minister Sharett to the Secretary. [2] The letter could be summarized briefly in that Israel wished a formal security association with the United States and also was willing to cooperate in measures to relieve tensions in the area. Mr. Dulles' letter of April 16 [3] had appeared to link these two matters. Mr. Sharett had replied that while Israel was interested in both subjects, she did not feel that one should be made conditional on the other. This could well stimulate Arab intransigence toward a settlement with Israel. There was a further logical defect. The United States regarded a security guarantee as a sequel to the relief of tensions, Israel regarded it as a means to such relief. Therefore Israel would like a guarantee first, and action towards a settlement of some of the outstanding issues with the Arabs second. Israel understood the U.S. position on the matter, however, and was willing to work simultaneously on both.

Mr. Allen expressed appreciation for this clarification since he had not understood this new point in Mr. Sharett's letter. Mr. Eban replied that the letter had been hurriedly drafted so that the Secretary would have an opportunity to study it before proceeding to Europe and meeting with the British Foreign Secretary. Israel stood by her position that a security treaty should come first but was willing to discuss both this and measures to reduce tension simultaneously.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–1055. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Bergus.

[2] See Document 87.

[3] Document 79.

The Ambassador continued that Mr. Sharett's letter had defined rather precisely Israel's views regarding measures to reduce tension. Israel felt that the best point to start on would be payment of compensation to Arab refugees by Israel in return for a lifting of the secondary boycott and the Suez blockade by the Arabs. These were not the most delicate of the issues outstanding, and consequently afforded a good place to begin. The relatively quick beneficial effect which the implementation of such measures would have on the refugee problem was also of importance.

Mr. Eban said that since the Secretary had mentioned border adjustments and the refugee problem, the Prime Minister had reiterated Israel's position that there could be no sizeable cessions of Israel territory or return of refugees. This did not, however, preclude a willingness to consider minor and mutual adjustments as well as the continuation of the plan for the reunion of refugee families. Mr. Eban wished to emphasize the word "mutual" in his reference to border adjustments. Israel was not morally bound to cede territory to the Arabs. She could, however, participate in a process of exchange even if this should mean that the Arabs might end up as a net beneficiary. The abortive attempt to make adjustments in the Latrun area was an example of what might be done.

Mr. Eban concluded by stating that he felt Israel's position on this matter was not far from that of the U.S. in substance and that the difference could be bridged in practice.

Mr. Allen said that the Secretary would be giving his reaction to Mr. Sharett's letter upon his return. His own personal view was that progress on the Jordan River negotiations was the touchstone to progress on the other matters. Mr. Eban replied that he felt good progress was being made on the Jordan question. He added that Israel was concerned lest there be possible divergencies of views between the U.S. and Israel regarding territorial adjustments or repatriations. Mr. Allen answered that the need for success on the Jordan River negotiations made us reticent on the other points at this time.

Mr. Eban asked if the U.S. Government was working with the United Kingdom on these overall questions. Mr. Allen replied that we were making every effort to keep in close touch with the British on this matter. This did not mean that our views would at all times be identical. Mr. Eban pointed out that the Secretary had mentioned only substantial progress toward stabilization of the situation as a condition precedent to a U.S. security guarantee. In his recent speech before Parliament, Sir Anthony Eden had talked of British willing-

ness to guarantee Arab-Israel "peace".[4] Israel was concerned regarding this apparent difference in view and felt that the British might be taking a stand which was impractical and perfectionist. Mr. Allen ventured the guess that the British, with their long tradition of practicality, would not be perfectionists on this matter.

Mr. Eban asked if France was associated in this effort. Mr. Allen replied that France had interests in the area and was associated in the Tripartite Declaration. We would try to work with the French in the most appropriate manner. The French position was clouded, however, by such factors as the special position which France felt she had in Syria and Lebanon, as well as France's interests in North Africa. This would probably mean that liaison with the French on these questions would be slower than our contacts with the British.

Mr. Eban asked if Mr. Allen would confirm the recent speech by Congressman Bentley[5] to the effect that the U.S. envisaged arms aid only to Iraq during FY 1956.[6] Mr. Allen replied that a public statement of policy such as this could come only from the Secretary. He imagined that there would be further informal indications of the lack of present U.S. intention to grant arms aid to Israel or her immediate Arab neighbors. Perhaps a public statement by the Secretary should be made. However, it might have an undesirable effect on the Jordan Valley negotiations, and there might be other reasons against a formal declaration of policy at this moment. He felt that timing was an important factor in considering a public statement.

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[4] On April 4; for text of his remarks, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th Series, volume 539, columns 894–904.

[5] Alvin M. Bentley (R–Mich.), Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

[6] Not further identified.

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93. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State[1]

Cairo, May 10, 1955—4 p.m.

1685. Burns called May 9 and summarized his conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Khairat Said and Gohar.[2] Egyptians ex-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–1055. Secret. Received at 7:26 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and USUN.

[2] Lieutenant Colonel Salah Gohar, Head of the Palestine Department, Egyptian Ministry of War.

tremely reserved regarding high-level talks stating they had no official information as to Israeli reaction to Burns' four "concrete proposals" and saw difficulties in second paragraph agenda proposed by Burns in his April 16 letter (Jerusalem tel 287 April 16).[3] Burns informed Egyptians Israelis had agreed to three of four "concrete proposals" but had refused discuss joint patrols except at "high-level talks". In his proposed agenda, Burns said he as chairman would make sure no discussion took place thereunder unless agreed to by both sides.

Egyptians replied that under these circumstances they saw no need for high-level talks since Egypt had already accepted in principle Burns' four points and negotiations to implement them could best be handled by Gohar. Burns pointed out Israelis unwilling discuss joint patrols at operational level and Shalev[4] (Gohar's opposite number) had no authority commit Israeli Government in negotiation on other points. Burns also stressed advantages Israeli Foreign Office participation talks since its views "more moderate" than those of War Department and IDF. Egyptians appeared unconvinced but asked Burns summarize his points in writing. (Summary Burns letter to be delivered Government of Egypt today in immediately following telegraph.[5])

I told Burns that while we of course fully supported his efforts reduce border tension it would be extremely difficult in my opinion for Government of Egypt agree undertake at this time major move in direction of Israelis such as high-level talks would represent and pointed out Gohar was responsible authority this subject in Egyptian Government with direct access Nasser. It seemed to me that care must be taken avoid concentration of efforts on high-level talks to such a point that Government of Egypt might renege on its promise cooperate with Burns on his four "concrete proposals". Burns replied he was under instructions SYG press for direct talks but obviously this line could not be further developed usefully if Government of Egypt were categorically to refuse. In answer my question Burns noted that on Israeli side considerable importance is attached to direct talks. He recognized possibility Israeli refusal accept principle joint patrols was being used as bargaining point. He aware Egyptian

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[3] Telegram 287 from Jerusalem to Cairo, sent to the Department as telegram 132, transmitted the text of an April 16 letter from Burns to the Egyptian and Israeli Governments proposing that both governments send high-ranking representatives to meet together with Burns and suggesting the following agenda:

"(A) implementation of Security Council resolution of 30 April 1955; (B) other points which the two parties to the general armistic agreement may agree to discuss, relating to the improvement of the situation in the area concerned." (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1655)

[4] Ariel Shalev of the Israeli Defense Force.

[5] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–1055)

position re talks difficult but pointed out impending Israeli election would hardly contribute to modification Israeli position.

Press today gave very full coverage to Burns visit highlighting Egyptian willingness cooperate on four points with following reservations:

1) Barbed wire not to be placed on D/L but in Egyptian territory;
2) No direct contact could be accepted under local commanders agreement—contact could be maintained through UN representatives.

Press made no mention "high-level talks".

Byroade

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94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, May 11, 1955—2:04 p.m.

1960. For Ambassador only. For your personal information Secretary recently discussed Alpha project with President, [2] stating time appeared to have arrived for talk with Nasser, that Alpha contemplated US–UK guarantee borders between Israel and neighboring Arab states and also involved rather heavy financial implications. President indicated he thought it in order for you speak to Nasser on assumption any references to border guarantee or additional financial assistance would be on purely exploratory basis and would avoid any commitment US at this stage.

Following Secretary's return from Europe it is planned discuss Alpha proposals with other interested Department heads and possibly three or four Congressional leaders. Definiteness US undertaking give border guarantee and additional economic and military aid will depend on results these discussions as well as of course on Nasser's initial reactions exploratory talks.

Hoover

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–1155. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell; cleared with Jernegan and Murphy; approved by Russell; and initialed for Hoover by Murphy.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 91.

95. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Paris, May 12, 1955—9 p.m.

Dulte 38. Eyes Only Acting Secretary from Secretary. I discussed Alpha with Macmillan this morning. I said principal difference in US and UK view was that UK believed Byroade should initially suggest on personal basis large northern triangle if Nasser rejected out of hand small southern triangle proposal. I said that we did not believe it was feasible at this juncture to broach northern triangle since while it did not lack intrinsic merit in terms of appeal to Arabs and while it would not really deprive Israel of any valuable territory it would on a map look like a serious dismemberment of Israel territory and would if it leaked have enormous and adverse psychological impact on Israel and world Jewry.

I said that I knew that Byroade and British felt southern triangle would not be acceptable basis for Nasser but I thought this was limit to which we could proceed in Byroade's talks with Nasser which would probably take place in next week or so. I added that in first instance I did not think any plan we put forward would prove acceptable but at least we could see what Nasser's reaction is and in light thereof decide whether or not it would be desirable to do something re northern triangle.

Macmillan agreed with me and said UK had thought Byroade might advance as personal suggestion northern triangle because of Nasser's comments to Eden last February in Cairo when Nasser had indicated no small corridor through the Negev would be acceptable solution. However in light of my presentation he agreed Byroade should only broach southern triangle and we will keep northern triangle as possible card to be played later.

Macmillan then mentioned Sharett's latest note to me [2] and asked my reaction. I replied that I felt strongly that territorial guarantee was biggest carrot we had and that it would be folly to give this away until we had a general settlement agreed between Arabs and Israel. I explained that Arabs want protection against an expansionist Israel and Israel wants protection against Arab desire to push her into sea. Guarantee is therefore card to be played when there was general agreement on various aspects of Israel settlement which include water, Arab refugees, territorial adjustment, status of

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 3. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Drafted by MacArthur and cleared with Merchant. Received at 6:56 p.m. Also sent to Cairo. (Telegram 1973; *ibid.*, 684A.86/5–1355)

[2] See Document 87.

Jerusalem, etc. I concluded by saying that when I replied to Sharett I had in mind making it clear that we could not give guarantee in advance. Macmillan heartily approved.

Dulles

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96. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 12, 1955—7 p.m.

1696. Reference mytel 1685 May 10. [2]

1) Burns letter (mytel 1686 [3]) handed Kheirat Said by UN reps afternoon 10th. Burns met with Abd Al Hakim Amer Minister of War for two hours evening same day and left for Gaza May 11th. Burns letter reviewed by Kheiratsaid, Gohar and Radwan (Chief Arab Affairs FonOff) May 10 and 11.

2) EmbOff saw Gohar today. Latter, who was relaxed and cheerful in sharp contrast to agitation he had shown May 7 (mytel 1671 [4]), said:

A) Burns had informed Govt of Egypt he under instructions SYG to arrange high level talks, as best means reduce border tensions in view lack of authority of Shalev ("my opposite number") to commit his govt. Burns had stressed that Govt of Egypt acceptance direct talks between civilians (eg "Ambassadors") would also strengthen hand of Sharett and Israeli FonOff in combating activist policies of Ben Gurion and IDF. Egypt, Gohar commented, had no desire be used as "cat's paw" in connection Israeli elections or intra mural quarrels.

B) Govt of Egypt had "unofficial but sure" information Israelis had deliberately instructed Shalev arrange failure negots between him and Gohar in order justify Israeli contention "high level talks" essential.

C) Govt of Egypt now preparing reply Burns letter (mytel 1686). Reply will reaffirm desire cooperate on latter's 4 "concrete proposals" but will categorically reject direct talks on political level.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–1255. Secret. Received at 10:50 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Amman, Jidda, Damascus, Baghdad, Paris, London, and Beirut.

[2] Document 93.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–1055)

[4] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/5–955)

D) Govt of Egypt has no intention naming any one other than Gohar to talk with Israelis. (Gohar confirmed Burns had mentioned Riyad [5] as possible Egyptian representative. He described the suggestion as "ludicrous" in view Riyad's current task in Syria.)

E) Israeli patrol attack from demilitarized zone of Al Auja on Egyptian position at 7 AM yesterday (during Burns visit) resulting in death two Egyptian soldiers when linked with Israeli refusal accept joint patrols proposal made clear Israeli bad faith. He would not be surprised if Israelis, having failed achieve direct talks, now launch new attacks against Egyptians. "If this happens, we will be ready for them."

3) Govt of Egypt press coverage Burns visit continued extensive emphasizing Egyptian cooperation on 4 points and omitting any reference direct talks issue in obvious effort counteract Israeli attempt seek propaganda victory by playing up Egyptian refusal direct talks.

4) *Comment*: Categoric Govt of Egypt refusal "direct talks" firmly based on Govt of Egypt appraisal effect such talks on regimes internal stability and external objectives particularly ESS pact. In view unlikelihood this position will be altered, it appears only chance implement Burns 4 "concrete proposals" is for Israelis prove good faith by agreeing negotiate with Gohar as responsible Govt of Egypt nominee for this purpose. In my opinion Israeli willingness to abandon "direct talks" in favor practical cooperation at operational level may be only alternative to discrediting of UNTSO efforts as "ineffective" and renewed border clashes of greater intensity.

In connection Israeli refusal accept joint patrols, it is of interest that Burns confirmed to me at our meeting May 9 reports which had reached Embassy from other sources that "provocative maneuvering of Israeli patrols close to the border" was major cause present border tension.

Byroade

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[5] General Mahmoud Riad, Egyptian Ambassador in Syria.

97. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 16, 1955—4 p.m.

1719. Embassy telegram 1718 [2] designed give Department general feel on situation as it seems here pending clarification talks with Nasser himself. Message sent primarily, however, as basis for recommendation that consultations mentioned last paragraph Department telegram 1960 May 11, [3] be delayed.

Necessity for broader consultations regarding Alpha with other departments and congressional leaders fully understood here but hope dangers inherent in holding such discussions will cause Department to await assessment following further talks here prior such discussions.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–1655. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limit Distribution.

[2] In this May 16 telegram, Byroade reported that since Nasser's return from Bandung, he had avoided contacts with American officials and seemed to be giving credence to "many rumors of United States activities of late directed against him and RCC." Among these rumors were allegations that U.S. personnel were raising doubts about the stability of his regime; that the United States was sabotaging foreign financial support for the Aswan Dam; and that the United States intended to pressure Egypt into making peace with Israel.

Byroade expressed the view that Nasser wished to "clarify his own thinking re. foreign affairs policy approach to be followed by Egypt prior to further talks with me." He observed that there were indications of a possible "fundamental swing" in Egyptian foreign policy "towards the line of 'independence' and freedom of action uninfluenced by all other nations, including Arab states." (*Ibid.*, 774.00/5–1655)

[3] Document 94.

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 17, 1955—3 p.m.

1725. Shortly after dispatch EmbTel 1718 [2] Nasser gave me appointment his office.

In contrast previous encounters found Nasser reserved and cautious. Although meeting lengthy, conversation was devoted almost entirely to irritations and complaints along lines paragraph 1 above reference telegram. Not all items above reference emerged but several others along same general line were added. Attempted take each case and get to bottom of matter. In most cases he not forthcoming but on some produced "specific evidence" involving alleged activities U.S. personnel. He several times attempted to dismiss entire matter which I refused to allow. Told him I could not allow unsubstantiated charges against U.S. Government or Embassy without being allowed opportunity to get at bottom of these accusations. We finally agreed that he would send Ali Sabri to me personally with any new charges that are reported against U.S. as soon as they came to his attention.

While Nasser professed he himself did not believe many of these accusations, there no doubt he is extremely suspicious. Most obvious conclusion for this area would seem to be that he deliberately trying to put U.S. on defensive for some tactical purpose. Do not however believe this the case as Nasser personally somewhat incapable such acting. Am more inclined believe he has gone through a period since his return of really fearing U.S. may be turning against him. His training and experience might lead him to conclude that it would be logical for U.S. to work against him personally whenever our policies do not coincide. There are indications that he concerned U.S. should not be allowed strengthen its present capabilities to penetrate his support for possible use against him. Last week he took steps to restrict army officer contacts with Americans. (These now noticeably easing.)

It will be interesting to see effect of our talk upon him. Only indication as yet is that press gave meeting great publicity. [3]

Nature of conversation was not such as to raise other topics than U.S.-Egyptian relations. Gained impression, however, that E.S.S.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.00/5–1755. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:51 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Ankara, London, and Paris.

[2] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[3] Byroade reported on May 26 from Cairo that "there are many indications atmosphere re U.S.-Egyptian relations improving considerably." (Telegram 1785; Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/5–2655)

Pact [4] not about to move forward. He stated that Syrian amendments imposing obligations upon Egypt still as they were prior to Bandung and that nothing had really happened of late to change situation.

Byroade

[4] Reference is to the proposed Saudi-Syrian-Egyptian Pact. See footnote 6, Document 58.

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99. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, May 19, 1955—6 p.m.

5099. Foreign Office very concerned over latest Gaza incidents but is awaiting further details before deciding what action if any HMG should take. Foreign Office shares Ambassador Lawson's anxieties (Tel Aviv's 966 [2]) regarding Israeli reaction to Egyptian refusal participate high level talks. In fact, some days ago Foreign Office suggested to Ambassador Stevenson in Cairo that he raise matter with Egyptians and urge them agree to talks. Stevenson, however, reported that he and Byroade both doubt advisability approaching Government of Egypt in present circumstances.

Foreign Office has asked Stevenson reconsider matter. [3]

Butterworth

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–1955. Secret. Received at 6:50 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Paris, Baghdad, and Jidda.

[2] Lawson expressed his fear to the Department on May 16 that the Israelis would react unfavorably to Egypt's refusal to participate in high-level talks; he believed that the consequence would be a "further weakening Sharett's moderation position within Cabinet"; and he predicted that the Israelis would try to exploit to the fullest the Egyptians' refusal to cooperate with the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/5–1655)

[3] Byroade informed the Department that Stevenson had seen Nasser on May 19, that Nasser was "intensely bitter and suspicious of Israel and objective conversation most difficult." Nasser did tell Stevenson, however, that he would give the matter of high-level talks some more thought. (Telegram 1749 from Cairo, May 20, *ibid.*, 674.84A/5–2055)

100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, May 20, 1955—7:08 p.m.

674. Please make following statement to Foreign Minister:

IDF announcement of attack against Egyptian position in Gaza area May 18, marking resumption IG policy of reprisals, represents a deliberate flouting of SC resolution of March 28. As so often reiterated to IG by USG in past such actions can only render more difficult measures in which US is vigorously engaged and of which Foreign Minister has been advised to promote basis IG security and area stability.

As IG aware, USG has worked bring to pass high-level talks which IG stated it desired. At same time we must make it plain that we believe IG is prolonging present unsatisfactory border situation by refusing cooperate with UNTSO in practical measures aimed at reducing tensions along Gaza frontier as recommended by General Burns and endorsed by SC. We deplore mining activities on part persons coming from Gaza Strip and are so advising Egyptians. In past week both Egyptian and Israeli lives have been needlessly lost as parties jockey for what appear to us to be rather dubious political advantages.

Cairo convey to GOE appropriate portion preceding paragraph supporting in your discretion démarche to Nasser by Stevenson of May 19. [2] We continue support Burns proposals including his suggestion for Egyptian-Israel talks under conditions he has outlined.

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2055. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus; cleared with Ludlow, Burdett, and Russell; and approved by Jernegan, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Cairo, London, Jerusalem, and USUN; and pouched to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Paris.

[2] Stevenson spoke with Nasser on May 19 about the holding of high-level talks with Israel. See footnote 3, *supra*.

101. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 20, 1955—5 p.m.

1750. In view Nasser's reaction Stevenson approach regarding high level talks with Israelis (mytel 1749 [2]) broader matters regarding Israel did not arise. However I understand Stevenson message to FonOff states very specifically his view Alpha clearly impossible for time being. While I fear (and Embassy staff feels certain) this most probably the case, it my present intention have another try in few days.

It interesting Nasser accused members British Embassy spreading rumors against him of late in much same manner he spoke to me regarding activities of Americans. He also showed resentment that Stevenson "had taken the lead" in keeping Western diplomats away from airport upon his return. [3]

Byroade

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–2055. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Received at 11:56 p.m. Repeated to London.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 99.

[3] Reference is to Nasser's return from the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung.

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102. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, May 20, 1955—6 p.m.

328. I discussed current situation with General Burns today particularly in light Israeli retaliation raid May 19, Tel Aviv's telegram 966 [2] and London's 5099. [3] I thought it would be well ascertain Burns present appraisal usefulness proposed high-level talks Israel and Egypt as well as his ideas regarding any steps which might be taken in atmosphere resulting most recent incidents and Egypt's aversion high-level talks. Burns commented as follows:

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2055. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:27 a.m., May 21. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 99.

[3] Document 99.

(1) He had done his best to comply with UNSYG instructions arrange talks. However, he thought respective governments might well accept judgment their Ambassadors in Cairo and refrain from further pressure bring about such talks at this time.

(2) Lacking a precise agenda with significant points (in addition to the four points of the March 30 SC resolution) Burns failed to perceive any especial need for such talks. He was thus somewhat at a loss to refute Egyptian thesis that there is no need for discussions above the Shalev–Gohar level.

(3) With regard to the mines which causing much of the trouble, Burns expressed relief that these were not planted by or at the instigation of any authority of the GOE. However, GOE authorities have shown themselves unable to prevent this activity thus far. He has written to Gohar to ask what further measures may be taken to stop mine planting. He has also recommended that GOE revamp administrative set-up in Gaza strip. Present organization places control police and refugees under Governor while military force is responsible to Army Commander. Burns urges that unified command all elements be established enhance effective control situation.

(4) Burns suggested that powers might again urge upon Israelis futility their policy of retaliation. Gaza incursion of February 28 certainly did not improve the situation, and there appears no valid reason to expect future retaliation efforts would prove more successful. In addition, very serious results might follow owing existence large body refugees there toward whom UN and powers have considerable responsibilities.

Consulate General comment: Foregoing suggests that perhaps time has come to tell Israelis that we have done what was possible to arrange high level talks; but that in existing atmosphere and lacking firm and basic agreed agency [*agenda*?] sound reason for pressing for talks does not now exist. Meanwhile, best efforts should be made to resume negotiations at working level, to discourage retaliatory activities by Israel and to encourage Egyptians improve control Gaza area. [4]

Regarding last paragraph my telegram 327 [5] Burns states he has no present intention evacuating UNTSO dependents Gaza.

Cole

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[4] Byroade cabled the Department that he agreed "completely with views General Burns (Jerusalem telegram 328, May 20), and, unless instructed to contrary, will not press here for high level talks (Deptel 2030)" (printed as Document 100). Instead, Byroade planned to discuss the "general situation with Foreign Office along lines Deptel 674 to Tel Aviv repeated Cairo 2030. In this discussion will urge GOE take steps proposed by Burns re administrative set up in Gaza or such alternative steps as can be found which would make for more effective control." (Telegram 1758 from Cairo, May 21; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2155)

[5] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/5–1955)

103. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, May 23, 1955—1 p.m.

986. In conversation with Prime Minister on other matters yesterday, he told me that the Cabinet earlier in day heard his full report on Johnston water negotiations and every member was very much interested in every detail. Also at Cabinet meeting were Ambassador Eban, Teddy Kollek, Weiner and Blass (the last named making some comment constructive as well as otherwise). The matter is being held under advisement and the Prime Minister could not at this moment say when a firm final decision would be upcoming. I gathered that he felt confident of a favorable decision but he was careful to make no comment in that direction. In response to my question as to what he thought the Arabs would do he said, "I don't know, but they should grab it quickly—especially Jordan".

Lawson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–2355. Confidential. Received at 12:16 p.m. Repeated to London, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus.

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104. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, May 23, 1955—2 p.m.

987. In accordance with Deptel 674 [2] I called late yesterday afternoon on Prime Minister in Jerusalem to which he had returned from weekend. He was obviously expecting me to deliver message of nature I gave orally to him on basis reference telegram. He received message seriously. In somewhat stern tone and speaking without notes he said he wished to reply as follows:

He desired to comment first on the final sentence our message which he said described as "sting in the tail of the message". He

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2355. Confidential; Priority. Received at 12:57 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, London, USUN, Jerusalem, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Paris.

[2] Document 100.

said that he emphatically rejected the suggestion that there was any jockeying for political advantages on the part of the GOI and "speaking for the government I reject this suggestion most emphatically."

As explained on many occasions, he said, "there is no systematic policy of retaliation—there are isolated acts which to Israel are unavoidable." He said that the loss of three innocent young lives cannot occur without punishment.[3] "I challenge the representative of any government to say that if such an outrage had occurred on its frontier no retaliatory action would have been taken," he said. He then referred to the long period of time since US borders have been disturbed, implying that it would be difficult for US Government to visualize itself in same position, and appealed to US to put itself in Israel's position.

He did not think it "easy to accuse GOI of deliberately flouting SC resolution March 28" at a time when, (a), the resolution seems to have "had no effect on GOE" and (b), when the "SC itself did not keep faith with its own principles by refusing to condemn Egypt for outrages committed against Israel, to which outrages Israel did not retaliate but about which Israel complained to the SC."

He then referred to a press announcement, reported, he said, to have some Department connection, to effect that the mines which caused the loss of life in this latest incident were old mines laid before recent admonitions to Egypt. He said, "this is not my information. It is true that Egypt had informed General Burns some time ago that couple of old mines remained in the ground and he warned us, after which we discovered and disposed of them. But the mines in the last outrage were newly laid mines. Moreover, they were not primitive or handmade mines but regular military mines of British manufacture and undoubtedly from stocks of military supplies used by the Egyptian Army. I impute nothing to the British, of course."

On the subject of "high level talks," he directed attention to the fact that the initiative came from the GOI, "and was then taken over by the UN." He said, "we responded immediately, accepting the entire agenda as outlined by the UN Chief of Staff.[4] We note with concern, to this day Egypt's reply is still outstanding—and we have been hearing for quite a time from UN circles that there is no likelihood of a favorable reply. In meantime, General Burns initiated talks at a routine level. Here again, the GOI responded and we do not think we can be properly blamed for not accepting every single

[3] Reference is to the death of three of four Israelis wounded by the explosion of a mine near Kisufim on May 17.

[4] Major General E.L.M. Burns.

suggestion, made in perfectly good faith by General Burns. Any country enters a conference on the understanding that it is free to use its judgment as to the efficacy and usefulness of the matter proposed. The fact that the GOI acce ed three of the four proposals whereas Egypt accepted with reservations all four, does not leave us, in the balance, in an unfavorable position or lay the GOI open to the charge of non-cooperation with the UN. General Burns has referred to Egypt's reservations, however we are aware that they flatly rejected some of the proposals, such as telephone communication between local commanders without which any local commanders agreement is likely to become a farce."

He then referred to the fact that the GOI had repeatedly stated that it had no greater desire than to see complete calm along the border. "There is," he said, "only one way to bring this about on the Gaza border zone and that is a complete cessation of all aggressive violence on the part of the Egyptian Forces."

Comment: The above is virtually a verbatim report of his remarks which he made at dictation speed and obviously desired that they be accurately recorded. They were it seemed, extemporaneous.

I endeavored at several points to inject comment or explanation but this was firmly resisted as he proceeded firmly ahead with his remarks. I was able after his comments, however, to underscore US Government attitude on this policy of retaliation and how such acts upset our timetable in our efforts to promote area stability and Israel's basic security in particular. I was able also to indicate our failure to understand why the GOI was not in favor of joint patrols, pointing up their value in cases such as this last mining incident. I likewise called his attention to the advantages of patrolling further back from the border.

It seemed to me that the Prime Minister was "making a case" much as a lawyer would and certainly he was defending vigorously the policy of his government. But it is believed, as has been reported to us from responsible quarters, that his personal views are not those which supported retaliation in this instance (Embtel 984 [5]). In response to my direct question, he agreed that retaliation seemed to occur when (a) there was loss of Israeli life, and (b) when in the judgment of the GOI the aggravating action by the other party is military in character or supported directly or indirectly by the

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[5] Ambassador Lawson reported on May 21 in telegram 984 that on the afternoon of May 18 the Mapai inner group had considered the mining incident which had resulted in the deaths of the three officers the previous day. The group, composed of Sharett, Ben Gurion, Eshkol, Myerson, and Aranne, decided by a vote of four to one, with Sharett dissenting, to retaliate for the mining incident. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2155)

military. It would appear, therefore, that at the moment at least, the pattern as to when retaliation is to be used has been firmly set.

Lawson

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105. Memorandum of Conversation, American Embassy, London, May 18, 1955 [1]

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh, Foreign Office
Mr. Michael Rose, Foreign Office
Mr. Kenneth Simpson, Foreign Office
Mr. Geoffrey Arthur, Foreign Office
Mr. Arthur Gardiner, Department of State
Mr. Evan M. Wilson, AmEmbassy, London
Mr. Dayton S. Mak, AmEmbassy, London

SUBJECT

Progress Made in Jordan Waters Negotiations

Mr. Gardiner explained that Mr. Eric Johnston was prepared to return to the Middle East in early June and act as intermediary between the Arabs and the Israelis in arriving at a solution of the water distribution and storage problems in the Jordan Valley, provided the Israelis would present him with a firm and reasonable offer which he can take to the Arabs. It is hoped that the Israelis will make, formally, a proposal to Mr. Johnston that meets these requirements and is reasonably close to the position reached with the Arabs in Beirut in February 1955. Talks have been held in Washington to this end and were still continuing.

Whereas the Israelis previously were prepared to consider the idea of using Lake Tiberias for storing water for Israel and the Arabs, they now wish to delay a decision regarding the storage of water for the Arabs in Tiberias, until the year 1960. The reason for this change in attitude is the failure of the Israelis to find adequate alternate reservoir sites at Sahl Battauf, and elsewhere in Israel. The Israelis have, however, indicated that they would be willing to permit the storage of 300 MCMs of Arab water in Tiberias if Israel could be provided (at no cost to her) with alternate storage facilities.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/5–2355. Confidential. Enclosure to despatch 3477 from London, May 23. Drafted by Mak.

Mr. Johnston is seeking Israeli agreement to provide this space for the Arabs at an expenditure not exceeding provable costs of increasing the capacity of the lake to 1,000 MCMs, a 300 MCM increase over its present capacity. These costs have been estimated by the Israelis possibly as high as $5 million, although other estimates are considerably lower. The Israelis have also indicated that they much prefer the erection of a high storage dam on the Yarmuk River which the Arabs could utilize for complete control of its waters as an alternative to their using Tiberias for this purpose. This is very likely unacceptable, as such a dam would probably cost around $60 million.

Mr. Johnston wishes the Israelis to agree, as an interim measure, to permit the Arabs to utilize water now wasted from Tiberias, by passing it into the proposed "feeder canal" from the Lake to the Eastern Ghor Canal, prior to the date when the Israelis agree to storage of Yarmuk water in Tiberias.

Mr. Gardiner said that the Israelis and Mr. Johnston had made progress on ideas for a neutral control authority. The Israelis wish to limit the judgmental powers of the authority, and it is believed that much of its work can be limited to carrying out delivery schedules set in advance, and modified only by prearranged sets of calculations.

Mr. Gardiner remarked that Mr. Johnston was prepared, as an intermediary, to approach the Arabs with a schedule of division of water less favorable than that agreed upon tentatively in Beirut. He thought there was some chance of Arab acceptance, as limitation of Tiberias storage carried the implication that a high Yarmuk Dam would be a requisite to prevent wastage of water; this the Arabs were most desirous to secure. Problems of quality of water, i.e., its salinity, also remain to be solved.

Mr. Gardiner remarked that Sir Anthony Eden's messages to the Jordanians and Israelis urging their cooperation with Mr. Johnston had been helpful.[2] Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the Foreign Secretary would be happy to assist Mr. Johnston's mission on his next visit to the Middle East if he were asked to do so.

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[2] Ambassador Lawson informed the Department on April 6 that the British Ambassador on April 5 had transmitted a personal message from Eden to Sharett in which Eden had "referred to fact that he was encouraged reports of progress in Jordan Valley water negotiations and stressed importance which he attached to their successful conclusion." (Telegram 863 from Tel Aviv, April 6; *ibid.*, 684A.85321/4–655)

106. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, May 23, 1955.

I discussed the attached file today with George Allen and Francis Russell. Mr. Russell is coming up with a supplemental memorandum. [2] Apart from the substantive features of the Alpha plan, in essence Mr. Russell's recommendations about the procedure boil down to:

1. A waiting period of about two weeks to evaluate Nasser's attitude and to provide Byroade an opportunity to further probe the situation. If affirmative indications at Cairo develop, there will then be opportunity to unfold the plan to Nasser.

2. Mr. Russell is preparing a draft letter which could be sent either by the Secretary or the President to Nasser, urging his cooperation. [3]

3. In the event that Byroade's efforts in Cairo prove abortive, then examine the possibilities of working through the Jordanians. . . .

4. If both the Egyptian and Jordan channels bring no success, then in cooperation with the British we would publish our proposals, hoping thus to force the issue and give proof of our constructive attitude.

5. The recall of Elath from London and Eban from Washington to Tel Aviv plus other indications in the Gaza area and public statements might indicate if anything a hardening of the Israel attitude. [4]

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after 2nd London Talks—April 26–June 30, '55. Top Secret.

[2] *Infra*.

[3] See Tab B below.

[4] The Embassy in London reported that Eliahu Elath, Israel's Ambassador in the United Kingdom, informed Shuckburgh on May 13 that he and Eban had been recalled to Tel Aviv for routine consultations. Shuckburgh, however, regarded their recalls to be "further evidence Israeli anxiety regarding plans of U.S. and U.K." (Telegram 5056 from London, May 17; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–1755)

Attachment

Memorandum From Francis H. Russell to the Secretary of State [5]

Washington, May 18, 1955.

SUBJ

Summary Statement of Alpha Proposals

At the meeting in your office on May 3, [6] you asked me to prepare a summary statement of the Alpha proposals which might be shown to the President and, at an appropriate time, to the heads of other interested departments and possibly to three or four Congressional leaders. Attached is such a statement (Tab A). In a telegram received yesterday, [7] Ambassador Byroade suggests that, in view of the danger of a leak following the revealing of Alpha to other department heads and Congressional leaders, and the damage which such a leak would do to his negotiations with Nasser, discussions outside the Department be deferred until he has progressed further with Nasser.

Aside from broad approval of Alpha and the contemplated inducements to the parties, it is a matter of special urgency that Byroade be authorized to state to Nasser that the President, in the context of an Israel-Arab settlement, would recommend to Congress US aid in the amount of $100 million in the construction of the High Aswan Dam (Tab B).

Recommendations:

1. That the attached statement of the elements and inducements for an Israel-Arab settlement (Tab A) be approved as a Departmental position.

2. That the President be asked to authorize Ambassador Byroade to state to Nasser that the President, in the context of an Israel-Arab settlement, would recommend to Congress US aid in the amount of $100 million in the construction of the High Aswan Dam (Tab B).

3. That the President be asked to authorize the Secretary, as soon as our discussions with Nasser make it expedient, to discuss the Alpha statement (Tab A) with a few top Congressional leaders.

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[5] Top Secret; Alpha. The source text bears a notation that Dulles saw this memorandum.

[6] See footnote 2, Document 86.

[7] Document 97.

Tab A

POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT OF PRINCIPAL ISRAEL-ARAB ISSUES [8]

I. The Need for a Special Effort to Achieve an Israel-Arab Settlement

Arab-Israel tension and hostility, periodically breaking out into armed clashes, have continued for seven years after the signing of Armistice Agreements. The continuance of the dispute will be increasingly a major detriment to vital US interests. The strategic Near East has been economically and politically weakened and divided; the situation contains possibilities of renewed open warfare which might involve states outside the area; and measures for strengthening the area to resist Soviet aggression are greatly hampered.

There is no indication that time alone or the efforts of the parties themselves will resolve the smoldering conflict. The bitterness between the parties has thus far resisted efforts by the United Nations and the Western Powers to bring about a settlement of issues. Prospects for the success of a renewed effort are none too bright but a number of considerations lead us to the view that an effort by the US and the UK should be made: (1) two other major issues which troubled the area—the Anglo-Egyptian dispute and the Iranian oil controversy [9]—have been resolved; (2) US influence in the area has increased considerably as a result of our policy of sympathetic and impartial friendship towards both Arabs and Israelis; (3) UK influence has been on the increase since the conclusion of the Suez agreement with Egypt; (4) if the effort is not made in 1955, we will probably lose more than just a year, since 1956, a Presidential election year, would not be propitious for such an effort.

II. Timing and Method of Approach

The proposed settlement would involve the solution of the principal issues between Israel and her Arab neighbors, including a cessation of acts of belligerency. It is not proposed, however, to aim immediately at formal and comprehensive peace treaties and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations. It would be hoped that the removal of the principal causes of tension and the passage of time would lead to an ultimate formal peace.

It is planned to sound out Nasser to see whether Egypt would take the initiative. Egypt has indicated in the past a willingness to

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[8] Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Russell on May 18. Attached to the source text is a 2-page summary of this statement.

[9] For documentation on the U.S. interest in the settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, volume X.

cooperate in taking measures to reduce tension with Israel. The next stage would be a carefully planned disclosure of the suggested elements of a general settlement to Jordan and Israel. Assuming progress, other Arab states as well as other friendly Western powers will be approached shortly after.

If this method of approach to the problem should prove unproductive, the proposed terms of settlement might be urged upon the parties publicly by the US and the UK, possibly in the UN.

In view of the inflammability and suspicion in public opinion in the area, the utmost secrecy is essential during the initial stages of the program.

III. Elements of a Settlement

The following are the principal issues on which it is hoped that settlement can be reached:

A. *Territorial*: It is proposed that Israel and the neighboring Arab states agree to a definitive border which would include the following adjustments:

1. A division of the present "demilitarized zones" and "no man's lands" created by the Armistice Agreements;
2. Returning to border Arab villages, almost entirely in Jordan, a portion of the adjoining farm lands upon which they are dependent for a livelihood and from which they were cut off by the existing Armistice Line. The net total of these cessions by Israel would be 77.5 square miles;
3. Giving to Israel a portion of the Latrun salient, making possible the resumption of use of the most direct road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem;
4. Allocating to Egypt and to Jordan triangles of land in the Negev which would make possible land communication between Egypt and the rest of the Arab states, with over- and underpasses connecting the two triangles and the two Israel sections of the Negev;

. . . . . .

(The area presently occupied by Israel, excluding demilitarized zones, is 7,805 square miles.)

B. *Refugees*: The approximately 800,000 Arab refugees who fled and were subsequently debarred from their homes in what is now Israel constitute probably the greatest cause of friction between Israel and her Arab neighbors. This problem must be dealt with by a program that calls for the repatriation of a comparatively small proportion of the refugees, the eventual resettlement of the remainder, and compensation for expropriated land.

It is proposed that Israel would repatriate up to 75,000 Arab refugees at a rate of 15,000 yearly, with priority being given to those presently living in the Gaza Strip.

Israel would assume a liability of £100 million ($280 million) for the payment for real property left by Arabs who fled Palestine. Israel would also renounce counter-claims which it has against the Arab states, and the Arab refugees would renounce claims for movable personal property and community property. Israel, with assistance from world Jewry, would be asked to raise some 30% of the compensation fund. The balance would be loaned to Israel on a long-term, low-interest basis, primarily by the US and the UK. Payments to individual Arabs would be made through the UN under conditions designed to achieve the greatest amelioration of present bitterness, to encourage work-creating investment in the area, and to prevent inflation.

The great bulk of the refugees will have to be resettled, largely in Arab countries where, as a result of expanding economies and projects such as the Jordan Valley Development Plan and the Sinai Project, they could be gradually integrated.

C. . . .

D. *The Boycott*: The Arab states would remove restrictions on Israel commerce and vessels transiting the Suez Canal; cease their attempts to prevent trade between Israel and non-Arab countries; and repeal all legislation and multilateral boycott arrangements based on the existence of a state of belligerency. The Arab states would not be pressed at this time to engage in direct trade with Israel.

E. *Jordan Waters*: It is hoped that this issue can be resolved within the next few months through the negotiations of Ambassador Johnston.

F. *Free Port at Haifa and Transit Rights*: Israel would agree to establish a free port at Haifa. She would grant Jordan transit rights to Haifa across Israel territory, and Egypt and Jordan transit rights across the northern Negev. Arrangements would also be made for travel of commercial aircraft and for telecommunication facilities by each side across the territory of the other.

G. *Border-Guarantee Treaties*: In the event that agreement is achieved on the above elements of a settlement, the US and the UK would agree to enter into treaties with Israel and each of the neighboring Arab countries guaranteeing the agreed borders against change by armed force. The treaties would provide for consultation in the event of a threat of armed attack by any of the parties and for joint measures to maintain or, if necessary, restore the agreed boundaries. The guaranteeing states would not be bound to intervene in the case of boundary incidents or raids. These would remain the responsibility of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization. The treaty of guarantee would relate only to borders; it would not underwrite other elements of the settlement.

IV. Inducements to Parties to Reach a Settlement

Since the border guarantee and the benefits to the parties inherent in the settlement will in all probability not be sufficient to secure their cooperation, it is contemplated that additional inducements to cooperate might be offered in the form of economic and military assistance, possibly of the following magnitude, shown in

terms of expenditures presently contemplated regardless of the projected settlement, and those which would be additionally required:

(1) Funds probably required during the next five years under a continuation of the present situation:

	(*millions of $*)
Funds appropriated and presently being held in US Treasury for UNRWA Sinai and Syrian resettlement projects	$44
US commitment as supporter of UNRWA five-year plan for Arab refugee relief	80
Unified Jordan Valley Plan (if agreement is reached by Ambassador Johnston)	112
Probable regular economic aid to Israel and Arab states over next five years on basis of present programs	250
	$486

(2) Additional funds probably needed for Israel-Arab settlement:

US loan to Israel for payment of compensation to Arab refugees (repayment to US doubtful)	$150
Additional economic aid to Egypt (including portion of funds needed for High Aswan Dam), Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon	145
Military aid to Israel and neighboring Arab states conditional upon settlement	250 [10]
	$545

Tab B

Memorandum From Francis H. Russell to the Secretary of State [11]

Washington, May 18, 1955.

SUBJ

Inducements to Egypt; High Aswan Dam

The Alpha project assumes that economic inducements to Egypt will be required in order to secure her cooperation. One of the most effective forms which this could take would be assistance in financing the construction of the High Aswan Dam. Ambassador Byroade

[10] This amount should not be regarded as exclusively chargeable to an Israel-Arab settlement. It would be used to promote area security against an internal and external communist threat. [Footnote in the source text.]

[11] Top Secret; Alpha.

may soon, if he is to be persuasive, have to make his proposals to Nasser in definite terms.

The cost of the High Aswan Dam (dam, civil works, turbines and generators) is estimated at from $500 to $550 million, spread over a 10-year period, of which roughly 50% would be foreign exchange. The Government of Egypt itself should be able to finance most or all local costs and, by drawing upon its gold reserves, about $85 million of the foreign exchange cost. The IBRD might be expected to loan $85 million. Thus, a gap of some $80 million would remain which the US might undertake to provide.

Additional auxiliary works (power transmission lines, indemnities to the Sudan, and land reclamation) would add costs of possibly another $500 million, of which about one-fourth would be foreign exchange. The US might well contribute some $20 million of this.

Any US assistance in the High Aswan Dam project and auxiliary works should be in the form of grants, since Egypt's entire ability to finance foreign loans would be committed.

Recommendation: That the US state to Nasser that if (a) there is a settlement of the major Arab-Israel issues, and (b) the High Aswan Dam proves otherwise feasible, the President will request a Congressional authorization and appropriation of $100 million toward the foreign exchange costs of the High Aswan Dam and the auxiliary works.

(All figures used above are based on current estimates and are tentative.)

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107. Draft Memorandum From Francis H. Russell to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, May 24, 1955.

SUBJ

Launching Alpha

In anticipation of my commencing leave within a couple of weeks, I am putting down my ideas with respect to various ways

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., April 26–June 30, '55. Top Secret; Alpha. The source text bears the following handwritten notation: "Withdrawn per agreement of W[alter] K. S[cott]/Russell, 6/2. To be superceded by new memo. 6/2. R[obert] L. B[urns]." Attached was an uninitialed typewritten chit that conveyed the same information.

that are open to us to launch the Alpha program, in the order in which I believe they should be considered.

1. Ambassador Byroade should be given another two or three weeks to see whether an opportunity arises in which to follow up on the discussions about a possible settlement which he had with Nasser and Fawzi before Nasser's trip to Bandung. Byroade should be authorized to mention the possibility of a US contribution of $100 million to the High Aswan Dam (see my memo of May 18 attached, Tab A [2]).

2. If Byroade does not find an opportunity to raise Alpha with Nasser in the normal course of his talks, the President or the Secretary should send a letter to Nasser which Byroade would be authorized to use as a basis for soliciting Nasser's cooperation in Alpha. The letter would acknowledge that the Gaza raids have made difficult an approach to settlement at this time but state that nevertheless Egypt would stand to gain much from taking the initiative. A draft of such a letter is attached (Tab B).

3. If Nos. 1 and 2 should not prove feasible or successful, an approach to Jordan should be made by the UK and the US. Although Jordan is handicapped by a weak government and by its weakness in relation to its sister Arab states, it has the largest stake of any Arab country in a settlement with Israel, and the British are in position to exert some pressure.

4. Failing in all of the above approaches, the US and the UK might publicly state their conviction that an equitable settlement of the Israel-Arab dispute is possible and make clear the contribution which the US and the UK are prepared to make to assist in such a settlement (a guarantee to both sides of the Israel-Arab border, financial assistance in dealing with the refugee problem, and economic aid—e.g., the High Aswan Dam). This could be done through a speech by the Secretary, the publishing of a joint démarche, or introducing a resolution in the UN. This approach should be used only as a last resort. At best, it would set up a set of specific objectives toward which the Western powers and the UN could exert their influence. At the least, it would provide an answer to Jewish pressure groups until Israel gave its assent to the main elements of such a settlement.

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[2] See the attachment to the memorandum of May 23 from Murphy, *supra*.

Tab B

DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO PRESIDENT NASSER [3]

MY DEAR FRIEND: I am asking Ambassador Byroade to discuss with you a matter of deep interest to me, that is, an accommodation between the Arab States and Israel. I am impressed by the yearning on the part of all of the peoples of the world for a period of tranquillity and a removal of the specter of armed conflict. The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, as well as recent events in Europe, reflect this universal feeling. The Bandung communiqué correctly noted the inter-dependence of freedom and peace and the correlation between peace and social and economic progress.

Turning specifically to the Near East, I detect a weariness at the existing impasse, a rejection of negativism, and an eagerness to find a positive forward policy. The record of your Government in espousing social and economic development and in solving troublesome international questions such as the Suez Base controversy leads me to the thought that Egypt might wish to assert area leadership by example and undertake the task of resolving the Arab-Israeli problem.

I recognize the difficulties in the way of any Arab-Israel settlement—the periodic border outbursts do not serve in any way to lessen them—but I am convinced that it is possible to reach agreements which will bring to all the nations concerned definite advantages over the existing situation. Besides removing the constant danger of a renewal of hostilities, an accommodation would give added impetus to social and economic programs which, as your Government has correctly diagnosed, are indispensable to progress and security. Countries of the Western world, including the United States, would find it easier to extend appropriate assistance which might be requested. Accordingly, I hope that it will be possible to work out with you proposals which subsequently may be discussed with other interested countries in the area. I understand that the present Prime Minister of Great Britain expressed to you similar thoughts during your discussions in January of this year. [4]

I am suggesting that you take the leadership in this matter because of my high respect for your achievements and reliance upon your statesmanship. It is my conviction that this problem will yield to our cooperative efforts as other difficult ones have done with results beneficial to all the peoples concerned.

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[3] Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Russell on May 24.

[4] Prime Minister Eden spoke with Nasser on February 20.

I extend to you my personal best wishes and hopes for the continued progress of Egypt under your leadership.

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108. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, May 24, 1955—6 p.m.

5157. Foreign Office has been considering some form of tripartite action recurrent Gaza situation but according to British Embassy Paris and Washington Quai D'Orsay is opposed and Department not responsive. Meanwhile, in reply to instructions mentioned Embassy telegram 5140, [2] British Ambassador Tel Aviv has commented that he does not believe approach to Israel along lines indicated would be of any benefit unless at same time representations were made to Egypt reference mining in Gaza area.

Although Foreign Office working level is inclined agree with Lawson's view (Tel Aviv's 989 [3]) that US and UK should continue seek agreement of Egypt to high level talks, British Embassy Washington has reported that Department does not appear inclined take further action in this regard at this time in light of recommendations of Burns and Byroade as reported Jerusalem's 328 [4] and Cairo's 1758. [5]

In circumstances Foreign Office is now considering "2 pronged" approach by UK, ie, to Israel reference May 18 attack and to Egypt re mining and administrative set-up in Gaza as suggested paragraph 3 Jerusalems's 328 and final sentence Cairo's 1758. [6] Department will no doubt receive details from British Embassy.

Aldrich

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2455. Secret. Received at 5:09 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Paris, Baghdad, and Jidda.

[2] The Embassy in London reported on May 23 that the British Foreign Office had instructed the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv to make representation to Sharett about the Gaza situation. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/5–2355)

[3] Dated May 23, not printed. (*Ibid.*)

[4] Document 102.

[5] See footnote 4, Document 102.

[6] See the last sentence of the final quotation, *ibid.*

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan [1]

Washington, May 28, 1955—2:10 p.m.

504. Eyes only Ambassadors. Israel ambassadors to Washington, London and Paris [2] currently conferring Jlem with FonOff and Cabinet. Presumption is they have been considering IG policy and strategy in light of info that US and UK giving serious consideration possible settlement Israel-Arab issues (though indications are they have no info re nature our proposals).

Dept does not yet know what decisions they may have reached but we must consider strong possibility IG may within next week or two make public statement that time has come for settlement Israel-Arab issues and lay down its own suggestions re elements of settlement. Such IG statement would of course seriously damage ability US and UK influence Arabs move toward settlement as we would appear be acting on IG initiative. US–UK might endeavor dissuade IG from such a step but case would at best be doubtful.

As you know, US and UK convinced present offers most favorable circumstances Arabs will have for some time to enter into negots for settlement principal issues, and US–UK prepared offer substantial contributions. Assuming no possibility of chief of state to which you are accredited making early statement pointing toward possibility of settlement (so that idea would have best chance Arab support), would appreciate your comment on possible US–UK statement within next few weeks that time has come when settlement should be possible and indicating in general terms what US and UK willing contribute make settlement possible. We had hoped be able make initial confidential informal exploratory approaches to Arab leaders but appropriate opportunity has not [been] offered. We may therefore face alternatives of IG statement or one by US–UK.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–2855. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell; cleared with Jernegan, Allen, and Murphy; and approved by Hoover. Also sent priority to Beirut, Cairo, London, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Abba Eban, Eliahu Elath, and Jabob Tsur, respectively.

Pls comment soonest. [3]

Hoover

[3] Ambassadors Mallory, Heath, and Byroade, as well as officials of the British Foreign Office, favored delaying any U.S.-British public statement. (Telegram 424 from Amman, May 31; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–3155; telegram 1252 from Beirut, May 30; *ibid.*, 684A.86/5–3055; telegram 1806 from Cairo, May 30; *ibid.*; and telegram 5222 from London, May 30; *ibid.*) Ambassador Lawson reported that he had no evidence to indicate that the Israelis were contemplating a dramatic public statement, but he felt the Department should take into account the deterioration in Egyptian-Israeli relations before making a U.S.-British announcement. (Telegram 1004 from Tel Aviv, May 31; *ibid.*, 684A.86/5–3155)

110. Memorandum From Francis H. Russell to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, June 2, 1955.

SUBJ

Next Steps to Advance Alpha Settlement

The following are recommended as steps to be taken during the next few weeks to launch the Alpha program:

1. A telegram to Byroade saying the time is growing short in which Alpha must be launched if it is to make significant progress during the present year; urge him to proceed as rapidly as possible in discussions with Fawzi and, if occasion offers, with Nasser; authorize him to refer to the possibility of US aid on the High Aswan Dam, in the context of Alpha settlement, bearing in mind that the ultimate figure might be around $100 million although no specific commitments should be made; say that if it appears that, at the end of three or four weeks, no early progress with the Government of Egypt is

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after 2nd London Talks—Apr. 26–June 30, '55. Top Secret; Alpha, Limited Distribution. Addressed also to Hoover and Murphy. The source text is not dated but bears a drafting date of June 2. The source text bears Allen's and Jernegan's initials, indicating their concurrence, and a notation that Dulles saw it on June 2. A marginal notation by Hoover reads as follows: "Noted: Hoover. Recommend for discussion with the Secretary."

An attached memorandum dated June 2 from Russell to Hoover and Murphy states that since Byroade had informed the Department on May 30 that there was little prospect of securing Nasser's cooperation at an early date in launching Alpha (telegram 1806 from Cairo; *ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/5–3055), it seemed desirable "to move more expeditiously than we had anticipated in working through Jordan and Lebanon."

likely, we intend to approach the Jordanian and Lebanese Governments.

2. Send copies of Alpha summaries to Ambassadors Mallory and Heath; say we have been hoping that the Egyptians would cooperate in launching Alpha but this appears unlikely at the present time, and we are giving serious thought to possible approaches to Jordan and Lebanon.

3. If, at the end of three or four weeks, no favorable response has been obtained from the Egyptian Government, instruct our ambassadors to approach the Jordanian and—if Jordan's response warranted—the Lebanese Government. The inducements which we would advance to Jordan are set forth in the attached Tab A. The inducements to Lebanon are set forth in the attached Tab B.

4. The built-in inducements in Alpha, however, will probably not be enough to secure Jordanian and Lebanese cooperation. Both countries have evinced some interest in adhering to the Turk-Iraq pact: Lebanon in connection with arms aid; Jordan in connection with possible substitution for the present Anglo-Jordanian treaty of [*or*] one similar to the new Anglo-Iraq treaty. Our existing policy contemplated delaying Jordanian and Lebanese adherence to the Turk-Iraq treaty until after Alpha implementation. It might be possible to secure Jordanian and Lebanese cooperation in Alpha by linking the two developments. This would mean that:

(a) Alpha would be raised with Jordan and Lebanon simultaneously with discussion of their possible adherence to the Turk-Iraq treaty and attendant benefits to each therefrom. We would make clear we could not support such adherence in the absence of an Alpha settlement.

(b) If, in the context of Alpha, developments point toward Jordan–Lebanon adherence to the Turk-Iraq pact, the US and the UK should plan to hold discussions with the Israel Government about its participation in area defense (confined to use of Israel bases, harbor facilities, and protection of Israel Government territory and waters).

(c) The US–UK would bring pressure upon Iraq not to interfere with Jordanian and Lebanese cooperation in Alpha, pointing out the advantages to Iraq from Jordanian-Lebanese adherence to the Turk-Iraq pact, which the US–UK could then support.

5. An effort should be made to induce the Israel Government, pending the above, to refrain from acts (e.g., increased border activity, or publication of an Israel Government plan for settlement) that would hurt Alpha.

Tab A

JORDAN: INDUCEMENTS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN SECURING COOPERATION [2]

1. The status quo in the Near East is not in Jordan's interest. Her economy can never be properly developed in the present situation. All Jordan's neighbor states contain elements which entertain notions as to Jordan's future which do not coincide with Jordan's interests. . . .

2. Jordan is bearing a heavier burden as a result of the Palestine hostilities than any other Arab state. The largest share of the sporadic hostilities falls upon Jordan, and it is her trade and communications with the outside world which have been the most thoroughly damaged. Jordan therefore has the most to gain from a resolution of the Palestine issue. It is time for Jordan to look to her own interests and to select a course of action which will benefit her the most. The US and the UK could then cooperate with Jordan in persuading other Arab states of the necessity of Jordan's participating in a just and equitable settlement of the controversy. Past experience has shown that Jordan's leaving the initiative to other Arab states is fruitless and dangerous.

3. In the type of settlement which we have in mind, Jordan will receive a good portion of what she has demanded. There will be provisions for territorial adjustments, repatriation of some refugees, rehabilitation of the rest, and arrangements for compensation. The US would likewise be prepared to support Jordan in obtaining facilities through Israel for communicating with other Arab states and the outside world. . . . Jordan is already aware of our active support of the proposition that she must have her full share of the waters of the entire Jordan–Yarmuk system.

4. We fully appreciate that any settlement at all, no matter how just and equitable, would arouse considerable opposition among certain extreme elements in Jordan's population and create a serious internal security situation. To this end we would be prepared to consult with the Jordanians on ways in which we can be of assistance in dealing with this problem during the transition period. We would also be prepared to speak to Israel in the strongest terms of the necessity for a tranquil border situation.

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[2] Drafted by Russell on June 1.

Tab B

LEBANON: INDUCEMENTS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN SECURING COOPERATION

1. The Lebanese are most anxious to receive military aid from the US, desiring it primarily for internal security and prestige, and as a sign of the recognition by the US of the importance of Lebanon. The cost to the US would be perhaps $5 to $10 million.

2. The Lebanese would like to receive economic aid on a much larger scale than at present (in FY 1954 they received $6 million economic assistance; the figure for FY 1955 will be much smaller). The Lebanese would like us to finance a significant portion of the Litani River development project, and they would like large-scale help, for instance, with their road program. An offer of some $10 million for these or similar purposes, over and above our "normal" technical assistance and economic aid, would be a genuine inducement.

3. Like the other Arab states, Lebanon fears that Israel, unless held in check, may some day attempt to expand at Lebanon's expense. The Lebanese fear that Israel some day may attempt by force to establish control over the waters of the Litani River for the benefit of Israel. A Western security guarantee of Lebanon against the possibility of an attack by Israel would remove these fears. A "SEATO-type" guarantee[4] of Lebanon's borders against Israel aggression (and vice versa), conditional upon a Lebanon–Israel peace settlement, would thus constitute an effective inducement.

4. A basic fear in the dominant Christian element in Lebanon is that some day the country may lose its separate identity through absorption into the neighboring Moslem states, particularly Syria. An offer by the Western powers to help maintain somehow the integrity of Lebanon as a separate entity would be most welcome to the dominant Christian element. If the other inducements turn out to be sufficient to persuade Lebanon to undertake a settlement, consideration might be given to the possibility of US-UK-French offers to take steps to maintain Lebanese independence should it be threatened from any quarter. This could take the form of confidential explanations to the Lebanese that the US (or the three powers) will agree to interpret the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 as specifically guaranteeing the integrity of Lebanon. For example, we might offer—conditional on a Lebanon–Israel settlement—to take

[4] Reference is to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed at Manila, September 8, 1954.

action "both within and outside the UN" if the integrity of Lebanon is threatened . . . .

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111. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, June 2, 1955—6:46 p.m.

693. Please make following statement to Israel FonMin leaving with him written memorandum and advising him you acting under instructions your govt:

1. US deplores grave incident which took place in Gaza Strip on night May 30 and regrets casualties. From evidence assembled by UNTSO it appears this incident was started when Egyptian outpost fired on Israel jeep in Israel territory.

2. We have accordingly made strong representations to Egyptians and condemned this type behavior.

3. At same time we cannot exonerate Israel from all responsibility for tragic sequence events which has taken place in Gaza area since reprisal raid of Feb. 28 for which Israel condemned by SC.

4. We have already made clear to Israel FonMin our unalterable opposition to an apparent Israel policy of armed retaliation. We are further concerned at Israel practice of operating patrol vehicles along demarcation line. While such practice might be technically within Israel's sovereign right it is inevitably most provocative in character and indicates complete disregard for necessity of diminishing tensions in area and bringing an end to this bloody cycle of incidents.

5. Facts as we see them clearly belie assertion which we see from time to time among some quarters Israel public opinion that retaliatory raids have effect of reducing border tension. Opposite is the case.

6. USG urgently requests that Israel Defense Forces cease taking actions which are provocative in their effect and cooperate fully with Burns and UNTSO in implementation of practical measures aimed at reduction border tensions. [2]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–255. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bergus; cleared with Ludlow; and approved by Allen, who signed for Hoover. Also sent to London, Paris, Jerusalem, and USUN. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda.

[2] Ambassador Lawson informed the Department on June 3 that he had repeatedly set forth the views transmitted in Department telegram 693 to the Israeli Government; thus, he believed "transmittal Department's statement with heavy concentration criticism on Israel's behavior and with little detail of what is being said to Egyptians would prove counter productive." (Telegram 1021 from Tel Aviv; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–355) The Department responded on June 4 that it wished Lawson to "make it clear that we cannot concur in policy of retaliation" and that the messages to Israel and

London [3] and Paris [4] advise FonOffs of US action and request they take similar steps. USUN convey substance this message UK and French dels and if you think it advisable, UNSYG. [5] Jerusalem inform Burns. [6]

Hoover

Egypt (telegram 2090 to Cairo, June 2, *infra*) should be delivered simultaneously. (Telegram 700 to Tel Aviv; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–455)

[3] See footnote 3, *infra*.

[4] See footnote 4, *infra*.

[5] No record of a reply from the Mission at the United Nations has been found in Department of State files.

[6] See footnote 6, *infra*.

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112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, June 2, 1955—6:46 p.m.

2090. Please make following statement to Egyptian FonMin leaving with him written memorandum and advising him you acting under instructions your govt:

1. The US has followed with the gravest concern the tragic sequence of events along the Gaza frontier since the Israel raid into Gaza on Feb. 28.

2. This Govt supported action in SC condemning Israel for Gaza raid and will continue oppose Israel actions of armed reprisal. At same time both SC and this Govt have strongly urged Egypt to take effective measures to cooperate with UNTSO in maintaining tranquillity along border.

3. Our information is to effect that the major incident which occurred night May 30 commenced when Egyptian outposts fired on Israel jeep in Israel territory. USG is compelled to express to Egyptian Govt in strongest terms fact that failure adopt adequate measures to prevent such behavior is strongly deplored by this Govt. It displays a lack of respect for the armistice agreements.

4. It seems to us that the Egyptian Govt by permitting such behavior in Gaza Strip is forfeiting what was essentially an advantageous position for Egypt in eyes of world opinion. Furthermore, such action adds to risk of open conflict along frontier. In view of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–255. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bergus; cleared with Ludlow; and approved by Allen who signed for Hoover. Also sent to London, Paris, Jerusalem, and USUN. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

publicly expressed policies of Egypt with regard to lack of intent resort to force in her relations with Israel, this Govt fails understand how courting the risk of major hostilities can benefit Egypt or the interest of area peace generally.

5. USG fervently hopes that Egypt will take the strongest measures to impose effective discipline in the territory under her occupation and to cooperate fully with Burns and UNTSO in implementation of practical measures aimed at reduction of border tension. [2]

London [3] and Paris [4] advise FonOffs of US action and request they take similar steps. USUN convey substance this message UK and French dels and if you think it advisable, UNSYG. [5] Jerusalem inform Burns. [6]

Hoover

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[2] Ambassador Byroade reported on June 4 that, pursuant to the Department's instructions contained in telegram 2090, he had handed a memorandum to Foreign Minister Fawzi. (Telegram 1841 from Cairo, June 4; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–455) Byroade forwarded a copy of [illegible]s memorandum to the Department. (Despatch 2254 from Cairo, June 10; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–1055)

[3] On June 3, the Embassy in London gave the British Foreign Office copies of telegram 693 to Tel Aviv and telegram 2090 to Cairo and requested the United Kingdom to take similar action. (Telegram 5296 from London, June 3; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–355)

[4] On June 3, the Embassy in Paris informed the French Foreign Ministry of the Department's instructions contained in telegram 693 to Tel Aviv and telegram 2090 to Cairo and asked the Foreign Office to take similar steps. (Telegram 5334 from Paris, June 4; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–455).

[5] No record of a reply from the Mission at the United Nations has been found in Department of State files.

[6] Cole informed General Burns on June 3 of the contents of telegram 693 to Tel Aviv and telegram 2090 to Cairo. (Telegram 345 from Jerusalem, June 3; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–355)

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113. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, June 2, 1955—7 p.m.

849. Re Palestine in SC. Dixon (UK) called at his request to discuss current Gaza situation. He had no new facts to add to our present knowledge of the situation, but wished to discuss the

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–255. Confidential; Priority. Received at 8:11 p.m.

possibilities of action by the three powers, either in the UN or elsewhere. He expressed some surprise that SYG Hammarskjold had not already asked to meet with the three powers on the situation. One suggestion he put forward was for us to stimulate a meeting with the SYG to consider matters.

Dixon appeared to believe that MAC would censure Egypt for incident of May 30, and fully expected Israel to come to SC seeking endorsement of MAC finding. As possible alternative to awaiting this result, Dixon suggested three powers might summon Egypt and Israel to the SC and, in effect, read the riot act to them. He felt there were certain disadvantages to this, however, such as: (a) forcing parties to take extreme positions; and (b) risking an upset to the progress made thus far by General Burns.

I told Dixon that we agreed things were a little worse than usual, but that we had no specific thoughts on what should be done about it. I told him we would get in touch as soon as we had anything to offer.

It would not seem helpful and might be harmful to have regular session of SC at which Israeli and Egyptians would give a repeat performance.

Likewise unless we have some particular course which we wish to press, it would be preferable not to stimulate a meeting between the Secretary General and the three powers. Our initiative in this matter would make it most difficult to refuse support to any suggestions of the Secretary General which might be contrary to our policy. We can assume that the Secretary General is fully aware of the events in the area and if such a meeting were to be held, the initiative should be his.

One course which would at least have the advantage of novelty and might have some impact would be to have Burns summoned to New York to report fully to a closed session of the SC at which the Egyptians and Israelis would not be present. Burns would be expected to give, as he has given in private to governmental representatives, a frank assessment of the most important elements creating tension. These would undoubtedly include the provocative effect of Israeli patrols practically on the demarcation line and Egyptian failure effectively to prevent infiltration and mining. One meeting of the Council should suffice to hear the report. Burns would return to Jerusalem immediately. The SC could then press for practical measures which would remove the most immediate causes of friction, including perhaps (1) joint patrols, (2) joint mine-clearing, (3) mutual withdrawal to specified distance from the demarcation line, and (4) effective Egyptian control over the troops and population in the Gaza area.

In view of preparations for San Francisco,[2] if the preceding suggestion were to be carried out, we should discuss the proposal without delay with the British and French and the Secretary General. It should not be impossible for Burns to get here by the end of next week.

Department's views requested.[3]

Lodge

[2] Reference is to the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the signing of the U.N. Charter in San Francisco, June 20–26, 1955.

[3] See Document 115.

114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan[1]

Washington, June 3, 1955—7:15 p.m.

517. Johnston reluctantly planning postpone his return Near East formerly scheduled early June. Factors considered include:

(1) Fact Israel position not yet sufficiently clear and discussions still being conducted

(2) Departure King Hussein June 4 for about one month and change Jordanian cabinet[2]

(3) Syrian Foreign Minister Azm expected leave Near East June 15

(4) Absence Mohammed Selim from Near East until first July

Addressees authorized inform Foreign Offices and discuss such of above factors as may appear useful.

Information reaching Johnston and Department indicates several Arab officials suspicious of Johnston's discussions Washington with Israelis and tendency assume negotiations somehow being "conducted behind Arabs' back." Suggest you take early occasion refer to conclusion Beirut discussions when Johnston undertook to present program to Israelis. He did so, and has continued negotiations in effort to obtain satisfactory position.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/6–355. Official Use Only. Drafted by Troxel; cleared with Bergus and Barnes; and approved by Russell who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Cairo, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jidda, London, and Karachi by pouch for Gardiner.

[2] On May 29, King Hussein accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Tawfik al-Huda and asked former Prime Minister Said Mufti to form a new Cabinet.

New target date for Johnston's return tentatively set for July 11 on assumption Israel position meanwhile clarified. Your comments requested.[3]

Dulles

[3] Telegram 437 from Amman, June 7; telegram 1887 from Cairo, June 10; and telegram 1302 from Beirut, June 9, reported that the Jordanian, Egyptian, and Lebanese Governments had been informed of Johnston's decision and had raised no objections. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/6–755, 120.1580/6–1055, and 120.1580/6–955, respectively) The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported on June 10 that it had discussed Johnston's decision the previous day with Herzog, Wiener, and Kollek, who all agreed that if Johnston could not arrive in June, his trip should be delayed so that he would not arrive in Israel until after the July 26 elections. The Embassy concurred in this recommendation. (Telegram 1042 from Tel Aviv, June 10; *ibid.*, 120.1580/5–1055) The Embassy in Jidda commented on June 9 that "SAG generally views Johnston negotiations with unconcern, an attitude we hope will continue. Any change in all probability would be toward unhelpful position." (Telegram 562 from Jidda, June 9; *ibid.*, 120.1580/6–955)

115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, June 4, 1955—12:34 p.m.

718. Re Palestine in SC: Gaza. We suggest re urtel 849 [2] that you take following course of action:

1. In your capacity as President of SC this month you address a letter to members of SC, with copies to Egyptian and Israel Delegations, in which you would make following points: a) you have special responsibility as President of SC to bring to attention of Council members your concern over continued incidents on Gaza border and difficulties being encountered by Chief of Staff of TSO in carrying out Council's unanimous resolution of March 30; b) you are still hopeful resolution will be implemented promptly with full cooperation of Governments of Egypt and Israel; c) if this hope is not realized, however, and General Burns does not receive full cooperation of parties it may be necessary to call Council for specific purpose of considering status of implementation of March 30 resolu-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–255. Confidential. Drafted by Ludlow, cleared with Bergus; and approved by Key, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris.

[2] Document 113.

tion and such further assistance and support to General Burns as may be necessary.

2. Purpose of this letter is to establish priority for Council consideration of Gaza border situation in context of March 30 resolution and Burns' proposals over possible Israeli and Egyptian agenda items which can only produce rehash of previous accusations against each other. Meeting, if called, would be to hear Burns or consider written report from him if necessary, and to culminate in consensus action a) reaffirming March 30 resolution, b) endorsing any new proposals which appear feasible such as Nasser's mutual withdrawal proposal,[3] and c) urging parties, pursuant to March 30 resolution, to meet under aegis of General Burns at higher level than MAC to ensure implementation of March 30 resolution.

3. We urge you advise UK and French Delegations of your proposed action, but believe it not necessary or desirable to obtain their concurrence to proposed letter to Council members.[4]

Dulles

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[3] On June 1, Nasser proposed to General Burns that, as a way to relieve tension in the Gaza area, both the Israelis and Egyptians "could withdraw their troops a kilometer from the demarcation line." Byroade reported that both he and Stevenson urged Burns to consider Nasser's offer of mutual withdrawal. Burns had indicated his willingness to pursue the matter but believed the Israelis would not accept such a proposal. (Telegram 1827 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–155)

[4] For text of Ambassador Lodge's letter of June 7 as President of the Security Council to the members of the Council, see U.N. doc. S/3406. In this communication, Lodge voiced his concerns about the situation along the Gaza demarcation line and the difficulties encountered by General Burns in carrying out the Security Council resolution of March 30. The Mission at the United Nations transmitted the text of this letter on June 7 to the Department in telegram 862. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–755)

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116. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State[1]

Cairo, June 6, 1955—2 p.m.

1855. Following reference Gaza.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–655. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:11 p.m. Repeated priority to London, Tel Aviv, Paris, Jerusalem, and USUN.

1. Counselor this morning made démarche Department's 2108, [2] June 4 to Director Political Section Egyptian Foreign Office since Fawzi unavailable and Embassy wished close coordination reference timing approaches of US, UK and France (Embassy telegram 1850, June 5 [3]). Director promised inform Fawzi at once. He said he hoped Israel would take seriously Nasser's statement June 4 (Embassy telegram 1847 [4]); there should be no doubt reference consequences of Israelis' attack against Arab territory. He mentioned also assurances of support for Egypt received recently from Arab Governments (Embassy telegram 1854 [5]).

2. French Ambassador saw Fawzi this morning. [6]

3. Stevenson pressed Nasser last night to agree to "high level" meeting at least at Chief-of-Staff level. He found Nasser in bitter and disappointed frame of mind. Nasser complained to him that US memorandum put all blame on Egypt and condemned her for events May 30th even though these had not been considered by MAC. He referred to new "Israeli attack" with heavy weapons June 5 (Embassy telegram 1854). Nasser repeated to Stevenson his statement to Burns (Embassy telegram 1827 [7]) that he felt personally responsible casualties resulting from original Gaza incident because he had encouraged troops to believe there would be no Israeli attack.

Stevenson assured Nasser that "we are not blaming Egypt as much as Israel". However, UN observer had seen Egyptian fire first shot and mining highly provocative. In any case objective all concerned must be to reduce tension. Long argument then followed reference "high level" meeting. Nasser contended that if GOE agreed

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[2] The Department informed Byroade and Lawson that their British counterparts had received instructions to make démarches similar to those outlined in Documents 111 and 112. It instructed them to concert with their British and French colleagues in both capitals to press the Egyptians to agree to high-level talks and to urge on Israel the dangers of rejecting practical proposals such as joint patrols and withdrawal of troops. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–455)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–555)

[4] Byroade reported on June 4 that the Egyptian press was featuring stories that General Burns had warned Nasser of the seriousness of the Gaza situation and had expressed his fear to Nasser that the "Israelis would attempt occupy Gaza Strip." Nasser was reported to have replied that, "If such an attempt should be made it will have no other meaning than renewal of the war." (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–455)

[5] The Embassy in Cairo on June 6 reported that statements from Jordanian, Lebanese, and Iraqi officials supporting Egypt in the event of an Israeli attempt to seize the Gaza Strip had appeared in the Egyptian press. The Embassy also summarized press stories alleging new Israeli attacks along the Gaza Strip demarcation line. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–655)

[6] Ambassador Byroade reported on June 7 that his French colleague, Comte Armand de Blanquet du Chayla, had met with Fawzi the previous morning, and that the session "had not been particularly productive" because Fawzi had merely repeated Nasser's statement to Stevenson that a meeting with the Israelis at the Minister of War level was impossible. (Telegram 1859 from Cairo; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–755)

[7] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–155)

to meeting Ben-Gurion would take this as proof of the rightness of his aggressive policy. Stevenson tried disabuse Nasser of this idea; said talks would strengthen hand of Sharett and moderates. Nasser finally consented think over idea of talks carefully. In his telegram to British Foreign Office Stevenson expressed view that only basis on which Nasser likely agree to talks is if Burns convokes meeting and invites Egyptian and Israeli Chiefs of Staff to come to discuss with him proposals to reduce border tensions.

Byroade

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117. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, June 6, 1955.

I spent Sunday afternoon [2] sitting on Dick Richards' porch in South Carolina to put down a possible move in the Near East situation. As suggested, this would constitute a memorandum along the lines of the attached which presumably would be transmitted by the US and the UK jointly (although the US could do it alone) to the Governments of Israel and the neighboring Arab States, i.e., Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. It would presumably be made public shortly after transmittal.

This memorandum was dictated purely from memory as I did not have before me any of the Alpha or other relevant papers and no doubt needs a good deal of technical perfecting. However, this will serve to illustrate my idea of a possible approach which we can consider and accept or reject, or accept with modifications as may seem wise.

I would like to have your thoughts on this paper for our meeting on Alpha which I understand has been set up for Wednesday afternoon at 4 p.m. [3]

JFD

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 4. Top Secret. Addressed also to Murphy, Jernegan, and Russell.

[2] June 5.

[3] This meeting took place on June 8; see Document 120.

Attachment

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

I.

The United States and the United Kingdom believe that the time has come to explore the possibilities of promoting conditions of peace and prosperity in Israel and the neighboring Arab countries. In that area the opportunities of the people are tragically shrunken by the aftermath of the hostilities of 1947[4] (?).[5] The large-scale fighting of that year was brought to a close by armistices negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. But there is no genuine peace and armed clashes are a frequent occurrence. The lines as defined by the armistices are in many respects artificial. They sometimes unnaturally separate homes and villages from their appurtenant gardens and wells. They deny direct land contact from Egypt with other Arab States. Water rights are ill-defined and legal uncertainties under the armistices prevent the maximum development of precious water in those arid lands. Economic relations between Israel and neighboring states are negligible and Israel has only uncertain use of the Suez Canal. The Arab refugees, numbering some 600,000(?), are still living in refugee settlements of the most primitive character and their lives depend precariously upon charity. No adequate compensation has been made for the homes and possessions of which the refugees have been deprived in Israel.

Jerusalem, containing the Holy places of three great religions, each of which teaches love, is a vortex of hatred; and pilgrims from all over the world are denied adequate access to the places they revere.

But over and above all this there is fear that relations will further deteriorate. The Arabs fear lest Israel seek violently to expand at their expense. The Israelis fear that the Arabs will gradually marshal superior forces to be used eventually to drive them into the sea. This fear hangs like a pall over the Arab and Israeli people. It leads to military preparations which drain the already poor economies of the countries concerned.

The fear on both sides is so great that other countries which would aid both Israel and the neighboring Arab States find it difficult to do so without attracting the animosity of those whom they would befriend in a spirit of impartiality. Thus, an area of vast cultural and strategic value is so weakened by strains and stresses

[4] Hostilities in Palestine began in May 1948.

[5] This and subsequent question marks appear in the source text.

between its component parts that it could readily fall prey to aggression from without.

Surely it lies within the capacity of the statesmanship, within and without the area concerned, to better this situation.

The United States and the United Kingdom see possibilities of a happier condition. This condition we outline in the hope that its manifest advantages to all concerned will come to be appreciated and bring about the concurrent efforts needed for its achievement.

II.

1. The boundaries as fixed by the armistices should be rectified and as so rectified accepted as permanent. This recommendation would not appreciably alter the usable area of Israel or impair its strategic or economic assets. It would do away with local causes of frictions which have no adequate justification.

In addition to local adjustments, Egypt should have sovereignty over a triangular portion of the Negeb area as is appropriate to assure it direct territorial contact with Saudi Arabia or with Jordan. This Egyptian triangle would be selected from land without agricultural or mineral value and presently unsettled. There is ample land in the Negeb which meets these specifications.

Since, however, Israel should also have contact with the port of _____,[6] there will inevitably be a point of Egypt and Israel crossing at the Eastern apex of the Egyptian triangle. There, the sovereignty of one will have to be in terms of an overpass and the sovereignty of the other in terms of an underpass.

2. The permanent boundaries between Israel and the Arab States should be internationally guaranteed, preferably under United Nations auspices, so that neither the Arabs nor the Israelis need henceforth fear a forcible change of boundary at their expense and so that both Arabs and Israelis may henceforth devote their efforts to causes more productive than preparations for possible war against each other.

3. Funds should be provided by Israel to permit the resettlement of the Arab refugees, chiefly in Arab territory. These funds will represent just compensation by Israel for the properties of Arabs which have been taken, so far without such compensation.

4. Resettlement is not merely a question of money but of creating additional permanent means of livelihood. This, in turn, requires more irrigated land. A first step in this direction would be the "Johnson" plan which already has been negotiated to a point of near acceptability to all the parties concerned.

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[6] Dulles failed to indicate the port in question.

The compensation fund above referred to should be primarily used, and should be supplemented, to make up the funds required to develop additional water for the irrigation of land in those countries which contribute to the solution here envisioned.

5. The portion of Jerusalem which principally contains the Holy places should be vested in an international body which will be an organ of the United Nations. It will maintain the Holy places and guarantee equal access to pilgrims of Jewish, Moslem and Christian faiths.

6. The Suez Canal will be open to Israeli flag traffic on the same terms as the traffic of other nations, as called for by the United Nations Security Council Resolution of _____, 1954.[7]

III.

In the event that Israel and any one or more of her Arab neighbors desire to proceed on the basis of the foregoing principles, insofar as applicable to them, the United States and the United Kingdom would be willing to contribute to bring about the acceptance and implementation of these principles. They would:

1. Lend their good offices to facilitate a direct exchange of views between the parties concerned or an exchange of views through themselves or other acceptable intermediaries.

2. Join in giving firm guarantees of the new permanent boundaries as against future changes by force.

3. Advance to the State of Israel funds to assist in making compensation to the refugees for the property taken, and thus facilitate their permanent resettlement.

4. Make financial advances to Israel and to participating Arab States directly or through the United Nations, so as to permit water development which will increase the arable land of participating nations of the area.

The measures enumerated in Points 2 to 4, inclusive, depend upon parliamentary approvals which would be sought.

IV.

The program here outlined will serve, and will strengthen, each of the Near East nations individually; and the aggregate result will be to end a threat to world peace. The processes will deprive no nation of any rights, since renunciation of force in international relations is already required by the Charter of the United Nations.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom would be pleased to receive in due course any observations from the

[7] Reference is to the U.N. Security Council resolution adopted on September 1, 1951.

governments concerned on the point of view set forth in this memorandum.

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118. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, June 7, 1955—4 p.m.

1034. I met with Prime Minister at noon yesterday in his office in Tel Aviv (Embtel 1028) [2] and handed him memorandum transmitted Deptel 693. In subsequent oral conversation I emphasized to him that our representations to Egypt were stated strongly and dealt with specific measures required by Egypt to bring the Gaza strip situation under control. Secondly, I informed him that we were pressing GOE to agree to high level talks, adding that the British and French were taking similar measures (Deptel 699). With reference to Deptel 700 I reminded Sharett distinctly that the tripartite declaration applies to armistice lines as well as to frontiers.

The Prime Minister read the memorandum and although apparently taking the final paragraphs most seriously, made no comment until he had finished reading and I had completed my statements as indicated above. He then said he would like to give me his reactions in a completely friendly manner and with full appreciation of the promptness with which the US Government had made representations to GOE and informed him of those actions.

His first comment referred to paragraph three Deptel 693. He said with regard to the tragic sequence of events since February 28, he must point out that the initial action in every case had been taken "by the other side"—that every cycle of trouble had been started by Egypt. He also reiterated his previous arguments to the effect that, while opinions may differ regarding Israel's use of patrols, there was no justification whatever for Egypt to follow its program of persistent firing on those patrols.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–755. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:31 p.m. Repeated to Cairo and London.

[2] Ambassador Lawson reported on June 6 that he had met with Prime Minister Sharett that day and had conveyed to him the message transmitted in telegram 693 to Tel Aviv (Document 111) as well as the Department's other comments suggested in telegrams 699 (same as 1850 to Cairo; see footnote 3, Document 116) and 700 to Tel Aviv (see footnote 2, Document 111). (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–655)

Regarding high level talks and cooperation with UNTSO, he said he was planning to talk with General Burns the following morning. He underlined the fact that Egypt had not yet replied to Burns' invitation to a joint high level meeting, which invitation the GOI had accepted immediately. He then raised certain objections to the new conditions which had been introduced in connection with the proposed talks as reported to him by General Burns. He was especially critical of Nasser's insistence that high level (military) talks must be premised on prior acceptance by GOI of Nasser's proposal for a demilitarized zone.[3] He remarked that the theory of demilitarized zones had been proven generally in practice as ineffective and a source of continuing trouble. He spoke at some length on the inequities of the proposal as viewed by Israel, pointed out that infiltration was solely an Egyptian action as Israel did not practice it. He said, "we do not infiltrate into Gaza. The infiltrators come from Gaza and although the situation has improved in that respect and it is not the major problem now, the demilitarized zone proposal would recreate this problem in a very serious manner. Thus, the emphasis would be shifted from the present military problem to that of infiltration". With regard to both infiltration but especially military actions by persons in Gaza, he said "we do not say our irregulars or unknown persons perpetrate these actions. Quite the contrary. We decided, as in a recent incident, who was responsible. The Egyptians say they cannot be responsible for some of these actions. In the latest Burns–Nasser talk, Nasser admitted that Egyptian troops had opened fire but repudiated responsibility for mine laying, saying he did not know who did it. We do not say this. In the face of mutual evacuation, therefore, it could not be the same for Israel as for Egypt; Egypt will not be prevented from using irregulars, and this is of no small danger from Israel's viewpoint". He also said, "to evacuate troops from the area would leave the ground free for marauding, theft, pillaging and other incidents. The presence of troops prevents that. Any suggestion to Israel to accept the withdrawal of troops proposal unconditionally would seem to betray a lack of familiarity with the problem and could lead to one-sidedly grave effects".

I suggested that joint patrols could supply the necessary controls in the evacuated areas. He gave no convincing reply to that point

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[3] Reference is to a proposal which Nasser made to Burns on June 1 and Burns conveyed to the Israelis the following day for withdrawal of all Egyptian and Israeli troops from a zone one half or one kilometer wide on both sides of the line of demarcation. (Telegram 346 from Jerusalem, June 3; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–355) Byroade reported on June 5 that Fawzi had told Stevenson the previous day that the Egyptians were willing to conduct high-level talks with the Israelis if they accepted this proposal. (Telegram 1850 from Cairo, June 5; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–555)

and after an exchange of arguments and comment, he admitted that this point could be considered at any joint high level meeting eventually set up. I also suggested that GOI's initial lack of enthusiasm for the "no man's land" plan was to a considerable extent due to the fact that the plan was advanced by Nasser. He then inquired whether the present reaction to the plan might be substantially improved if the project were presented formally by General Burns. (Sharett had previously advanced claim that Egypt was clearly the aggressor and was now seeking its reward for aggression by presenting this plan and Israel could not accept such dictation "at the point of a bayonet".) The reply to my question was non-committal but it was clear that he saw the point. I took this opportunity to again emphasize the very substantial progress which would be made if a high level military meeting, without any prior rejections or prior acceptances of conditions applying to subjects which might be discussed at such meetings, could be arranged.

At the close of our conversations, which were conducted pleasantly and in a relaxed atmosphere, we summed up our understandings as described above and it was agreed that I would report back to Washington that Sharett had no objections to a high level military meeting and would make no advance rejection of any concrete proposals prior to such meeting. This understanding with Sharett was arrived at, however, only after I had urged him not to fake [*make?*] a categorical rejection of the proposal for a "no man's land", pointing out that such action would be as open to criticism as was Nasser's demand for a categorical acceptance by Israel of his plan—a condition to which Sharett had strongly objected.

Comment: I was unable to determine whether Sharett was reflecting directly the sense of the Cabinet meeting held on Sunday,[4] which is reported to have considered the Gaza situation. This seems likely although no firm or formal decision may have been made at that meeting. When I left him, I again reminded him that there should be no rejection of any proposal prior to the talks and he confirmed my understanding. Herzog of Foreign Office, who was present during the conversation, undertook to again stress to the Prime Minister the visible disadvantages to Israel of a rejection of the demilitarized zone plan prior to the high level meeting.

However, some afternoon papers carried stories that the GOI had rejected the demilitarized zone plan. Later in the day I talked to Herzog about these stories and he assured me that they had no authorized basis but that they would add a new factor and that Prime Minister had commented to him that every effort should be

[4] June 5.

made to speed up the high level meeting. The Prime Minister would take this line with General Burns in his conversation today.

Lawson

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119. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, June 8, 1955—10 a.m.

351. When General Burns brought message my telegram 171 to Cairo [2] he also handed me text his telegram to UNSYG reporting his conversation June 7 with Sharett. Paraphrase follows:

Begin Paraphrase:

Sharett viewed as encouraging Egypt's agreement have senior officer discuss Nasser's proposal for creation neutral zone through withdrawal military each side DL. Although not agreeing beforehand to proposal, he said Israel is prepared enter into discussions and Egypt should also be ready discuss Burns' four points. Sharett perceived various objections to neutral zone idea, which he discussed at some length. He showed interest in obtaining Burns' impressions as to whether Nasser in fact sought establish peaceful conditions Gaza area or desired continue trouble there for some purpose of his own. Burns explained Nasser's problems in respect enforcement strict orders with regard opening fire in view incidents subsequent to May 28 as well as incident of that date itself, but said he thought Nasser really desired peace. According Sharett, Israel desired that Agenda for talks should include any other proposal respecting improvement security and lessening tensions area which either party may bring forward. Message ends with text Burns' telegram to Fawzi as given my telegram 171 to Cairo.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–855. Confidential; Priority. Received at 10 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and USUN.

[2] General Burns asked Cole on June 7 to transmit a message to Fawzi saying that Sharett had told Burns the morning of June 7 that Israel was prepared to appoint a general officer to meet an Egyptian of similar rank to consider Nasser's proposal to withdraw each other's armed forces one kilometer away from the Gaza Strip demarcation line. (Telegram 350 from Jerusalem; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–755) Byroade delivered Burns' message to the Egyptian Foreign Office on June 8. (Telegram 1864 from Cairo, June 8; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–855)

End Paraphrase.

In discussing above Burns said Sharett had objected to setting up neutral zone on grounds that it would increase possibilities for infiltration. Burns pointed out that conclusion of a local commanders agreement allowing police operate in neutral zone should overcome that objection. Sharett alluded to Egyptian reservations about such an agreement. In view their objections direct telephone contact he felt such an agreement would prove ineffectual. Burns replied that Egyptians have recently modified their stand and have indicated to him that they might accept some form of quasi-direct communications possibly handled through UNTSO personnel Gaza area. He also told Sharett, in reply to some comment of latter, that Egyptians now more favorably inclined his proposal about erection barbed wire barrier, not on frontier perhaps but possibly small distance their side of boundary.

In reply to my inquiry, Burns agreed that choice Egyptian Chief of Staff or other ranking military figure represent Egypt at prospective high-level talks was not ideal and that matter might better be handled by civilian officials. In his view, however, Egypt will not agree to send civilian. He strongly recommended as practical matter acquiescing Egyptians wishes on this point. He hoped Dayan might prove fairly reasonable, assuming he would be Israel's representative. Burns concurred heartily substance last sentence Cairo's telegram 1850, June 5 to Department, [3] expressing hope Sharett's agreement to discuss neutral zone proposal would suffice to pave way for meeting.

Adverting Burns' earlier views as presented my telegram 328, [4] which was drafted (reference London's 5257 to Department [5]) on basis written notes made while Burns was speaking, I asked him whether he is now more optimistic about value high-level talks. Burns replied that introduction idea of buffer zone constituted a new element which he thought merited such consideration, while Egyptian offer send ranking officer had of course changed entire situation.

Cole

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[3] Burns subscribed to Byroade's observation that the joint U.S.-U.K.-French démarches to the Egyptian Government contemplated in Department telegram 2108 (see footnote 2, Document 116) "should be aimed at getting GOE to permit Chief of Staff to attend in any case." (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–555)

[4] Document 102.

[5] The Embassy in London, in telegram 5257, June 1, informed the Department that the British Foreign Office had received a report from the British Consul General at Jerusalem to the effect that "views of Burns on high level talks are not so much that need for such talks no longer exists (Jerusalem's 328, May 21) as that Burns personally feels he has done all he can and next move is up to tripartite powers." (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–555)

120. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 8, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Steps to Launch Alpha

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Assistant Secretary Allen
Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Director-General of the Foreign Service
Mr. Francis H. Russell
Mr. Robert L. Burns, S/S–RO

Mr. Russell gave a review of recent developments bearing on Alpha. He said the Israel Ambassador to London had informed the Foreign Office that Israel was discontinuing its efforts to obtain a security guarantee from the UK and was going to concentrate on getting it from the US. [2] Ambassador Eban had just informed Mr. Allen that the Israel Government desires immediate discussions with the Department on a security treaty, with simultaneous talks confined to the issues of refugee compensation and the Arab blockade. [3]

With respect to the Secretary's memo of June 6 [4] proposing memoranda setting forth the general principles of the Alpha proposals to Israel and the Arab states, to be made public shortly thereafter, Mr. Russell said that our Missions in Cairo, Amman and Beirut, in response to a Department telegram sent May 28 [5] suggesting a US–UK announcement of settlement proposals, had given their opinion that such a step would hurt Alpha prospects. The British had also expressed their opposition to such a step until secret negotiations had been fully tried. [6]

Mr. Russell suggested as steps to advance Alpha: Departmental approval of the Alpha summary (memo to the Secretary of May 18 [7]); authorization for Byroade to offer US financial help on the High Aswan Dam; a telegram to Byroade instructing him to raise Alpha with Nasser within the next few weeks; preparing Mallory

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 4. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell on June 9.

[2] The British Embassy provided Russell with this information on June 6. (Memorandum from Russell to Allen and Jernegan, June 6; *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after 2d London Talks—Apr. 26–June 30, '55)

[3] Memorandum of conversation, by Bergus, June 8, not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/6–855)

[4] Attached to Document 117.

[5] Document 109.

[6] See footnote 3, Document 109.

[7] Attached to Document 106.

and Heath to broach Alpha to the Jordanian and Lebanese Governments in the event that Nasser refused cooperation (possibly linking area defense steps with Alpha as suggested in Mr. Russell's memo to the Secretary of June 2 [8]); and the preparation of a public statement on Alpha which would be ready for use in the event all of the above efforts failed. Mr. Russell said that such a schedule would give Eric Johnston another month within which to make a final effort to negotiate agreement on the Jordan Valley Plan.

The Secretary cautioned against revealing any of the details of the Alpha plan to Nasser or any of the other governments. He said that any approach should be only in the form of suggesting the general principles on which a settlement might be based. Any mention of specific amounts—such as the amount of compensation to be paid to the refugees, or the amount of economic aid that would be forthcoming as a result of a settlement—would be unwise, as any figure which might be mentioned would be regarded by the parties only as a starting point for bargaining. Mr. Russell said that the figures contained in the Alpha documents were regarded by both the British and us as our concept of final figures, and that any early negotiations would have to take that into account.

The Secretary went on to say that he believed a public statement of Alpha, either in the form of memoranda to the interested governments or a speech which he might give, would be preferable to secret negotiations. He said he believed the prospects of success through secret negotiations were slight; the result of pursuing them further might be either a long delay through waiting for the proper moment to arrive or a turn-down. If any success is to be achieved it must be this year, as the whole subject of Israel-Arab relations will be a political football in 1956. This would undo the improvement in our relations with most of the states in the area during the past two years. If we approach the states through secret negotiations and are turned down, any subsequent public enunciation of Alpha would be regarded by them as an effort to coerce them into doing something which they had already refused to do. On the other hand, a public statement of Alpha objectives and principles must appeal to the good judgment of all concerned. There might be immediate negative responses but both Israel and Arab public opinion would, on second thought, realize that there were great advantages to both sides. World opinion, too, should rally to its support.

There was some discussion about the probable grounds that would be advanced by Israelis or Arabs for refusing the plan. The Secretary said that he felt that the objections were so weak that they could be overcome. The Secretary pointed out that there had been

[8] Document 110.

an initial negative reaction in the case of Trieste but that a settlement was eventually achieved. Mr. Hare said that the Arabs would be nonplussed at first but that certain points in the Alpha plan would have obvious attraction for them. The Secretary said that the situation in the area is deteriorating and that it is difficult to see how the parties could feel there was any alternative to an Alpha approach.

Mr. Russell suggested that the possible disadvantage of initial secret negotiations which the Secretary had mentioned, i.e., that it would make difficult a subsequent public statement if they had previously expressed their opposition, might be overcome by our saying in our confidential presentation that we were planning on presenting our proposals publicly but wished first to have their reaction and, hopefully, their cooperation. Mr. Allen said that he felt there were disadvantages to starting off with a public statement. For example, it would harden Israel and American Jewish opinion against any border alterations. The Secretary replied that any public proposals on borders should be a general statement of principles, such as the suggestion of triangles with over- and under-passes, leaving it to the parties to negotiate their location and size.

The Secretary reiterated that he did not think there was any chance of secret negotiations bringing any positive result within the present year. If the Department does not have an established position on the Israel-Arab issue by the end of this year, both political parties will take extreme positions in the elections, which would result in the loss of the Arab world to the West.

Mr. Allen suggested that we might first seek a settlement between Israel and Lebanon. The Under Secretary said that there is not time at our disposal for the snowballing effect which we would hope such an approach might produce. Mr. Hare pointed out that such an approach would require us to make a "client state" of Lebanon, since she would become immediately the object of political and economic pressures by the other Arab states.

The Secretary asked that a draft public statement of the Alpha proposals be prepared [9] which he would discuss with Macmillan in

[9] On June 15, Russell sent the Secretary, under cover of a memorandum, a draft public statement on Alpha which he could use in his discussions with Macmillan. (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 4)

New York next week. He asked that Byroade be instructed to defer any approach to Nasser. [10]

[10] Byroade was so instructed on June 9 in telegram 2133 to Cairo, not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/6–855) Byroade did not receive the message, however, until after he saw Nasser the morning of June 9 and discussed Alpha with him. Byroade commented: "It very clear from discussion that followed that in present state of tension at Gaza cannot expect serious talks regarding Alpha. He [Nasser] agreed to value of planning better future relations even under present circumstances, but unwilling proceed at present." (Telegram 1878 from Cairo, June 9; *ibid.*, 684A.86/6–955) See also *infra* and Document 122. Russell informed the Secretary of these developments in a memorandum dated June 7. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after 2d London Talks—Apr. 26–June 30, '55)

121. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 8/9, 1955—midnight.

1871. Called upon Fawzi tonight at my request to urge early acceptance proposition by Burns contained Jerusalem telegram 171 to Cairo. [2]

Fawzi most cordial and talkative. Stated they would not be "inactive" re Burns message. He meeting late tonight with advisers and then Nasser. Council of Ministers apparently also meeting tonight.

I stated as I familiar with Burns message because use our communications I felt it incumbent upon me urge early positive response. Message after all indicated Israelis had abandoned Foreign Office participation and it seemed clear political subjects would not be involved. Also "Generals" were specified which ruled out Ben Gurion participation. Message clearly states Israelis willing talk about Nasser's proposal and would seem to indicate even joint patrols might be discussed.

Fawzi said he glad I had come and he would pass along my feeling acceptance best for Egypt re Burns use our channels and memo handed me earlier today (my telegram 1865 [3]) wished say he

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–855. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:04 a.m., June 9. Also sent priority to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Repeated to London, Paris, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and Jidda. Passed to USUN.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 119.

[3] Telegram 1865 transmitted the text of a June 8 memorandum from the Egyptian Foreign Office replying to an Embassy memorandum of June 4 (sent in accordance

convinced US not up to any underhand or partial attitude this situation as continuation present dangerous drift not in US interest. He hopeful as to Egypt's decision.

One matter of concern to him (which I was fearful would be the case) was specific reference to "one kilometer" withdrawal. He reiterated that what Nasser had suggested was principle of "no-mans-land" without prejudging specific lines. I told him I thought Egypt would have logical position if they took this attitude in conference. It clear however they worried about this as Fawzi said he made this point clear in his last conversation with Burns and wondered why specific distance still retained by him.

As to representatives, he said repeated reference "level" rather amazing. They prepared pick man of ability who could speak for GOE and this should be adequate. I urged, nevertheless, that they meet stipulated rank of General. He said thought they could, but smiled and said after all Prime Minister was only Lieutenant Colonel.

My net impression is that Fawzi will try hard for acceptance. He seems worried about agenda which I cautioned they not quibble about in view Burns' message.

Following above subject, had general foreign policy exchange which was most encouraging since my arrival. As am seeing Nasser tomorrow will withhold report until see nature that meeting. [4]

Byroade

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with the instructions in Document 112). The Egyptian memorandum declared that Israel was "obstructing, under flimsy pretexts, all proposals aiming at easing border tension" while Egypt was implementing them. It concluded: "In view of what precedes, the Egyptian Govt deprecates the assumption made in the memo in question that it lacks respect for the Armistice Agreement and wishes to trust that the Govt of the United States will in future desist from leveling at the Govt of Egypt such free accusations or to couch its communications in terms which are hardly becoming to the best traditions of internatl parlance." (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–855)

[4] See footnote 10, Document 120.

122. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 9, 1955—7 p.m.

1880. Nasser told me this morning he would not accept meeting with Israelis at "high level". He would accept meeting based upon Burns' recent message (Jerusalem's 171 to Cairo) [2] but only with Lt. Col. Gohar representing Egypt. Gohar was his most qualified man and he would give him authority to commit Government of Egypt. Israelis could not dictate whom he must choose to put in position of such responsibility and he would not let Ben Gurion's attempt to do so at point of gun succeed. He and whole Arab world familiar with tactics of Israelis over past several years to attempt shoot their way into such talks. He would not place himself in eyes of his army, Egypt and Arab world in light of having been forced to accept such talks by threat of force. He furthermore would not allow Israelis who believe this best tactic dealing with Arabs to be able to propagandize to his humiliation that their tactics had succeeded.

Used every argument I could think of to cause him to change his mind. Pointed out apparent concessions made by Israel in latest Burns message. Consequences of Egypt's refusal, however strongly he might feel on these matters, were certain not to be in Egypt's advantage. Regardless of instructions I might be given, I could not have used more forceful language in trying to convince him he must meet stipulation of "General" officer. Do not believe I succeeded. While to me his logic unassailable and feelings perhaps can be forgiven, greatly fear consequences of such a reply from Egypt. If it proves anything it should be one more evidence that Israeli tactics of dealing with Arabs are not correct and lead to greater intransigence on Arab side.

If Egypt's answer to Burns is along expected lines my first thought is that we should at least try persuade Israelis to cooperate in meeting with designated representative of Egyptian Government regardless of rank. Realize this may be impossible present situation in Israel, but it seems to me that there enough logic in Egypt's position to cause effort to be made. I see no possibility of convincing Nasser that Israeli position is not merely irrelevant attempt to gain political advantage at his expense. Furthermore, while Israeli position

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–955. Secret; Niact. Received at 6:52 p.m. Repeated priority to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Beirut, Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, Ankara, and USUN.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 119.

may be politically understandable from their domestic viewpoint, do not believe it can be sustained as essential to success of talks. [3]

Byroade

[3] The Embassy in Cairo reported on June 10 that Lieutenant Colonel Gohar had been instructed to deliver the following message to General Burns: 1) Egypt was willing to conduct high-level talks with Israel to consider Burns' four proposals regarding steps to preserve security around the Gaza Strip and to examine Egypt's proposal for the establishment of a neutral zone along the demarcation line, and 2) the ranking Egyptian representative at these sessions was to be Lieutenant Colonel Gohar. (Telegram 1889 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1055)

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123. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 9, 1955—9 p.m.

1881. No Distribution Outside Department. Met with Nasser at Presidency for lengthy meeting this morning. Found him friendly and apparently endeavoring to correct impressions of strain last meeting. He said we might have to disagree but he never again wished to have strained relations with me personally.

Despite friendly atmosphere conversation disturbing. Because of urgency report re Gaza situation sent separately. [2] Remainder of summary follows in three sections.

I.

Nasser and I were able to agree upon general policy objectives in Middle East. He wishes Middle East spared from Communism and wants to see adequate defense against Russian overt or covert activity. He wishes build stronger Egypt and does not wish war with Israel which may mean his destruction and stoppage his plans for a better Egypt. On tactics we could not agree and I told him frankly Egypt's position today was one of spreading disruption throughout Middle East. . . . Continuation of bad relations between Egypt and Iraq benefited no one. If he felt he in stronger bargaining position as regards the West with a block of Arab states behind him, he

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–955. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 12:24 a.m., June 10.

[2] See *supra*.

basically wrong. . . . He stated he did not know honestly whether ESS pact would ever be accomplished. He agreed situation in Syria dangerous. He agreed with long range dangers of Egypt's policy but stated we seemed to ignore his short range dangers re Israel. Re Egypt–Iraq relations, he had suffered extreme insult while at Bandung to receive letter from Iraqis quoting "conditions" he must meet for them to stop Radio Free Egypt. He did not start either this series or the present tenseness with Israel. He would not be humiliated either by Israel or Iraq.

II.

Nasser repeated to me his feeling of personal guilt at deaths of his soldiers in Gaza. He had been led by Israeli contacts and to some extent by US into complacency that Israel really wanted a settlement. He had ended Hakim American [*Hakim Amer's*] funds for army. He had himself told officers that he believed there was good chance of making better arrangements with Israel and that he was taking funds from military for economic development. Under these conditions the Gaza February 28 raid left him in almost impossible position. He would not and could not issue orders that troops could not defend themselves if they had reason to believe approaching Israeli vehicles were intent upon attack. It was for this reason he said that he had suggested separating the troops.

Nasser spoke with discouragement of his belief during past three years that military equipment could be obtained from the US. Realized he had not been willing to sign military aid agreement but could not understand why we unable to increase economic aid funds or take some other measure which would allow Egypt be able to purchase equipment from us with its own funds. This after all was what happened with Israel. She had obtained funds from the US, Germany and elsewhere which enabled her to buy equipment to keep her armed forces in top condition. He stated that as a matter of principle as contrasted to available funds he was able to buy equipment from every nation except the US. He had concluded that he should accept Russia's offer of military equipment and plans to send a mission there next week. I responded that surely he would not put himself in a position of depending upon Soviet spare parts and ammunition and that he must realize the long range implications of such a move. Refuted his contention that he had been denied right of purchase US arms but even so he had stated could buy from Britain, France, etc., so why turn to Russia? He replied that in his view if Israel really started a war the Western powers would again boycott the Arab world as they did before, but still let Israel obtain equipment. Although Russian motive undoubtedly dangerous in long

run to Middle East, Russians at least would not blockade Arab world attempt to get arms. Department can imagine my response to stupidity of his position. It included, however, categorical statement that if Israel started war, US would not embargo Arab states and leave Israel free to obtain support. (In this connection, heard yesterday Nasser had received report from Hussein stating his view US would not act under tripartite declaration if major aggression started by Israel. This is only rumor here but if true this may be cause of Nasser's mood.) It only logical for any reader this message consider this aspect of conversation attempt by Nasser to threaten us into supplying equipment. Do not believe this the case. He speaking his conclusions and convictions however illogical and dangerous they may appear to us.

In this connection was approached last week through indirect channels as to whether US policy prohibited Egypt buying any arms from America. Did not choose to give reply through channel used. Last night Fawzi talked to me at some length about problem, stating Nasser really wished to know our position. I reviewed history of matter over last three years. He said, nevertheless, would I find out now whether Egypt could now purchase under previously signed 408E agreement.[3] We understood there would be limitations upon amount and type. Nevertheless, as matter of principle, he thought it important that they know.

Nasser today took position we had denied purchase of equipment by Egypt. I told him I thought this was not correct. He asked if I would determine Washington policy. I reminded him of recent approval of British equipment and asked what specifically he had in mind. He said he could not go into types and quantities at the moment but merely wished principle defined. I told him types and quantities might well affect the principle. He said he not thinking in big terms but wished to know whether under present conditions we would deny Egypt the right of purchase.

Regret putting this question to Department under present conditions but felt I could not refuse Nasser's request that I ascertain Washington's views. If he has large amounts equipment in mind, suppose both US policy and Egyptian financial status would prohibit. On other hand, if he thinking of modest expenditure which would not really affect situation would regret outright refusal in principle which would only drive him to deeper gloom and feeling

[3] On December 9 and 10, 1952, Prime Minister of Egypt at that time, General Mohammed Naguib, and then U.S. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, exchanged formal notes to bring into force a Mutual Defense Assistance Understanding under Section 408 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (64 Stat. 373) and the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 373). For texts of these notes, see TIAS No. 3565, printed in 7 UST 844.

we really with Israel when the chips are down. Request instructions. [4]

III.

While this may sound inconsistent, Nasser talked with sincerity of his desire to be friends with America. He felt it still possible and that we should continue talking until we see whether something might evolve that could get us back in step. He took my extremely strong criticism Egypt's policies calmly and without sign of hostility but gave impression of person fully convinced he acting in best short range interests of Egypt. At present moment it clear he would pull down temple on top of regime rather than suffer what he considers humiliation and pressures upon him, particularly from Israel. This is indeed a dangerous and most unfortunate situation, particularly as I completely convinced there no desire here to have war with Israel.

Can only hope this talk may produce some moderation. Can conceive of no pressure that will have desired effect upon Nasser. Believe only power we have is one of persuasion and personal contact which shall try do utmost. Difficulty in dealings with this fellow is that he honestly agrees with our criticism and dangers of Egypt's policies in long run yet seems convinced he must move as he does in the short run.

Request Department repeat portions or entire message as desired other capitals.

Byroade

[4] See footnote 2, Document 132.

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124. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, June 12, 1955—1 p.m.

1052. Delivered message to Sharett last night (Deptel 711, [2]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1255. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:53 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, and Jerusalem.

[2] In light of Nasser's apparent willingness to give Gohar authority to act, as reported by Byroade in telegram 1880 from Cairo (Document 122), the Department

Embtel 1051 [3]). He obviously much disappointed and gave impression considerable discouragement over trend of developments in this field. (This confirmed later by Herzog who was present.) Prime Minister said he assumed that no definite answer required this moment as he would have to receive message through UN channels (Burns) before GOI decision could be stated. But he was most appreciative of advance information which would give GOI time to think over matter before reaching decision.

Although declining to comment definitively, he did refer to continuous paring down of original high level talks concept. He referred sadly to fact that "whole thing has fizzled out." But I did not take that to mean that matter had come to an end without talks on Gohar level. I urged that GOI not reject idea solely on basis of lower level military talks than he had anticipated and referred to topsy-turvey military hierarchy with Nasser a Lieutenant Colonel only and with many junior officers possessing much more power than general officers. I also referred to expectation that Nasser would grant Gohar wide powers—much wider than in past conversations between Gohar and Israeli officers. Furthermore, I underlined understanding that Gohar had always reported direct to Nasser thus bringing conversations closer by direct line to high level. Sharett listened, but rather scorned idea that Gohar would have much real authority and would have to refer back to Nasser frequently. I did not press point, but commented as in our last conversation, on net gain which might come from any discussions of broad problems of border tensions, even at proposed military level. Although he made no comment I was encouraged by fact he gave no indication Gohar level talks would be rejected. However, he did not know at that time of Egyptian restrictive agenda proposal. [4]

Lawson

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instructed the Embassy in Tel Aviv on June 10 to urge Sharett to accept Nasser's offer to have Israeli representatives meet with Gohar. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–955)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–1155)

[4] See footnote 3, Document 122.

125. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, June 13, 1955.

SUBJECT

Gaza Situation; Tripartite Declaration; NSC 5428 [2]

Discussion

The situation in Gaza continues extremely tense and there is a strong possibility that the high level talks for which we, the British, the French and General Burns have been pressing will not eventuate.

General Burns has indicated his intention to apprise the Security Council of the situation, and the question may well come up for discussion there. On June 7 Ambassador Lodge, who is chairman of the SC this month, formally advised his colleagues on the Council of the dangers of the situation and indicated that the Council might well have to take up the matter once again. [3]

We have applied strong pressure on the Egyptians to participate in such talks on a basis acceptable to Israel but the outcome of our efforts looks rather dubious. It is quite possible that should the talks not take place the Israelis will maintain that the situation in Gaza requires strong military action. You will note from the attached telegram (Tab B) [4] that the Israel Prime Minister has intimated that Israel might be pushed into a position whereby she had no course but to "move into the Gaza Strip and get it over with . . . . drive the Egyptians into the desert." [5] NSC 5428 provides that if an armed attack occurs, the U.S. should take certain steps to deal with the situation, including discontinuance of U.S. aid to the aggressor, an embargo of trade and the freezing of funds (See Tab C). NSC also

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1355. Top Secret. Drafted by Bergus; Ludlow and Elbrick concurred in the memorandum.

[2] For text of NSC 5428, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.

[3] For text of Ambassador Lodge's letter of June 7 as President of the Security Council to the members of the Council, see U.N. doc. S/3406.

[4] Ambassador Lawson informed the Department of State that he had spoken with Prime Minister Sharett at his home on the afternoon of June 1. In the course of this conversation, Sharett indicated to Lawson that unless the United Sates, the United Kingdom, and the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization were able to prevail upon the Egyptians to stop shooting at Israelis inside Israeli territory and to take other measures to reduce tension along the border, the people of Israel would soon reach the point, he believed, where they would say "to hell with them [the Egyptians], let's move into the Gaza Strip and get it over with. Let's drive the Egyptians into the desert." (Telegram 1010 from Tel Aviv, June 1; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–155)

[5] Ellipsis in the source text.

provides that at a time and in a way deemed appropriate the courses of action set forth therein should be made known to Israel and individual Arab states privately.

An OCB Working Party has been set up to look into specific actions which this Government must take to implement the policy set forth in the NSC document.

The British Embassy has informed us as follows:

"Mr. Macmillan thinks it desirable that Colonel Nasser should be reminded that the Tripartite Declaration means something. He accordingly wishes to suggest that the Three Powers should now make joint representations to both the Israeli and Egyptian Governments expressing concern at the present dangerous tension on the Gaza border and reminding them that under the Tripartite Declaration, the Three Powers would be bound to take action against an aggressor. Moreover it is clear that the situation in the Gaza salient is very explosive and Mr. Macmillan thinks we should consider whether, in addition to the warning proposed above, some move of forces in the Mediterranean is required to indicate that we mean business. So far as Her Majesty's Forces are concerned H.M.G. could for example at short notice move an aircraft carrier to the Eastern Mediterranean. This should prove an effective way of reassuring Colonel Nasser of our serious intentions. Mr. Macmillan would be grateful for the U.S. Government's views and to know whether they would contemplate any similar action.

"In the meantime, Mr. Macmillan is proposing to make a suitable reference to the Tripartite Declaration and H.M.G.'s obligations under it in the House of Commons in the course of the foreign affairs debate on Wednesday June 15." [6]

Mr. Macmillan will undoubtedly be taking this matter up with you this week when he sees you. [7] Our inclination is to be in a position of readiness to apply the economic sanctions set forth in the NSC document. We are dubious as to the wisdom of a show of military force as the opening gesture on the part of the Tripartite powers. For one thing, a naval demonstration on the part of the great powers against small countries could redound to our discredit for a considerable period. For another, in his Independence Day speech, Israel Defense Minister Ben Gurion stated that a British attempt to force a peace on Israel would be carried out only after a

[6] No copy of this communication has been found in Department of State files. On June 13, however, Murphy and Bergus met with Sir Robert Scott and Ronald Bailey, the Minister and First Secretary, respectively, of the British Embassy. At this session, Scott and Bailey presented the same proposal. (Memorandum of conversation, by Bergus; Department of State, Central Files, 774.5/6–1355)

[7] The Secretary of State was in New York from the afternoon of June 15 to the afternoon of June 17 to prepare plans with his British and French counterparts for the Heads of Government meeting in Geneva in July. For documentation on the Meeting of the Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union at Geneva, July 18–23, 1955, see volume V.

bloody war between the two countries. . . . We feel that economic measures or the threat of them would be much more effective as a way to begin in the present situation and that military action should be considered only in the event that economic measures have failed.

Recommendations

1. That the British and French be informed that we would like to consider in concert with them economic measures which we would adopt in case either Egypt or Israel takes aggressive action against each other and captures and holds territory not presently belonging to them.

2. That our Ambassadors in Cairo and Tel Aviv be instructed, in collaboration with their British and French colleagues, to express our grave concern over the situation.

3. That our Ambassadors in Cairo and Tel Aviv be authorized in their discretion to convey to the Prime Ministers of Egypt and Israel the measures which this Government would take ("a" thru "d" of Para 10 of NSC 5428) in the event of either an Egyptian or Israel aggressive attack against the other party. [8]

Tab C

Extract From NSC 5428, July 23, 1954 [9]

COURSES OF ACTION

10. If in the opinion of the U.S. an armed attack occurs, the U.S. should be prepared to take the following steps either simultaneously or in stages:

a. Discontinue U.S. Government aid to the aggressor.

b. Embargo trade between the U.S. and the aggressor.

c. Prevent the transfer of funds from any source in the U.S. to the aggressor directly or indirectly.

d. Urge other countries, as appropriate, to take similar measures.

e. In the event none of the above courses of action are successful in causing the aggressor state to desist from armed attack and to withdraw within its own borders, consult (without prior commitment) with the U.K., and to the extent practicable with other powers, on whether to take concerted action to:

(1) Establish a blockade of the attacking state.

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[8] Dulles initialed his approval of the first and second recommendations, but disapproval of the third, adding in his own hand the words "until cleared with Pres".

[9] Top Secret.

(2) Use military forces to compel the attacking state to relinquish any territory seized and to withdraw within its own borders.

f. Make every effort at the outset to secure UN sanction and support for the above measures; but, if it appears that UN action will not be forthcoming promptly, be prepared in an urgent situation to take such measures without delay.

11. In collaboration with the U.K., and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey, develop plans, including military plans as appropriate, to support the measures in paragraph 10 above.

12. At a time and in a way deemed appropriate, make the policy in paragraph 10 above known to Israel and individual Arab states privately.

13. As appropriate, enlist Congressional support for the measures in paragraphs 10 and 12 above.

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126. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, June 15, 1955 [1]

I told the President that the situation around the Gaza neutralized strip was serious; that the Israeli were massing forces there and that there was some evidence that they might move in and take over the whole of this strip, driving out the Egyptians. [2] I said that the NSC paper [3] contemplated that in the event of action of this sort, the United States might unilaterally take economic sanction, including cutting off remittances of funds to Israel. I expressed the view that we should try, if possible, to get the United Nations recommen-

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers; Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles.

[2] According to telegram MAI 693 from the U.S. Army Attaché in Tel Aviv, June 7, an Israeli source informed him that day "that he personally believes IDF to overrun Gaza strip without notice and he is certain his top superior believes same. Bases his feeling on truculence Israeli civilians and military; the political advantages accruing to MAPAI party; irredentist claims to strip and desire colonize there; getting rid refugees whose headlong flight would impede Egypt army def or counter atk and not discounting value to IDF as practice alone, as well as opportunity for glory. Believes however another incident necessary as excuse. He estimates two days at most to accomplish. *Comment*: I concur his beliefs." (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after 2d London Talks—April 26–June 30, '55)

[3] Reference is to NSC 5428; see footnote 2, *supra*.

dations in the matter rather than act unilaterally. The President agreed with this point of view and suggested that Lodge could take this up with the United Nations and try to get appropriate action by the Security Council. I said there was always the problem of the veto, but that I thought that as things were now going, if the action were against Israel, the Soviets would probably concur in it but not vice versa. The President thought it particularly important that the finding as to who was at fault should be made by the United Nations and that we should not take that responsibility alone. I said that General Burns was watching the situation closely and would probably be in a position to make a quick report to the Security Council. [4]

The President also said that while he thought we should in general adhere to the NSC policy paper on the subject, he thought that, in the first instance, we should limit ourselves to suspending governmental aid and hold back on interrupting private transmittals of funds as a second step, if the first step did not work.

JFD

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[4] According to a June 15 memorandum for the files by Barco, Dulles discussed this with Lodge upon his arrival in New York later that day. Lodge then telephoned Hammarskjöld, informed him of the U.S. concern with developments in the Gaza area, and requested that the U.N. Secretariat be prepared for a meeting of the Security Council in San Francisco during the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the signing of the U.N. Charter. He told Hammarskjöld that time might be of the essence and urged that if such a meeting should prove necessary, a full report from Burns should be ready for it. Hammarskjöld telephoned Lodge later to say that he had issued the necessary instructions to Burns. (Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224, Palestine) Barco recorded in a June 16 memorandum for the files that Hammarskjöld had informed him by telephone that Burns was prepared to report immediately in the event of an attack. (*Ibid.*)

127. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, June 16, 1955, 2:30 p.m. [1]

PMCG(NY) MC–2

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Ambassador Lodge
Mr. Merchant

M. Pinay
Ambassador de Murville
Ambassador Hoppenot
M. Crouy-Chanel

Mr. Macmillan
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Pierson Dixon
Sir Roger Makins
Mr. Ramsbotham

A brief meeting was held after luncheon on June 16 to discuss the Gaza strip situation and its relation to the Security Council. Ambassador Lodge described the present situation as tense. He referred to the Burns report after the January incident [2] and the letter which he had circulated to the Security Council members a week or so ago. [3]

The Secretary stated that there were intelligence indications that the Israeli were massing. The Security Council might be able to take some action which would deter hostilities, or, failing that, it then might make recommendations based on a report from General Burns which would call on member governments to impose economic sanctions. The United States would then be prepared to suspend governmental aid to Israel which it would not consider itself in a position to do except in response to some call from the Security Council.

There was some discussion as to a public announcement that the Security Council was prepared to meet in San Francisco next week if the situation deteriorated.

Mr. Macmillan said that on Tuesday he had called in separately the Egyptian and Israeli Ambassadors in London. He had earnestly

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–NE/6–1755. Secret. Prepared on June 18. No other drafting information is given on the source text. The time was taken from Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) Another memorandum of this conversation, drafted by Barco, is in Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224, Palestine.

[2] Presumably reference is to the Gaza incident of February 28.

[3] Reference is to Ambassador Lodge's letter of June 7. For text, see U.N. doc. S/3406.

asked them to meet in full the four points of General Burns' recommendation, but he had not yet had a reply from either. He said that he had solemnly reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration in the House of Commons yesterday.[4] He recognized the desirability, in the event of a major outbreak, of securing some form of Security Council action which would in effect support tripartite action.

The Secretary again pointed out that we have a constitutional problem in connection with action under the Tripartite Declaration and said the essential thing was that any action under that Declaration be specifically linked with action by the United Nations.

After some further discussion, it was agreed that the Security Council should be prepared to meet immediately in the event of the situation worsening and that it would be in a position to meet if necessary in San Francisco.

The three Permanent Representatives to the United Nations were then requested to withdraw and to consider (1) what further publicity, if any, should be given to the possible meeting of the Security Council in San Francisco and (2) what types of sanctions might be employed against the aggressor in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in the Gaza strip.

[4] For text of Macmillan's remarks, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th Series, vol. 542, cols. 596–600.

128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

Washington, June 20, 1955—6:33 p.m.

2224. Secretary discussed Alpha with Macmillan New York 16th.[2] Stated it would be necessary for him make basic policy statement on Israel situation; USG must have clear and official position. He would try shape statement along lines consistent with Alpha but without revealing or referring to that operation. General purport would be that if boundaries, transit and refugee problems

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/6–2055. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan, who signed for Hoover. Also sent to London. Repeated to Tel Aviv on June 22. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/6–2255)

[2] Memoranda of this conversation are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 481, and S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume.

could be solved. US might be willing participate in joint or UN guarantee. Secretary indicated statement should be made after Israel elections to avoid its becoming election issue. Said he would clear statement in advance with Macmillan.

Macmillan inquired whether Egypt and Israel should be informed in advance of what Secretary intended say and what UK would say in support. He noted Israel wanted treaty substituted for Tripartite Declaration and that he had taken line it not appropriate guarantee a truce by treaty.

Agreed US–UK should discuss further general content and timing public statements on problem. [3]

Hoover

[3] Russell flew to London on July 7 for further discussions with Shuckburgh. (Telegram 6587 to London, June 30; *ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/6–3055; telegram 3 from London, July 1; *ibid.*, 684A.86/7–155; and telegram 7 to London, July 1; *ibid.*)

129. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, June 16, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Palestine—Gaza

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Pierson Dixon—UK
Ambassador Hoppenot—France
Ambassador Lodge—US
Ambassador Wadsworth—US
Mr. Barco—US
Mr. Ramsbotham—UK

At the meeting of the Permanent Representatives it was agreed first that the President of the SC, Mr. Lodge, should let the press know that he had alerted the Secretariat to the possibility that a Security Council meeting might be necessary in San Francisco. It was also agreed that the President should not issue a statement to be quoted.

Sir Pierson Dixon felt that the question to be decided was (a) what should the three governments do if Israel attacked in the Gaza

[1] Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224, Palestine. Secret. Drafted by Barco.

area, and (b) what the UN should do. Under (a) he felt that it was a question of what might be done to take preventive action. He said that the UK wanted joint action under the Three-Power Declaration of 1950.

Mr. Lodge pointed out the desirability of having UN action to back up any three-power initiative.

Ambassador Hoppenot said that he felt that the course of action in the Security Council in the event of serious trouble in the Gaza area should be (1) an immediate report from General Burns, (2) the issuance of a cease-fire by the SC, (3) a call by the SC for Israel to withdraw from the area occupied and (4) pressures on Israel to enforce compliance. Under (4), there were two aspects (a) should the terms of the pressures be fixed by the SC or (b) should it be left to the Members to choose what pressures they should apply?

Mr. Lodge pointed out that we, the US, would want to have the SC indicate the lines of action as much as possible. He agreed with Sir Pierson Dixon that it was not yet the time to think of intervention in the Palestine situation with troops. The possibility of aid to one of the countries concerned being cut off remained, but we would need as specific instructions from the SC as possible without, of course, having our hands tied. Ambassador Hoppenot suggested that this might be done by having the Council, if it met after an attack in the Gaza area, ask all Member States of the UN to "abstain from assistance to the aggressor". He felt that this was something that the USSR could not veto. Mr. Lodge made clear and Hoppenot and Dixon agreed, that if such line were used it would leave open to Governments to cut off government aid, but that it should not imply that private aid should be cut off. It was also agreed that the Council should call upon countries in the area to exercise the greatest restraint to avoid an intervention by the other Arab states. It was also agreed that the Permanent Representatives should recommend to the Foreign Ministers that it would be desirable to tell the parties what we had in mind doing in the Security Council in the event of an attack. This might have a deterrent effect. The Permanent Representatives agreed that an attack by Israel would be a threat to the peace and would require action under Article 7.

Mr. Ramsbotham was requested to draw up a recommendation for the Foreign Ministers comprising the above points to be submitted after consulting with Mr. Wadsworth.

Mr. Ramsbotham drew up a statement based on the above and this was presented to the three principals at the end of their afternoon meeting.[2] Mr. Macmillan questioned the wording of some

[2] No copy of the original draft statement has been found in Department of State files. For final text of the agreed statement, see Document 131.

of the paragraphs but was generally satisfied except that he reacted against the suggestion that SC action should include the call upon other states aimed at deterring other Arab intervention. Reason was not clearly given, but since meeting was then breaking up it was decided to postpone decision until morning session. M. Pinay and Secretary Dulles made no particular comment.

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130. Memorandum for the Files, by Oliver L. Troxel, Jr., of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs [1]

Washington, June 17, 1955.

SUBJECT

Briefing of Ambassador Eric Johnston on Alpha

Mr. Francis Russell called on Ambassador Eric Johnston at the Motion Picture Association, 9:15 a.m., June 17, 1955 to brief Mr. Johnston as to the Department's current thinking on Near Eastern problems. I was the only other person present.

After a brief discussion of recent events in the area, particularly the increased tension between Israel and Egypt along the Gaza strip, Mr. Russell commented that the Department had, as Mr. Johnston knew, been examining for some time a number of possible means to end the unsatisfactory situation that existed in the Near East. Since about last August, members of the Department's staff had been considering various aspects of the problem, he said, always with the understanding that no steps should be taken which would interfere with Mr. Johnston's negotiations. He pointed out that the Secretary and Mr. Allen had both been careful in all their discussions with the Israelis to state that the settlement of the water issue should precede consideration of other major steps, which the U.S. might take respecting the area. He added that he had been asked a few months ago by the Secretary to assist in pulling together the elements of a possible settlement, for inclusion in a public statement on the Near Eastern question, and that he had been in consultation with the British on the matter.

Ambassador Johnston asked what the current thinking was as to the components of a settlement. Mr. Russell replied that, while the

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, Framework of the Fourth Mission—No. 19 (April 22, 1955). Top Secret. Drafted by Troxel on July 7.

details were still under consideration, certain principles must clearly be a part of any settlement. The difficult day-to-day friction between Israel and the Arab states occurred along the borders and, as Ambassador Johnston knew, Israel had been pressing for a security guarantee of its boundaries. The United States obviously could not participate in any guarantee of boundaries, however, unless these were defined. Thus, a settlement of the border question was an essential part of any general settlement.

The Palestine refugee problem, was another major source of area tension; hence the special attention given to Jordan Valley development through Ambassador Johnston's negotiations. In a general settlement, further steps would be necessary to settle the claims of the refugees for property now in Israel hands, so arrangements for the payment of compensation would also be required. In response to questions by Ambassador Johnston, Mr. Russell confirmed that a resolution of the Jerusalem issue was envisaged as a part of the settlement, and that the Department was thinking in terms of treaty arrangements between the United States and each interested Near Eastern nation.

Ambassador Johnston said that he would like to express his views on the subject, as one who had been in close contact with the area, even though the Department had already doubtless considered the ideas he had in mind. He then explained that a reaffirmation and strengthening of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 for a specific period of time would, in his view, help to lessen area tensions and provide a period in which a more comprehensive settlement could be reached. Mr. Russell said that there were two considerations which raised doubt as to the value of using the Tripartite Declaration. First, the Israelis had already informed us that no such action would meet their needs; they wanted a document which would bear their signature as well as that of the U.S. Second, it is very likely that a situation would arise where the peace of the area would be seriously disturbed but where it would be impossible to ascertain with certainty which side was at fault. It would then be difficult for the United States to know what steps should be taken. When Mr. Johnston commented that the latter would be true even in the case of a treaty, Mr. Russell agreed that a problem existed but pointed out that the obligations would be assumed in the latter case only after a number of steps had been taken to reduce tension—thus decreasing the possibility that any sanctions need be applied.

Mr. Johnston contended that a basic difficulty would still not be overcome. He said that it would take a long time under the most favorable conditions to develop the proposed treaty arrangements—eighteen months would, he said, be a conservative estimate even if the negotiations were to follow a successful resolution of the water

issue. Meanwhile, he asked, how would tensions be relieved if an interim step is not taken to stabilize the situation. Mr. Russell replied that there was considerable doubt whether the U.S. would find itself willing to become further involved in the area until after it was assured that the steps he had mentioned had been taken. Mr. Johnston felt, however, that the U.S. would necessarily be involved in any major eruption in the area, regardless of the formal position, and that to refrain from strengthening the Tripartite commitment would only leave people in doubt as to our intentions and exacerbate the present unsatisfactory position. He added that by placing a time limit on the Tripartite reaffirmation, pressure could be placed on the parties to come to a more general agreement.

Mr. Johnston told Mr. Russell that he would very much appreciate having an opportunity to discuss the entire question with the Secretary and Mr. Allen before any statement is made. Mr. Russell assured him that he would be kept informed and would pass on his desire for a full discussion of the problem.

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131. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, June 17, 1955—1 p.m.

900. For Acting Secretary from Dulles. Subject: Gaza Situation. The following tripartite agreement was reached this morning on the subject of the Gaza situation with particular emphasis on suggested action by the Security Council in the event of an overt aggression.

Begin verbatim text.

The three Permanent Delegates to the United Nations met at 3:15 p.m. on June 16 to consider the following two questions referred to them by the three Foreign Ministers.

(1) *Whether the President of the Security Council should issue some immediate warning that the Security Council may meet in San Francisco.*

It was agreed to recommend that Mr. Lodge, as President of the Security Council in June, should take steps to see that his letter of June 16 (S/3406) was kept before the public, and to indicate that the

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1755. Secret. Received at 4:56 p.m.

United Nations Secretariat had been warned of the possibility of a meeting in San Francisco in case of an emergency.

(2) *In the event of one of the parties committing an overt aggression, what action would we wish the Security Council to take?*

[It was noted that there was a prior question which was outside the jurisdiction of the Permanent Representatives and which was still under discussion between governments viz: whether a tripartite warning should be made to the Israeli and Egyptian Governments re-affirming the intention of the three powers to act upon the Tripartite Declaration.] [2]

It was agreed that, in the event of an overt aggression by one of the parties, involving an invasion across the Gaza Strip, the Security Council should be called at once and should be moved to take the following action under the terms of Chapter Roman seven of the Charter:

(a) Call for an urgent report from General Burns;
(b) Call for a cease-fire;
(c) Indicate which party was the aggressor;
(d) Call upon the aggressing state to withdraw its troops;
(e) Call upon all *member governments* to refrain from all aid to the aggressor.

[A broad formula of this kind would be advisable as we would not wish the Council to call, in terms, on the three powers to take measures to restore the situation. The formula suggested would, however, permit us to apply economic sanctions without stopping all trade with the country concerned.]

It was further recommended that consideration should be given to whether we should warn the parties concerned in advance of the action contemplated in the Security Council in the event of aggression.

End verbatim text.

It is suggested Department pass to appropriate Missions, also Mr. Lodge if available. [3]

Wadsworth

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[2] All brackets are in the source text.

[3] Repeated priority on June 18 to Cairo, London, Tel Aviv, Paris, Jerusalem, and to San Francisco for Ambassador Lodge. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1755)

132. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 17, 1955—6 p.m.

1928. Nasser asked me last night if I had received decision on principle of whether Egypt could purchase arms in U.S. I replied I had not and pointed out that he must realize his request had had to be put to Washington in most unfortunate light.

In long discussion which followed, Nasser made clear that he was still aware of long range disadvantages of Soviet arms aid. However, partly for morale effect in army and partly for security of Egypt, he still felt desperate need to obtain additional supplies of military equipment which would continue in event of trouble and therefore still seemed discount unfavorable impression acceptance Soviet arms would make.

He also tended discount effect Soviet aid would have within Egypt itself. For example, he insisted he could make deal whereby no Russians were allowed inside Egypt and under which no signed agreement would be necessary. I told him effects would come later and in form he would not like. In my opinion Egypt was important target for USSR. Soviets probably would ask nothing more initially than show of real neutrality and be content with effect that would have upon Middle East as a whole. Second phase would come later when he might find himself incapable of coping with it. He replied he felt communism in Egypt could be controlled and asked if I knew of his action a few hours earlier in jailing Communist leaders. I said I did not but history was full of examples of leaders who felt they could play only so far with Communist and then cut off relationships.

During discussion Nasser retreated somewhat from his previous categorical statement that he intended obtain arms from USSR. (We know that he has held up dispatch of mission to Moscow.)

He asked me several times what I thought answer from Washington would be. I told him I did not know but I thought he had presented his request in most difficult form possible by seeking decision in principle without giving ideas as to items or quantity. Department alone could not decide this question and military certainly would be unable consider such a vague request.

Hope Department will give most careful consideration to reply which I am to make to Nasser. Point at issue in my opinion is not whether Nasser can persuade West to supply arms failing which he

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1755. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 1:26 a.m., June 18.

will turn to USSR—in fact believe decision should be based upon other factors pushing possible USSR deal aside. I believe Nasser feels he is posing test of U.S. good faith and intentions toward Egypt in its current concern regarding Israel. Therefore present issue is whether as matter of principle Egypt is or is not barred from purchasing military equipment in U.S. If at this time we give Nasser answer that as matter of principle Egypt is denied right of purchase of arms in U.S., believe we shall be very long time getting over effect that will be created. Regardless of facts of past history this matter, Egyptian officers (Nasser included) generally believe it has been impossible for Egypt purchase arms in U.S. If at this time of urgent need, as they see it, when we both know Egypt is far weaker than Israel, we turn Egypt down on question of principle, Nasser and his supporters will not soon forget our action which they will interpret as being totally partial to Israel.

I therefore recommend Department authorize me reply that U.S. has no policy which would bar Egypt from purchasing equipment. It seems to me unnecessary to go beyond this statement unless and until Nasser is prepared specify requirements in practical terms. As Egyptian financial resources are obviously limited, I would expect that in any event Egyptian purchases of equipment could not be large.

Nasser has said that he wishes me to inform him as soon as I receive Department's views. [2]

Byroade

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[2] The Department, in telegram 2214 to Cairo, June 17, authorized Byroade to inform Nasser that Egypt was eligible to purchase arms in the United States under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Understanding of December 1952, that the United States would consider any request solely on its merits and within the framework of the principles embodied in the Tripartite Declaration, and that it would consider sympathetically those requests that involved reasonable expenditures. (*Ibid.*, 474.008/6–1755)

133. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, June 18, 1955—6 p.m.

1069. At Prime Minister's request that I call at his residence in Jerusalem today (*Shabot*) on an urgent matter I visited him at twelve noon. He was considerably agitated saying "yesterday was a day of shock." He referred to Lodge's proposed meeting of SC in San Francisco for purpose of discussing (as Prime Minister termed it) the Gaza strip situation.

Sharett was visibly upset for fear that meeting was being called on basis of rumor that "Israel has massed troops and arms on Gaza border with intention of making aggressive move into Gaza, probably during UN meeting in San Francisco." He said this was fantastic story which he feared may have been sold to Lodge and other SC members by Arabs. He was afraid that SC meeting might well result in "Israel being hauled before bar on a completely false charge—that whatever resolution came out of meeting the edge of sword would be aimed toward Israel to its unfair disadvantage." He wished to place this matter immediately before me denying categorically veracity of story and requested that I inform Department without delay. This I agreed to do.

In exchange of comment, I made following points:

1. He should be certain that IDF was not in any possible way vulnerable to charge. He assured me that it was not and that there was no plan whatever for aggressive use of arms on border.

2. That I felt sure that SC would not condemn Israel unjustly on basis of unconfirmed rumor—this seemed to me axiomatic; but in view of situation, admitting that border had been relatively quiet for several weeks, there were several unsettled problems which General Burns was trying to solve and thus a firm resolution calling attention of both Egypt and Israel to March 30 resolution of SC would seem a reasonable action. After some argument, he admitted logic involved but said most important incomplete item was failure of Egypt to follow UN instructions to carry out high level talks despite continued pressure by General Burns, the US and UK. In this connection, he said General Burns told him yesterday there was still no agreement by Egypt but that Gohar was taking to Nasser Burns' arguments for talks at a level higher than Gohar, [2] and a reply was expected Monday June 20. Therefore, he thought it might be effec-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1855. Secret; Niact. Received at 6:10 p.m. Repeated priority to Cairo and London. Repeated on June 20 to San Francisco for Ambassador Lodge. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–2055)

[2] Burns met with Gohar on June 16. Telegram 365 from Jerusalem, June 18, reported Burns' account of the meeting, as he had described it to Cole. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–1855)

tive if US again urged Nasser to accede to such a program and should make approach now to coincide with Nasser's consideration of Burns' recommendations. I informed him I would pass on his suggestion to the Department.

3. That it was common knowledge that IDF had long been in a position to defend itself on border but I had seen no evidence of a recent build up of military strength in that area for an aggression to coincide with UN meeting in San Francisco. (He gave me impression that Lodge's proposal may have stemmed from Embassy reports although he did not make direct charge. He did remark "I am confident that had you believed situation described to be true, you would have come to me and asked for confirmation." In any event, he made it clear that he did not want Israel to be charged with threatening aggressive action, referring again to substantial period of time without incident on border.)

In subsequent comment, he thought any SC action at this time would conflict with efforts now being made by Burns to solve outstanding problems and would come just at time Israel had come out with its firm proposals for reducing border tension (see immediately following telegram [3]), which proposals would form part of agenda for proposed Israel–Egypt talks. He thought that SC action should be postponed until these efforts were exhausted, especially in view of border quietness. *Comment*: Although Embassy agrees with Sharett to extent he was speaking of absence of large-scale mobilization, evidence available indicates recent active maneuvers in Negev area. As reported Embtel 1067, [4] Embassy believes immediate crisis has passed, due largely three weeks period without Israel casualties along border and apparent willingness to await results Burns negotiations.

Lawson

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[3] *Infra.*

[4] In telegram 1067, June 18, the Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that the U.S. Army Attaché had concluded that the Israeli troop movements in the northern Negev were nothing other than large-scale maneuvers. Although the Embassy recognized that the Israelis could use such exercises as a springboard for military action, it had concluded that the evidence available indicated that the Israeli Cabinet had taken no decision at that time to permit large-scale military action against the Egyptians. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1855)

134. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, June 18, 1955—7 p.m.

1070. When talking to Sharett about Lodge's proposed SC meeting, he informed me of GOI decision to release publicly its four definite proposals for reducing border tension, which could be discussed at proposed Israel–Egypt talks. He told me that had been outlined to Burns and would appear in week-end press. They were:

1. Cancellation by Egypt of standing orders to its troops to fire on Israelis.
2. Establish a narrow border zone within which there would be mine fields along parallel wire fences on Egyptian and Israeli sides. Zone would straddle existing line.
3. Operation of joint patrols on a central clear path within narrow, mined, border zone.
4. Establishment of effective local commander's agreement with it specifically agreed that telephonic communications exist between those commanders.

He said that Egyptians could introduce other proposals but he thought Israel's proposals would obviate the "demilitarized" zone idea of Nasser, and would at same time prevent opening up of border area to unlimited infiltration as permitted by that proposal.

He thought move by Israel was a constructive one and supported his argument that a San Francisco SC meeting was not now necessary and would prove more confusing than effective in circumstances. [2]

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1855. Secret; Priority. Received at 5:29 p.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, and Jerusalem. Repeated to San Francisco on June 20 for Ambassador Lodge. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–2055)

[2] Byroade reported on June 22 that he had asked Nasser earlier that day for his view about these latest Israeli proposals. Nasser stated that, with the exception of the first point, he believed they were really a variation of his own and Burns' suggestions. With respect to the first point, Byroade reported that Nasser thought it "was a strange entry in context of agenda. I asked then if his position was that Israeli suggestions appeared all right for discussion at meeting under Burns along with other suggestions that had been made. He replied, 'Yes, certainly.'" (Telegram 1952 from Cairo; *ibid.*, 674.84A/6–2255)

135. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, June 21, 1955—10 a.m.

370. Burns has now had message from Gohar with reference to their meeting at Gaza on June 16 to effect that owing to some unexplained delay he will not be able supply information regarding his powers commit GOE (paragraph 2 mytel 365 [2]) at a prospective meeting with Israelis before June 22. Burns had hoped for Gohar's reply June 20. With reference Israel's four proposals reduce border tensions (Tel Aviv's 1070 to Department [3]) Burns stated that the second, third and fourth proposals were nothing more than variations of three of his earlier four points, and that Egyptian reservations with respect barbed wire fence and direct telephone communications were well known. However, they could form basis for reasonable compromise if both sides willing negotiate in good faith. . . .

Burns confirmed information received from Hommel (mytel 366 [4]) that Israelis have discontinued, or at least greatly reduced frequency, of patrols along demarcation line.

Cole

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–2155. Confidential. Received at 7:32 a.m. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Cairo, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–1855)

[3] *Supra.*

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–2055)

136. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) [1]

Washington, June 21, 1955.

SUBJECT

Possible Egyptian Purchase of Arms from the USSR; Egyptian-USSR Relations in General

In response to your request, I am setting forth the information which we now have on the USSR "offer" of arms to Egypt, and on Russian activities in Egypt in general. I have requested our Embassy in Cairo to submit by telegram any additional information on the arms "offer" and by despatch on over-all survey of USSR and satellite activities. [2]

Embassy Cairo's previous report states Nasser said "that he had concluded he should accept Russia's offer of military equipment and plans to send a mission there next week." [3] A subsequent telegram reported that the dispatch of the mission had been delayed. [4] We have no other information from the Embassy regarding the current Russian offer. In view of the authorization we have given Ambassador Byroade to inform Nasser that we have no objection in principle to Egyptian purchases of arms in the US, Nasser may abandon his plan to buy in the USSR.[5]

In February 1954 the USSR offered, through an Egyptian economic mission then in Moscow, assistance in construction of the High Aswan Dam. Nasser, however, did not accept this offer because of fear of Russia's real intentions. . . . Soviet Ambassador Daniil S. Solod offered technical and economic assistance, including financing for the High Aswan Dam, on May 23, 1955 and added that if Egypt objected to the presence of Soviet personnel in Egypt, the USSR would work through the UN. Nasser declined the offer but inquired whether the USSR would barter heavy artillery for cotton. Solod replied affirmatively and indicated shipment might be made within six weeks. . . . Nasser has designated Major-General Hassan Raghib to head a mission to the Soviet Union to negotiate

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/6–2155. Secret. Drafted by Burdett.

[2] The Department made this request in telegram 2229, June 21, to Cairo, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 474.618/6–2155)

[3] Reference is to Document 123.

[4] Reference is to Document 132.

[5] Byroade had received this authorization from the Department in telegram 2214 to Cairo, June 17. See footnote 2, Document 132.

the purchase of artillery items offered for barter against cotton. . . . According to DRS, the arrangement, if finalized, will be the first sale of arms by the USSR outside the Soviet bloc since World War II.

. . . Czechoslovakia has offered immediate delivery of an unspecified number of military planes in exchange for cotton.

In May 1954 the Embassy in Cairo reported a noticeable increase in Russian overt activity on the commercial, diplomatic, cultural and propaganda fronts. The present Russian Ambassador arrived in Egypt in October 1953. In December 1954 the Soviet was reportedly attempting to increase its cultural influence in Egypt, and plans for opening a "Cultural House" in Cairo received Egyptian approval in April 1955. In that month Egypt announced approval of Soviet and Roumanian offers to supply petroleum products worth $8.4 million against Egyptian cotton. The agreement, similar to one signed last year, is causing concern to American and British oil companies operating in Egypt. You will recall that during the Bandung Conference, Egypt and Communist China were reported to be discussing a trade arrangement involving an exchange of cotton. Since March 1954, the Hungarians, East Germans and Czechs have conducted well-publicized trade fairs in Egypt. The fairs were apparently conducted mainly for propaganda reasons, since no appreciable increase in trade followed.

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137. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 22, 1955—2 p.m.

1953. Information contained first paragraph Deptel 2214 [2] conveyed Nasser this morning. He thanked me for information but in general gave impression he did not believe we would find ourselves able to let him buy any significant amounts of equipment from US. He spoke at some length about apparent inability of tripartite powers to let Egypt become as strong as Israel. In this connection he was particularly critical of French who [he] says have supplied rather large quantities of tanks to Israel. Yet when delivery date came for previously arranged deliveries of same type of tanks to Egypt they

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 474.008/6–2255. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:48 p.m.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 132.

had demurred saying Egypt's North African policy primarily responsible.

I felt it best not to encourage Nasser as to amounts of equipment he might be able to obtain from US as must avoid creating expectations which probably would not be forthcoming. I did say I believed, however, he would be able to purchase from the West in general the armaments that he would find himself financially able to purchase on commercial basis.

I would expect that Egyptian Embassy Washington will follow through this interview with specific requests. I told him this best way handle matter although there would be advantage our knowing here what requests they were putting to Washington.

Byroade

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138. Memorandum of a Conversation, San Francisco, June 24, 1955 [1]

BSF MC–11

SUBJECT

United States-Egyptian Relations; Prospects for an Arab-Israel Settlement

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Mahmud Fawzi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary George V. Allen

The Secretary greeted Dr. Fawzi cordially and expressed pleasure at the opportunity of having a discussion with him. Commenting that relations between the United States and Egypt seemed to be slightly less cordial than they have been a few months ago, the Secretary said he regretted this development very genuinely since he had always felt that Prime Minister Nasser was the most promising of the Arab leaders and that Egypt was the logical leader of the Arab States. He asked Dr. Fawzi what he thought the reasons were for Nasser's reservations about the United States.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF480. Top Secret. Drafted by Allen. Secretary Dulles was in San Francisco, June 19–25, for the Tenth Anniversary of the signing of the U.N. Charter.

Dr. Fawzi said that relations between the United States and Egypt had reached their high point at the time of the signing of the Suez Canal Agreement, but that Egypt had been shocked by the signature of the Iraqi-Turkish Pact. Additional adherence to this pact by other Arab States would make matters worse. The Secretary pointed out that the United States had been given too much credit for bringing about this pact and that he himself had been quite surprised when it occurred. He said that as long ago as June 1953, he had originally used the term "northern tier" as a concept for a collective security arrangement to include the countries between Turkey and Pakistan and that we welcomed any proper step in this direction, but any idea that we were building up Iraq as a counterweight to Egypt among the Arab States had no justification whatever.

Dr. Fawzi said he was now satisfied that the United States was not "interfering in Syria", but any impression that we supported the adherence of other Arab States to the Turkish-Iraq Pact would create further uncertainties in Egypt with regard to American policy. The Secretary said that far from urging such adherences, we would be embarrassed if they did join since the effect would be bad not only in Egypt but also in Israel. In the latter connection, he asked Dr. Fawzi how Israeli-Egyptian relations stood. Dr. Fawzi said these fell into two categories, the immediate and the long range. As regards the immediate, the problem concerned the Gaza strip. Egypt had agreed to General Burns' proposals for discussions with Israel and Colonel Nasser had suggested a neutralized zone along the Gaza frontier and arrangements for joint Israeli-Egyptian patrols as possible means for improvement. He hoped these suggestions would bear fruit.

As regards the long-range question, Dr. Fawzi said Egypt's position was quite straight forward and clear. He did not wish to imply that this was a matter which had been thrashed out in the Egyptian cabinet, since only he and Colonel Nasser had discussed the matter, but he had let Ambassador Byroade know their basic attitude. He said Nasser had two requirements which must be fulfilled before any long-range settlement with Israel could be possible. The first requirement was full material compensation for the losses sustained by the refugees. He emphasized material compensation since, he said, no one could estimate the moral and psychological damage done to these uprooted people. Egypt did not insist that the compensation be paid by Israel, but full compensation was required from some source in order to enable these people to begin a new life, either in Israel for those permitted to return, or elsewhere for those who were not. The second requirement was the physical and geographical union of the Arab States. This meant the surrender

of the Negev, "including Beersheba", by Israel. Egypt did not demand an inch of this territory for herself. It could all be given to Jordan. Moreover, Israel could have Gaza. He said that one often heard reference to the partition of Palestine, but the creation of Israel had in fact partitioned the Arab States, by separating them physically. If he wished to go by car from Egypt to Damascus, he would have to obtain the permission of Mr. Sharett. This was an impossible situation for any Arab to accept. A mere corridor would in no way suffice.

The Secretary remarked that he had not made any basic statement regarding United States policy toward the Middle East since his return from that area two years ago.[2] Prior to the United States Congressional elections last year, he had been subjected to considerable pressure to make a further statement but he had refused to do so, promising a statement after the elections. Eight months had passed and he now felt that he should not wait much longer to do so.

Dr. Fawzi said he presumed that the reason the Secretary felt a statement necessary was the request he understood Israel had made for a security pact with the United States. He pointed out that a security pact must guarantee certain boundaries; he asked what we proposed to guarantee. Until boundaries were fixed, he did not see how any pact was possible. If the United States signed a security pact with Israel under present circumstances, before boundaries had been agreed upon by the Arab States, the pact would be illegal and he would protest it as such. Moreover, the United States would do irreparable harm to its relations with every Arab State, without exception, if we gave Israel a security pact prior to a permanent boundary settlement. The Secretary commented that, as a lawyer, he was not always impressed by legal arguments but he understood fully the political considerations Dr. Fawzi mentioned.

Dr. Fawzi said he thought efforts for a definitive settlement should be made during 1955 since the United States would find it difficult, "for obvious reasons", to do anything during 1956. Consequently, if progress was not made during 1955, we might have to wait until 1957. The Secretary commented that even 1957 might not be an easy year since positions might be taken by both sides during the 1956 political campaign which would be difficult to overcome.

Dr. Fawzi said that if the two basic conditions regarding refugees and boundaries were met, he saw no reason why the matter

[2] For documentation on the visit of Dulles and Harold Stassen to the Near and Middle East, May 9–29, 1953, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 1 ff. For text of Dulles' speech of June 1, 1953, which summarized his trip, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 15, 1953, p. 831.

should not go ahead in the near future. The Secretary expressed his appreciation for this encouraging news and repeated his pleasure at the opportunity to discuss the subject with Dr. Fawzi in San Francisco.

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139. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 29, 1955—11 a.m.

1975. Deptel 2229. [2]

1. Following . . . summarizes information available Embassy re Soviet bloc arms offers to Egypt.

a. Presumably as result arms purchasing trip to Europe in spring 1955 of Hasan Ibrahim and Minister Commerce Marei, Czechs shipped unspecified number (probably about 17) T–er tanks to Egypt which arrived in knocked-down condition. Tanks have not yet been assembled and Egyptians appear unable to assemble them. Egyptians now said to be claiming Czechs did not send all parts required.

b. Czech trade mission proposed to deliver in exchange cotton unspecified number of military aircraft. Egyptians anxious receive shipment as RCC reported to have decided station AF unit Syria by first July.

2. Soviet Ambassador Solod called on Nasser May 21. . . . Solod renewed offer Soviet technological and economic assistance, including help on high dam. Nasser showed no interest, but asked if USSR willing barter "certain items heavy artillery" for cotton. Solod replied he authorized give affirmative answer, that USSR could ship items requested in six weeks. Nasser indicated any training Egyptian officers in use Soviet artillery would have to be in USSR.

3. No arms purchase mission to Moscow appears to have been formed as yet.

4. Despatch requested reftel being prepared.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/6–2955. Secret. Received at 1:03 p.m.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 136.

140. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, June 30, 1955—11 a.m.

381. According press communiqué being issued by UNTSO Egyptian-Israeli discussions on Gaza [2] postponed until next week owing "technical difficulties" in drafting agenda. General Burns gave me evening June 29 following account meeting that date.

Gohar was willing to accept as an agenda the four points of the March 30 UN resolution plus Nasser's proposed neutral zone. He was not willing have Israelis three points (Tel Aviv's 1070 to Department [3]) also included in agenda. Gohar indicated he was ready talk about latter provided they were not set forth in agenda itself. Israelis maintained that they should not be put in an inferior position with respect preparation agenda and therefore would not accept Gohar's position. Burns considered Israeli viewpoint as logical and made number of efforts reconcile differences and achieve formula regarding agenda agreeable both parties. In so doing he proposed some seven different possibilities none of which acceptable to Gohar.

In view complete rigidity Gohar's position, Burns mentioned to Gohar his opinion that latter given no authority deviate from fixed instructions. Gohar replied to effect he had authority but did not wish "deviate" owing "question of principle" which caused him adhere his fixed position.

Burns told me he assumes Gohar attitude dictated by necessities Egyptian internal politics, thus involving forces he is not well able to assess. Meeting June 29 adjourned on understanding it would be resumed about July 6 if some progress could be made toward agreement on agenda. Burns said he is not optimistic about prospects and will not call future meeting unless they show considerable improvement meanwhile.

I also discussed subject with Vigier, who generally takes pessimistic view such matters. He referred to idea he had expressed earlier (mytel 331 [4]) to effect Egyptians would yield to pressures

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–3055. Confidential; Priority. Received at 8:05 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, and USUN.

[2] Cole reported in telegram 379 from Jerusalem, June 28, on the first meeting of Egyptian and Israeli representatives with Burns that day. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–2855) He reported in telegram 375, June 25, that Burns had informed the Israelis that Gohar had been named the Egyptian representative with full authority to discuss and agree to subjects forming the agenda. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–2555)

[3] Document 134.

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2555)

favoring holding talks Gaza situation merely to forestall Israeli propaganda which could result from their refusal. He thought that this had in fact occurred and that Egyptians had no discernible intention of making real progress toward bettering situation through such talks. Vigier regards virtual breakdown talks as potentially dangerous, since in face Egyptian intransigence Israelis may again resume "provocative" patrols, etc., and be more inclined than previously retaliate against any interference.

Cole

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141. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Dorsey) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) [1]

Washington, June 30, 1955.

SUBJECT

Status of Jordan Valley Negotiations

After two months of discussion centered largely on the one issue of whether the proposed Engineering Board will have the unequivocal right to use 300 mcm of storage capacity in Lake Tiberias, if necessary to irrigate the lower Jordan Valley, the Israelis have advised us that they concede the point. We have informed Ambassador Johnston, who is now in Los Angeles, by telegram.

We now hope to concentrate on the following points:

(1) The right of the watermaster to unimpeded access to all points on the watercourse. We do not intend to insist that he have the right to issue directives, but we believe he must be able to move freely for the purposes of inspecting and maintaining records.

(2) The right of the Arabs to withdraw the Yarmuk River water they store in Lake Tiberias, as and when they wish.

(3) The construction of the outlet facilities from Lake Tiberias to Point JX (i.e., the point where the irrigation system begins in Jordan), immediately after an understanding is reached with both sides. We are inclined to believe that these facilities should be built all at one time, of a capacity adequate to serve the system when it

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, Framework of the Fourth Mission—No. 19 (April 22–). Confidential. Drafted by Troxel.

conveys Yarmuk waters stored in Lake Tiberias as well as the agreed flow from the upper Jordan River. [2]

[2] The Department also provided the information contained in this memorandum to the Embassy in Tel Aviv. (Telegram 765 to Tel Aviv, June 30; *ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–455)

142. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) and the Counselor of the British Embassy (Bailey), Department of State, Washington, July 1, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Possible Sanctions Against an Aggressor in Egypt–Israel Conflict

Mr. Bailey said the British Government, at the working level, had been preparing contingent plans for action if the Egyptian-Israeli tensions degenerated into open conflict. They had worked out specific actions to be taken to apply both economic and military sanctions. [2] He recalled in this connection Britain's special obligations to Jordan and the likelihood that Jordan would become involved if there were fighting between Israel and Egypt.

Mr. Bailey emphasized that the planning which had been done had not been submitted to the Cabinet and could not be considered, therefore, as having governmental approval. He thought it desirable, however, to exchange ideas on this subject with us, it being understood that such exchanges will be strictly informal. He knew that the Department of State had been doing some preliminary thinking about means to be employed to put economic sanctions into effect and he therefore proposed to talk to Mr. Dorsey of NE on this subject. He thought it would also be useful to discuss possible military actions. The British Chiefs of Staff would hope for American cooperation if it became necessary to impose military sanctions,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–155. Top Secret. Drafted by Jernegan.

[2] The British Embassy submitted a memorandum dated June 28 to the Department of State entitled "Economic Sanctions which might be applied against Israel in the event of Israel launching a major attack against Egypt" (*ibid.*, 684A.86/6–2855), but no British document dealing with military sanctions has been found in Department of State files.

and were of the opinion that United States action could best take the form of providing a task force of aircraft carriers and amphibious troops. Mr. Bailey added that he understood his Government thought it would be well to have such naval forces moved to the eastern Mediterranean in advance of an outbreak of hostilities, to serve as a deterrent.

I replied that I thought it would be desirable to exchange notes with respect to the question of economic sanctions. I pointed out, however, that the Secretary felt quite strongly that the U.S. Government should not impose such sanctions except within the framework of some UN action against the aggressor. He had already explained to Mr. Macmillan the legal and political difficulties which we would face in taking action unless we had the blessing of the UN.

With respect to the sending of a task force to the eastern Mediterranean to act as a deterrent, I recalled that Mr. Bailey had passed this suggestion to me some weeks ago. I had discussed it with the top officers of the Department and had found a general reluctance to take this action. I did not know of any consideration which had been given in the U.S. Government to the use of military force in the event of an outbreak of fighting in Palestine. I rather thought we would be extremely reluctant to come to that point and would certainly hope that UN action plus economic sanctions would be sufficient to meet any situation which might arise. I was afraid, therefore, that any discussions we might have with respect to the military aspect would be very one-sided, with the British doing all the talking. I would, however, explore this question further.

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143. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 2, 1955—noon.

10. . . . Nasser, Hakim Amer and others had had long night meeting in which decision was reached set aside Russian offer of arms for cotton and make serious effort attempt purchase arms from US. Since then they have been in process preparing list (contained in immediately following message) [2] which I received morning July 1.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–255. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 4:59 p.m.

[2] *Infra*.

Am merely acknowledging receipt of communication with indication that it will be submitted Washington. Do not plan any comment or discussion here prior to receipt advice from Department.

. . . . . .

. . . this Embassy has attempted analysis of effect in Egypt, in general Middle East area including Israel, and on position of US versus Soviet bloc of various types of US response. Based upon this type analysis, and mindful of Department's position on principle already conveyed Nasser in compliance Department telegram 2214,[3] recommend US Government give favorable consideration Government of Egypt request and facilitate shipment as much as possible. Am not unaware that substantial purchases by Government of Egypt at this time will be most difficult domestically, but in making this recommendation am guided by following:

a. Necessity as I see it for US to take at this time some affirmative step halt growing belief on part Government of Egypt that identity of short term interest in foreign and economic fields exist only between Government of Egypt and Soviet bloc.

b. Fact that Egyptian officers, almost without exception, believe US has in fact denied Egypt opportunity to purchase weapons. This would be judged in context regime's exaggerated idea value US friendship in terms military and economic aid in early days their friendship with US. This real factor for consideration when Nasser depends upon support of military in his general policies.

c. Conviction that, with general mood of desperation re Egyptian stability since February disruption of Gaza, Nasser has feeling he has no alternative than to obtain arms from some source in order keep confidence of military. Egyptian officers now know they have been offered arms for cotton by Russia. If they now informed effort was made with US and that we failed follow through or quibbled or delayed in response, majority would probably welcome Government of Egypt arrangements for arms with Soviets.

d. Fact that I am convinced Egypt has no intention to, nor sees no profit from, initiating hostilities. In any case added equipment would not give Egypt capability carry out successful aggressive action against Israel based on information available service attachés here.

e. Fact that, although some items on list have had bad psychological implications, list is not unreasonable from point view of adequate defense against Israel and would, even if obtained in entirety, leave Egypt considerably weaker than Israel. (In this connection when I spoke of tripartite declaration with Nasser in complying Department telegram 2214 he reminded me that declaration sanctions armed forces for legitimate self defense. This he says he does not have and even if we do have good intentions, Israelis could destroy Government of Egypt military and probably topple him

[3] See footnote 2, Document 132.

before we could interfere. This is a tough one to answer when our own information made it appear as if Israel might do just that only a month ago.)

f. Fact that introduction Soviet arms in area will have great impact upon Middle East generally and strengthen opportunities for Soviet bloc in other endeavors. Even Israel, our own problem in connection with all this, should certainly be even more concerned than if arms purchased in US which certain to exercise continuing influence their use and logistic support.

Go-betweens who have in past been helpful and who seem genuinely concerned over trend US-Egyptian relations past few months, strongly stress that quick and affirmative handling this request will go far reestablish GOE confidence in US intentions toward Egypt. Cannot promise this would happen but believe chances are at least even this could be the case. On other hand, if we take opposite course results far easier to predict. Such action on our part will, I believe, be used to "clarify the record" and result in increased Soviet political penetration of Egypt and thence Arab world. We must remember that Egypt is certain continue to be real influence this total area, whether for good or bad.

Am sending as third cable this series summary of the pattern of Communist bloc activities here in Egypt.[4] Am concerned, however, more by apparent flexibility in case of operations of Soviet and satellite representatives than I am with facts and statistics given that message. You will note that we do not see indication of greatly increased Communist bloc political and subversive activity in Egypt itself during past few months. Nevertheless, am convinced that bloc's position in Arab states has greatly improved during this period. Believe this in large part consequence skillful method of operations employed by bloc representatives in taking advantage local opportunities caused by disruption and friction in area. In addition Soviets have natural advantage in that situation permits them to move in on Egypt under guise of legitimate trading interest and thus avoid arousing unduly Egypt's fear of political penetration.

Our enemies are ready to do business on spur of moment, flatter local officials and make every effort to please whether requests seem designed for efficiency and real benefit or not. As example, Soviet Ambassador volunteered to Nasser help on high dam. No surveys or attachment of conditions (such as necessity agreement on Nile waters, et cetera) involved. He also offered economic development funds. Both were refused. When Nasser said how about some guns for cotton in same conversation, it is reliably reported Soviet Ambassador took list of available equipment from his pocket with prices indicated, and stated delivery could be made

[4] Document 145.

within six weeks with payment in cotton. Other interesting examples involving GOE procurement from Hungary of locomotives which it originally intended to obtain with US aid will be sent separately.

If decision is to try affirmatively meet greater part of requirements, there will be great benefits here by acting quickly. If local attaché information correct, it would appear that bulk of heavy items requested are World War II vintage believed to be readily available and at reduced prices.

As to procedures, should think Egyptian Ambassador and attachés Washington should handle arrangements with Department and Pentagon. Would hope avoid necessity in this commercial deal, under existing 408 e agreement,[5] repetition past procedures of missions to and from Washington (unless GOE desires otherwise) prior to any affirmative response, and I would hope, some deliveries.[6]

Byroade

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[5] Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which became Public Law 329 on October 6, 1949, enabled the President to transfer or to sell equipment, materials, or services to a nation which had joined the United States in a collective defense or regional arrangement. For text of the act, see 63 Stat. (pt. 1) 714.

Egypt and the United States, through an exchange of notes, had concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on April 29, 1952. For texts of these notes, see TIAS No. 3564, printed in 7 UST (pt. 1) 841.

[6] Allen informed Byroade on July 12 that the Department was "giving urgent and sympathetic consideration Egyptian request for arms." (Telegram 77 to Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–1255) Byroade acknowledged receipt of this cable on July 14 but warned "any significant delay now will be same as negative answer." He also reported that he had received a number of queries from the Egyptians as to when they could expect a response from the United States. Byroade urged that he be sent a rapid reply from Washington, since the Soviet Ambassador had recently asked the Egyptians what they planned to do with the Soviet offer of arms. (Telegram 72 from Cairo; *ibid.*, 674.84A/7–1455)

144. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 2, 1955—2 p.m.

11. Re Embtel 10. [2] The following communication dated June 30 was received by me from Chef du Cabinet Ali Sabry:

"With reference to your Excellency's discussion with the Prime Minister on the 22nd of June 1955, [3] regarding the purchase of arms from the US, by the Government of Egypt, I enclose herein, a list of the requirements the Egyptian armed forces would be willing to procure."

The attached list as follows:

I. A. 120 M4A3ES medium tanks, 76 mm guns (or later model suitable for desert warfare). Tanks to be accompanied by all items except personal sidearms necessary to equip 2 US separate medium tank battalions.

B. 200,000 rounds 76 mm ammo in proportions of basic load.

II. 15 M24 flame thrower tanks. Also specifications of flame fuel and an estimate of fuel consumption per combat day.

III. T/O and E equipment for one armored infantry battalion (M59 APCs, or later model, if any) less personal sidearms.

IV. A. 10,000 rounds 75 mm HE.

B. 10,000 rounds 75 mm APC.

C. 4,000 rounds 75 mm HEAT.

D. 5,000 rounds 75 mm WP.

E. 10 tons propellant for 75 mm HE.

F. 10 tons propellant for 37 mm HE and AP.

V. 30 B–26 (A–26) aircraft, accompanied by the T/O and E equipment needed to outfit a US Air Force unit or units represented by this number of planes.

VI. Three target towing aircraft. Also information on the modification of aircraft for target towing.

VII. 2,000 napalm bombs. [4]

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–255. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 5:19 p.m.

[2] *Supra*.

[3] See Document 137.

[4] On July 11, Under Secretary Hoover, in a memorandum to the Secretary, informed Dulles that earlier that day he had shown the President the list of military items requested by the Egyptians. The President "observed that while it might appear costly to the Egyptians, it actually did not represent a particularly potent military force. Unless we felt it would raise undue complications with the Israelis, he saw no objection to selling them part or all of it. The President thought we should make a concerted effort to 'woo' Nasser." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/7–1155)

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 2, 1955—2 p.m.

12. Following summarizes pattern of Communist bloc activity in Egypt.

1. *Political*. Communist bloc states now enjoy great political advantage in Egypt as compared US since their public position agrees with that of GOE and most of its supporters on vital issues of Turk-Iraqi pact and all "western-sponsored" defense alliances, Zionism and Israel, "colonialism", and Egypt's policy of "independence". Furthermore no split on issue of wide public interest seems exist between Egypt and Communist bloc.

During past two years Communist bloc states have more than doubled size their missions in Egypt, opened several new offices, and now appear to be planning to open liaison office Khartoum. Pattern of blocs general political activity in Egypt, however, has not changed significantly this period. In particular no evidence exists that bloc has made serious attempt unite splintered Egyptian Communist movement although subversive activities among minorities continue on small scale.

2. *Economic*. In contrast, Communist bloc has made every effort maximize commercial ties with Egypt from which it has reaped considerable political advantage. Bloc has increased cotton purchases 66% above last season and figure likely go much higher if projected exchange with Communist China can be worked out. Communist bloc also actively interested in Egyptian rice which, like cotton, suffering heavily from depressed world market for which Egyptians blame US surplus disposal programs (present or "contemplated"). Communist bloc, in exchange for cotton and rice, is offering petroleum and industrial equipment at favorable prices including locomotives and is carrying on very intensive trade promotion through trade fairs and delegations. Egyptians have welcomed Communist trade offers. Apparently convinced American agricultural policy will continue unfavorably affect their previous markets in Western Europe, GOE making every effort establish new markets in only available area i.e. Communist bloc.

Soviets have also offered "assistance" to Egypt on high dam project. In this case however Egyptians have been wary, probably because they are doubtful of Soviet ability follow through and so prefer not cut themselves off prematurely from possible western

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/7–255. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:39 p.m.

financing. If IBRD and or other forms of western financing fail materialize, Soviet offer, if renewed, may appear more interesting.

Communist bloc has also concluded series payment agreements with Sudan Government with tacit consent of Governor General who considers "foreign affairs" not involved.

3. *Cultural*. Communist bloc has carried on active cultural program which has been particularly successful in promoting visits of Egyptians to Communist areas and in penetrating press circles. Latter is relatively easy since by and large Communist and crypto-Communist journalists are highly qualified professionally and write well and to the liking of many of regimes supporters on subjects such as foreign and economic policy.

4. *Psychological*. Present world wide conciliatory attitude of Communist bloc has also helped produce feeling on part GOE that in addition economic necessities, short run advantages of dealing with Soviets may outweigh long range disadvantages. Additional factors are awareness weakness local Communist movement and pervading suspicion of western intentions toward Egypt as GOE becomes increasingly persuaded that divergencies between its foreign policy objectives and those of the US unlikely to be resolved in Egypt's favor in near future.

Conclusion: GOE remains opposed local Communist political activities and is vaguely aware of long-term dangers closer relations with Communist bloc. Nevertheless, I believe GOE, which sees no evidence recent increase bloc political and subversive activity in Egypt and appears convinced trade with bloc probably absolute necessity in absence concrete evidence to contrary, is prepared accept risks involved.

Byroade

146. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 3, 1955—1 p.m.

24. Eyes only for Secretary. Have received for comment draft text possible public statement by you re Arab-Israeli situation [2] which suggestions are made along lines of Alpha project. Will inform Department by separate message reasons why I believe such a statement will be counter-productive in Middle East generally. Will also forward such comments as we have on text, although these relatively unimportant if decision actually made to proceed with that type statement.

I hope you will not conclude that you personally should make statement containing suggested methods of settlement of Arab-Israeli matters. I say this because I do not like to look forward to extreme criticism of you personally which I am certain would follow. This I believe would be case in Middle East generally regardless of how reasonable statement might be in your eyes or of well-intentioned motivation. Things are not going well out here as you know but I retain conviction expressed to you prior my departure that our greatest asset in Arab world is feeling that both you and the President personally are trying be fair and just. I fear if statement made by you increasing and vicious propaganda will do much to change this regard for highest level officials our administration.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–355. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Received at 2:22 p.m.

[2] Jernegan informed Byroade and Lawson in letters dated June 22 that Dulles had decided to launch the Alpha project by making a public statement, probably around August 1, on the Arab-Israeli situation, and that the British planned to issue a supporting statement. He enclosed copies of the draft statement and requested their comments. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after 2nd London Talks—April 26–June 30, '55) The draft, dated June 18, was a revised version of the draft which Russell sent to Dulles on June 15 (see footnote 9, Document 120). Copies of both drafts are in Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 4.

147. Memorandum From Oliver L. Troxel, Jr., of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs to Francis H. Russell [1]

Washington, July 5, 1955.

SUBJECT

Status of the Jordan Valley Negotiations

During the past week, we made more progress in our discussions with the Israelis than during the entire period since our return from the Near East. You will recall that the Israelis had earlier accepted the minimum position on quantities set forth by Mr. Johnston—the position he feels obligated to try on the Arabs. We have now obtained the understandings we desired on the following issues:

1. The proposed Engineering Board will make its decision as to whether Lake Tiberias is to be used as a reservoir for Yarmuk flood flows on the basis of need in the lower Jordan Valley.
2. The Engineering Board will be empowered to obtain from Israel up to 75 mcm of additional water until the decision is made on Lake Tiberias storage of flood flows.
3. The Watermaster will have free access to all points on the watercourse. [2]

Three issues remain to be resolved. The first two arise in part, at least, from differing evaluations of the engineering facts, and we have asked our engineers to make the necessary analysis for us. We hope to obtain it by July 14. The third issue requires an Executive Branch decision which, in turn, must await a recommendation from Mr. Johnston.

1. Whether the Arabs will be permitted to withdraw Yarmuk flood waters stored in Tiberias as and when they wish.
2. Whether facilities will be constructed south of Tiberias, immediately on reaching an Arab-Israel understanding, adequate to serve the system when Tiberias is used to store Yarmuk water.
3. In what manner and amount aid will be extended to Israel in connection with the program.

Assuming we come to a satisfactory understanding with the Israelis on these three points, Mr. Johnston feels obligated to return to the area. However, the indications we have of sentiment on the Arab side are, if anything, even less propitious than before. The

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Unified Jordan Valley Program. Confidential.

[2] These understandings were incorporated into the text of a "Draft Memorandum of Understanding" that the American and Israeli representatives accepted on July 5. The text of this memorandum is *ibid.*, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, Framework of the Fourth Mission—No. 19 (April 22, 1955–)

situation in Syria shows still fewer constructive elements—if such a thing is possible—and the position of the Lebanese Government is deteriorating. The Government in Jordan is probably slightly stronger (its downfall is no longer predicted daily), but at best it cannot approach the Abol Huda Government of last winter for leadership on this issue.

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148. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, July 8, 1955—2 p.m.

86. From Russell. [2] At conclusion of meetings yesterday [3] Shuckburgh and Minister of State Nutting indicated that, despite earlier misgivings about public Alpha statement by Secretary in near future, they are inclined believe, in view of all circumstances, it probably a desirable step. Shuckburgh expressed general approval of Secretary's draft statement [4] subject to further discussion on question of degree of specificity.

Though less definite on this score, Shuckburgh and Nutting also indicated they would recommend to Macmillan when they see him Monday that he make statement immediately following Secretary's. Nutting said he would prefer have statement made in Commons, which he is sure would give its support. Commons however rises on July 27 and three of us agreed statements should not be made before Israel elections, July 26. Nutting said undoubtedly some other appropriate forum could be found. I would appreciate Department's confirmation that possibility Commons discussion and approval does

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–855. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 11:14 a.m.

[2] Russell flew to London on July 7 to discuss with Shuckburgh the content and timing of the Secretary's proposed public statement. (Telegram 6587 to London, June 30; *ibid.*, 684A.86/6–3055; telegram 3 from London, July 1; *ibid.*, 684A.86/7–155; telegram 7 to London, July 1; *ibid.*)

[3] Shuckburgh, officers of the Foreign Office, Russell, and representatives of the U.S. Embassy met on July 7 and again on July 11. British officials prepared summary minutes of these meetings; these documents are *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha: London Talks, July 7–15: Minutes of 2 meetings held at Fon Off.

[4] Presumably Russell had taken with him a copy of the third draft of the Secretary's proposed public statement on Alpha, which was dated June 28. (*Ibid.*, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after 2d London Talks—April 26–June 30, '55)

not alter previous Departmental position statement should be made around August 15. [5]

Shuckburgh said Treasury has approved in principle UK providing of pounds sterling 10 to 15 million to Israeli Government towards refugee compensation fund. Treasury also agreed to approve, if requested by Israeli Government and if necessary to raising of balance of compensation fund by Israeli Government, some means by which Israeli Government could obtain funds from British Jewry.

I am discussing with Foreign Office today measures which could be taken preliminary to, and following, Secretary's and Macmillan's statements to assure greatest possible general support and most likely acceptance by parties. Shuckburgh plans go to Paris with Macmillan. It is his understanding Secretary and Macmillan lunching Friday July 15th [6] and Alpha discussion probably then. [7] I plan leave for Paris Thursday morning to report to Secretary on results London discussion.

Aldrich

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[5] The Department informed Russell that it continued to believe that both statements should be made around August 15. (Telegram 150 to London, July 9; *ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/7–855)

[6] Preceding the Heads of Government meeting at Geneva, Dulles was in Paris, July 14–16, for the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council and related conferences.

[7] Macmillan and Dulles discussed Alpha on July 14. See Document 158.

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149. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, July 9, 1955—noon.

6. General Burns has told me that Israel press stories of July 7 and 8 constitute good factual account of last two Gaza meetings. According Tekoah's recent statements to press, which source such accounts, Egyptian and Israeli representatives agreed tentatively to certain proposals which comprise: (1) strict measures to prevent civilians crossing D/L; (2) provisions for return of persons crossing

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–955. Confidential; Priority. Received at 10:13 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, London, Paris, Beirut, and Damascus. Passed to USUN.

D/L; (3) only trained police or soldiers to man forward posts and conduct patrols.

Areas of disagreement (with Egypt taking negative stand) are said to have been as follows: (1) direct telephone communications between local commanders; (2) acknowledgment of an obligation to return stolen property carried across the D/L; (3) frequent meetings of local commanders; (4) exchange of information concerning punishment of persons attempting to cross the D/L illegally; (5) settlement of minor incidents by local commanders without resort to MAC procedures.

Gilroy, *New York Times* correspondent, has reported that Tekoah described meeting as "tough going." He said that while Israel wants to reach agreement on best measures for reducing tensions on frontier Egypt is on guard against anything indicative of real cooperation. Tekoah expressed view that the Egyptian attitude is opposed to going beyond the present security arrangements. Egyptians thus sought to accomplish the minimum possible through the talks.

In commenting on foregoing press accounts, General Burns told me July 8 Gohar is certainly trying to reduce any commitments to a minimum. However, Gohar said to Burns July 6 "I hope you don't find me deliberately obstructive now!" Burns added that Gohar evidently had instructions to be less difficult than at opening meetings, but that he is still very formalistic and pedantic in his approach, if not now "obstructive."

Regarding settlement minor incidents outside MAC procedures, Gohar maintained that subcommittee of MAC already capable of handling such incidents.

With reference local commanders agreement, or "arrangements," Burns explained that Gohar insists Major Sedki (Egyptian MAC representative) act as local commander for Egyptians, although the Officer with authority to take action is Brigadier Aghroudi, in command of military Gaza area. Burns said Sedki has no authority over troops and would not prove effective. On contrary he would merely have to refer all matters to the Brigadier. This subject is to be considered further next meeting. Meanwhile, Burns is trying work out compromise. Burns also seeking obtain compromise on question direct telephone communications between commanders which would involve using UNTSO observer as intermediary. Understand Egyptians would probably agree such expedient.

Burns said that while facts given out by Tekoah are substantially correct, he considered unwarranted impression conveyed by Tekoah that owing to Egyptian obstruction no satisfactory agreement can be reached on outstanding points in future discussions. . . .

To summarize, Burns added that Gohar has at least agreed in principle to his four points. Gohar remains afraid, however, of any

measures which might prove unpopular with Egyptian military. Burns expressed view that he thought it would be well for powers to avoid any further pressures on Egypt with regard talks at least for time being. If, however, diplomatic representatives found opportunity to mention informally, for instance, the possible detriment to Gaza proceedings of controversial statements for the press, that might prove helpful. Also he had no objection if they could let it be known casually that he is still finding Gohar "a bit sticky." Burns said that (in the light of Gohar's evident aim to achieve a minimum of accomplishment) his own efforts to get something done doubtless made him appear "pro-Israeli" to the Egyptians. For that reason Burns exercised more restraint than usual in conducting most recent meetings.

Cole

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150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, July 9, 1955—3:44 p.m.

53. Eyes only Ambassador. From the Secretary. I believe that is unavoidable that we soon make some statement of US policy toward the Israel-Arab problem. We have made no policy statement for over two years. During the Congressional elections, we said we would not do so because we felt sure that whatever we said would be tinged by politics, but we promised action soon afterwards. Now nine months have gone by since our October promises in that respect. If many more months go by, we will be in a worse position politically than during the Congressional elections. Inevitably, statements will be made on both political sides, and I don't see how it is possible to prevent those statements having a very grave effect upon future relations. Therefore, it seems to me that a reasonably comprehensive statement should be made now which will represent the position to which the Administration, and I hope the Opposition, would adhere during the 1956 elections.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–955. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by Dulles. Repeated to London eyes only Ambassador and Russell.

I have been struck by the fact that Fawzi shares the view that we should this year seek an overall solution of Arab-Israel problems. He told me that at San Francisco.[2] He has repeated it here in Washington.[3] He emphasizes three points: There should not be a security treaty with Israel before there is an overall settlement, and he then prefers a "declaration" to a treaty. He believes there should be adequate compensation for the property losses of the refugees, and he believes that there should be an adjustment in the Negev which would reunite the Arab world. His expressed idea of such adjustments is greatly exaggerated, but I would not expect less from an initial statement of trading position. He sought American financial help for High Dam, and when I indicated this would be more easy after Israeli settlement, he said he understood our position. Russell from London indicates that despite earlier misgivings about public Alpha statement by me in the near future, British now inclined to believe under all circumstances, this probably a desirable step, and I expect to discuss this with Macmillan in Paris.

I believe my two talks with Fawzi are such that he will believe that what I say has been influenced by his own judgment and that this may mitigate ill reception. Probably, there can be similar talks with Eban and possibly some Jewish leaders here with like result.

While therefore I recognize that both Jews and Arabs will as first reaction be publicly negative and critical, this will probably subside, and even if negotiations along the lines suggested do not soon get underway, we will have charted a course which is basically sound and to which we can perhaps hold during our national elections.

I suspect that any announcement may have a negative effect upon Johnston's plan, but his effort has been going on now for two years and I see no prospect of consummation within another year or more. Therefore, I am not inclined to hold off on this account. However, I shall discuss this with Johnston on Monday.[4]

If you believe that there is a serious divergence between point of view expressed by Fawzi and that held by Nasser, please inform me promptly.

Dulles

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[2] See Document 138.

[3] The Secretary had met again with Fawzi on July 7. (Memorandum of conversation, by Dorsey; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86A/7–755)

[4] See *infra*.

151. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 11, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Relationship of Public Statement on Arab-Israel Problem to Jordan Valley Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Eric Johnston
S—The Secretary
NEA—Mr. George V. Allen
NE—Mr. William C. Burdett

Mr. Johnston stated he understood from Mr. Francis Russell that the Secretary was considering a public statement on the Arab-Israel problem and he requested the Secretary to indicate the nature of the proposed announcement. [2] The Secretary replied that he planned to comment on the explosive potentialities of the Arab-Israel situation and to indicate that if progress were made on such major matters as compensation for the refugees and border rectifications, including a land connection between Egypt and Jordan, that the U.S. would be prepared to assist by providing a loan to help Israel pay compensation and by extending a security guaranty of the borders agreed upon.

Mr. Johnston urged forcefully that the Secretary postpone a decision on whether or not to make a public statement until Mr. Johnston's return from his impending trip to the area. He stated he would be back by August 25, at the latest, and possibly as early as August 15. Mr. Johnston thought the Arab-Israel problem should be approached from an economic standpoint and not a political one, because none of the Arab leaders would feel able to ask their people to accept a political settlement. He maintained that success in the Jordan Valley negotiations might well open the way to a solution of the entire problem. Mr. Johnston reported that considerable progress

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1155. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Burdett.

[2] Jernegan stated in a July 6 memorandum to Dulles that, in accordance with the latter's instructions, Russell had telephoned Johnston in Spokane, Washington, and informed him that Dulles planned to make a public statement around August 15 presenting a program for a general Near Eastern settlement and that he hoped Johnston would be able to return to the Near East before July 28. Johnston expressed concern at this decision and subsequently requested an opportunity to talk to Dulles by telephone to attempt to dissuade him from it. Jernegan's memorandum stated that Johnston was expected to argue that if his negotiations were successful, the Arabs would regard such a public statement as a "double cross." (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/7–655) No record of such a telephone conversation has been found. Johnston's views are further discussed in a letter of July 7 from Troxel to Russell. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/7–755)

had been made recently with Israel, and he estimated his chances of obtaining agreement in principle during his next trip at about 50–50. However, if the Secretary were to make his planned statement, prospects for the Jordan Valley negotiations would be destroyed.

In reply the Secretary explained that he felt obliged to make a definitive statement of U.S. policy towards the area before the 1956 election campaign started. If he failed to chart out a specific course now, the issue would inevitably become enmeshed in domestic politics. The results could be severe damage to the U.S. position in the area as a whole. Israel was exerting strong pressure to secure a security guarantee, and we had been delaying since October 1954. It was impossible to continue doing so much longer. The Secretary pointed out that, according to his reports, agreement was unlikely during Mr. Johnston's next trip. Even if agreement in principle were reached, the details still would have to be worked out, which would require a long time. It would be logical for Mr. Johnston to ask for a further delay in order that the final negotiations might be completed. The three or four weeks delay now requested was not critical, but he foresaw that it would be only the first of a series of additional delays. The Secretary mentioned that the British were thinking of making a statement before Commons rose on July 27.

At the conclusion of the discussion the Secretary agreed not to make a public statement himself before August 25, but added that he could not say whether the British would do so. The Secretary said that in preparing the statement, he would take into consideration, of course, the results of Mr. Johnston's trip. Mr. Johnston expressed pleasure at the decision and gave the Secretary categorical assurances that he would not request any further delay in the issuance of a public statement.[3]

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[3] Dulles informed Russell the following day that, in light of Johnston's assurances that "he had obtained sufficient agreement from Israel on Jordan water plan to justify 50–50 expectation of obtaining concurrence of Arab States during his visit Middle East at end of July", he had "reluctantly agreed" to refrain from making his public statement before August 25, and he asked Russell to request a similar postponement by the British. (Telegram 199 to London, July 12; *ibid.*, 684A.86/7–1255)

152. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 11, 1955—8 p.m.

61. Department eyes only Secretary. London eyes only Ambassador and Russell. Have received your personal message regarding motivation for policy statement in near future on Arab-Israeli problem [2] and want you to know I fully appreciate domestic reasons for statement which indeed important and convincing.

It had been my hope some way could be found meet situation that did not include public specific recommendations by United States as to how elements Arab-Israeli problem might be solved. Feeling you would wish me point out after effects in area as I see them sent letter July 7 to George Allen which hope you can find time read. [3] (For information London: One of main points letter was my belief that these particular recommendations which we call Alpha and which have been carefully worked out to best our ability, may well have to be discarded after public launching in search of other methods of solution which, in some cases at least, probably do not exist from practical point of view. It seemed to me that Arab leaders would not place themselves in position of attempting meet public suggestions made by United States on this particular problem.)

Fawzi's statements to you quite similar those made to me and reported in past but must caution that Fawzi is not representative of Arab mood and mentality on this question and is not in position of responsibility this matter even in Egypt. He can be helpful but will not be in position to mitigate ill reception of statement.

Hope Department will give United States and other posts in area as much advance notice of delivery as possible so that we in best position do what we can follow through.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1155. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Received at 7:29 p.m. Repeated priority to London eyes only Ambassador and Russell. An attached chit forwarded the telegram to the Secretary; a handwritten note reads: "Sec saw." The chit also indicates Hoover, Murphy, and Allen received copies of the telegram.

[2] See Document 150.

[3] No copy of this letter has been found in Department of State files.

153. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, July 12, 1955—6 p.m.

141. From Russell. As reported telegram 86 [2] there is present disposition on part of FonOff recognize impelling reasons for Secretary to make an early statement on Israel-Arab problem. British have expressed gratification that ideas in Secretary's draft statement are those which have been worked out in Alpha. As following telegram [3] indicates we have been engaged in formulating specific measures to be taken preparatory and subsequent to proposed statements by Secretary and Macmillan.

British anxieties with respect to effect of proposed statements on governments and public in Middle East and specifically in Iraq and Jordan, however, remain. FonOff points out that there is a risk of the following repercussions in respect of which the British have particular responsibility: (1) visibility of grave disturbances in the refugee camps leading to border troubles in Gaza or along Jordan frontier involving the British treaty with Jordan and Arab legion; (2) possible violent reaction of disappointment on the part of a new and perhaps extremist Israeli Government leading again to involvement of Jordan; and (3) what concerns them mostly is reaction from Nuri and the Arab world generally which would destroy progress to date on northern tier and even lose the British their treaty position in Iraq. At worst Nuri might be overthrown in a wave of public indignation against a policy of cooperation with the West. If estimates from area pointed to such developments, they would in British opinion have to be regarded as overriding.

In order to obtain most accurate possible appraisal, FonOff is sending Geoffrey Arthur to Baghdad (arriving Thursday morning and reporting directly to Macmillan in Paris) to talk with British Ambassador there and later with British Ambassador Amman.

Possibility suggested from discussion this morning that there are two steps which U.S. might take which would bear heavily toward favorable reaction on part of Nuri: (1) decision to provide Iraq through off-shore procurement with small number Centurion tanks along lines recently discussed in Washington, and (2) statement to Nuri that U.S. continues support Turco-Iraqi pact and that while present state of Israel-Arab relations prevents U.S. adherence to pact,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1255. Top Secret; Niact; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:33 p.m.

[2] Document 148.

[3] *Infra.*

if settlement were worked out along lines Secretary will propose, U.S. adherence might be contemplated. If decision could be made on these two points it would not only minimize danger of an explosive Iraqi opposition to proposals but would greatly relieve UK concern re position in Iraq and Jordan.

Macmillan will probably raise these points with Secretary at Paris.

Aldrich

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154. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, July 12, 1955—6 p.m.

142. From Russell. Subject to considerations mentioned preceding telegram following has been agreed with Foreign Office: (1) text of statement to be made by Secretary, with only minor revisions in draft prepared by him; (2) that Macmillan (or if he on vacation, the Foreign Office) would make rather full statement to press day following Secretary's statement showing joint nature of proposals and elaborating certain points of special concern to UK; (3) that British and American Chiefs of Mission Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Baghdad [2] should be informed immediately and their views solicited on certain points; (4) text of memorandum as summarized below to be sent Chiefs of Mission. Foreign Office proposed to send it air pouch closing Friday evening subject to decision at meeting between Secretary and Macmillan in Paris. In view of delays in US air pouch service to area I suggest Department authorize me, subject to results Paris meeting, send memo with brief covering letter to US Mission Chiefs at 6 posts in question, through Foreign Office pouch.

Begin summary proposed memorandum.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–2155. Top Secret; Niact; Alpha; Limited Distribution.

[2] The British Chiefs of Mission were, respectively, Sir Ralph Stevenson, J. W. Nicholls, C. B. Duke, Sir John Gardener, Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews, and Sir Michael Wright; the American Chiefs of Mission were, respectively, Henry A. Byroade, Edward B. Lawson, Lester D. Mallory, James S. Moose, Jr., Donald R. Heath, and Waldemar J. Gallman.

Foreign Office and Department agreed on need for equitable settlement and best means attempting achieve it. Intention had been approach Nasser first but this not possible. Secretary convinced he cannot refrain much longer from defining policy US administration toward Israel's security and Middle East as a whole. Longer he waits more difficult it will become for him make balanced statement on subject; should therefore soon make statement, to which US administration could hold firmly. It our hope that parties to dispute even though they may vigorously reject proposal at first will in long run come see its merits and move slowly toward it. On other hand we not blind to grave risks entailed.

Memorandum encloses copy of draft of speech which Secretary would deliver probably on Thursday August 18, containing outline of possible settlement. Macmillan intends give full support to Secretary's proposals, possibly at press conference, day after publication and express HMG readiness help in bringing about settlement and make financial contribution.

We will avoid being drawn into publishing any fuller details of proposals as this would prejudice any later negotiations. Guidance for publicity will be sent later, meanwhile following explanations of specific points may be useful:

(a) *Guarantees*: It intended these be limited to territorial aspect of settlement. Will be made clear however that guarantees will not be granted except in framework of actual comprehensive settlement, in other words mere acceptance by one party of part or all plan would not earn guarantee.

(b) *Boundaries*: (1) Restoration of land to Arab border villages: this should be interpreted flexibly. To restore all such lands would not be possible as Israel would be almost cut in two. On other hand problem must be solved if settlement to endure. A sort of solution which in our minds will be equitable has in fact been worked out but we want avoid any specific mention of these ideas to parties until they can be induced to engage in serious discussion of a settlement.

(2) Road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem: would entail cession to Israel of part of Latrun Salient and surrounding no man's land.

(3) Negev: Principle underlying this solution is there would be a point at junction of two triangles where sovereignty would appertain both sides or possibly neither. This would make it possible for east-west Arab road under complete Arab control pass over (or under) Israeli north-south road under complete Israeli control. No other way reconcile vital interests of both parties in Negev. We should not commit ourselves on size and location of triangles which left for negotiation although we have various alternative ideas.

(c) *Jerusalem*: . . . first we would try get through UN resolution providing for functional internationalization of Holy Places along lines of Swedish 1950 draft. . . .

(d) *Blockade*: An essential part of any settlement is that Egypt should open Suez Canal to Israel ships and Israel-bound traffic and

that Arab States [should cease to?] put pressure on third parties not to trade with Israel. We would not however ask Arabs engage in direct trade with Israel themselves, even after settlement. Wording of draft statement designed make this distinction.

We propose give parties about 24 hours notice that statements are to be made. Substance of statements would not be revealed at that stage but we would say we hoped both sides would receive them in constructive spirit with willingness look seriously for common ground. We would point out that statements do not call for immediate reply or decision on part of govts nor do they carry any suggestion of coercion. We hope indeed that govts will take their time and be prepared discuss our ideas with us further. In meantime we would ask them in their public reactions to exercise restraint and at least not commit themselves against our suggestions until they have had chance discuss with us in greater detail the advantages we believe them to contain.

We would also inform certain other govts and authorities, notably France, Turkey, Commonwealth, UNSYG, Burns and Labouisse, a few days in advance of statements and seek their support. We will want couch our communications to govts in manner best calculated avoid leak. We would solicit support of other UN members at time of publication of plan.

Chiefs of Mission are asked comment on (a) best way of presenting proposals to govts to which accredited; (b) likely response both of govts and people; (c) whether public reaction would be such as necessitate any special preparations or precautions; (d) best lines of publicity; and (e) whether either Chief of Mission or effective head of govt to which accredited will be out of country on or about Aug 18.

Need for absolute secrecy stressed and matter to be revealed only to minimum number senior officers in each mission. Before replying Chiefs of Mission are to consult US or UK colleagues respectively. *End summary.*

If Dept approves my sending letters as suggested above, subject to decision at Paris meeting, please cable approval for my attention this Emb and also Paris my attention merely stating "Message approved."

If not please cable views to London and send message Paris "not approved." In latter case I will return London before going on to Washington.

Aldrich

155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon [1]

Washington, July 12, 1955—7:40 p.m.

64. As appropriate request you inform Foreign Offices of following and convey your and Foreign Office reactions and comments. [2]

Johnston plans leave US July 28 and open discussions on Arab side. Considerable progress made Washington discussions in clarifying Israel position. Final decision itinerary withheld pending evaluation by Embassy Amman as to desirability Johnston visit Amman to acquaint new cabinet with program and obtain renewed support. [3] If visit made Amman, mission would probably begin conversations with Arabs there, follow with brief visit Damascus and conclude at Beirut where would hope Foreign Ministers or other plenipotentiaries could be assembled.

In any event key meeting with Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanian and possibly Egyptian ministers probably best held Beirut. Embassy Beirut should express Johnston's appreciation for expert handling and many courtesies provided in February and inquire whether GOL again prepared take leadership in arranging meeting. [4]

In ascertaining whether Fawzi able participate, Embassy Cairo may wish refer to brief contact Washington between Fawzi and Johnston mission in which Fawzi's advice was asked re meeting place and sponsorship. [5] Fawzi here gave impression Egyptians would

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/7–1255. Confidential. Drafted by Troxel; cleared with Burdett, Ludlow, and Barnes; and approved by Burdett. Also sent to Amman, Damascus, Cairo, and Tel Aviv. Repeated to Jidda and Jerusalem, and pouched to London, Baghdad, and Haifa.

[2] The Embassy in Damascus reported that Istawani, Director General of the Foreign Office, had raised no objections to Johnston's itinerary or to Beirut as the site of a meeting. Istawani noted, however, that since the election of a new Syrian President would occur only 10 days or 2 weeks after Johnston's visit and the proposed Beirut meeting, and the present Cabinet would have to resign when the new President was installed on September 5, it was not in a good position to make a commitment only a month before it left office. (Telegram 39 from Damascus, July 14; *ibid.*, 120.1580/7–1455)

[3] The Embassy in Amman recommended that Johnston should begin his negotiations with Jordan and reported that when the substance of this message was conveyed on July 13 to the Prime Minister, he welcomed Johnston's visit. (Telegram 19 from Amman, July 14; *ibid.*)

[4] Ambassador Heath conveyed the substance of this message in separate conversations on July 15 with President Chamoun, Foreign Minister Frangie, and Ammoun, Director General of the Foreign Office. Chamoun had no objection to a meeting at Beirut but Frangie argued that Cairo would be more suitable. (Telegram 53 from Beirut, July 15; *ibid.*, 120.1580/7–1555)

[5] Byroade reported that he had posed the questions raised in this message to the Acting Foreign Minister, who "stated he certain Egypt desired be helpful but felt any

be agreeable Beirut. Believe it important Riad attend in view his long standing role as de facto chairman Arab committee. Continue count on Selim's invaluable participation.

Mission would expect arrive Israel beginning second week August. [6]

Dulles

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decisions on part of GOE should await Fawzi's return." (Telegram 93 from Cairo, July 18; *ibid.*, 120.1580/7–1855)

[6] The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that the Israeli Foreign Ministry had raised no objections to this. (Telegram 27 from Tel Aviv, July 15; *ibid.*, 120.1580/7–1555)

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156. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 13, 1955.

SUBJECT

Proposal by British Respecting Eric Johnston's Trip

Discussion:

The attached telegram from Francis Russell [2] states that Mr. Shuckburgh has suggested Mr. Johnston's trip might follow the proposed US and UK statements on Near Eastern policy.

Mr. Johnston's staff has already raised with him the possibility that his trip might be postponed until afterwards. Mr. Johnston felt, however, that to do so would open him—and, through him, the United States—to the accusation of bad faith. In his previous visits, he has emphasized to the Arabs that acceptance of the Jordan Valley proposals would not imply any political accommodation with Israel. Your proposed statement he believes, will necessarily link a settlement on the water issue with the other elements set forth. The Arabs will assume that your statement was discussed with him and has his approval. Mr. Johnston therefore has personal grounds for not wanting the statement made before he returns to the area and either succeeds or fails.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1355. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Troxel.

[2] Telegram 152 from London, not printed. (*Ibid.*)

Under the circumstances, and in view of your conversation with Mr. Johnston, it would probably be difficult to arrange the suggested postponement of Mr. Johnston's trip.

Recommendation:

I recommend that no change be made in the timing of the statement from that which you gave Eric Johnston, i.e., that it be made *after* his visit.

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157. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 13, 1955.

SUBJECT

Comments on Alpha Proposals

The following comments are submitted on the Alpha proposals worked out by Mr. Francis Russell with the British in London (London telegrams 141 and 142, [2] Tab A).

1. *British concern at area reaction to public statement.*

We agree that a sharply critical initial reaction may occur. However, we believe the British overstate the strength and possible results of the reaction. Although elements on both sides almost automatically attack any reasonable proposals, it is unlikely that either party will take drastic action. The proposals contain important benefits for Jordan. Assessment by our missions of this problem will be especially helpful.

We question whether grave disturbances will necessarily occur in the refugee camps, particularly since the leaders are offered the attractive prospect of compensation. The point the refugees probably will resent most strongly is the omission from the statement of any mention of their return to Israel. In the absence of an indication that the U.S. and U.K. intend to impose the proposals, Israel is unlikely to erupt. Instead she may well exert extreme pressure to obtain an

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos & corres., July 1–Aug. 26 (day of Secy's speech). Top Secret; Alpha. Burdett forwarded a copy to Russell on July 13. (*Ibid.*)

[2] Documents 153 and 154.

interpretation of the proposals agreeable to her; endeavor to place the onus for any rejection on the Arabs; and in that context renew her drive for a security guarantee. We doubt that Nuri will risk his newly acquired prestige and leadership won through taking the lead in cooperative area defense arrangements by reacting violently over the Israel problem.

2. *British suggestions for U.S. action to counter adverse Iraq reaction.*

Neither proposal appears particularly useful in mitigating a genuinely popular reaction; both are actions the U.K. has sought persistently from the U.S. in other contexts.

A summary of the off-shore procurement problem, particularly as it relates to Centurion tanks, is attached (Tab B).[3] We recommend replying to the British that the U.S. intends to continue the present policies on offshore procurement; that the present Iraq aid program contemplates no tanks; that we do not see how signing a contract for delivery of tanks at a much later date will influence appreciably Iraq public reaction to the statement. This reply is in accord with the President's decision on Middle East Defense policy[4] which we intend to communicate to the British on July 14.

Statement to Nuri on adherence to Turco-Iraqi pact. The President approved on July 11 the following position on U.S. adherence:

Under existing circumstances, the U.S. does not think it wise to adhere or otherwise formally associate itself with the Pact, particularly because this would adversely affect our influence in bringing about a reduction in Arab-Israel tensions. We do not, however, exclude the possibility that we shall eventually adhere, and we shall keep this question under constant review in the light of developments.[5]

We recommend informing Nuri of the substance of the above decision if Embassy Baghdad and the British believe it would be helpful in connection with the Alpha statement. In any event, Nuri will have been informed before the statement is issued that the U.S. will establish close liaison arrangements with the pact organization, which should allay any suspicions on his part that U.S. support for the Turk-Iraq pact is weakening.

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[3] Not printed.

[4] According to a July 11 memorandum from Hoover to the Secretary, the President that day approved the Department's position that the United States should continue to procure limited amounts of military equipment for Middle East defense from British sources and should encourage the United Kingdom to provide more resources for the defense of the area. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/7–1155)

[5] This statement is from a memorandum entitled "Defense of the Middle East", which Hoover gave the President at their meeting on July 11. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos & corres., July 1–Aug. 26 (day of Secy's speech)

3. We should ask the British for a copy of their proposed statement. Since we have considered their views on ours they should be willing to receive our comments.

4. We concur that the views of the U.S. and U.K. Chiefs of Mission at Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad should be sought. In addition, we should not single out Jidda for omission.

5. The proposed memorandum is excellent and should be sent to the field. The date of your proposed statement should be changed to read "about August 25", in accordance with your commitment to Eric Johnston.

6. We agree that a short advance notice to the parties is desirable and that other governments and authorities should be informed also. The approach each mission will use to the foreign government should be carefully worked out to assure the best possible reception. Your talks with Fawzi should prove most helpful in this regard. Leaks will probably occur, but last-minute disclosures need not be harmful. They may serve a useful purpose in focusing public attention, increasing the impact, and also may lessen the chances of a spontaneous unthinking adverse reaction such as might occur if the statement came without warning.

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158. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador's Residence, Paris, July 14, 1955, 10 p.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles	Mr. Macmillan
Mr. Francis Russell	Mr. Shuckburgh

Mr. Macmillan said that he had discussed with the British Cabinet this morning the new proposal that the Alpha Plan should be launched by means of a public statement rather than through the procedure of secret approaches to the parties.[2] He said that he had not had long notice of this change of plan and that the Cabinet had felt unable to take a final decision so quickly. They were concerned

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[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 494. Top Secret. Drafted by Shuckburgh.

[2] Aldrich reported on July 13 in telegram 148 from London that he had presented the proposal to Macmillan the previous afternoon and that the latter was presenting it to the Cabinet that day. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1355)

by the risks which the procedure would involve, risks which would fall to a large extent on Great Britain by reason of her commitments in the area. Mr. Macmillan himself would prefer that if the procedure of public statements were adopted, it should be a wholly joint announcement, rather than an announcement in which the United States declared a policy and Her Majesty's Government said that they had been consulted and were in agreement. He said that the Israeli would in his view no doubt in the end accept the situation revealed by such statements, particularly since they were heavily dependent upon the United States. The greater difficulty was with the Arab world.

He therefore felt justified in asking Mr. Dulles to consider certain ways in which the United States could help to mitigate hostile reactions by the Arabs, and particularly dangerous effects on the position of Nuri, the Turco-Iraqi Pact, and the British-Iraqi Agreement. He had the following suggestions to make: (1) Would the United States consider giving its support to the Turco-Iraqi Pact now? (2) Would the United States be prepared to assure Nuri that he would receive arms by offshore purchase? He referred particularly to the case of tanks. (3) Should not our two Governments concert together what precautionary measures might be required in the event of outbreaks of one kind or another in the area?

In this connection Mr. Macmillan pointed out that the United States had originally been very favorable to the elaboration of the Northern Tier concept, that in the event Her Majesty's Government had adhered to it and the United States had not, the Arab world as a whole was watching to see whether Iraq obtained the reward she expected for her courage in her taking this step, thereby splitting the Arab world.

Finally, Mr. Macmillan told Mr. Dulles that he had recently heard through Mr. Lester Pearson that the Egyptian Foreign Minister speaking privately had adumbrated a solution of the Palestine problem which did not differ greatly from the Alpha proposals. Although he did not necessarily represent entirely the views of the revolutionary command in Egypt, this was at least an encouraging feature.

A telegram from Sir Michael Wright, British Ambassador in Baghdad, on the possible effects of such statements in Iraq was read.

Mr. Dulles explained the political reasons which impelled him to make some statement on the subject of Israel in the near future. He did not say that it had to be this month or next month, but it must [be] some time in the early fall. He too had spoken to Fawzi who had agreed that if a settlement was to be reached, it must be through some initiative by the Western powers and must be during the current year. Mr. Byroade, the United States Ambassador in

Cairo, had, however, warned him that it would be rash to pay too much attention to what Fawzi said in this matter.

As regards the procedure of private negotiation which of course he would have preferred, Mr. Dulles pointed out that this would not be sufficient in the coming months unless it might suggest rapid strides as to enable some public results to be shown in the next few months which he did not believe was likely. He said that he had himself been thinking of a statement rather less detailed than that which had now been produced by the Working Group.[3] He would like to see the statement contain principles only. For example, he had suggested eliminating the references to Arab villages, their lands, the Latrun salient, and to the over and under passes in the Negev. He thought we would be more likely to avoid outbursts and attract inquiries into our proposals and that if we succeeded in doing that the Governments would have "gotten their feet wet", and we should at least have made a beginning. Mr. Macmillan said that he agreed generally with this thought. He felt that it was not over details of this kind that the Arab outbursts would be likely to arise, but rather over a general proposition that they should make peace with Israel. Mr. Dulles said that he was thoroughly prepared to take the position that Israel should not get a security guarantee until a settlement had been worked out. He anticipated that there would be some pressure against this, but he felt that it would be possible to stand up to it.

As regards Iraq, Mr. Dulles said that the United States Government could indicate to her that it was impossible for the United States to join the Northern Tier Pact or indeed to make any pact with Arab states until this question was settled, but that if this could be achieved, the United States would be prepared to join the Pact. In the meantime the United States would maintain contact with the defense discussions of the Northern Tier through observers and would give its strong support to the Northern Tier. As regards timing Mr. Dulles said that he [had] undertaken through Mr. Eric Johnston that he would not make the statement until after Mr. Johnston's forthcoming visit to the area in connection with the Jordan waters. Taking into account the holiday period around the end of August, this meant that the statement could probably not take place until about the first week of September.

It was agreed that Mr. Schuckburgh and Mr. Russell would review the various papers that had been drafted during the previous week on the launching of Alpha in the light of these discussions and

[3] A copy of the Working Group's draft statement for Secretary Dulles' consideration is *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha. Secretary's Statement: Letr of 7/22 to NE Chiefs of Mission, with 4 attachments re.

present specific proposals to Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Dulles the following day. [4]

[4] *Infra.*

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159. Memorandum by Francis H. Russell and the Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office (Shuckburgh) [1]

Paris, July 15, 1955.

In accordance with instructions given to us last evening by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Macmillan, we suggest the following course of procedure on Alpha:

1. Mr. Dulles' statement will be postponed to early September. [2]
2. Attached is a revised draft of Mr. Dulles' statement omitting mention of specific details of the proposed settlement. [3]
3. Mr. Macmillan would make a supporting statement (subject to 4 below) twenty-four hours later. Attached is a suggested draft of such a statement. [4]
4. It will be necessary to await further discussion by the British Cabinet before deciding whether the statements would indicate that HM Government had participated fully and from the beginning in the proposals outlined; or whether Mr. Macmillan would merely welcome the Dulles statement and support it.
5. If possible, Mr. Dulles will inform Mr. Macmillan prior to this Cabinet discussion (probably around July 26) concerning (a) what the U.S. would be prepared to say to the Iraq Government following the enunciation of the Alpha proposals with respect to eventual U.S. adherence to the Turko-Iraq Pact, and (b) whether it would be USG policy that Iraq be supplied Centurion tanks under OSP, assuming appropriate timing and political conditions; and whether Nuri might be informed of this and told that delivery of the tanks will depend upon the manner in which the Alpha proposals are received by the Iraq Government.
6. The U.S. and U.K. Missions in Israel and the Arab countries should be informed, on a secret basis, of the proposals for the Alpha

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha: 1) Paris: Memo of Conv. betw. S and Macmillan, July 14; 2) Paris: Memo on Procedure, July 15, signed by Shuckburgh and FSR. Top Secret; Alpha.

[2] Originally this sentence read: "Mr. Dulles' statement will be postponed to Thursday, September 8." Secretary Dulles made the textual changes.

[3] See Document 169.

[4] See Document 169.

statements as soon as HMG has formulated its position under paragraph 4 above.

Francis H. Russell
C.A.E. Shuckburgh

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160. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, July 16, 1955—1 p.m.

11. I saw General Burns this morning and found him now cautiously optimistic regarding Gaza talks. He is reporting to UNSYG along following lines relative past 3 days meetings:

Begin Paraphrase

Although there is still considerable suspicion atmosphere now improved. It should be possible achieve certain results in course next few weeks, barring occurrence some extraneous incident. With regard to "arrangement for maintaining security along the D/L" all clauses now agreed except important ones relating to position officers representing parties and means communication between them. Appears possible obtain consent both parties to telephone line to UN observer stationed at kilo 95, who would relay messages or arrange for commanders to converse. Regarding question level local commanders for purposes agreement, Israel wants commander specified while Egypt willing agree only specify "senior officer with authority to ensure required action." However, Egypt gave unofficial assurance that this officer will have status of staff officer to local commander with power issue orders (in absence his superior) on subjects within scope arrangement.

There was considerable "shadow-boxing" with reference question joint patrols and border obstacle. Gohar wished discuss patrols first, in hope that Israel would refuse unqualified agreement. He would then be in good position raise objection proposals regarding obstacle. Burns will try to advance modified proposal combining the two concepts, and believes Egypt will stand by undertaking made in Security Council to erect obstacle along portions D/L. Owing questions internal politics and Arab States relations, Egypt finds it difficult agree effective continuous barrier.

End Paraphrase.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–1655. Confidential; Priority. Received at 11:26 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, London, Paris, USUN, Beirut, and Damascus.

Burns said clauses of commanders arrangement upon which agreement reached are:

(1) Obligation regarding recovery and return stolen property,
(2) Settlement minor incidents within framework of arrangement,
(3) Exchange of information regarding persons crossing D/L,
(4) Enforcement strict measures re prevention such crossings,
(5) Periodic meetings of local commanders, and
(6) Return of infiltrators at meetings of commanders.

Gohar unwilling make commitment about punishment of returned infiltrators, and likewise would not agree to proposal providing for exchange of information concerning or giving publicity to such punishments.

Both parties agreed refrain from controversial publicity pending next meetings which scheduled for July 20. In Burns opinion there is fair possibility to conclude local commanders arrangement next week. He said Gohar somewhat more cooperative is still very slow and cautious. Tekoah seemed very reasonable to deal with and possibly subject some criticism from Israelis for not being "hard-boiled" enough. [2]

Referring incident Gaza border, July 14, Burns explained this involved some Egyptian shepherds who crossed D/L, rather than soldiers as has been reported. He regarded SY as "minor".

Cole

[2] On July 18, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld in Geneva gave Secretary Dulles the text of General Burns' report. It was transmitted to the Department of State in Secto 38 from Geneva, July 18; *ibid.*, 396.1–GE/7–1855.

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161. Telegram From the Consulate General at Geneva to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, July 17, 1955—9 p.m.

Secto 28. Following message was delivered by Prime Minister [2] to President Sunday evening, July 17th:

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1755. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 8:15 p.m.

[2] Sir Anthony Eden.

"The proposal to make a public statement on the Alpha plan for Palestine carries serious risks which will fall largely upon Her Majesty's Government by reason of our responsibilities and commitments in the Arab world. The main danger is that there might be a violent reaction in Iraq against the Baghdad Pact and the new Anglo-Iraqi agreement which might lead to the weakening or even the fall of Nuri. In that event the whole concept of a Middle East defense organization would be swept away.

"2. There are two ways in which the United States could help to mitigate these risks. The first is by making it clear to the Iraqi Government that if a Palestine settlement could be achieved on the lines suggested in the proposed statement the United States would be prepared to join the Iraqi-Turkish Pact. On this point the United States Secretary of State has given assurances to the Foreign Secretary.

"3. The second, and even more important, point is that an early decision should be taken that the Iraqi Army shall be equipped with British Centurion tanks. Nuri has indicated that he wishes this, but that he desires the tanks to be supplied free under the American military aid programme, that is to say, by off-shore purchase. The strategic arguments for basing Iraq's armoured formations on British equipment have been fully set out to the United States Government. Primarily it is a question of the Iraqi forces being able to operate in conjunction with British armoured units in the Middle East and to share repair and supply facilities. Not until this matter is resolved can the Iraqi Government show that they are receiving from the West the reward to which they are entitled for their courage in joining the northern tier.

"4. It would therefore greatly allay the anxieties which Her Majesty's Government must feel regarding the proposed Alpha action if the United States Government could agree as follows:—(a) that it will be U.S. Government policy to supply the Iraqi armoured forces with Centurion tanks by off-shore purchase; and (b) that Nuri may be informed of this decision now and the launching of the Alpha statements."

Dulles

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162. Editorial Note

On the evening of July 17, President Eisenhower met with British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who gave him the message, *supra*. The President described this meeting in a diary entry of July 19, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:

"*Mid-East*. Anthony also was concerned about the Mid East. He has been talking to Foster about the so-called 'Alpha Plan.'

"He feels that if any public statement is made by the United States that is interpreted in the region as slanted in favor of Israel, that we are going to lose a lot of Arab support. This support is already shaky and it could, in his opinion, switch toward the Soviet very markedly. The Arabs themselves, of course, are weak except that (together with Iran) they possess the world's greatest oil reserves.

"He believes that if we could do something to meet Iraq's military ambitions *before* we make any announcement slanted toward Israel, that the effect of such announcement would be largely nullified.

"Britain had wanted to sell Centurion tanks to Iraq. But that country has been insisting that it was going to get them for nothing from the United States.

"In these circumstances the British were hopeful that we would buy Centurion tanks as part of our offshore procurement program and give the necessary number to Iraq.

"I told him I did not see much sense to us assuming full financial responsibility for such a proposition, but I did tell him that if Britain would provide a satisfactory portion of the costs, we might participate because we were *of course* interested in strengthening the 'northern tier' of Arab States, of which Iraq is a part.

"Actually I think we should look up the financial status of Iraq. It is entirely possible that that country could afford to pay at least a minor portion of the cost, Britain could then assume a bigger portion and we could foot the rest of the bill. In this way we would really be implementing the thought behind the *Mutual* Security Program." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

Dulte 15 from Geneva, dated July 18, reported on this as follows:

"The President said he had told Eden it was impossible for us to put up the money to enable them to manufacture and give away Centurion tanks to the Iraqi. If, however, the British were prepared to carry a substantial part of the burden we might then do some of it. He said that in principle he favored the use in the Middle East of equipment of British design so as to minimize the burden upon us of replacement of spare parts in the event of war." (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1855)

163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva [1]

Washington, July 19, 1955—3:53 p.m.

Tedul 23. Alpha and Middle East. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary. Re Dulte 15, [2] Secto 28. [3]

1. No tanks of any type have been scheduled by US for Iraqis, and suggestion of Eden that UK should supply Centurions (at US expense) was first intimated to us by Makins in US–UK ME strategy talks two weeks ago. We made no comment.

2. Iraqis have not indicated they want us to obtain Brit tanks for them. We understand they prefer US equipment.

3. In view broad effect which your talks at Geneva may have upon future joint US–UK plans for ME defense, we are suggesting to Makins that continuation of ME strategy talks which are scheduled for this week should be postponed until after Geneva conference has been concluded. UK had presented its concepts two weeks ago, which could involve us in substantially stepped-up expenditures. We had expected to present our position this week but under circumstances will defer for further consideration.

4. No further developments on Alpha here.

Hoover

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1955. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted, approved, and signed by Hoover.

[2] See the editorial note, *supra*.

[3] Document 161.

164. Editorial Note

At 8:30 a.m. on July 20, President Eisenhower met with Prime Minister Eden for breakfast at the latter's villa to review, with the assistance of Secretary of State Dulles, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Dillon Anderson, and Foreign Secretary Macmillan, a number of subjects, including the Middle East and arms for Egypt. According to Anderson's memorandum of this conversation, the participants discussed the Egyptian arms request in the following terms:

Egyptian Armament

"Mr. Dulles mentioned that the Egyptians had recently offered to buy from the United States a substantial (for them) quantity of tanks, guns and ammunition; that they had hinted that they would buy from the Russians if we didn't sell to them. Eden thought this latter would be bad, but doubted that the Russians would sell to the Egyptians.

"Mr. Dulles said he thought we would make the sale; that it couldn't be aid because the Egyptians would not make the kind of agreement in connection with aid that our laws require.

"Eden said the British were furnishing some small amount of armaments to the Egyptians; that the French were too; that some of it was being resold through Libya to the Arabs and shot back at the French in Morocco and Algeria." (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up)

For a summary of those sections of the conversation related to the Middle East and to the Alpha project, see Document 171.

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165. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 20, 1955—noon.

104. As recommendations mytel 10, July 2, [2] were made only after consideration of dilemma described Deptel 127, [3] I find it impossible, in light of what I understand to be basic United States objectives in this part of world to alter my previous strong recommendation that we attempt to meet expeditiously and without substantial reduction Egypt's requirements as listed Embtel 11. [4]

While of course Department at present confronted many issues of overriding importance feel I have apparently not been able adequately communicate consequences of foreign policy in ME area which I believe would follow if we deny Egypt's request. It seems to

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–2055. Top Secret; Priority; Received at 1:26 p.m.

[2] Document 143.

[3] Telegram 127, July 18, informed Byroade that "favorable action on Egyptian request will place us under strong pressure grant Israel permission purchase similar quantity comparable equipment." It asked Byroade whether, in view of this, he would still recommend favorable action on the Egyptian request or if a "substantial reduction in Egyptian list and correspondingly smaller sale to Israel" would be advisable? (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–1455)

[4] Document 160.

me that United States security interests that area require us in our own interests to meet Nasser's request in order prevent GOE from concluding that there is virtually no prospect of fruitful cooperation with the United States in any of the most important foreign issues currently confronting Egypt. If convinced United States indifferent to Egypt's military position and that we in fact may have objective keeping Egypt in relatively weak position vis-à-vis Israel, GOE in all probability will then wish carefully reexplore possibilities of cooperation with Soviet bloc, including the question of arms procurement. Effect of Egypt's decision would not be confined Egypt alone. While of course cannot be certain course this reexamination will take and relaxing tension along border might stay Egypt's hand, all evidence we have points to fact that Egypt will most probably accept Russian offer of arms. These purchases may be substantial as payment acceptable in cotton which Egypt otherwise unable dispose of.

We may not like to be faced with this type of situation as factor in making up our mind whether Egypt should be able buy arms from United States but fact is we are so faced. Certainly it seems to me we should be prepared avoid such consequences as long as we can conscientiously say arms we provide are not upsetting balance and fall within the defensive requirements envisaged by tripartite declaration. Am not recommending going beyond this point as this would in fact be getting into arms race in area which tripartite declaration of course opposes. The point is, however, once Russian arms begin to enter this area on side of Arabs the West will have lost control and the arms race will be on as we certainly would not be in a position under those circumstances to deny Israeli requests for more arms irrespective of the consequences to our relations with the Arab States. Consequence GOE reliance on Russian arms would not be limited to arms race but very possibly would open Egypt Soviet penetration all spheres with considerable influence other Arab States.

I hope Department can send me as soon as possible cost and availability data re items on Nasser's list. When final Egyptian decision has been made as to items required (and in this decision GOE's limited foreign currency holdings will probably play important part), Department will then be in better position review Israeli requests on basis of relative military capabilities.

Department of course must weigh all aspects prior to decision, but for my part I cannot entirely forget that it was Israeli action that initially started build up of tension at Gaza that has resulted in GOE decision purchase more armament. Nor can I ignore in my thinking fact that even if GOE decided purchase entire list Egypt's position would still remain relatively weak as compared to Israel. Under these conditions it would seem to me that a decision which would not

permit Egypt to purchase arms in the United States (or specify that Israeli purchases should be equal purchases by Egypt) would hardly be consistent with policy of impartiality we have tried so hard to establish and maintain over past three years.

Byroade

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166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria [1]

Washington, July 20, 1955—7:50 p.m.

37. Ambassador Malik advised Johnston July 19 on behalf GOL to postpone his arrival until after Syrian elections, thus confirming difficulties already called to attention of Department. (Damascus 39. [2]) Malik stated IBRD has given assurances that loan action on Litani not linked to Israel aspirations or Jordan Valley negotiations. He indicated that GOL likely take stronger position on negotiations when Lebanese mission to IBRD returns early August and reports. Johnston making effort postpone arrival until immediately after Syrian elections but urgently needs Embassy Damascus judgment whether August 18 election date is firm. [3]

Desire Embassy Cairo confirmation of present understanding Selim will participate negotiations. Comment also desired as to significant Riad attitude reported Damascus 44, [4] particularly whether it may reflect Egyptian coolness toward project. [5] In discussion

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/7–1455. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Troxel; cleared with Barnes; and approved by Burdett, who signed for Hoover. Also sent priority to Cairo, Amman, Beirut, and Tel Aviv.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 155.

[3] Earlier that day, the Department received a telegram from Ambassador Moose in Damascus indicating that Foreign Minister Azm had stated his willingness to "see Johnston but it was common knowledge GOS preoccupied domestic matters. Noting Cabinet must resign following Presidential election mid-August, Azm asserted Syrian Government would be unable to have any useful conversations with Johnston before end September." Moose urged the Department to accept Azm's "frank admission GOS inability to act." (Telegram 64, July 20; Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/7–2055)

[4] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 120.1580/7–1655)

[5] Byroade reported on July 23 that the previous day he had a long discussion with Fawzi about the Johnston mission. Fawzi "stated Egypt felt it had played its part as a direct participant in the negotiations on this plan. Now it was time for the states who would be parties to the agreement to take matters wholly into their own hands." Fawzi was willing, however, to make Selim and Riad available to provide assistance to

Fawzi trust Embassy Cairo can clarify Egyptian preferences re locale meeting with Foreign Ministers. (Beirut's 55 and 57.[6])

Hoover

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the participants in the negotiations, but they would not take part in the formal negotiations. In keeping with this decision, Fawzi also said that Cairo should not be the site of discussions and recommended Amman if the Lebanese objected to Beirut. (Telegram 126 from Cairo, July 23; *ibid.*, 120.1580/7–2355)

[6] Ambassador Heath commented in telegram 55, July 15, that the announcement of Johnston's forthcoming visit was stirring opponents of the Jordan Valley development plan to initiate measures designed to secure Lebanon's rejection of Johnston's efforts. (*Ibid.*, 120.1580/7–1555)

In telegram 57 from Beirut, July 16, Heath informed the Department that he had received a telephone call from Frangie, who indicated that the Cabinet was of the opinion that Johnston's final meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the states interested in the Jordan Valley projects should be held in Cairo rather than in Beirut. (*Ibid.*, 120.1580/7–1655)

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167. Letter From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) [1]

Washington, July 21, 1955.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Egyptian Government officially requested on June 30 permission to purchase in the United States the items of military equipment on the attached list. [2] It is our belief, concurred in by our Ambassador in Cairo, that a substantial portion of these items are needed to enable Egypt to meet legitimate national defense requirements.

The matter was discussed with the President on July 11 at a meeting attended by Secretary Anderson, Admiral Radford, Mr. Dillon Anderson and myself. [3] The President attached importance to improving our relations with Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser and indicated that he saw no objection to meeting the Egyptian request in whole or in part unless such action would cause undue complications with Israel.

We believe, on political grounds, that it is desirable for the United States to offer to provide at least some portion of the equipment requested. Objections from Israel must be anticipated, but

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.5–MSP/7–2155. Drafted by Burdett.

[2] Not printed.

[3] See footnote 4, Document 144.

we think the sale will not have undue effects upon our relations with that country since Israel is entitled to purchase in the United States on the same basis as Egypt. As a practical matter, actual deliveries of many of the items could be spread over a period of time so that no sudden increase of Egyptian military capabilities would be effected. Also, we understand the latest estimate by G–2 indicates that Israel has a decisive military superiority over the Arab states combined. The United States should be prepared, however, to meet in part certain of Israel's outstanding requests to purchase equipment in this country.

Our Ambassador in Cairo reports that in the absence of a favorable response, Egypt may accept the arms offer recently made by the USSR. The Ambassador's assessment is supported by intelligence reports. Should an Egyptian-Soviet arms sale materialize, it would have adverse repercussions on our position in the Middle East. Another important reason for the sale is to arrest the conviction growing in Egypt that the United States alone is endeavoring to prevent her from purchasing arms.

The equipment would be made available under the reimbursable aid agreement between the United States and Egypt signed on December 10, 1952 and in accordance with the terms of Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954. We believe it important to inform the Egyptians promptly that we are prepared to consider supplying a portion of the equipment requested, and we would appreciate having your concurrence in a Governmental position of this nature. Members of my staff already have requested from your Department price and availability data on the equipment involved and we would appreciate any steps you may take to expedite the study.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Hoover, Jr. [4]

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[4] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State in Geneva [1]

Washington, July 21, 1955—7:55 p.m.

Tedul 36. We have received through Russell report of your talk with Macmillan on Alpha [2] and Macmillan's request that we inform him, if possible before Brit Cab discussion of Alpha (about July 26), of our position on two points he raised with you and about which Eden sent message to President (Secto 28 [3]). Subject your approval, we suggest Emb London inform Macmillan as fols:

1. US adherence Turko-Iraqi pact. In explaining to Nuri Secretary's statement on Arab-Israel problem immediately before its issuance we are willing to outline to Nuri our views on adherence to Turko-Iraqi pact. We would explain that under existing circumstances and particularly because of effect on Arab-Israel situation we unable adhere at this time. Should Arab-Israel accommodation materialize we prepared join pact. In meantime we will continue to encourage and support Turko-Iraqi pact and we are ready establish close liaison arrangements with pact organization in order coordinate our plans and aid programs for development ME defensive strength with plans and efforts other states concerned.

2. Offshore procurement tanks for Iraq. We intend continue our present policies on offshore procurement in UK for Iraq. Our current modest Iraq program makes no provision for tanks. We unable yet give definite answer re offshore procurement Centurions but under present circumstances and in absence greater effort by other countries, any increase in Iraq program for this purpose would prove difficult.

Hoover

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1755. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Burdett; cleared with Allen; and approved and signed by Hoover. Repeated to London.

[2] See Document 158.

[3] Document 161.

169. Circular Letter From Francis H. Russell to Certain American Ambassadors [1]

Washington, July 22, 1955.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: At the Secretary's direction, I have been conferring with Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh and other members of the British Foreign Office concerning possible statements in the near future by the Secretary and the British Foreign Secretary on a settlement of the Israel-Arab controversy. The reasons for the statements and the form which they might take are set forth in the enclosures to this letter.[2]

I should like very much to have your comments on the following points:

(1) The best way of presenting the proposals outlined in the memorandum to the Government to which you are accredited. Is the approach suggested in paragraph 5 of the enclosed memorandum the best, and where and when should it be made?

(2) The probable response both of the Government and local public opinion to the proposed statements.

(3) Whether you believe that immediate public reaction would be likely to be such as to indicate the need for any special preparations or precautions on our part.

(4) The best lines of publicity both before and after the statements are made.

(5) Whether you, or the effective head of the Government to which you are accredited, will be out of the country in early September.

Please send your comments as soon as possible by Top Secret telegram to the Department, Limited Distribution, with code name Alpha, repeating to London only.

It is of primary importance to insure absolute secrecy in this matter. Please limit sight of this letter and its enclosures to the minimum number of senior members of your staff whom you feel

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha. Secretary's Statement: Letr of 7/22 to NE Chiefs of Mission, with 4 attachments re. Top Secret; Alpha; Official–Informal. The source text is a carbon copy of a letter sent to Ambassador Lawson in Tel Aviv. According to typewritten notations on it, Russell and Burdett were the drafting officers. In a memorandum dated July 26, Jernegan informed Dulles that Russell's letter and its enclosures had been sent eyes only to the American Ambassadors in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Information copies were sent to Ankara, London, and Paris. (*Ibid.*, Alpha—Memos & corres., July 1–Aug. 26 (day of Secy's speech)) On August 1, Russell, under cover of a separate letter, sent the same enclosures to Ambassador Wadsworth in Saudi Arabia. (*Ibid.*, Alpha. Secretary's Statement: Letr of 7/22 to NE Chiefs of Mission, with 4 attachments re)

[2] Enclosures 1 and 2 are printed below. Enclosure 3, not printed, dated July 15, was headed "Draft British Statement (to follow statement by Mr. Dulles)".

you must consult; and, for the present, keep this letter and all correspondence connected with it in your private safe.

Before replying, however, please consult your British colleague to whom the Foreign Office is sending a similar communication. I am sending similar letters and enclosures to our Chiefs of Mission in Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad; and for their information only, to our Ambassadors in Paris and Ankara.

The Secretary and Mr. Macmillan conferred on this subject in Paris on July 14, and gave their approval to the enclosed memorandum. Mr. Macmillan is seeking the authority of his Cabinet colleagues to support the proposal, but until their agreement is obtained, Her Majesty's Government is not committed to any particular course of action.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Francis H. Russell [3]

Enclosure

July 14, 1955.

PALESTINE SETTLEMENT [4]

The Foreign Office and the Department of State have reached agreement on the need for an equitable settlement of the Palestine affair and the best means of attempting to achieve it.

2. The intention had been that the first approach would be made to the Prime Minister of Egypt. But this has not proved possible, largely because of Colonel Nasser's preoccupation with the immediate tension on the Gaza strip, and we do not think it likely that we should be able to enlist his interest in moving towards a settlement for some time to come. Secretary Dulles is convinced that he cannot refrain much longer from defining the policy of the United States towards Israel's security and the Middle East as a whole. The longer he waits, the more difficult it will become for him to make a balanced statement on the subject: as the United States Presidential elections approach, the pressure for a statement favorable to Israel will increase. He feels that he must crystallize United States policy on the issue; and that he should therefore soon make a statement, to which the United States Administration could hold firmly, on the general lines of the proposals for a Palestine settle-

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[4] Top Secret; Alpha.

ment which our two Governments have worked out. It is our hope that the two parties to the dispute, even though they may vigorously reject the proposed settlement at first, will, in the long run, come to see its merits and move slowly towards it. On the other hand we are not blind to the grave risks which the action entails.

3. Attached to this memorandum is a copy of a draft of a speech which Mr. Dulles proposes to deliver early in September and which contains an outline of the settlement which H.M. Government and the U.S. Government believe to be the fairest now possible. Mr. Macmillan is seeking the authority of his Cabinet colleagues to make a statement the next day expressing H.M. Government's support for the principles enunciated by Mr. Dulles and their readiness to help in bringing about a settlement and to make a contribution to the financial commitments which a settlement would involve.

4. In general, we shall avoid being drawn into publishing any fuller details of the proposed settlement, on the grounds that to do so would prejudice any negotiations which the parties might wish to enter into, whether between themselves or through third parties, on the basis of the principles which we shall have enunciated. The recipients of this memorandum will be sent guidance for publicity and help in dealing with enquiries later. Meanwhile, the following are explanations of some of the specific proposals contained in the enclosed draft statement:

A. Guarantees

As will be seen from the draft statement, it is intended that these should be limited to the territorial aspect of the settlement. It will be made clear, however, that they would not be granted except in the framework of a comprehensive settlement. (In other words, acceptance by one party of part or all the plan would not earn the guarantee.)

B. Boundaries

The Negev. The idea here is that Israel should cede to Egypt a triangle of territory with its base on the Egyptian frontier and to Jordan another triangle with its base on the Jordan frontier. The apex of one triangle would meet the apex of the other on the Israeli road from the north to Elath. The principle underlying this solution is that there would be a point at the junction of the two triangles where the sovereignty would appertain to both sides. This would make it possible for an East-West Arab road under complete Arab control to pass over (or under) an Israeli North-South road under complete Israeli control. We can see no way of reconciling the vital interests of both parties in the Negev except by this principle. We should not commit ourselves on the size and location of the triangles: that would be left for negotiation. We have, however, got various alternative ideas.

C. Jerusalem

. . . we should try to get through the United Nations a resolution providing for the "functional internationalization" of the Holy Places, on the lines of the Swedish draft resolution of 1950. . . .

D. The Blockade

It would be essential, as part of any settlement, that the Egyptians should open the Suez Canal to Israeli ships and Israel-bound traffic; and that the Arab states should cease to put pressure on third parties not to trade with Israel. We would not, however, ask the Arabs to engage in direct trade with Israel themselves, even after a settlement. The wording of the enclosed draft statement is designed to allow for this distinction to be made.

5. We should propose to give the parties to the dispute about 24 hours' notice that the statements are to be made. We should not reveal the substance of the statements at that stage, but we should say that we hoped that both sides would receive them in a constructive spirit and with a willingness to look seriously for common ground. We should point out that the statements do not call for an immediate reply or decision on the part of the Governments nor do they carry any suggestion of coercion. We hope indeed that the Governments will take their time and will be prepared to discuss our ideas with us further. In the meantime we would ask them in their public reactions to the statements to exercise restraint and at least not to commit themselves against the suggestions until they have had a chance to discuss with us in greater detail the advantages we believe them to contain.

6. We should also inform certain other Governments and authorities, notably France, Turkey, the Commonwealth and the Secretary-General of the United Nations (and through him General Burns and Mr. Labouisse) a few days in advance of these statements and seek their support for our proposals. We will want to couch our communications to Governments in the manner best calculated to avoid leaks. We should solicit the support of other states members of the United Nations at the time of the publication of the plan.

Enclosure

July 15, 1955.

DRAFT OF POSSIBLE PUBLIC STATEMENT BY MR. DULLES ON AN ISRAEL-ARAB SETTLEMENT [5]

Two years ago last month I returned from a trip which took me to the Near East. I wanted to see, for myself, that area, so rich in culture and tradition, yet today so torn by strife and bitterness. I visited Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Upon my return I spoke of the impressions gathered on that trip and of the hopes which I hold as a result of talks with leaders and people there.

Some of those hopes have become realities. Two years ago the Suez Base was a center of controversy and of potential strife. In my report to the American people, I expressed the conviction that there was nothing irreconcilable in the positions of the two Governments, and the hope that both sides would continue to try to find a peaceful solution. I said that the United States was prepared to help in any desired way. Since that time, as a result of patient effort, in a spirit of conciliation, the problem of the Suez Base has been successfully resolved.

Another problem which was concerning many of the leaders in the Middle East was that of securing the area against the menace of aggression from without the area. It was clear that effective defense depended upon collective measures and that such measures, to be dependable, needed to be based on the development within the area of a sense of common destiny and of common danger. Here, too, there has been encouraging progress and a growing realization of the need for cooperation in defense.

A third problem which called for attention was the need for water to irrigate land. I mentioned in my report the possibility that the rivers flowing through the Jordan Valley might be used to make this important and fertile valley a source of livelihood rather than dispute. Ambassador Eric Johnston's talks since that time with the governments of the countries through which the River Jordan runs have shown an encouraging willingness on both sides to contemplate the principle of coordinated arrangements for the use of the waters and plans for the development of the Valley are well advanced.

A beginning has been made, as you see, in dealing with the obstacles that stand in the way of the aspirations of the Near Eastern peoples. It is my hope—and it is that hope of which I would

[5] Top Secret; Alpha.

now speak—that the time has come when it is useful to think in terms of further steps toward stability, tranquillity and progress in the Middle East.

The Arab-Israel Problem

What are the principal remaining problems? There are three that stand out above the others.

The first is the tragic plight of the 900,000 refugees who formerly lived in the territory that is now occupied by Israel.

The second is the pall of fear that hangs over the Arab and Israel people alike. The Arab countries fear that Israel will seek by violent means to expand at their expense. The Israelis fear that the Arabs will gradually marshall superior forces to be used to drive them into the sea and resent the measures of economic blockade which are now enforced against them.

The third is the lack of fixed permanent boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

There are other important problems. But if these three principal problems could be dealt with, then the way would be paved for the solution of others.

It seems to me that these three problems are capable of solution, and surely there is need.

Border clashes take an almost weekly toll of human lives. The sufferings of the 900,000 Arab refugees are drawn out almost beyond the point of endurance. The fears which are at work, on each side, lead to a heavy burden of armament, which constitutes a serious drag on economic and social progress. Responsible leaders are finding it hard to turn their full attention and energies to the positive task of creating the conditions of stability and healthy growth out of which strong nations could emerge.

Serious as the present situation is, there is a danger that unless it improves, it will get worse. One ill leads to another, and cause and effect are hard to sort out. Both sides suffer greatly from the present situation, and both are anxious for what they would regard as a just and equitable solution. But neither has been able to find that way. This may be a situation where mutual friends could, through their good offices, serve the common good.

The United States, as a friend of both Israelis and Arabs, has given the situation deep thought and has come to certain conclusions, the expansion of which may help men of good will within the area to fresh constructive efforts. I speak in this matter with the authority of the President.

I.

We find no single and easy answer to the plight of the 900,000 Arab refugees who formerly lived in the territory that is now Israel, who fled at the time of the fighting in 1948 and were barred from returning to their homes and the cost of whose maintenance now falls directly on the international community. But we do feel that an answer can be found in a combination of measures which, together, would reestablish these uprooted people and offer them hope of a new life.

Compensation by the State of Israel is due for the land and buildings belonging to the refugees which are now in Israel's possession. Perhaps Israel cannot, unaided, now make adequate compensation. If so, there might be an international loan to Israel of the balance of the sum necessary. The President would recommend substantial participation by the United States in such a loan for such a purpose.

Money alone, however, will not solve the problem. The money must be used to create more arable land on which the refugees could make permanent homes and work to produce a self-respecting livelihood. Many of them would be settled over a period of the next few years as a result of projects much as the Jordan Valley development plan, the Sinai project, and as a result of the increased opportunities provided by the expanding economies of countries of the area. Here, too, outside help might be required.

II.

The second principal element which I mentioned is that of fear. The nature of this fear is such that it is not within the capacity of any single country of the area to take measures to dispel it. President Eisenhower has authorized me to say that if a solution can be found to the other related problems, he would recommend that the United States formally commit itself to take appropriate action to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors. I hope that other countries would be willing to join in such a commitment, and it might perhaps be sponsored by the United Nations.

III.

If there is to be a guarantee of borders, it would be normal that there should be a prior agreement upon what the borders are. That is the third major element. The existing lines separating the Arab states from Israel were fixed by the Armistice Agreements of 1949. They reflected the status of the fighting at the moment. They were

not designed to be permanent frontiers in every respect. They clearly require rectifications and adjustments.

For example, there should presumably be an allocation of the present demilitarized zones and "no man's lands" created by the Armistice agreements.

The Arab world, which is now separated by Israel possession of the Negev, understandably desires an unbroken land connection. This could be provided, without prejudice to any of Israel's vital interests, by ceding to one or two Arab nations sovereignty over triangular portions of the Negev having little or no economic value and now wholly barren. The Arab triangles could be based on the Egyptian and Jordanian frontiers respectively so that their apexes meet at a point on an Israeli route to the south. Thus the now divided Arabs would reestablish sovereign contact, while the sovereign connection of Israel with the port of Elath would be maintained.

IV.

If agreement can be reached on these basic elements—refugees, boundaries, and the elimination of fear—it should prove possible to find solutions for other questions, largely economic, and to bring to an end external economic measures which presently fan the flames of hostility and resentment.

It should also be possible to reach agreement on the status of Jerusalem. The United States would give its support to a United Nations review of this problem.

Conclusion

I have not attempted to enumerate all the issues on which it would be desirable to have a settlement; nor have I tried to outline in detail the form which a settlement of any of the elements might take. I have tried to show that possibilities exist for an immeasurable improvement without any nation taking action which would be against its interests whether those interests be measured in terms of material strength or, what is more important, in terms of national prestige and honor.

Both sides in this strife have a noble past, a heritage of rich contributions to civilization; both have fostered progress in science and the arts. Each side is predominantly representative of one of the world's great religions. Both sides desire to achieve a good life for their people and to share, and contribute to, the advancements of this century. Both can contribute much to progress in the coming decades. The people of the United States for their part could and would contribute much more readily and more happily if there could

be ended the strains which now burden life within the area, a life which, for most of the people, desperately needs enrichment.

At a time when a great effort is being made to ease the tension which has long prevailed between the East and the West, can we not hope that a similar spirit should prevail in the Near East? Indeed, may not the nations there set an example which would show how the spirit of conciliation and of the good neighbor brings rich rewards to the people and to the nations? That is our plea, and if the response involves some burdens, they are burdens which the United States would share, just as we would share the satisfaction which would result to all peoples if happiness, contentment and good will could drive hatred and misery away from peoples whom we hold in high respect and honor.

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170. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, July 23, 1955—noon.

17. I met with General Burns and British Consul General Wikeley July 22 regarding Gaza talks. Burns reviewed situation as it has developed through July 20 Gaza meeting and discussed draft letter he preparing send Gohar in place "ultimatum" (mytel 15 [2]).

Above letter refers to 6 long and exhaustive discussions on subject commander's arrangement and expresses opinion that time has come for adoption final text, especially since points on which Egyptian agreement still needed now relate only form of wording following:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–2355. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:51 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, USUN, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus.

[2] Cole reported on July 21 that General Burns had informed him that the "Gaza talks July 20 proved inconclusive as most of the time was spent endeavoring to overcome Gohar's quibbling about matters of phraseology. Burns added that discussion was almost entirely concerned with unsuccessful efforts to draft various clauses of proposed local commanders arrangements in a manner acceptable to Gohar." As a result, Burns did not believe he could make any progress if such meetings continued; he was contemplating sending Fawzi an "ultimatum" in an effort to get the talks moving again. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/7–2155)

(1) Naming of senior officer to represent each party to arrangement;

(2) Periodic meetings of these officers;

(3) Details of telephone communications. Burns enclosing draft clauses these points for Gohar's consideration. With regard (1) above Burns also including in his letter statement his understanding that Egyptians will agree to appoint an officer of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel having staff or command assignment in vicinity D/L. Letter then proceeds to question of signatures to arrangement and concludes it should be signed in same manner as GAA.

Burns then told us that Gohar wanted him to sign also as party to arrangement. Burns thought that would be illogical and would moreover be resisted by Israelis.

However, his letter continues, if arrangement signed as Burns suggests he would forward certified copy to UNSYG accompanied by supplementary explanation that arrangement was negotiated under his chairmanship and in his opinion adequately covers 2 of the 4 proposals of SC resolution March 30: i.e., the so-called local commanders agreement itself and the proposal that only trained troops should be in forward areas, since latter proposal incorporated in text prospective arrangement. Statement would also include passage expressing his belief that it would be in accordance with resolution just mentioned for UN observers to be available to parties for consultation and assistance in implementation arrangement in addition their other duties.

Letter concludes with expression hope that Gohar will be authorized agree enclosed 3 draft clauses and method signature, especially in view proposed supplementary explanation to UNSYG. Failing such authorization, Burns adds, he does not think it would be worthwhile holding meeting tentatively fixed for July 27. He would, however, be prepared proceed Cairo discuss differences there.

Turning to other items Gaza meetings agenda, Burns said no progress yet made respecting joint patrols, barrier, or Nasser's neutral zone.

Cole

171. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Anderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, July 26, 1955.

SUBJECT

Centurion Tanks for Iraq

Reference is made to the attached copy of a communication on the above subject from the British Prime Minister to the President, dated July 23, 1955. [2] The President received the communication at Geneva on the same date, handed it to me, and directed that I bring it to your attention promptly upon my return to the United States; also, that I pass on to each of you promptly the substance of the conversations on this subject at Geneva.

According to my notes and recollection, the following exchanges of views in Geneva constitute material background:

1. On Sunday afternoon, July 17, Sir Anthony Eden called on the President at his villa in Geneva, and brought up with the President the matter of U.S. adherence to the Iraqi-Turkish Pact. The President advised him that he understood no such action was deemed practicable until the Arab-Israeli problem could be clarified. Sir Anthony then brought up the subject of U.S. aid to Iraq, and made particular reference to Centurion Tanks. He proposed to the President that between 50 and 100 tanks be purchased by the U.S. from British Manufacturers under the offshore procurement program, and that such tanks be made available to Iraq. The President asked Sir Anthony what the English proposed to do by way of aid to Iraq, and indicated that he felt the Iraqis should bear at least a token part of the cost. (The foregoing is based upon the President's statement to me shortly after the conference, as to the substance of the conversations on this subject.)

At the President's direction, I called Deputy Secretary Anderson Tuesday evening (July 19), in Paris, [3] and asked him to discuss with

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 5. Top Secret. Addressed also to Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson, JCS Chairman Radford, and ICA Director Hollister.

[2] Eden informed Eisenhower in this communication that the United Kingdom was prepared to expend £500,000 on the purchase of 10 Centurion tanks for Iraq. As Iraq required 80 Centurions, the British gift of 10 would, according to Eden, complement the remaining 70 which the United States would furnish under the offshore procurement program. Eden stated that he intended to issue instructions on this as soon as the United States had reached a favorable decision. (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eden to Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955–1956, Vol. I, as well as in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

[3] No account of this telephone conversation has been found.

Governor Stassen the matter of the availability of funds for further Iraq aid this year, and be prepared to advise the President on the subject when he reached Geneva the next day.

2. On Wednesday, July 20, 1955, Sir Anthony Eden and Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan had breakfast with the President at his villa, and I joined them at the President's request, in order that I might record the substance of the conversation.[4] Both Eden and Macmillan suggested that before the "Alpha Plan" was announced, the U.S. should furnish some concrete evidence of an intention to provide further assistance in the form of defense aid to the Iraqis; that such a step would strengthen the present Government; that it would be a major tragedy in the area if the present Government should fall; and that there were many powerful elements within Iraq working for its down-fall. Sir Anthony stated that the British would be prepared to participate in such assistance. The President pointed out that while it was of course desirable to have munitions manufacturing facilities spread about somewhat in the free world, there was a definite limit on funds available for mutual aid. He went ahead to explain his concept of mutuality of aid, which includes participation by countries mutually interested in common defense, and suggested again that Iraq should bear some of the cost. He said that his experience had been that when people put some of their own money into a venture, they become more interested in it. Eden agreed that there should be some Iraq participation, but the amount of U.S. aid and the degree of British participation were left open.

The President said that he would try to get from Deputy Secretary Anderson and Governor Stassen some further information as to what we were in a position to do generally in the Middle East, and particularly in Iraq, in the light of available funds under Congressional appropriations for the current year. He stressed the fact that no commitment could be made until we could ascertain how near we were to the limit of Congressional appropriations in this connection.

Mr. Dulles then described one of the problems we had to consider back home,—namely, that our military people preferred in dealing with such countries as Iraq to pass on to them older equipment, which in turn gave our Defense Department FOA credit, which could be used to replace old equipment with new equipment. Macmillan urged that the Northern Tier concept of countries bordering Russia on the south, but not actually bordering Israel, had been a U.S. proposal; that the U.S. therefore had a special responsibility to support the countries adhering to treaties within the framework of this concept. Macmillan, while recognizing that the British were

[4] See Document 164.

committed to support the arrangement, stressed the U.S. interests and obligations in this particular, and mentioned the fact that at the present time, all tanks in the hands of the Iraqis were of British manufacture.

Macmillan said that the announcement of the Alpha plan could cause a "blow-up" in the Middle East; that neither the Arabs nor the Israelis would like it at first,—the former because of the recognition of boundaries enlarged by "Israeli aggression"; the latter because it would seem to be "pro-Arab". Sir Anthony appeared to accept this possibility with equanimity, and regarded it as an immediate but not lasting result of the treaty settlement. Mr. Dulles said he felt any "blow-up" from the "Alpha" would be in the nature of a "little fire", of a kind we sometimes have to set to prevent a "big fire",—the analogy of forestry fire-fighting.

. . . Mr. Dulles said he had held up any further steps on Alpha at the earnest insistence of Eric Johnston, who believed he could get agreement on the Jordan water projects. Mr. Dulles said he felt sure Johnston would not succeed, but he had acquiesced in Johnston's request. Eden concurred in this appraisal, and incidentally compared the Israelis and Arabs to the Hatfields and the McCoys in Tennessee.

It appeared to me to be agreed that the matter of Iraq aid was an urgent one, and must be dealt with promptly, although I did not take it that any specific commitment was made by the President or Mr. Dulles. The effect of it seemed to be an agreement in principle that the British and the U.S. should both participate in ways and to the extent to be determined later, after Messrs. Anderson and Stassen arrived in Geneva.

On Wednesday evening, July 20, after the discussions at the President's villa about the disarmament proposal, the President described briefly to Deputy Secretary Anderson the nature of the problem raised by the British that morning at breakfast. It was agreed, as I understood it, that they would discuss it further the next day. [5]

I understand that the next day the President and Deputy Secretary Anderson had some further discussions about it.[5] Whether there were any further talks by the President or Mr. Dulles and the British thereafter in Geneva, I do not know, but it was my impression that the President did not engage in any further talks.

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[5] No account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

The President indicated to me that he wanted very prompt action in this matter. As you know, I shall be glad to work with you in any way when I can be of help.

Dillon Anderson

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172. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, July 27, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Meeting on OSP in UK of Centurion Tanks for Iraq

REFERENCE

Memorandum from Dillon Anderson of July 26, 1955 [2]

A meeting presided over by Mr. Hoover and including representatives of Defense and CIA considered on July 27 the British request that we provide Iraq with Centurion tanks by off-shore procurement in the UK. The meeting concluded that for the reasons given below we should not accede to the British request.

A. Political

1. Adverse effect on the Arab-Israel problem of supplying tanks to Iraq. It was recalled that assurances had been given to Israel's supporters, to Israel, and to Congressional leaders that no heavy equipment was being programmed for Iraq at this time.

2. Establishment of a precedent which was likely to provoke similar requests from other countries. In particular, Saudi Arabia would have additional grounds for pressing a demand for Centurions or their equivalent.

3. The adverse effect upon other Arab states of off-shore procuring Centurions for Iraq only. Egypt especially might be encouraged to turn to the USSR for tanks.

4. Iraq's concern that US support for the Turk-Iraq Pact has diminished could be offset adequately by informing Nuri of our intention to establish close liaison with the Pact organization and to adhere when an Israel-Arab accommodation was reached. The Secre-

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files. Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 5. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.

[2] *Supra.*

tary gave Mr. Macmillan in Geneva assurances that we would so inform Nuri.

5. Contrary to the implications of Eden's memorandum to the President,[3] Iraq signed the Turk-Iraq Pact in its own self-interest. Among the important benefits accruing to Iraq may be mentioned: an increase in her security against Communism, revision of her treaty with the UK, and the prestige accruing from her seizure of area leadership in defense matters.

6. Iraq has indicated to us a preference for US equipment, and has complained that the Centurions previously furnished by the UK were obsolete.

B. Military

1. Our current appreciation concludes that in the event of a major war, the UK would not be in a position to supply equipment or spare parts to the Middle East.

2. The Turkish, Iranian and Pakistan forces are being supplied with US equipment. Since, in the event of hostilities, Iraqi troops would be grouped with forces from these contiguous countries as well as forces from Britain and Jordan, the logistical problems would not be simplified appreciably by providing Iraq with British equipment.

C. Political Military Factors

1. In the FY 50–54 Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the US has programmed arms and equipment for Iraq to the extent of $10.9 million. There were no additional funds proposed for Iraq in 1955. Out of the total program for Iraq toward the equipment of two infantry divisions, the items currently scheduled are: vehicles, engineering equipment, supplies and artillery. No mention was made of tanks in the initial program, and no tanks were called for in the division T/O & Es. Out of the total program, $372,000 in scout cars, $850,000 in anti-aircraft artillery, $1,290,000 in artillery pieces, and $1,500,000 in ammunition (totalling $4,100,000) are planned for OSP in the UK. The UK is able to provide only $3.9 million of this total. Thus, out of the total program of $10.9 million, approximately 30% of this total would be off-shore procured in the UK.

It should be noted that the world-wide mutual defense assistance programs for FY 1950 through 1955 are presently unfunded in the amount of approximately $500 million and the MDA losses under Section 1311 of the Appropriation Act of 1954[4] result in an additional shortage of $228 million. From this it can be readily seen

[3] See Document 161.

[4] Not further identified.

that any provisions for tanks to Iraq in the MDA Program for the fiscal year 1956 would have to be accomplished at the expense of other priority items in the existing MDA Programs for Iraq or higher priority programs for other countries. It is believed that US military objectives in Iraq are not sufficient to justify a higher priority than those defined for other countries of the area, nor to validate an additional request to Congress for funds to finance US or Centurion tanks for Iraq, as grant aid.

The current programmed and planned programs for furnishing military end items through FY 1956 to Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan amount to $1.3 billion. No information is available as to United Kingdom programmed and planned expenditures during this period, but these are understood to be nominal.

2. Difficulties might be expected with Congress on the general principle of off-shore procurement in the UK for Middle Eastern countries. The Congressional attitude would be affected by sensitivity over the relation to the Israel problem.

3. The establishment of a ratio between equipment sold by the UK and off-shore procured by the US, particularly the 7-to-1 ratio suggested by the UK, would set an undesirable pattern. The US might find itself confronted by demands that the same ratio be applied to other countries.

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173. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) [1]

Washington, July 27, 1955.

SUBJECT

Jerusalem

The Jerusalem question is becoming complicated. [2] I will try to

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.00/7–2755. Top Secret.

[2] On July 22, Lawson reminded the Department of the Israeli Government's "intense and persistent efforts to obtain recognition of Jerusalem Foreign Office". He pointed out that the United States had been able to avoid the issue as long as the Prime Minister was also Foreign Minister, since Lawson could call on the Prime Minister either in Jerusalem or at his Tel Aviv office, but the general elections scheduled for July 26 might bring to power a new government in which the Foreign Minister was someone other than the Prime Minister. He urged the Department to

simplify the present situation. There is attached a proposed message to Tel Aviv [3] proposing a new procedure to be put into effect following the Israeli elections and the expected installation of Ben Gurion as Prime Minister and Sharett as Foreign Minister. Both positions are now held by Sharett. In effect the proposed U.S. position would recognize the practical situation, and it would be made clear to the Israelis that the U.S legal view re Jerusalem had not changed.

There is also attached a copy of a message which the British Embassy in Washington received this morning regarding Jerusalem. [4] The proposed British position provides, in effect, for a continuation of present practice. The British Ambassador would continue to call on Ben Gurion (as Prime Minister) in Jerusalem. Lesser officials of the British Embassy would call on lesser Israeli officials in Jerusalem or at the Israeli Liaison Office in Tel Aviv. The British Ambassador would not call on Sharett (as Foreign Minister) in Jerusalem. The chief British argument against relaxing on Jerusalem is that we will be giving something away to the Israelis prior to a settlement of the Palestine problem. This is particularly important in the light of Alpha.

This latter argument has some force, although we would not in actuality be giving up a point of substance, since we would have made clear to the Israelis that a call on the Israel Foreign Minister in Jerusalem did not indicate a change of U.S. policy. However, before adopting either our own or the British position, perhaps we should obtain Ambassador Lawson's views? It is therefore recommended that you sign the attached telegram.

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develop an agreed policy with other interested nations and to forward instructions to him. (Telegram 45 from Tel Aviv; *ibid.*, 601.1184A/7–2255)

[3] See Document 176.

[4] No copy of this message has been found in Department of State files.

174. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 27, 1955—2 p.m.

146. For Allen. Invite your attention Embdes 95 July 20 [2] evaluating Egyptian-Soviet bloc relations and describing Soviet capabilities capitalize on important points at issue between US and Egypt.

While Nasser continues follow anti-Communist line on domestic front we must recognize danger to US objectives arising from Soviet ability present program of parallel action with Egyptians on several important issues of foreign policy and fact that more experienced men than Nasser and his advisors have been beguiled into opening road for Communist subversion by less tempting prospects than those offered Egypt by Soviet. Despite increase of moral prestige which we believe has accrued to US as result of apparent sincerity US conduct at Geneva Conference, reduction of international tension which should ensue may be expected facilitate Soviet efforts encourage this regime believe it can safely pursue course of expanding cooperation with Cominform bloc.

Only US has the capability of checking growing Soviet influence this area and this can only be accomplished through a coordinated positive program designed convince the Egyptian Government that despite numerous issues in which our short term objectives do not coincide close cooperation with the US and other Western powers offers Egypt maximum opportunity of achieving its long-run political, economic and social objectives.

Embassy has forwarded individual recommendations covering some of the most important elements which should be included in such a program. Am encouraged by proposed policy line pertaining ESS and Turk-Iraqi Pact (Deptel 107 July 15 [3]) which should somewhat reduce Nasser's fears that US objectives this area would result in isolation of Egypt. Forthcoming US decision regarding sale military equipment may be of decisive importance. Our ability convince Egyptians of our long-run sympathetic and effective interest in economic cooperation will be affected by US cotton policy.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.74/7–2755. Secret. Received at 4:26 p.m.

[2] Not printed (*Ibid.*, 661.74/7–2055)

[3] In this telegram, the Department informed the Embassy that the United States supported, encouraged, and welcomed the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact, but that, at the present time, the United States was not contemplating adherence to it. Conversely, the Department believed that "Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian pact will serve no useful purpose since it does not contain necessary elements area defense." (*Ibid.*, 780.5/7–1555)

From long term point of view project for high dam at Aswan can potentially be developed into single most important factor influencing Egyptian economy during latter half this century a development which might well have correspondingly important implications in creating atmosphere conducive to greater political stability. It seems therefore important that it be made evident in IBRD consideration this matter that US has sympathetic interest in contributing towards progress this project.

We may be able follow with specific recommendations on subject Egyptian-Sudan relations in a subsequent despatch.

While fully realize complexities which make early action difficult, believe we should do our utmost in view situation outlined Embdes 95 to take some constructive move in our relations with Egypt. If we do not, present "drift" will surely continue with potentially dangerous results which I believe in end will surely affect more of Middle East area than Egypt alone.

Byroade

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175. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 28, 1955—3 p.m.

153. For Secretary. Reference Deptel 172, July 26. [2] Greatly appreciate your query re Nasser visit. Have thought often of recommending visit but have held off in deference crowded schedule you and President must have and desire if possible see visit take place after beginning of more favorable trends here. We will have opportunity to accomplish much more if, prior to visit, pendulum in Egyptian-United States relations could by other means be started again toward United States. In that case visit would add momentum rather than be used as effort stop present backward swing. Hope we will succeed by fall in improving situation, but in any case, would recommend visit by about that time. Hope you can see your way clear give us positive decision on as many as possible my outstand-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.7411/7–2855. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 4:03 p.m.

[2] The Secretary informed Byroade in telegram 172 that he was considering issuing Nasser an invitation to visit the United States, but first wished to have Byroade's views. (*Ibid.*, 033.7411/7–2655)

ing recommendations to Department which would pave way for best results.

In view delicacy our relations and fact that opposition to Nasser is essentially anti-American, feel he would prefer some positive accomplishments prior visit rather than come with usual hat in hand approach. My present estimation is that Nasser could under these conditions return with honor as international statesman and some sense of achievement from talks with President and other top-ranking officials and would be less inclined to think in terms of booty in tradition other foreign visitors.

While I assume your proposal of visit associated with United States objectives re achieving Arab-Israeli settlement, more specific connection not clear. During discussions with Nasser you and President may be able make final determination whether we should continue hope that Nasser will play an effective role toward achievement of settlement. In this connection careful consideration must be given to effect of your proposed speech outlining suggested formula for settlement of Arab-Israeli issues on timing of visit. If speech preceded visit I think it would result in situation here which would cause Nasser weigh with utmost care acceptance of invitation. Made shortly after Nasser's return it could wipe out benefits of visit in public mind and, perhaps more important, risk jeopardizing his position.

I definitely would like to see Nasser invited to United States as, in spite of all our difficulties here, he is the rare symbol of a Government in Middle East which is really working for development and welfare people and, hampered though he is, is still relatively free and powerful in comparison most Middle East politicians. A Nasser convinced of mutuality of our interest is still best chance of making progress in large part of Middle East and of moving on Arab-Israeli problem.

Know of no local factors preventing visit in fall but assume that beginning December Nasser will be preoccupied with problems connected with projected Parliament.

In view above considerations believe you and Department in best position judge favorable time of visit.

Byroade

176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, July 28, 1955—5:47 p.m.

54. Tel Aviv's 45. [2] FYI. Our preliminary thoughts on conduct business with GOI following election as follows:

a.) Ambassador or Chargé make initial courtesy call on FonMin in Jerusalem offices Foreign Ministry subsequently to call at Foreign Ministry when necessary. FonMin, in turn, to visit Tel Aviv periodically for conduct official business. b.) Existing liaison office in Tel Aviv to remain open and senior officers be stationed there. c.) Embassy to remain at Tel Aviv. d.) Ambassador to attend at his discretion social and official functions in Jerusalem but endeavor minimize practice and avoid functions carrying special connotation acceptance Jerusalem as capital. e.) U.S. may if necessary issue press statement explaining that arrangements intended only to facilitate practical conduct of business and do not imply any change in US policy re future Jerusalem. GOI to be requested minimize press comment on changes. Mutual interests best served by not raising issue publicly and thus probably precipitating GA debate. End FYI.

Embassy comments requested on substance above and on tactics.

You may consult British, French and Turkish colleagues and report their views. You should stress preliminary character US views.

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.0084A/7–2255. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins and Burdett and approved by Allen, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Jerusalem and Amman, and pouched to London and Paris.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 173.

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan [1]

Washington, July 28, 1955—6:37 p.m.

36. Embtel 39. [2] Request following message be conveyed Prime Minister from Johnston: "Am grateful for your thoughtful message and have given it thorough consideration. However, in view increasing evidence of opposition in some quarters based on apparent misunderstanding, consider it important make no further postponement. I have come to this conclusion most reluctantly and I trust you will appreciate mutual advantages discussions with you as soon as possible. Recognize difficulty posed by Syrian elections and do not intend go to Damascus until some days afterwards." [3]

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/7–2455. Confidential. Drafted by Troxel; cleared with Barnes, Ludlow, Wilkins, and Allen; and approved by Burdett, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Tel Aviv, and pouched to Jidda, Baghdad, and London.

[2] Telegram 39 transmitted a Jordanian recommendation that Johnston postpone his trip to the area until after the Syrian elections and the installation of a new Cabinet in September. (Telegram 39 from Amman, July 24, *ibid.*, 120.1580/7–2455)

[3] Geren reported on July 30 that he had conveyed Johnston's message to the Prime Minister, who replied that Johnston was welcome and that he hoped the Syrian situation would be clarified by the time Johnston had spent several days in Amman. (Telegram 47 from Amman, *ibid.*, 120.1580/7–3055)

178. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 29, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Egyptian Arms Request; Economic Aid; Sudan; Middle East Defense

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Ambassador of Egypt
NEA—Assistant Secretary, George V. Allen

The Ambassador said he was leaving for Cairo tomorrow on consultation and welcomed the opportunity to obtain the Secretary's views on various United States-Egyptian matters prior to his personal report to Prime Minister Nasser. The first item he wished to present was the pending Egyptian request to purchase arms in the United States. He said Egypt had endeavored to obtain armaments from us on three previous occasions, the first two having been refused pending a Suez settlement and the third, brought to Washington . . . having simply produced no results. (Mr. Allen pointed out that the Egyptian Government had not made a formal application for the arms on the list . . . because Egypt had wanted special terms of payment or perhaps a direct or indirect gift of the armaments, which had complicated the request. Ambassador Hussein smiled his concurrence.)

The Secretary said he knew of no basic political objection to the sale of arms to Egypt for defense purposes. The US was reluctant to contribute to an arms race in the Middle East and was aware that the Israeli Government would probably ask to buy arms as soon as it learned of sales to Egypt. Nevertheless, he did not want Colonel Nasser to think that we were trying to prevent Egypt from being able to defend itself. Instructions would be sent to Ambassador Byroade as soon as cost and availability information were obtained from the Defense Department, which he hoped would be in a few days.

Ambassador Hussein hoped we could make a special price to Egypt. The Secretary said he thought we would have to deal with all countries in the area on an equal basis. For example, Saudi Arabia had recently bought B–26 planes from us. We could hardly sell to Egypt at a different price. Ambassador Hussein pointed out that Israel already had superior armament to Egypt and that some concession to Egypt would merely tend to redress the balance. He was

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.5/7–2955. Secret. Drafted by Allen on August 3.

aware that an outright gift of arms could be made only if Egypt signed certain agreements required by US legislation. He wondered if we could not increase our economic aid by, say, $10,000,000 and allow Egypt to pay for the arms with foreign exchange which would be released by this amount. Mr. Allen pointed out that the Egyptian Government had not raised the question of terms of payment in the present case. Ambassador Hussein said, smiling. "I am raising it right now." Mr. Allen suggested that the first step was to obtain the cost and availability figures.

Ambassador Hussein said his second point was to urge increased economic aid for Egypt. The Secretary asked what the aid amount had been last year. The Ambassador said, "About $40,000,000." The Secretary thought this was considerable and remarked, pleasantly, that Egypt would be fortunate if its aid during the coming year was not reduced along with most other countries. He emphasized our desire to do everything we could for Egypt but that other requirements and available appropriations must also be taken into consideration.

The Ambassador said his third point concerned the Sudan. He recalled that Foreign Minister Fawzi had spoken to the Secretary on this point in San Francisco, and repeated the Egyptian Government's desire for US assistance in bringing about closer relations between Egypt and the Sudan. He hoped that some kind of federation could be achieved. The Secretary said that in principle he was inclined to agree that confederation was preferable to the setting up of innumerable weak independent states which could not defend themselves. He was unable to say what we could do in the Sudan, if anything, and thought our political influence there was quite small. However, he would take the Egyptian Government's views under consideration. Ambassador Hussein said that the most difficult question at the moment concerned the division of the Nile waters. The Secretary asked Mr. Allen to look into this question to see if we could help the negotiations along and agreed that just division of these waters was highly desirable.

Ambassador Hussein's last point concerned the High Aswan Dam. He said this was the most important element in Egyptian economic development and that without it Egypt could not make progress. He was greatly disappointed that the International Bank seemed to be continually raising new difficulties now related to upper waters in the Sudan, and he hoped the US Government would use its influence with the Bank to speed the negotiations.

At the close of the conversation, the Secretary asked Ambassador Hussein to assure Prime Minister Nasser that while the US Government supported the "northern tier" concept, he had never had in mind doing anything which would challenge Egypt's place as

the leader of the Arab States. He said Egypt was entitled to this both by history and present position and strength. Moreover, he had full confidence in Colonel Nasser and was anxious to do everything possible to help him succeed. The US had many demands from foreign nations for political and economic support and could not always do everything which all nations would like. However, he was determined to conduct the foreign policy of the United States on a moral basis and to deal as honestly and fairly with every nation as he possibly could. He felt it of extreme importance that at least one powerful nation in the world today should base its foreign policy on principle. He asked the Ambassador to remind Colonel Nasser that US policy today, based on justice and fairness to all countries in the Middle East, was much better than it had ever been since the creation of Israel. He hoped the Prime Minister would believe in our genuine support and good will towards him personally.

(Subsequently, Ambassador Hussein told Mr. Allen and Mr. Wilkins, separately, that he was extremely pleased with the Secretary's statements.)

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179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan [1]

Washington, August 2, 1955—6:09 p.m.

46. Request following message be conveyed Government to which accredited from Eric Johnston:

"In recent days representatives of the Governments of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan have suggested that I postpone my visit until the latter part of September. They have pointed out that the new Government of Syria may not be established until some time during that month.

I appreciate the problems arising from the Syrian elections and want to accommodate the Arab Governments to the fullest possible extent. While I find that a postponement until the end of September is not possible, I am prepared to make one further postponement in view of these representations. I propose arriving in the area about August 24, visiting Amman, Beirut and perhaps Cairo for discussion of detail, then proceeding to Damascus about September 5 for

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/8–255. Official Use Only. Drafted by Troxel; cleared with Barnes, Bergus, and Boardman; and approved by Wilkins, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jidda, and Baghdad, and pouched to London, Paris, and Jerusalem.

similar discussions. If circumstances warrant, I will be pleased to follow these conversations by a meeting with the Foreign Ministers concerned at any place named by them."

Dulles

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180. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 3, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Alpha

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. R. W. Bailey, Counselor, British Embassy
W. Barbour, EUR

The British Ambassador called by appointment made at his request. He handed the Secretary the following letter: [2]

"My dear Secretary of State: You will recall that Mr. Macmillan undertook to seek the authority of his Cabinet colleagues to make a statement on Alpha the day after your statement is issued. Draft texts for both these statements were discussed and provisionally agreed by Mr. Russell and Mr. Shuckburgh in London. [3]

"The Cabinet have now agreed that if your statement is on the lines of this draft Her Majesty's Government should issue a supporting statement, subject to assurances by the United States Government [4] on:

(a) their ultimate adherence to the Turco-Iraqi Pact; and
(b) their readiness to make a substantial financial contribution towards the supply of British tanks to Iraq. I understand that this point has already been discussed by the President and the Prime Minister.

"The Cabinet also invited Mr. Macmillan to suggest two amendments to your draft statement. The first of these would be to omit the words "in every respect" after the phase "not designed to be permanent frontiers" in Section 3 of the draft. The second would be to restore to Section 1 some reference to the possibility that some

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 6. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Barbour.

[2] The original of Makins' letter, August 2, is *ibid.*

[3] See the enclosures to Document 169.

[4] According to telegram 413 from London, August 3, the British Cabinet reached these decisions on July 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–355)

of the Arab refugees who formerly lived in Israel might be allowed to return to their homes. Yours sincerely, Roger Makins".

In supplementing orally the above letter Sir Roger referred to condition A and said that the British do not expect that US assurance on this point would be communicated to anybody else at this time nor obviously referred to in the US statement except possibly by general inference. He added that we might, of course, subsequently wish to inform the Iraqiis either generally or specifically. The Secretary assumed that the British understood that no assurance on this point could be given except subject to US constitutional requirements, i.e., Senatorial ratification.

With regard to the last paragraph concerning suggested amendments to the US draft statement Sir Roger thought that the first is only a drafting change. The second was designed to fill a gap which the British felt existed in the US draft, namely, the omission of any reference to the return of refugees to Israel. The Secretary said he did not recall the exact language of the statement which he would look at again, but it was his impression that the point was covered at least by inference if not specifically. Sir Roger said Macmillan is sympathetic to the apparent US concept that the statement should be general rather than specific but it was their impression that there are some specifics mentioned and, in the circumstances, this apparent omission might raise questions. The British also contemplated a broadly drawn statement but believed that if any details were included, all of them should be mentioned. In this connection Sir Roger said the British have a particular preoccupation with the problem of Arab lands outside villages.

Finally, Sir Roger turned to requested assurance B, and remarked that he thought the President had a letter from the Prime Minister on that subject.[5] The Secretary was not sure of the status of that problem but said he would look into it.

[5] See footnote 2, Document 171.

181. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, August 5, 1955.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to your letter of 21 July 1955 [2] requesting Department of Defense concurrence in a governmental position that we are prepared to consider supplying a portion of the equipment requested by the Government of Egypt. Reference is also made to Department of State memorandum, S/MSA–8–2A, dated 7 July 1955, [3] which requested pricing and availability data for the requested equipment and assigned Egypt Case No. 12 to this transaction.

In view of the overall political considerations indicated in your letter, the Department of Defense is prepared to supply to the Government of Egypt on a reimbursable basis the equipment requested. The delivery of such equipment is to be in consonance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. [4]

There is attached data reflecting estimated costs and probable availability for the equipment requested by the Government of Egypt. [5] Availability is contingent on prompt receipt of a firm order and funds to cover purchases.

The following comments are made regarding the requested items:

(a) If Napalm Bombs are sold to the Egyptian Government it will not only contribute to its offensive capability but will establish a precedent for making sales of this item. It is suggested that this item not be included in any list of equipment approved for supply to Egypt.

(b) B–26 aircraft are still maintained in active USAF inventories, however 30 to 33 could be made available either in the United States or from the USAF in Europe. Aircraft made available from either source will require complete rehabilitation, costs for which are shown. Costs for necessary follow-on support and equipment, based on a 200 flying hour program per aircraft, per annum, are also shown.

(c) An expedited delivery of six aircraft could be made in December 1955.

(d) An expedited delivery of twenty M4A3 tanks could be made to the shipping agent of the Egyptian Government within 60 days after receipt of a firm order and funds.

(e) Flame Thrower Tanks are not available for supply.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/8–555. Top Secret.

[2] Document 167.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 774.5–MSP/7–755)

[4] The Mutual Security Act of 1955, which became Public Law 138 on July 8, 1955, amended the Mutual Security Act of 1954. For text of the act, see 69 Stat. 283.

[5] Not printed.

The Department of Defense recommends that before a commitment is made to the Government of Egypt careful consideration be given to:

(a) Insuring that the supplying of this equipment to Egypt does not set off an arms race between the Arab States and Israel. This may be done by controlling the scope, character and phasing of delivering this equipment and of any material sold to Israel to minimize the possibility of its use for aggressive purposes. The Department of Defense is prepared to periodically supply, in accordance with the availability shown, only that portion of the equipment so desired by the Department of State.

(b) The capability of Egypt to purchase this matériel without damaging its economy.

(c) The feasibility of urging Egypt to refrain from signing the Egyptian-Saudi-Syria pact on the basis that the receipt of this equipment will raise the relative military strength of Egypt and should allay fears that the United States is not interested in her welfare. A diminution in Egyptian opposition to the Baghdad Pact and an end to Egyptian pressure for the formation of the ESS Pact could forestall any possible Iraqi apprehension over this sale of U.S. Arms to Egypt, and thereby facilitate continued Iraqi support of the "Northern Tier" concept.

Sincerely yours,

C. E. Wilson

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182. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, August 5, 1955, 12:30 p.m. [1]

SUBJECT

Military Equipment to Egypt

I told the President that we planned to notify Nasser that we would sell certain military equipment to Egypt as desired by him. I said that this had perhaps been put up as a test of our friendly relations and with the suggestion that if Egypt cannot buy here, they might buy in the Soviet Union.

The President agreed with this and also with the other point I made, namely, that we would have to be in a position to sell to Israel also.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/8–555. Secret. Drafted by Dulles.

The President suggested that we should say this to Eban. I indicated that I thought this might be useful but it had better be deferred until we discover whether in fact the Egyptians would buy.[2]

JFD

[2] The following day the Department instructed Byroade to respond to Nasser's request of June 30 to purchase arms from the United States. Byroade was to tell Nasser that the United States agreed "in principle" to such a transaction; that the United States wished to provide an initial increment of equipment worth about $11 million; that the United States was willing to expedite the prompt arrival of the initial shipment; that the items sold to Egypt would be in accordance with Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954; and that the total estimated cost of the Egyptian request was $27,586,323. (Telegram 244 to Cairo, August 6; *ibid.*, 774.56/8–655)

183. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, August 5, 1955, 12:30 p.m. [1]

SUBJECT

Centurion Tanks for Iraq

I discussed the matter of Eden's proposal for the offshore procurement of Centurion Tanks for Iraq. The President said that he had been impressed by Eden's representation, that if we were going to go ahead with Alpha we would have to give Nuri something to prevent his overthrow and to keep momentum behind the Northern tier concept.

I said that we did not view Nuri's situation as so precarious, but that no doubt it would be useful to do something to sweeten, for Nuri, a proposal which the Arabs might consider as a pro-Israel move—even though the Israeli would consider it a pro-Arab move.

I mentioned to the President that our Israeli relations would not be improved if we gave on a grant basis heavy items such as Centurion Tanks to Iraq.

I gave to the President, and he read, Deputy Secretary Anderson's letter of August 3. [2]

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 6. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Dulles.

[2] On August 3, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson asked Secretary Dulles to transmit to President Eisenhower a letter enclosing a memorandum that outlined the Department of Defense's objections to Eden's proposal. (*Ibid.*,

After discussions, the President called up Mr. Anderson and the following program was agreed to:

(a) We would advise the British that we would use, of this year's budget, funds to provide for the offshore procurement of ten Centurion Tanks to cost about a million and a quarter dollars. This was on the assumption that the British would contribute two. We would explain to the British the loss of MDA funds as a result of the cut in this year's appropriation.

(b) We would indicate an intention to seek funds for the offshore procurement of about 40 more Centurion Tanks for Iraq in the next fiscal year with a comparable UK matching.

(c) We would accelerate deliveries under our present Iraq program.

(d) We would find some additional scout cars and the like which, being in an obsolete or used condition, could sweeten the present pot without any appreciably additional charge against MDA funds.

JFD

787.5–MSP/8–355) The arguments in the memorandum were substantially the same as those presented at the July 27 meeting summarized in Document 172.

184. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Makins), Department of State, Washington, August 5, 1955 [1]

I told the British Ambassador with reference to Centurion Tanks to Iraq as follows:

(1) The Defense Department would, although faced with serious financial difficulties because of appropriation cuts, try to squeeze out for this year the offshore procurement in the UK of ten Centurion Tanks at a cost of about a million and a quarter on the assumption that the UK would match this with two.

(2) We would try to sweeten this years military pot for Iraq by accelerating deliveries and perhaps by adding some fresh items.

(3) That we would consider sympathetically a further contribution to the Centurion program in connection with our next years request to the Congress.

(4) We understand that this action on our part is not designed to set a general pattern for the Near East but to meet a special situation anticipated to arise from the announcement of Alpha and

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 6. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Dulles.

the difficulty faced by Nuri in meeting Arab opposition to his participation in the Northern tier concept.

I had told the Ambassador points 1, 2, and 3 prior to talking with Anderson and Hoover, et als in my anteroom. After this talk I went back and added pointed 4 and also asked him not to inform his government of what I had said until I could clear it more definitely which I said I would do the first of next week. We should, therefore, advise him definitely and in writing along the foregoing lines by Monday or Tuesday.

JFD

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185. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, August 9, 1955.

SUBJECT

Alpha: Comments from the Field

Discussion:

Attached for your information is a summary of the comments from the Chiefs of Mission at Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Paris on the proposed Alpha statement and tactics (*Tab A*).

The comments were submitted in response to a letter dated July 22 from Mr. Francis Russell, requesting their views on five specific points (*Tab B*). [2] The statement on tactics to which the comments refer is attached (*Tab C*), [3] as is the draft of your statement (*Tab D*) [4] which was sent to the field.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos & corres., July 1–Aug. 26 (day of Secy's speech). Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Burdett on August 8. The source text also bears a notation that Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Hoover saw this memorandum.

[2] Tab B was a list of five specific points which had initially appeared in Document 169.

[3] The statement on tactics appeared initially as numbered paragraphs 5 and 6 in the text of Enclosure 1 to Document 169.

[4] Tab D was the July 15 draft of the Secretary's proposed statement on the Arab-Israeli problem, Enclosure 2 to Document 169.

Mr. Russell is returning to the Department on August 10 and we have arranged a meeting with you for Friday, August 12 at 2:30 p.m. to discuss the entire matter, at which time both Mr. Russell and I would like to present our views.

Tab A

COMMENTS ON ALPHA FROM CHIEFS OF MISSION AT AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS [5]

I. Tactics

The interested governments should be informed of the proposed statement about 24 hours in advance by the American Chiefs of Mission. After the UK supporting statement is issued, the UK Chief of Mission should make an appropriate approach. In both cases, stress should be placed upon the desirability of studying the statement, exercising restraint, and not taking an immediate position. Ambassador Dillon strongly recommends that in order to avoid adverse effects on over-all US-French relations, the French be provided two weeks' advance notice and, in general, be made to feel we consider them in the same category as the UK. Ambassador Heath suggests we may wish to approach the USSR in advance.

II. Response on Part of Governments and Public

The Governments of Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan at best will probably be cautious in their response and refrain from taking a definite position until after Arab consultations. Unfavorable reactions on the part of Egypt and Syria are foreseen. In all cases, the Arab public probably will immediately reject the proposals. Ambassador Gallman is less apprehensive than the British over the effect of the statement in Iraq. Ambassador Lawson expects outright and vigorous opposition on the part of both the Israel Government and public.

III. Special Security Precautions

Our missions anticipate that demonstrations may occur but believe that they can be handled by the local authorities.

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[5] The information developed in this summary was drawn from the following telegrams: 56 from Amman, August 5; 101 from Baghdad, August 6; 127 from Beirut, August 2; 159 from Cairo, July 30; 100 from Damascus, August 4; 87 from Tel Aviv, August 4; and 490 from Paris, August 2. All these telegrams are in Department of State, Central File 684A.86.

IV. Publicity

No publicity before the statement is advocated. Authentic texts in Arabic, French and English, together with explanatory material, should be on hand for immediate distribution afterwards. We should be prepared to use all information media to explain the statement and refute distortions. Ambassador Gallman advises having ready a statement rebutting the contention that the proposal is a planned follow-up of the Turko-Iraqi Pact.

V. Presence in Countries of Chiefs of Mission and Heads of Government

All of our Chiefs of Mission plan to be at their posts in September. With the possible exception of Prime Minister Nuri, who may visit Turkey from September 10 to 15, the heads of government are expected to be at home.

VI. Comments on Text of Statement

Few comments were received from the Arab states on the text of the statement. There was a consensus, however, that reference to repatriation of a portion of the refugees should be included. Ambassador Lawson strongly urged that the statement be generalized and confined to an analysis of the problem and outline of the principles in accordance with which it might be solved. If this is not possible, he believes we should specify the concessions to be made by the Arab states as well as those expected from Israel. He notes that the draft British supporting statement confines itself to an analysis of the problem and to general principles. (Note: The revised August 4, 1955 draft of your statement is considerably more general than the text sent to the field.) [6]

VII. Johnston Mission

The Chiefs of Mission believe the statement would have an adverse effect upon the Johnston negotiations.

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[6] For a copy of this revised draft, see *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos & corres., July 1–Aug. 26 (day of Secy's speech).

186. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, August 9, 1955—5:39 p.m.

87. French and British reactions to preliminary proposals (Deptel 54 to Tel Aviv) [2] have been generally negative. French strongly urge Western powers hold to previous practice arguing inter alia: 1) West should not give Ben Gurion what is denied Sharett; 2) Further relaxation would provoke Arabs and might lead to their demanding UNGA consideration of Jerusalem question; 3) France is having enough difficulties with Arabs at present. British agree with French for reasons 1 and 2 above.

Accordingly USG has revised its preliminary views (Deptel 54) and proposes authorize Ambassador Tel Aviv to act along following lines, in event PriMin and FonMin two different individuals:

a) Initial courtesy call could be made on PriMin in Jerusalem as before, explaining to him that because of US policy on Jerusalem question which continues under UN consideration it will not be possible for Ambassador to call on FonMin in Jerusalem and that he will therefore be calling on PriMin but only for the most important matters;

b) FonMin would continue visit or send high-ranking representatives to Tel Aviv from time to time and would maintain Liaison Office there. In order facilitate business, Ambassador would continue authorize Deputy Chief of Mission and lesser officials Embassy to discuss matters of lesser importance with officials of Israel Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem.

c) Re social and official functions in Jerusalem, attendance will be left Ambassador's discretion subject considerations mentioned para (d) Deptel 54.

d) Issuance of press statement would be considered only if necessary correct false impressions US policy and practice.

Embassies London Paris and Ankara should inform Foreign Offices. [3] Dept hopes they will be willing instruct their mission

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.0084A/8–955. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins and Bergus and approved by Allen, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to London, Paris, and Ankara. Repeated to Amman and Jerusalem.

[2] Document 176.

[3] The Embassy in London reported that British Foreign Office officials supported the Department's suggestions and were instructing the British Ambassador in Israel to proceed along similar lines. The Foreign Office also understood that the French and the Turks were sending their representatives parallel instructions. (Telegram 516, August 11; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.00/8–1155) The Embassy in Paris informed the Department of French support as well. (Telegram 656, August 12; *ibid.*, 784A.00/8–1255)

chiefs along similar lines. Embassy Tel Aviv should discuss with friendly colleagues and enlist their support.[4] Advise result.

Dulles

[4] The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that the British, French, and Turkish missions in Israel had received instructions paralleling the Department's. (Telegram 128, August 17; *ibid.*, 601.0084A/8–1755)

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187. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to Francis H. Russell [1]

Washington, August 10, 1955.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Discussion regarding Proposed Letter to Sir Roger Makins with respect to Centurion Tanks for Iraq

This afternoon Assistant Secretary Allen discussed with the Secretary the redraft of a proposed letter to Sir Roger Makins with respect to Centurion tanks for Iraq (Tab A [2]). Mr. Allen pointed out that this redraft incorporated the Secretary's two suggestions: (1) that phraseology be inserted which would insure that the British would not be in a position to take entire credit in the matter; (2) that American action in supplying ten Centurion tanks on a grant basis which had been obtained by offshore procurement was contingent on British support for the Alpha statement. Mr. Allen also noted that he had with him a proposed telegram to the American Embassy in Baghdad inquiring whether in fact the Iraqis wanted Centurion tanks or would possibly prefer American tanks. [3]

During the course of the ensuing discussion the following points were touched on by the Secretary:

1. The Secretary speculated on the Congressional reaction to the possibility of American adherence to the Turko-Iraqi Pact. The Secretary mentioned in passing that he did not like open-ended

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha–beginning July 1955: U.S. Adherence to Turko-Iraqi Pact; also Tanks for Iraq. Top Secret; Alpha.

[2] Drafted by Burdett on August 10; not attached to the source text but filed *ibid.* Allen's initial draft, which he sent to Dulles with a covering memorandum of August 8, is *ibid.*, Alpha—Memos and corres., July 1–Aug. 26 (day of Secy's speech).

[3] Not attached to the source text. Telegram 93 to Baghdad, August 10, informed Ambassador Gallman of the conversations with the British and requested information as to Iraqi preferences. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/8–1055)

pacts but preferred those with a definite time limit which might be extended as necessary.

2. The Secretary was inclined to believe that the British would take entire credit for the provision of Centurion tanks for Iraq in spite of the fact that the letter provided that no intimation be given to the Iraqis by either the British or ourselves before the United States made its formal approach.

3. The Secretary raised the question of the United States selling the ten Centurions to the Iraqis which had been obtained from Britain by offshore procurement. He wondered whether this were possible and checked with Mr. Nolting, who stated that it had been done in one or two isolated cases but was not generally the practice. The Secretary wondered whether it should not be stated in the proposed draft letter to Sir Roger Makins that the Centurion tanks would be supplied by the United States to Iraq on a grant basis in the United States program.

4. The Secretary wondered whether the Iraqis wanted British tanks or would prefer American tanks. The proposed telegram was discussed and wording was added cautioning the American Ambassador regarding any queries he might put to the Iraqis regarding tanks.

Mr. Russell observed that any discussion with Nuri concerning the supply of Centurions to Iraq would probably leak and would prove an unfortunate backdrop for the Alpha statement. It would appear that the United States had abandoned its objective position, giving tanks to Iraq unconditionally but making the security treaty for Israel conditional on cooperation in Alpha. The Secretary said it might be better, if we decided to have the British tell Nuri that they were informed the prospects were good and withhold any U.S. statement until later.

The Secretary concluded that he felt that it would be sufficient for the moment to send the telegram to the American Embassy in Baghdad. Following the reply as to whether the Iraqis wanted Centurion tanks, further consideration could be given to the proposed letter to Sir Roger Makins. [4] He supposed that it could be held up another day or two.

[4] See Document 191.

188. Editorial Note

At 9:15 a.m. on August 11, Secretary Dulles met with President Eisenhower to review a number of policy matters, one of which was

the question of furnishing Centurion tanks to Iraq. According to Dulles' memorandum of conversation, the following was said:

"We discussed the matter of Centurion tanks for Iraq. I said we were in somewhat of a dilemma on whether to let the British get the credit for these tanks or to seek credit ourselves, in which case we would get a corresponding debit from Israel. The President reaffirmed his often-expressed view that we should encourage the British to take the lead in the Middle East and not seek to compete with them in that respect. He said that he thought it was better for us to let the British deal in this tank matter directly with the Iraqi." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

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189. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, August 11, 1955—1 p.m.

37. Further to my telegram 34, [2] General Burns today reviewed in detail with British Consul General and officer Consulate General present status Gaza talks:

According to Burns:

1. Israelis insist the "senior officer," who is to represent the parties for the purpose of the commander's agreement, be well defined term and want such officer to be the local commander or some one of direct relationship to that commander. Egyptians are unwilling that "senior officer" be local commander as they object to direct contact between parties at this level. Burns of opinion that Gohar contemplates Egyptian representative to be officer of lieutenant colonel rank who will be directly subordinate to War Ministry, and thus subject to Gohar, as well as to Egyptian General commanding Gaza sector. This arrangement would be satisfactory under circumstances and Burns has informed Israelis that he is willing to give his "personal guarantee" that Egyptian representative will have requisite authority. Gohar's objection to delineation of precise relationship of senior officer to Egyptian forces Gaza based on fear that he might be accused of promoting direct talks between Egypt and Israel.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–1155. Confidential. Received at 1:08 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Telegram 34 reported in part that General Burns informed Cole on August 10 that there had been no progress in the Gaza talks on August 9 and 10, and that the next meeting was scheduled for August 19. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/8–1055)

2. Gohar refused direct telephone link between parties, although will accept passing of messages through United Nations observers stationed at kilo 95. Israelis insist on direct telephone communication.

3. Israel objection to attendance United Nations observer at meetings of representatives of parties reinforces belief which Egyptians have always had that Israel desire for Gaza talks and commanders' agreement merely attempt to bring about direct discussions between two countries. . . .

Concerning other items of agenda, Burns stated Israelis unwilling to agree to mixed patrols unless they feel Egyptians will accept barbed wire obstacle. Egyptians do not want obstacle if neutral zone idea not accepted by Israelis. However, Burns hopeful that agreement can be reached on some combination of these proposals.

Prior to scheduled August 19 meeting Burns intends to speak with Lourie of Israel Foreign Office in effort obtain Israel acceptance to Egyptian position on items one and three above if Egyptians will agree direct telephone line. Burns not sure whether Gohar objection to telephone line accurately reflects firm Egyptian position and in event he obtains Israel agreement as outlined above he may ask for outside pressure on GOE to gain Egyptian acceptance. [3]

Cole

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[3] Cole reported on August 16 that General Burns had canceled the Gaza meeting scheduled for August 19 in the hope that, by approaching each side separately, he would be able to convince them to reconcile their differences described in Jerusalem telegram 37 before they met together again. (Telegram 39 from Jerusalem; *ibid.*, 674.84A/8–1655)

190. Memorandum for the Files, by Francis H. Russell of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs [1]

Washington, August 12, 1955.

SUBJECT

Alpha: Points Made at Meeting with Secretary today [2]

1. He will give speech on Wednesday, Sept. 28. [3] He will be in New York at that time for the meeting of GA (Foreign Ministers of Big Three) and therefore would give speech there.

He approved idea of giving it at luncheon meeting of Council on Foreign Relations. An effort should be made to obtain radio and TV coverage, if possible, but no pressure should be brought to bear for it.

2. Re obtaining bipartisan support: Secretary approved making an approach to Sen. George and Rep. Richards; also, Sen. Wiley and Rep. Vorys should be informed; and since they will presumably not be in Washington at that time, they would have to be approached individually by someone (other than the Secretary) conversant with Alpha. They should be given an outline of what he intends to say but *not* the text.

3. GVA [4] will see Ambassador Johnston. The Secretary wishes Johnston to conclude his negots by Sept. 19 so that some time will elapse between their conclusion and the Secretary's speech.

4. Ambassador Bohlen should be informed of the Secretary's statement beforehand and instructed to inform the Soviet Foreign Office, on the day that the Secretary makes his statement, in very general terms, saying that we hope that this effort to bring about peace in the area will have Soviet support.

5. The Secretary will inform Ambassador Lodge of his intention to make a statement. The Secretary thought that the info should be confined to Ambassador Lodge in the UNA area for the time being.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos and corres. July 1–Aug. 26 (day of Secy's speech). Top Secret; Alpha.

[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, the meeting began at 2:35 p.m. Those present were the Secretary, Allen, Jernegan, Murphy, Hare, and Russell. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[3] The Embassy in London was instructed on August 12 to inform Shuckburgh of this decision. (Telegram 779; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–1255)

[4] George V. Allen.

6. The Secretary approved the changes checked on FHR's [5] copy of the Aug. 11 draft. [6] He intends to draft an additional paragraph or two for the speech, making the point that it is not within the capacity of the countries in the area themselves to bring about settlement, since they do not have the financial resources necessary for the compensation of the refugees, nor the military resources to create their own security. [7] It is therefore incumbent upon outside countries to do more than merely exhort the parties to make a settlement. If there is to be a settlement, outside countries must provide the financial resources and the security guarantees that will eliminate fear of aggression.

7. The Secretary thought that Israel should be informed at least three days beforehand, i.e., Israel should be given at least the same advance notice as Egypt, Iraq and Jordan.

8. Re item A–3. in the "Suggested Steps" (Tab B [8]): Some reference should be made to the time at which the approaches are made to Iraq and Jordan—presumably the British approach would be three days before and the U.S. approach two days before.

9. Re France: [9] An approach should be made about 10 days beforehand by Ambassador Dillon to Pinay. It should be very general and should tend to minimize the importance of the statement. It should say that the IG has been, for a considerable time now, asking a security guarantee of the US and that the US feels that there should be some improvement in the relations between Israel and its neighbors before the US can give such a commitment. The Secretary will express the hope that such an improvement can be brought about. The Ambassador should say that the US hopes that the French and British will support the Secretary's suggestions. The British should not approach the French beforehand.

10. Re Item A–8. [10] in the "Suggested Steps": The Secretary believes that no approaches should be made beforehand to India, Pakistan and Ceylon.

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[5] Francis H. Russell.

[6] Not printed. Russell sent the Secretary a copy of this draft on August 12, with a covering memorandum and a paper entitled "Suggested Steps Prior To And Following Secretary's Statement". (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos and corres., July 1–Aug. 26 (day of Secy' speech)

[7] On August 15, Russell sent Dulles a redraft incorporating these changes. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 6)

[8] Not printed; see footnote 6 above.

[9] Reference is to item A–6 of Tab B, "Suggested Steps Prior To And Following Secretary's Statement".

[10] Item A–8 of Tab B recommended that the British High Commissioners should inform the "old" Commonwealth nations of the Secretary's speech about a week prior to its delivery, and these governments should be asked to express their public support for the Secretary's proposals. It was further suggested that U.S. representatives should not approach the Governments of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon for support until 24 hours in advance of the speech.

191. Letter From the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Makins) [1]

Washington, August 15, 1955.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I refer to our conversations and correspondence concerning Centurion tanks for Iraq.

Off-shore procurement of Centurion tanks faces us with serious financial difficulties because of recent appropriation cuts by the Congress. Nevertheless, we are prepared to purchase in the United Kingdom for Iraq, as part of our grant aid program for the current fiscal year, 10 Centurion tanks if the United Kingdom will provide two. Also, we will explore the possibilities of expediting deliveries to Iraq under our current program and of adding certain other additional items to this program. Our action with respect to the tanks is not intended to set a general pattern for the Near East but only to meet a specific special situation.

Members of our staffs can discuss the question of the manner and time for informing the Iraqi Government.

Because of the personal interest Prime Minister Eden has expressed to the President, I would appreciate your bringing this letter to his attention.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles [2]

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 6. Top Secret. Drafted by Allen and Burdett.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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192. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, August 15, 1955.

SUBJECT

Contingency Plans for Action in the Event of Armed Aggression in Palestine

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–1555. Top Secret. Drafted by Jernegan and sent through Murphy, who initialed the memorandum. No Tab B was mentioned or attached to the source text.

Background

As you will recall, NSC 5428 (Tab C) (the policy paper covering the Near East) provides that if an armed attack occurs by either side in Palestine the United States should impose certain economic sanctions. It further provides that if these sanctions are unsuccessful in causing the aggressor state to withdraw within its own borders, we should consult with the UK and to the extent practicable with other powers on whether to take concerted action to:

(1) Establish a blockade of the attacking state;
(2) Use military forces to compel the attacking state to relinquish any territory seized and to withdraw within its own borders.

Paragraph 11 of the paper calls for the development of plans, including military plans where appropriate, to support the measures set forth above.

When the Gaza situation seemed especially acute last June we submitted a memorandum (Tab A) [2] suggesting steps looking toward possible implementation of the economic sanctions. You subsequently discussed this matter with Mr. Macmillan and it was agreed that any action taken should be within the United Nations framework.

Although the threat of large-scale hostilities has not materialized, an OCB working group has addressed itself to the mechanics by which we would impose economic sanctions if the occasion should arise. So far as I am aware, however, no action within the United States Government has ever been taken to draw up plans against the contingency that military action would be needed.

Discussion

The British Embassy approached us some time ago with a request for informal discussion of action to be taken by our two governments, in case of need, in both the economic and military fields. [3] The Embassy said that the British Government, at the "official level" had worked out plans in both fields. We expressed our willingness to have informal exchanges regarding economic sanctions as soon as our own study was completed but said we did not think discussion of military plans would be useful, since no such plans existed in our government.

I think the British approach serves as a reminder that we may have been remiss in not carrying out the injunction of paragraph 11 of NSC 5428 to develop "military plans as appropriate." While we all hate to contemplate the possibility of employing military force against either side, it seems to me only prudent to have plans ready

[2] Document 125.
[3] See Document 142.

against the possibility that at some time the necessity for such action might arise.

In view of the delicacy of the matter, I feel that we should have your personal approval before making a request to the Department of Defense.

Recommendation

That you approve a strictly secret (and probably oral) request to appropriate officers of the Department of Defense for the initiation of plans for the imposition of military sanctions upon an aggressor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. [4]

[4] Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendation.

193. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, August 15, 1955—2 p.m.

233. There follows a series of three messages which should be considered together. This message contains account my conversation last evening with Nasser re sale military equipment. Second contains analysis of situation here as reported to me by Ahmed Hussein after lengthy conversations with Nasser. [2] Last message will contain such recommendations as I have for consideration of Department. [3]

In order insure there be no lack of understanding I let Nasser read appropriate portions Deptel 244 [4] as amended by niact 256. [5] Supplemented text by saying I personally greatly pleased by Washington decision this matter and hoped it would disprove once and for all charge of his military that it impossible purchase weapons

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/8–1555. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:59 p.m. Passed to London and Paris.

[2] *Infra*.

[3] Byroade stated in telegram 235 from Cairo, August 15, that he believed the Soviet Union was intervening in the Near East on the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli dispute, in part by its offer to furnish Egypt with military equipment. He recommended that if the United States hoped to dissuade Nasser from accepting this proposal and Soviet offers of economic development assistance, it should "try to meet Nasser's request for purchase of some military equipment for Egyptian pounds." (Department of State, Central Files, 474.118/8–1555)

[4] See footnote 2, Document 182.

[5] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/8–855)

from US. Expanded in some detail as to wisdom military personnel discussing matters such as items, availability, shipping, maintenance, spare part situation, etc. Told him also I felt there were items on list which he would find it unnecessary to purchase as many of the TO and E items for US units probably would be found unnecessary or duplication of what was already on hand. Explained that prices given were lowest possible for US in view of its own regulations and practices with other friendly nations.

Nasser took no exception to information he read or my supplementary remarks. He said he thoroughly understood it in his interest that matters I had mentioned be handled by military personnel. For reasons which became immediately obvious he did not object to phased program as I had anticipated. Nasser said he had just gone through GOE financial situation again with Minister of Finance [6] and his dollar position was really far worse than he had realized. He stated they now had a balance of $28 million. (This checks roughly our information. Last report available to Embassy was $34.4 million and Egypt has been losing from $2 million to $4 million per month.) He had asked Minister of Finance to re-study this situation and give him recommendation as to how much could be spent for military equipment. Nasser said I must realize this was very difficult problem for them and inquired whether we could find some way to let him finance these purchases with Egyptian pounds. I stated I not hopeful that such arrangement could be made. As far as I aware we had not used this practice for any other nation and was certain we would not like precedent to be set. Nasser said could understand this but after all we no longer selling equipment many places and would I please try. After considerable discussion I agreed consult Department. Matter as left that he also would go again into his own financial situation and we would have further talk later.

Byroade

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[6] Abdel Moneim Kaissouny.

194. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, August 15, 1955—3 p.m.

234. Reference Embassy telegram 233 August 15. [2] Ahmed Hussein called on me yesterday morning in state obvious concern. He began by stating his belief there was beginning to be general improvement in US-Egyptian relations as far as Nasser was concerned. He told me in great detail of his last talks with Nasser and argumentation he had used, including encouraging conversations he had prior to his leaving Washington, particularly with Secretary. [3] He felt these talks supplementing my own efforts were beginning to bring positive results. There were new difficulties however which caused him great concern.

They had discussed the internal situation, apparently in extremely blunt terms. Nasser was determined to broaden base of government next January but Hussein was trying to convince Nasser he could not afford to wait that long. He told Nasser he was surrounded by "third raters" and machinery of government under RCC was such that changes must be promptly made. He indicated he had pointed out to Nasser danger of Salem brothers, stressing importance of not losing friendship with west and inadvisability of tactics some top government people, particularly Salah Salem. Nasser later called together Hakim Amer, Salah Salem, Zakaria and others to hear Hussein's general views as to foreign policy course Egypt should follow. Hussein this time added he was appalled by same anti-American "record" now played every Egyptian officer who visited America and it was perfectly obvious that before leaving Egypt they were being systematically worked on by communists and communist sympathizers.

Following this joint meeting, Nasser saw Hussein again alone and went into detail on internal problems he faced. Nasser said he had to let certain things happen in Egypt with which he did not agree in order to keep support of army and RCC at this stage. He agreed with Hussein that RCC must go and asked his help in trying to plan steps that must be taken to this end. Discussing his need for support army officers Nasser revealed to Hussein magnitude of recent Russian offers which was creating nearly impossible situation for him. Shepilov had brought word Russia prepared go all out in

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/8–1555. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:26 p.m.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] See Document 178.

assisting Egypt.[4] Russia would finance high dam and Egypt could repay in cotton over period up to thirty years and in terms suitable to Egypt. Russia would also be of great assistance to Egypt in economic development and technical assistance and Russia prepared to put large funds in both fields. Egypt need not be fearful of US cotton policy as Russia and communist bloc needed Egyptian cotton and suitable barter arrangements could always be made. As regards military, Russia willing to increase her latest offers substantially and would provide Egypt with MIG aircraft and latest weapons quick delivery payable in cotton. (Hussein states he was not shown details of Russian offer in military field but Nasser did at one point mention 100 MIGs and 200 tanks. He also mentioned jet bombers which Russia is willing to sell for LE 37000.) Military shipments could begin to arrive within 30 days. (Nasser had not given Shepilov definitive reply.)

Nasser told Hussein that 3 or 4 days ago Moscow radio announced USSR prepared give free military assistance to Egypt. Nasser had taken steps keep this out of press although fact such statement made was getting around. He felt compelled bring text of monitored announcement up at RCC meeting. General sentiment had been Egypt should not refuse such an offer if it were in fact officially made. Hussein later brought me a transcript which had been used in RCC meeting. It had been broadcast from Moscow on August 10 in Arabic. Most of transcript was published here after Nasser had crossed out portion dealing with military equipment which translated as follows: "very highly informed sources announced that the Soviet Union is ready to supply Egypt with modern arms and military equipment free. These sources expect that negotiations would take place between the Soviet Union and Egypt about this subject in the coming days."[5] Hussein stated Israeli radio had picked up this portion and used it in two broadcasts along with appropriate references about the USSR.

Nasser told Hussein he (Nasser) getting himself in real box on this one. He realized communists had of late directed their activities toward army as controlling factor in determination Egyptian policy. He knew where accepting all these Russian offers would lead. He determined have truly "independent policy" and realized acquisition Soviet arms was road to "domination". However, his officers were

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[4] Dimitri Trofimovich Shepilov, the editor of *Pravda*, visited Egypt July 21–29.

[5] The Department informed Byroade on August 17 that, according to FBIS, "no broadcast made by USSR on or about August 10 resembling that quoted by Hussein." (Telegram 300 to Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 474.118/8–1555) Byroade replied that "There absolutely no doubt my mind that Hussein and Nasser believe broadcast was made and that RCC meeting was held on this subject." (Telegram 253 from Cairo, August 18; *ibid.*, 774.56/8–1855)

desperate for arms and word was getting out that these new offers had been made. With the army in this mood and with its general lack of confidence in America, and with RCC certainly deeply divided on issue, he had to reckon with fact he would be placing his position in jeopardy in advocating turn-down of Russian offer in favoring use limited Egyptian resources to purchase arms. Such a course would appear nonsensical to average officer who convinced west determined keep Egypt weaker than Israel and who saw no danger accepting arms from any source available. Having Russian made weapons, they argue, would not make them communists so why this hesitation.

Hussein recounted to me argumentation he had given Nasser which was excellently conceived if presented to Nasser as to me. According to Hussein, however, Nasser needed little convincing, he seemed genuinely concerned at Russian motives and primarily interested in how he could marshal sufficient support within RCC and army to turn down Russian offers.

Hussein appealed to me to think of something dramatic to help Nasser in this situation. He stressed that a decision to acquire Soviet arms would not have impact on Egypt alone but could be turning point in history Middle East. He stated that high dam, economic aid, and other matters were obviously important, but paled into relative insignificance compared to question of Russia's offer of arms under present conditions.

I asked what he thought we could do. Egypt would not accept grant assistance now even if offered. He said this was true but it might be very helpful if our response to Nasser on US purchase terms were as generous as possible. Surely, he said, we could find some way help Nasser with his foreign exchange problem so he could buy weapons from US. He also asked if we would consider a request for Egypt to purchase considerably greater quantities of equipment on list presented. I said I thought this latter point quite unlikely. He must realize from practical point of view Egyptian military could not absorb large amounts of equipment in short period of time. He said he knew this but matter was now more psychological than practical. I also stated it seemed to me not in Egypt's interests to go too far with military equipment at this stage in view obvious reactions. Also, even if equipment were furnished on gratis basis, maintenance of much larger military establishment could not be afforded by Egypt. He nevertheless pleaded that I try think of something that would help Nasser now.

I told Hussein Middle East had been thrown into chaos, partially if not primarily, by Egyptian tactics, that it obvious Moscow had decided now was time to really move in on this area. He said he completely agreed. However Nasser still by far best thing in Egypt

and now needed our help. He felt convinced that if he could get by these present troubles without losing army support, he was determined to get rid of elements that had been causing difficulties.

Byroade

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195. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, August 17, 1955—1 p.m.

250. General subject Arab-Israeli settlement beginning to appear again in conversation here. When Hussein came to me so concerned re Russian arms situation he stated some dramatic move necessary prevent this controversy from being capitalized on by USSR. Could we for instance he inquired force quick settlement? I stated did not like word "force" but he entirely correct greater efforts should go towards solution basic problem rather than being satisfied with trying to ward off piecemeal dangers arising from controversy itself. Hussein now is pressing for quick and forceful action on our part to bring some type of immediate settlement.

In our discussions last night with Fawzi, Fawzi reiterated his conviction that even at this late date the year 1955 was still the time to act. We went back over our previous discussions in considerable detail. He said his sense urgency was greater than during our previous conversation and he felt that even on GOE side, Nasser might be more willing to act now than "even in six months".

I stated we always seemed to reach about the same point in these talks. Did he really wish to proceed in detail with such talks and if so how should we proceed? There followed a long talk on the Negev and it became obvious that question was no longer one of tactics as to how to proceed. He was rather giving me GOE position that if solution could be found for the Negev satisfactory to Egypt, Egypt would be ready to move forward to rapid and complete settlement. I have now talked to Fawzi in sufficient detail on elements other than Negev to believe that meeting of minds thereon could be readily reached.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–1755. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 7:30 p.m. Repeated priority to London.

I expressed opinion that any plan to give entire Negev to Jordan was quite out of question, explaining somewhat the obvious reaction and emotions of Israelis. Furthermore, stated that there were concessions elsewhere that should in all logic be made by Israel. One could not contemplate coupling these with such a large loss of territory. For instance if Arabs in addition contemplated return of refugees into Israeli territory thus reduced, he must see how impossible this would be. Fawzi said "don't quote me, but if we can get a solution to Negev we might be willing take a position that there should be no return of refugees and that Arabs now residing Israel should even have evacuation facilitated".

Fawzi refused to talk in terms of anything resembling a corridor or access rights. What he stressed was rather a "continuity of territory" in the Arab world. Thus Egypt could not contemplate solution which would allow Israel access to Gulf of Elath. This I said would put Israel at the mercy of Suez Canal. He replied, no more than Greece, Italy or others. I stated he must realize Israel had more reason to fear for the future re the Canal than other countries. Fawzi responded by saying he was not thinking of a settlement that would leave cause for concern but of a real effort being made for establishment of friendly relations which would erase such fears. He remarked that Jews and Arabs had lived together in the past and could do so again if Israel could accept the type of solution he recommended. Israel would really not lose much of a practical value as good lands would not be taken from her. She could under these conditions fulfill her dream of a metropolis for the area if she wished to really cooperate with her neighbors.

Fawzi stated he concerned increasing numbers of individuals who wished come this area as peacemakers. This was not way to handle problem and secret informal discussions such as this between professionals was the only way to start. He mentioned forthcoming visit of Congressman Powell [2] with anxiety as to bad propaganda which would probably result. He felt Lester Pearson, whom he greatly admires, was also about to visit both Egypt [3] and Israel for same purpose and gave impression he wished he would not.

I made no effort bring matter to conclusion or arrange for further discussions because not certain what Department would wish at this stage. It is subject, however, I did not wish avoid as in my own mind complications of Russian attitude greatly increase dangers continued stalemate. Cannot conceive of being able convince Israel

[2] Congressman Adam Clayton Powell announced on July 23 that, after Congress had adjourned, he planned to go to the Near East in an unofficial capacity to promote a peaceful settlement between Egypt and Israel.

[3] Pearson was in Cairo on November 12.

accept this type of solution yet when one weighs the consequences of continued controversy against the value this worthless spot of desert it difficult not to reach conclusion maybe we should try sound out what is furthest Israel could accept under real pressure from US for quick settlement.

Fawzi stated he going on vacation but would be available any time I wished to see him. Would appreciate any comments as to how to handle future discussions this subject which feel will continue to arise.

Byroade

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196. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, August 17, 1955—3 p.m.

252. Following my meeting with Fawzi[2] attended dinner at home Ambassador Hussein with Nasser, General Hakim Amer, Zakaria Muhyi Ad-Din. Hart also present. First half of long evening devoted non-substantive matters in relaxed atmosphere. Fact that Nasser willing devote such amount of time to discussions of personal and small talk matters in general line with some change of relations for better here.

Afterward we covered nearly every facet American-Egyptian political relations without any new subject being raised. I attempted focus attention on points on which Egypt and United States could cooperate. Urged Nasser regard northern tier as solid anti-Communist achievement which in interest Egypt, United States, and West

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/8–1755. Secret. Received at 6:10 p.m. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Byroade reported on this meeting in telegrams 247 and 251 from Cairo, both dated August 17. (*Ibid.*, 120.1580/8–1755 and 611.74/8–1755, respectively) Telegram 247 stated that Fawzi said Nasser had reversed his previous position against Egyptian involvement in Johnston's negotiations and now felt the matter should be handled by all Arab states jointly. The Secretary General of the Arab League had therefore called a meeting of Arab diplomatic representatives in Cairo which had unanimously supported an approach to the U.S. Government to recommend that Johnston's trip be delayed. Fawzi requested that Byroade pass this recommendation to Washington, stressing that the delay need be only for a "few weeks" or a month. Byroade asked Fawzi if he would advise that Johnston continue to negotiate directly with the parties most directly concerned. Fawzi replied that this might be useful, but it might be best for Johnston to meet with the entire Arab group together, perhaps in Cairo.

must under no circumstances be allowed disintegrate. It was of basic importance. Iraq should not continue to be attacked for adherence nor worked upon to recant and drop out. In answer to his complaint Iraq and Turkey constantly seeking additional Arab adherences, I again reassured him United States not enthusiastic over such adherences at this time and sought his reflections as to how this inter-Arab tug-of-war could be eased without setting up rival ESS which we felt sure would be viewed by Iraq as well as Turkey as directed against them and would therefcre tend to perpetuate cleavage and resultant area weakness which we did not desire. Perhaps because a group was present, Nasser sought to justify necessity ESS, but seemed receptive to idea some reconciliation.

He thought an all-Arab arrangement in which Iraq could also participate might some day eventuate in supplementing northern tier but not as long as Nuri in power. He made clear he detested Nuri and therefore he could not at present take up my further suggestion that Egypt and Iraq bilaterally talk out their differences on basis continuation Iraqi membership northern tier and Iraq-Egyptian understanding. I had impression, however, he would be open minded about composing differences with whoever might be Nuri's successor.

Considerable time was spent on Egypt's military weakness vis-à-vis Israel and Western policy of equating Israel with totality Arab States in military aid matters. Hakim Amer obviously very sensitive this point. I told him I felt sure United States would welcome an Egypt strong enough not to fear an Israeli attack, but until Arab-Israel quarrel removed a building up of Egyptian might superior to that of Israel would present grave problem to United States and probably not even be in Egypt's real interest at this time. After real solution to quarrel had been found, I saw no reason why Egyptian strength should be limited by other than load Egypt's economy could bear and role she might play in strengthening area. I emphasized importance we attached to Egypt along with Turkey and Pakistan as future foci of strength which we desired in Middle East.

Question of Russian offers did not come up and I thought it best not to pursue question before other members RCC. Fact that Nasser had chosen present these matters through Hussein believed due desire not to discuss his personal problems with other members of RCC directly with me.

Although am somewhat reassured regarding relations here, this does not reduce in importance recommendations Embassy telegram 235.[3] Fact that Nasser believes this Embassy trying find some method help him with his dollar problem regarding equipment

[3] See footnote 3, Document 193.

purchases probably in itself factor for more friendly local relations. Nor does all this reduce in my mind new dangers inherent in Russia's offers strengthen Egypt, thereby placing her on Arab side of Arab-Israeli conflict.

Byroade

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197. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Makins), Department of State, Washington, August 18, 1955, 10:30 a.m. [1]

(1) I asked the Ambassador whether he had received my letter about tanks for Iraq. [2] He said he had and had forwarded it to his Government with the statement that he assumed it would be satisfactory and asking for a reply. I said that it was in general agreeable to us that the British should handle this matter with the Iraqi, but I thought there should be a clear understanding as to precisely what would be said, and when it would be said, and to whom.

(2) I informed Ambassador Makins of the shift of position of Egypt with reference to the Johnston Plan [3] and said in view of that we were having a meeting this afternoon to discuss the effect thereof, not only on Johnston's trip, but also on the timing of Alpha. I said it might lead us to accelerate Alpha, but I would let him know as soon as a decision was reached. [4]

[Here follow discussion of unrelated matters.]

JFD

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 6. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Dulles.

[2] Document 191.

[3] For further information concerning the Egyptians' shift of position, see footnote 2, *infra*.

[4] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, a meeting concerning Alpha began at 2:30 p.m. that afternoon in Dulles' office. Those present, besides the Secretary, were MacArthur, Murphy, Hare, Allen, Jernegan, Wilkins, and Russell. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) According to an undated and uninitialed memorandum concerning this session, "Secretary decided to make the statement on August 26 instead of Sept. 29." (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos and corres., July 1–Aug. 26 (day of Secy' speech))

198. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Eric Johnston, Chairman of the International Development Advisory Board, Washington, August 18, 1955, 3:10 p.m. [1]

The Secretary telephoned Eric Johnston in New York and said he understood the Arab League was getting into Mr. Johnston's party. Johnston said they had kept them out up to the present time and he felt they would take only a negative attitude. He said they would tell the States involved they would do business with them on this project, although they can consult with whom they wish. Johnston said the project was the key to the solution to the difficulties in the area. Until the backbone of the resistance was broken, he did not see how the problem could be solved. The best way, he said, of solving the Arab refugee problem was this water project. The Secretary agreed that if it went into the Arab League it would be a morass. On the other hand, we are not prepared to beat down Colonel Nasser at the moment. He is probably using this as a device to restore his prestige in relation to the Arab League. That is maybe what he is up to. Johnston thought this perhaps might be true. J. said a cable had come in a while ago to the effect that Lebanon was behind the move to put this in the Arab League. [2] This was not true of Egypt and if this is correct that puts quite a different aspect on the situation. Johnston said if he could have a talk with Nasser he would stress the futility of allowing this to go into the Arab League. He said he realized the difficulties of trying to put this over and was not nearly as sanguine of success as he was a month ago. Johnston said he knew how helpful it would be to the Secretary if he could put this thing over and he still hoped it was possible.

The Secretary said he may have to make his statement sooner than he thought. Johnston said if there were repercussions he might be able to temper them while he was over there. The Secretary asked if J. felt he should go right away in spite of this business. Johnston said he did think he should go. He said that Saudi Arabia and Iraq were at each other's throats and did not appear to be interested in a solution. We appreciated Egypt's help and were delighted she was taking a renewed interest in the project. Johnston

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Mildred J. Asbjornson.

[2] Reference is presumably to telegram 139 from Baghdad, August 18, in which Gallman informed the Department that the Lebanese Government had asked Iraq to "side with latter in insisting that Johnston discussions be conducted with A[rab] L[eague] in Cairo rather than with individual Arab States." (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/8–1855)

reiterated how important it was for him to get out there and said if we waited two or three weeks the different States would not have the courage to resist and it will get into the Arab League and never get out. Johnston said he thought there was so much involved that he should do what he could for the Secretary's sake. The Sec. said he didn't believe the statement would be such that it would interfere with Johnston's operation. If we don't do something to keep it out of the Arab League it will sink anyway.

Johnston said that to be perfectly honest with the Secretary he would prefer that the Sec. not make the statement now but if in his judgment he thought he should it was OK with Johnston, but he did think he would make the trip in any event.

The Secretary said the reasons he wanted to make the statement were: If the Russians began to get into the scene, particularly in Egypt, with various devices which they are now using at the present time and the situation becomes intensified, we would have to alter our entire position from one of neutrality in the area. The situation is rapidly changing and we should do something soon. It is more or less perhaps backing Egypt against Israel. There are risks involved. [3]

Johnston said Nasser and the King of Jordan were all right but Lebanon and Syria would do nothing to keep the project out of the League.

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[3] On August 23, Dulles informed Johnston that "I can now confirm my plan to make public statement on Israel-Arab problem in NY on Aug. 26"; that the Chargé in Amman was to make the text of the speech available to Johnston; and that Johnston was free to say that his water negotiations "stand on their own merits" and were separate from the goals to be outlined in Dulles' speech. (Telegram 77 to Amman; *ibid.*, 684A.86/8–2355)

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199. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, August 18, 1955—3 p.m.

256. Embassy has understood GOE objection direct telephone communications (Jerusalem telegram 37, [2] paragraph 2) to be based on same principle as that recognized by Burns as motivating GOE

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–1855. Confidential. Received at 3:31 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, and Paris.

[2] Document 189.

stand on meetings (Jerusalem telegram 37 paragraph 3) and often repeated in press, i.e., policy of avoiding direct contact with Israelis and desire maintain strong UNTSO with which GOE can cooperate to reduce tensions without risking charges of "softness toward Israel".

Since GOE position appears firmly based on point of principle which Burns has in effect endorsed in accepting GOE position on meetings, Embassy doubts that GOE will be willing abandon it on issue telephone communications in exchange Israeli acceptance UNTSO participation in meetings. Embassy recognizes procedure proposed by GOE is somewhat cumbersome but we have impression that its adoption would not significantly affect operation of local commanders agreement. Furthermore, it must be realized that this principle of avoiding direct contact underlies Egyptian position on a great number of points—including joint patrols—which arise in implementation GAA. This being the case it would appear that acceptance this principle by all parties concerned would facilitate joint efforts reduce tension and in fact encourage Egyptians believe they can safely pursue course of expanding cooperation in Gaza area.

For these reasons Embassy believes "outside pressure on GOE" would be unproductive particularly since GOE rejoinder will almost certainly contrast GOE desire secure maximum UNTSO participation in implementing GAA with Israeli efforts, as summarized by Burns, "to reduce UNTSO authority".

Byroade

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200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, August 18, 1955—6:03 p.m.

307. Embtel 247. [2] Request you seek early opportunity convey following to Fawzi:

(1) Department and Ambassador Johnston welcome Egypt's decision resume active role in negotiations. Egypt's assistance in past

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/8–1755. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Russell and Troxel; cleared with Wilkins, Ludlow, and Barnes; and approved by Allen, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Benghazi, and London.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

has been invaluable and we anticipate continuation profitable collaboration. Please reciprocate Fawzi's regards warmly on Johnston's behalf and mention appreciation for expression of his views.

(2) Johnston has given careful consideration to recommendation of diplomatic representatives Arab states at Cairo to postpone trip. Believe however general discussion Jordan Valley project accentuates need for proceeding with visit by Johnston in order provide detailed and up-to-date information on program. He believes further postponement likely only increase misunderstanding. Johnston proposes therefore proceed area as planned although delighted make visit to Cairo if Fawzi believes it would be useful. (See Deptel Zurich rptd Cairo 306 [3] re Johnston's itinerary)

(3) Right any interested country to discuss matters with any other countries or group of countries is fully recognized. Department and Johnston feel that negotiations can appropriately be carried on only directly with governments and plan therefore continue bilateral discussions along lines previously followed.

FYI: We consider introduction Arab League into negotiations adverse development. Believe best course under circumstances is attempt turn Egypt's interest to best advantage in view of importance Egypt's cooperation. End FYI[4]

Info addressees may convey above to governments accredited as appropriate.

Dulles

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[3] Dated August 18, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 120.1580/8–1855)

[4] The Embassy in Cairo subsequently informed the Department that Hart conveyed Johnston's message to Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs on August 12. (Telegram 269, August 22; *ibid.*, 120.1580/8–2255) Johnston asked Byroade on August 24 if Fawzi had responded to his telegram. (Telegram 449 from Athens; *ibid.*, 120.1580/8–2455) Byroade replied on August 24 that "Fawzi would be very pleased to see you should you decide to visit Cairo", but that the decision rested entirely with Johnston. (Telegram 12 from Cairo to Amman; *ibid.*, 120.1574/8–2455)

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201. Message From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Macmillan [1]

Washington, August 19, 1955.

DEAR HAROLD: I have come to the conclusion that it is necessary to expedite the Alpha matter and to telescope somewhat the

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 6. Top Secret; Alpha. A notation on the source text states that Russell delivered the original to the British Embassy on August 19.

preparatory plans. The situation has become so brittle that I fear that any day events may happen which will outdate the Alpha project. For example, while momentarily the situation in Egypt looks better, it could very readily become one where Soviet aid was enlisted by Egypt. In that event our own present program would go by the board and we might have to take a very different attitude, possibly by indicating an intention to back Israel more fully. I have come very definitely to the opinion that we must move rapidly if at all.

I have already told you that we are prepared to start in a small way to assist on the tank program for Iraq and I am confirming today our attitude of contemplated adherence to the Iraq–Turkey arrangements as I indicated to you in Paris. [2]

I expect to be in a position later today to cable you the text of the statement which I plan to make and which closely follows the present draft [3] except that I plan to deal with the boundary subject only in terms of generalities, avoiding detail. This, I understand from Roger Makins, is your preference. I feel I must, however, retain "in all respects" [4] since shifting to the generality here indicated would otherwise leave the statement apparently weighted in favor of the Arabs.

I realize that this change of pace is going to make it harder for you and for us in the way of preparing the ground. However, I doubt very much if it is prudent to have any great length of time between the decision to go ahead and the actual pronouncement itself.

A postponement for a week would not be practical as I am leaving on vacation on August 31 and I have Shigemitsu [5] here August 29–31. I have not yet had any vacation and I think it imperative that I take the first fortnight of September before getting into the intensive preparations for our next round at Geneva. [6]

I would hope that we can coordinate our plans for the next few days without the necessity of Russell going to London as I need him

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[2] An August 19 letter from Dulles to Makins stated that while it was not feasible for the United States to join the Baghdad Pact "until there was a relaxation of tension between the Arab states and Israel", it would at that time "be disposed to seek formal adherence." (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—beginning July 1955: U.S. Adherence to Turko-Iraqi Pact; also, Tanks for Iraq)

[3] It is not clear whether the reference is to the July 15 draft (Enclosure 2 to Document 169) or to a subsequent draft; see footnotes 6 and 7, Document 190.

[4] See Document 180.

[5] Mamoru Shigemitsu, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan.

[6] Reference is to the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27–November 16, 1955.

very badly here to help cope with our own final preparations. Of course, he will be at your disposal after the plan is once launched.

Faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles [7]

[7] Printed from a carbon copy that bears this typed signature.

202. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President [1]

Washington, August 19, 1955.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending you separately the "Alpha" statement which I propose to make with reference to the Near East. [2] This is along the lines we have previously discussed and is, I understand, concurred in by the UK which will plan to issue a public statement of concurrence immediately following my own statement.

The section about boundaries we have decided to generalize rather than to touch on concrete and extremely sensitive subjects such as the access of Egypt to Saudi Arabia and Jordan through Neguib, the road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and so forth.

We plan, subject to British concurrence expected shortly, to make the statement in New York before the Council on Foreign Relations next Friday evening.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Dulles, according to a copy in Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 6.

[2] The draft statement, headed "#2, 8/19/55," was sent as an attachment to the letter. It differed most significantly from the July 15 draft (Enclosure 2 to Document 169) in Section III, which reads as follows:

"If there is to be a guarantee of borders, it would be normal that there should be prior agreement upon what the borders are. That is the third major problem. The existing lines separating Israel from the Arab states were fixed by the Armistice Agreements of 1949. They were not designed to be permanent frontiers in every respect; in part at least, they reflected the status of the fighting at the moment.

"To draw permanent boundaries which could be guaranteed is primarily a task for those who represent the people who are in contact with each other and who have to live on one side or the other of the boundaries. The task is admittedly one of difficulty. There is no single and sure guide, for each of two conflicting claims may seem to have much merit. The difficulty is increased by the fact that even territory which is barren has acquired a sentimental significance. However, the overall advantages of the measures here outlined would seem to outweigh vastly the net disadvantages of the adjustments needed to convert armistice lines of danger into boundary lines of safety."

We have accelerated somewhat the program for a number of reasons. The first is that momentarily at least Colonel Nasser seems more friendly and more sympathetic to such a project, although his ambitions in relation to the Neguib are much exaggerated.

The second is that Johnston's project which I had given the right of way now has taken a bad turn because the Arab States have apparently decided not to deal with him directly but through the Arab League, and while Johnston is still going out to push on his project, it now seems less likely that he can carry it through as an independent effort. He has withdrawn his prior plea to me not to announce this project until he had a further round of his own.

In the third place, while at the moment there is relative tranquillity, events could happen in terms of a Soviet-Arab rapprochement so that we would have to back Israel much more strongly and drop our role of impartiality.

If "Alpha" is to be done at all, it should be done while we can speak as the friend of both.

As you know, we anticipate that the initial reaction of both sides will be negative. The Arabs do not really want to have peace with Israel, and Israel does not want to consider any boundary adjustments. Rather it wants first of all a security treaty with the United States. I believe, however, that the presentation will come to command a serious hearing and that at least it represents a positive effort by the United States to deal with this question. We need to make such an effort before the situation gets involved in 1956 politics.

Both Nixon and Herb Brownell have looked over the statement and think it is tolerable from a political standpoint.

I expect to have it shown in advance to a few of the Congressional leaders, Republican and Democrat.

The text, which was originally worked out in London, has been cabled back to them so that they can take note of some minor changes which have been made.

I would appreciate knowing whether you authorize me to make the presentation, which, as you will note, contains the statement that "I speak in this matter with the authority of the President."

I would appreciate as early a reply as is practical because we want to have the statement translated into both Yiddish and Arabic and in the hands of all our Near East posts before I speak. [3]

Faithfully yours,

Foster

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[3] The President called Dulles at 10:50 a.m. on Monday, August 22. According to Phyllis D. Bernau's memorandum of this conversation, "On Alpha, the Pres. said he does not see anything wrong with it." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

203. Message From Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles [1]

DEAR FOSTER: Many thanks for your message about Alpha. [2] I am sorry that you do not see your way to giving more time for the preparatory work which we have agreed should be done. I am recalling our Ambassador at Bagdad from his leave and instructing him to return to his post forthwith. He will have to do his best to prevent an adverse reaction in Iraq to your statement.

We had hoped that a substantial offer of tanks would soften the blow. So the Prime Minister and I are disappointed that you can only promise ten, but we are glad to see that you regard this as a start. In the circumstances we shall be happy to provide the two to match your gift. I think that both our Ambassadors in Bagdad should now tell Nuri in confidence that we have agreed that the Iraqi forces should be equipped with British tanks and that we are providing twelve to begin with. If you agree, I will give appropriate instructions to Sir Michael Wright.

As regards the text of your statement [3] may I make some suggestions. I am glad that you have decided to avoid detail, and my proposal is that you should be even less specific. I am sure you will agree that we should not give the contestants an excuse for taking up an extreme position against some particular part of what you say and so make any subsequent confidential negotiations more difficult. With this in mind, I hope you will feel able to omit the phrase in the passage dealing with refugees which limits the compensation to land and buildings. [4] I entirely agree with this limitation, but I fear

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 7. Top Secret. The source text is undated. Enclosed with an August 20 note from Scott to Dulles, which bears the notation that it was seen by the Secretary.

[2] Document 201.

[3] Presumably the August 19 draft cited in footnote 2, *supra*. No record that the text was cabled to London has been found in Department of State files; it was apparently provided to the British Embassy.

[4] The relevant sentences in the August 19 draft read as follows:

"All of this requires money. In part it should come from Israel as compensation due for land and buildings taken from the refugees. However, it may be that Israel cannot, unaided, now make full compensation."

that to announce it now would invite attack on the grounds that it is an unjustifiably narrow interpretation of the basis on which compensation should be paid. I am sure it would pay to be less specific.

I am a little worried about what you propose to say on frontiers. I fully agree that you must avoid the appearance of weighting your words in favour of the Arabs, and with that in mind I can see why you wish to retain "in all respects" in the first paragraph.

But I fear that the first and last sentences of the second paragraph as it stands will give the Arabs the impression that you think a few minor adjustments to the frontier are all that will be necessary and that you are expecting them to enter into direct negotiations with the Israelis on that basis. The Prime Minister shares my apprehension. I also fear that this will drive them into open opposition and in particular spoil our chances with the Egyptians, who will think that you have ignored their desire for access across the Negev. I must therefore ask you to reconsider this paragraph. Could you not perhaps omit the first sentence and simply say at the end that in spite of the difficulties of conflicting claims and sentiment you believe that it is possible to find a way of reconciling the vital interests of all the parties, adding that the United States would be willing to help in the search for a solution if required.

Yours sincerely,

Harold Macmillan [5]

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, August 20, 1955—3:46 p.m.

324. We informally advised by IBRD that both engineering and economic reports on High Aswan Dam now prepared for management consideration early date with recommendations GOE be invited

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/8–2055. Confidential. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to London and Khartoum, and pouched to Addis Ababa and Nairobi.

further discussions over-all problems of financing and organization connected with project. One of major remaining problems is absence Egyptian Sudanese agreement on division Nile waters.

We believe US and UK should make strong effort secure Egyptian-Sudanese agreement. Fawzi requested Secretary for assistance during visit here. Best chance success offered by agreement in principle on political level leaving in abeyance to maximum extent complicated technical problems. Latter could be resolved subsequently perhaps through assistance international commission of experts. Agreement should provide Egypt sufficient water to make High Aswan Dam feasible about 12 MCM. Consequently necessary obtain Sudanese acceptance in general Egypt proposal for 50–50 division present surplus water after deduction evaporation loss at Aswan.

Embassy London requested approach foreign office outline our views and seek British cooperation in démarche to Sudanese. [2] Embassy should state we concur UK policy avoiding friction with Egypt over Sudan London 638 [3] and believe steps suggested would calm situation and demonstrate to RCC, UK and US desire assist Egypt. Because status of Sudan British might make main effort through Governor General. USLO Khartoum could make informal representations Azhari.

Comments requested from Khartoum [4] and Cairo. [5] Do not inform Egyptian and Sudanese governments in absence of further instructions.

Pouching additional explanatory information. [6]

Dulles

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[2] The Embassy in London reported in part on August 22 that it had approached the Foreign Office about making a joint démarche to the Sudanese. Although the preliminary British response was unfavorable, Foreign Office officials pledged to study the question thoroughly before replying to the Embassy proposal. (Telegram 667; *ibid.*, 645W.74322/8–2255)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 745W.00/8–1955)

[4] The U.S. Liaison Office at Khartoum recommended on August 23 that, given the present state of tension that existed between the Sudan and Egypt, the United States should not make any démarche to the Sudanese at that time. Any U.S. initiative which was "based on Egyptian aspirations in the Sudan [would be] taken as indication of non-neutral position at this critical stage of self-determination." (Telegram 34; *ibid.*, 645W.74322/8–2355)

[5] The Embassy in Cairo on August 22 reported its concurrence with the Department's position. (Telegram 279; *ibid.*, 645W.74322/8–2255)

[6] Reference is to circular airgram 1631, August 25, which was sent to London, Cairo, and Khartoum and repeated to Addis Ababa and Nairobi. (*Ibid.*, 645W.74322/8–2555)

205. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Francis H. Russell of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Washington, August 20, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Alpha Operation: Points Discussed with Secretary

Mr. David Muirhead of the British Embassy delivered to me about 4 p.m. today Mr. Macmillan's reply [2] to the Secretary's letter of yesterday to him. [3] I called the Secretary and he asked me to come to his home. The following points were discussed there.

With respect to Macmillan's suggestion that the British and American Ambassadors in Baghdad inform Nuri in confidence that we have agreed that the Iraq forces should be equipped with British tanks and that we are providing 12 to begin, I told the Secretary that our communications to date had merely dealt with the specific 10 tanks and had not committed us to the broader proposition that "Iraq forces should be equipped with British tanks." The Secretary said that he knew that the President's thinking was along the line of approval of the proposition suggested by Macmillan and he told me that I should inform Mr. Muirhead that we concurred in the British Ambassador making such a statement to Nuri but that we felt that it would be better for our Ambassador not to make the statement at this time unless queried by Nuri, in which case he might confirm it.

I was also to inform Muirhead that the Secretary is agreeable to omitting the phrase "land and buildings"; that the Secretary feels that if that change is made the word "full" in the following sentence should be changed to "adequate." [4]

With respect to Macmillan's suggestion for the omission of "the first sentence", it is not clear to which sentence he is referring as the paragraphing, due to telegraphic transmission of the text used by Macmillan, may be different. The Secretary thought, however, that Macmillan might be referring to the sentence beginning "The existing lines separating Israel" and possibly the following sentence "They were not designed [etc.]." [5] If that is so, the Secretary is inclined to agree but feels that it may require a little further redrafting of the section. We will give to the British Embassy on Monday our suggestions in this respect. (It later developed that the

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 7. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Russell.

[2] Document 203.

[3] Document 201.

[4] Dulles, like Macmillan, was referring to his draft statement of August 19; see footnotes 3 and 4, Document 203.

[5] Brackets in the source text.

Macmillan suggestion was different from this and I so informed the Secretary.)

The Secretary also asked me to request the British Embassy to convey to Macmillan his appreciation for the UK accommodation to the Secretary's time schedule. [6]

The Secretary authorized me to tell the Council on Foreign Relations to send out the letters of invitation to the Friday afternoon meeting.

The Secretary said that he would have no objection to his speech being carried by radio and thought that would probably be a good idea. One of the local New York stations would probably be glad to carry it if the national hookup did not. The Secretary thought that in any event USIA should arrange to make a recording of it.

I told the Secretary that I thought that it was desirable that he inform Ambassador Lodge of his forthcoming speech now that it was definitely decided to go ahead with it. The Secretary said that he would put in a call for Lodge right away. [7] He also said that he was seeing Lyndon Johnson tomorrow (Sunday) and intended to say something to him about it. [8]

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[6] A memorandum of August 22 from Russell to Dulles states that on August 21 the British Embassy had given him a message from Macmillan replying to the oral message from Dulles which Russell had given to the Embassy the previous day. The message reads in part as follows:

"With regard to the date, I confirm that I agree to work to August 26th.

"With regard to the tanks, I will instruct H.M. Ambassador to speak accordingly to the Iraqi Prime Minister and say that he does so 'with the knowledge and approval of the U.S. Govt'." (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 7)

[7] The Secretary telephoned Ambassador Lodge at 11:23 a.m., August 22, and informed him that the speech would be given on August 26 and that it would "be about the Middle East." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

[8] Dulles informed Senator Johnson on August 21 of his impending statement. Johnson in turn, according to Dulles' memorandum of the conversation, "indicated that he thought it was appropriate for us to make our position clear." (*Ibid.*, General Memoranda of Conversation)

206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, August 20, 1955—7:49 p.m.

123. For Ambassador from Secretary. Re Russell letr on Alpha of July 22. [2]

After consideration of possible alternatives as to timing I plan to make on August 26 a public statement concerning the Arab-Israel issues and US willingness help in working toward a settlement. Statement will be along general lines of draft text already sent you. Final text, reflecting recommendations from field, will be telegraphed to you separately. You should plan call upon PriMin Wed Aug 24 and advise him I expect make a statement on some of issues pending between Israel and Arab states and on possibility of steps toward stability and econ progress in that area. Do not make appointment until receipt subsequent instruction that effect. [3] You should inform him this statement embodies considered views this Govt reached after intensive study. We hope govt to which you are accredited, which has so much to gain from a solution of problems hampering progress and impeding national development of Near Eastern states, will give my statement closest study and constructive consideration. You should not, of course, give any indication of content of proposed statement other than above.

FYI: Dept has worked closely with Brit FonOff in working out principles and proposals contained in my statement and you should coordinate closely with your Brit colleague. Dept is informing French FonOff of proposed statement only in most general terms at this time [4] but hopes for French endorsement of our proposals. In your discretion you may reveal substance your conversations with govt to your French colleague but only in most general terms.

You will shortly receive a further instruction re points you should make in event govt raises certain questions with you fol my statement.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2055. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell; approved by the Secretary and by Russell, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London.

[2] Document 169.

[3] Telegram 124 to Tel Aviv, August 21, instructed Lawson to do so. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2155)

[4] Telegram 672 to Paris, August 20, instructed the Ambassador to inform Pinay in general terms that Dulles planned to make a statement on the Arab-Israel problem, to express the hope that the French would support his suggestions, and to impress on him the importance of secrecy. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/8–1055) Chargé Theodore C. Achilles reported in telegram 799 from Paris, August 22, that, in Pinay's absence, he had spoken to Margérie on August 22 to carry out these instructions. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/8–2255)

It is my hope that the statement will provide an opportunity for all of us to engage in a renewed effort to reduce tension and to assist in broad progress in the area. [5]

Dulles

[5] The Department transmitted similar instructions on August 20 in telegram 101 to Damascus, in telegram 257 to Beirut, in telegram 88 to Jidda, and in telegram 57 to Tripoli. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2055)

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207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, August 20, 1955—7:50 p.m.

325. For Ambassador from Secretary. Re Russell letter July 22. [2]

I have reached decision make statement on Arab-Israel problem evening August 26 before Council Foreign Relations in New York. I have come to believe major move necessary now in order seize initiative in Near East, arresting policy of drift and consequent opportunity for USSR cause trouble. Your reports Soviet efforts in Egypt confirm need for early action. If we delay further we may miss present relatively favorable moment. US is now in position impartial friend both parties but with delay we could be obliged, by Soviet maneuvers or domestic developments, to take steps which would arouse resentment of Arab states. Also we have period of comparative quiet in Arab-Israel relations. With Israel under Ben Gurion calm may not last especially should Israel learn beforehand of my statement. I am encouraged further by your latest talks with Nasser and Fawzi particularly latter's view US should seize initiative in 1955.

Accordingly you should plan to request meeting with Nasser August 24 and subsequently with Fawzi to make presentation along fol lines (do not make appointments until receipt subsequent instruction that effect): [3]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2055. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Burdett and Russell on August 19; approved by the Secretary and by Russell, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London.

[2] Document 169.

[3] The Department sent a confirmatory instruction to Cairo the following day. (Telegram 329, August 21; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2155)

1. I have asked you reiterate on my behalf points I made to Fawzi in San Francisco [4] and Washington, [5] i.e., our strong support for Nasser personally and his govt; our recognition of Egypt's natural and legitimate aspirations in Middle East; although we think "northern tier" contains elements essential for defense of area, we do not advocate adherence of additional Arab states at this time and it does not preclude major role for Egypt when Nasser so wishes; our hopes for cooperation with Egypt.

2. In above spirit you wish to tell him confidentially of my plan to make major Arab-Israel statement on Aug 26. US decision to take initiative largely influenced by Egyptian advice as expressed by Fawzi that such action desirable in 1955. Statement will be made as sincere friend both sides and offers great deal to Arabs. You confident Egypt will realize positive benefits from objectives set forth and will take lead among Arab states in working towards them. Statement will outline in broad strokes US views on need for accommodation (not asking formal peace) and matters requiring settlement including borders, refugees, and guarantee of boundaries. (You should not provide further details at this time.) You will be glad further to discuss matter afterwards. You hope Nasser will ponder statement carefully to determine how best to capitalize on opportunity offered and that he will provide constructive leadership to other Arab states.

3. You also bring news other matters in which Nasser expressed interest. On my behalf you may assure him US following scrupulously policy of complete non-interference in Sudan and, whatever results of self-determination, hopes to see and will encourage friendly cooperation between Egyptian and Sudanese people. In response his request we prepared try bring about agreement between Egypt and Sudan on Nile waters.

4. You able inform him in confidence IBRD has completed economic and technical engineering studies of High Asuan Dam and studies will be reviewed by management near future along with recommendations that GOE be invited further discussions of overall problems of finance and organization connected with problem. We intend urge upon IBRD desirability expeditious consideration. Success in our efforts on Nile waters would assist further favorable decisions by Bank. If Nasser wishes, US economic aid for FY 1956, insofar as feasible, could be programmed to projects and studies supporting high dam.

5. We are exploring with utmost care all possibilities assisting him with respect to financing arms he wishes obtain. His request presents us with severe difficulties but we are making every effort to find ways to help. FYI: From political standpoint difficulties would be greatly increased by hostile reaction to statement and immoderate presentation of exaggerated Negev claims. End FYI.

Revised text statement, instructions re follow-up presentation, timetable and publicity will be telegraphed separately.

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[4] See Document 138.

[5] See footnote 3, Document 150.

You should coordinate your approach with British colleague without, however, revealing substance numbered paras three, four and five. We are informing French FonOff of proposed statement only in most general terms at this time but hope for French endorsement of our proposals. In your discretion you may reveal to your French colleague nature your presentation to Nasser and Fawzi but only in most general terms.

Dulles

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208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan [1]

Washington, August 20, 1955—7:52 p.m.

68. For Chief of Mission from Secretary. Re Russell letr on Alpha of July 22. [2]

After consideration of possible alternatives as to timing I plan to make on August 26 a public statement concerning the Arab-Israel issues and US willingness to help in working toward a settlement. The statement will be along the general lines of the draft text already sent to you. The final text, reflecting recommendations from the field, will be telegraphed to you separately.

Dept has worked closely with the British FonOff in working out principles and proposals contained in my statement and you should coordinate closely with your Brit colleague. We have agreed with British that UK reps should make first approaches in Iraq and Jordan, with follow-up by US rep. In other countries of area, order is reversed.

You should plan to call upon one or all of fol: PriMin, [3] FonMin or King [4] on Wed August 24 as soon as possible after your Brit colleague has done so. Advise him I expect make a statement on some of issues pending between Israel and Arab states and on possibility of steps toward stability and econ progress in that area. Do not make appointment until receipt subsequent instruction that

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2055. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell; approved by the Secretary and by Russell, who signed for Dulles.

[2] Document 169.

[3] Said al-Mufti was both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

[4] Hussein ibn Talal.

effect. [5] You should inform him that this statement embodies considered views of this Govt reached after intensive study. We hope govt to which you are accredited, which has so much to gain from a solution of problems hampering progress and impeding national development of Near Eastern states, will give my statement closest study and constructive consideration. You should not, of course, give any indication of content of proposed statement other than above. [6]

FYI: Dept is informing French FonOff of proposed statement only in most general terms at this time but hopes for French endorsement of our proposals. In your discretion you may reveal substance your conversations with govt to your French colleague but only in most general terms. End FYI.

You will receive shortly a further instruction re points you should make in event govt raises certain questions with you fol my statement.

It is my hope that the statement will provide an opportunity for all of us to engage in a renewed effort to reduce tension and to assist in broad progress in the area. [7]

Dulles

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[5] The Department sent a confirmatory instruction to Amman the following day. (Telegram 69, August 21; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2155)

[6] The Embassy in Amman reported on August 24 that the Chargé, Paul Geren, had carried out the Department's instructions in calls on Mufti and King Hussein. Mufti's response was noncommittal, and the King was willing to say only that Jordan would "do what it could". The country's reaction, the King said, was dependent upon the contents of the Secretary's statement. (Telegram 85; *ibid.*, 684A.86/8–2455)

[7] The Department transmitted similar instructions on August 20 to Baghdad as telegram 120. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2055)

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209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

Washington, August 20, 1955—7:53 p.m.

279. For Ambassador. Re Francis Russell's ltr to you of July 22. [2]

Secretary will make public statement on Arab-Israel problem on Aug 26. Final text will be telegraphed separately.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2055. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted and approved by Russell, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London, Paris, Baghdad, and Karachi.

[2] Document 169.

Please plan see PriMin [3] and/or FonMin [4] Wed. Aug 24 and advise him time and subject of Secretary's speech and tell him advance text will be available to him shortly. (Do not make appointment until receipt subsequent instruction that effect. [5]) You should say this statement reflects long intensive study of problem by Secretary personally. It is feeling of this Govt, which is shared, we are sure, by Govt of Turkey, that interests of all nations of North Atlantic community and their allies, as well as, of course, interests of peoples of Near East themselves, require an early and effective reduction of Arab-Israel tension. Secretary's statement will deal with general principles. (You should not give any indication of content of proposed statement other than above.)

We hope Turkish Govt will study Secretary's statement and give consideration to supporting US views with Arabs and Israel and with other friendly countries. Turkey's participation in Turk-Iraq Pact and other area considerations will probably make it desirable Turkey effect her support in private and diplomatic sphere rather than by public statements at this time. It is our feeling that Turkey, by reason her history, influence and position can contribute to a détente in present impasse which impedes our common effort strengthen area but we would not wish her jeopardize her important role in area defense by any current action in Israel-Arab dispute. We look forward to consultations with Turks as to manner in which our efforts can best be coordinated. [6]

FYI: Dept has worked very closely with British in this matter and you should coordinate your action very closely with that of your British colleagues who will be receiving similar instructions. Dept informing French in general terms and seeking French support. At your discretion you may advise your French colleague of your activities but only in most general terms. End FYI.

Dulles

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[3] Adnan Menderes.

[4] Mehmet Fuat Köprülü.

[5] The Department instructed Ambassador Warren on August 21 to make his presentation as soon as feasible. (Telegram 281 to Ankara; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2155)

[6] Warren reported on August 24 that he spoke with Prime Minister Menderes in Istanbul on August 23 while Foy Kohler, the Counselor of the Embassy, saw Nuri Birgi, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Ankara. "While Birgi expressed chagrin that Turks not consulted in advance, both Prime Minister and he assured us statement would receive careful sympathetic study." (Telegram 262 from Ankara; *ibid.*, 684A.86/8–2455)

210. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, August 22, 1955—6 p.m.

278. For the Secretary. Deptels 325 [2] and 329 [3] received and indicated appointments have been requested. Hope it not too late that you consider following 2 suggestions:

As regards presentation here, would be far more hopeful if we could be more specific as regards subject matter covered paragraph 5 Deptel 325. Appreciate my recommendation regarding assisting Nasser in some manner on arms purchase is most difficult for Washington. Nevertheless believe subject of such importance as regards U.S.-Egyptian relations in general and possible cooperation on this particular problem that it extremely important Nasser does not obtain impression new matter has been raised requiring prior cooperation on his part before purchase can be consummated.

I fear that as matter now stands he may obtain this impression as he would think decision in principle should have been possible for Washington in time that has elapsed since his request to me on August 14, [4] which, you will recall, similar to request made by Hussein in conversation with you before his departure. [5] If at all possible suggest alteration of this paragraph to indicate that, while complying his request produces severe difficulties that will require few more days to overcome, decision in principle has been made that a way will be found to assist him in purchase of some U.S. equipment.

As regards revised text of statement (not yet received) have been encouraged by word from George Allen that specific references to proposed settlement plan might be replaced by more general statements. Think this important in general but particularly so as regards Negev and that text not commit us to any specific formula or even type of solution. Egypt's reaction to speech will most probably be largely influenced by phraseology regarding this problem and if catch phrase such as "re-establishment of continuity of Arab territory" can possibly be utilized we may not come out too badly. Realize this is extremely difficult without specifically endorsing Israel's right of access to Elath but believe this issue can become matter of bargaining at later date if statement worded with this

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2255. Top Secret; Niact; Alpha. Received at 7:03 p.m. Repeated priority to London.

[2] Document 207.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 207.

[4] For Byroade's report, see Document 193.

[5] See Document 178.

objective in mind. Statement would have to be phrased in such a way that it would not evoke strong Egyptian denunciation which would have effect of freezing Arab position from outset.

While above recommendations seem very important here am certain you know we will do our best carry through with whatever decision you feel required from over-all viewpoint.

Byroade

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211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, August 23, 1955—6:03 p.m.

337. Embtel 278. [2] We endeavored in presentation authorized Deptel 325 [3] meet Nasser's various requests on wide range matters important to him. Our recognition importance Egyptian cooperation shown by this strong effort accommodate Nasser. We approved his application purchase substantial quantity arms in US and he raised new matter in asking us to assist him in effecting payment for arms. Our decision will necessarily be affected by attitude Nasser adopts toward statement.

Under these circumstances you may wish to avoid raising question of arms. If so you may omit paragraph 5 Deptel 325. Should Nasser raise matter you could reply that you have not yet heard results of Department's consideration.

Text statement telegraphed August 23. [4] In response to suggestions from field specific proposals omitted and question permanent

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2255. Top Secret; Niact; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Burdett and approved and signed by Dulles. Repeated to London.

[2] *Supra*.

[3] Document 207.

[4] Telegram 131 to Tel Aviv, also sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Tripoli, Ankara, London, and Paris, transmitted the text of the statement, authorized each Chief of Mission to provide a copy to his British colleague, but instructed him not to provide the text to the government to which he was accredited or discuss it prior to the release hour. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2355) Telegram 140 to Tel Aviv, August 24, also sent to the same missions and to Canberra, Wellington, Pretoria, and Ottawa, transmitted revisions in the text. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/8–2455) For text of the address delivered by Dulles on August 26, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1955, p. 378.

boundaries covered only in general terms. Because of this approach not possible mention any specific territorial change.

Dulles

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212. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, August 24, 1955—1 p.m.

147. Eyes only for the Secretary. Re Middle East. I explained to Secretary-General Hammarskjold the purpose and general content of your speech Friday on the Middle East. He was unusually excited and pleased, in fact interrupted when I mentioned US plans regarding financial aid for compensation and repatriation of refugees, to remark "This is the best news you could bring me".

He feels that the refugee question is the keystone in the Middle East area and that solution of it may well "break the dike" although he does not expect that political solution will be found in the immediate future.

He promised to give full support both publicly and in consultation with representatives of interested nations.

In a subsequent conversation at which I informed him regarding your speech Sir Pierson Dixon (UK) read me his instructions. In accordance with which he will see the Secretary General this afternoon expressing complete British agreement and requesting Hammarskjold's support.

The absence of top Arab and Israeli representatives here makes contact in New York difficult and perhaps unwise. I suggest therefore that our approach be made at the capitals and if you wish with the Ambassadors at Washington.

Lodge

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2455. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 1:31 p.m.

213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, August 24, 1955—4:01 p.m.

138. For Chief of Mission. In your talks with officials of govt to which accredited, after Secretary's speech Aug 26, you should bear in mind that primary objective speech is to provide impetus which could lead toward sincere negots for an Arab-Israel settlement in near future. It is our hope that leaders of area will agree with US view that efforts reach settlement by all concerned are urgently required. If however after thorough consideration Secretary's statement they unwilling or unable consider possibility of working toward settlement, statement will remain as definitive exposition of US policy objectives toward area which this Govt wishes to achieve in few months if possible or longer if need be.

You should provide no details of US views as to possible elements of settlement unless and until specifically instructed do so. Fol telegram [2] sets forth points which we have agreed with UK should be made by US and UK reps regarding Secretary's and Macmillan's statements.

After you have had opportunity appraise reaction to Secretary's speech telegraph Dept your recommendations as to next steps this Govt should take to lead parties to sincere negots either direct or in Trieste pattern.

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2455. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell and approved and signed by Dulles. Also sent priority to Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Amman, Damascus, Jidda, and Tripoli. Repeated priority to London, Paris, and Ankara.

[2] *Infra.*

214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, August 24, 1955—4:01 p.m.

139. Dept has agreed with UK on fol position to be taken by reps in Israel and Arab states in any background comment on Secretary's speech Aug 26.[2] You should not volunteer comment beyond urging earnest consideration and support of statement. But if pressed and you believe situation warrants you may informally use fol background:

1. It is important that statement not be regarded as a "plan" for a settlement. Rather it an explanation of what US would do to make a settlement possible.

2. Statement declares our policy re border guarantees. Israel Govt may object that it makes guarantee dependent on a settlement. Arab Govts may assert it attempts force them into settlement with Israel. We must insist there is no suggestion of coercion. Statement does not demand immediate decisions from Govts concerned in dispute but offers opportunity for discussion which we trust they will not throw away. Our real hope is it will provide impetus to instill in parties to dispute a sense of urgency in seeking a settlement; and that after a possible initial period of adverse statements it will lead them discuss possibility of a settlement with US and UK who are in position help them in ways Secretary's statement indicates.

3. If you are questioned on details of statement you may make use fol points:

a) *Refugees*. There should be no dispute on principle of compensation. Israel has from time to time admitted her liability pay it as part of a general settlement. There is no doubt Israel could not pay the compensation which is due without help. The offers of US and UK to take part in a loan to Israel for this purpose are a most important contribution to a solution this difficult problem.

Re question repatriation we cannot be dogmatic. Secretary's statement reserves right by which Arabs set so much store. It is reasonable expect Israel find homes for some of refugees who wish return; but it clearly not possible for all or most of them go back. Large numbers will have be resettled in Arab countries and Secretary announces backing of US for appropriate resettlement projects.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2455. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell; cleared with Jernegan; and approved by Russell, who signed for Dulles. Transmitted priority to Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Amman, Damascus, Jidda, and Tripoli. Repeated priority to London, Paris, and Ankara.

[2] For text of Dulles' address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1955, pp. 378–380.

b) *Guarantees*. Importance this passage of statement as a definition of US policy is mentioned above. If Israel could now get an unconditional guarantee of her existing frontiers she would have less need seek a solution through a settlement with Arabs while Arabs would of course remain unreconciled to situation. But Arabs should not jump to conclusion they can afford reject a reasonable settlement in hopes blocking guarantee forever.

c) *Frontiers*. This passage directly concerns Israel and Arab States. The problem of sovereignty over demilitarized zones between Israel and Syria should not prove serious. There is the notably unsatisfactory frontier between Israel and Jordan dividing villages from their lands and in some places cutting villages themselves in two. Finally there is the Arab claim for unbroken land connection between Egypt and rest of Arab world to East. These are the kinds of frontier problems that need to be tackled. We believe that with patience and good will, ways could be found reconcile vital interests all parties.

d) *Jerusalem*. Here Secretary simply defining another problem that must be dealt with. There have been many proposals on status Jlem and it is for United Nations to review them. You may recall that in past US has supported proposals for changing original UN resolution on territorial internationalization and you may say you are sure US is not committed to any particular solution.

e) *Econ Questions*. In any settlement, Arab blockade of Israel would have be brought to end. There have also been proposals that Jordan might be offered a free port and transit facilities in Israel. That is the kind of econ question that might be discussed. If pressed you may say that Secretary's statement does not imply that Arabs would *necessarily* have to engage in direct trade with Israel. But you should avoid this question if possible.

4. If you are asked whether you think there should be a conference of the parties you should point out it has always proved difficult get them sit down together. There may be other more fruitful ways of proceeding.

5. If you are asked about UN resolutions you should say it well known that Arabs take their stand on UN resolution of 1947 as their opening bid and that Israelis claim their present frontiers. If settlement ever reached there will have be concessions from both these positions. We believe that in present circumstances neither is practicable. All agreements require concessions by both sides.

Dulles

215. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, August 24, 1955—6 p.m.

290. Nasser received me alone in residency at 11 a.m. this morning. I told him I approaching him upon matter which I considered of greatest importance to Egypt, Middle East, and in fact of worldwide significance. Stated Secretary had asked that I see him on this particular date and I appreciated promptness with which that request had been granted. Timing had been important to us as Secretary wished him to be among the very first who should know of his personal plans. Stated I considered matter so important I had reduced to writing Secretaries [*Secretary's*] instructions to me which I wished to read. I thereupon read to him substance of Deptel 325 [2] with no change other than smoothing out cablese.

Nasser listened intently. Department's statement so full and well conceived I thought it best not to attempt expansion other than few remarks. Regarding portion which indicates others were being informed, I told him this not being done as fully as in his case in view of our conversations in past this subject and recognition of constructive role it was hoped Egypt could play. I expanded somewhat upon vital importance initial press reactions and stressed that whole world would be watching to compare the reaction of Arab States with that of Israel. He had risen in stature in world in view of his stand for peace. He was now in key position to cooperate on removing one of world's greatest danger spots and contribute to developments of great historical significance. Added that I personally was extremely pleased my government had felt able to take initiative upon this problem in this specific manner. I was convinced that after study he would conclude that Secretary's speech would make major contribution towards giving real impetus to developments which I knew both he and we desired.

Nasser asked if he could have paper which I read as it was of great importance and he wished to study its contents. I agreed instead to let Ali Sabri take full notes upon its contents. Nasser said he could not give me preliminary reaction as everything depended upon what Secretary would actually say. He would study matter very carefully and hoped statement would be of nature which would allow him to feel he could cooperate. At no time in conversation

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2455. Top Secret; Niact; Alpha. Received at 8:02 p.m. Repeated to London.

[2] Document 207.

that followed did Nasser indicate any displeasure or fact that he felt this method of handling was a mistake.

I saw Fawzi at 1230 and found him more forthcoming. Fawzi stated he appreciated friendly approach in giving Egypt advance warning and general tone of understanding and friendliness that permeated my whole communication. He was glad to see that time table he and I had discussed months ago was being urgently sought by us. Said he and I had agreed 1955 better than 1956. Dulles had gone further and said also better than 1957. Yet time had gone by and he had become fearful we would not press in time. Stated he shared my hopes and sincere desire that statement would be given fair chance in area. Wished me to understand however that a public statement led to public questions which demanded public answers. He would wait with crossed fingers and sincere prayer that no unauthorized statement would be made in one Arab capital or another which would burn bridges—not with that motive—but to appear patriotic. Nasser and he would do their best to see common sense and fair play maintained. All this however depended upon nature of statement. If by terms it automatically ruled out some of the Arabs' strongly held convictions, as for instance on boundaries, then he could promise me nothing. If it did not take such a stand then he would do his utmost.

Other matters which emerged in both discussions will be reported separately. Am off to see Hussein who ill, but who should be brought into picture.

This an interesting day and so far, would say, so good. Without knowledge of text it difficult to see how reaction either Nasser's or Fawzi's could have been better.

Byroade

216. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, August 24, 1955—7 p.m.

291. In view reactions Nasser and Fawzi this morning (mytel 290 [2]) and as text of draft is excellent, believe it most important we seek to capitalize apparent objectivity both Nasser and Fawzi by making sure that Nasser receives full text at least prior to its receipt in Egypt from wire services. Must proceed on hope that Nasser will desire to control initial press reaction and difficult to see how he can do so unless he has time to study text prior to its receipt in hands of local press.

I told Nasser this morning I would see he got full text as soon as possible, but warned him that past experience indicated that advance texts sent me in code sometimes did not arrive until after wire services able to transmit clear text. He therefore does not know whether he will be able to see text prior to local press. I feel sure that Nasser would respect confidence in advance delivery. Furthermore timing suggested below would make impossible press treatment here prior to Saturday morning by which time local press will have picked up at least portions of speech in any event.

Therefore request authorization pass text to Nasser on confidential basis approximately 5 p.m. Cairo time (11 a.m. Washington time) August 26, or earlier if you think it safe to do so (suggested timing must of course be advanced if Department plans to issue earlier on wire services on "hold for publication" basis). [3]

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2455. Top Secret; Niact; Alpha. Received at 5:21 p.m.

[2] *Supra*.

[3] The Department instructed Byroade and Lawson on August 25 to furnish Nasser and Sharett with advance copies of the text. (Telegram 355 to Cairo sent as telegram 144 to Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2555)

217. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cai August 24, 1955—7 p.m.

292. Nasser took occasion my call on him today (on other subject) to inform me that he had yesterday communicated his decision to Secretary General of UN that GOE had decided to terminate talks on Burns' proposals. He stated the Israelis had obviously provoked incident Gaza August 22 [2] with objective of applying pressure to obtain for domestic political purposes their goal of establishing direct contact, outside UN auspices, between parties. He stated Israel must finally come to learn that these tactics would not work and that he was not going to agree to any position that did in fact, or even gave appearance, of shoving UNTSO aside. I stated my regret that he had felt such step necessary, and that, while I understood principle he trying to maintain, doubted that world opinion position would be good. Did not carry matter further as purpose of call had been discuss other matters of overriding importance reported separately.

In discussing with Embassy GOE decision terminate talks, General Burns added that after Nasser informed him of this decision they discussed progress of talks to date and that Nasser expressed disappointment that there had not been greater attention given three points covering joint patrols, obstacles and neutral zone. While GOE would not meet with Israeli it would be glad study proposal Burns might wish submit coordinating these points. Burns said that he agreed submit his views and that in effort place latest incident in proper perspective he pointed out that Israelis had broken off discussions on two earlier occasions.

As Gohar did not mention breakdown of discussions in his conversation with Embassy representatives or Burns yesterday forenoon, it appears GOE decision may not have been taken until after Burns talk with Kheirat Said (Deputy Foreign Minister) which, according Burns, made no progress whatsoever.

Having heard both Gohar's and Burns' views reference progress Gaza talks, Embassy confirmed in its views set forth Embassy telegram 256. [3] I realize we all shared the hope that these discussions would see a bilateral connection developed between Israel and Egypt

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–2455. Confidential. Received at 8:14 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and USUN.

[2] On August 22, Israeli and Egyptian troops engaged in armed conflict near the U.N. truce hut at Kilo 95 in the Gaza Strip. One Egyptian officer and two Egyptian soldiers died in this action. Documentation on this incident is *ibid.*, 674.84A.

[3] Document 199.

but we should not lose sight of fact that even more important would be gradual development of an area of cooperation between the two and that at this stage best chance of achieving this would be to permit Egyptians to feel they can cooperate without sacrificing principle of no direct contact.

In light of the forthcoming developments having a more important bearing on basic issue, I do not recommend any action on matters set forth this telegram at this time. Suggest however that Department bear in mind desirability approaching Secretary General UN along lines preceding paragraph at appropriate time.

Byroade

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218. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, August 25, 1955—11 a.m.

156. I informed Prime Minister (Embtel 145 [2] Deptel 123 [3]) of Secretary's statement. He received news with evidence some concern saying he was "deeply apprehensive" and repeating some of his previous attitudes (Embtel 118 [4]). He seemed particularly concerned over public reaction to any presumption that settlement of Arab-Israel tensions would be dependent on concessions to be made by Israel. He said, if statement contains suggestion of concessions which Israel unable to offer, then purely negative results may be expected; it will cast a shadow over US–Israel relations and peace will be retarded. He said he appreciated this advance advice of statement but statement along lines he fears can only be inimical to US–Israel relations and to prospect of peace with Arabs.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–255. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 9:06 a.m.

[2] Lawson informed the Department on August 23 in telegram 145 that he had an appointment to see Sharett at 4:30 p.m., August 24. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/8–2355)

[3] Document 206.

[4] On August 16, Lawson reported Sharett's opinion "that the whole purpose of an approach to the settlement of the basic Israel-Arab problem would be defeated if an announced proposal by the US implied that a security guarantee for Israel was contingent upon the settlement of certain outstanding problems by means of concessions by Israel. This, he felt sure, would further solidify Arab determination not to settle those exact problems unless the concessions they demanded were forthcoming, thus prolonging the present unsettled security situation." (Telegram 118 from Tel Aviv, August 16; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–1655)

He returned to his previous argument that any concessions demanded would be made at expense of Israel which in wholly defensive position and making no demand of "concessions" from Arabs.

He remarked that now all of political parties and others (meaning those within his own party) who opposed his moderation policy and hopes for US security assurance would be saying, "We told you so", and reaction of opponents to his policy might be expected to be immediate and strong.

It should be noted that his comments were predicated on assumption that statement would suggest concessions Israel unable to make.

He added that statement would not create a favorable public attitude toward the Johnston negotiations.

Urged that he not prejudge statement or effect; that although had not received text it might well be that his apprehensions were ill-founded and statement might accomplish just what Israel had always desired, that is, bringing together of two interested parties for discussion of outstanding problems, whereby benefiting them and entire area. He expressed appreciation my good will and optimism but felt that news I had brought left him in "a state of gloom."

British Ambassador who saw him immediately after our conversation received almost exact reaction from Prime Minister and is so reporting to London.

I agreed to supply text of statement to Prime Minister morning August 27 and to have accurate full text in hands of press in time for first issue following Secretary's speech. This will be morning August 28 as no newspapers Saturday, but radio will operate Saturday. We will report promptly press and radio reaction.

Lawson

219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, August 25, 1955—1:43 p.m.

1039. FYI: Secretary today signed following letter [2] to Macmillan:

"Dear Harold: I am about to leave for New York, first to make the Davis Cup draw and then to launch 'Alpha'. I hope and believe this latter will turn out to be a constructive move, although obviously we are taking some risks. However, risks are inherent in the situation.

One thing is, however, already a good result—that is the close cooperation between our two Governments in preparing this project. I want to thank you very much. Yesterday Francis Russell showed me the copies of your instructions to your Near East posts with reference to follow-up. I was greatly impressed by the high quality of these instructions—both as regards substance and lucid expression. [3]

I do not know of any joint project that has been better prepared and if it does not succeed that will not be due, I think, to any lack of care on either of our parts. Faithfully yours, Foster" End FYI.

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2555. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted and approved by Gordon, who also signed for Dulles.

[2] According to the record copy, Dulles drafted the letter. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Alpha) He had the signed original of this letter sent to the British Embassy with the request that Sir Robert Scott "cable it to Mr. Macmillan." (Message from Robert G. Barnes, Director of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State, to Sir Robert Scott, British Chargé; Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 9)

[3] This documentation is *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos and corres., July 1–Aug. 26 (day of Secy' speech).

220. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, August 25, 1955—7 p.m.

861. Reference telecon with Russell. [2] After concerting with British Chargé, I telephoned Margerie late yesterday afternoon we now had text and could give it to him then or this morning. He chose latter. When text given him this noon, his only substantive comment was that sentence in Part II concerning U.S. willingness to join in guarantees was obviously key point of statement. Believe French sensibilities adequately covered.

He says he sent word to Pinay orally by member of latter's Cabinet who has gone to Aix that statement would be forthcoming and that he does not plan to transmit text to Pinay since latter fully occupied with Moroccan discussions. Margerie will however have Foreign Office press chief guide French press favorably when Secretary makes statement. He thought that sufficient but at my request agreed to suggest Pinay issue supporting statement after his return to Paris sometime this weekend.

I now believe it would be desirable for British Chargé to show Margerie Macmillan's proposed statement tomorrow afternoon or Saturday. Reilly agrees and is so recommending to London. [3]

Achilles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2555. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:09 p.m. Repeated priority to London.

[2] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files. Russell, however, spoke with Dulles at 9:44 a.m. on August 24 and informed the Secretary that he, Russell, had received a telegram from Achilles saying that Pinay was at Aix-les-Bains, and that he, Achilles, wished to give the text of the speech to Margerie, who would forward it to Pinay. Achilles believed that if this procedure were followed, there was a good chance that the French would support Dulles' statement. (Telegram 828 from Paris, August 24; *ibid.*, 684A.86/8–2455) Russell also suggested that Russell instruct Achilles, when he called, to give the text to Margerie. Dulles agreed. (Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Bernau; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

[3] Achilles reported on August 26 that the British Chargé, Reilly, had shown Macmillan's statement to Margerie, "who had already drafted guidance for Quai D'Orsay to give press," and "was inclined to think . . . that there would be little point in Pinay making additional statement on Monday [August 29]." (Telegram 889 from Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2655)

221. Letter From the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cabell) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, August 25, 1955.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In answer to your request to the Director of Central Intelligence, [2] we are submitting the following views and the attached analysis. [3]

On 23 May, . . . Soviet Ambassador Daniel Solod in Cairo offered technical and economic assistance to Egypt, including financing of the proposed Aswan high dam. . . .

In late July, D.T. Shepilov, editor of *Pravda*, and a secretary of the Communist Party, visited Egypt and . . . elaborated the Soviet offer. . . .

As reported to you by Ambassador Byroade, Ahmad Husain, Egypt's former ambassador in Washington, in discussing the alleged Shepilov offer, told Byroade in Cairo that it included a cotton barter deal to finance the high dam, 100 MIG's and 200 tanks. Jet bombers (probably IL–28's) were also said to be available for 37,000 Egyptian pounds (equivalent to $106,000). Soviet spokesmen reportedly also suggested in discussions with Egyptians that if direct negotiations with Moscow embarrassed Cairo, Warsaw or Prague could offer the same deal.

A report that Radio Moscow had broadcast in Arabic to the Near East an offer of free military assistance to Egypt appears to be in error. [4] The latest Egyptian claims are that Radio Israel made the statement on 10 August, that this statement was picked up by an Egyptian monitoring station, and, as a result of haste and carelessness, was passed to the press as having been broadcast by the Soviets in Arabic, and with the paragraph concerning military aid deleted. These reports and similar ones all apparently originate with Egyptians. They may be exaggerated in order to bring pressure on the United States to satisfy Egypt's military needs on favorable terms. The fact that no Western monitors intercepted any such broadcast, coupled with the lack of motivation for the USSR to broach an offer of such magnitude and portent in this manner, raises the possibility of deception, which we are still trying to confirm.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/8–2555. Secret. According to a note attached to the source text from Roger Kirk to Gordon, "The Secretary and Mr. Hoover have seen the attached letter."

[2] No record of such a request has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Not printed.

[4] See footnote 5, Document 194.

During the past weeks, the USSR . . . has offered Saudi Arabia economic aid and military equipment.[5] This approach was made by Soviet Ambassador Lavrentiev in Tehran, first to the Saudi ambassador[6] and then to King Saud, and Deputy Foreign Minister Yassin. In the spring of 1955, Soviet offers of military, economic, and diplomatic aid were also reported made to Syria.

In our opinion the USSR directly or through its Satellites is able to deliver the items specifically mentioned by the Egyptians; heavy artillery, tanks, jet fighter and bomber aircraft and destroyers, in the quantities that could conceivably be absorbed by Egypt or other nations in the Arab league without any perceptible effect on its own arms program. Only in the event the Soviets anticipated general war in the relatively near future would they have any compelling reason to hang onto all of their vast stockpile of this obsolescent matériel. For example, the early alternate fate of the MIG–15's is probably to be turned into scrap.

Moreover the Soviets are undoubtedly well aware of the . . . preoccupation of Arab leaders such as Nasr and King Saud with building their arms strength and would calculate that the surest way to achieve a real position of influence in those countries would be to become a substantial supplier of arms with the attendant requirements for Soviet technical and possibly tactical training in their use.

It is also quite consistent with what we know of current Soviet external trade programs for the USSR to be willing to offer such equipment for indigenous currency or basic commodities with favorable terms as to time of repayment.

Finally, it seems to us that the present Soviet drive to relax tensions between the power centers of East and West could well have as a concomitant a subordinate policy of sowing seeds of discord in such trouble spots as the Near East.

We, therefore, conclude that it is well within Soviet capability to implement the reported offers of arms aid and that it is probably their intention to do so if the offeree governments accept their proposals.

Sincerely,

C.P. Cabell
Lieutenant General, USAF

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[5] For documentation regarding Soviet offers of economic and military assistance to Saudi Arabia, see volume XIII.

[6] Sayid Hamza Ghuth.

222. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Francis H. Russell and Willy Morris of the British Embassy, Department of State, Washington, August 25, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Reports of Egyptian Attacks to be Launched on Sinai Front

Mr. Morris called me around 3 a.m. this morning and said he had a message from Cairo that he thought I would wish to see at once. I met him shortly at the Department. He showed me a telegram which the British Embassy had just received from Cairo, [2] the substance of which was that there were reports that the Egyptian army command were considering launching a series of attacks on the Sinai front today.

Mr. Morris and I agreed that because of the nature of the reports it would be better for any communication from the Department to Ambassador Byroade to be sent through the British Embassy in Cairo. Accordingly, after discussing the matter with Mr. Jernegan on the telephone, I asked Mr. Morris if he would send the message to Byroade [3] which is referred to in the attached letter. [4]

This afternoon Mr. Morris called again. He had a telegram from London[2] which expressed doubt that the Egyptian Government would launch attacks in view of their advance information about the Secretary's statement but leaving it to the discretion of the UK Ambassador, in consultation with Byroade, whether an approach should be made or not.

Mr. Morris also had a telegram from Cairo[2] which said that Byroade, having failed to see Nasser, spoke to Abdel Hakim Amer, Minister of Defense and Chief of Armed Forces. Byroade said that Washington had informed him there were rumors there that hostilities had broken out or were about to break out. Hakim Amer told Byroade that all was quiet but that he would make a check to be certain. The telegram concludes by saying that unless Amer is prevaricating—which would be quite out of character—it looks as though plans for attack have been called off.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos and corres., July 1–Aug. 26 (day of Secy's speech). Secret. Drafted by Russell.

[2] No copy of this telegram has been found in Department of State files.

[3] No copy of this message has been found in Department of State files.

[4] (Attached to copy circulating G[eorge] V. A[llen]–J[ohn] D. J[ernegan]–F[raser] W[ilkins], marked for return to WCBurdett's files.) [Footnote in the source text. The letter was not attached to the source text nor found elsewhere in Department of State files.]

223. Message From the Embassy in Egypt to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) [1]

Cairo, August 26, 1955.

Last night we came very close to having real trouble here. By late afternoon I had come to believe it possibly true that orders had in fact been issued for heavy attack on some 6 or 8 separate Israeli objectives along borders, although Hakim Amer assured me border was quiet (which of course it was at the time of our conversation). Matter delicate to handle as one of greatest past difficulties of this embassy has been suspicion that we are attempting to penetrate Army. Had to weigh possibilities being able to stop attack if it had in fact been ordered against long range harm that could accure [*accrue*] to us by appearing to have such information. Decided however about midnight, knowing that all appointments RCC members had been cancelled and they had been in continuous session since early afternoon, that the chance should be taken. Besides the obvious danger, to be prevented at all times if at all possible, such action by Egypt would have been particularly disastrous in connection timing and receipt of Secretary's speech. Unable reach Hakim Amer and there was long delay after which it obvious Zakaria Mohiud Din had been picked to return my call. I told him I had received an additional excited cable from Washington. [2] Still not clear but it obvious Washington extremely concerned re possibility developments along border. Told him I had no clue as to Washington sources of concern but that . . . there might be real effort made to draw Egypt into a trap prior to delivery of speech. Told him I knew enough of contents of speech to know that it an extremely good development for Arab side and what a great pity it would be if Egypt would be drawn into action which might either cancel speech or cause radical change in text. Zakaria said he understood the point and appreciated the concern. RCC meeting lasted until daybreak and we have reliable info orders given cancelling operation. There some chance these orders not reaching certain small units which could yet result in some action but probably most limited. Will probably never know part my action with Hakim Amer and Zakaria had in cancellation of orders. Regret necessity of tactics used but could see no other

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2755. Top Secret. The source text is incorrectly dated August 27. This telegram was typed on a plain sheet of paper and contains no information on agency identification. Although it appears to be a Department of State message, it was not transmitted through Department channels.

[2] No copies of these telegrams have been found in Department of State files.

way that we could afford here at moment and would guess the peg of Sec's speech did give us opportunity to be effective. This near action by Egyptians undoubtedly came as result of Nasser's public commitment to avenge further deaths at hands of Israeli so my guess is there was lively time in RCC discussions last evening and hope some day we able find out stand taken by various members.

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224. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, August 26, 1955—2 p.m.

165. In view of crucial struggle between Ben Gurion and Sharett going on within Mapai Party (Embassy telegram 142 [2]), it now appears that tripartite formula for dealing with Foreign Minister (Department telegram 87 [3]) might prove unfavorable to very ends for which we strive.

The reason given by the French and British Governments for the formula, that is, the West should not give Ben Gurion what is denied Sharett may be entirely fallacious. As I visualize the possible formation of the new government Sharett would have great difficulty in justifying his conduct of business with Ambassadors in Tel Aviv, particularly if there is no reciprocity. This would tend to concentrate in Ben Gurion's hands all important foreign policy matters, leaving Sharett to explain as best he can through the press and through his missions abroad the military and other actions taken by Israel. This seems clearly indicative of Sharett's basically weak and extremely difficult position if he should accept portfolio of Foreign Minister. Furthermore, recent history has clearly demonstrated that his basic attitudes are much more conducive to making progress on area matters than are the impetuous decisions of Ben Gurion. . . .

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.0084/8–2655. Confidential. Received at 11:37 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, and Rome.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 784A.00/8–2355) The Sharett Cabinet had resigned on August 15, just before the newly-elected Knesset convened. President Itzhak Ben Zvi invited Ben Gurion to form a new government, and on August 17, the Knesset adjourned for 2 months to facilitate his efforts. In the interim, the Sharett Cabinet was serving in a caretaker capacity.

[3] Document 186.

. . . . . .

The British Ambassador remarked to me last night that he was very disturbed about this proposed tripartite formula and had encountered the same reaction from smaller missions as have we; namely, that formula will prevent them from effectively performing their duties, although there was willingness on their part to try to follow the formula. I understand that he has so informed his government.

Lawson

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225. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, August 26, 1955—9 p.m.

169. Amman for Johnston. [2] With reference to highly sensitive and critical situation which has developed in Gaza Strip during past 24 hours (Embassy telegrams 161, [3] 162, [4] 163, [5] et cetera), Director, US Division Foreign Ministry, [6] today conveyed urgent message to me from Prime Minister. Sharett requested US Government to make clear to GOE that Egypt cannot do such things as its military forces are now doing with impunity and expect pressure by the US Government on Israel to prevent reaction. Parenthetically, it should be noted that this statement is in complete accord with tenor of remarks Sharett has made to me recently whenever Gaza Strip

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–2655. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:38 p.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, Amman, London, Paris, Beirut, and Damascus.

[2] Johnston arrived in Amman on August 24.

[3] The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported earlier that morning in telegram 161 on three incidents that had occurred within the previous 24 hours along the Egyptian-Israeli border: at 9:30 p.m. the previous evening, the civilian commander of Kibbutz Erez was ambushed in his jeep at the Erz-Yad-Mordecai crossroads and was dying of his wounds; a well was blown up during the night at Mekarat near Niram; and at 6 a.m. that morning, Egyptian troops crossed the frontier at Tel-Achmar and attacked fixed Israeli positions. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–2655)

[4] The Embassy in Tel Aviv informed the Department in telegram 162 that the Israelis confirmed that they had sustained casualties as a result of these three actions, including a number of soldiers killed. (*Ibid.*)

[5] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 683.84A/8–2655)

[6] Yaacov Herzog.

problem has been discussed. Two days ago he expressed with some agitation his surprise over Egyptian forces attack on IDF Patrol (Embassy telegram 135[7]) and he stated emphatically, "Nasser feels he can make all sorts of trouble on the Gaza border and can get away with it by counting on strong US pressures on Israel". Sharett made no reply to my comment that if Nasser has so much confidence in US pressures exerted on GOI, it seemed unlikely that he would refer so frequently to his fear of IDF action in Gaza. However, there was no question in my mind but that he wished to underscore his opinion that US warnings to Israel were operating as an effective screen behind which Egypt's activities were undertaken.

Although Sharett's message to me, coupled with his previous comments to me, may constitute a warning to Egypt, they may also be designed to establish a rationale for a more militant policy towards Egypt based on a governmental decision already made.

It has been my consistent view that there are two essential elements required prior to any drastic retaliation by GOI. These are:

(1) Fatalities incurred as a result of border activity, and
(2) Belief by GOI of clear Egyptian Government participation in border incidents.

We have no evidence that GOI will respond immediately to latest Egyptian incursions but it is apparent that GOI will regard their continuation as evidence bad GOE intentions border situation and will respond by more militant measures. Nor have we evidence of military activity which points to retaliatory measures of unusual character.

Lawson

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[7] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–2255) See footnote 2, Document 217.

Impact of the Egyptian-Czechoslovak Arms Deal, August 27–November 16, 1955

226. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, August 27, 1955—2 a.m.

318. Delivered Secretary's speech to Nasser 6 p.m., today. [2] His reaction somewhat less satisfactory than had hoped. Had feeling he somewhat confused by general nature of approach and really did not understand significance of some passages. He asked many questions and Department telegram 347 [3] used to considerable advantage. His principal points of concern seemed to be refugees and territorial. He said Arabs would find it difficult to accept concept that refugees should be scattered with settlement in many separate places. There was considerable discussion about Negev with repeated references his part to Ben Gurion's plans for settling 2 million additional Jews by developing Negev. I told him this impossible because of water situation. Even if Israelis had all of Jordan waters this not feasible and if Arabs could only see advantage of agreement for present plans for use of Jordan waters then certainly not even a small fraction of waters needed for such plans for Negev would be available.

I reiterated again my hope that caution would be used as regards press comment and my fear that editors might tend commit Egypt prior to real analysis of significance of speech. Pointed out that within realm of what is possible and feasible statement did not deny in any way what Arabs feel entitled to but that statement did in fact refuse Israel's present primary aim, i.e., to obtain a permanent security guarantee of her present borders. He stated he felt there bound to be considerable criticism of statement but he would consider carefully what he could do.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2755. Confidential; Priority. Received at 4:19 a.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda.

[2] August 26.

[3] Printed as Document 214.

Greatly surprised when he suddenly said he wished discuss Morocco. Told me that Nuri of Iraq had taken initiative to call upon Arab States to attack France. He himself was going to respond that Moroccan troubles were not solely fault of France but entire Atlantic Alliance and that he would be critical of US, particularly re military equipment being used against North Africans. I told him of US efforts on this problem and fact that we now hope, that partly because of these efforts, situation might greatly improve. Reminded him that US can often not get credit for efforts they making, as to be effective our pressures must be accomplished secretly, just as had been the case of the British during his own Suez controversy. Nasser said he appreciates these things but frankly he was not prepared see Nuri Said become Arab champion on such issues. He asked if he had my permission to tell press that he had complained to me re Moroccan situation. I said certainly. Am reporting this extraneous matter as it may have bearing upon his decision re press treatment of speech.

In view of feeling that Nasser really did not understand significance of speech and other matter reported above decided take copy to Fawzi immediately thereafter and had Hart deliver copy to Ahmed Hussein. Fawzi, while not so admitting, obviously pleased with speech. He warned, however, that we must expect criticism, and that it was our job as professionals to try to keep this from affecting our thinking. He said no matter what happens we must continue to work together just as before.

Hart found Hussein slightly disappointed that speech not more specific. He feared USSR would take opportunity make specific promises support Arab position and expressed concern Communist penetration Egyptian press. He took initiative, however, to phone Mustapha Amin of *Akhbar* to urge withholding any comment in Saturday edition. He was informed Nasser had already decided all papers should withhold comment at least until Sunday to await Israel reaction. Consider this decision defer press comment quite good development if it is maintained; it suggests Nasser not quite so pessimistic as he appeared. There no doubt, however, that he fears his own position would suffer if Egypt's reaction were to appear soft in comparison that other Arab States, particularly in light current difficulties along border with Israel.

Byroade

227. Message From the Embassy in Egypt to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) [1]

Cairo, August 26, 1955.

In discussion with Nasser during appointment deliver Sec's speech told Nasser I hoped he had not misunderstood my nervousness last night re situation along border. He responded by saying that he certainly had been wondering how I knew so much about plans his military. Replied I knew nothing of his Army's plans and gave him same explanation cause my concern re two unclear messages from Washington [2] . . . . He seemed accept this explanation and said I then had been unaware of how much cause I really had for concern. Told me as result of 22 Aug incident [3] orders had been sent to frontier forces carry out simultaneous and large scale attacks upon "several" Israeli objectives. As result of my call to Hakim Amer they had finally decided issue stop order to troops. This order had obviously not reached outlying units in time prevent some action but I might as well know that action would have been far heavier but for my call. At start of our conversation he unaware of action reported Para 3 Tel Aviv 161 to Dept. [4] but received call in my presence with this info. I tried convince him that this had been unwise move . . . . Told him my Govt stood firmly behind policy of no retaliation and if I had in fact prevented heavy casualties he would some day thank me for what I had done. However this has been emotional day with Nasser himself attending funeral of officer killed Aug 22, and I doubt that I convinced him their action had been wrong. Furthermore if Israelis retaliate under this provocation see little hope of restraining forces here.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2755. Top Secret. This telegram was typed on a plain sheet of paper and contains no information on agency identification. The source text is incorrectly dated August 27. Although it appears to be a Department of State message, it was not transmitted through Department channels.

[2] No copies of these telegrams have been found in Department of State files.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 217.

[4] See footnote 3, Document 225.

228. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State [1]

Baghdad, August 27, 1955—11 a.m.

171. I saw Prime Minister Nuri at his home this morning shortly before his departure for a regular cabinet meeting and gave him a copy of the Secretary's August 26 New York speech. Nuri had earlier heard a broadcast giving the highlights. He did not read the speech while I was with him. He said he wanted to read it more leisurely later at his office.

I told Nuri that after he had had time to study the statement carefully I hoped he would not only agree with our view of the urgency of trying to reach a settlement of the Arab-Israel problem but that he would also find it possible to give the statement his support.

Nuri's first response was in the nature of a fine tribute to the Secretary. Without specifically mentioning last evening's statement he said he admired very much the Secretary's approach to world problems.

Turning to the statement Nuri said that judging from what he had heard over the radio it covered well the outstanding Arab-Israel problems. Among these the problem of the frontiers was especially important. The position of the Arab states on this was well-known. It was based on the UN resolution of 1947.

At this point I interjected that Israel's position had also been made known. Israel stood pat on the present lines. The problem called for concessions from both sides. Nuri said nothing to this but nodded.

Before leaving the problem of frontiers Nuri observed that he was very much interested in the passage of the Secretary's statement dealing with the President's authorization with a possible security guarantee.

The reaction of Egypt to the Secretary's statement Nuri then said was of immediate interest to him. The reaction of each of the states bordering on Israel was important but above all this applied to Egypt. He would instruct the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo to get Nasser's reaction. He only hoped the Ambassador would be able to get Nasser's honest reactions.

"I don't think Israel will like the statement" Nuri said.

We broke off our talk at this point as Nuri had to leave for his cabinet meeting. We agreed to talk further within the next few days.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2755. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:33 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo and London.

At noon I am calling on Foreign Minister Bashayan to present him with a copy of the Secretary's statement.

Gallman

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229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, August 27, 1955—1:12 p.m.

155. Re Tel Aviv 169 [2] and 171; [3] Cairo 316. [4] You should see Prime Minister earliest and say that US Government is informed and believes that Egyptian actions August 25 took place despite orders from Egyptian Commander in Chief against any aggressive moves and were due to failure of communications to reach all units in time, and that Army has issued strict orders against any border activities.

US Government wishes express its hope in strongest way that GOI will not permit episode to start vicious circle of reprisal and counter-reprisal. This especially important since any IDF reprisal might well be construed by world opinion as GOI reply to Secretary's statement. We believe statement offers best hope that Israel may have for considerable time to come to achieve settlement and security she has so frequentiy spoken for and it would be major disaster if opportunity were to be thrown away by hasty action

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–2755. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Russell and approved by Allen, who signed for Henderson. Repeated priority to Cairo, Paris, and London.

[2] Document 225.

[3] The Embassy reported on August 26 in telegram 171 that Sharett indicated to White that he was uncertain whether Israel would retaliate for the incidents of the previous night. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/8–2655)

[4] Byroade informed the Department on August 27 in telegram 316 that the August 25 attacks were "not connected in any way Secretary's speech. Action planned after incident August 22 as retaliation. We obtained sufficient evidence here yesterday to approach officials and obtain reversal of orders to troops but word did not reach outlying units in time—otherwise by Nasser's own admission total effort would have been 'much heavier'." (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/8–2755)

which could serve no purpose. We have already spoken urgently to GOE in this regard. [5]

Henderson

[5] Lawson informed the Department on August 28 that he was trying to arrange an appointment with Sharett and that he would strongly emphasize the considerations set forth in the second paragraph of telegram 155 to Tel Aviv. (Telegram 176 from Tel Aviv; *ibid.*, 674.84A/8–2855)

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230. Letter From the British Chargé (Scott) to the Director of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State (Barnes) [1]

Washington, August 27, 1955.

DEAR MR. BARNES: At the request of Mr. Dulles, the United Kingdom Delegation in New York telegraphed yesterday evening to the Foreign Office about the omission from the Foreign Office statement on Palestine [2] of the phrase:

"and believe that the principles outlined are those which must govern any attempt to solve the Palestine question by agreement." [3]

2. Our Secretary of State has telegraphed a reply in the following terms:

"Please inform Mr. Dulles that we decided to omit the phrase to which he refers because, in view of the final form which Mr. Dulles' statement took, these words did not seem altogether appropriate. The ideas set forth in it were of so general a character, and the whole exercise had taken so much less detailed a form, that it seemed to us better to make certain amendments to the text which was shown to Mr. Dulles in Paris. This was one of them. You will probably observe that there were one or two other changes which followed from the same thought.

"I regret that it is too late for us now to alter the statement which has gone out to all our posts abroad, but we shall cover the point in our guidance to the press.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 9. Top Secret; By Safe Hand.

[2] The text of the statement issued by the Foreign Office on August 27 is filed with a copy of a letter of August 26 from Sir Pierson Dixon to Secretary-General Hammarskjöld. (*Ibid.*)

[3] The phrase appears in the July 15 draft British statement cited in footnote 3, Document 169.

"Please also thank Mr. Dulles for his kind message to me of August 25 which I received through Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington. [4] We have done our best to conform to the various changes which the plan has necessarily had to undergo, and we shall certainly keep in every sense the spirit of our collaboration. It seems to us that it has made a very good start, and the new difficulties on the Israel–Egypt border may in fact serve to bring home to all moderate, sensible people the need for some settlement."

3. I understand from our Delegation that Mr. Dulles has left New York and we should therefore be most grateful if you could arrange for this message to be passed to Mr. Dulles. [5]

Yours sincerely,

R. H. Scott

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[4] See Document 219.

[5] Barnes sent this communication to Dulles on August 29. (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 9)

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231. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State [1]

Jidda, August 28, 1955—11 a.m.

82. 1. I called by appointment on Prime Minister–Foreign Minister Prince Faisal afternoon August 25 and, after advising him of Secretary's proposed statement, handed him aide-mémoire reading:

Mr. Dulles expects make statement on some of issues pending between Israel and Arab States and possibility steps toward area stability and economic progress.

As statement will embody considered views USG after intensive study, Mr. Dulles hopes SAG will give it closest study and constructive consideration.

I was able make point we hoped statement would open door for helpful exchange of views, stress word "constructive", arrange supply him English and Arabic texts, when received, and offer personally discuss them with him his convenience.

Faisal commented he would be last to question Secretary's high motives in opening question but we should know his basic view: "It

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2855. Secret. Received at 9:54 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, London, and Paris.

is impossible for Jews and Arabs to live side by side as neighbors, that is as Jewish State among Arab States. Arab world had always accepted them as individuals; and, had they established state elsewhere, Arabs would have been among first to recognize it; but Arabs can never forget or accept injustice of establishment Jewish state in their land."

2. British Chargé d'Affaires Phillips, in compliance his instructions, called later same day on Royal Counselor for Foreign Affairs Gargoni. Latter's only substantive comment was to effect that American and British statements would be welcomed were they to open way for Jews departure and Arabs return to Palestine.

3. We have no local comment to report as yet. It may be of interest, however, to report Aramco Vice President for Government Relations Ohliger as saying when discussing SOCONY case with me (my telegram 79, August 26 [2]) that he feared Arabs would never recognize Israel and would continue tighten boycott. This was, he said, King Saud's policy based on deep religious conviction and not on advice given him by Royal Counselors Yasin and Gargoni. Ohliger's relations with King are certainly more intimate and extend over longer period of years than any other American.

Wadsworth

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 886A.2553/8–2655)

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232. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State [1]

Amman, August 28, 1955—2 p.m.

93. Initial reaction Dulles speech cautious, with requests more details and warning it needs careful study. No violence yet and none expected.

1. King told Embassy officer August 27 speech step in right direction. Ambassador Johnston seeing King again today.

2. Prime Minister Mufti as reported by Ambassador Rifai to Johnston initially reacts with uncertainty and disappointment. Prime

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2855. Official Use Only. Received at 11:48 a.m. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

Minister stayed up all Friday night to hear speech, called Rifai at nine next morning and told him HKJ would have to reject Johnston proposals which now tied to political settlement. To press Prime Minister has said only that HKJ will consult other Arab governments in keeping with its policy statement.

3. Four ministers on committee negotiating with Johnston party were guarded in their reactions and gave impression they considered fate unkind in loading so much controversy on people who only wished to stay in office. Saman Daoud Minister Reconstruction pronounced speech step in right direction. Two ministers took position US would never help in solution border question if condition is desire of both parties since Israel does not desire rectification of borders favorable to Arabs.

4. Ex-Minister Defense Anwar Nuseibeh described speech as "excellent—major step forward".

5. Press urges caution [illegible] either accepting or rejecting. *Falast* in editorial August 28 says "If we reject offhand we make outside world think Arabs are refusing very thing they have requested. Least we must do is ask for more details and study Secretary's speech carefully." *Ad-Difaa* says speech contains nothing new, deviates from UN resolutions, and is loaded with financial inducements to get Arab acceptance fait accompli, "but no doubt it now being studied in all Arab capitals."

Geren

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233. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State [1]

Amman, August 28, 1955—5 p.m.

94. From Johnston. Yesterday I met twice with Ministerial Committee. [2] I opened discussions by referring to your statement and saying you and I agreed it preferable conduct negotiations in atmosphere complete frankness re US policy. Pointed out I might be open

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/8–2855. Confidential. Received at 2:35 p.m. Repeated to Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, London, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jidda, and Paris.

[2] Summary minutes of discussions held August 25–30 between Johnston and his staff and Jordanian representatives are filed, along with related documents, *ibid.*, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, The Fourth Mission—No. 21 (Negotiating File).

to charge bad faith if I secured agreement immediately before issuance policy statement which might affect views governments concerned.

I then outlined program in some detail, laying facts squarely on table. Some disappointment expressed re reduction water quantity. Meetings cordial but surprisingly little inclination bargain. Questions indicated desire for information and our answers appeared satisfy them on points raised.

Your statement obviously very much in minds officials here though effect on these negotiations as yet inconclusive. I am asking water proposals be considered entirely separately from question political accommodation outlined your statement and am pointing out your statement together with history negotiations demonstrate separability. However, strong tendency persists many quarters assume statement puts water proposals in political context which makes their acceptance impossible. In light traditional Arab reluctance make decisions it is entirely possible statement is being seized upon as convenient excuse take no decisive step regardless statements contents or merits.

Am lunching with King, Cabinet and Abdel Monem Rifai today. [3] Rifai has been consistently helpful although degree influence unclear. Expect ministerial committee report to Cabinet today on our discussions.

Geren

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[3] Johnston reported that his luncheon session was "encouraging" and that, in the course of a subsequent private conversation with King Hussein, he had emphasized to Hussein that his government had to come to a decision about the Jordan Valley Plan; that Jordan would be the "primary beneficiary of project and must fight for it before League if it wants it. He replied decision will be made and reaffirmed Jordan needs project. Disposition Cabinet toward project appears be generally favorable but it still reluctant come to decision. Expect it will attempt obtain some modifications in proposal, but precise extent still unknown." (Telegram 95 from Amman, August 29; *ibid.*, 684A.85322/8–2955)

234. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, August 28, 1955—midnight.

181. Met with Prime Minister 4 p.m. today at his office Jerusalem (Embassy telegram 176 [2]). Following few exchange of remarks on Gaza developments, Secretary's speech, and Syrian removal Israel soldiers from POW status, [3] I delivered substance of message contained in paragraph 2 Department telegram 155. [4] Prime Minister listened carefully, made a few notes and when I finished entered at once into a measured reply, the gist of which follows:

1. Reviewed Gaza border developments of past few months which he characterized as complete quiet until recently when (a) Egypt suddenly opened fire on IDF patrol in Israel territory; (b) Egypt broke off Gaza talks under UN; (c) Egypt started series of "dastardly actions on border."

He referred specifically to Egyptian military action of Thursday night [5] when GOE military forces crossed into Israel territory four times and GOE publicly admitted actions, and Saturday night [6] Egyptians launched "regular offensive" with some military units penetrating rather deeply as illustrated by the action near Askelon (Embassy telegram 172 [7]) some 12 kilometers inside Israel. In reply to my inquiry as to whether there was any doubt as to [garble] Egyptian action, he stated that Israel now held uniform Egyptian who was wounded in the action and who admitted that he was member of one of several groups which had been sent into Israel to ambush and sabotage. Sharett laid considerable stress on the depth of penetration angle and the startling effect this had on the public security-wise, just as he did when he defended the Gaza incident of February 28.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 679.84A/8–2855. Secret; Niact. Received at 5:25 a.m., August 29. Repeated priority to Cairo, Paris, and London.

[2] Lawson reported in telegram 176 from Tel Aviv, August 28, that he was trying to arrange an appointment with Sharett and that he would emphasize the points in paragraph 2 of Document 220. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–2855)

[3] Documentation regarding the issue of Israeli soldiers held captive in Syria is *ibid.*, 683.84A and 784A.551.

[4] Document 229.

[5] August 25.

[6] August 27.

[7] Dated August 27, it reported that the Foreign Ministry had informed the Embassy of three Egyptian incursions that evening: an attack on an Israeli military vehicle, the ambush of a taxi cab, and the destruction of a well. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–2755)

He then said, as in effect he has twice said during the past two weeks (Embassy telegrams 117 [*171*][8] and 172) "surely Nasser realizes that two can play the same game."

He then launched into his theme that Egypt has no right to remain in Gaza—she is there only under terms of the armistice and she has so abused her position that she should no longer be permitted to remain; the Egyptians are "invaders." The question arises as to whether this can be tolerated any longer. He then said, "Please inform the United States Government that Egypt should be made to clear out of Gaza—she had used it as a springboard for violent action against Israel—she has violated the armistice and cannot claim its protection, she cannot have it both ways."

"Why is Nasser doing this?" He said, "I am no mind reader and I cannot be certain why he has adopted this policy. It must be because of one or two of the following reasons: (a) his desire to cement the Arab front around Israel; (b) he may wish to provoke Israel into a major action; (c) he may wish to bolster up his tottering regime."

Sharett was convinced that Nasser broke off the Gaza talks to clear the decks for this current action and every conceivable effort had been made to convince Nasser that "he should behave." In considering why Nasser acted as he has, Sharett reiterated his former statement to me, that is, "Nasser has the idea that he can carry on these aggressions (implying that they would be kept below level of major military action) without fear of drastic reactions on the part of Israel, because the United States will continue to bring pressure on Israel not to retaliate."

I remarked, that I doubted that Nasser really believed that, but if Nasser had thought so I certainly hoped that by now, due to our representations to him, his mind has been completely disabused of the idea. Sharett said he hoped so, "but it (*sic*) will depend on what will happen during the next two or three nights."

I immediately picked up this remark, hoping it indicated the GOI was holding up action on the Gaza border to await indicative actions by Egypt. I repeated his remark and asked if it might not be logical to see in the next two or three nights a direct reflection of our counseling to Nasser to abandon any aggressive program he might have in mind. He thought that might well be the case, implying that continued Egyptian military action would show clearly that US Counsel was having no effect. I could not, however, elicit from him any statement or indication that the IDF was holding up action until there is proof that our pressures on Nasser were effective. The great danger of a continuation of these incidents was, he

[8] See footnote 3, Document 229.

said, that the people living on the border would leave the area or they would become "war-minded." He did not say so, but I assumed that the latter development applied to some sizeable segments of the general public as well.

He remarked that he considered it a tragedy that the Gaza talks, which had been proceeding for some time and which held for him so much hope, should have been renounced by Egypt—first Egypt opens fire on an Israel patrol in Israel territory; then Egypt breaks off the talks; then Egypt embarks on a regular offensive.

He again referred to Israel intelligence reports to the effect that Nasser had inferred [*informed*] other Arab States of his aggressive active program in Gaza (Embtel 172) as indicating that the current incidents are part and parcel of a determined program by Egypt. He thought Nasser should be told firmly by the US to stop. I reminded him that we had already approached GOE on that score and that we hoped for effective results. But I fear that he feels our representations are not strong enough, although he did not say so. I make no reference to our specific efforts and results thereof (Deptel 155, Cairo 316 [9] and Embtel 146 [10]) in view of counter-productiveness due to subsequent Egyptian actions.

With regard to possibility that retaliatory action by IDF might be construed by world opinion as GOI reply to Secretary's statement (Deptel 155) he expressed some doubt. He said the speech was a very important document and had been considered by the Cabinet meeting earlier in the day; the Cabinet would give it further study; and that he might wish to discuss it with me in a few days, possibly asking for "USG to elucidate certain points." In response to my question as to whether the Cabinet exhibited any definite reaction to the speech, Herzof replied that there were some strong reactions on some points but did not identify them.

Comment: The Prime Minister seemed to be in much better spirits than one might expect in view of the rather long and important Cabinet meeting a short time prior to our meeting; the critical situation on the Gaza border with news of new incidents reaching him frequently; he had not heard of the latest one (Embtel 180 [11]) (in which two Israel soldiers killed when I saw him), the Syrian

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[9] See footnote 4, Document 229.

[10] Reference is evidently in error. Telegram 146 from Tel Aviv, August 25, pertained to a consular matter. Presumably reference is to telegram 176 from Tel Aviv, August 28; not printed. For a summary, see footnote 5, Document 229.

[11] Earlier that day the Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that two Israeli soldiers were killed and that three were wounded when their vehicles struck mines on the highway near Berri. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–2655)

decision re the Israel soldiers (Embtel 170 [12]) and the very difficult and personally distasteful experiences suffered by him at the hands of Ben Gurion during recent weeks. He did not display as much excitement or explosiveness in his comments as I had anticipated. Whether this reflected relief and resignation to important and critical Cabinet decisions today I could not assess, but I felt confident that it did not reflect any great personal victory or success for moderation over activism in the same meeting. He was firm and decisive in his manner but not aggressive.

It seemed to me that the outstanding indices to the current GOI attitude toward retaliation in terms somewhat stronger than usual, lie in the emphasis with which he treated certain points. For example, he returned several times to the thesis that Egypt had no right to remain in Gaza, and pondered whether it could long be tolerated; he requested that the USG oust Egypt from Gaza; he stressed Egypt's loss of rights to be in Gaza.

I gathered that the discussions in the Cabinet meeting today followed something of the same pattern followed before final decision in February to launch the Gaza incident. Therefore, this coincidence of approach to the present situation seems to support the theory of retaliation on something larger than the usual talk of retaliation of the past.

The possible loss of benefits deriving from Secretary's speech proposals seemed to be of far less concern to him than presence of Egypt in Gaza with the immediate security problem it posed, the deep penetration, the loss of life and associated current problems.

With regard to possible immediate action or timing of any phase on a retaliatory action program I sensed, although I had no tangible evidence, that the present plan—probably confirmed at the Cabinet meeting today—is a flexible one which can be activated without delay and whenever the Egyptian aggressions become too frequent, too penetrating, or too intolerable from Israel's viewpoint and there is no firm policy of awaiting the events of "the next two or three nights."

Lawson

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[12] Lawson reported in telegram 170 from Tel Aviv, August 26, that Radio Damascus had announced the decision of the Syrian Government to cancel the prisoner-of-war status that it had previously accorded to four captured Israeli soldiers. (*Ibid.*, 683.84A/8–2655)

235. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, August 29, 1955—1 p.m.

332. General Hakim Amer has just transmitted orally, through Gohar to me, fact that Egypt would welcome cessation present vicious circle along borders which becoming more and more serious. Egypt would be willing to live up to cease-fire if Israel also would agree abide by cease-fire in good faith. If date and time were set for cease-fire and no incidents initiated by Israel during 24-hour period after that date, Egypt on its part would guarantee that no incidents would be instigated by its forces.

Believe this proposal most important but am aware it can fail if (1) it is made dependent on Israeli admission for responsibility for commencement present series of incidents, which is implied as side light in part of message transmitted to me, or (2) it is interpreted in Israel as "peace offer" because Egypt weakening under Israeli pressure, as has been implied by recent Israeli broadcasts. To avoid these possibilities suggest Burns might approach both sides immediately along following lines: Immediate measures obviously required to restore tranquillity in border region. He, there, proposes, as agent of Security Council, and with reference final paragraph SC resolution March 30th each side order its military forces suspend any action against the other as from H hour on D day, and agree that if during subsequent 24-hour period there are no incidents, cease-fire will be considered to be formally in effect.

Have suggested immediate action by Burns in view of gravity of situation and apparent importance of this communication from Hakim Amer. If Burns should decide to act on this recommendation consideration should be given to strengthening his position by follow-up instructions and support to him from Secretary General.

Request Jerusalem contact Burns without delay this message. [2]

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–2955. Secret; Niact. Received at 12:36 p.m. Also sent niact to Jerusalem. Repeated niact to Tel Aviv and priority to London and Paris.

[2] The Department informed Cole in Jerusalem that it supported Cairo's suggestion that Burns should approach Egypt and Israel immediately and call for a cease-fire. (Telegram 30 to Jerusalem, August 29; *ibid.*) Cole reported on August 30 that Burns had sent messages to this effect to both parties. (Telegram 58 from Jerusalem, August 30; *ibid.*) Byroade reported from Cairo on the evening of August 30 that Fawzi had informed him "that orders had already been given to the troops to cause no incidents whatsoever after 6:00 p.m. this evening. (1600Z)." (Telegram 344 from Cairo; *ibid.*)

236. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State [1]

Baghdad, August 29, 1955—5 p.m.

180. Had further talk this morning with Foreign Minister Bashayan on Secretary's August 26 statement (Embtel 172, August 27). [2]

Bashayan said he was in favor of early meeting of representatives of the Arab States for exchange of views on statement. Jordan [and] Syria in accepting invitation to a conference to consider North African situation (Embtels 166, August 25, 168, August 26 and 170 August 27 [3]) had suggested that Secretary's statement be considered at same time. Bashayan said he too was in favor of that.

I asked Bashayan how far plans for conference on North Africa had progressed. He said all Arab States except Egypt and Saudi Arabia had replied and had accepted invitation to attend such a conference. States replying had suggested Beirut as meeting place. Egypt he anticipated would request that meeting take place at Cairo. That would be acceptable to him.

I gather that the level at which this conference is to be held has not up to now been decided. To my question as to when conference might take place Bashayan said within three or four days.

Until Arab States can get together for an exchange of views on Secretary's statement Bashayan said he thought it was important that public stand by various governments on statement be avoided. He regretted very much that certain members of present Government of Syria had already declared themselves publicly against statement. These men he continued as they are members of only a caretaker government are all too inclined to act irresponsibly. Their one aim now is to pile up difficulties for the new incoming government.

What about the 1947 UN Resolution Bashayan then asked? No mention of it was made by the Secretary he continued and this has given rise to some unfavorable comment. I told him that it was generally understood that the Arabs took their stand on that resolution. It was equally recognized that the Israelis took their stand on the present frontiers. These clearly would be the starting points in any negotiations but obviously if a settlement were to be reached both Arabs and Israelis would have to make concessions.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2955. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:35 a.m., August 30. Repeated priority to London.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/8–2755)

[3] None printed. (*Ibid.*, 751S.00/8–2555, 751S.00/8–2655, and 751S.00/8–2755, respectively)

Bashayan said he understood that. (Prime Minister Nuri's reaction to a similar observation of mine was reported in Embtel 171, August 27.)[4]

There remained the UN Resolutions on Jerusalem Bashayan continued. Could I say something about them? On the matter of Jerusalem I said I felt I could tell him that the US Government was not committed to any particular solution.

There was one more question Bashayan then said that he wanted to ask. How urgent was it for the Arab States to declare themselves on the statement?

The main objective of the Secretary's speech I explained was to get both parties thinking of ways to bring negotiations for a sound settlement to a head. A settlement certainly was urgently needed by both parties but there was not the slightest intention of coercing or rushing the governments concerned into commitments of any kind. It was very important though in my view that an early start be made on exchanging views.

But if, Bashayan then asked, representatives of the Arab States get together and it develops that the atmosphere is not propitious for moving toward a settlement would you say that it were best under those circumstances to play for time trying to keep door open for talks at some future more favorable time.

I told Bashayan that I felt strongly that if no real progress could be made right now then by all means every effort should be made to keep the door open for another attempt at a later more favorable time.

Before we parted Bashayan reiterated his deep interest in the Secretary's statement. He said he would continue to give it very careful consideration. He had one suggestion he would like to make now. When the negotiations which he so much hoped would materialize reach the problem of refugees he would like to see Doctor Izzet Tannous Director of the Arab Refugees Office in New York brought into the picture. Tannous whom he described as a Palestinian refugee could he said give much valuable detailed information.

Gallman

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[4] Document 228.

237. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State [1]

Beirut, August 30, 1955—6 p.m.

227. Have preferred await seeking official reaction Secretary's speech from President [2] and Prime Minister [3] in order allow additional time their consideration. Foreign Minister [4] now in Cairo, will presumably express a position upon return here this week. However, believe reaction can be summarized as readiness keep door open examine proposals.

My British colleague is proposing and I concur, that Secretary and possibly Macmillan issue statements on eve Arab League Political Committee Cairo session September 3. Statement might take form response to press conference question and/or might be communicated to governments concerned by US–UK diplomatic representatives. Statement could take note some encouraging response to Secretary's proposals and disposition give them serious consideration. Suggestion could then be made that if parties willing, Secretary would be glad meet representatives countries concerned separately or in groups during his presence Europe October to explore further steps which might be desirable.

Such statement would signify continuing US–UK interest and might forestall negative or restrictive action which might hamper future negotiations. Statement would have advantage also maintaining momentum while at same time keeping question methods and forums completely flexible.

Embassy believes Trieste pattern offers best chance in view great difficulty if not impossibility bringing parties together for direct talks at this stage and generally confusing possibilities of UN jurisdiction. Embassy also believes if US and UK play broker role far preferable negotiate with representatives countries concerned keeping decisions out of Arab League if possible. We would hope negotiations might be confined as much as possible to states bordering Israel, thus eliminating obstructionist role such states as Saudi Arabia, Yemen.

Whether Secretary makes statement or not we strongly recommend missions in Arab capitals be instructed approach governments

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–3055. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 5:28 p.m. Repeated to London.

[2] Camille Chamoun.

[3] Samih al-Sulh.

[4] Hamid Frangieh.

urging against precipitate action Cairo meeting and calm careful consideration which would leave door open for further exploration.[5]

Heath

[5] The Embassy in London reported on September 1 that the Foreign Office had received a message from the British Ambassador in Lebanon suggesting that Dulles or Macmillan issue a further statement. The Embassy also noted, however, that the Foreign Office "does not like idea." (Telegram 839; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–155)

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238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, August 30, 1955—6:54 p.m.

401. Prelim reactions to Secretary's speech have in main been gratifyingly thoughtful, sober and responsible. Dept desires make most of present momentum provided by speech and supporting statements by UK, [2] France, [3] UN Sec-Gen, [4] Ceylon, [5] and additional statements which may be forthcoming. Effort is complicated of course by Gaza developments but we intend treat Gaza flareup separately and as far as Alpha concerned, use it only to underscore necessity moving forward.

Meeting of Arab states Cairo Sept 3 will be important in setting Arab course. Despite probable reiteration of past polemics for bargaining and domestic polit purposes, we hope fol may materialize from meeting:

1. Approval of Secretary's sincerity and effort at impartiality in stating problems;
2. Expression of desirability exploring significance and fuller meaning of Secretary's statement.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–3055. Top Secret; Niact; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Burdett and Russell and approved by the Secretary. Russell signed for Dulles. Also sent niact to Baghdad, Beirut, Amman, Damascus, Jidda, and Tripoli. Repeated to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Ankara.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 230.

[3] Telegram 898 from Paris, August 28, transmitted the text of a statement to be issued that day by the French Foreign Office. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2855)

[4] See the *New York Times*, August 27, 1955, p. 1.

[5] The Embassy in Colombo furnished the Department with the text of the Government of Ceylon's statement on August 28. (Telegram 77; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2855)

We wish avoid necessity deal with Arab states as bloc. Hope they will tacitly agree Egypt take lead in exploring Secretary's ideas. Intimations from Nuri and Bashayan that Egypt holds key to Arab position give reason think Arab states may agree to Egypt moving first.

We assume Arabs not yet ready tackle problems by their reps sitting around table with Israelis. Exchange of views of various parties therefore might be achieved through suitable person or commission designated by UN, or by any govt or person agreed upon by both sides.

Chiefs of mission should in their discretion seek impress upon delegates to Sept 3 meeting essentiality avoiding negativism and of indicating their govts' desire explore further significance of statement.

Chiefs of mission authorized to use, informally and orally only, and in response inquiries from govts to which accredited, any of points in guidance contained Deptel 139 to Tel Aviv rptd other posts, except para 3(e). [6]

Dulles

[6] Document 214.

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239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, August 30, 1955—6:55 p.m.

402. You will see from Deptel 401 [2] we consider Egypt key to development Arab cooperation in exploring possibilities progress along lines Secretary's Aug 26 statement. We recognize complications posed by Gaza flareup. You should however impress upon GOE: 1) Continuation uneasy border situation can only harm Egypt; 2) If not dealt with along lines suggested by Secretary, it will almost inevitably sooner or later break out into larger warfare.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–3055. Top Secret; Niact; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted and approved by Russell, who signed for Dulles.
[2] *Supra.*

At your discretion you may add US anxious help Nasser along lines Deptel 325 [3] but our ability assist necessarily affected by possibility of progress in this matter.

Dept would appreciate your opinion re any tactics US and/or UK can take move Nasser toward initiating Trieste approach to Alpha in early future.

Dulles

[3] Document 207.

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240. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State [1]

Jidda, August 30, 1955—8 p.m.

88. Supplementing my telegram 82, August 27 [*28*]. [2]

1. Embassy Arab consultant [3] reports that when handing Prince Faisal copies English and Arabic texts Secretary's statement His Highness spoke with unwonted fervor substantially as follows:

"Why should I read it; let those whose task it may be to comment do so. Did I not give your Ambassador my personal view?: We can never live with Israel. Will Americans ever understand this fact; nothing they can do can change it.

"They will probably say in Washington I am their enemy, as an officer in their Near East section recently said. But why; I am simply speaking truth, truth which every Arab feels.

"No such statement can really help. Why should America concern itself with us or with Israel; let it pull out and leave us alone. Such interference can only injure Saudi-American relations.

"What they are doing is against nature. It may have temporary result; but in last analysis only one of us can be sovereign in Palestine".

2. As yet there has been no editorial comment in only Saudi daily newspaper, semi-official *Bilad Al-Saudiyah*. It did however publish factually accurate news story August 28, and we may expect something in its weekly political commentary next Friday.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–3055. Secret. Received at 6:47 a.m., August 31. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, London, and Paris.

[2] Document 231.

[3] Mohammed Massoud.

Further on August 30 it published brief news roundup of comments by Jordan Prime Minister Mufti and Syrian President-Elect Quwatli, Prime Minister Asali and Faris Khouri—all non-commital except Khouri's which warned Arabs against "this new danger in American policy." One Cairo item added that Arab Foreign Ministers would meet there September 3 to discuss Dulles statement.

Roundup ended "statement is being studied carefully by high (Saudi) authorities to end Saudi views may be communicated other Arab States with view reaching unified decision."

Wadsworth

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241. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, August 30, 1955—5 p.m.

191. With reference Embtel 165 [2] my British colleague informs me that he has requested reconsideration by Foreign Office tripartite formula on Jerusalem question. [3] His arguments were as follows:

First, he believes agreed line of approach would precipitate a bitter and sterile quarrel in new government and would react adversely upon prospects successful followup Secretary Dulles statement August 26.

Secondly, he quoted Sharett as having told him Ben-Gurion would not make it easy for us to avoid dealing with Foreign Minister and that given state of his own relations with Ben-Gurion it would be impossible for Sharett to help us out of difficulty by meeting elsewhere than in Jerusalem. Nicholls concluded that present instructions would make our dealings with Israel Government infinitely more difficult and weaken Sharett and moderate elements at a critical period.

He proposed therefore following variations present instructions,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.00/8–3055. Confidential. Received at 9:06 a.m., August 31. Repeated to London, Paris, and Rome.

[2] Document 224.

[3] The Embassy in London reported on September 12 that the French Embassy had informed the British Foreign Office that the French Government had reconsidered the tripartite formula on Jerusalem and had concluded that in order to strengthen Sharett and the moderates, the diplomatic representatives in Israel should be authorized to conduct business with Sharett in Jerusalem. (Telegram 995; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.00/9–1255)

"If normal dealings with Foreign Ministry are out of question, even with assurances that no political capital would be made of them."

1. No indication to be made to new Prime Minister of our line.
2. A courtesy call would be paid on new Foreign Minister.
3. Sharett would be informed that question whether Heads of Missions can call on him at Foreign Ministry would not be decided for a month or two because possibility prejudicing Israel-Arab negotiations and that, in meantime, he should agree to meet us either elsewhere in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv.

Embassy Comment: I agree with British Ambassador's analysis of underlying situation. Important point seems to be to keep operations working on practical basis but in no way prejudicing Israel-Arab negotiations or in fact contravening UN resolution on Jerusalem. In any event the temporary character of these operations and avoidance publicity should be insisted upon whatever arrangements are made.

Therefore if arrangement under point 3 can be made and publicity controlled and practical working conditions as now exist can continue we would avoid for moment (a) adverse reactions on prospects of following up Secretary's statement (b) bitter and sterile dispute with new government (c) prejudicing Sharett's position vis-à-vis Ben-Gurion and Cabinet.

Alternative would be for an effort to be made to force Sharett to agree to meet us alternatively at Foreign Office and Tel Aviv an agreement which I rather doubt he would make except under compelling conditions. Even if arranged, it would place us in position of recognizing Foreign Office in Jerusalem in operational sense, something we would avoid under British Ambassador's proposal point 3.

Lawson

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242. Editorial Note

In telegram 61 from Jerusalem, August 31, Consul General Cole reported that Major General Burns was issuing a press release regarding the cease-fire which would state that the Egyptians had agreed to a cease-fire and said they would issue orders to implement it and that Burns was endeavoring to obtain Israeli agreement to a cease-fire. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–3155) Telegram 196 from Jerusalem, also dated August 31, transmitted the text of the Israeli reply to Burns' proposal. It declared that the

events of the past week were the sole responsibility of the Egyptian authorities and rejected a cease-fire unless the Egyptian Government accepted responsibility for those acts and was ready to guarantee the immediate cessation of all hostile acts. (*Ibid.*)

Ambassador Byroade telephoned from Cairo that afternoon and talked to Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs John A. Jernegan. A memorandum of the conversation, drafted by Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs William C. Burdett, Jr., reads as follows:

"Ambassador Byroade telephoned from Cairo to state the following:

"I am convinced that the Egyptian Government is doing everything it can to control the situation in Gaza and to observe the cease fire. Hakim Amer, Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army, is personally in Gaza to see that the Government's orders are carried out. However, some Egyptian personnel may still be out of communications with headquarters. Because of the messages I have seen I am worried that something may happen. I am not pessimistic over the situation here provided we can keep something big from happening on the other side during the next two days. Egypt may issue a public statement about the cease fire. You may wish to consider asking the Secretary to telephone Sharett and tell him that we are convinced the Egyptians mean what they said to General Burns and will observe the cease fire.

"Mr. Jernegan replied that he would report the conversation to the Secretary." (*Ibid.*)

Secretary Dulles telephoned Ambassador Lawson in Tel Aviv at 2:40 that afternoon. Notes of the conversation prepared by Dulles' secretary, Phyllis D. Bernau, read as follows:

"The Sec. said he wanted him to know that we believe that the Egyptians really intend in good faith to try to get a cease fire there, and the Sec. hopes very much L. can do something with his friends. The Sec. wants Mr. Sharrett to know that he is personally convinced that they are in good faith trying to call it off and hopes for reciprocity. L. will be in touch right away. The Sec. said to tell Sharrett he did phone him personally and requested him personally to carry that information to him." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

243. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, August 31, 1955—8 p.m.

350. From Johnston. [2] Yesterday during long session with HKJ Ministerial Comite I stated following position in response Prime Minister's points (Amman telegram 99 to Department [3]).

1. We prepared recommend financing 126-meter (300 MCM) dam at Maqarin but cannot recommend expenditure additional funds to construct uneconomically large foundation on highly speculative possibility that Jordan will increase dam height in future. Even in unlikely event Jordan later obtains necessary funds and thus becomes able make political decision store more water Arab territory, it is uncertain whether dam would be raised, additional dam on Yarmuk would be constructed or Tiberias arrangements continued.

2. We conceded that Israel due 25 rather than 40 MCM from Yarmuk for Jordan–Yarmuk triangle. However we maintained position HKJ requirements adequately met by 100 MCM of upper Jordan water from Tiberias. Thorough discussion engineering data has confirmed that total quantity available to HKJ adequate irrigate all arable lands Jordan Valley. (Incidentally information given us privately from informed source indicates ground water explorations more encouraging than previously known.)

3. Question neutral supervision not discussed in formal session but we explored with ministers most concerned and submitted written proposals for supervision to comite. Jordanians indicated more interest in guarantees than in machinery supervision.

Pursuant Prime Minister's suggestion I have supplied him with letter reaffirming that our proposals do not "in any way alter or prejudice the refugees right to repatriation or compensation" and that it is "not intended to have any other political effect with respect to boundaries, territorial claims, rights or responsibilities under the several general armistice agreements or any other outstanding political issue."

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/8–3155. Confidential. Received at 11:33 p.m. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Damascus, London, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jidda, and Paris.

[2] Johnston arrived in Cairo on August 31.

[3] Dated August 30, it reported that at an informal meeting the previous day, the Prime Minister stated that Jordan was prepared to accept the Jordan Valley proposals on economic grounds if certain modifications could be agreed upon: (1) construction of a dam at Maqarin capable of supporting a possible future increase in dam height from 126 meters (300 MCM storage capacity) to 147 meters (460 MCM capacity); (2) adjustments in the amount of upper Jordan River water available from Tiberias; and (3) more specific "guarantees" as to action in the event of a violation. The telegram further stated that Jordan insisted that a political decision be taken in concert with a subcommittee of interested Arab States in Cairo. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/8–3055)

At comite's specific suggestion we handed them a "memo of United States proposals" embodying all elements of proposed understanding in our terms. If accepted memo would provide solid foundation for basic agreement both sides.

Comment: In my judgment HKJ seriously wants project but must surmount several difficulties. On one hand these involve substance of proposals and internal and public relations problems while on other they relate to HKJ ability enlist support other Arab countries. Assuming solution internal difficulties Jordanian Cabinet appears willing try isolate project from question general political accommodation in area and secure support Lebanon Syria and Egypt. We attempting Cairo and Beirut provide maximum support this direction and would welcome help Department and field.

Byroade

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244. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, August 31, 1955—8 p.m.

352. Tel Aviv's 194 [2] and 196 [3] arrived just prior appointment with Fawzi arranged for Eric Johnston. Prior discussion Johnston's business stated new matters had arisen of such urgency that I must request him again to see Prime Minister and/or Minister of War without delay. Fawzi started immediately arrange appointment with General Hakim Amer but recalled he had left for border.

Gave Fawzi my view situation nearly out of hand. He stated he had authority to assure me that Egypt doing everything within its power to live up to unequivocable commitment given yesterday to General Burns. Hakim Amer had gone to border to personally do everything within his power to get word to commando types inside Israel. I stated it of utmost importance that Israel know without

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–3155. Secret; Niact. Received at 10:47 p.m. Also sent niact to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and priority to London and Paris.

[2] The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported earlier on August 31 in telegram 194 that at 6:50 p.m. the previous evening two Israeli civilians were found shot to death at a point 3 kilometers from Kfar Menachem, indicating that the commandos were moving toward the Jordanian border. Moreover, the Israelis were referring to this incident as evidence that Egypt was not conforming to Burns' request for a cease-fire. (*Ibid.*)

[3] See Document 242.

delay Egypt really trying to prevent further incidents. He stated he had given me his statement with thought that perhaps we could see it got to right places. I asked if such a statement could be made to General Burns as well in any communication they might send him. He replied that it could.

I said I unaware of any communication Burns might have made to them but asked their reaction as to how to treat last paragraph Israeli statement Tel Aviv's 196. Fawzi replied that obviously they could not accept responsibility that things had gotten to point they now were. I therefore replied it best ignore this part of Israeli statement and in addition to new assurances to Burns make an immediate public statement of their position. This would merely take note of the Israeli statement but not attempt to refute allegation last paragraph. Fawzi replied their position would be well known to Burns and Secretary General. Johnston and Ahmed Hussein who present joined me in urging a public statement with high authority be made without delay. Fawzi said it might be possible and they would consider it carefully.

From other sources close to Nasser situation here seems quite clear. Some of the National Guard types and commandos who took off with specific harassing missions are to an extent at least untraceable at moment. I do not doubt slightest that every effort is being made to stop it. Egyptian acceptance of cease fire was broadcast yesterday evening and this morning in hope it would be heard by Egyptian commandos still in Israel (now believed to number about 5). On other hand Government here now believes that Israel may attack tonight or tomorrow and possibly make real effort regarding Gaza. Egypt would feel impelled react (probably elsewhere). No one in authority here really wants this to happen and while Egyptians over optimistic and not apparently too concerned at their ability militarily make good showing initially there is a real realization that it would be a defeat for Egypt and Nasser no matter what happens. They also now thinking in terms of what it would do to U.S.-Egyptian relations and our past support for this regime regardless of who won first round.

In spite of seriousness of situation Nasser content with second hand contact with me at moment due to his internal problems. Salah Salem's wild accusations before RCC colleagues during resignation scene that he being tossed over at insistence this Embassy has made him cautious until he can be more at ease over this split of RCC. [4] Mohamed Haikel who spending most his time now in this crisis

[4] Salah Salem's resignation as a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and as Minister for Sudanese Affairs as well as Minister for National Guidance had been announced earlier that day.

with Nasser personally is now enroute to see whether we have further ideas.

Can only hope way can be found to convince Israel (in manner which she will not misuse) of what I at least believe to be Egypt's real desire get things back under control.

Byroade

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245. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, August 31, 1955—7 p.m.

198. GOI's reply General Burns' cease-fire proposal transmitted Embtel 196 [2] contained no surprises and appears consistent with the considerations set forth Embtel 190. [3]

Burns' proposal may have caused some momentary embarrassment to GOI upon its receipt because it was apparent that no government here could accept such a formula in face fact Egyptian marauders were at time receipt still committing murders well within Israel territory. Reply appears designed (a) avoid outright rejection, (b) keep spotlight on basic Egyptian responsibility events past week end, (c) reserve for GOI freedom of action to follow such policy decisions as it may have already made.

Embassy attaches some significance unusual action GOI yesterday in permitting photographs of murdered civilians and scenes of incidents, which were widely printed in today's papers. Difficult to believe that GOI would have followed this course if it had decided to rely diplomatic means to reduce Egyptian-Israel tensions.

At this juncture, Nasser's militant tactics past week appear to have (a) served as catalyst bringing together various political groups previously dispersed and at odds over election campaign and its results and, (b) provided GOI with enough evidence to support its position of righteousness to point where world opinion would be

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–3155. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:03 a.m., September 1. Also sent priority to Cairo, Jerusalem, London, and Paris.

[2] See Document 242.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–3055)

confused in case outbreak hostilities and world Jewry probably united in support Israel cause.

Lawson

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246. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, August 31, 1955—midnight.

199. For Secretary. Your message re genuineness Egyptian cease-fire desires delivered personally to Prime Minister [2] with emphasis on fact you telephoned personally and matter was one of great importance and urgency.

He expressed great appreciation message but felt it necessary to comment on responsibility Egypt for what he termed "beastly and inhuman acts perpetrated on Israel citizens." He said Egyptian gangs running wild in, through country. He appreciated your interest and expressed regret that he had to refer to Egyptian reprehensible actions. He promised to take up matter first thing in morning. He asked that I convey his respect and personal good wishes to you.

I shall report promptly Sharett's comment as soon as received. [3]

Public feeling running high and we believe there is considerable activity in high government and military circles. Believe Israel attitude will be largely dominated by Egypt's willingness accept cease-fire terms submitted through General Burns by GOI Tuesday evening.

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–3155. Secret; Niact. Received at 3 a.m., September 1. Repeated niact to Cairo.

[2] See Document 242.

[3] Lawson transmitted the following message from Sharett to Dulles on September 1:

"With reference your message last night, we shall undertake no action now and strict orders will be given to that effect provided that there are no acts of hostility on the other side; that is, shooting across the border, mining and acts of sabotage."

Lawson also reported that, in response to a question, the Acting Director General of the Israeli Foreign Office, who delivered the message, indicated that the Israeli Government hoped that Byroade would convey the message to Nasser and added that the Israeli Government had given Burns a similar message for Nasser. (Telegram 206 from Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–155)

247. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, September 1, 1955—noon.

203. For Assistant Secretary Allen. Re your memo July 22 [2] and Embassy despatch 154, [3] Foreign Minister has informed Embassy that Jackson has been given proposals by Prime Minister to be taken immediately to Nasser of "Far-reaching character with specific suggestions designed to ameliorate situation". Jackson also meeting with Ben-Gurion later this morning. Embassy endeavoring to arrange plane transportation to Cairo out of Kalandia this afternoon. At request both Jackson and Foreign Minister I am arranging to meet with him prior his departure to obtain precise information re proposals and will report immediately to the Department. [4]

Previous activities Jackson were reported by him to me yesterday as follows:

1. Held two and one-half hour conversation with Fawzi with no firm results other than development his interest in whole exercise.

2. Held hour-long conversation with Nasser, net result being development interest to desire continuation of exercise with definite hope Jackson's return Cairo following visit to Israel; specific inquiry as to details Israel-held Egyptian prisoners and what pattern joint narcotic traffic control; strong and final dissipation Nasser's confidence in "anyone in Israel".

3. Sessions with Sharett, Ben-Gurion and Rafael held immediately on Jackson's arrival here evening August 29 at behest Israelis. This produced intense, sharp questioning of Jackson regarding Nasser reactions to definite points transmitted by Sharett and Ben-Gurion. Sharett appeared in role of more agitated and emphatic questioner than Ben-Gurion and when subject Gaza raid February 28 discussed offered only defense. It was significant that when Jackson explained this action was basis Nasser's complete abandonment confidence in Israel leaders, Sharett never removed his eyes from

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–155. Secret; Niact. Received at 7:59 a.m. Repeated niact to Cairo.

[2] Elmore Jackson, the U.N. observer for the American Friends Service Committee, had met with Allen on July 22. According to a memorandum of the conversation by Wilkins, Jackson told Allen that he had met with Fawzi on July 15, immediately before Fawzi's departure for Cairo, and that Fawzi had indicated that the Egyptians considered the time ripe for the commencement of talks between Israel and Egypt, for intensification of AFSC efforts, and for an "imaginative approach to the problem." Jackson stated that he planned to visit Israel and the Arab States in August and could continue discussions with the Egyptian and Israeli authorities. Allen expressed interest and approved of Jackson continuing his efforts. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/7–2255)

[3] Dated August 19, it transmitted a memorandum of a conversation on August 12 between Lawson and Sharett, in which Sharett indicated that he planned to see Jackson in a day or two and "seemed genuinely interested" in Jackson's visit. (*Ibid.*, 784A.13/8–1955)

[4] See Document 253.

Ben-Gurion, who we assume promoted Gaza action in opposition Sharett.

Jackson was asked if he would return Cairo following day bearing message to Nasser. Matter seemed so urgent that offer was made to fly Jackson to Athens to make plane connections without delay—much depended on immediate delivery of message. But during night the thoroughly upsetting Egyptian raids forced change in Israel plan and execution message idea postponed.

Lawson

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248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, September 1, 1955—1:27 p.m.

421. Despite difficulties created by Gaza clashes it still of prime importance that Arab FonMins at meeting Polit Subcommittee Arab League not take definitive position against Secretary's Aug 26 proposals. If you have opportunity and if, after consultation with Brit colleague, you feel would be useful in securing Nasser's cooperation to this end, you authorized reassure him over certain points on which there seems from various Arab statements danger misunderstanding:

a) statement did not as has been alleged ignore possibility of return of some refugees to Israel;

b) we have open mind how the com[illegible]sation for refugees would be administered and would be glad discuss this with Govts concerned;

c) proposed treaties of guarantee relate only to Arab-Israel border security and not to Middle East defense;

d) we fully realize this only a beginning and that all problems cannot be solved at once. All we are asking is that parties should be

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/9–155. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Allen, and approved by Russell, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London.

willing embark on a process of seeking solutions which might lead to improvement of relations and eventually to overall settlement.[2]

Dulles

[2] Shortly after the transmission of this telegram, Gallman reported from Baghdad that Bashayan had told him that morning that the Arab League Political Committee meeting had been postponed, since Syria still had only a caretaker government. (Telegram 193, September 1; *ibid.*, 684A.86/9–155) Byroade reported on September 2 that his information about the meeting was that Foreign Ministers would not attend and member states would be represented by their chiefs of mission in Cairo. According to Fawzi, he added, "there no plan this body seriously discuss Secretary's speech." (Telegram 369 from Cairo; *ibid.*, 684A.86/9–255)

249. Letter From the British Chargé (Scott) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, September 1, 1955.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: When we discussed the Middle East the other day you said you would like to have Mr. Macmillan's views on the next steps to be taken about Alpha.[2] I telegraphed this to Mr. Macmillan, and later telegraphed some proposals, including a circular telegram of instructions to United States representatives in Arab countries, which were passed to a member of my staff by Mr. Russell.[3] I have now received a reply from Mr. Macmillan.

2. Mr. Macmillan asks me to inform you that he agrees with your view that we need to keep up the impetus given by your speech and by the British supporting statement,[4] and says he will be very ready to coordinate the next steps closely with you. He says that a visit from Mr. Russell would be very welcome at any time.

3. Mr. Macmillan agrees that the preliminary reactions in the countries concerned are as favourable as could have been expected. On the other hand, the Arab attitude has clearly not yet been determined, and it looks as though decisions may be taken at the Arab League meeting on September 3. He has been wondering whether there is anything more we can do to prevent these taking a

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 12. Top Secret and Personal.

[2] Reference is apparently to Scott's conversation with Dulles on August 29. The memorandum of this conversation, by Elbrick, is *ibid.*, Central Files, 684.86/8–2955.

[3] Document 238.

[4] Dulles' address is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1955, pp. 378–380.

negative form. All the evidence suggests that the attitude of Egypt will be decisive. The Iraqi Prime Minister has said that his attitude will depend on that of Egypt. The Syrian and Jordanian Prime Ministers have both stressed the importance of consultation with other Arab States, and clearly await a lead from Egypt. Mr. Macmillan thinks we must therefore do our utmost to see that Nasser's lead is not a negative one, or at least that he does not demand a closing of the doors. He is in a strange frame of mind, and Mr. Macmillan is not confident that he will behave helpfully. In particular, there is the danger that he may feel compelled to take an extreme line through fear of being outbid by the Iraqi Prime Minister, with whom he is already competing over Morocco and other matters. Mr. Macmillan suggests therefore that we should make an immediate approach to Nasser. The object would be to inform him that we have reason to think that the Iraqis (and others) will adopt a constructive attitude towards your proposals if Egypt gives a lead in that sense. We could add that we should use all our influence with Iraq and other Arab States in that direction.

4. The second purpose of the approach should, Mr. Macmillan thinks, be to give Nasser a little more confidential background about our ideas than he has hitherto received, and to reassure him over certain points on which there seems from various statements to be danger of misunderstanding. In the first place, it is worth considering whether we might now indicate to him in confidence, as an example of the kind of ideas we have in mind, the principle (but, of course, not any application) of the triangles in the Negev. We would not ask him to commit himself in any way to this principle.

5. Other points which might be made are:

a) that the statement did not, as has been alleged, ignore the possibility of the return of some refugees to Israel;

b) that we have an open mind as to how the compensation for refugees would be administered, and would be glad to discuss this with the Governments concerned;

c) that, of course, the proposed treaties of guarantee have nothing to do with Middle East defence;

d) that we fully realise that this is only a beginning and that all the problems cannot be solved at once. All we are asking is that the parties should be willing to embark on a process of seeking solutions which might lead to a radical improvement of relations and eventually to an overall settlement.

6. In view of the above, our representatives might conclude by saying that for all these reasons we hope Nasser will agree as to the importance of avoiding any open rejection by the Arab League of your initiative. Mr. Macmillan concludes by saying that he would be glad to hear your views so that agreement may be reached on instructions for a joint approach in Cairo.

7. Mr. Macmillan has also studied the circular telegram of *instructions to the United States representatives* in Arab countries and has only one comment to make. It is about your suggestion that "views might be exchanged as to a person or commission designated by a government or person agreed upon by both sides." [5] Mr. Macmillan fears that if the parties chose an unsuitable government or person the operation might pass out of our control. He has therefore suggested that the relevant sentence should read "the exchange of views of various parties might therefore be achieved through a suitable person or commission designated by the United Nations or through those governments who are prepared to contribute towards the achievement of a settlement."

8. I took the opportunity this afternoon of mentioning these points briefly to Mr. Hoover for whom I am sending copies of this letter. I also understand that Mr. Russell has discussed Mr. Macmillan's views with a member of my staff.

Yours sincerely,

Robert Scott

[5] Quoted from Document 238.

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250. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 1, 1955—3 p.m.

355. Conversation with Fawzi night before last covered number of matters which being reported separately. In general conversation that followed after completion my specific items he stated that some things must be encouraging to me. Certainly we should be pleased to see drastic action taken last weekend re some of the worst leftist elements in the press. (It will interest Department that one of reported reasons for action re press was Nasser's displeasure that they overplayed and sought to put more into his possible visit to Moscow than he desired.) Stated in this connection he considered it more and more important that Nasser be invited to United States if possible without much delay. Certainly they hoped for an invitation

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/9–155. Secret. Received at 8:05 p.m.

before the tentative time set for Nasser's Moscow visit early next year. I replied that this matter to which I had given much thought as I knew President and Secretary would be delighted to see such a visit take place under appropriate timing and atmosphere. Fawzi then speculated as to whether invitation delivered by Nixon (as rumored here in press) would be in time and finally decided perhaps it would be.

In my second meeting with Fawzi (after he had talked to Nasser by phone re world situation) Fawzi raised matter again and said he wished to correct impression given me in our first meeting as regards timing. (I gathered matter had just been discussed but do not know whether at Nasser's or Fawzi's initiative. Perhaps it came up in connection Nasser's expression concern to Fawzi re Secretary's statement on Soviet arms reported Embtel 345.) [2]

Fawzi went on to say that they now felt timing of invitation very important and hoped, if United States agreeable, Nasser should visit States sometime that invitation could be issued without delay. I stated as he knew these matters difficult to fit in President's schedule and our invitations normally included a suggested time for visit if convenient for invitee. Did he have any suggestions in this regard, particularly in view of Nasser's reported feeling he unable to leave Egypt until sometime after anticipated change in form of Government in January? Fawzi stated that timing of invitation was what was important now rather than actual time of visit. If we agreed he would suggest a communication from the President indicating a desire to have the Prime Minister visit United States at time to be mutually agreed later. Stated that if we worried about President's schedule, he could make this kind of approach without concern that actual visit might be this year and that Nasser's reply could be one of pleasure at invitation and acceptance, leaving vague actual timing. Additional probing on timing of invitation and new apparent urgency from their point of view elicited only remark that it probably best invitation did not come for "about ten days—but as soon as possible thereafter."

I closed conversation by indicating I certain Washington would be highly interested what had been communicated to me. He stated

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[2] According to telegram 345, Fawzi informed Byroade on August 30 that "Nasser quite upset over report that Secretary stated today's press conference that if Government of Egypt should receive arms from Soviet Union this would badly affect U.S.-Egyptian relations, etc. Stated that if this report were correct, he considered it a most unwelcome public approach on one of his principal problems." (*Ibid.*, 611.74/8–3055) On August 31, Dulles informed Byroade "I made no statement with reference to Egypt receiving arms and when asked what countries might be involved in possible Soviet arms I refused to answer." The Secretary also told Byroade to treat this report as a "personal message from me to Fawzi." (Telegram 415 to Cairo; *ibid.*, 774.56/8–3155)

he realized I could not on my own give any indication but hoped we would consider matter carefully.

Must confess do not know what has caused this note of urgency on their part for invitation. Considering however believe it in our interest find some way follow through on Fawzi suggestion. Realize that formal open-handed invitation from President very unusual and that problem further complicated by fact that invitation worded "next spring" or "early next year" would give appearance of competing with Kremlin. Useful alternative of formal invitation might be letter to Nasser from President stating he has long felt it would be useful have personal exchange of views in United States on matters of mutual interest and that he is hoping that if Nasser also thinks this a good idea he will bear the suggestion in mind and communicate with the President at a later date when they would fix a mutually acceptable date.

We would not of course expect deliver letter until immediate situation on borders has quieted down. [3]

Byroade

[3] The Department responded on September 3 that "We do not believe that invitation should be extended to Nasser at this time. Public knowledge of US invitation to either Egyptian or Israeli Premier prior to acceptance and implementation of Burns proposals re Gaza would give impression US was partial." (Telegram 442 to Cairo; *ibid.*, 611.74/9–155)

251. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 1, 1955—7 p.m.

367. Message contained Tel Aviv 206 [2] to Department conveyed to General Hakim Amer by me and Fawzi through Ahmed Hussein. Hakim Amer stated he would get it to Prime Minister without delay. Told him in my opinion it represented cease-fire by Israel without condition previously stipulated in last paragraph their public statement. Urged that he do all within his power restrain refugees and contact marauders still in Israel.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–155. Secret; Niact. Received at 5:56 p.m. Repeated niact to Tel Aviv and priority to London and Paris.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 246.

He replied with feeling that they deeply appreciated our efforts during this recent crisis. Egypt in difficult position as she could, of course not publicly indicate, commandos out of control. Refugees probably could not be completely controlled and individuals likely to go across border to revenge refugee deaths of last night.[3] I asked if he did not have enough people to picket borders. He replied he only had his troops and obviously could not place them in such a drawn-out and exposed position. Stated I felt if Israel convinced Egypt doing what it could there was at least a chance things could be kept under control, but if Egypt made decision to retaliate re last night, then I felt situation hopeless. He told me there were no such orders now. He had in fact issued orders to retaliate (in operation to be "smaller" than Israeli action last night) but Nasser had stopped him. I said day would come when he would thank Nasser for this act. Obtained impression matter probably not completely settled and that he may still try get Nasser's approval conduct small operation. Arrival Sharett's message therefore timely and hope this new factor will [apparent omission] Nasser stick to his position.

This is indeed touchy situation and hope in assessing it history of past period not be forgotten. Nasser said today he felt I knew in my six months here that he had ordered no operations inside Israel until these past few days. Things, he admits, now very difficult and in some cases out of control.

Can appreciate extreme difficulties being experienced by GOI. Nevertheless, still feel that we would not be in this situation but for February 28.

There has been, and even is today, in my mind quite a contrast between situation such as here and one that is reflected by a long history of Cabinet decisions to conduct military operations across Arab borders.

Byroade

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[3] On the evening of August 31, the Israelis attacked Khan Yunis in the southern portion of the Gaza Strip, killing more than 30 Palestinian refugees and Egyptian soldiers. The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported on September 1 that Israeli casualties were one killed and eight wounded and that the Israeli justification for the attack was self-defense against Egyptian terrorist gangs. (Telegram 200; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–155)

252. Editorial Note

On September 1, Secretary of State Dulles sent President Eisenhower, who was in Denver, Colorado, a letter reviewing a number of matters, including the current situation in Gaza and the status of Alpha. On these subjects, Dulles wrote the following:

"Today's trouble spot is the Gaza strip. I hope, however, that it will not lead to full-scale war. I spoke over the phone yesterday with Ambassador Lawson at Tel Aviv . . . . I told the Ambassador that I was confident that Egypt's cease-fire offer was genuine and that it was up to the Israelis to respond in kind. They nevertheless struck across the border, but then withdrew; so that could be the end—unless Egypt now feels it has to strike again.

"The initial reaction in the Arab States to our 'Alpha' project is not as violently against as was feared, but probably the official reaction will initially be negative. Israel and Jewish sentiment seems more favorable than anticipated. I am more than ever convinced that the move was a good one." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)

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253. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, September 1, 1955—9 p.m.

211. Jackson (Embtel 203 [2]) informs me that he met with Sharett and later Ben-Gurion today who have requested that he take important message to Nasser. Jackson arriving Cairo 1845 this evening (Cairo time) and will endeavor through own efforts meet Nasser on urgency basis. Later he will report developments to Embassy Cairo but feels direct association himself and Embassy at this time should be kept to minimum. Jackson hopes to receive from Nasser sufficient encouragement to warrant return to Israel, which very much desired by Sharett and Ben-Gurion, although Jackson probably meeting Rafael in Cyprus September 3 for secret talks with Sharett and Ben-Gurion, Jackson convinced that Israel, now that it has made sharp retaliation, feels it has balanced the score and taught Egyptians a lesson and is anxious that all violence on border and sabotage within

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–155. Secret; Niact. Received at 2:53 p.m., September 2. Repeated niact to Cairo, London, and Paris.

[2] Document 247.

Israel can be completely stopped. To that end, the messages consist of two proposals to Nasser:

1. GOI will accept General Burns' cease-fire [3] if GOE will give complete and satisfactory assurance that the armistice will be strictly observed and all acts of sabotage and violence stopped. This means not only military action on border but mining and sabotage.

Sharett and Ben-Gurion think it very important that Nasser be directly informed on sabotage acts within Israel, which have so completely aroused all of the country, and that he believe that they are taking place. In reply to my specific and clear question Jackson said that at no time was mention made of an Israeli requirement that GOE acknowledge and take responsibility for acts which have led to this round of retaliations on both sides, a condition included in GOI reply to Burns request for cease-fire (Embtel 196).

2. GOI will agree to 48-hour complete cease-fire (including mining and sabotage activity), during which it hopes that arrangements can be worked out for some kind of discussions which would set stage for strict and complete observance of armistice. GOI would agree that such conference would involve no discussions outside armistice operation but would not limit conferees to military people only. Conference could be held any agreed place (kilometer 95, Cyprus, etc), should be secret and could be held under chairmanship Jackson, General Burns, or any other agreed neutral person—there would be wide flexibility in regard to place and chairman. Jackson confident GOI much prefers proposal number 2 but confident that if he can return with genuine assurances by Nasser meeting terms of number 1 it will accept Burns cease-fire proposal. He feels that GOI will undertake no further military reprisals pending outcome his visit to Nasser unless Egyptians engaged in provoking actions and serious sabotage incidents in Israel continue. [4]

Lawson

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[3] See Document 242.

[4] On September 3, Byroade reported: "Nasser would not commit himself to Jackson nor British Ambassador to effect GOE would not retaliate for Khan Younes attack (nor in fact has he ever done so with me). He has, however, carried out his promised efforts control refugees and regain control over commandos. Nasser told British Ambassador about noon today that while GOE had not yet reached final decision, no orders for any retaliation had been issued up to that time. Nor from many little things does it appear he is expecting new wave of trouble, particularly since as of that time he was planning visit with his family in Alexandria greater part of next week." (Telegram 386 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–355)

254. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, September 1, 1955—11 p.m.

212. For the Secretary. At request Sharett I met with him in Jerusalem to receive comments in reply to Secretary's message (Embassy telegram 199 [2]) and to hear anything he might care to say about last night's retaliatory raid in Gaza (Embassy telegram 200). [3] He left special Knesset session for half hour to give me the following:

He attached full importance to Secretary's personal message and wanted him to know that it receiving serious consideration. At time message received Israel troops already cross Gaza border. But now, Israel "not engaged in firing" and would not resume firing unless Egypt provoked such action. He referred to my visit to him on August 28 (Embassy telegram 181 [4]) when I told him of strong hope of US Government that GOI would not permit Egyptian actions August 25 to start vicious circle reprisals and counter-reprisals. At the time I had expressed hope that GOI was holding up action on Gaza border to await indicative actions by Egypt as next two or three nights might give direct reflection our counseling to Nasser to abandon aggressive program. He said during that period of time that there was in fact no retaliation. Now, Israel plans to make no further military reprisals unless Egyptians engage in provoking actions and serious sabotage and murder incidents in Israel continue. He expressed hope that some means could be found whereby all provoking actions could be stopped and to that end had sent direct to Nasser two proposals (Embassy telegram 211 [5]) via Elmore Jackson. (He confirmed substance of the proposals as described in reference telegram as I repeated them to him). In reply to my reference your feeling as expressed final paragraph Department telegram 166 [6] and in obvious effort to underscore the sincerity of his desire to find an effective formula, he dwelt at some length on the continued and varied means he had used to send messages to Nasser in past with

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–155. Secret; Niact. Received at 2:49 a.m., September 2. Repeated niact to Cairo, Paris, and London.

[2] Document 246.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 251.

[4] Document 234.

[5] *Supra.*

[6] In the referenced paragraph of telegram 166, Dulles asked Lawson, in his conversations with Israeli officials, to underscore his belief that the present round of hostilities had to stop promptly. Regardless of who was responsible for the current trouble along the border, a continuation of the present situation could only result in disaster to each side. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–3155)

regard to Israel's genuine desire to end trouble on the border. He named several members of British Parliament who acted as intermediaries and referred to occasions on which he had described to me his desires and efforts along that line, with implication that Israel position must have been transmitted to Nasser through our Embassy Cairo. He said he was still at loss to understand why Nasser has initiated incidents and permitted the operation of Egyptian gangs of trained saboteurs in Israel. In response to my final question he again declared firmly that Israel plans no further retaliatory actions unless Egypt provokes them.

He seemed impressed with fact you had telephoned personally. [7]

Lawson

[7] See Document 242.

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255. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State [1]

Amman, September 2, 1955—2 p.m.

106. Beirut for Johnston. [2] Situation re two matters subject of Deptel 96 [3] is reasonably satisfactory. Department's guidance has been employed on both points.

1. Perhaps most remarkable achievement Johnston missions visit was conversion Jordanian unbelievers to view water negotiations are separate and economic in character. Johnston has convinced Prime Minister among others and given him means to establish the position in other councils.

2. Line taken throughout negotiations and follow up is: US recognized desire Jordan consult with Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt but hopes full dress Arab League consideration can be avoided and that HKJ will take a positive stand as most interested party and not

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/9–255. Secret. Received at 11:31 a.m. Repeated to Beirut and Cairo.

[2] Johnston arrived in Beirut on September 2.

[3] Telegram 96 to Amman, August 31, instructed Geren to emphasize to Mufti that Johnston's negotiations were economic rather than political and to indicate that while the United States recognized Jordan's desire to consult with other Arab states and saw no objection to informal discussion among the states concerned, it would be desirable to avoid discussion of the Jordan River at a formal political meeting of the Arab League. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/8–3055)

merely submit passively to what others may propose. Prime Minister desires confine consideration to four interested states, wishes employ first occasion for such consultation, supposes, Cairo is place and September 6 probable beginning date. He considers Arab League Political Committee meeting provides the opportunity for but need not be the vehicle of consultation which could proceed informally. Prime Minister is personally courageous but Jordan is usually timid when consulting with other Arab States.

Geren

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256. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, September 2, 1955.

In my telephone conversation with Ambassador Cabot Lodge this morning he noted the recommendation of General Burns and Ambassador Byroade for a meeting of the Security Council on the Israel-Egypt hostilities in the Gaza area. [2] Ambassador Lodge was against this Security Council meeting unless we were thoroughly and completely prepared with a full course of action determined in advance.

I stated that I would call a meeting during the day and would advise him of the Department's attitude toward the calling of such a meeting of the Security Council.

Subsequently, I asked Mr. Wainhouse if he would discuss the matter with Mr. Allen and let me know their recommendations of a course of action for a Security Council meeting.

H.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/9–255. Secret. According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, he departed for Duck Island on the afternoon of Thursday, September 1. He returned to Washington on Friday, September 16. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[2] Cole reported in telegram 70 from Jerusalem, September 2, that Burns had recommended to Hammarskjöld that the Security Council meet and call for an immediate cease-fire and other steps to prevent hostilities. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–255) Byroade's recommendation for a meeting of the Security Council was sent in telegram 357 from Cairo, September 1. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/9–155)

257. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State [1]

Beirut, September 2, 1955—6 p.m.

243. From Johnston. My conversations Cairo past two days fruitful and generally encouraging. [2] I place primary emphasis on following points:

(1) HKJ seriously interested project and attempting overcome obstacles in way acceptance;
(2) HKJ primary beneficiary project;
(3) Egyptian assumption Arab leadership carries responsibility assure that major interest one Arab state not sacrificed as result attitudes taken by states with relatively minor interests. This argumentation well received all levels.

Foreign Minister Fawzi appeared primarily disturbed by political implications proposed Israel use of portion its share Jordan River in coastal plain and Negev, particularly in view current difficulties Gaza. I reiterated that right any nation dispose of its share water, once allocation agreed, was basic premise negotiations from their inception and could not be changed.

Nasser was very forthcoming. He recalled active role Egypt had played in negotiations, his decision withdraw from this role on grounds states most concerned should choose course of action and his recent decision resume active part at request US. He recognized importance project to HKJ and said would urge its acceptance if analysis proposal indicated it fair to Jordan.

Heath

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/9–255. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:59 a.m., September 3. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, London, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jidda, and Paris.

[2] For summary minutes of Johnston's discussions with Egyptian officials, see *ibid.*, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, The Fourth Mission—No. 21 (Negotiating File).

258. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, September 3, 1955.

On Friday afternoon, September 2, reports from Gaza indicated that the fighting had quieted down and that no crisis was impending.

Later that afternoon I asked Mr. Allen, Mr. Wainhouse, and their staffs, to review the situation with me and to consider appropriate courses of action in the event that hostilities should be resumed. During the meeting Mr. Wainhouse brought in a long telegram which had been received from our Delegation in New York (unmis 207, September 2, copy attached [2]). Briefly, General Burns stated it was imperative in his opinion that a meeting of the Security Council should be called, as he felt any further moves on his part would prove fruitless in preventing renewed hostilities. He specifically proposed that such a meeting would call for a cease-fire, with certain specific additional proposals to physically separate the antagonistic elements.

In view of the lull in hostilities Friday afternoon, and after discussion with Ambassador Lodge in Massachusetts, we recommended that the Security Council not be called at that time.

This morning, however, the ticker carried reports of renewed hostilities in the Gaza area and a heavy artillery duel lasting for approximately 70 minutes. After consultation with Mr. Murphy, Mr. Allen, Mr. Wainhouse, and their staffs, and after several conversations with Ambassador Lodge on the telephone, we decided that there appeared no alternative except to ask for a meeting of the Security Council.

Ambassador Lodge found great objection from both the British and the French to having the SYG call for a meeting on his own initiative "for constitutional reasons". In view of (a) the resumption of hostilities, and (b) British and French objections, it is planned that the British, French, and ourselves will request a Council meeting for Wednesday, September 7. The British and French are wiring their Foreign Offices for instructions and confirmation, and believe they will have no difficulty in obtaining authorization by Monday, September 5.

In discussing details of the title of the agenda item, Ambassador Lodge and Mr. Wainhouse are taking great care to restrict the wording so that it will not be necessary to determine the guilt of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–355. Confidential.
[2] Not found attached.

either party in the starting of these hostilities, and therefore avoid as much acrimonious debate as possible in the meeting, and furthermore to prevent any remote possibility of discussion ranging to such subjects as your Near East speech. The title of the agenda item will relate to a cease-fire and future acts, rather than to past.

H.

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259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, September 3, 1955—3:49 p.m.

441. You are authorized in manner which you consider most effective to get in touch immediately with Prime Minister, and urge him to comply with Burns' arrangements for cease fire in Gaza area. Unless Israel and Egypt take immediate action to bring about cease fire, meeting of Security Council would appear unavoidable. FYI Security Council almost certain to meet for purpose of taking action on Burns' latest report, [2] particularly in view latest press reports of renewed hostilities in Northern Gaza. End FYI. [3]

Hoover

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–355. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wilkins and approved by Allen. Also sent niact to Tel Aviv and repeated to Jerusalem and USUN.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 256.

[3] Byroade reported in telegram 391 from Cairo, September 4, that Hussein had called to say Nasser had accepted the view that the reply to Burns' cease-fire call should be "simple and devoid [of] any accusations or recriminations." (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–455) He reported in telegram 393 of the same date that Mohamed Heikel had called to tell him that all Egyptian commandos had left Israel. (*Ibid.*)

260. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Tel Aviv, September 4, 1955—1 p.m.

70. For Ambassador Byroade. Gideon Rafael requests that Jackson be informed that Rafael is flying to Cyprus tomorrow (Monday), arriving there about 2:30 p.m. He suggests Jackson could meet him there.

For your information: Embassy believes GOI increasing anxiety contact Jackson arises from continued Egyptian troop movements northward. Rafael informed Embassy counselor GOE troops moving up to El Arish and Elaiya. (Foreign liaison, confidentially, confirms foregoing to USARMA and adds that a third Egyptian column with armor is also moving northward, destination unknown. Each of these groups reputed brigade strength.) GOI also concerned implication report GOE had ordered evacuation from Gaza all army dependents.

Rafael said that GOI accepting Burns cease-fire proposal subject Egyptians doing same; opined Burns had about reached end his rope; suggested someone should intervene with Egyptians to "save them from falling before it is too late." In reply to question whether this his personal or official opinion, Rafael replied it was personal.

Embassy would appreciate your analysis foregoing information. [2]

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–455. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:20 a.m. The source text is the copy sent to the Department of State as telegram 220. Passed to the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

[2] Byroade replied that the latest information from Cairo regarding Egyptian troop movements had been transmitted via military messages to Washington and to the U.S. Army Attaché at Tel Aviv. Byroade also informed the Embassy in Tel Aviv that Jackson had departed Cairo on the morning of September 4 for Cyprus and Tel Aviv. (Telegram 49 to Tel Aviv, September 5, repeated to the Department as telegram 400; *ibid.*, 674.84A/9–555)

261. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, September 5, 1955—noon.

225. 1. Available evidence points to conclusion basis decision yesterday's Cabinet meeting was in support policy restraint in dealing with Egyptian-Israel situation.

2. Foreign Ministry official said Sharett's personal message (Embtel 223 [2]) was designed to make clear that official reply to Burns was not designed to permit GOI to abrogate cease-fire in response to minor infractions by Egypt. Prime Minister desires to emphasize unusual restraint which GOI would exercise to make cease-fire arrangement effective.

3. Colonel Harkabi, Chief IDF Intelligence, called Military Attachés together 5 p.m. yesterday and made following points.

(a) IDF Intelligence knows that Egyptians have transferred two divisions from Delta area to east of the Canal. One of these is moving to reinforce other Egyptian forces in north Sinai area.

(b) This fact, coupled with Nasser's instability, his precarious position, and his known habit of "pushing on" has made it necessary for Israel to undertake as limited and selective mobilization. Steps have also been taken to expedite further mobilization, if necessary, but the national economy must be considered.

(c) Israel hopes General Burns efforts to procure truce will be successful. She stands ready (and has so replied to him) to observe strictly such a truce, provided other side observes truce completely, including no feda'in (marauder) activities.

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–555. Confidential; Priority. Received at 11:30 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, Paris, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Baghdad.

[2] Dated September 4, it reported that Israel had accepted Burns' cease-fire proposal but had reserved the right of self-defense, and it transmitted a personal message from Sharett assuring that the Israeli forces had "strict orders" to observe the cease-fire and that "no action whatsoever will be taken by Israel Defense Force which may exacerbate situation." (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/9–455)

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262. Editorial Note

On September 5, the United Nations Security Council received a report from Major-General E.L.M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. In this document, Burns detailed the events that had occurred in the Gaza Strip since August 22, and stressed that the repetition of such incidents could be avoided only if Egyptian and Israeli forces were separated by an effective physical barrier along the demarcation line. (U.N. doc. S/3430)

On September 7, the Permanent Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States addressed a letter, together with the text of a joint draft resolution, to the President of the Security Council requesting that the Security Council convene as soon as possible to consider a cessation of hostilities and measures to prevent further incidents in the Gaza area. (U.N. doc. S/3432)

As a result of this tripartite request, the Security Council held its 700th meeting the following day, September 8. Ambassador Lodge and most of the other members of the Security Council stressed the advisability of refraining from introducing into the debate the question of responsibility for the recent incidents and emphasized the necessity of enforcing the suggestions of the Chief of Staff. After the representatives of Egypt and Israel expressed the positions of their governments, the Security Council unanimously adopted the draft resolution. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 700)

This resolution noted that both Egypt and Israel had accepted the appeal of the Chief of Staff for an unconditional cease-fire; called upon both parties to take all necessary steps to establish order and tranquillity in the Gaza area and, in particular, to desist from acts of violence and to continue the cease-fire in full force and effect; endorsed General Burns' view that the Egyptian and Israeli Armed Forces should be clearly and effectively separated; held that United Nations observers should have freedom of movement in the area to fulfill their functions; and called upon both parties to appoint representatives to meet with the Chief of Staff and to cooperate with him fully to achieve these ends. (U.N. doc. S/3432)

263. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State [1]

Beirut, September 5, 1955—7 p.m.

254. From Johnston. Have had friendly reception here by Chamoun, Sami Solh, and Frangie but have thus far been unable bring them to grips with details my proposals or to elicit specific reactions.

In exploratory discussion between my staff and Abd El Al, latter stated Lebanese acceptance of program would be difficult obtain in view action Parliament unless offer made to assist in development Hasbani. This is confirmed by analysis Embassy here and comments previously made by Arab leaders area. [2]

However, Abd El Al freely admits aid other than for project planning may not be desired for about five years. We attempting formulate proposal embodying Lebanese agreement to accept final decision of engineering board as to technical and economic feasibility after detailed survey completed. Proposal will incorporate limitations on scope and US responsibility.

All available information indicates that it probably impossible secure presence Syrian Foreign Minister [3] prior September 15 a.m. meeting Foreign Ministers states concerned. Mohammed Salim scheduled be absent Istanbul September 11–16, and Fawzi now understood trying postpone departure for UNGA until September 19. While continuing attempt speed up schedule, following may be best possible under circumstances:

September 6 Trozel and Criddle initiate technical discussions at Damascus [4] with Masloum and Jazzar, while Barnes, Ludlow and I continue talks here with Frangie, Fouad Ammoun and Abd El Al.

September 7 conclusion bilateral discussions here. Trozel and Criddle return.

September 6–10 technical committee discussions Beirut.

September 11–14 unscheduled.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/9–555. Confidential; Priority. Received at 4:43 p.m., September 6. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, London, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jidda, and Paris.

[2] In a unanimous vote on July 26, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies opposed Lebanon's continued participation in the Jordan River negotiations and proposed instead the development of the water and power resources of the Hasbani River, a tributary of the Jordan. (Telegrams 90 and 99 from Beirut, July 26 and July 27; *ibid.*, 684A.85322/7–2655 and 684A.85322/7–2755)

[3] Khalid al-Azm.

[4] Troxel and Criddle informed Johnston on September 7 of their impression that the Government of Syria was "firmly committed" to maintaining a united stand with other Arab States and that in effect, "this probably means support for whatever position Jordan takes on quantities." (Telegram 212 from Damascus; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/9–755)

September 15–18 dates available for Foreign Ministers meeting Cairo.

Would appreciate comments Embassy Tel Aviv as to problems upcoming high religious holidays. Believe Tel Aviv should indicate to GOI possible postponement arrival Israel.

Heath

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264. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 6, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Preliminary Israel Reaction to Secretary's Policy Statement of August 26, 1955

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Israel Embassy
NEA—Mr. Allen
NE—Mr. Bergus

Mr. Eban stated that recent events had been so turbulent (he was referring to the Gaza border situation), that it had been hard for the Israelis to concentrate their minds on the Secretary's policy statement of August 26. The Ambassador wished to make some preliminary observations, however, which would be followed up by a conversation between the Israel Prime Minister and Mr. Lawson in Israel. The Israel Government might also address a written memorandum to the U.S. Government in which concrete questions as to certain details of the Secretary's speech would be raised.

Mr. Eban said that the speech had impressed Israel as a serious act of public statesmanship. Israel was aware of the impressive reverberations of the speech throughout the world. Mr. Eban saw in the speech that the positions of Israel and the U.S. were drawing closer together. Both countries envisaged an Israel living at peace with her neighbors. The concept of perpetual hostility and boycott had been repudiated. The most important single theme of the speech

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–755. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus on September 7. In telegram 179 to Tel Aviv, September 6, Bergus and Allen summarized this conversation and indicated that it had occurred on the morning of September 6. (*Ibid.*, 684.86/9–655)

had been the effect of a U.S. treaty arrangement. The role of such an arrangement in creating conditions of peace and stability had been impressively described.

It had been dispiriting for the Israelis to pass to the paragraph dealing with the frontiers. It was unfortunate that a U.S. security guarantee had apparently been linked to changes in the frontiers. This contingency was so remote as not to come within the bounds of feasibility. The statement might therefore contain a "built-in deadlock."

Mr. Dulles statement did not place full value on Israel's present frontiers. Although these frontiers were based on military history, they had endured for seven years. Israel regarded them with an impulse of cherished possession, the Arabs had come to accept them, albeit grudgingly. These frontiers were real, while "agreed frontiers" were intangible. The armistice agreements provided that the demarcation lines could be changed by mutual agreement. In seven years, neither party had invoked these provisions. This amounted to Arab recognition of the frontiers. The United States had entered into treaty arrangements with Germany and the Republic of Korea which in effect guaranteed frontiers no more fixed in their nature than Israel's.

Israel wondered if the U.S. had any specific thoughts about possible frontier adjustments. The problem of land communication among the Arab states was unimportant. Israel would not give up the Negev in whole or in part. In any event the normal communications between Egypt and the other Arab states had always been across the north of Israel. Israel was willing to consider transit arrangements, so the solution of the Arab communication problem lay in an adjustment of the Arab attitude toward Israel, rather than in adjustments of the frontiers. Did the U.S. feel that there was a "physical case" for frontier adjustments? Israel felt that border tension arose not from the shape of the frontiers but from Arab relations with Israel. There was no inherent tension in the situation.

Israel suggested that this problem be separated from the question of a security treaty. Israel was willing to discuss frontier adjustments with Arabs but felt that it should not be made an obstacle to a security guarantee. In such discussions, Israel would have claims of her own to put forward.

Israel had been impressed by the offer of a U.S. loan to finance compensation to the Arab refugees. In due course the Israelis would be placing a specific plan in the hands of the U.S. Government. Israel emphasized the need that compensation paid should be used for the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab states. Mr. Eban assumed that the problems of the Arab blockade and boycott had

been included in the Secretary's reference to "other questions, largely economic."

Mr. Allen said that he welcomed the Israel Government's analysis which showed sympathetic study and consideration of the Secretary's policy statement. He was not surprised by the restatement of Israel's desire to obtain a U.S. security guarantee as a first priority. This was probably the major difference between the U.S. and Israel: Israel felt the need for an early U.S. guarantee to prove to the Arabs that Israel was here to stay. The U.S. felt that it would be preferable to work toward our mutual objectives of peace and stability by obtaining Arab agreement rather than cramming a solution down their throats. He emphasized that the Secretary had mentioned "agreed frontiers"; Israel should not assume that all adjustments would have to be at her expense.

The Ambassador welcomed this observation, but asked if the U.S. Government had excluded the possibility of a security guarantee with Israel based on Israel's present frontiers. Mr. Allen replied that the Secretary was acting on the expectation that progress could be achieved along the lines he had proposed and was concentrating on the success rather than the failure of the policy which he had outlined. Mr. Allen pointed out that the Secretary did not intend to "sit on his hands" in this matter. The speech had not been an end in itself.

Mr. Allen asked if the Ambassador had any comment on the subject of repatriation. Mr. Eban replied that Israel liked the Secretary's emphasis on resettlement. Mr. Eban felt that the U.S. and Israel might disagree on what might be "the maximum extent feasible" for repatriation.

In a personal and informal exchange of views which followed, Mr. Eban hinted that Israel might be willing to accept Gaza along with its 70,000 indigenous inhabitants. He did not feel that Israel would accept the 200,000 refugees presently encamped there. Mr. Allen said he hoped the day might come when Arabs could live in Israel as fully accepted citizens and Jews could live in the Arab states in like status. Mr. Eban concurred but emphasized that Israel could not cast off its roots in Jewish tradition and Hebrew civilization. He thought, however, that the concept of the secular state would triumph both in Israel and the Arab states.

265. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State [1]

Baghdad, September 7, 1955—noon.

223. I called on Nuri at his home this morning. Nuri is leaving for Istanbul tomorrow where his family has been vacationing. He will see his two teen age grandsons off to public school in England and then return to Baghdad with his wife and other members of his family on September 21.

I told Nuri that I wanted to have another talk with him on the Secretary's statement before he got away. I said that I was particularly interested in learning whether the Cabinet had reached any decision.

Nuri said that the Cabinet had decided that if the GOE and Jordan, the two governments most immediately concerned, came out with a favorable reaction to statement, or if Egypt did so alone then the Government of Iraq would do likewise. He then reported what he had said to me previously that he was especially interested in the stand the GOE would eventually adopt. Egypt to him was the key nation.

Of all the problems involved, Nuri continued, that of the refugees was the most important. Frontiers came next. A conciliatory gesture by Israel in the field of refugees would in his view contribute more than anything else to preparing the way for coming to grips with the general problem of Arab-Israeli relations. Agreement in principle on Israel's part to receive refugees would constitute such a gesture. No one knows how many of the refugees want to return to Israel. There may be only a few. If in response to such a gesture by Israel, it developed that a great many wanted to return, then both parties would have to come into the picture. To get at the problem though called for some gesture first from Israel.

Would there be an opportunity before long for the Arab states to meet and exchange views on the Secretary's statement I asked Nuri.

Nuri said that there was talk of another meeting of the Political Committee of the AL on or about September 20. That meeting he continued if it materialized would be on the Foreign Ministry level and Bashayan would of course, attend. Whether he were back from Istanbul by that time or not would make no difference. "Bashayan" he added, "knows my views. He knows I would want him to

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–755. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 10:33 a.m. Repeated to London.

encourage full exploration of Mr. Dulles' statement and of ways of moving on with it".

As I was leaving, Nuri said that he was urging upon all his friends not to reject the Secretary's statement out of haste but to study and weigh it carefully.

I told Nuri I was glad to hear that.

Gallman

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266. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, September 7, 1955—6 p.m.

236. Herzog, Chief American Division Foreign Ministry, called at Embassy today to discuss press report from Paris that Security Council was to be convened to consider Gaza situation. He repeated GOI views this subject as transmitted Embtel 230. [2] In reply to inquiry as to what alternatives GOI had in mind as a means of getting off dead center problem adequate border controls, Herzog said that Foreign Ministry had concluded GOE's previous adamant attitude in Gaza talks arose (a) from Nasser's misplaced confidence in Gohar and (b) more importantly, from reluctance of GOE to appear before Arab world as cooperating with Israel. He said Foreign Ministry had arrived at conclusion that it had been a mistake to hold these talks in full public view and to publicize them. GOI therefore had arrived at conclusion that best procedure in future was to conduct secret negotiations probably through Burns with intermediary to shuffle back and forth between Cairo and Jerusalem.

Embassy comment: From comments Lourie and Herzog it appears that GOI is at long last learning lesson that road to progress in ironing out difficulties with Arab States does not lie in conduct of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–755. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:33 a.m., September 8. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, Paris, USUN, and Jerusalem.

[2] The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported on September 6 in telegram 230 that a senior Israeli Foreign Ministry official had informed the Embassy Counselor that day that Israel "believed SC consideration Gaza situation at this time was most inadvisable", on the grounds that 1) a debate there would engender increased bitterness on both the Arab and Israeli sides, and 2) would especially influence Arab public opinion adversely, thus jeopardizing further the attainment of the Johnston mission objectives. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/9–655)

propaganda battles. Secondly, although unmentioned by either Lourie or Herzog, it is believed GOI has concluded that its condemnation by SC for Khan Yunis is too high a price to pay for parallel SC condemnation Egypt for mine laying and homicide squad activities.

Of possible interest is opinion of Elmore Jackson, who has had much recent and intimate contact with very high level Egyptians and Israelis. He informed me today he is convinced that sense of restraint and desire to eliminate Gaza border troubles very much more evident both sides. He is likewise convinced neither side desires SC meeting.

He claims: Nasser, although unwilling re-engage in Gaza talks at this time will in lieu Gaza talks work through General Burns on all armistice matters, thus possibly meeting GOI procedure mentioned above as alternative to SC meeting; Nasser gave him definite assurance he would agree to erection of barriers "at certain points on line" thus retreating from previous position, expressed hope some physical separation military forces two countries could be used to remove major source of incidents on border; and in other ways indicated real interest in eliminating tension.

He equally if not more impressed with present genuine desire Sharett and Ben Gurion for border quiet. He cited fact that Khan Yunis raid, originally scheduled for night August 29 called off on receipt news Nasser's conciliatory attitude as reported that evening by Jackson. Orders were countermanded although some Israel units had crossed over border. Spectacular murderous action by Egyptian saboteurs deep in Israel brought Israel raid on Khan Yunis later in week. [3]

In view new evidence Egypt–Israel attitudes Jackson feels SC meeting with attendant publicity might well eliminate possibilities effective quiet approach to problems.

Lawson

[3] See footnote 3, Document 251.

267. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, September 10, 1955—3 p.m.

246. At Prime Minister's request I called on him at his house in Jerusalem afternoon September 8. Purpose of meeting was to permit him comment on and ask questions on Secretary's statement. [2]

He prefaced his comment with remark that he at this time offering no official document in reply to Secretary's statement. He was merely making an oral examination of some of points. He would undoubtedly have other comment and questions to ask in future and therefore reserving right to make further comments. He emphasized fact that this not final government position. It was what he termed a "series of marginal notes". It was an effort to sit down and talk informally about various points concerned and to give expression to some reactions in specific field covered. It was neither thorough-going review nor a discussion of complete statement.

First he commented on high standard and character of Secretary's statement saying it was eminently constructive in spirit and he pleased statement had been made. He especially impressed with basic objective involved which he interpreted to be an "emphatic effort to obtain in Middle East a state of *peace and co-existence* between Arabs and Israel." He thought it extremely important that Israel and Arabs live peacefully together and that Secretary's statement was effort to bring about that condition.

He was favorably impressed with fact statement placed major emphasis on development and constructive tasks. He interpreted warning against arms race as important and encouraging. This would prevent diversion of effort from constructive tasks to destructive action. He reached conclusion from statement that United States does not propose to carry out any one sided arming in area. He then put this in form of question whether this meant "an end to one sided arming" policy of United States and asked if I could get specific reply to this question. He was conscious of fact that there might be no reply to this question or that three replies to his question were possible namely (a) that US already committed to its arms arrangement with Iraq and would necessarily have to continue under that policy (b) US would cease sending arms to Iraq and (c) US would not extend arms aid policy to other Arab States.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1055. Confidential; Priority. Received at 2:52 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, London, Paris, and Baghdad.

[2] Reference is to Secretary Dulles' statement of August 26; see Document 214.

With above preliminary background he then decided to discuss some salient points in statement which he termed both constructive points and those on which he had not sufficient information to permit complete consideration which however raised some serious questions and apprehensions.

Refugees: Under this subject he concluded that statement supported very constructive principle that solution to refugee problem is to be found in *resettlement* rather than *repatriation*. He made it clear he was not attempting to pin down Secretary to specific statement to that effect but it was clearly a reasonable deduction. Secondly he was impressed with constructive statement of willingness of US and UK to participate in loan to be used for settlement of refugee problem.

He warned of dangers of over simplifying resettlement problem. Solution was not primarily supplying of agricultural land—at least one-third of refugees had been urban dwellers and even remaining two-thirds had not all been engaged in agriculture. Furthermore it might be thought agriculture land provided would have to be irrigated—there were many areas in Arab countries where resettlement could take place and yet irrigation would not be absolutely necessary.

Re compensation by Israel to refugees: He referred to paragraph I of statement which implies that such compensation would be definitely applied to *resettlement* of refugees. He thought this excellent principle and should be strictly adhered to, and that it should be certain that compensation actually be used for resettlement purposes and not dissipated by refugees.

He then asked specific question: To whom should compensation funds be paid? Would they be paid to individuals whose property in Israel was involved? Would they be paid to a fund?

Economic Problems: He said that references under this subject pertained largely he assumed to Arab economic warfare against Israel. Question arose in his mind as to when compensation to refugees was to be paid. He did not mean seen in terms of date but at what stage in settlement. He talked at some length about Arab boycott and losses and inconveniences which it had caused Israel. He spoke particularly of high additional costs of imported oil which is so essential to Israel's economy. He thought it important that timing of implementation of proposed refugee compensation be in proper relation to cessation of economic warfare.

Jewish Property in Iraq: He asked what provision would be made for payment of compensation to Jews who left property in Iraq especially property which belongs to Iraqian Jews who now citizens of Israel saying it was definite responsibility of GOI to protect their property. Therefore compensation for such property must be balanced against compensation payments Israel makes to Arab refugees.

He then asked specific question "what is attitude of USG to this principle?"

Boundaries and Security: He referred to paragraph II and said "if this security proposal were read alone I would have only greatest praise for it. But is bound up with settlement of main problems described". He said he would not go any further in commenting on this point at this time but wished to underscore Ambassador Eban's critical statement in that regard to Assistant Secretary Allen (September 6) wherein he made reference to unsatisfactory linking of security guarantee with settlement of frontiers problem. [3] On face of it (he repeated "on face of it") this contingency would seem to relegate settlement of Arab-Israel problem to dim future.

He said boundaries section of statement is full of obscurities, urged clarification be made to Israel. He asked: What is United States idea of armistice lines? Does US contemplate peace treaty involving permanent settlement of armistice lines? Or does US contemplate simple revision of armistice lines? If the latter then in his opinion settlement of armistice lines must be made under armistice agreement and must utilize machinery set up under that agreement for such purposes. Even then he remarked they would still remain armistice lines and not permanent international frontiers.

At this point he referred to phrase "convert armistice lines of danger into boundary lines of safety." He said what does this mean? Does it mean they are not easily defensible and that purpose now is to establish more defensible lines? Or are new armistice lines designed to satisfy certain claims. He pointed out that Jordan–Israel line was relatively difficult one to defend. On other hand straight Gaza line was much more defensible line. Yet in first instance there was little difficulty between two countries on that line whereas in second instance there had been continuous incidents and troubles. Therefore in his opinion question does not rest on defensible character of line.

Territorial Changes: He then asked question "what territorial changes does US have in mind?" He referred to phrase "even territory which is barren has acquired sentimental significance." He thought this obviously referred to Negev but wished to point [out] that Negev was not only "barren land" in this part of world. In fact much of Arab lands are barren but no one would suggest that Arabs abandon those lands or concede them to someone else. "Barrenness" does not justify giving up territory.

He then referred to Elath saying "certainly Elath is not area of sentimental value only. It has practical values. Its value as port is especially underscored at this time and Israel will never give up

[3] See Document 264.

Elath. There may be barrenness connecting Elath with other parts of Israel but they can certainly not be considered of 'sentimental' view of Elath's very great practical value to Israel".

He then referred to historical fact that Arab countries did not enjoy free connection across southern Negev "before war". First it was Ottoman empire and then mandate territory. Therefore possession of Negev by Israel does not remove right formerly enjoyed by Arabs. In fact if Arab principle of presently demanding connections between Arab States on grounds such connections were destroyed by Israel is valid such principle might be more emphatically applied where Israel stands between Egypt and Lebanon.

Jerusalem Problem: He said I have only one question to ask under this heading "does US contemplate any initiative along this line at forthcoming UN Assembly?"

Speaking generally he said Israel has always stood ready for mutual adjustments of boundaries but has never been ready to consider cession of territory. We shall be ready to discuss first but shall be adamant about second. He then repeated rather forcefully "there is no question of concession of land by Israel." He followed statement by question "what category of above adjustments to boundary is involved in US thinking?" He then asked question "what procedures with regard to revision of armistice lines are contemplated?" Does US envisage Arabs agreeing either to revision of armistice lines under armistice or revision through negotiation of peace treaty? If Arabs will not agree to either procedure will question of defense pact between US and Israel be put off indefinitely?

He said that generally boundaries question had aroused considerable apprehension in government. This apprehension was evident when Cabinet first hurriedly considered Secretary's statement and later in subsequent discussions this same concern had been very evident. He remarked whatever US can do to allay this apprehension—either by public statement or by confidential message—would be helpful.

He then added what he termed "two footnotes": He commented that figure 900,000 refugees was inaccurate and greatly inflated.

He picked up phrase in statement "in territory now occupied by Israel." He thought it unfortunate phrase had appeared because it was not in conformity with general sense of statement which was that "Israel is here to stay." By using phrase referred to Arabs might gain false hopes that US was not firmly of conviction Israel here to stay and at same time this phrase has raised certain resentment among Jews. He went on to enumerate certain actions and evidences which confirmed by implication that Israel was recognized as occupying and representing present territory. He said that as sovereign state, Israel had signed armistice agreement, had made treaties, had

diplomatic relations with other countries, was member of UN and represented in sovereign way area now enclosed within its present boundaries. Therefore he thought that in place of this phrase there should have been simple reference to State of Israel. He thought that Secretary's statement would lose great deal of its practical value through use of this unfortunate phrase.

Comment: Sharrett obviously neither desired nor expected any attempt on my part to reply to his questions and comment. In view this and fact I had at time not received report on Eban–Allen talk I restricted my remarks to such generalizations as need for careful study, importance of keeping open mind and underscoring great opportunity statement presents to Israel. I indicated that replies to all of questions raised might require some discussion and might be delayed but we welcomed GOI close study and analysis of statement. I made no substantive comment on questions raised. When I questioned Sharrett as to channel through which he anticipated working he implied he was at this stage using Eban but said he wished to discuss his reactions with me personally and two approaches would have to be "dovetailed." He remarked that report on these conversations would be sent to Eban who would perhaps get in touch with Department in week or so inquiring as to replies to questions raised.

Have informed British colleague of substance this message.

Lawson

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268. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 11, 1955—6 p.m.

442. Reference Deptel 401 and 402, [2] have following thoughts regarding future moves Alpha.

(1) Arab States either individually or collectively should be discouraged from ever taking public position on Secretary's speech. We should return now to highly secret discussions as soon as possible.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1155. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Received at 10:48 p.m.

[2] Documents 238 and 239.

(2) Arab-Israeli settlement can most probably never be achieved by treating matter in isolation from other matters in Middle East. If subject isolated settlement takes on too much character of final registration of "defeat" for Arabs by Israel. Matter must therefore be included in over-all package deal of some kind. Of primary importance in this regard will be (a) U.S. policy for Middle East as a whole and (b) use of U.S. economic and military aid resources. Department may wish to refer this connection Embtels 440 and 441 [3] which admittedly speculative but probably indicative of sweeping nature of over-all deal that will be required as regards (a) above. Since manipulation U.S. policy and resources such a cardinal factor, believe profitable utilization of "suitable person or commission designated by United Nations or by any government or person agreed upon by both sides" as mentioned Deptel 401 probably should be ruled out for time being.

(3) If Egypt is to take desired lead there must be some overt recognition on part of U.S. of Egypt's position in Middle East. This probably most effectively accomplished through some manipulation our present concept of Middle East defense.

(4) While this philosophy subject to change we would not adopt traditional British approach in this part of world of "little steps for little people" but would rather move forward without delay or quid pro quo in certain fields as form of approach may cause us never to get off the ground to real start. In this connection and without minimizing difficulty for Department would recommend earliest possible action on sale of some military equipment to Egypt. Believe from talks with Jackson, Israel may be aware that increased cooperation and better relations between Egypt and U.S. is prerequisite to real progress on Alpha. The sale of some equipment would not in my opinion reduce our bargaining power but in fact enhance it in view of importance of military here. Even ignoring [garble] importance of moving forward in this field as contained recent cables this Embassy has not diminished in my mind and believe we should proceed if at all possible without hesitation.

(5) Following same philosophy it seems to me Department may wish reconsider that invitation to Nasser visit U.S. on basis recommended by this Embassy should be held up as quid pro quo for proper attitude on Alpha. [4] Position of U.S. and this Embassy has improved considerably in past two or three months and particularly in view of our recent help during Gaza troubles. My own feeling is now is time to push forward wherever we can set best possible stage

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[3] Neither printed.

[4] Byroade reported on September 1 that Fawzi had raised the question of Nasser's visiting the United States. See Document 250.

for Alpha—which is project of much importance probably cannot be attained without some risk and without criticism in some quarters.

(6) Feel Nasser will have difficulty with Trieste approach at least in early stages and that matter better be handled with him direct with such assist as we can get from Fawzi. In this connection there seems to be an inclination on part Trevelyan (although he does not insist) as with Stevenson to want to work towards actual joint and simultaneous conversations with Nasser. Have told Trevelyan my opinion mechanics of this most difficult and do not see how it could be done without causing great speculation as to subject matter such joint démarches. Feel it far better as matter of principle we work towards same ends separately. Have feeling British Foreign Office may not like this but hope Department will agree that we should avoid such approaches here on local level as long as possible after which time Department might wish to take up matter with Foreign Office. Am thinking somewhat of our experience on Iranian problem when that problem in early stages. If we ever get to actual drafting stage perhaps such an arrangement might work.

Byroade

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269. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 12, 1955—3 p.m.

448. For Allen. Have not reported to any extent on activities of Elmore Jackson as Tel Aviv's cables gave good picture of his efforts. Nevertheless, wish Department to know feel he has made considerable contribution, and as such is an exception to my general thinking that individuals privately operating in such capacity usually do more harm than good. Am certain he was helpful in keeping things from getting out of hand on crisis on border week before last. Also feel from long range point of view he may have been able re-establish some small degree of mutual confidence between Nasser and Sharrett which unfortunately has apparently been completely lacking.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–1255. Secret. Received at 2:53 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv.

270. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, September 13, 1955—11:13 a.m.

194. Embtels 157,[2] 165,[3] 191.[4] After consultation with British here, agreement has been reached instructions contained Deptel 87[5] should stand with exception slight variation of para a) re timing explanation our position to PriMin. Following consultation with your British colleague you are authorized explain our position to IG at time and in manner you deem most suitable. Dept's views on questions raised by Italy and Argentine: Chief of Mission could at his discretion attend social functions given by FonMin in Jerusalem provided practice minimized and functions do not carry connotation of acceptance Jerusalem as capital. Chief of Mission may discuss important matters with PriMin in Jerusalem but not with FonMin. Device of discussion with latter outside FonOff would undermine present agreed position.

Hoover

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.0084A/9–1355. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Jernegan, who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Jerusalem, London, and Paris.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 601.0084A/8–2555)

[3] Document 224.

[4] Document 241.

[5] Document 186.

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271. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State [1]

Beirut, September 13, 1955—5 p.m.

285. From Johnston. Technical committee began discussions here by taking stand which represented least common denominator Arab views on all issues. After prolonged and difficult joint session with

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/9–1355. Confidential. Received at 4 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Damascus, London, Baghdad, and Paris.

committee, however, believe we were successful in persuading it moderate its views. [2]

While precise nature of committee's recommendations is unknown, I have reason believe it plans suggest to Foreign Ministers that last attempt be made to obtain (1) Yarmuk Dam foundation capable of supporting future increase in dam height, (2) larger overall allocation water, and (3) elimination provision permitting Israel supply 30 MCM of water to HKJ at above Lake Tiberias salinity. However, committee not believed to be recommending insistence on any issue to point of rejection with possible exception of 30 MCM brackish water. If this correct, decision on program as whole will be squarely up to Foreign Ministers.

Most serious current problem continues to be secure meeting Foreign Ministers in face lack of Syrian Government and resignation Lebanese Foreign Minister. [3] Although Fawzi almost certain to depart for New York prior any date meeting can be held, I am continuing press for meeting with other Ministers and Fawzi's Deputy [4] at earliest feasible date. According to best available information, there is some possibility political difficulties Syria and Lebanon will be resolved to permit meeting on September 17 or 18, but if difficulties not resolved within next few days additional delay of week or more will likely result. If unable set up meeting by September 20 at latest, therefore, I plan make brief trip London to dispose of urgent business and return Cairo September 23 or 24. Despite difficulties convoking meeting am convinced we must maintain pressure for consideration and decision program through continued presence in area. [5]

Emmerson

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[2] Summary minutes of Johnston's discussions at Beirut on September 8 and 9 with the members of the Arab Technical Committee are *ibid.*, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, The Fourth Mission—No. 21 (Negotiating File).

[3] Frangie resigned from the government on September 7.

[4] Ahmad Kheirat Said.

[5] Acting Secretary Hoover on September 15 supported Johnston's decision to continue with his mission. (Telegram 512 to Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/9–1555)

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, September 14, 1955—1 p.m.

240. From Johnston. [2] In hour's conversation with President Quwwatli today I had opportunity explain Jordan Valley Program and seek his estimate of when Foreign Ministers' meeting might be held. He showed sympathetic interest and indicated new government [3] would consider as early order of business. He mentioned need Syria act in concert Arab States in view international character program. In course discussion of Lebanese situation [4] and developments information new government here, he concurred that meeting Foreign Ministers at Cairo might be possible about September 24.

Moose

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1480/9–1455. Confidential. Received at 8:48 a.m. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Tel Aviv, London, Baghdad, and Paris.

[2] Johnston arrived in Damascus on September 13.

[3] Said al-Ghazzi formed a new government on September 13.

[4] On September 13, Lebanese Prime Minister Sami Solh resigned after four members of his Cabinet submitted resignations in the course of a parliamentary attack on the Prime Minister. President Chamoun asked Rashid Karame, Minister of Economy in the outgoing government, to form a new Cabinet.

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273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, September 14, 1955—1:11 p.m.

195. Embtel 246. [2] You may convey fol to Sharett. You should make it clear to him that this is general comment and that omission of reply to any his specific points or questions does not imply any US position re them.

USG does not have any plan for Arab-Israel settlement which it intends attempt impose on parties. In his statement Secretary wished

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1055. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Bergus and Russell; cleared with Jernegan; and approved by Russell, who signed for Hoover. Repeated priority to London and repeated to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, and Paris.

[2] Document 267.

indicate desirability working toward settlement principal issues and to set forth what this country is prepared contribute to facilitate such settlement. The expressed willingness of Arab Govts to study Secretary's statement encourages us believe they will in near future discuss with us some of problems arising in connection with a settlement. USG hopes leaders of both Israel and Arab states will continue give this matter intensive study to the end that parties will at early date be prepared indicate concessions and contributions each can make toward settlement. If both sides or indeed either side should take position unable make any, it obvious no progress possible. We feel however that reception Secretary's statement creates opportunities for progress. If a period of calm can be maintained in area, we hope obtain views of several of Arab govts as to form and elements of settlement to which they would agree. We also look forward to receiving Israel's thoughts concerning what it prepared to do. We feel it in interest all concerned that such steps take place with minimum publicity. US willing, if both sides desire, assist—with UK presumably in view its relations in area—in initiating exchange of views between parties.

You may inform Sharett we do not intend raise Jerusalem question at forthcoming UNGA.

FYI only: Israel rep here has indicated to Dept officer that Sharett planning come to US at some time during forthcoming UNGA. We assume one of purposes of such trip would be press Dept for further details as to US proposals on settlement. As indicated above, Dept for present desires concentrate only on eliciting from both sides what they prepared do toward settlement. If occasion arises therefore you may indicate appropriately to Sharett that trip to US would not result his obtaining "US blueprint" for settlement but could only provide us with opportunity hear further from him. End FYI

London inform FonOff contents immediately. Dept informed by Brit Embassy here that Israel Ambassador calling on FonOff Sept 14 and FonOff interested know position Dept taking in IG approaches.

Hoover

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 14, 1955—2 p.m.

461. Fawzi and I discussed at length yesterday combined subject of Alpha and Secretary's speech. He said in his opinion speech was being considered in sober fashion in Arab world, even though we might disagree on various points. (While there have been some fairly jarring editorials and cartoons, am inclined to agree with him that press criticism could be labeled "moderate", all things considered.) He agreed that it would be unwise for the Arabs collectively to formally and publicly answer speech. He agreed it was far better that matter be kept under consideration and followed up by secret discussions.

As to substance, he felt it was time to have further discussions provided they could be in utmost informality and that number of persons involved be as small as possible. He made point however that talks should be held in Tel Aviv as well as Cairo. Queried him considerably on this point as we had agreed several months ago best approach was for US and Egypt try to reach general meeting of minds prior to approaching Israelis. He said he thought that had been good start but it probably time now see what Israelis had in mind and we had discussed substance enough to know that there probably no insurmountable obstacle between our views except as regards Negev. Egypt could hardly be expected to bargain away her position without every conceivable effort being made to change Israeli's position, as well as that of Egypt, on Negev.

Fawzi reiterated most adamantly that they would never accept corridor type arrangement and there must become actual transfer of defensible territory to establish continuity of Arab world. Told him again it inconceivable to me that any Israeli Government could come even near to meeting Egyptian position of all of Negev. He admitted he believed this probably true. Therefore real effort should be made to see how much gap could be narrowed between present positions. If gap could not be substantially narrowed then he supposed we would all have to conclude settlement impossible. On other hand if gap could be made small enough, perhaps then it could be cut in half by efforts of outsiders and a solution could be arrived at which neither would readily accept but which they could both acquiesce in.

In answer to query, Fawzi stated he believed matter should be kept in normal diplomatic channels at this stage and as secret as

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1455. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Received at 4:16 p.m. Repeated to London.

possible. Stated British Ambassador[2] had asked his view as to whether US and UK should make joint approaches in Cairo and Tel Aviv. Fawzi said he had told Trevelyan he thought formalities of joint approach highly undesirable at this stage. (Trevelyan later confirmed this to me and stated he thought Fawzi probably correct.)

Believe this conversation calls for alteration past Alpha procedure and Fawzi probably right that next move should be with Israel. He said Egypt could hardly play role we envisaged unless it could be convinced what it would consider as minimum position could be substantially met. Only then could it be expected to take leadership on Arab side and stick out its neck on this problem. Am encouraged somewhat also that this the first hint there could be some concession on Negev, but not in continued one-sided discussions. Under circumstances doubt there much more that we can do here by merely expressing our view as to Israeli attitudes.

If Department decides take matter up with Israel without delay, would think it most unfortunate that cross-triangle solution be suggested to them, as do not conceive this particular solution would ever be accepted here. Would suggest our approach be a general one stressing utmost importance from their own point of view finding solution to Negev problem with statement that we do not believe Arabs will accept a corridor. Perhaps it would be wise to seek Israeli's reactions on Negev in context of general review with them of important elements entire Alpha plan.

Fawzi stated we must remember there no significant body of opinion in Arab world seeking immediate settlement. Almost everyone was of two minds about problem. There was general feeling that time was essentially now on the side of the Arabs and many people believe that there should be delay until such time as the Arabs could negotiate from a better basis of strength. He himself had feeling that if real progress could not be made in next few months, Arab attitude might well harden for such delay. He wished stress he was not talking about eventual use of force but the psychology of wishing to negotiate from position of greater strength.

Department may wish consider passing this message Tel Aviv.

Byroade

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[2] Sir Humphrey Trevelyan.

275. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 14, 1955—7 p.m.

466. Jackson saw Nasser and reports very friendly interview in which Jackson deliberately sought strengthen for possible future use cordial personal relationship rather than concentrate on "selling" 2 items he brought at behest Ben Gurion (1) prisoner exchange and (2) a new "gate" at kilometer 95 near Gaza. However Nasser's reaction both subjects indicated he willing consider them but required a period of quiet on border prior to any decision.

For your information Jackson informed Nasser he felt he had begun in last contact with Ben Gurion to win latter's confidence and consequently had been able impress upon him restraint which Nasser had exercised in latter sieges [*stages?*] Gaza fracas. Conversely Jackson feels some degree confidence in Sharett restored in mind Nasser who seems comprehend Ben Gurion more emotional and likely act on basis latest advice received. End for your information.

Nasser did not ask Jackson to continue shuttle visits but twice in conversation expressed his belief exchanges had been useful and expressed hope his and Jackson's paths would cross again. Jackson concludes (and I concur) he is persona grata here and could again act as intermediary for Nasser if latter felt time and circumstances made desirable.

Jackson departs tomorrow and expects see Rafael at Paris or New York and give him his own account this Nasser conversation. However he authorizes Lawson pass on general tenor to I.G. in his discretion.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–1455. Secret; Limited Distribution. Received at 9:18 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv.

276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, September 15, 1955—6:54 p.m.

515. Embtels 440, 441, 442. [2] Dept agrees with you on interrelationship US area policies and Alpha tactics. Your talks with Fawzi have helped clarify possible steps to relate them in concrete terms. Our policies in support of northern tier have been set forth both publicly and privately to various govts (e.g., Deptel 107 [3]). We cannot change these policies. Pakistan's adherence to Baghdad Pact expected momentarily. We would welcome adherence Iran but believe this unlikely occur near future. While we do not envisage adherence additional Arab states at this time, we could not assist in any program which would isolate Iraq from rest of Arab states. Also we could not give our support to grouping involving states bordering on Israel in absence substantial progress toward Arab-Israel settlement. However, can envisage rear area grouping complementing and supporting, not rivaling, northern tier and not precluding eventual adherence other Arab states to Baghdad Pact. This underscores importance movement on Alpha.

We have been exploring possibilities assisting Nasser finance arms purchases and find severe practical difficulties irrespective policy considerations. Acceptance local currency in magnitude $10 million apparently would require programming current econ assistance funds so as create requirement this amount of pounds. In effect Egypt would lose in econ assistance dollars what it gains in military assistance dollars. We see no prospects for other immediate large-scale requirement for pounds. Extension of credit under Section 106 [4] requires use of service funds and would involve repayment in dollars with interest. We recognize disadvantages delaying answer to Nasser for protracted period. However, positive steps by him such as start in exploring Secretary's statement would bolster greatly case for accommodating Egypt on financing.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1155. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell and approved by Jernegan, who signed for Hoover. Repeated to London.

[2] Telegrams 440 and 441, September 11, are not printed. Telegram 442 is Document 268.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 174.

[4] Reference is to Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

Re timing Nasser visit to US, we still inclined believe extending of official invitation should tie in with demonstrable progress on Alpha.

Hoover

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277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, September 15, 1955—6:54 p.m.

516. In discussion with Eban here yesterday and in Deptel 195 to Tel Aviv [2] we have informed IG that Dept has no blueprint for settlement which it will seek impose on parties. We are looking to IG to formulate most favorable position it can on various issues which can then be used as basis for initial exchange of views between parties. You may inform Fawzi we have done this.

As you know from Alpha papers forwarded you, problems involved more numerous and complex than it was possible to present in Secretary's speech, an effort to highlight principal issues. At London next week Russell will suggest to FonOff that we draw up list of questions on which IG should prepare its position in order engage in realistic discussion of settlement. [3] If UK agrees, list could be given to IG as basis preparation its position. Copy could also be given GOE with suggestion it might establish committee under Nasser's chairmanship as done during Suez Base negots. He could name trusted subordinates discuss details. (FYI: It would appear to us Mohammed Riad might be desirable deputy to Nasser on committee. Phrase re suitable person or commission in Secretary's speech quoted para 2 Embtel 442 [4] designed avoid impression we seeking assume principal role. As practical matter US/UK must probably be

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1555. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell; cleared with Jernegan and Wilkins; and approved by Russell, who signed for Hoover. Repeated to London, Ankara, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 273.

[3] The Department informed London and Cairo as well as Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Paris the day before Russell departed for London on Monday, September 19, "for Alpha discussions with FonOff on steps to be taken in implementation suggestions Secretary's August 26 speech on Israel-Arab settlement." (Telegram 1453 to London; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1455)

[4] Document 268.

principal agents this capacity. In London Russell will reach agreement with FonOff on respective US and UK roles in Alpha negots. End FYI)

In any discussions with Nasser and Fawzi you authorized in your discretion make fol points:

1. Response Arab states in studying Secretary's proposals carefully has been gratifying. We not asking public statements applauding proposals but only indication Arab govts prepared explore possibility progressing along lines outlined by Secretary.

2. Response Arab states generally affords Egypt best opportunity exert leadership among Arab states. We hope GOE will take initiative which they appear ready permit Egypt take. Otherwise leadership might fall to other hands. We do not mean Egypt should negotiate for all Arab states but should take initiative to extent of exploring problems directly affecting Egypt. Once Egypt has set course (as in case armistice agreements) other Arab states might be expected follow similar path.

3. We agree discussions should be conducted in secret and through normal diplomatic channels.

Hoover

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278. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 16, 1955—2 p.m.

472. From Johnston. [2] As result strong urging Egypt Government and overriding political considerations Arab world I have reluctantly agreed to postponement of meeting four Foreign Ministers concerned at Cairo until morning October 1 just prior to opening of Arab League Council (full report follows) [3] this further delay presents serious problem in maintaining level of interest and receptivity which developed painstakingly and with difficulty over past weeks. Problem appears greatest in HKJ . . . . This confirmed yesterday by disturbing report that key officials Jordan Government including

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/9–1655. Confidential. Received at 4 p.m. Repeated to London and Amman.

[2] Johnston returned to Cairo on September 14 and met with Fawzi and other Egyptian officials on that date; summary minutes are *ibid.*, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, The Fourth Mission—No. 21 (Negotiating File).

[3] See Document 282.

Prime Minister may be wavering in their support Jordan Valley program.[4]

Believe it essential that forceful British support be obtained HKJ if program to be carried through to successful conclusion. Am proceeding London Tuesday [5] and wish appointment Wednesday or Thursday with Macmillan. Would appreciate support Department in setting up appointment and emphasizing importance vigorous British representations to HKJ at this crucial juncture. [6]

Byroade

[4] Johnston reported in telegram 484 from Cairo, September 16, that he had met the previous day with Jordan's Ambassador in the United States, Abdul Monem Rifai, who "painted somber picture of deterioration situation in Amman since our departure. Rifai states Prime Minister has grown increasingly reluctant make any decision during his tenure office which might be 'politically dangerous' and now question[s] whether acceptance program politically practicable." (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/9–1655)

[5] September 20.

[6] The Department so instructed the Embassy in London in telegram 1512, September 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/9–1655) The Embassy reported in telegram 1094, September 19, that Johnston had an appointment with Macmillan on September 22. (*Ibid.*, 120.1580/9–1955)

279. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, September 16, 1955—7 p.m.

1077. Time did not permit Embassy convey substance Deptel 1440 to Foreign Office [2] prior to Israeli Ambassador's call on Macmillan yesterday but in any event Foreign Office had obtained gist of Department's views from British Embassy Washington. Conversation, of which full account being pouched to British Embassy Washington, did not reveal anything particularly new. Israel Ambassador first raised questions of Egyptian restrictions on shipping in Gulf of Aqaba and supply of arms to Iraq. Ambassador then touched on Secretary's statement regarding Israel-Arab settlement alleging it was unfair to make security guarantee conditional upon settlement. Macmillan remarked HMG fully supports views of United States

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1655. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 8:29 p.m. Repeated to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

[2] Printed as Document 273.

Government on this point. Ambassador mentioned refugee problem and said Israel Government encouraged by apparent recognition by Secretary that resettlement was key to problem. Here Macmillan reminded Ambassador that Secretary had referred to "resettlement, and to such an extent as may be feasible, repatriation". On boundaries, Ambassador took line Israel unable to make any concessions, to which Macmillan observed that both sides would have to make concessions if settlement to be achieved.

Foreign Office has shown Embassy recent telegrams exchanged with Washington regarding Russell visit next week,[3] to which Foreign Office greatly looking forward.

Today's *Times* contains editorial entitled "Arab Dilemma" which declares reaction to "Dulles plan for regional security" in Middle East not feasible and plan as a whole not likely to be accepted. Editorial adds many Arabs think time is now on their side and U.S.S.R. may support them. When Embassy official mentioned article to Foreign Office official, latter emphasized editorial did not reflect views of HMG and reiterated, as he had previously stated on occasion of similar editorial carried by *Times* on August 29 which critical of Secretary's statement, that Foreign Office distressed by line being taken by *Times* but unable exert influence in this instance since editorials in question were written by an opinionated individual who formerly served in Middle Eastern section of Foreign Office and who disagrees sharply with British policy on this issue.

Aldrich

[3] See footnote 3, Document 277.

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280. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 16, 1955—7 p.m.

485. For Secretary. It is apparent from wording paragraph two, Department's 515,[2] that considerable misunderstanding has arisen

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1655. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 4:11 a.m., September 17.

[2] Document 276.

between this Embassy and Department. Will review our recent cables to see if we can possibly make our views more clear.

Of immediate importance, however, is subject of paragraph three Department telegram 515 on which I believe definite answer needed without delay and every day now counts. Hope Embassy telegram 461 [3] which apparently crossed Department telegram 515 will cause Department to reconsider urgently this subject, as well as last paragraph Department telegram 515 as a second priority. I consider Egypt's position as outlined in Embassy telegram 461 in favor forward movement on Alpha through initiation discussions with Israel not unreasonable.

Unless Department decides ignore Egypt's recommendation that Alpha now be discussed with Israel, ball is no longer in our court here. Therefore consider it most unwise and probably dangerous for US to continue to seek tie arms purchases to improbable further move by GOE at this time.

Byroade

[3] Document 274.

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281. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, September 17, 1955—10 a.m.

89. Burns has given me following details regarding his visit Cairo September 14.

Burns spent some hours with Gohar discussing implementation Security Council resolution of September 8. [2] Gohar said Egyptians willing withdraw their forces from frontier thus creating neutral zone, provided Israelis did same. However he maintains opposition to erection physical barrier along demarcation line. Egypt might agree to establishment barbed-wire fences to limited extent in certain strategic places but continuous barrier was out of question. In view Gohar's consistently negative attitude this matter Burns addressed letter to Egyptian Minister of War pointing out that propos-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–1755. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:02 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Amman. Passed to USUN.

[2] For a summary of the resolution, see Document 262.

als must be accepted as whole in order comply with resolution. (He left copy this letter with Embassy Cairo.) [3] Burns described Gohar as almost completely useless as representative for such discussions and expressed regret his continued connection with subject.

Owing Jewish holidays Burns has not yet taken up question September 8 resolution with Israelis but intends do so early next week. He anticipates they will firmly oppose proposal for withdrawal motorized patrols from immediate vicinity DL. However he considers it barely possible they might consent do so in unlikely event Egyptians accept barrier. Burns has concluded that only Nasser is in position face up to decision regarding latter. He was therefore thinking of requesting appointment see Nasser in near future.

Burns discussed with Gohar dangers implicit in maintaining Palestinian soldiers in forward positions Gaza strip (Contel 83 [4]). Gohar merely counters with some nonsensical argument to effect that while these soldiers are indeed Palestinians "a soldier obeys orders regardless of his place of origin." In voicing his disagreement with foregoing thesis, Burns said he pointed out to Gohar that should further incidents occur through lack effective Egyptian control of troops Israeli retaliation would be most likely. He did not plan to be issuing a warning, but merely expressing a fact.

Burns said that so far as he is aware Egyptians had never withdrawn Palestinian troops from area. However their officers including non-commissioned officers are Egyptians. Palestinian soldiers are evidently considered as regular troops "trained and disciplined." Consequently present situation with respect this point does not to his knowledge represent deterioration from earlier practice. In Burns' opinion decision to send "suicide squads" into Israel was taken by Egyptians primarily as means retaliation for Israeli attack on Egyptian position August 22.

To sum up situation as to this date Burns evidently made no progress at Cairo unless of course his letter to Minister of War should evoke more favorable response than is now to be anticipated. Moreover he is not optimistic regarding attitude either party toward Security Council resolution. He expressed opinion parties will remain indifferent to resolution unless great powers can exert some efficacious form of pressure or persuasion. If they cannot he foresees

[3] The Embassy in Cairo transmitted its summary of Burns' conversation with Gohar to the Department in telegram 490, September 17, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–1755) The Embassy also sent the Department the text of Burns' letter of September 15 to the Egyptian Minister of War under cover of despatch 325, September 20, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/9–2055)

[4] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/9–955)

renewal of cycle of incidents and reprisals as most probable development.

Cole

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282. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 17, 1955—7 p.m.

492. From Johnston. In discussion with Fawzi Deputy Foreign Minister Said, Ambassador Hussein, Mohammed Selim and Ahmad Farag just prior Fawzi's departure for US we explored technical aspects Jordan Valley program and factors bearing on timing Foreign Minister meeting, procedure and documentation.

Discussion opened on technical questions. Selim asked for and received clarifications on following points: (1) Whether HKJ can build higher dam. We repeated arguments against dam impounding more than 300 MCM but said no objection Arabs increasing its height so long as they finance, (2) Arab objection to inclusion 30 MCM saline water in HKJ allotment from Jordan River. We expressed willingness try work out compromise proposal, (3) financing hydroelectric installations Yarmuk dam. We reiterated power installations bankable and hence not eligible US grant aid, but indicated US willing provide good offices in connection loan application to appropriate banking institutions, (4) authority of neutral supervisory body. Selim at first insisted neutral supervision should be limited to facilities having international effect. When it pointed out this might preclude access of supervisory body to Israel diversion at Jisr Banat Yaqub, Selim indicated merely that supervision should not extend to ground, Wadi and other local water resources, (5) inclusion Hasbani development in program. We confirmed offer to conduct survey on Hasbani River and assist in financing through UNRRA sound irrigation project based on availability 35 MCM allotted to Lebanon.

In discussing timing, Fawzi pointed out Farhan at present Istanbul. Selim scheduled go London and Paris until September 28 and serious question whether Lebanon will be in position send Foreign

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/9–1755. Confidential. Received at 4:15 a.m., September 18. Repeated to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Tel Aviv, London, Baghdad, and Paris.

Minister to meeting prior end this month. We discussed possibility meeting September 24, but I reluctantly agreed to October 1 when Fawzi strongly urged setting it back rather than attempt earlier date with serious risk postponement.

We next discussed procedure: How and by whom meeting should be called, participation and relationship meeting to League. Fawzi began on assumption program was already in hands Arab League through its Technical Committee. When I pressed view it not Arab League affair, Fawzi appeared primarily concerned because his inability find rationale for Egypt's participation outside framework Arab League. He contended that in final stage of political consideration Egypt had no more basis for participation than Iraq, and that matter was therefore one for either three riparian nations or full Arab League. We continued press case with Hussein supporting our position until Fawzi suggested we await arrival Arab League Secretary General Hassouna who had next appointment with him.

In reviewing problem with Hassouna we emphasized inappropriateness my seeking approval Arab League on political level when program had been carefully removed from political sphere and pointed out necessity deal with States concerned on project basis. On other hand we made explicit our lack any objection if States concerned wish seek Arab League approval after conclusion negotiations with US. Hassouna appeared appreciate problem, while making point that to consult other States would be less dangerous than not since they would then be less free to criticize and be obstructive. He said if four States concerned had determined on position before going into Council he believed others certain to go along.

Hassouna's automatic assumption that Egypt one of four interested States which would be expected concert views prior general Arab League discussion appeared reassure Fawzi. We agreed members Technical Committee should meet September 28 and 29 to complete report to Arab League political committee and their governments. Meeting Foreign Minister four States concerned to be held morning October 1. Foreign Ministers will take agreed position to meeting Council which follows immediately.

Concluding discussion touched on form which agreement to program might take. Fawzi initially disposed favor US agreements with Arab State. We briefly outlined advantages of unilateral declarations each participating State which could be of basis UNGA resolution. Fawzi agreed problem should be explored in more detail on working level.

Throughout discussion Egyptians showed every disposition be helpful. I could not have asked for more considerate or constructive attitude.

Byroade

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283. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 19, 1955—3 p.m.

502. From Johnston. Embtel 492. [2] Have attempted minimize Arab League complications by arranging meeting four Foreign Ministers concerned prior to Arab League Council meeting. However Foreign Ministers clearly feel obliged submit Jordan valley program to Council for final concurrence. While I cannot evaluate complex political forces which may bear on Council consideration of program, wish set forth following observations for comment and suggestions.

Assuming continued Egyptian cooperation, Saudi Arabia unlikely create serious difficulties and neither Libya nor Yemen expected play active role. Iraq however could cause trouble.

Important interest Iraq in Arab League Council appears be take leadership in determining Arab position and tactics re North African question in forthcoming GA. Iraq–Egypt struggle for Council leadership could conceivably result in tactical Iraqi opposition Jordan valley plan because of role Egypt has played. Am attempting reduce embroilment in Arab League controversies generally by seeking through Egypt to place four-nation recommendation as first item Council agenda.

Iraq may oppose plan in attempt demonstrate that Iraq's uncompromising anti-Israel stand not modified as result military orientation toward West. If this possibility appears to develop Embassy Baghdad may find means encourage Iraq maintain earlier disposition to stay out of problem and let states concerned decide. In this connection Fawzi's desire avoid any step re plan which might be provocative to Iraq (see reference telegram) is of interest.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1480/9–1955. Confidential. Received at 12:11 a.m., September 20. Also sent to Baghdad and repeated to Jidda, London, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Tel Aviv, and Paris.

[2] *Supra*.

On basis limited information available to me it would appear unwise for Embassy Baghdad, myself or member my staff engage in substantive discussion Jordan valley plan with Iraqi officials as it might stir up interest that unlikely be constructive. However if Embassy believes it necessary to have detailed discussion I might be able send Troxel Baghdad for discreet consultation Embassy personnel.

Byroade

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284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at New York [1]

Washington, September 19, 1955—8:55 p.m.

Tedul 2. Secretary from Under Secretary. Following niact 507 from Cairo: [2]

" . . . GOE acceptance Soviet arms offer likely . . . (possibly tomorrow):

"GOE military mission now in Moscow; Soviet offer said to be almost embarrassing in size . . . ."

We are wiring Cairo: [3]

"In your discretion you may advise GOE that consummation of agreement along lines indicated would create most serious public reaction in US and greatly complicate our ability cooperate with them.

"Furthermore, it would place an extremely heavy load our shoulders to try maintain balance in our relations with the area.

"Will forward additional comment shortly."

You may wish discuss this development with Nutting this evening.

Hoover

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–1955. Top Secret. Drafted by Hoover and approved by Stutesman, who signed for Hoover. Dulles was in New York for the opening of the Tenth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly, which convened on September 20.

[2] Telegram 507 was sent at 5 p.m. (Cairo time) and received at 5:56 p.m., September 19. (*Ibid.*)

[3] Telegram 533, September 19, was sent niact at 9 p.m. to Cairo with the instruction "Ambassador from Under Secretary". (*Ibid.*)

285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, September 20, 1955—12:15 a.m.

537. From Secretary. Embtel 485. [2] Decisions embodied Deptels 515 and 516 [3] reached only after complete review considerations advanced by Embassy including Embtel 461. [4]

In essence we believe it inadvisable alter our present and promising plans for Middle East defense arrangements because of Egyptian opposition and in hope Egypt might then cooperate on Alpha. Suggestions advanced by Fawzi nebulous at best and regardless of how presented appear to involve either isolation of Iraq from Arab world or de facto abandonment by Iraq of northern tier.

Re final paragraph your 485 we have asked Israel Government to formulate its most favorable position on various issues and will continue press them on this. This however does not mean "ball no longer in GOE court". Our primary problem continues to be to induce Arab country to exchange views directly or indirectly with Israel Government. This means, if GOE is to exert leadership we hope for, that it should similarly formulate its views on various issues to be settled and make specific suggestions as to manner and timing of actual exchange.

We believe more persuasive indication serious determination work toward Alpha objectives than contained in Fawzi suggestions is necessary to warrant reconsideration decisions on arms and Nasser visit. [5]

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–1655. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Burdett and Russell on September 17 and approved and signed by Dulles. Later that day the Department informed Russell in London that the "Secretary signed Sept 20 tel to Cairo." (Telegram 1544 to London; *ibid.*, 684A.86/9–2055)

[2] Document 280.

[3] Documents 276 and 277.

[4] Document 274.

[5] Byroade responded to this message as follows:

"Want Secretary to know that I appreciate his message Deptel 537 and that my 509 [Document 287] to Hoover sent before its arrival. Also had not interpreted Deptel 515 [Document 276] as a 'decision' of Department arms question until arrival his message. My struggle has been to obtain a decision and wording of Department's cables has been pretty vague on this point as received from this end." (Telegram 520 from Cairo, September 21; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2155)

286. Editorial Note

At 11:30 a.m. on September 20, Secretary of State Dulles met with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, Soviet Ambassador Zaroubin, and Soviet Interpreter Troyanovski at the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York to review a number of matters, among them being the question of possible Soviet armaments shipments to Arab nations. According to the memorandum of conversation, the following was said on this issue:

"The Secretary said there was one matter which he would like to raise. The United States Government had received recurrent reports, although it could not be sure of their accuracy, of possible large armament grants to Arab countries. He said that he should not conceal the fact that if these reports were true, this action would be a disturbing element at a time when the US is trying to keep a balance between the Israelis and the Arabs. Mr. Molotov replied that such questions might be discussed on the normal commercial plane, but such conversations should not cause misunderstanding. In any case, he said the matter is not being approached on political grounds but rather on a commercial basis. The Secretary said there might be political repercussions if there were to be a change in the present balance of power in that area—there would be great potential danger if either side thought it was strong enough to undertake successful aggressive action—then you might have a war in which it would be difficult for the US to be completely disinterested. Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Union approaches questions in that area only on the basis of its relations to the countries there—there is no complication of the situation in the area—at least that is the assumption of the Soviet government." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/9–2055)

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287. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 20, 1955—2 p.m.

509. For Hoover. Advice suggested for GOE your niact 533 [2] has been communicated to them sufficient different occasions and forms in last few months so as to make further repetition ineffective.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2055. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 4:02 p.m.

[2] Repeated in Document 284.

Irrespective of what I may be allowed tell Nasser, I find it impossible understand why I have not been informed of Department's reasoning in turning down repeated and increasingly urgent recommendations that we make financial arrangement which would permit Egypt take advantage our offer (in response its request) sell arms. Follow-up comments referred Deptel not yet received but to this Embassy it is crystal clear that by our unwillingness manipulate a few million dollars we are permitting situation deteriorate to point where chain reaction of nature that will constitute a major defeat for US policy in Middle East, as contrasted to that of Soviet bloc, is highly probable. Either we have been unable to adequately communicate this conviction or Department and other interested agencies are operating on an assessment or premises which are radically different from ours and which have not been communicated to us here.

While Department must decide over-all policy it seems to me that due weight should be given recommendations Embassy as to best tactics to obtain atmosphere under which these policies may succeed. If we are wincing under what may appear to be blackmail, I would remind Department again that this situation did not arise from Nasser's initiative but by Russian initiative capitalizing upon Nasser's need for continued support of his army in situation that has followed events since initial February 28 attack by Israel at Gaza. If on other hand our inability meet requirements of present situation is due to belief that quid pro quo can be increased by continued delay, we are making very great mistake.

Byroade

288. British Minutes of Meetings of Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, Foreign Office, London, September 20, 1955, 10:45 a.m. and 4 p.m.[1]

PALESTINE SETTLEMENT

United Kingdom	*United States*
Mr. Shuckburgh	Mr. Russell
Mr. Arthur	Mr. Wilson
	Mr. Mak

A. Next Steps

Mr. Shuckburgh suggested that the meeting should begin by discussing the next steps. Mr. Dulles's statement had been received as well as we could possibly have expected in the countries concerned: no government was publicly committed against it. We knew that the Israelis were willing to talk to us about a settlement; and the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated his position in general terms, and whilst emphasising that we must next sound out the attitude of the Israeli Government, he had given us to understand that we were at liberty to put our more specific ideas to Colonel Nasser and him whenever we wished. We had thus made a start, and we must proceed as quickly as possible. He would be suggesting that after assuring ourselves that Colonel Nasser was fully behind what his Foreign Minister had said to us, we should next approach the Israelis. We should explain to them that the Egyptians were ready to discuss the possibility of a settlement but had put a high price—the whole of the Negev—on their readiness. We could then try to elicit some kind of counter-offer from the Israelis.

2. Mr. Russell said that he took a rather less optimistic view of Dr. Fawzi's talks to our Ambassadors in Cairo. Our first objective must be to find some Arab country, which we thought would have to be Egypt, to take the lead in moving towards a settlement. It looked as though Dr. Fawzi was simply trying to postpone the day when Egypt would have to make that move by transferring the onus of starting concrete negotiations to the Israelis. We must first get the Egyptian Government to say definitely that they were prepared to exchange ideas, directly or indirectly, with the Israelis with a view to reaching a settlement. The Egyptians had not yet gone as far as this.

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[1] Source: Department fo State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Minutes of London Talks held Sept. 20 and 21, 1955. Top Secret.

3. Meanwhile, the Israelis were trying to dislodge the United States Government from the position that a settlement must precede a guarantee. Their latest proposal was that the United States should announce that they would give the guarantee either at the end of a fixed period, or as soon as it became clear that the Arabs would not cooperate in the achievement of a settlement. They were also trying to find out what kind of settlement the United States Government had in mind. In order to keep them at arm's length whilst we tried to bring the Egyptians to the point, he suggested that we should now formulate a set of questions through which we could seek the views of both sides on certain specific questions, such as the magnitude and method of distribution of compensation. This would engage the Israelis' attention for some time; and meanwhile we might be able to get Colonel Nasser to designate some person or body to exchange views with the Israelis through an intermediary. Only then should we be certain that the Egyptians were willing to negotiate without pre-conditions.

4. Mr. Shuckburgh suggested that our tactics depended on whether we regarded the Negev difficulty as being in a different category from the other elements of a settlement. The Egyptian Foreign Minister had given us the impression that the other issues were capable of solution, but he had emphasised the Egyptian determination to secure the Negev. It was unlikely that we should be able to make any further progress with the Egyptians until we could show them some counter-proposal on the Negev. There was much to be said for tackling this problem first. Our past experience indicated that Colonel Nasser would simply refuse to discuss other problems until he was convinced that he would get some satisfaction on the Negev; and there was little else that we could discuss with the Egyptians without bringing in other Arab states. Until we felt fairly certain that agreement on the Negev was possible, we should be unwise to show our hand on other matters. In the end everything would turn on a solution for the Negev; and if we failed on that, our other proposals, by then known to all the parties, would collapse and be discredited. By starting with the Negev we could keep these intact.

5. Mr. Russell agreed that the Negev was the most difficult problem. If we tried to deal with it at the beginning, we should find it very hard to make any progress. The Israelis felt that they had little room to manoeuvre: there were few things on which they could make concessions, and they would not make so important a sacrifice until right at the end of negotiations. They might possibly accept our idea of triangles as a final concession to clinch agreement, but they would need to be sure that they would get a settlement before they abandoned their present position on the Negev. The

same consideration might weigh with the Egyptians also: if we could get negotiations started and create an atmosphere of progress on other issues, we might in the end be able to induce both the Egyptians and the Israelis to give up their dreams of possessing the whole of the Negev. But we could not expect to do so immediately. Before approaching the Israelis we must get Nasser to accept the idea of negotiations unconditionally.

6. Mr. Shuckburgh remarked that from the Egyptian point of view the idea of moving towards a settlement with Israel was the first concession. Nasser would be reluctant to make it unless he received something in return, that is to say an assurance that Israel would be ready to make some concession on the Negev during the negotiations. Only if we could show him that he would get something out of Israel could we expect to move him from that position.

7. Mr. Russell said that it seemed that what Colonel Nasser most wanted was arms supplies. But he could not pay; and it might be possible for the United States to give him a long-term credit if he was ready to commit himself formally to negotiations with Israel through an intermediary. By this means Nasser would be able to safeguard his internal position, and we should have obtained from him the starting point for the Alpha negotiations.

8. Mr. Shuckburgh said that he did not like the idea of offering arms to the Egyptians at the present time. Since Egypt was not cooperating with us over defence matters, the normal justification for the offer would be lacking; and it would look as though we were rewarding Nasser for an agreement to betray the whole Arab position over Palestine. However, we must certainly try to move Nasser from the position that the acquisition of the Negev was a *condition* for negotiations at least to the point at which his claim would appear as *part of* negotiations which he had already accepted in principle. Putting the matter simply and bluntly, it seemed that Mr. Russell's idea was to induce Nasser to make that move by the prospect of arms supplies; whilst his (Mr. Shuckburgh's) idea amounted to a proposal that we should first get some concession out of the Israelis and use that as the lever to shift Nasser.

9. Mr. Russell said that the State Department had not arrived at the idea of an arms offer as a result of a search for an appropriate inducement. It was rather that they were being pressed to help Nasser with arms in any case; and they did not wish to do so unless they got something more concrete from him on Alpha.

10. In discussion, *it was recognised* that the difficulty was that neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis were prepared to be first in the field with concessions. The situation resembled an oriental bazaar bargain in which neither vendor nor purchaser would name the starting price. We should have to point out to both sides that they

had taken positions over the Negev that made any kind of negotiation for a settlement impossible. The only way out of this deadlock was to induce both sides to admit that the Negev was a subject for discussion: each side should receive and give an assurance on this point.

11. *It was agreed* that we should seek Nasser's agreement to an agenda for negotiations which contained among the other elements of a settlement the Egyptian claim for a land link with Jordan across the Negev. We should ask him whether he was prepared to start discussions on condition that the Israelis accepted this agenda. If so, we would try to get the Israelis to accept it.

B. Inducements to Nasser

12. Mr. Russell wondered what we should do if Nasser refused to accept the idea of proceeding through an agreed agenda. With regard to the possibility of offering material inducements, he explained that the offer of arms, to which he had referred before, had not in the first place been connected with Alpha. It had been proposed quite independently as a means of strengthening Nasser's position. The State Department's idea was not to use arms as a bribe in connection with Alpha, but simply to delay an offer which was being considered on other grounds until Nasser was ready to make a move on Alpha.

13. Mr. Shuckburgh agreed that the offer of arms to Nasser was premature. The mere acceptance of the agenda would not be sufficient to justify it: such an offer should only be made in return for real progress in the Alpha negotiations. In any case it was open to the following objections:

(a) It would mean that the West was aiding a country which was not cooperating in defence matters.

(b) The Egyptians were already doing well over arms: they had already obtained the release of 32 Centurions from the United Kingdom, and they had asked for a further 32 which we could not let them have.

(c) It was doubtful whether an offer of arms would make any difference to Nasser's attitude at this stage.

14. *It was agreed* that we should not offer Nasser arms in the mere hope that he would thereafter cooperate on Alpha. We should require evidence of real progress.

15. Turning to political inducements, Mr. Russell said that Mr. Byroade had pointed out that Egypt's rôle on Alpha could not be divorced from the general policy of the United States Government in the Middle East. Mr. Byroade's view was that we should relax our efforts to seek new members for the Turco-Iraqi Pact and encourage Egypt to take the lead in the formation of an Arab pact which

would fit into the "defence in depth" of the Middle East. He thought that if the Egyptians saw that this was Western policy, they would be ready to cooperate on Alpha. The State Department intended to explain to Mr. Byroade that the Northern Tier concept, which they supported, must be promoted, though they were not making any effort to get additional Arab members for the Turco-Iraqi Pact now. They hoped that some rôle might be found for Egypt in the defence of the area, but they could not agree to abandon their support of the Turco-Iraqi Pact merely in order to allow Egypt to recover her leadership.

16. Mr. Shuckburgh said that he was glad to hear that the State Department agreed that we should not say anything to Nasser which was inconsistent with the support of the United States and the United Kingdom for the Turco-Iraqi Pact.

C. Mechanics of Negotiation

17. *It was recognized* that when we presented the agenda to Nasser we might also have to give him some indication of our ideas on the methods of negotiation. It was likely that he would demand complete secrecy: he would not wish the other Arab states, particularly Iraq, to know that he was entering on negotiations with Israel. Another difficulty was that the Egyptian Foreign Minister had told us that he did not want joint Anglo-American approaches: we must put our ideas to him separately.

18. In discussion the following points *were agreed*:

(a) Up to the stage at which the agenda was agreed we could maintain complete secrecy: we should work through our representatives in Cairo and Tel Aviv.

(b) Dr. Fawzi had insisted on dealing with either the United Kingdom or the United States Ambassador alone. The lead should be taken by Mr. Byroade, who would of course keep Sir H. Trevelyan fully informed.

(c) In Israel joint approaches would probably be best: the Israelis must know that we were in full agreement.

(d) In Jordan and Iraq H.M. Representatives would take the lead when the time came.

(e) Once the agenda had been agreed and negotiations on matters which were of concern to the other Arab states were ready to start, we should have to bring in Jordan at least. We could not discuss Jordan's interests behind her back.

(f) We should discuss the best means of bringing other Arab states in with Nasser. We could counter his objections by explaining that this would spread the burden of negotiations. We hoped Egypt would take the lead, but we were not asking her to accept the responsibility of negotiating alone those parts of a settlement which touched other parties.

19. *It was agreed* that once the agenda had been accepted we should not long be able to carry on negotiations through our representatives in the Middle East. It would indeed be easier to avoid the appearance of breakdowns that way; but the best hope of reconciling the positions of the parties, as Mr. Johnston's negotiations showed, was to have a person or group who could talk to both sides. We could not conduct the early stages of the negotiations with the plenipotentiaries of all the parties in London and Washington: where important matters of principle were concerned, the Arab representatives would neither enjoy the full confidence of their Governments nor have the authority or the courage to make any concessions. We must get at the leaders who would have to take the decisions. But once the main lines of a settlement had been agreed, negotiations on matters of detail could most conveniently be conducted with representatives of both sides in London or Washington.

20. *It was recognized* that the employment of mediators would involve publicity, and by arousing excitement defeat its own ends, and perhaps expose us to the charge of usurping the functions of the United Nations. We should not take up a rigid position on that yet, but await developments and arrange mediation ad hoc at first. For example, after the acceptance of the agenda and the preliminary exchange of views, British and American representatives might make a tour of the Middle Eastern capitals for some other ostensible purpose and start the reconciliation process: if the Governments concerned wanted secrecy it could easily be maintained at any rate for one such visit. As regards the United Nations, we should do well to keep the Secretary General (who had supported Mr. Dulles's statement) informed of our progress.

21. *It was agreed* therefore that the negotiations would fall into three main stages:

(a) Up to the acceptance of the agenda and the preliminary exchanges of views: to be conducted through H.M. and U.S. Representatives in the countries concerned.

(b) The attempt to reconcile the views of the parties and secure agreement on broad principles: special representatives of the Foreign Office and State Department would visit the Middle East and talk to both sides.

(c) Negotiation of details: the parties would designate representatives to meet negotiators from the Foreign Office and State Department, either in London or Washington or in some other suitable capital.

22. *It was agreed* that if real progress could be made and a settlement seemed possible, we should recommend to our Secretaries of State that they should consider taking a personal share in the final negotiations in order to clinch the agreement. If they saw Dr.

Fawzi and Mr. Sharett in New York during the present session of the Assembly, it would help if they showed a strong personal interest in Alpha and urged the two Ministers in the direction we want them to take. But the real decision in Egypt would lie with Colonel Nasser, and in Israel probably with Mr. Ben Gurion.

D. Interim Dealings With the Israelis

23. *It was recognized* that we must soon expect further questions, and perhaps some specific proposals from the Israelis. As it might take some time to bring the Egyptians to the point, we should have to be prepared to make some non-committal response to Israeli initiatives.

24. *It was agreed* that we should say that we had so far received no response from the Arabs: our offers to help in finding a solution were dependent on the request of both sides. The Israelis must be patient, for it was encouraging that for the first time the Arabs had not rejected the idea of a settlement out of hand. Meanwhile, we were quite ready to listen to their views on the refugees, which was the least contentious yet the most complicated part of a settlement.

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289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, September 20, 1955—11:37 p.m.

549. Re Embtel 509 [2] Deptel 533 [3] and USUN [*Deptel*] 537. [4]

(1) We cannot extend credit or grant of arms to Egypt in absence of clear progress on program outlined in the Secy's speech of August 26.

(2) If appreciable progress made in this direction, we believe positive action possible on credit or grant of arms, as well as in many other directions contingent upon completion of program.

(3) We can at any time deemed advisable use our best offices and influence to promote closer relations between Egypt and Sudan

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2055. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Hoover and Allen, and approved and signed by Hoover.

[2] Document 287.

[3] Repeated in Document 284.

[4] Document 285.

and endeavor assist on solution of Nile water problem which would facilitate Aswan Dam project.

(4) As regards US adherance to Baghdad Pact we do not intend to move at this time in absence of Arab-Israeli settlement, but developments could alter our position. In event of chain reaction resulting from GOE acceptance of Russian proposal (Emb's 509) it might prove desirable for us to join Pact promptly, bringing with us as many Arab States as possible. In such contingency, events might also require us to grant Israel a security pact.

(5) It has seemed to us that above analysis was implicit in operation outlined in Secy's speech and we regret that any misunderstanding should have arisen.

(6) We hope above will give you basis for further frank conversations with Egyptians. [5]

Hoover

[5] The following day the Department repeated this telegram priority to Russell. (Telegram 1577 to London, September 21; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2155)

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290. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 21, 1955—1 p.m.

518. Late last night we were told by highly reliable source that Egypt's arms deal with Russia was now definitely decided. Informant interrupted by entrance additional persons into conversation before full story could be obtained. Not certain as to exact quantities but mentioned 200 MIGs, 100 tanks, and "U" boats. All deliveries to be made within 3 months. Russian technicians would be admitted to Egypt to assist in assembling but it would be stipulated they would stay no longer than 3 months. No public announcement was to be made but rather series of editorials would start today justifying fact that Egypt should no longer wait on West but accept Russia offer.

Such editorials, one of them full page, did in fact start this morning. Story thus hangs together so well and conforms so closely

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2155. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 1:53 p.m. Passed to the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Repeated priority to London for Russell. (*Ibid.*)

with reports from other sources there no doubt in my mind Executive decision made although there is reason to believe decision may not have actually been passed to Soviets.

Byroade

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291. British Minutes of a Meeting of Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, Foreign Office, London, September 21, 1955, 3:30 p.m.[1]

PALESTINE SETTLEMENT

United Kingdom	*United States*
Mr. Shuckburgh	Mr. Russell
Mr. Arthur	Mr. Wilson
	Mr. Mak

Mr. Shuckburgh said that the Foreign Office had received a telegram from H.M. Ambassador in Cairo, who had seen Nasser on September 20.[2] It was unfortunately evident that Nasser was not behind what Fawzi had said to our Ambassadors. He had told Sir H. Trevelyan that Egyptian public opinion and his own thinking was dominated by fear of Israeli expansion and a feeling of insecurity. The present was therefore no time for a Palestine settlement. When Sir H. Trevelyan had pointed out that the way to remove the feeling of fear and insecurity was through a settlement, Nasser had changed his ground and said that he feared that the other Arab states would conduct a political attack on Egypt if she took the lead towards a settlement: he feared such attacks on account of Egyptian leadership on the Johnston plan. Even if this went well, he thought that a settlement now was impossible and emphasised the great strategic importance of the Negev to Egypt. He did not favour an approach to Israel by us at this stage, but he would be prepared to listen to our more detailed ideas on the strict understanding that the conversations would remain entirely confidential and not come to the ears of other Arab states.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Minutes of London Talks held Sept. 20 and 21, 1955. Top Secret.

[2] No copy of this telegram has been found in Department of State files.

Mr. Russell considered that it would be unwise to allow Nasser's statements to stand for long without comment. He thought that Mr. Byroade should be instructed to point out to Nasser that his attitude amounted in effect to the first negative response we had had from any government to Mr. Dulles's statement; and that if this continued to be Nasser's position the United States Government, who had not expected this of Egypt, were seriously disturbed and might be forced to reconsider their whole policy in the Middle East.

Mr. Shuckburgh agreed that we could not let Nasser's remarks pass. But he wondered whether it was wise to tackle him immediately. Whilst it was desirable to maintain the impetus which Mr. Dulles's statement had given, it might be better to wait until we saw what happened to Mr. Johnston's negotiations. The surest way of convincing Nasser that his leadership would not be attacked would be to wait until we could show him that he had not suffered for his attitude on the Jordan Waters question. We might then more reasonably expect from him a new act of leadership. But we were perhaps expecting too much of him in present circumstances, and it might be better not to press him for the time being.

Mr. Russell wondered whether Nasser was really under any special pressures at present. If so, we should understand his position. But Egyptian leadership on the matter of Jordan Waters was no new thing, and far from resenting it more than in the past, the general attitude of the other Arab states on Palestine affairs seemed nowadays to be more reasonable than usual. Nasser's fears might simply be an excuse for further postponement, and what he had told Sir H. Trevelyan might well be the expression of a deep and enduring reluctance to make any move towards a settlement. If he continued to say "not now", we should sooner or later have to meet him head on; and the present was probably the time for this, since he was holding up our efforts at the most propitious moment. If we lost our present momentum it was doubtful whether we would be able to recover it. If the Arabs refused to move, the position of the United States Administration on the guarantee to Israel would be weakened.

Mr. Shuckburgh agreed, but thought that it was dangerous to threaten a reappraisal of our policies in the Middle East. If that was meant to imply that we would transfer our support to the Israelis, we could not carry it out. Our interests would not permit us to coerce or blackmail the Arabs into peace, and Nasser knew this.

Mr. Russell agreed, so far as the Arab world as a whole was concerned. But it might be possible to withdraw support from Egypt alone.

Mr. Shuckburgh, reverting to the question of timing, pointed out that Mr. Johnston hoped to meet the Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo on October 1. If he got them to accept his plan, it would be a

most important achievement in itself and have a favourable effect on the prospects for Alpha. With that possibility in mind, we should not press Nasser too much for the next ten days. Afterwards we could tackle him strongly on the acceptance of an agenda for the Alpha negotiations.

Mr. Russell agreed that we should await the conclusion of Mr. Johnston's talks next week, especially since Mr. Johnston was fairly hopeful of getting Arab agreement to the main lines of his proposals. But immediately after the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers to discuss the Johnston plan, there was to be a meeting of the Arab League Council which would probably discuss Mr. Dulles's statement whether the Egyptians wanted [to] or not. We ought to make some attempt to prevent Nasser's attitude from hardening; otherwise we might find that the Arab League would be affected by it and slip into opposition to Mr. Dulles's statement.

It was agreed that Mr. Russell should recommend that Mr. Byroade should be instructed to tell Nasser soon that we were disappointed at his attitude as expressed to Sir H. Trevelyan, and that he (Mr. Byroade) would wish to talk to him further about it in a fortnight or so. Meanwhile the United States Government counted on Nasser to ensure that the Arab League meeting, if it should discuss Mr. Dulles's statement, left the door open for further discussions.

It was agreed that Mr. Byroade should not make a further positive approach on Alpha until after the meeting to determine the Arab attitude to the Johnston plan. When he did so, he would do his utmost to get Nasser's acceptance of an agenda for discussions, explaining the advantage to Egypt of an agenda which included the Negev. [3]

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[3] In a September 26 letter to Russell enclosing copies of the minutes of this meeting, Wilson noted that Russell had not submitted this recommendation because it had been overtaken by events "in the form of the Soviet arms deal." Wilson also stated that he and Shuckburgh had agreed that Russell's discussions on September 22 and 23 were "of such a nature that it was impracticable to write up any minutes." (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2655) Regarding Russell's September 22 meeting with Shuckburgh, see Document 296.

292. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, September 21, 1955—5 p.m.

93. Burns gave me and White of Embassy, Tel Aviv, account along following lines with respect incident last night El Auja demilitarized zone. He was called to Israeli Foreign Ministry today and told that shortly after midnight last night Israeli unit attacked Egyptian detachment maintained in zone to guard MAC offices there, pursuant reciprocal agreement dating from 1949. [2] Israelis wounded two Egyptian soldiers and drove remainder out of D/Z. Israelis thereafter established a "defensive position" in the zone consisting some fifty to seventy men. Foreign Ministry gave as reason this action continued existence two Egyptian checkposts at points shown by survey to be within Israeli territory in D/Z. Additional reason was recent activity of Egyptians in pulling down and destroying border markings established on basis survey boundaries of zone undertaken by Israelis beginning last February or March. Foreign Ministry said Israeli "defensive position" would be kept in zone until the two Egyptian check posts were removed and a proper survey made.

According Burns, Gohar had some months ago agreed to remove the checkposts and cooperate in survey. However, this agreement fell into abeyance following Gaza incident of February 28 and Israelis proceeded with survey alone. Removal of markers could represent unauthorized action local Egyptian military and thus possibly be indicative lack GOE control its personnel in area. On other hand, Israelis maintain in the zone a Kibbutz which has character of a thinly disguised military post rather than genuine agricultural settlement.

Burns is addressing letter to Israelis describing incident as "flagrant violation of GAA" and asking for immediate withdrawal of military force in zone. In consideration incident MAC chairman will also call on Egyptians to withdraw two checkposts and participate in survey. In Burns opinion immediate cause of incident evidently recent removal border markers by Egyptians.

Burns said that in view above developments he has cancelled proposed trip to Cairo scheduled for today. He hoped arrange

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–2155. Confidential; Priority. Received at 3:58 p.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, London, and Paris; passed to USUN.

[2] For information concerning this agreement, which came into force with the signature of the Egypt–Israel General Armistice Agreement on February 24, 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VI, pp. 768–769.

another appointment with Nasser early next week for discussion SC resolution September 8. In conversation yesterday that matter with Tekoah latter told Burns Israelis willing consider question neutral zone along border Gaza strip, provided Egyptians first signify their acceptance idea of continuous barrier. Burns maintained his position to effect that proposals for separation parties military forces must be considered as a whole rather than piecemeal.

Burns told us that he would do his best convince each side other not unwilling consider proposals. He added that neutral zones 500 yards each side Gaza D/L would not affect Israeli settlements in vicinity since nearest of these are more than one kilometer east of D/L.

Cole

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293. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 21, 1955—9 p.m.

528. Department telegram 549 [2] contains clear cut presentation Department thinking we have been seeking.

Shortly after its arrival Hussein came to see me at Nasser's request. Nasser wanted me to know that he appreciated my efforts of past to convince him it unwise move on Egypt's part make arms deal with Russia. He knew my feelings this regard were sincere. For that reason he wished me to know that arms deal was now accomplished fact and would not be changed. It was in the nature of a commercial arrangement and he would take every precaution minimize its political implication. Things had reached point where he could not hold off revolution in Army if he did not accept. Others would replace him but only with support of Army which would have been gained by accepting Russia's offer. This would have dramatized affair making implications, he felt, even worse from our point of view. There was one point however on which he thought we honestly disagreed, and that was Egypt's desire to negotiate on or deal with, if this should become necessary, the Israeli problem

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2155. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:11 p.m. Repeated to London.

[2] Document 289.

from a position of strength instead of weakness. He had read enough about our philosophy in the East–West situation to hope that this would be understandable to United States.

I made no substantive comment to Hussein on Nasser's message. Nasser has asked him to depart shortly for Washington in effort see Egyptian action not misunderstood.

My own view is that Nasser probably could not have survived turning down Russian offer in absence assurance assistance of military nature from United States. Had he nonetheless attempted to do so while at same time trying to move forward on Arab-Israeli settlement he would certainly have negotiated himself out of power. This appraisal does not in my opinion reflect weakness on part of Nasser but situation in Egypt on this subject since February 28.

My latest information is that formal announcement of acceptance Russian offer will probably be avoided. We are refusing comment on press inquiries here and will forward in due course such thoughts as we have on suggested reaction on our part.

Byroade

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294. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Washington, September 21, 1955—7 p.m.

278. Called on Prime Minister at my request this morning and gave him orally substance Deptel 195. [2] Despite fact in so doing I underscored that Secretary's statement not plan and USG has no blueprint for settlement problems Sharett made following comments:

1. George Allen's statement to Eban (memo conversation September 15) [3] to effect USG not thinking in terms of unilateral concession of territory by Israel and there must be some give and take on both sides "somewhat but not completely reassured" Sharett following latter's apprehension over general reference to subject in Secretary's statement.

2. He was not clear as to meaning attached to term "settlement" of problems as used in statement. Does it mean permanent settle-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2155. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 11:50 a.m., September 22. Repeated priority to London, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Baghdad.

[2] Document 273.

[3] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

ment in terms of peace? Does USG feel Arabs amenable to peace settlement? Or are changes or amendments to armistice agreement contemplated? If latter these must be done according to armistice agreement machinery. (This is second time he has made this point.)

3. Referring to territorial concessions Egypt has demanded continuity with Jordan. What is US attitude on this point? Is Egypt's approach accepted? If so what happens to Israel's continuity? GOI will not sacrifice its continuity to give Arab States continuity.

At this point I again injected remark that although Prime Minister's comment of interest USG has no plan it imposing on either party and statement made to indicate desirability of working toward settlement principal issues in connection with which Secretary set forth what we prepared to do. We hoped Israel and Arab States study problem and indicate contributions each willing to make. Then we and UK would if desired by both parties aid in initiating exchange of views of both sides. His only reply was "Yes, but Arabs have already put forth their claims for continuity and I would like to know USG attitude". I made no further comment.

4. Re tripartite declaration there was no question as to borders it guaranteed. Now statement says those border lines cannot be guaranteed. This seems inconsistent—why any question of frontier changes from those guaranteed under declaration.

I said I must take issue with him on this point as it seemed clear to me that declaration pertained to armistice lines which by their very nature were recognized as temporary. On other hand Secretary was quite obviously visualizing lines which would be considered permanent in nature [and so] recognized by both parties before any guarantee involved. He accepted these remarks without further comment on subject.

Re minimum publicity, he agreed in principle but pointed out there no way to prevent general discussion of statement in Knesset.

Comment: Sharett in view my insistence US not proposing settlement plan did not at this juncture expect definitive replies to his questions. But character of his comment may be helpful in marking his line of thinking and aid us in anticipating his expressed reaction in these particular fields if and when he indicates what contributions Israel is willing to make. Also these discussions should help us prepare specific questions to be presented to him at some later date and his reception of these questions. For these reasons I am reporting his remarks on each occasion.

Lawson

295. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, September 21, 1955—7 p.m.

279. Sharett awaited my call this morning with determined attitude and armed with notes to raise Jerusalem question (Embtels 165 [2] and 191; [3] London's 995 to Department [4]). This is second time he raised this subject, but this time in much more emphatic manner.

Prefacing statement with comment to effect it rather likely Ben Gurion will soon head GOI and Sharett would hold Foreign Ministry Portfolio, he made following remarks in firm and somewhat categorical manner and designed I thought, to express his very great concern over possible events which would so vitally affect his position and conduct of foreign relations with chiefs of mission of major powers: He hoped US Government "would not fall into error";

(A) Of treating major issue and disturb our existing fine personal relations on basis of technical question; it would be unfortunate "if personal relations between American Ambassador and Foreign Minister were cut off because another room in Jerusalem was substituted for room in which they had in those capacities met in past". This he said, would be impossible to explain to public. He insisted that regardless of technical inferences it was as Foreign Minister that he had discussed GOI matters with me.

(B) Of assuming that new Prime Minister would act as channel for communications instead of Foreign Minister. This would be impossible. The Prime Minister would receive Ambassadors on special business and even then appointment would be made by Foreign Minister who would be official contact for normal foreign affairs business.

After developing these points extensively and underscoring again dangers inherent to upcoming conditions, he volunteered following:

1. That he and I continue under existing formula with meeting me alternately at Foreign Office in Jerusalem and in Tel Aviv. (This is a new factor in picture and an agreement we thought very unlikely he would agree to if we presented it to him (Embtel 191).)
2. There would be no publicity of any change in procedure. He was confident that first meetings would pass off unnoticed.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.84A/9–2155. Confidential; Priority. Received at 2:28 p.m., September 22. Repeated priority to Paris, London, and Rome.

[2] Document 224.

[3] Document 241.

[4] See footnote 3, Document 241.

Comment: My only comment was that I would send his remarks and positive suggestions to Department and inform him of any reply thereto.

Later Herzog who seemed very much excited over possible trouble in this field, suggested that I send Prime Minister's comments to Secretary in a personal message. I did not engage to do so. When I questioned him as to whether Prime Minister had delivered similar comments to my French and British colleagues, he replied in negative, but said he would so recommend to Sharett. I shall inform those colleagues of my conversation as soon as practical.

Lawson

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296. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, September 22, 1955—6 p.m.

1161. From Johnston. Met with Foreign Secretary Macmillan this afternoon with Russell and Foster. Shuckburgh and Simpson of Foreign Office also present. I explained in detail progress that we have made, and said we felt we were near agreement with Arab technical committee, but real problem would be presented on political side by Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting Cairo October first. Explained I expected meet with Foreign Ministers from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon only. If this group approved they would go to larger Arab meeting for their approval. In the interim there were certain things HMG might do that would be extremely helpful. I mentioned three: First, insure against Iraq's opposition in Arab League meeting. Second, bring whatever pressure HMG thought advisable on Jordan so that Jordan would thoroughly understand that HMG supported this program wholeheartedly. Third, inform Lebanese officials of HMG's desire to have this project proceed so there could be no question in Cabinet's mind of HMG's position. [2] I specifically mentioned Emile Bustani to see if HMG could have any

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/9–2255. Confidential. Received at 4:13 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, Jerusalem, Paris, and Rome

[2] In telegram 1311, September 30, the Embassy in London informed the Department that the British Embassies in Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and Amman had reported conversations in support of Johnston's proposals. (*Ibid.*, 120.1580/9–3055)

influence in quieting him down, particularly in Arab university graduates meeting Jerusalem next week. I further expressed hope HMG would make it clear they not only wanted the project but wanted it adopted now by governments involved at Cairo.

Foreign Secretary was most complimentary about the progress that had been made and agreed to do all three things mentioned, although he doubted their influence with Bustani and said they might decide that it would be useless to try to influence him. Shuckburgh was directed to take necessary steps implement these three requests immediately, emphasizing importance of Arab States accepting this project at time of Cairo Foreign Ministers' meeting. I felt atmosphere was completely cordial and cooperative, on part both Foreign Minister and Shuckburgh.

Foster

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297. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

New York, September 22, 1955—5 p.m.

Dulte 1. For Hoover, Merchant and Allen from the Secretary. Today at luncheon with Lange, I spoke separately to Nutting and to Alphand about the Egyptian situation. I said we were informed definitely that there would be a substantial sale of military equipment from the Soviet Union to Egypt. I told them of my prior talk with Molotov, [2] and said I felt greatly concerned about the situation. I feared that the Israelis might insist upon attacking Egypt before the arms arrived, or if not, the Egyptians would attack the Israelis after the arms had been assimilated. I suggested our three governments consider whether we should not unitedly raise this problem with Molotov when the three Foreign Ministers meet with him next week.

Nutting said he would communicate at once with Macmillan. Alphand said he would do the same with Pinay when he arrives tomorrow morning. Alphand said that it was almost a certainty that

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2255. Secret; Priority. Received at 5:04 p.m.

[2] See Document 286.

if the arms flowed into Egypt, some of them would flow from Egypt into Libya and to the insurgents in North Africa.

Dulles

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298. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, September 22, 1955—7 p.m.

1165. Foreign Office has informed Embassy Her Majesty's Government feels unable for reasons mentioned Embassy telegram 667 [2] to press Sudanese accept Egyptian proposal for division Nile waters. Foreign Office has requested British representatives Cairo and Khartoum estimate probable reaction Egyptian and Sudanese Governments to suggestion United Kingdom, Egypt and Sudan hold technical discussions of Nile waters problem in near future. British Ambassador Cairo being authorized to sound out Nasser on this idea. Foreign Office not suggesting Ethiopian or Belgian participation in such discussions.

Foreign Office hopes discussions could be kept strictly technical rather than political. If discussions should fail to bring about solution Foreign Office thinks IBRD or other qualified organization might be asked study problem and recommend equitable solution. Failing this, Her Majesty's Government would probably recommend matter be taken to arbitration.

Regarding general Sudan situation Foreign Office informed Embassy that on September 16 Trevelyan tried discuss Sudan with Nasser but latter claimed he still unfamiliar with Sudan question and would have to give it further thought.

Foster

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/9–2255. Confidential. Received at 9:05 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Addis Ababa, and Khartoum.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 204.

299. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, September 22, 1955—8 p.m.

1167. From Russell. Deptel 1580, [2] Cairo's 528 [3] and 530 [4] to Department. I have discussed with Shuckburgh today and will discuss with him and Macmillan tomorrow some of implications of Egyptian arms deal with Soviets. Macmillan will wish to discuss question with Secretary at New York Monday or Tuesday. [5] I am leaving for Washington tomorrow evening if possible, and if not on Saturday, and will report on Foreign Office views.

In interim, following are my tentative analysis and recommendations:

1. Nasser's view is, and apparently has been, that he would be unwilling to engage in exchange of views with Israel on settlement from what he considers to be a position of weakness and that he will negotiate only after substantial change in balance of power between Egypt and Israel (Cairo telegram 528 to Department).

2. It would be impossible for U.S.–U.K. to cooperate with him in such a sizeable arms build-up in effort eventually to secure his cooperation in efforts toward Israel settlement.

3. Arab-Israel conflict holds great danger of increase in intensity and settlement must remain a primary U.S.–U.K. goal in area. U.S.–U.K. cannot realistically support either Arab countries or Israel in complete disregard of other.

4. Against the background of recently increasing Soviet interest in the Middle East we must regard Egyptian arms deal as a very serious step toward the penetration of the Western position in the Arab World and we must consider all possible steps of preventing Egypt from consummating it. The arrival of Soviet arms with technicians in Cairo, whatever Nasser may say, would lead to a grave threat to the ultimate security of the Suez Canal. Once the Soviets

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2255. Top Secret; Niact; Alpha. Received at 9:07 p.m. Repeated niact to Cairo.

[2] The Department informed Russell of the imminence of the Soviet-Egyptian arms sale agreement and observed that, "If sale materializes our ability cooperate with Egypt and Alpha tactics inevitably will be affected. You may wish discuss with UK." (Telegram 1580 to London, September 21; *ibid.*, 684A.86/9–2155)

[3] Document 293.

[4] Byroade on September 22 reported in telegram 530 that Nasser had told Ambassador Hussein on September 21 that the Soviet Union had offered "Egypt a formal guarantee of her borders if US made a security guarantee with Israel. Nasser told Hussein he had replied to Russian Ambassador that he did not wish discuss such matters." (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–2255)

[5] September 26 or 27.

obtained a foothold of this kind in Egypt, similar penetration of other Arab states would be hard to prevent.

5. The U.S. and the United Kingdom Ambassadors in Cairo should be instructed, speaking perhaps in the name of the President and the Prime Minister to make vigorous representations on the following lines:

The proposed arms deal is not just a "commercial transaction". The evidence is overwhelming that the Soviet Union uses deals of this kind only for the purpose of extending its influence and to gain special status. It would not be possible for the United Kingdom and the U.S. to provide arms to Egypt if the Soviet Union were to acquire this position in Egypt. As we have previously informed Nasser, we have anticipated being of assistance to Egypt in many ways. If Egypt is to enter into such arrangements with the Soviet Union we should be obliged to review our entire policy in regard to Egypt. Security considerations alone would make it difficult for us to envisage any sort of cooperation in military matters with a country which was receiving arms from the Soviet Union. Also this would bring Egypt into a position which we feel confident she would not wish for. Insofar as Egypt's power relationship with Israel is concerned, we believe that any effort by Egypt to change the balance of power as a pre-condition of negotiating a Palestine settlement would result only in a great increase of armaments on both sides, without any improvement of Egypt's relative position, and a consequent increase of dangerous tensions in the area. If Nasser fears to negotiate with Israel from what he believes to be a position of relative weakness we can assure him that if he is willing to negotiate a settlement which we believe sound safeguard Egypt's vital interests, we would be prepared to exert U.S. and United Kingdom influence on behalf of such a settlement. We would be prepared to discuss with him what the terms of such a settlement would be. Nasser has said to us on many occasions, and we thoroughly believe, that he desires to associate Egypt with the Free World. We believe that the considerations which have led him to contemplate a policy divergent from that are not substantial and we earnestly hope that he will discuss with us whether steps such as we have just suggested cannot be taken to accomplish at one and the same time his object of building an increasingly strong Egypt and measures designed to relax the tensions in the area.

Foster

300. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Representative at the United Nations (Dixon), New York, September 23, 1955 [1]

At 11:30 at the UN General Assembly, Sir Pierson Dixon said that he had had word from Harold Macmillan that he thought our two governments should immediately make, preferably jointly, strong protest to the Government of Egypt against its reported large purchase of Soviet arms. He said Macmillan felt that we should point out that this was not merely an incident, but would mark a basic change in relations. He thought we should do this at the earliest possible moment. He read me a copy of a memorandum on the subject, which he said he thought had been sent to the British Embassy in Washington and which was probably now before the State Department. [2]

I said I was not certain of the desirability of this approach and would want to talk about it in Washington before making a decision. I asked what Macmillan had thought about my suggestion made through Nutting that the three Ministers should jointly present the matter to Molotov when we meet with him next week in New York. [3]

Dixon seemed unaware of this suggestion, and indicated that Macmillan's message did not deal with it. He said he would communicate further with Macmillan.

Later during the proceedings, I gave Dixon to read, but not to retain, the annexed memorandum which I had received through Jernegan,—being a . . . report of the details of the presumed arms deal. [4]

JFD

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

[2] No copy of such a memorandum has been found in Department of State files.

[3] See Document 297.

[4] Attached to a copy of this memorandum of conversation in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 543, is a handwritten note from Jernegan to Dulles summarizing the contents of Armstrong's memorandum, *infra*.

301. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, September 23, 1955.

SUBJECT

Egyptian-Soviet Arms Purchase Agreement

. . . received a report . . . to the effect that on September 21 Egypt signed an "open agreement" with the USSR to run for five years, in which the Soviets committed to sell certain categories of arms and military equipment to Egypt. At the time of signing, Egypt is reported to have given the Soviets an initial order for the following items:

(1) 200 jet aircraft (100 to be delivered by December 1955, comprising 37 medium jet bombers and the remainder MIG–15's).
(2) 6 jet training planes.
(3) 100 heavy tanks.
(4) 6 torpedo patrol boats.
(5) 2 submarines.

The cost of the above order is reported to be 30 million pounds sterling Egyptian ($86 million), payable in Egyptian exports; all of the equipment is to be of Soviet manufacture, and the report states that the first shipment has left, or is about to leave Odessa by ship for Alexandria. The first shipment is said to have been inspected and accepted at Odessa by Egyptian military personnel.

. . . Soviet technicians will come to Egypt to assist in assembling the aircraft, but will stay only three months, and that no other Soviet personnel are to come to Egypt in connection with the agreement. . . . the Soviets are trying to get Nasser to use his influence with Syria and Saudi Arabia in favor of their purchasing Soviet arms.

. . . . . .

Comment: Other than for the heavy tanks, you will note that the list of equipment does not include artillery, which was reported as being offered by the USSR early in the summer. Nevertheless, receipt of the reported quantities of arms would, if the Egyptians could man and maintain them, give Egypt a numerical superiority in jet aircraft and heavy tanks over Israel (Egypt now has 52 British jet

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2355. Secret. Armstrong circulated copies of this memorandum to Hoover, Merchant, Allen, and Bowie. The source text bears a notation that Dulles saw this memorandum.

fighters and about 350 jet pilots). Israel is not known to have any medium jet bombers and to have only some 20 jet fighters, mainly French; Israel has no heavy tanks, but has about 300 medium and light tanks.

The terms of payment are only sketchily reported. Presumably, Egypt would ship cotton as the principal item in payment. The reported amount would mean over 100,000 tons of cotton if it alone were used (cotton comprises over 80 per cent of Egypt's exports). Such an amount would take about one-third of Egypt's normal exportable cotton.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

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302. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 23, 1955—2 p.m.

547. Reference London's niact 35. [2] News this Embassy in reappraisal situation following Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement will be sent as quickly as possible. Pending this I urge we not plan in haste, a vacuum and without regard to realities in area. One reality is that it is now too late for "vigorous representations" recommended in reference telegram paragraph 5. Arms deal is concluded and Egypt is convinced it can expect no early military aid from United States. Nasser's immediate concern is to quickly build defensive capability and thereby preserve his regime. If our concern is to discourage him from doing this until he has made substantial progress on Israel settlement we can expect no concurrence from him as this in his conviction puts cart before horse. In effect it asks him to place reliance on our diplomatic support as a questionable deterrent to Israel while his considerable military weakness continues unremedied. It asks him to be responsive to our own immediate objective while neglecting his own. He knows his support will vanish if he does and further insistence by us will but harden his impression that we regard him as expendable for our purposes. There still seems to be a general lack of awareness that, in opinion this Embassy at least,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2355. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Received at 4:18 p.m. Repeated priority to London.

[2] Same as Document 299.

securing arms from some source had become an internal necessity for Nasser. He has made a sweet mistake. It may be of future value to us however to recognize that we should not try to bargain under circumstances in which there is on other side virtually no freedom to so bargain.

Let us not permit project Alpha to become in itself a colossus to which every other possible move in area must be related, even though by so doing we may wreck all possible chances of seeing Alpha succeed, and as well seriously jeopardize what I suppose is still primary objective of saving Middle East from Soviet domination.

Byroade

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303. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, September 23, 1955—6 p.m. [1]

The Sec. said we had a little rough time in NY with Molotov. The Sec. said he talked about the Egyptian situation, and it seems to be authentic that they are giving a massive lot of arms to the Egyptians theoretically to be paid for by cotton—it is one hundred million dollars worth. The Sec. reported his conversation with Molotov in NY about it. [2] The British and French are alarmed. The Sec. thinks the Israelis will want to attack first because today they can lick them easily. We could counter it with a collective security arrangement in advance of any agreement with the Arabs but that would throw the Arabs in the hands of the Soviets. The Sec. was wondering as to whether it would justify a personal appeal to Bulganin. The Sec. hasn't a final recommendation to make about it—just suggesting it now. The British want a joint representation to Nasser but the Sec. doesn't think that is the point to attack it. He feels the Army will overthrow him (Nasser that is) if he refuses to take it. The Sec. doesn't think he is happy about it but he is held in power by the Army. The Sec. thinks Moscow is the place to stop it.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House. Telephone conversations. Transcribed by Bernau. According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, Dulles had returned to Washington from New York earlier that afternoon. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[2] See Document 286.

The Sec. said he thought possibly next week the 3 when they meet with Molotov might jointly raise the issue there. [3] The Sec.'s relation with Molotov is not so good and the Sec. explained what happened today. Molotov says the aerial plan is a cover-up for spying etc. The Pres. said he thought what the Sec. said re disarmament was good. The Sec. thinks Molotov represents the old school. He doesn't think that for us to talk to him about this would do any good. It appeals to his old-fashioned idea of making trouble. The Pres. said he was thinking about an answer and got a briefing this a.m. and heard about the Egyptian thing—he has been churning it around and it seems to him a temporary letter to the effect he is grateful for the detail in which he has given him his views. [4] It will take study and he will give him comments. Meantime he wants to assure him what has been said is constructive(?)—but now we learn and Molotov confirms they are considering giving arms to a country in an area where it will cause trouble. This would not then be a warning but would be in context. The Sec. mentioned drafting something—the Pres. will call at 10:30,—Sat., Sept. 24.

The Pres. said he talked with Hoover re recognition of Argentina and thinks it is fine.

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[3] Dulles, Macmillan, and Pinay were to meet the following week in New York with Molotov to concert preparations for the impending Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

[4] Reference is to Marshal Bulganin's disarmament message of September 19 to President Eisenhower, which Soviet Chargé Striganov delivered to Hoover on September 20. (Tedul 4 to USUN, September 20; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower/Bulganin Correspondence, 1955–1958)

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304. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant), Washington, September 23, 1955—6:23 p.m. [1]

The Sec. said he was talking to Denver—an interim reply is planned to the other fellow [2] and he suggested he might include in that a reference to these developments in Egypt. The Sec. told him he did not make that suggestion but had been thinking of his doing

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.

[2] Reference is to Bulganin's message of September 19. See footnote 4, *supra*.

something in that quarter. The Sec. did not see the value of doing it in the other quarter. His army will overthrow him. The Sec. told him of the British suggestion today.[3] He wants to talk it over with Merchant. The Pres. will call at 10:30 tomorrow—the Sec. will bring out to M.'s house tonight[4] a draft of something and perhaps we can have a meeting here at 8:30.[5] The Sec. asked for M.'s immediate reaction. M. said it is all right to mention it but then it seems to him it has to be followed up. Maybe the draft would give it a sufficiently solid treatment to take care of that. It is worse than nothing to mention it almost in passing without following up. M. is almost inclined to make it a separate communication. This other may be published. The Sec. suggested it could go in the same envelope. M. seemed to agree.

[3] See Document 300.

[4] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, Dulles had dinner with the Merchants at their home at 8 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[5] According to Dulles' Appointment Book, the Secretary met at 8:30 a.m., September 24, with Jernegan, Merchant, Phleger, and Allen to discuss the Soviets' sale of arms to Egypt. (*Ibid.*)

305. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, September 24, 1955, 9:02 a.m.[1]

AWD returned the call. AWD said he had an excellent trip, and the Sec. explained his schedule for the next few days. The Sec. said they were talking about the Egyptian situation.[2] They thought of various things to do. The Pres. is writing to Bulganin in reply to his letter.[3] They thought he would make a reference to it. The Sec. doesn't know how reliable our facts are. AWD said the facts seem pretty firm. The Sec. said the Israelis don't seem to be aware of this nor do the British. AWD was surprised about the British. The Sec. said he talked with Molotov[4]—he didn't deny it so the Sec. thinks there is something to it. The magnitude is the important thing. AWD referred to the report of getting light jet bombers. The Soviets

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.

[2] See footnote 5, *supra*.

[3] See footnote 4, Document 303.

[4] See Document 286.

would not give them to them and they couldn't use them. His people are certain it is signed. AWD doesn't think we are going to get far protesting to the Russians. They will say you send arms to Iran and Turkey. The Sec. said they have the legal right to, but it may lead to war. AWD said maybe that is what they want. The Sec. said he didn't think they would get far talking with Egypt—AWD sort of agreed and said we have not given them arms. They want them. The Sec. said we made them a big and liberal offer of arms. AWD didn't know about it—it probably happened when he was away. The Sec. said he really wanted to know how solid the facts were. Maybe we should wait. AWD said to wait . . . a couple of days. . . . AWD or someone will call George Allen.

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306. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 25, 1955—5 p.m.

565. Department pass USUN for Secretary. [2] For Secretary from Johnston. [3] From conversations Francis Russell London and Byroade here I understand that you are considering measures to be taken as result of Egyptian-Soviet arms agreement. While recognizing fully that many broad policy factors must be taken into consideration, I wish set forth briefly my views as to relationship Jordan valley negotiations to this question. [4]

Despite weakness of key Near Eastern Governments, frequent vacillation their leaders and frustrating delays, there is real possibility these negotiations can be carried to successful conclusion within next few weeks. Positions parties on division water and major technical issues are now so nearly identical that differences no longer stand in way understanding if nations concerned will take political plunge. Best judgment I can make is that they are now more nearly prepared do so than ever before or likely be in foreseeable future.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2555. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 4:01 p.m.

[2] A notation on the source text states that this was not done.

[3] Johnston returned from London to Cairo on September 24.

[4] Byroade reported in telegram 548 from Cairo, September 23: "Nasser sent me word yesterday not to be concerned that there might be a change in Egyptian attitude on Jordan Valley project due to recent developments. He would continue do all he could see Arabs agree to this project." (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/9–2355)

Quite aside from tremendous economic benefits plan offers all participants, its acceptance by both sides would have dramatic psychological impact on Israel-Arab relations and would probably provide genuine impetus toward political settlement US and UK are seeking. In contrast to Soviet policy of deliberate mischief-making, US achievement of plans acceptance would forcefully demonstrate to world US constructive efforts relieve tensions, avoid bloodshed and create opportunities for better life.

It should be recalled that Egypt Government throughout two years negotiation has cooperated fully in attempting bring other states to favorable conclusion water project. While some indication slackening of this support in present atmosphere, may be possible secure tacit if not active support sufficient to conclude matter successfully in immediate future. Confident you will wish take these considerations into account in any decisions you may reach regarding present Egyptian situation.

Byroade

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307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, September 26, 1955—5:18 p.m.

1676. We note Sharett's suggestions reported Tel Aviv 279 [2] are substantially identical with point a) of Dept's original proposals outlined Deptel 54 to Tel Aviv. [3] Situation is more favorable than it would have been had foreign representatives made these suggestions. We therefore believe Britain, France and other interested countries should now consider accepting Sharett's suggestions plus other steps

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.84A/9–2155. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins, cleared in substance with Tyler, and approved by Wilkins who signed for Hoover. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 295.

[3] Document 176.

proposed by us in July (Deptel 54). London and Paris requested approach FonOffs.[4]

Hoover

[4] The Embassy in London on September 27 conveyed the substance of this message to the British Foreign Office. Although willing to undertake a reconsideration of the entire question of contacts with the Israeli Foreign Minister in Jerusalem, Foreign Office representatives did not believe there had been any change in circumstances to warrant alterations in the present procedure. (Telegram 1239; Department of State, Central Files, 611.84A/9–2755) The French Foreign Ministry was approached on September 29, and the Embassy in Paris reported that the "French position, as stated earlier, [is] to provide for visits by Ambassadors to Sharett in Jerusalem on understanding he would also receive diplomats in Tel Aviv approximately as often." (Telegram 1456; *ibid.*, 601.0084A/9–2955)

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308. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, September 26, 1955—5 p.m.

571. From Johnston. Baghdad's 264 to Department September 20 [2] and Amman's 153 to Department September 24. [3]

Nasser assured me personally today Egypt will support water plan technical committee and join Lebanon, Syria, Jordan in supporting political acceptance in League Council. Nasser said he would undertake arrange concurrence Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Libya but US would have to handle Iraq. I assume in view Baghdad's reference telegram no difficulty with Iraq anticipated. [4]

Byroade

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/9–2655. Confidential. Received at 8:34 p.m. Also sent to Baghdad and repeated to London, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Tel Aviv, Jidda, and Paris.

[2] It reported that so far as Gallman was aware, the Iraqis were still prepared to go along with the decision of the riparian states on the Johnston proposals. (*Ibid.*, 786.00/9–2055)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 786.00/9–2455)

[4] Gallman responded in telegram 294 from Baghdad, September 28, that Bashayan had told him the previous evening that Iraq would support whatever position was adopted by the other Arab States. (*Ibid.*, 786.00/9–2855)

309. *Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the* Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, September 26, 1955—2 p.m.

98. Following are most recent developments El Auja area (Contel 97 to Department). [2]

September 24 chairman of EIMAC reported to UNTSO that Egyptians have increased personnel their positions along border of D/Z and that Israelis have likewise moved additional troops into the D/Z or area bordering it. Observers report two companies Egyptian troops established within D/Z west of Birein since about September 24. Also, Israeli half-tracks estimated at about fifty or more seen moving south from Beersheba same date. Chairman considers possibility outbreak hostilities now seriously increased.

Burns has today addressed communication to parties calling upon them to withdraw simultaneously their forces from D/Z and to implement all clauses of article roman eight of GAA and withdrawal, under supervision of UNTSO, to begin September 28 at 1000 GMT and to be completed by 1600 GMT same date. Burns asks that each party signify acceptance above terms by 1600 GMT September 27.

Burns concurs with estimate of MAC chairman that El Auja situation obviously serious. However, as possible favorable symptom he stated Israelis are now allowing observers move freely about area, but have cautioned them of existence of mines without identifying places where mines located. When Burns saw Tekoah yesterday latter said GOI would make its acceptance Burns appeal conditional on Egyptian agreement not to interfere with a resurvey of the border by Israelis. Burns replied to effect that he thought Egyptians would agree to survey under UNTSO auspices, that the matter could be dealt with later, and that he could not at this time go into such questions as conditions proposed by Tekoah. Burns also told me that on August 24 Gohar assured him that the two Egyptian checkposts which encroached into the D/Z would be drawn back, but that has not been done.

Burns considers it probable that parties will take no action respecting his request for withdrawal D/Z unless tripartite powers

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–2655. Confidential; Niact. Received at 9:50 p.m., September 16. Repeated niact to Cairo and Tel Aviv and priority to London, Paris, USUN, and Amman. Both the date and the time of receipt are evidently in error. See footnote 3 below.

[2] Dated September 24, it reported additional details regarding the El Auja incident reported in Document 292. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/9–2455)

urge them do so. He would therefore appreciate support of US Government.[3]

Cole

[3] At 6:07 p.m., September 26, the Department, in response to telegram 98 from Jerusalem, informed the Embassy in Tel Aviv in telegram 218 and the Embassy in Cairo in telegram 594 that they were "authorized consult with your British and French colleagues and if they receive similar instructions from their Governments, separately to approach Egyptian and Israel FonOffs in support of efforts of Burns to obtain troop withdrawal from El Auja area in accordance with Article 8 GAA." (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/9–2655)

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310. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, September 26, 1955, 9:45 p.m. [1]

POM(NY) MC–1

PARTICIPANTS

US:
The Secretary
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Russell
Mr. Burdett

UK:
Mr. Macmillan
Sir Roger Makins
Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Patrick Hancock

SUBJECT

Egypt—Purchase of Arms from USSR

Mr. Macmillan: I took advantage of a call by the Egyptian Ambassador on September 23 to express very strong concern regarding the reports of an Egyptian-Soviet arms agreement. From New York, I sent a telegram asking our Ambassador in Cairo to seek particulars from Nasser and to repeat to him the strong language used in London.

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 555. Top Secret. Dated September 30. A note on the source text states that it is not a verbatim report but a paraphrase from notes. The drafter is not indicated.

Mr. Dulles: Persons in whom we have confidence confirmed from Nasser today that an agreement of the character reported has been made. The size of the shipments was not indicated but the presumption is that the detailed information we received previously is correct. Our representatives made known our concern and set out the grave consequences for Egypt. We are faced by a difficult situation. We could give arms aid or a security guarantee to Israel but this would only involve us in a cycle. We could throw more weight behind the Turk-Iraq-Pakistan Pact and try to isolate Egypt. Up to now we have supported the Northern Tier but have not been eager to have Arab states bordering on Israel join; nor have we desired to build up an Iraqi challenge to Egypt's position of leadership in the Arab world.

If the French agree, the three of us could speak to Molotov.[2] I raised the matter with him on September 20.[3] I said I thought it was a grave step which would increase area tension and expressed the hope that the reports were untrue. He unconvincingly tried to pass it off by saying it was a commercial sale with no political implications. In the US the development will have serious effects because of widespread anti-Communist feelings accentuated by the powerful influence in the Jewish press. It will disturb the new atmosphere between Soviets and the Western Powers. I mentioned the matter to Alphand, who was concerned and feared that Soviet arms might filter through Egypt and Libya to North Africa. I doubt that the Soviets will stop the deal but they might moderate the amounts.

Mr. Macmillan: We are faced by a major issue. I have not been able to understand why the Soviets have not made this move previously. It constitutes an aggressive entrance into a new area.

We could reward the "good boys" and punish the bad. We could extend more help to the Turk-Iraq Pact. We are now considering issuing a statement indicating we would welcome Iranian entrance into the Pact. We would not extend additional guarantees, but the statement we have in mind might be helpful to the Iranian Government. We could also give Iraq more equipment and encourage Jordan and Lebanon to join the Pact.

Mr. Dulles: We could become involved in an expensive process because the Soviets have available obsolescent equipment with which they can make attractive offers which we would be hard-put to meet. Saudi Arabia and Syria particularly might be tempted to accept.

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[2] Dulles, Macmillan, and Pinay spoke with Molotov on the subject of the Soviets' selling arms to Egypt on September 27 at 9:30 p.m. For a summary of this conversation, see Document 317.

[3] See Document 286.

I believe the transaction will go far to shatter the spirit of Geneva. I mentioned it to Casey, MacDonald and Pearson and all felt it was bad business. It is a reckless proceeding by Moscow which will only intensify the strains in the area. I do not know what Israel will do.

Mr. Russell: Israel is frightened of a situation in which the Arabs can rush in and bargain off their resources between the USSR and the West. Israel knows she has nothing comparable to offer.

Mr. Macmillan: We should approach Molotov now. It is impossible to believe in the co-existence of two worlds, if the Soviets choose this moment to make such a mischievous move.

Mr. Shuckburgh: Molotov could reply that the USSR would be glad to stop if the West would cease efforts to build up military defense arrangements. He could ask whether we are interested in a neutral Middle East.

Mr. Dulles: Our efforts are directed at an Arab-Israel settlement. We should consider the Russian move in the context of its effects on the prospects for such a settlement. The whole world has recognized that the Alpha proposals are fair. The USSR offer will destroy them. We are not talking of the Northern Tier or our efforts to prevent Soviet aggression. This matter is completely apart from our differences regarding the value of collective security arrangements.

Mr. Macmillan: With Molotov we should stick to the argument that the arms offer will adversely affect prospects for an Arab-Israel settlement.

At the same time we should not abandon efforts at getting Nasser to abandon the arrangement.

Mr. Dulles: If Nasser rejects the offer, he may well be overthrown and we could get someone worse.

Mr. Macmillan: We must try a combination of the carrot and the stick. We could help Nasser as well as hurt him in the Sudan. We could permit him to purchase the minimum arms necessary to keep his position and the US could help him with the high dam at Aswan.

Mr. Dulles: We might be able to sweeten up our arms offer, but we are not in a position to do much with respect to grant military assistance without causing trouble with Israel.

Mr. Macmillan: We could turn to the stick. Nasser cannot have thought out all the consequences of his move. We could tell him frankly that we cannot tolerate it. It is a breach at least of the spirit of the Suez base agreement. The world will not allow the USSR to become the guardian of the Suez Canal. We could make life impossible for Nasser and ultimately bring about his fall by various pressures.

The development is certain to be attacked by the Right Wing Tories in the UK on the grounds that we left Egypt and let the USSR in. The Tories will claim that this is the result of Mr. Eden's moderate policies.

Mr. Dulles: Mr. Shuckburgh and Mr. Russell might draw up a paper covering the above points for our consideration. [4] Mr. Macmillan's comments regarding the Suez base are very important. We did not all work so hard to get a Suez base agreement in order to turn the base over to the Soviets.

In the United States we will not be able to put a good face on the matter. It will be regarded as a major defeat.

Mr. Macmillan: We have not yet completed our withdrawal from the Suez base and a demand might arise in Parliament to stop withdrawal. If we had your support, we might call the whole thing off.

Mr. Russell: If we could get Nasser to move on Alpha we would want to telescope our tactics. We might discuss with Nasser in detail the settlement we have in mind and then present this to Israel. The above course immediately involves the question of whether the US and the UK are prepared to exert pressure on Israel.

Mr. Dulles: We cannot make a deal with Egypt without prior consultation with Israel. We must continue to serve as a friend of both sides.

If Egypt lines up with the USSR, I doubt that US public opinion would permit us to use coercive restraints in the event of an Israel attack. The only reason Egypt doesn't attack Israel now is that she knows we will take restraining action.

Mr. Shuckburgh: Can the Soviet-Egyptian agreement be used to persuade Israel that she had better make more substantial concessions than we previously had in mind?

Mr. Dulles: I believe Israel would be more disposed now to make a settlement. She might give up a bigger slice of the Negev.

Mr. Macmillan: If we think Israel will accept what we consider a fair settlement, we could then offer this to Egypt.

Mr. Russell: If Nasser maintains he is unable to withdraw from the arrangement now, perhaps we could still work matters out if he would agree immediately to an Alpha settlement and would strictly limit the arms purchased from the USSR to those definitively contracted for.

Mr. Macmillan: Nasser would have to agree to exclude any Russian technicians.

Mr. Dulles: I agree with the suggestion, but we must also work to soften up the USSR.

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[4] No such document has been found in Department of State files.

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, September 27, 1955—11:05 a.m.

Tedul 2. Following text of first message . . . dated September 26 [2] mentioned this morning by Under Secretary:

In three and half hour meeting . . . , Nasr indicated he pleased cooperate . . . "on personal and unofficial basis" to find way out of difficulties which he now realizes will follow Soviet Arms Agreement. Drew line at making outright conciliatory gesture towards immediate future ("deaths Egyptian soldiers too fresh in memories our people") but agreed to go along with . . . suggestion to issue public statement asserting peaceful intentions and stating desire discuss directly with Secretary Dulles concrete steps to reduce Arab-Israeli tensions. Foll procedure adopted: . . . write statement in terms which would get favorable reception U.S.: Nasr will then do whatever editing he feels is required to make statement palatable Arab world. Upon . . . agreement on final text, enquiry will be made of Department to ascertain that its issuance will have good chance of, at least "softening blow".

Although Nasr talked at length of his country's determination, if necessary, to "fight Israeli indefinitely on Guerilla basis with knives, etc.," he did not appear at first able to recognize and face the magnitude of the damaging consequences certain to follow implementation Soviet arms deal. He later appeared to be quite moved by . . . prognostications ("speaking stricting [*strictly*] unofficially and as old friend") of what is in store for him, and wanted make it clear that although he "not a stooge" he yet willing follow our advice to extent such advice made sense to him. (This in spite of damaging effect of A.P. story which arrived during meeting. To be subject separate cable.) [3]

Although we feel Nasr prepared go considerable length in cooperation . . . , we still somewhat uneasy in that he appears be merely taking our word that his position is difficult and may not be disposed to act from real personal conviction. We convinced, however, that Nasr absolutely sincere in his belief that acquirement of arms was an absolute necessity, not only for his survival but that of his country; that in spite of repeated efforts on his part, U.S. could not or would not give him the kind of deal he needed; that he can

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2755. Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by Barnes who signed for Hoover.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 033.1180/9–2155)

[3] Telegram 573 from Cairo, September 27, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 774.56/9–2755)

withstand any Soviet attempts gain influence over him: He is equally confident he has capability carry to conclusion successful war with Israel "Guerilla basis" and is determined that "Ben Gurion will not dictate foreign policy". On other hand he has faith in Secretary Dulles and easily accepted suggestion that should he have opportunity of talking directly with Secretary something profitable both sides would be forthcoming.

Our conviction, which fully shared by Byroade and Eric Johnston is that Nasr remains our best, if not our only, hope here. Johnston says flatly that Nasr is only man who can put his water scheme across. Therefore all feel most strongly that we must make every effort mitigate the evil effects of Nasr's mistake which largely result of concentrating on one problem (the Army and its essentiality to his survival) to the complete exclusion of all others. Pls confirm urgently our feeling that statement of kind suggested would do at least *some* good. So far it seems to us best we can salvage from bad situation. Would welcome any suggestions.

. . . Hope we can have Washington reaction in time to have full discussion with Nasr before departure. End Message

Hoover

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312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, September 27, 1955—11:05 a.m.

Tedul 3. Following text second message also dated September 26 . . . :

"Nasr personally confirmed to me that he has concluded agreement whereby Soviets will provide him with Jet fighters, medium Jet bombers, tanks, artillery, PT boats and other heavy equipment. Did not mention submarines. He either did not wish to be or could not be precise about types or quantities. Did say that first shipment would arrive late October. Except for this statement, and very general ones made . . . by Ahmad Husayn to Byroade, all our reports have been from clandestine sources, which give more detail but which may not be reliable on every point. I credit them with

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2755. Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by Barnes who signed for Hoover.

reporting accurately what they have been able to learn, but am by no means convinced that the sources of our sources could tell one Jet from another. Nasr was puzzled by my interest in the medium Jet bombers (offered to sell us one if we interested) and unable to tell us the caliber of the artillery he is getting.

"Perhaps we should have emphasized in the first message that Nasr made great point of his success in keeping arms negotiations secret to date. Explained that he had conscientiously been keeping U.S. Govt informed, i.e., first through Byroade, later . . . (when Nasr became angry at Byroade for having discussed matter with British Ambassador) . . . through Ahmad Husayn. We were able to convince Nasr, although not without difficulty, that secret of this sort is impossible to keep and that he would do well to take steps to insure that its eventual release is accomplished in manner least harmful to him. It is possible that his realizing this was principal factor in moving him to make statement we suggested (See Tedul 2 [2]) and otherwise cooperate with us.

"AP story giving accurate account of what we have reported on Soviet deal [3] is most disturbing and dangerous to our intelligence capabilities here."

Hoover

[2] *Supra.*
[3] See footnote 3, *supra.*

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313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, September 27, 1955—11:06 a.m.

Tedul 4. Following is text of reply sent by Allen Dulles in reply to previous two messages:

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2755. Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by Barnes, who signed for Hoover.

"1. Your messages discussed with Herb [2] and read to Francis [3] for Secstate in New York.

A. We assume you completely satisfied deal is as firm as Nasr indicates.

B. Will carefully consider statement proposed to be issued by Nasr but believe it most important that he realize that no statement can successfully mitigate effects of proposed deal. Hence you should not create impression on Nasr who might be acutely disappointed by actual reaction of public here. Furthermore we cannot insure that any such statement would relieve State Dept. of necessity of making some statement on its own which would be condemnatory of proposed arrangement.

C. We are in general agreement with conclusions your paragraph 4 that Nasr remains our best hope and we believe State Dept. will within limits of overall policy cooperate to mitigate long term effects of arms deal if Nasr in turn cooperates as foreshadowed your cable.

D. Accordingly if Byroade concurs suggest you carry on along general lines you have outlined keeping foregoing cautions in mind.

E. Only possible alternative we see is for Nasr to issue no statement, to continue to keep formalized deal secret in the hope that practical operations under agreement will be less spectacular and possibly disappointing to Nasr and will give long term chance to help stabilize situation. I only suggest this because I am apprehensive of the effects here of any statement by Nasr no matter how carefully hedged with protestations of peaceful intent, etc. We note that you tend reject this solution in para 2 your 710. [4]

F. Appreciate unfortunate effects of situation described para 3 your 710 and would be glad have any suggestion as to any action here which would help to restore situation. Our friend should realize that rumors on this subject have been widely spread throughout press over past days.

G. So far State Dept. has had no reaction from Israelis of any sort whatsoever."

Hoover

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[2] Herbert Hoover, Jr.
[3] Francis H. Russell.
[4] Not printed.

314. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

New York, September 27, 1955—7 p.m.

Dulte 4. From Secretary for Hoover. Following is proposed telegram to Cairo. From Secretary.

I discussed with Macmillan last evening action which US and UK should take as result of Egypt–USSR arms purchase agreement. [2] We are agreed that, if carried through, it would inevitably have most serious adverse consequences with respect to: (a) increased tension in area; (b) Soviet penetration of and increased influence in area; and (c) US–UK relations with Egypt. We therefore agreed: (1) to make, with Pinay, approach to Molotov whom we are seeing this evening, [3] informing him that the whole "spirit of Geneva" would be seriously jeopardized, if not permanently damaged, by this move on part of Soviets, which can only inflame Arab-Israel relations, and which comes immediately after major move on part of US that has received world-wide political support to bring about a settlement of principal Arab-Israel issues; and (2) make simultaneous US–UK approaches to Nasser (in which French may also join although we will not urge them to do so.)

I therefore wish you to see Nasser at earliest possible opportunity and deliver to him the personal letter from me contained in the immediately following telegram [4] and say that I have asked you also to give him following oral message from me.

"Regardless of what Moscow may say, or what Nasser may quite sincerely like to believe, arms agreement of the nature he contemplates constitutes a major step by the Soviet Union to: create trouble in the area by fanning the flames of an arms race; gain as large a measure of penetration and influence there as possible; and, through both these means, work toward Soviet dominance. It will be an easy thing for the Soviet Union to so arrange matters that the equipment they provide will be useless without continuing and increasing Soviet technician support and supply of parts and ammunition. Once the total equipment of the Egyptian army has incorporated Russian material to the extent contemplated in the

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2755. Top Secret; Niact; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 6:39 p.m. Repeated by the Department at 11 p.m. to Cairo for action. Repeated on October 2 to Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Karachi, Moscow, Paris, and London. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/10–255) A copy of the telegram on USUN stationery, filed with the source text, indicates that it was drafted by Russell, cleared with Dulles, and approved by Russell, who initialed for Dulles.

[2] See Document 310.

[3] See Document 317.

[4] *Infra.*

Egyptian-Soviet arms agreement, Egypt will be dependent upon continued Soviet good will and cooperation, since failure to continue a supply of spare parts would render such a large proportion of Egyptian arms useless. It is by similarly innocuous-looking initial measures that the Soviet Union has brought about a vise-like control of one country after another. The Soviet Union also, of course, must recognize that an inflow of arms of this amount into Egypt will result in Israel's seeking similar acquisitions and quite possibly forcing issues at this time leading to all-out warfare in the area before Egypt was able to benefit from an increase in its arms.

As Nasser knows, the US exerted its influence to bring about a settlement of the Suez base problem, looking to Egyptian sovereignty over the base. It goes without saying that we made this effort in the expectation that Egypt would retain its independence and would not succumb to efforts by the Communist world to bring about a situation where the base would be controlled by Soviet equipment dependent upon Soviet provision of parts, to which increasingly onerous conditions could be attached.

Nasser must have in mind also that the US has endeavored to show its earnest desire to help and support Egypt and his regime. We have been, and would continue to be, willing in cooperation with the British to exert influence upon the Sudan to secure an agreement on division of the Nile waters. We have been and would continue to be willing, in context of Egypt–Israel settlement, to grant assistance, in addition to any loan the World Bank might make, in the construction of the Aswan Dam. We have endeavored to handle our cotton surplus with a maximum regard for Egypt's export needs.

With respect to the furnishing of arms, Nasser will recall that, following the conclusion of the Suez base agreement, we offered to provide grant military assistance provided Egypt would sign the usual form of agreement required by US legislation. More recently, we approved Nasser's request to purchase US arms. Subsequently he has asked for special financial facilities, which we would be prepared to provide in the context of his cooperation in carrying out the recommendations in my August 26 speech.

We believe, on the basis of Nasser's frequent statements, that the Egyptian Government is convinced that Egypt's best hope for future political and economic growth lies in close cooperation with the West. This we most earnestly desire. We appreciate that Nasser has, for the purposes of his personal leadership and the stability of the present regime, need of an early acquisition of military equipment. We are told that finance has not been a main obstacle with respect to the Egyptian Government's purchase of arms from Britain; and, given Nasser's cooperation in my August 26 effort to prevent an early outbreak of hostilities or a disastrous arms race in the area, arrangements could be made to facilitate Egypt's purchase of arms in the US. The only thing therefore that separates him from acquiring the arms which he needs from the West, with whom he has repeatedly stated Egypt's destiny lies, is his cooperation in removing the obstacles mentioned in my August 26 speech. At that time I set forth the contribution which the US is prepared to make to that end. Indeed, on this Nasser has stated that he would be willing to announce publicly that he is prepared to discuss with me steps leading to the implementation of my proposals. It may not be

possible to arrange immediately a meeting between Nasser and myself, especially with the imminent possibility of publicity of Egypt's intention to receive Soviet arms. It should be possible, however, for Nasser to begin with us an immediate exchange of views on this problem, thus preventing an early outbreak of all-out war in the area, which could only be disastrous for Egypt or, alternatively, a greatly stepped-up arms race between Israel and Egypt, with the danger of greater disaster in the future. For all these reasons, I most earnestly urge upon Nasser that he not proceed with his plans to receive arms from the Soviet Union."

FYI. Your British colleague is receiving instructions to make similar representation to Nasser.

In event Nasser is unwilling to cancel the Soviet arms deal, we shall have to review what the effect of his persistence in the deal will be. There will, beyond any question, be a major public reaction in Great Britain over Egypt's permitting Soviet penetration into the area so quickly after British relinquishment of the base to Egypt. It would be equally certain that public and congressional opinion in the US would prevent US assistance on the Aswan Dam and other economic aid at a time when Egypt was jeopardizing its ability to remain a fully independent member of the free world. We are aware of the danger of taking action that would further alienate Egypt, but the public reaction to Egypt's new policy is something which it would be beyond our power to control.

We do not believe that any statement by Nasser about Egypt's peaceful intent in making arms pact with Soviet will serve to mitigate in any substantial degree inevitable public reaction in US and elsewhere and he should not be encouraged to believe that it would. [5]

Dulles

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[5] Byroade, in a telegram to the Secretary, asserted that "neither I nor any member of embassy staff under my control have taken any part in encouraging Nasser make statement along lines last paragraph Dulte 4." (Telegram 590 from Cairo, September 28; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2855)

315. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

New York, September 27, 1955—7 p.m.

Dulte 5. From Secretary for Hoover. Following is proposed telegram to Cairo:

Verbatim text. DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I wish to bring to you most urgently my deep concern over reports of the conclusion of an agreement by the Egyptian Government for the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union. It is possible that you may not have realized fully the seriousness with which such a transaction will be viewed in the United States and the consequent difficulty of preventing it from marring the existing good relations between our two peoples.

Since the establishment of the present Government in Egypt, the United States has worked with it in the expectation that a solid basis would evolve for cooperation between Egypt and the nations of the West. We have placed full confidence in your repeated assurances regarding Egypt's identification with the West. We extended assistance during the negotiations of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan and the Suez Base Agreement in the belief that they would make possible close Egyptian cooperation with the West. Our economic assistance programs, Atomic Energy Program, approval of arms purchases, and my statement of August 26 on the Arab-Israel situation are all based on the same general thought. We have tried to handle our cotton surplus in ways which will not prejudice Egypt's economy and have otherwise sought to support that economy. I am convinced that the economic and social progress you so deeply desire for the Egyptian people can come best through continued association with the West.

The proposed agreement with the Soviet Union inevitably undermines the basic premise upon which we have worked in the past and sets Egypt upon a course which may well separate her progressively from her natural and long-term friends. The agreement cannot be considered a simple commercial transaction. It has deep political meaning. The record of the Soviet Union in this respect is clear. Initial, supposedly friendly gestures, lead quickly to subversion, inextricable involvement in the Communist orbit, and loss of that independence of action which Egypt rightly values so highly.

On the basis of our past cooperation, I feel justified in asking you to ponder carefully the consequences of the course you are now embarking upon. It is my firm belief that it would only augment existing tensions in the area and work to the detriment of the Egyptian people. I am asking Ambassador Byroade to give you my further views and I am hopeful that, as in the past, we will together

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–2755. Top Secret; Niact; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 6:54 p.m. Repeated by the Department at 11 p.m. to Cairo for action. Repeated on October 2 to Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Karachi, Moscow, Paris, and London. A copy of the telegram on USUN stationery, filed with the source text, indicates that it was drafted and approved by Russell, who initialed for Dulles. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/10–255)

find a way further to promote close association between our two countries.

Faithfully yours, John Foster Dulles. *End verbatim text.*

Dulles

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316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, September 27, 1955—6:54 p.m.

226. Israel Ambassador called his request on Assistant Secretary Allen twenty-seventh. [2] Stated he instructed call Depts attention grave concern with which IG viewed press reports US attempting counter Russian moves toward Egypt by offering large quantities American arms on easy terms to Egyptians. Allen repeated points made by Dept spokesman to press on twenty-sixth (Deptels 593 and 599 to Cairo; [3] rptd Tel Aviv, pouched Arab caps) emphasizing US policy of striving prevent arms race in Near East. Eban appeared reassured and paid tribute US practice of weighing requests to purchase arms, even Israel requests, in light general policy considerations. [4] Stated practice placed US on higher moral plane than certain European states which evidently considered arms sales as "commercial transactions."

Passing to reports re Egyptian-Soviet arms sale agreement, Eban recalled statement made in Mosc[illegible]o Israel Ambassador [5] Sept 12 whereby rumors of impending USSR-Egyptian arms deals were

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2755. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Allen who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Cairo, London, Paris, Moscow, USUN, and pouched to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/9–2755)

[3] On September 26, a Department of State spokesman issued a statement to the press which, in part, said that Egypt on June 30 had given the United States a list of weapons it hoped to obtain in the United States, and, "Although the United States agreed in principle to sell Egypt a certain amount of arms no arrangements have been effected to finance the purchase. Consequently, no transaction has taken place." (Telegram 593 to Cairo; *ibid.*, 774.56/9–2655) Telegram 599 to Cairo, September 26, contained another statement which had been given to the press and was designed to supplement the earlier statement transmitted to Cairo in telegram 593. (*Ibid.*)

[4] Lawson reported on September 30 that he had spoken with Sharett the preceding day, that Sharett had already read Eban's telegraphic report of his conversation with Allen, and that Sharett was "reassured" as well that the United States had not sold any arms to Egypt. (Telegram 307 from Tel Aviv; *ibid.*, 774.56/9–3055)

[5] Brigadier General Joseph Avidar.

dismissed as "fantasy". Eban stated if in fact USSR and Egypt had concluded arrangement, it appeared two courses open to Israel: 1) requesting friendly powers use their influence with USSR and Egyptians to cause them desist from implementing agreement. If this unsuccessful, then 2) Israel would be forced request that she be given sufficient arms from West to maintain balance of power. Said Israel would much prefer first solution.

Hoover

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317. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, September 27, 1955, 9:30 p.m. [1]

POM(NY) MC–6

PARTICIPANTS

US:
The Secretary
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Phleger
Mr. Bowie
Mr. McCardle
Mr. Merchant

USSR:
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Troyanovsky
Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Malik
Mr. Zarubin
Mr. Kuznetzov

UK:
Mr. Macmillan
Mr. Hancock
Mr. Roger Makins
Sir Geoffrey Harrison
Sir Anthony Nutting
Lord Hood

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[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 556. Secret. Drafted on September 30. No other drafting information is given on the source text.

France:
M. Pinay
M. Couve de Murville
M. Sauvagnargues
M. Soutou
M. Andronikof
M. Daridan

Following a discussion on arrangements for the forthcoming Geneva Conference, and on UN membership (both covered by separate memoranda),[2] Secretary Dulles asked the other three Foreign Ministers whether there were any other matters they would like to discuss.

Mr. Macmillan said that he would like to raise another question on which his Government took a very serious view. He believed that everyone should be trying to find ways to ease world problems. And in this connection, he felt obliged to say very frankly that his Government was disturbed over recent events which were not calculated to calm difficulties in an important part of the World, but on the contrary, were calculated to increase such difficulties and tensions. He said he referred to the furnishing of Soviet arms to Egypt. One of the problems which was worrying his Government a great deal was that of the growing tension between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries as evidenced by the recent incidents which were symptomatic of danger and tension. Mr. Macmillan said that the UK and certain countries were doing all that was possible to keep developments in the Middle East within tolerable bounds and prevent serious disturbances. In this connection, efforts were being made as a part of that policy to meet legitimate requests from Israel and the Arab countries for arms; but, in meeting these requests, a reasonable balance was being maintained. If Mr. Molotov would allow him to speak very frankly, he must say that UK is very much disturbed to hear of arrangements whereby Egypt would receive very considerable arms from the Soviet Union. The UK felt that any deliveries on the scale which had been reported would increase the arms race between Israel and the Arab countries and lead to demands from other countries for similar increases in armaments. This would, in turn, create a dangerous situation and greatly increase tensions in that part of the World. He said that he would appeal to Mr. Molotov to prevent such increased tension and danger since this would not be compatible with the expressed desire of the Soviet Union to ease tensions. On the contrary, it would lead to additional

[2] Not printed; memoranda of conversations covering these subjects are *ibid.*, CF 551.

strain. This was important because when the four Foreign Ministers meet in Geneva late in October, they should meet in an atmosphere conducive to progress and not one of stress. The UK Government felt strongly that the Soviet action in furnishing arms was not compatible with the general détente which they professed to desire. He therefore earnestly hoped that Mr. Molotov would keep this in mind since all the Foreign Ministers wished to meet in Geneva in an atmosphere in keeping with what the four Heads of Government had hoped for.

Mr. Molotov said that perhaps he was not sufficiently prepared to exchange views on this subject but nonetheless he had a few observations to make. He had had a talk with Secretary Dulles recently about this matter.[3] He had left Moscow only recently, but up to the time of his departure, "not a single rifle or bullet had been sold to any country in that area". He did know that certain requests had been made of the Soviet Government and said that the Soviet Government did not refuse to discuss such transactions on a commercial basis. As for the area mentioned by Mr. Macmillan, the Soviet view coincided with that of Mr. Macmillan. The Soviet Government would like relations among such countries not to become more acute. With respect to the question of arms sales, he was not clear as to how it was being posed to him. He said, "We have not been discussing these kinds of matters, but perhaps it would be useful to do so. Do you, Mr. Macmillan, propose that we exchange information on such transactions?" Mr. Macmillan said that any step to preserve a balance would be useful and he would be grateful for anything Mr. Molotov might be able to contribute. He wished only to reaffirm the serious apprehensions of his Government on any steps which would change the balance between the countries in this area and lead to a serious increase of tension.

Mr. Molotov said he was grateful to Mr. Macmillan for his frank observations and would inform his Government.

The Secretary said he would like to add a word. As Mr. Molotov had mentioned, he had had a brief conversation with Mr. Molotov last Tuesday.[4] Since then, our information had become more precise. He thought in all candor that he should express his Government's views on this matter. This was not a theoretical and academic matter as to whether nations should sell arms or exchange information on arms sales. It was a very serious practical matter at this moment. There were in the US millions of peoples of high and low estate who hoped that out of Geneva would come a real improvement in relations between our countries. The Secretary said

[3] See Document 286.
[4] September 20.

he thought that he was right in forecasting that, if at this juncture there were large shipments of arms to Egypt, the result would be largely to dissipate all these hopes. It could be argued that this should not happen and that arms shipments were only something that had been done in the past. However, the fact is that whether it is right or wrong, it will produce such a shock.

The Secretary said that in a talk he had with the President late Friday afternoon [5] before the latter was stricken [6] the President had expressed his deep concern on this matter and said he was planning to write a letter on Saturday to Premier Bulganin. Because of illness, the letter was not written, but the Secretary thought that Premier Bulganin, through Molotov, should know what was in the President's mind.

Mr. Molotov said that he had little to add.

Mr. Pinay said he would like to associate himself with what Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Dulles had said. He said that France had particular reason to be concerned and believed that the Soviet action was contrary to the "spirit of Geneva".

Mr. Molotov said that if Mr. Pinay had concluded his remarks he would like to say that he believed that there were "no grounds for any disturbance or concern on this". So far as he knew, arms deliveries being made by others to countries in the area were considerably larger than in this particular case. He said he had inquired whether the suggestion was to exchange mutual information on such transactions. In any event, he would inform his Government fully of the discussions that had taken place this evening.

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[5] See Document 303.

[6] President Eisenhower suffered a heart attack at about 1:30 a.m. on September 24.

318. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in New York and the Acting Secretary of State in Washington, September 28, 1955, 9:58 a.m. [1]

H. returned the call, and said last night Allen called.[2] The Sec. said he called him this morning. The Sec. said it looks like we ought to call him back right away for consultation.[3] H. agrees but the question is how does it look under these circumstances. There are a number of problems that will wait until H. sees the Sec. H. does not know how he is going to be able to deliver the papers[4] in view of the telegram last night.[5] Allen read the wire to the Sec. H. said that was the basic thinking he had in having . . . go over so H. is not surprised. The Sec. said we are in a dilemma because the Sec. does not believe he can effectively deliver those notes. If we pull him back, it looks like we are breaking relations. H. said Johnston[6] . . . cannot do it. On the other hand, we might send Allen[7] there. The Sec. mentioned Hare but he does not have a senior position as Allen does. H. said if George goes over—we have had Robertson do that. H. thought we might make such a thing permanent though not at the moment. This would pave the way. The Sec. said the idea to send him over now is excellent. How quickly could he get away. H. will explore it and have schedules looked up. The Sec. said we might get help from the military people from Europe—they could get him to Cairo. The Sec. said if he gets to Paris, Gruenther could probably fix him up. The Sec. said he hopes to be down about 4 and will be in the office.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.

[2] No record of the telephone conversation has been found.

[3] Reference apparently is to Ambassador Byroade in Cairo.

[4] See Documents 314 and 315.

[5] No copy of this message has been found in Department of State files. For Miles Copeland's account of the circumstances that occasioned the transmission of this message to the Department of State and for its repercussions, see his *The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), pp. 160–165.

[6] Reference is to Ambassador Eric Johnston, who was also in Cairo at that time.

[7] Reference is to George Allen.

319. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in New York and Department of State Officials in Washington, September 28, 1955, 12:41 p.m. [1]

Hoover said Allen was with him and put him on. Allen leaves NY at 6 and perhaps we could make the occasion that A. has been in his post for several months and had been trying to get to the area to talk about problems. He mentioned Athens, Beirut, and Cairo and possibly Saudi-Arabia. A. asked if the Sec. thought he should include Israel and the Sec. said he thinks so. They agreed to leave Saudi-Arabia out, and A. will do as much extra as to give a cover to the trip. A. thinks Byroade will have presented the letter. The Sec. suggested calling him and telling him to hold it and A. can take the original. [2] A. leaves Pan-Am. at 6. The Sec. said he thinks he is fine to do this. The Sec. said in view of the info re Byroade we should get A. there. He is to find out re the relationship between Byroade and Nasser. The Sec. said it is impossible to have a crisis and no recourse to the head of govt. A. questioned saying something re why he is going—just say, said the Sec., to discuss etc. current matters in the area. The Sec. repeated he should get word to Byroade to hold up the letter. A. said it will be awkward to tell him we don't want him to deliver it. The Sec. said he did not know why—it is more effective to do it by presenting the original from the Sec.

A. said Jernegan is supposed to go Monday and A. was talking with Henderson and he thinks he could spare Hare for A.'s desk. The Sec. said all right. The Sec. said A. should be gone 10 days at the most, and suggested he spend 2–3 days in Cairo and have talks with the British Amb. and get the feel of the situation.

Hoover got on. He called Radford and set the wheels in motion for Gruenther to supply a plane. H. asked if the Sec. brought the matter up with Molotov and the Sec. said they did. [3] Macmillan at the Sec.'s suggestion started to talk as the Sec. had done it before. He made a pretty good statement. But he does not express himself clearly. Molotov replied by saying Mr. Dulles had taken it up and as far as Molotov knows, nothing has gone to Egypt. He was very evasive. Molotov queried their having a general system of reciprocal info in this area re arms. The Sec. said this is not an academic matter to argue about reciprocal info. It is a practical situation etc. etc. He

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.

[2] Telegram 616 to Cairo, September 28, instructed Byroade not to deliver the message sent in Documents 314 and 315, "since Allen bringing original for presentation." (Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2855)

[3] See Document 317.

mentioned that it is destructive of the spirit of Geneva. He said he spoke to the Pres. [4] and Sat. the Pres. was going to write first thing to Bulganin, but became ill and couldn't. Pinay spoke up rather ineffectually. Molotov was non-committal and evasive. Hoover said he gave Byroade's background to Allen. The Sec. said he will be leaving right after lunch and would probably be in c.4.

[Here follows discussion of events in Cyprus and United Nations consideration of the disarmament question.]

[4] See Document 303.

320. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, September 29, 1955—11 a.m.

101. Burns gave me following account September 28 his efforts obtain withdrawal military units from El Auja D/ZM.

Egypt replied Burns communication September 26 by stating GOE prepared carry out withdrawal as requested. Israel stipulated certain conditions as prerequisite requested action and Burns discussed them with Eytan of Israel Foreign Ministry September 28. [2] These are:

1. That GOE give assurance her military forces will withdraw from D/Z and communications zone defined in article viii paragraph 3 of GAA. Regarding this point Burns assured Eytan that Egyptians prepared comply (however, he added that the 3 Egyptian posts) mytel 97 [3] could properly remain, so long as they did not encroach across international frontier, pursuant decision MAC Chairman in June 1955 that they were only check posts. Not "defensive positions" so long as each post manned by only about 10 soldiers.

2. That GOE give assurance its forces would not interfere with demarcation boundary. On this point Burns proposed that MAC Chairman conduct boundary survey using technicians on duty with UNTSO and that each party erect ½ of total boundary marking pylons. Burns explained that Gohar has agreed in principle this procedure.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/9–2955. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:37 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris.

[2] The Embassy in Tel Aviv on September 29 transmitted the text of the Israeli reply to General Burns' request in telegram 303. (*Ibid.*)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/9–2455)

3. That situation MAC offices El Auja be "regularized" by respecting terms agreement reached between the parties in 1949. This has to do with guards, availability liaison officers maintenance separate premises for each party and UNTSO. Burns said Israelis main offender this subject, since their Kibbutz members had interfered in operations, their liaison officer is frequently absent, and Israeli unit had attacked Egyptian guard members September 21. In any event, Burns told Eytan that MAC Chairman would present proposals for attainment objective desired, and they would be implemented by parties.

Burns saw Gohar at Gaza September 27 and evidently obtained his assent foregoing. Burns said that Gohar's assurances not entirely to be relied on, but he had done his best convince Gohar action along above lines in best interest GOE. Burns added that Gohar tended quibble over such matters as marking frontier, saying Israel should put up all markers. Burns pointed out importance larger issues at stake and urged Gohar desist from frustrating arrangements by undue emphasis such minor questions. Regarding meeting Burns and Nasser, Gohar undertook arrange this for near future, but indicated meeting will likely be contingent progress El Auja.

Eytan told Burns that GOI would "consider" his proposals regarding above 3 Israeli conditions. In discussing matter with me Burns referred one additional "condition" which Israelis had at first put forward and which included in Jerusalem *Post* story September 28. This is that Egypt reaffirm "her resolve abide by cease fire both in Gaza and Nitzana areas". Burns understood this condition based on certain recent incidents allegedly involving activities Egyptian "suicide squad" said captured by Israelis. However, since UNTSO observers have not been allowed see persons captured, Burns replied to effect he could not approach Egyptians about this "condition", which has apparently been dropped.

In order allow time for Israeli deliberations, Burns has advanced his deadline for commencement withdrawals to 1000 local time September 30. He expressed skepticism favorable action Israelis, owing his belief that "activist elements" may well prefer have present situation in D/Z continue.

Burns asked me convey his appreciation Department's support as indicated Deptel 43.[4]

Message Unsigned

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[4] See footnote 3, Document 309.

321. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, October 1, 1955—7 p.m.

632. From Allen. Ambassador Byroade and I had an hour and forty-five minute conference with Nasser this morning at his office. Highlights are following:

1. Despite excited public atmosphere Nasser was relaxed and obviously making special effort to be friendly.

2. He assured us with emphasis that he was "even more concerned to prevent Communist activity through military technicians than Secretary Dulles could possibly be, because Egypt is country directly involved".

3. Conversation was slightly stiff at beginning. He did not express any opinion during first twenty minutes. I stated purpose of my visit was to try understand as clearly as I could (1) factual situation regarding arms deal and GOE policy and intentions in its regard and (2) to explain US point of view. I said this was not to be construed as indicating US Government had not been fully and correctly informed by Ambassador Byroade but Secretary State wanted me to emphasize his own deep personal concern over situation. I would speak as frankly as I could so our two governments could at least act on basis of understanding even though we might not agree on certain aspects.

4. I then read verbatim text your letter, [2] reading slowly and enunciating carefully. He asked for repetition at one or two points and clearly understood full contents. At conclusion I pointed out that our analysis was naturally based on such information as we had and expressed interest in further facts which Nasser might wish to let us have.

5. He then responded pleasantly but intently. He pointed out that fundamental basis for 1952 revolution was lack of military equipment, and reviewed three years of efforts by Egypt to obtain such equipment. He and his government had been most anxious from beginning to achieve economic progress but would simply not have remained in power if he had not also endeavored to equip

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–155. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Paris, London, Tel Aviv, and Damascus. Repeated on October 2 to Beirut, Baghdad, Amman, Jidda, Tripoli, Ankara, Karachi, Moscow, and USUN.

[2] See Document 315. On September 30, Allen recommended that he only read Dulles' letter to Nasser and not leave the text, on the grounds that "written document likely to be dangerously misused." (Telegram 623 from Cairo, Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–3055) Dulles, in reply, told Allen to use his discretion on this matter. (Telegram 642 to Cairo, September 30, *ibid.*)

army. For three years his efforts were unsuccessful, but he had nevertheless been able to live with situation until Israel attacked at Gaza on February 28, 1955. From that moment onward military equipment had become absolute priority and all other considerations had to be put aside. It would do no good, he said, how many schools, hospitals and irrigation dams he might build if Egypt were to be overrun.

6. As regards efforts to obtain military equipment from US he alleged that prior to October 1952 he had sought arms only from US. At that time Under Secretary of Defense Foster had "promised" Egypt 60 million dollars worth of military equipment.[3] Nothing resulted, due to British objections. Early in 1955 two American officers, . . . from Pentagon had expressed full understanding of his needs. Again nothing happened. Then in June he had made urgent representations to Ambassador Byroade. US expressed concurrence in principle and he submitted list. After considerable delay we had indicated he could buy the arms for $27 million. He pointed out, with a wry smile, that that happened to be exactly Egypt's total dollar resources. He had asked us whether he could buy in Egyptian pounds. We had given him no affirmative response.

7. Nasser then recalled that he had been assured in part by American sources, prior to February 28 that Israel had no aggressive intentions. He had consequently reduced his forces on Gaza front materially. Then came Gaza incident and Israeli boasts that they would "teach Egypt a lesson". He added "I have been through a nightmare since then which your Secretary State may not be able to realize". He referred to doubling of Herut representation in Israeli Parliament at last elections, expressed confidence that neither Ben Gurion nor present Israeli Parliament would last more than one year and that Herut would again double its representation at next election. He remarked that Herut policy is "Israeli domination from Nile to Euphrates".

8. During his desperate efforts to obtain arms following February 28 incident he turned to France among others, and in April or May this year, paid 10 million Egyptian pounds on account for sizeable arms purchased. Not one gun has been delivered. Two weeks ago France placed complete embargo against this shipment. Today he asked French Ambassador to give him back his money.

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[3] A memorandum of October 5 from Ben F. Dixon to Russell states that although he had not located any records of these talks, he had learned that during 2 days in Egypt in October 1952, Foster talked to General Naguib and indicated that the United States "might give favorable consideration to Egypt's request for military equipment providing a satisfactory base agreement were reached." (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after Sec's Speech—Aug. 26–Oct. 29, 1955)

9. In summary he said that in all frankness he had the conviction that US Government was trying to keep Egypt weak and that this resulted from Jewish influence in US.

10. I expressed appreciation for his frank expose but said his statement had revealed to me clear misunderstanding between us. I recalled our offer of grant military aid agreement in 1954 [4] and our offer to let him obtain very sizeable amounts of arms in US very recently. I asked if that indicated we were determined to keep Egypt defenseless. Nasser explained at length the reason Egypt could not accept grant aid agreement, partly due to our requirement for MAAG mission. He said he had finally been able to remove British from Egypt, had refused to permit Americans to replace them. Was it likely he would now let Communists do so? I pointed to statement in your communication recognizing his good intentions in this regard but said we had had much experience with Communists and knew how hard it would be to prevent gradual encroachment.

11. Nasser emphasized that agreement with Czechoslovakia [5] was without any conditions whatsoever. He had already transferred to Prague one million Egyptian pounds on account and Egyptian cotton and rice would be shipped "more or less parallel" with arms received. I asked him whether he could draw down large amount of arms on credit—"say, 20, 30, 40 million pounds". After some hesitation he said "agreement is like ones we have with Germany, Italy and other countries on strictly commercial basis". When I pressed him further on this point he said any unusual features were in Egypt's favor. I asked whether Egypt might be led into position of being under special obligations to Soviet bloc. He insisted he would not permit such. Agreement did not specify any technicians and there would be none unless he requested them. He said his own technicians had assembled Vampire and Meteor fighter jets from handbooks and could also assemble MIGs. His only problem was to assemble fighter bombers. He would prefer that they be flown into Egypt and thereby avoid any Czechoslovakian technicians but since closest base was Albania out of range he might have to have one Czechoslovakian team for brief period to demonstrate assembly. He commented, lightly, that Greece or Cyprus were only refueling points available. Difficulty with Cyprus was that Israelis would be able to "count them" if they landed there.

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[4] For documentation on the question of military assistance by the United States to Egypt, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, pp. 1743 ff.

[5] On September 29, Byroade informed the Department "that actual agreement on arms was with Czechoslovakia." (Telegram 600 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2955)

12. Soviet Ambassador had been waiting in anteroom and conversation terminated at this point, [6] but I informed Nasser that I had further views to present to him. [7] He said he would be at my disposal at anytime. We had dealt only with past and he was anxious to consider future.

13. I shall be seeing Nasser again tomorrow or Monday. [8]

14. *Comment*: During two days here I have been impressed by fact that absolute determination of GOE and Egyptian people to obtain arms following Gaza attack of February 28 can hardly be conveyed by cable.

Byroade

[6] According to a report dated October 2 Solod made the following points in his interview on October 1 with Nasser: that United States and the United Kingdom had made strong representations to Molotov in New York to halt the arms deal; that the United States was planning to terminate all economic and technical assistance to Egypt as a result of the arms deal; that the Soviet Union was prepared to furnish Egypt with large scale economic and technical aid, including financial support at 2½% interest for the Aswan Dam; that if other powers interfered with Soviet ships transporting arms to Egypt, the Soviets would raise vigorously the issue of freedom of the seas; and that if Egypt became the object of a marine blockade, the Soviets would airlift the necessary machinery for the construction of munitions factories in Egypt. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—*Anderson* talks *w/BG & Nasser. Carbons* of incoming and outgoing tels)

[7] See Document 325.

[8] October 3.

322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan [1]

Washington, October 2, 1955—6:07 p.m.

141. Eban called on Secretary September 30 to discuss Soviet-Egyptian arms deal. [2]

Eban made following points: Agreement makes mockery of Soviet pretensions at Geneva about relaxing tensions and desiring disarmament. Although Israel had at times shared US hopes re Nasser, it became apparent before arms deal that Egypt element of

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–255. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Hare, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv. Repeated to Moscow and pouched to London and Paris.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, 774.56/9–3055)

instability. Egyptian willingness accept Soviet arms passed all limits. Now every affirmative appraisal of RCC collapses completely and irrevocably. Similar sales to Saudi Arabia and Syria must be expected. Following conclusions resulted from Egyptian action: (1) US should not attempt prevent deal by appeasement i.e. giving arms to Egypt; (2) West should sell Israel arms to correct threatened imbalance; (3) US should guarantee status quo now and invite any power in area to enter into treaty guaranteeing status quo. Treaty would not bar peaceful changes but would prevent changes by force. Essential take quick action deter aggression in light new situation. General reaction in Israel summed up as "let's not sit here like rabbit waiting for kill."

Secretary replied: Development one of gravest in recent years in sense that it means USSR opening new area of mischievous activity—Middle East and Africa. Problems posed for Israel and US not similar in all respects. US must consider matter in terms of world-wide confrontation with Communism. Matter of such gravity that we cannot make quick decisions. It unlikely transaction will be cancelled out entirely, although conceivable quantities involved will be reduced. Re Eban's three conclusions: (1) We have no intentions competing with USSR in supplying arms to Egypt. Although we did not wish make absolute commitment that we would never offer Egypt arms, we have no intention doing so now. (2) More definite information may indicate otherwise, but we must assume now transaction will transform military balance in area—not immediately but after 12 or 15 months. We have not reached conclusion that giving considerable military equipment to Israel would be best way to offset effects of Soviet-Egyptian arms deal. (3) US Security guarantee of status quo raises problems about likely effect on Arab world as whole. We do not want, and assume Israel does not want, situation where USSR backing all Arabs and US backing Israel.

Secretary inquired whether Israel had considered action by UN. Eban replied this unlikely prove effective in view Soviet veto in SC and strength of Soviet and Arab blocs in General Assembly.

Dulles

323. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 3, 1955, 10:01 a.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Call of the British Foreign Secretary re Soviet-Egyptian Arms Agreement

PARTICIPANTS

UK	*US*
Mr. Harold Macmillan	Mr. John Foster Dulles
Sir Roger Makins	Mr. Livingston Merchant
Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh	Mr. Douglas MacArthur II
Mr. Willie Morris	Mr. Raymond A. Hare
Mr. Patrick Hancock	Mr. Francis H. Russell
	Mr. Fraser Wilkins

The British Foreign Secretary suggested the discussion commence with a review of developments in Cairo and inquired how we analyzed them. The Secretary said that we had no new information with respect to quantities of arms or dates of delivery under the Czech-Egyptian Agreement. The Secretary added that Mr. Allen had had a report that the Soviet Union was also offering economic aid, help on the Aswan Dam and related matters.[2]

Mr. Hare analyzed the situation along the following lines: When this problem had first come to our attention we had hoped that, by prompt action, it might not be too late to block it completely, or at least to convince Nasser to so reduce and modify the transaction that it would be less objectionable. It now seemed clear, following talks of the British Ambassador and Assistant Secretary Allen with Nasser, that blocking the deal completely was out of the question and that even the possibility of substantial modification was doubtful. The question therefore arose whether a new equilibrium might be accomplished by inducing Nasser to take some other step or steps which would not only be of substantive importance but would also serve as a gauge of Nasser's sincerity when he said he had no intention of reorienting Egypt politically. Steps toward some sort of settlement with Israel, including assistance in gaining acceptance of the Johnston plan, could fall in this category of action. Simultaneously, attention should be directed to preventing other countries of the area from following Egypt's unfortunate example. In other

[1] Source: Department of States, Central Files, 774.56/10–355. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins. The time was taken from Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[2] See footnote 7, Document 321.

words, we would endeavor to create a situation with which we could live although it might be far from to our liking.

If this policy failed, consideration could then be given to the application of progressive pressures but, in so doing, we should bear in mind the complications which could arise if Nasser were forced out with no better candidate in sight; difficulty in taking any constructive regional steps if Egypt were forced into a hostile position; and the ominous prospect of promoting a real split in the Arab world with the West backing one group and the Communists the other.

The Secretary said that he would like to express his own reaction. He believed we should not take any threatening or drastic step at this time. There should be no public indication of our displeasure. Unpleasant events which we might instigate should have the appearance of happening naturally. If we did not proceed in this way the entire Arab world might be aligned against us, which would make it more susceptible to Communist penetration. We should not allow developments to take this direction because Middle Eastern oil was important not only to NATO but to the Western world. Egypt, the Secretary believed, wished to adopt a position similar to that of Tito's in Yugoslavia. Egypt wished the best of both worlds and hoped to play one against the other. Egypt as a neutralist would be more tolerable than as a Communist satellite. For these reasons the Secretary was more inclined to temporize regarding Egypt at this stage in order to see how matters developed there. For example, how many arms are actually acquired—what use was made of them and similar matters. We would have to be watchful of the effects elsewhere in the Middle East; but here the key factor would be Soviet rather than Arab actions. If the Russians decided to go into economic and military aid in a big way, it might gravely disturb our relations with the Soviet Union. In this case we might have to put pressure on the Soviet Union to desist. It seemed best however to try to insulate the present incident. This was not a very attractive policy and he put it forward only for lack of a better alternative. If it came to bringing pressure on to Egypt, the Sudan seemed to offer a suitable opening.

The British Foreign Secretary replied that he had the impression from the report of the British Ambassador's conversation with Nasser [3] that the Egyptian Prime Minister had been rather shaken by the U.S.–UK reaction and was not in fact anxious to quarrel with us. Mr. Macmillan considered that we must accept this diplomatic defeat and try to narrow or limit it. There would be no agreement between the Soviet Union and Egypt but only between Czechoslova-

[3] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

kia and Egypt. No Soviet technicians would go to the Near East. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, now in New York, had hinted as much to Mr. Macmillan. We should now talk to Nasser more in sorrow than in anger and tell him that he must endeavor to reduce his commitment with the Soviet bloc. At the same time, Mr. Macmillan said, Nasser would have to give evidence of good will if we were to accept his action. Nasser could give such evidence by throwing his whole weight behind the Johnston Plan or in progress toward a settlement with Israel. Mr. Macmillan concluded that if Nasser were unwilling to proceed along these lines, we would have to bring pressure to bear upon him.

Mr. Russell thought that the situation might be portrayed to Nasser in the following way: the Soviet Union appeared to be moving into the area with determination and on the basis of a well-thought-out plan. In addition to arms, they had referred to assistance for the High Aswan Dam in Egypt and had made approaches to Saudi Arabia and Syria. If Nasser went along with the Soviet Union, he would be putting Egypt's neck in the Soviet noose. The action of the Soviet Union in Egypt was not isolated but part of the Soviet pattern. Would Nasser wish to facilitate Soviet penetration or to prevent it?

The Secretary mentioned that it would, of course, be necessary to find specific funds for the Johnston Plan and also wondered what attraction there would be for Egypt in this general approach. Mr. Russell replied that help with respect to the Aswan Dam and the other matters to which reference had already been made in the Secretary's letter would be advantageous to Egypt.[4]

The British Foreign Secretary speculated that Nasser might be glad to represent the Czech Agreement as something that was necessary for him to conclude but that he might actually play it down. Nasser could say he did not look on the conclusion of the Agreement as a political act but merely as one for the necessary purchase of arms. At the same time we could follow a policy of assistance to other parts of the Arab world—to Iraq and some of the others. Together these two lines of action might offset the effect of an apparent Soviet diplomatic victory.

The Secretary asked if the UK had any information that Nehru had played a part. Mr. Macmillan said no, to which Mr. Dulles said he had the feeling Nehru was involved.

Mr. Hare thought Egypt's action might set a dangerous example in the eyes of the Arab world and that Nasser should say something which indicated he was not moving toward the Soviets. Whatever he

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[4] See Document 315.

might say privately, his public statements thus far had been to the contrary.

The Secretary said that we have to take into account that this development in Egypt might take place elsewhere. It may flow from a change in Soviet policy. Up until the time of Geneva, Soviet policy was based on intolerance which was the keynote of Soviet doctrine. Soviet policy is now based on tolerance, which includes good relations with everyone and basically alters many other things. It would not be possible for the West to reserve to itself good relations with the Soviet Union and to say that Egypt might not develop good relations with the Soviet Union. Perhaps this Soviet move in the Near East is the first example of a policy with which we must deal. It may be that internal changes are taking place in the Soviet Union which we will find welcome. As long as we accept visits between ourselves, we cannot object if Egypt does. We cannot be very stern with Nasser for accepting the fruits of change in Soviet policy. It may be necessary for us to accept the desire of Near Eastern countries to deal with both the East and the West, otherwise a stern Western position may force them to deal only with the Soviet bloc. It was surprising the Soviet Union had not been able to deal with Afghanistan more effectively.

The Secretary continued that it was easy for the Soviet Union to supply arms to Egypt in return for cotton. The United States and the United Kingdom and other countries were spread thin world-wide. It was necessary for us to sustain the whole structure in the Far East, especially in Korea and Japan, which totaled annually about $1,000,000,000. If it were not for these commitments, we could take $100,000,000 and buy Egypt off. It was Soviet policy to work and subvert other countries one by one. In these circumstances we needed patience in handling the current situation. We should wait and see how the Czech-Egyptian Agreement developed. It might be that Soviet military assistance to Egypt would create heavy economic burdens there. Our experience has been that arms programs cannot be handled on a one-shot basis. Soviet military assistance to Egypt might not work out well and Egypt might regret it. We should therefore approach the matter with patience and without drastic action.

The Secretary also believed that the Russians might not wish to invest heavily in Egypt because this country could be pinched off in the event of hostilities. In general, if the Russians were going to start on a mutual security program, they might be in for considerable difficulty and it might turn out to be a liability rather than an asset. Mr. Macmillan commented that Mr. Dulles' analysis and conclusions seemed consonant with his suggestions. The Secretary added that

Nasser might be pushed along on the Johnston proposals and a settlement with Israel.

The British Foreign Secretary returned to the question of the approach to Prime Minister Nasser and emphasized that he should be urged to begin the process of negotiation with Israel. In order to limit the scope of the Czech-Egyptian agreement it should be pointed out that if Egypt buys arms, Israel will buy arms. Mr. Macmillan asked what the Israeli reaction might be.

The Secretary said that the Israeli Ambassador had come to see him [5] and had spoken in the following way: the lines in the Near East were now clearly drawn. Egypt's position was now clear. Israel wished a security pact in addition to military assistance. Mr. Eban had not hinted at preventive war in his initial presentation to the Secretary. Later, however, Mr. Eban had said in response to a question that Israel would not stand like a rabbit waiting for the kill. The Secretary noted however that Mr. Eban had not said "either you give us arms or we will attack". In this general connection the Secretary wondered about possible UN action.

Mr. Shuckburgh stated that the British Foreign Office was not keen on United Nations action because the Russians would be able to pose as supporters of the Arabs. The Secretary inquired whether use might not be made of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Mr. Macmillan observed that the declaration had been written on the assumption of three-power control. This control had now been broken down through the supply of Soviet arms in the Near East. In these circumstances it would be preferable to push ahead with settlement between Israel and the Arab states. Mr. Shuckburgh further commented that it might be useful at least to reaffirm the last paragraph of the Tripartite Declaration with respect to action in the event of violations. Mr. Russell thought we might reaffirm the principles of the Tripartite Declaration in general wording. The Secretary noted that he did not wish to be committed at this time with respect to reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration. A number of constitutional problems would confront him on this score.

Mr. Macmillan said that he was not inclined to take the question of arms shipments to the United Nations at the present time. The Secretary agreed observing that debate might result in charge and counter charge together with details of shipments and related matters. It would be undesirable to discuss in public. It would be wise to move slowly in this respect.

The British Foreign Secretary reiterated that our general approach to the question of Soviet arms in the Near East should be played down rather than up. He wondered how we could encourage

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[5] See *supra*.

other Near Eastern states which did not take Soviet arms. Mr. Macmillan believed that one instrument would be through the Baghdad Pact. We might encourage the accession of Iran. He, himself, for example, could attend the first meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact. The U.S. might send observers. Considerations could be given to the repositioning of Britain's limited forces in the Middle East. Economic aid could be extended. The Secretary said we must look into this problem and agree on measures which might be taken.

The Secretary added that high priority should be given to considering whether economic aid could be switched from Egypt to Iraq. The fact that Iraq had oil revenues seemed to complicate this. Mr. Shuckburgh said that the Iraqis were devoting their oil revenues to economic development and were very reluctant to devote them to arms. It would therefore be preferable if additional aid to Iraq could be devoted to military assistance. It would not be desirable to discourage Iraqi interest in economic development. The Secretary agreed and added that Iraq seemed to be the only country with oil revenues which was using them constructively. This progress should be encouraged. Mr. Dulles inquired whether a public announcement had been made regarding the supply of Centurion tanks to Iraq. Mr. Shuckburgh replied that no publicity had been given to it although the Iraq Government had been informed.

Mr. Macmillan agreed that we should concert with respect to details of measures which might be taken to support our friends in the Near East and thought they might be divided into two broad categories: (1) symbolic; (2) material. He wondered in this connection if it would be possible for the United States to join the Baghdad Pact.

The Secretary replied negatively that constitutional problems made it difficult and pointed out that adherence by the U.S. would necessarily be followed by a security pact with Israel. These two developments might make the situation in the Near East worse. It was not, however, beyond the realm of possibility that both steps could be taken but the Secretary was not sure that it would be wise under present conditions. The British Ambassador noted that the United States had informed the British in August that it could only consider joining the Baghdad Pact after progress had been made toward a settlement between Israel and the Arab states. [6]

Meanwhile, our approach to Nasser might be delayed briefly until he cooled off and it would not appear as a surrender by us.

The British Foreign Secretary noted that we now appeared to be in general agreement as to how we should proceed. An approach to

[6] See footnote 2, Document 201.

Nasser by the UK or the U.S. in Cairo and for the other measures which we might later take to support countries friendly to us in the area. The Secretary concurred and said that Mr. Shuckburgh, Mr. Hare and Mr. Russell could work out the details. All of these various ideas could be written down and agreement could be reached on courses of action. Mr. Shuckburgh said that if we approach Nasser now it might indicate undue anxiety. Mr. Macmillan concurred and it was agreed that further approaches to Nasser would be postponed for a few days. Meanwhile, if necessary, Mr. Shuckburgh could return to Washington from London.

The Secretary informed Mr. Macmillan that we might be in a position next week to raise the question of a possible letter from the President to Bulganin.[7] It would depend upon the President's progress. Mr. Macmillan replied that if it was not advisable to tackle the Russians in the United Nations we should make it clear to them that they should play fair in the "spirit of Geneva". Prime Minister Eden would want to say something to them along this line. It would be necessary in view of the public attitude in Great Britain. The Secretary indicated that he realized the Prime Minister's position but wondered whether we wished directly to involve the Soviet Union in Middle Eastern affairs. Mr. MacArthur noted that Mr. Molotov might in any event raise this general subject at Geneva under the heading of other business.

The British Ambassador pointed out that the approach to Molotov already gave an opening for a response. A letter from the President and the Prime Minister would add nothing in this respect.

The Secretary observed that if the United States, United Kingdom, and France allowed the matter to rest as at present he doubted the Soviet Union would propose further discussions. As Mr. Macmillan had said it was a troublesome problem. The premise underlying the Tripartite Declaration of tripartite control had been shaken. We could not effectively say to the Soviet Union that the Middle East was our exclusive interest. Mr. Macmillan thought, however, that the Prime Minister could say we were trying to work with the Soviet Union but that it was not cooperating. Mr. Macmillan noted that perhaps they had already limited the arms agreement with Egypt to Czechoslovakia and themselves planned to supply no arms. As a result of our earlier approach the Secretary concluded that at this stage he would not want to feel committed to get a comparable letter from President Eisenhower.

Mr. Macmillan said that an approach to the United Nations might be studied further but that he himself was not in favor. The

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[7] On October 11, Eisenhower raised with Bulganin the question of arms shipments to Egypt. See Document 334.

French had not been cooperating in the control of arms shipments to the Near East and that if the general subject of arms was discussed in the United Nations the Western powers rather than the Soviet bloc might end up in the dock. For the time being we would play down the Czech agreement but, at the same time, would study ways in which we could back up the other Arab states. Mr. Hare suggested consideration should be given to French participation in joint action. This point was not pursued.

Mr. Macmillan thought that if we ruled out action in the United Nations, and if our policy was to go "soft" with Nasser and not to follow up with the Russians, we would give the impression that we had simply swallowed the Russian intervention in the Middle East. A letter dealing with the subject, not in terms of the area itself but on a world plane, relating it to the Great Powers' interest in avoiding causes of friction, would put the Russians on notice that we had serious objections. The balance of advantage and disadvantage was very even. If we did send a letter we risked getting the Middle East put on the agenda at Geneva.

The Secretary recalled that when he had previously discussed Near Eastern arms with Molotov he had pointed out that since Geneva people all over the world had high hopes. He had said he had now heard that the Soviet Union was planning on arms shipments to the Near East. He did not want to argue technicalities of the matter. He had suggested, however, that Mr. Molotov bear in mind that this action would have a serious effect on public opinion and that Mr. Molotov might well wish to take account of this fact. The Secretary believed that a restatement of our views along this line would be useful. The Prime Minister might wish to speak in this vein as well. The matter could be further considered in the light of later developments. The British Foreign Secretary believed that the Prime Minister's communication to Bulganin should be in the nature of obiter dictum and not an offer. Mr. Macmillan stressed the depth of public feeling in the United Kingdom with respect to Egypt and particularly in the light of current Soviet activities there. The average Englishman knew of Egypt personally or through relatives. They had followed the Suez negotiations with great interest. Egypt was regarded in the United Kingdom as the Pacific area was in the United States. The Secretary remarked that the communication to Bulganin might be cast along the lines of his previous oral remarks to Molotov.

Mr. MacArthur noted, as the meeting broke up, that we would have to reach agreement before the Geneva meeting on how to handle this Near Eastern question in the event either we or the Russians raised it there.

324. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Secretary Macmillan, Department of State, Washington, October 3, 1955 [1]

Mr. Macmillan stayed on after the general meeting on Egypt to talk privately with me alone. He pointed out the concern of Sir Anthony Eden in this situation since Eden had been largely responsible for the Suez Base Agreement and consequently had very definite ideas of his own.

We discussed further the prospective message of Eden to Bulganin and the danger that it might lead to talks which would recognize the Soviet as a great power equally interested in the area. Macmillan thought he could get the message framed to avoid this consequence.[2]

I said to Macmillan in substance:

"The essential thing is that our two countries should stand together and there should be great caution on your Government's part in starting a course of action which might lead to consequences which the United States could not share. It is all right for the Egyptians and the Jugs to try to get the best of both possible worlds but that is not a role that the UK could play. Therefore, it seems to me you should try very hard to avoid being sucked into a course of action with the Soviets which we could not or would not share."

Macmillan said he fully realized this danger and expected to avoid it.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret.

[2] Telegram 830 from Moscow, October 5, reported that the British Ambassador had delivered an October 4 message from Eden to Bulganin stating that the British Government viewed the sale of arms to Egypt as a political venture that posed a serious threat to the peace of the area. (Department of State, Central Files, 774.561/10–555) A copy of the message is filed with a covering letter of October 27 from Makins to Sherman Adams in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.

325. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, October 3, 1955—10 p.m.

654. From Allen. Byroade and I had further hour and quarter discussion with Nasser today. I opened by recognizing that America and Egypt were each faced with serious problem. Our problem was to avoid handling our relations in Middle East in manner which would play into Soviet hands—his was to handle Egyptian relations so as not to play into hands of his enemies. I recognized frankly that if United States reacted emotionally to Czechoslovak arms deal, we might cause Arabs to feel they could depend only on Soviet help. For this reason I had made every effort, in talks with him and with press, to present United States views with calmness and dignity. I was therefore much disturbed by his accusations, in public speech yesterday, that United States had intrigued to keep Egypt weak and strengthen Israel, and that United States, Britain and France were guilty of "big lie". [2] I said his enemies were probably rubbing their hands with glee over this speech since reaction in United States would be strongly against him.

Nasser said American press, mentioning particularly *New York Times* and *Newsweek*, had continually carried articles stating that Israel could mobilize 250,000 men (or more than all Arab states together) and could easily defeat Arab states combined. He said he had distinct impression that Americans printed and read this information with pleasure and approval. His most bitter complaint, however, was fact that even though American public had knowledge that Israel is much stronger than Egypt, Americans were nevertheless highly critical of him now for seeking as best he could to redress balance through commercial transaction from only source he could find.

Referring to his statement that Czechoslovak arms deal was "turning point in Egyptian history," I expressed sincere hope that turning was not in wrong direction. If he had justified his transaction solely on basis of commercial exchange of cotton for arms, American public might be less critical, but when he went further and justified transaction on basis of alleged "intrigue" and "big lie" of Western powers, including United States, I had to question whether he valued continued American good will.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–355. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:32 a.m., October 4. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, and Damascus. Repeated on October 4 to Beirut, Baghdad, Amman, Jidda, Tripoli, Ankara, Karachi, and USUN, and pouched to Paris.

[2] The Embassy in Cairo sent the Department a summary of Nasser's speech on October 3. (Telegram 651; *ibid.*)

He declared emphatically that he did, but said future depended on United States. I pointed out that arms race in Middle East would be tragic for all concerned and pointed out that United States had done and would continue to do everything it could to prevent this. Ambassador Byroade and I both pointed out that only way to avoid such race would be to find means of relaxing tensions in area. He said he was ready but that Negev constituted partition of Arab lands and initiative rested with Israel.

I said we considered your speech of August 26 as having created basis for progress in this direction. He said he regarded your proposals favorable to Israel since only benefit to Arabs might be some minor adjustment of frontiers.

Nasser then asked about future of United States-Egyptian relations. It seemed clear to me that he was anxious to learn what actions we might take as consequence of Czechoslovak deal. I thought it best to let him remain uncertain in this regard so avoided point. He remarked that he would always be ready to discuss this subject with Byroade.

Comment: Byroade and I feel that Nasser showed considerable concern today, possibly as consequence of his highly emotional speech yesterday. It is clear that he could not, even if he wished, cancel Czechoslovak deal since he would be overthrown.

While talks with Nasser have been inconclusive, I believe we have at least gotten over explosive period without playing into Soviet hands and without forcing Egypt into completely intransigent attitude regarding Israel. Emotionalism here has been so great that I am convinced ultimatum approach would not only have forced vast majority of Arabs into Soviet camp but might well have led to break-off of diplomatic relations and expulsion of United States interests from Egypt and possibly other areas.

Byroade

326. Memorandum of Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 6, 1955, 10 a.m. [1]

Present at the 260th Council meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; Mr. Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Mr. Robert Bowie, Assistant Secretary of State; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President; Brig. General Theodore W. Parker for Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the President; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows a report by Sherman Adams concerning President Eisenhower's health and plans for future interviews by government officials with the President.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence [2] informed the Council that the intelligence community believed that the arms deal between Egypt and the Soviet Union was firm. He also pointed out that Colonel Nasr was convinced that he could avoid the dangers attendant upon this link with the Soviet Bloc. The first arms shipments had already arrived in Egypt. General Cabell warned that this development could substantially advance Soviet objectives in the Middle East. The economic tie-up between Egypt and the Soviet Bloc resulting from the arms deal, would provide a potent vehicle for advancing Communist political interests in the Middle East.

Besides their maneuver in Egypt, the Soviets were duplicating their offers of arms to Syria and to Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the Israeli Government was demanding action by the Western Powers to deter Arab aggression which they believe is sure to come. They

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSG Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on October 7. The time was taken from the President's Daily Appointments. (*Ibid.*)

[2] Lieutenant General C. P. Cabell, USAF.

insist that they will not be caught in the position of "sitting ducks" and they wish both Western arms and Western guarantees.

[Here follow Cabell's comments on the death of Prime Minister Papagos of Greece, the impending referendum in the Saar territory, the position of the Faure government in France, and the results of the Indonesian elections.]

The National Security Council: [3]

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on the situation, with specific respect to the Middle East, Greece, the Saar referendum, the position of the Faure Government and the Indonesian elections.

2. *The Situation in the Middle East* (NSC 5428; [4] NSC Action No. 1394-b [5])

[Here follows an analysis by Secretary Dulles of the repercussions of the Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement; the question of Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact; the issue of providing military assistance to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey; and an examination of the state of relations between Iraq and Syria.]

The Vice President [6] asked Secretary Dulles whether the time had now come for a thorough re-examination of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Secretary Dulles agreed that the time for such re-examination had come as did Admiral Radford who pointed out that the British were pushing us very hard to build up the armed forces of the Middle Eastern states. Of course, added Admiral Radford, largely at our expense. Secretary Dulles said that undoubtedly we would have to respond to this appeal and help the Middle Eastern states to build up their armed forces.

Dr. Flemming inquired whether the situation was not one which called for an interim policy paper both on Iran and on the Middle East in general. Mr. Dillon Anderson reminded the Council that something like an interim policy paper was done with respect to

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[3] The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1446. (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 260th meeting held on October 6, 1955, and approved by the President on October 19, 1955; Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

[4] For the text of NSC 5428, "United States Objectives And Policies With Respect To The Near East," July 23, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 425.

[5] NSC Action No. 1394–b reads as follows:

"b. Agreed that a review by the NSC Planning Board of the policies set forth in NSC 5428 should await the advice of the Secretary of State as to timing."

(Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 247th meeting held on May 5, 1955, and approved by the President on May 7, 1955. Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

[6] Richard M. Nixon.

Austria last spring. He furthermore informed the Council of his conversation recently with Secretary Dulles [7] and the latter's feeling that a revision of NSC 5428 would presumably be in order. Finally, he indicated that the last time the National Security Council had considered the situation in the Middle East, it had decided to leave up to the Secretary of State the determination of the time when it would be appropriate to undertake a review and re-examination of NSC 5428 (NSC Action No. 1394-b). [8] Mr. Anderson summed up by saying that it was his understanding that Secretary Dulles was now indicating that the time had come to review the U.S. policy paper on the Middle East either on an interim or on a broader basis.

Secretary Dulles stated that events were moving so fast in this area that he was finding himself obliged to make decisions and that he would prefer to make these decisions with more guidance than it might be possible to get from the Planning Board and the National Security Council in the time permitted. Over and beyond these urgent considerations, there was every good reason to review our basic policy toward the Middle East at the present time. Secretary Dulles again commented on the specific courses of action which, according to NSC 5428, the United States was supposed to take in the event of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States. As he looked over these courses of action, which ultimately included the possibility of physical intervention, he did not find them very attractive.

Dr. Flemming again expressed the opinion that the situation seemed to call for an interim policy paper having top priority in the Planning Board's schedule. Admiral Radford added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also appreciate having a firmer basis on which to plan for the contingency of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities. Things could happen very fast in this area and the main point was that the United States should be ready to stop the fighting.

Governor Stassen wondered whether a blockade of North African ports might not be an effective course of action. In his opinion, after the Egyptians began to receive Soviet arms, the Egyptians would play a role toward French North Africa very much like that played by the Chinese Communists in supplying weapons to the Viet Minh in Indo-China. Secretary Dulles pointed out to Governor Stassen that the Soviets are alleged to have said that if the Western Powers tried to interfere with the shipment of arms to Egypt, those arms would be sent into Egypt by air.

Referring to the pleas from Iran and Pakistan for additional military assistance from the United States, Secretary Wilson coun-

[7] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
[8] See footnote 5, above.

selled that if, after examination, we find that there are controversies between the United States and these nations, or if we prove to be behind in promised deliveries of arms, we could certainly speed up these deliveries. Most of the arms which we have promised to the Pakistani and to Iran could be found somewhere and in a hurry if this proved to be necessary. Admiral Radford warned Secretary Wilson that the matter of getting additional arms to Iran and Pakistan might be more complicated than this. He pointed out that these deliveries of arms were slowed up by complicated U.S. administrative procedures as well as by internal politics and arguments within Pakistan itself. He was afraid that this "hassle" had never really been settled despite lengthy conversations. Secretary Wilson replied that, nevertheless, it would be downright foolishness to let such obstacles prevent the delivery of timely American aid to these nations. Secretary Dulles also advised with emphasis that we cut red tape and get the military supplies moving. Secretary Wilson assured Secretary Dulles that he would do his best.

The Vice President warned the Council that this Middle Eastern crisis came at a very unfortunate time. If things go badly for the United States in this area, there will be many who say that our misfortunes result from the lack of leadership. Accordingly, we must think of what the President would want us to do in these circumstances. Secretary Wilson replied that he was at least sure of one thing that the President would want us to do; namely, to carry out all agreements we had made with the nations of the Middle East.

As for the three policy decisions which the Secretary of State was now facing with Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the Vice President said that there were so many nuances and so many difficulties that it was best to rely on the judgment of the Secretary of State. The Vice President said he also assumed that the National Security Council Planning Board would promptly step up its review of existing U.S. policy in the Middle East and that the Department of Defense would promptly see what it could do to loosen up on additional U.S. assistance to the friendly nations in the Middle East.

Admiral Radford again stressed the fact that from the point of view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Israeli-Arab problem had the highest priority. However, he also agreed again that the government would have to ask Congress for more money for increasing the scale of U.S. assistance to the Middle East. Secretary Wilson added that if Israel should attack Egypt, every effort should be made to secure United Nations intervention. Above all else, we must attempt to stop the outbreak of any such war.

Mr. Dillon Anderson said that he deduced from the discussion thus far that the National Security Council desired the Planning Board to study three matters; first, the general problem of U.S.

military assistance worldwide. This subject was already about to be presented to the Council unless it was decided to postpone consideration of it until after the President's return. Secondly, the Council wished the Planning Board to study the broad aspects of existing U.S. policy toward the Middle East, much of which Mr. Anderson thought remained valid. Thirdly, the Planning Board should study the particular matter of Arab-Israeli tensions. This portion of our general Near East policy, continued Mr. Anderson, was one which appeared particularly hard to implement.

As to the proposed broad review of NSC 5428, Mr. Anderson thought that the Planning Board would find this a very difficult job and one which would consume considerable time. As for the specific study of the Arab-Israeli situation in the contingency of hostilities, would it not be appropriate, asked Mr. Anderson, for the Council simply to agree and note its agreement that this particular portion of the policy set forth in NSC 5428 was invalid?

Secretary Dulles pointed out that the Council was of course in no position to invalidate by its action any portion of Presidentially-approved policy. If the Planning Board found itself unable to prepare, in time, recommendations for U.S. courses of action in the contingency of war between Israel and Egypt, the National Security Council would have to make a finding in an emergency session.

Secretary Humphrey said he wanted to stress to the Council the importance of proceeding promptly to consider the entire broad subject of U.S. military assistance programs worldwide. Some decisions in this field were essential in view of the development of the budget process for Fiscal Year 1957.

Mr. Anderson assured the Council that the Planning Board would do its best to provide recommendations to deal with the Arab-Israeli contingency as well as to get underway a re-examination of the broader subject of U.S. policy in the Middle East as a whole. He then enquired of the Secretary of State whether the latter desired to have the Council concur in the Secretary's proposed decisions with respect to Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Secretary Dulles replied that he would be glad to have the concurrence of the National Security Council in his proposed handling of the decision noted in the Record of Actions of the Council.

At the conclusion of the discussion of this item, Secretary Wilson turned to Secretary Dulles and said that if the latter believed that the Defense Department should step up the tempo of the military assistance programs in the Middle East, he, Secretary Wilson, would find means to do so.

The National Security Council: [9]

a. Noted and concurred in actions which the Secretary of State proposed to take in the existing situation with reference to the current U.S. attitude toward provision of military assistance to Saudi Arabia; Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact; and relations between Iraq and Syria.

b. Discussed the current situation in the Middle East in the light of a report by the Secretary of State, in which he observed that recent developments in the area may have made portions of existing U.S. policy invalid and subject to urgent review.

c. Directed the NSC Planning Board to undertake an urgent review of the policy on the Near East contained in NSC 5428, with particular reference to U.S. courses of action in the contingency of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States.

[Here follows discussion of item 3.]

S. Everett Gleason

[9] The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1447. (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 260th meeting held on October 6, 1955, and approved by the President on October 19, 1955; Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

327. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 6, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

The Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Sir Hubert Graves, British Embassy
Mr. Willie Morris, British Embassy

The Secretary
Mr. Hare, Acting Assistant Secretary for NEA
Mr. Francis H. Russell

Ambassador Makins called at his request. He said that the British Cabinet had discussed the Middle East problem following Mr. Macmillan's return to London. As a result of the Cabinet discussion, the Foreign Office had sent a telegram to the British

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–655. Secret. Drafted by Russell.

Ambassador in Cairo saying that the line toward Nasser that had been agreed upon between the Secretary and Mr. Macmillan was approved by the Cabinet (see "Consensus of Meeting" attached) but that it was doubtful that much could be done at the present moment to influence Nasser. The Ambassador was therefore instructed to leave Nasser alone for a bit and let events work on him. Ambassador Makins said that perhaps Nasser will find that the arms deal is not working out exactly as he had hoped. After a while he may be willing to cooperate in limiting the extent of his deal with the Soviet bloc, in a Palestine settlement and in the Jordan Valley plan. As regards Iran, London is prepared to tell the Shah before his October 8 speech to the Majlis that Great Britain would, after the speech, make a statement welcoming it. The statement would also contain language similar to that of the British declaration of 1950 declaring Britain's vital concern in the independence of Persia. [2]

The Secretary said that he was still hopeful that as a result of the talks with Molotov the Soviets might be willing to treat the Egyptian arms deal as a one-shot affair, limiting the amounts of arms and not opening new fronts in the Middle East. If Iran joins the Baghdad Pact, Moscow may regard it as a counter-move. The Soviets are extremely sensitive to such pacts. Iranian adherence therefore might nullify the efforts we are making to get the Soviets to quiet down. The Secretary said he would prefer to have the Iranian move not take place before we have a real indication as to Soviet intentions. The visit of the French leaders to Moscow is already off and the Soviets may be concerned about "the Geneva spirit" and therefore willing to limit their activities in the Middle East. The Secretary wondered whether it was a matter of "now or never" with respect to Iran's adherence. Ambassador Makins said that it might be possible to put it off until after the Geneva meeting of the Foreign Ministers but he felt London must have taken these various considerations into account and had concluded that we had better take advantage of the present opportunity to get Iran into the pact. The Secretary said that if Iran decided to join the pact we would give it our blessing but he was not inclined to say anything to them beforehand to urge them to take the step now.

Ambassador Makins said that his Government had received from the Prime Minister [3] and King of Iraq [4] a list of equipment that Iraq would like. He said his Government was going over the list and believed that it might be possible to provide some of the items quite

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[2] Reference is to British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's statement of May 19, 1950. For text, see the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950* (London, Oxford University Press, 1950), 78–79.

[3] Nuri es-Said.

[4] Faisal II.

soon. The two British Centurion tanks previously discussed have already been shipped. The Foreign Office would like assurance from us that the offshore procurement procedure with respect to the ten Centurions also previously discussed, was well under way. Given such assurance the British could take ten such tanks off the assembly line and ship them right away. The Secretary assured the Ambassador that we would do everything we could to that end.

Ambassador Makins said that the British Government had decided, subject only to the views of its Governor General in the Sudan, [5] to make a statement that the UK was prepared to recognize Sudanese independence as soon as the Sudan authorities might declare it. He said that the Governor General might want to get British troops out of the area first. The British position is that all of the political parties in the Sudan want independence, so why wait to take a plebiscite. The Foreign Office does not regard this as a matter of "tit for tat" toward Nasser but just doing something that is desirable in itself. The Secretary said that although the Foreign Office might not regard it as "tit for tat," Nasser probably would. The Secretary said he would be happier if this development took place more slowly.

Ambassador Makins remarked that Mr. Dulles had told Mr. Macmillan that the United States was going to see what it could do for "the good Arabs." The Secretary said that we are looking into that and hoped to be able to do something for Iraq. He said the Saudi Arabian Ambassador had called on him yesterday and said that his Government wished to purchase some tanks. The Secretary said that he had informed the Ambassador in principle that they could buy them under the existing cash reimbursable agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Secretary said he thought it would not be wise to say no, as they might go elsewhere. The Secretary said he realized that the British were having their difficulties with the Saudis but hoped they would agree that the problem of Soviet penetration in the area made this reply necessary. Ambassador Makins agreed, saying, however, that he hoped any delivery of tanks to the Saudis while the Buraimi difficulty was still active might be both little and late.

Ambassador Makins said the British Ambassador in Baghdad had reported that Nuri wants to "take a crack" at Syria. The Foreign Office does not take this too seriously. They believe Nuri expects the British and the United States to say no. The Secretary stated that we could not accede to giving Nuri a free hand in Syria. It would have a most harmful effect both with respect to Israel activism and with respect to Saudi Arabia.

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[5] Sir Alexander Knox Helm.

Mr. Russell referred to the draft of "Consensus of Meeting with respect to Policy to be Followed as a Result of the Egypt-Soviet Arms Deal as Discussed by British Foreign Secretary and the United States Secretary of State, October 3, 1955," which the Secretary and Ambassador Makins had previously read. The Secretary and Ambassador Makins agreed to it as a consensus of the meetings between the Secretary and Mr. Macmillan. The Secretary said, however, that he did not wish to have it regarded as being in the nature of an inter-governmental commitment.

[Attachment]

CONSENSUS OF MEETING WITH RESPECT TO POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED AS A RESULT OF THE EGYPT-SOVIET ARMS DEAL AS DISCUSSED BY THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE

October 3, 1955

1. It appears from Trevelyan's and Byroade's discussions with Nasser that there is no likelihood of our being able to dissuade Nasser from proceeding with the Czech arms agreement. We should as quickly as possible attempt to ascertain whether there is any possibility of obtaining his undertaking that the Egyptian Government will attempt to so arrange matters under the deal that Soviet opportunities for penetration in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East will be reduced to a minimum; and also his agreement to cooperate in such things as the Jordan Valley project and working toward a settlement with Israel. If there are indications that Nasser will cooperate in such ways, our policy would be to take measures that would encourage him and show that Egypt would benefit by such a policy.

2. If Nasser is unwilling to cooperate in the ways mentioned in paragraph one, our policy would be directed toward having things work out in such a way as to make it appear to Egypt that such a policy in fact does not work out well. We would not give any public indications of sanctions against Egypt, which might serve to rally the rest of the Arab world around Nasser, but we would quietly take measures that would keep Nasser from appearing to have followed a policy that worked well for Egypt. Measures in pursuance of this policy might include a declaration of independence by the Sudan, difficulties in connection with agreement on the division of the waters of the Upper Nile, difficulties in connection with the marketing of Egyptian cotton, a reduction (though not complete elimina-

tion) in United States aid to Egypt, and an effort to alienate as many of the Arab countries from Egypt as possible.

3. We should immediately take steps to dissuade other Arab states from entering into an arms deal with the Soviet bloc.

4. We should take steps to convince the Arab states that are cooperating with us, notably Iraq, that such a policy of cooperation with the West is a wise one from their point of view. This might involve encouraging Iran to join the Baghdad Pact and indications of United States support for, and cooperation with, the signatories to that Pact.

5. We should take steps to dissuade Israel from embarking upon a policy of aggression, using its superior military strength before the ratio of power in the area changes. This would involve efforts to assure Israel that it was not without friends and helpless in the face of this new development in the Middle East. Consideration should be given to giving Israel a firm reaffirmation of the tripartite declaration. This is the minimum that would create a feeling of assurance on Israel's part, while any new security undertaking by the Western powers for Israel would alienate Arab countries who are still cooperating with the West.

6. The only apparent way of avoiding (a) an early Israel outbreak, (b) an attack by the Arab world when it has increased its military strength, or (c) an arms race with the danger of an ultimate and more disastrous outbreak, is to bring about a settlement between Israel and the Arab states. The Egyptian-Soviet arms deal obviously makes this even more difficult than before but it is possible that the increased sense of independence and strength which Nasser will have even from just the arms agreement and the commencement of arrival of equipment will enable him to move toward a settlement. Also the sense of disaster in the area from an all-out arms race may bring both sides to feel the need of a settlement.

7. It would not be wise to attempt to have the problem of control of arms shipments into the Middle East dealt with in the United Nations.

8. The United Kingdom and the United States should agree upon the position to be taken by them in the event the USSR moves to have the question included in the agenda of the Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva.

9. The United States and the United Kingdom should continue to consult closely, especially with respect to measures which can be taken to implement the above points.

328. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, October 6, 1955—1 p.m.

106. Burns gave me following details October 5 current UNTSO matters.

On basis oral report just received from Chairman EI-MAC he described situation El Auja D/Z substantially as reported Contel 102 [2] and 103. [3] Second Egyptian check post now moved back from frontier, with exception possibly of some barbed wire. With regard 30 police personnel whom Israelis have established in D/Z Burns said Israelis argued that their need for police to prevent infiltration into area was equal to Egyptians need maintain the check posts near frontier for same stated reason. Burns has agreed presence these police on condition they are not equipped with arms heavier than rifles and submachine guns. However, unit reportedly has one or more Bren guns as well. Burns hopes soon start survey of international frontier by UN personnel. Some delay is bound to arise over this matter since there are only two qualified surveyors with UNTSO and both are now ill. There were no especial developments respecting Israeli insistence on observance 1949 agreement concerning MAC office arrangements. As Egyptian guard personnel have not endeavored return matter evidently in abeyance.

Burns said Israelis had evacuated their military people from the D/Z without any especial resistance to his call for such action. He thought IDF might have sent military units into D/Z without prior consultation Foreign Ministry September which evidently not interested in maintaining situation thus created in absence Egyptian intransigence over position its check posts etc. Israelis allowing observers move freely within the D/Z. Burns unaware extent Egyptian compliance with article VIII paragraph 3 GAA since Egyptians have restricted movement observers within area opposite D/Z.

Regarding Gaza strip problems Burns has made several requests for interview with Nasser. In absence reply situation remains substantially as reported Contel 89. [4] He has therefore cancelled tentative plan proceed Cairo October 6. He understands Egyptians have

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/10–655. Confidential. Received at 1:27 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Dated October 3, it reported that the withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli forces from the El Auja demilitarized zone was completed the previous day. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/10–355)

[3] Cole reported on October 4 in telegram 103 that the Egyptians had not removed all portions of one and possibly part of another check point position from the El Auja Demilitarized Zone. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/10–455)

[4] Document 281.

moved their posts some 500 meters back from D/L. They have provided no clarification their professed willingness erect fences along certain parts of D/L, since they have not indicated where they would agree build such fences. Israelis on other hand have expressed approval of concept of continuous fence vicinity D/L, but maintain their earlier position that erection fence should render creation 500 meter neutral zone each side superfluous.

Burns assumed Nasser too preoccupied with other more urgent matters to grant interview. He said Gohar is likewise involved in wide variety of duties assigned him. As result Gohar is paying insufficient attention border matters. Burns said he will continue for limited time his endeavors clarify attitudes each party toward Security Council resolution of September 8. If, as he now expects, he can make no progress he will report status of matter to Security Council.

He added that while Gaza area has been relatively quiet his forecast developments there remains substantially as outlined last paragraph Contel 89. In this connection he referred incident at Gilat October 4 (Contel 105 [5]). He agreed that present moment does not appear propitious for further attempts powers support his efforts implement September 8 resolution.

Cole

[5] The Consulate General in Jerusalem reported on October 5 in telegram 105 that on the evening of October 4 one Israeli guard was killed and two others were wounded at Gilat, 15 kilometers northwest of Beersheba, by marauders who apparently came from the Gaza Strip. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/10–555)

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329. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State [1]

Amman, October 6, 1955—5 p.m.

179. Cairo for Johnston. [2] Saw Prime Minister and gave him, with sense of urgency, latest from Damascus and Beirut. Told him Ambassador Johnston distressed over attitude of Syrian [and] Lebanon Prime Ministers with whom he conferred yesterday. [3] Their

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/10–655. Confidential. Received at 2:12 p.m. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus.

[2] Johnston returned to Cairo from Beirut late in the afternoon of October 5.

[3] No records of these conversations have been found in Department of State files.

attitude indicated, to me at least, Syria and Lebanon are without qualms any losses to Jordan. Prime Minister Mufti interrupted to say that as he had just informed British Ambassador (who preceded me and delivered some very direct observations on arms) the problem was not technical but had become entirely political, and there might be possibility of salvaging the situation of [*by*?] delaying to more favorable epoch.[4] I informed him that I brought special message from Johnston, which was that Prime Minister Nasser stood ready to back Jordan and, in subsequent league meeting he would find additional support other Arab countries. He appeared greatly heartened at this and asked for repetition. He observed that if Egypt would really back Jordan, neither Syria nor Lebanon would stand up to her. While his impassivity is sometimes difficult to pierce, I left with very strong sense of his being relieved and encouraged by news given him. It will be vital that in Cairo he receive prompt indication Egyptian backing.

Mallory

[4] In telegram 1394, October 7, Ambassador Aldrich in London informed the Department of State that the British Foreign Office had received a report of Ambassador Duke's conversation with Prime Minister Mufti, in which Mufti promised to work hard in support of the plan, but that if a deadlock developed, he would try to avoid a decision by urging its further consideration. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/10–755)

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330. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, October 7, 1955—6 p.m.

328. From Johnston.[2] On eve my meeting with Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo, following is my estimate situation in light of most recent developments:

1. Usual Arab reluctance face up to definite decision becoming increasingly apparent as time draws near. Following arguments are set forth in conversations group and I have had with Arabs here,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/10–755. Confidential. Received at 8:03 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jidda, London, and Tripoli.

[2] Johnston returned to Damascus from Cairo on October 6.

Beirut, and Amman,[3] in apparent attempt justify in advance inability make political decision accept or reject Jordan Valley plan.

(a) Time inappropriate for favorable decision: Secretary's speech, Gaza raid of February 28, Iraq joining Northern Tier, and Egyptian arms deal combine to convince Arabs that US motive in area is Arab-Israel peace, Israel cannot be trusted, Arabs are not as united as they should be, and US opposes steps of Arabs taken in their own interest.

(b) Development Yarmuk River alone what Arabs really want. This rather cynically put to me yesterday by Syrians and Lebanese[4] who assert it better for Jordan to lose 175 to 200 MCM water from Jordan River and Tiberias storage than to have any apparent contact or agreement with Israel on division and use of waters. To US, economics their proposals should be secondary to favor gained with Arabs by accepting their plan.

2. Jordan wants to accept JVP but presently lacks courage stand up for its own best interests. Syria sees itself getting all hydroelectric power from Yarmuk plan without alleged embarrassing political implications JVP. Lebanon interested only in Hasbani development and apparently confident can get US aid for purpose. Neither Syria nor Lebanon really concerned how Jordan fares. All view acceptance or rejection of JVP as contingent on political not economic or technical factors.

3. Egypt is key to favorable action on JVP. As already reported Nasser has indicated his support project. This reaffirmed yesterday by Mahmoud Riad who obviously under instructions, assured us Egypt's support and his personal desire be of assistance.[5] This quite in contrast to his previous statement time month ago Egypt had no further role in JVP. If Nasser could now be persuaded take more positive lead than he has indicated willingness to do with Jordanians, Lebanese and Syrians, I believe JVP will be accepted. If, however, Nasser adheres to mere support of program, I fear Lebanese will be ringleaders in Arab League meetings to reject JVP; advance and insist upon counterproposals; or insist on postponing decision.

4. Most probable Arab tactic at Foreign Minister's meeting will be they confront us with Yarmuk plan as counterproposal. I propose take general line that I came not to discuss old Yarmuk plan but to get their answer on JVP as now modified meet Arab views. Yarmuk plan was rejected by US long ago as entirely uneconomical and

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[3] Prior to his arrival in Damascus on the evening of October 4, Johnston was in Amman. No record of his activities in Amman has been found in Department of State files.

[4] Presumably Johnston was referring to his conversations in Damascus and Beirut on October 5.

[5] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

inequitable. US cannot accept responsibility for plan which could cost more than JVP, and irrigate far less land in Jordan. JVP is only plan which has proven sound from points of economics, engineering, and equity.

Comment: Unfavorable developments in Lebanon and Syria (upon information of whose governments I have now been obliged to wait nearly a month) appear seriously jeopardize chances acceptance JVP unless, as result Mallory's talk with Jordan PM today [6] and possible Egyptian support in Cairo, Jordan prepared stand up and be counted for plan. If Jordan will do so, with Egyptian backing, it will be very difficult for Syria and eventually Lebanon oppose. Therefore, despite odds, I remain somewhat hopeful of favorable verdict.

Moose

[6] See *supra*.

331. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, October 8, 1955—3 p.m.

684. From Johnston. [2] Had dinner last evening Nasser's home. Present were Nasser, Zakaria, Hakim, Amer, Ambassador Hussein, ... Following is condensation of information re Jordan valley project gained during evening's conversation. [3]

Nasser met each incoming Foreign Minister at airport and obtained impression Arab states were not in mood accept Jordan valley plan. Lebanon had new Arab proposal which Syria apparently accepted, with following main features: diversion Hasbani and Banyas rivers by tunnels to Lebanon coast for irrigation, power and spill of balance in Mediterranean. On Yarmuk, dam would be constructed at Maqarin Diversion. Dam would be built above demilitarized zone with tunnel through mountain to East Ghor. Total cost about

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/10–855. Top Secret. Received at 9:38 p.m. Repeated to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Tel Aviv, and London.

[2] Johnston returned to Cairo on October 7.

[3] Summary minutes of Johnston's dinner meeting with Nasser on October 7 are in Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, The Fourth Mission—No. 21 (Negotiating File).

$200,000,000, but sponsors would contend US should agree since costs no more than Jordan valley plan.

Nasser stated he spent hour with Dr. Selim discussing new proposal, and Selim reported it completely uneconomical and infeasible. Nasser therefore decided Egypt would oppose.

Nasser felt best course action was to divide consideration of Jordan valley plan into economic and political components. If this could be handled successfully in Foreign Ministers meeting he felt they would approve. Members technical committee were already in agreement plan best and most practical. Once technical advantages driven home Ministers would then consider political advantages and disadvantages. Nasser said wished handle Egypt's role in his own way, but he convinced still possible secure plan's acceptance despite great difficulties. His tactics would be let others argue political aspects without expressing his views. When they come to him privately to ascertain his position, he would urge them to accept.

Nasser further stated that because Lebanon was leader of opposition he had requested Prime Minister Kharami come to Cairo. Syria was neutral and Jordan wanted project but all 3 governments were weak and fearful of being overturned.

During course conversation Nasser referred several times to Voice of America broadcast previous evening which stated Nasser had not given US prior notification of Russian arms offer. Nasser objected strenuously to broadcast, declared it untrue and appeared upset.

Comment: Nasser appears genuinely interested have water plan accepted and seems be making strong effort secure agreement other Arab states. In spite many duties and presence high officials all Arab League states he devoted most of day and entire evening to Jordan valley plan. While am unable judge whether his efforts likely be successful, he appears confident his entire attitude has seemed friendly and cooperative. This also appeared true of Zakaria and Hakim Amer who have in past seemed lukewarm at best.

Byroade

332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, October 10, 1955—7:33 p.m.

1942. Tel Aviv's 340. [2] British Embassy here has approached Dept suggesting rejection Sharett offer (Deptel 1676 to London [3]) but acceptance variant whereby Ambassadors would visit Jerusalem when specifically instructed to do so while Sharett would come to Tel Aviv when he wished transact business with Ambassadors personally.

Dept continues feel best way out of dilemma is acceptance Sharett offer for following reasons:

1. If Western powers accept Israel offer, believe our chances holding Israelis to their own promise better than attempting impose variant on them which they will almost certainly resist.

2. As for Arab reaction, believe subtleties involved in differences between acceptance Sharett offer and pursuance course outlined in British variant would be lost on Arabs. Arabs in any event will object to any arrangement whereby Ambassadors physically appear in Jerusalem, vide their reaction to presentation credentials there.

3. Dept notes French support acceptance Sharett offer (Paris' 1456 [4]).

4. British point out that if US changes policy other interested govts such as Belgians, Italians, Swiss, Yugoslavs, Australians and Canadians would have to be informed. Our view is that UK-US-French Ambassadors Tel Aviv could inform friendly colleagues and seek support, once we three agreed on acceptance proposals. Evidence available appears indicate smaller missions in Israel would welcome more flexible arrangement. [5]

Murphy

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.0084A/10–1055. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Allen, who signed for Murphy. Repeated to Tel Aviv and Paris.

[2] Dated October 7, it reported a conversation with the British Ambassador concerning the problem of where to meet with the Foreign Minister once the new Israeli Government was formed. (*Ibid.*, 601.0084/10–755) Negotiations were still in progress for a new government headed by Ben Gurion.

[3] Document 307.

[4] See footnote 4, Document 307.

[5] The Embassy in London informed the Department it had conveyed the contents of this message to the British Foreign Office, which was looking into the matter and would provide a reply as soon as possible. (Telegram 1442 from London, October 11; Department of State, Central Files, 601.0084A/10–1155)

333. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 11, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Israel's Concern at Egypt–USSR Arms Deal; Soviet Efforts to Penetrate the Near East

PARTICIPANTS

Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Gideon Rafael of the Israel Foreign Office and the UNGA Delegation
Col. Katriel Salmon, Military Attaché, Israel Embassy
NEA—George V. Allen
NE—Donald C. Bergus

Ambassador Eban said that Israel was following developments with great interest and recalled Mr. Allen's earlier statement that we would exchange views. He was anxious to learn anything Mr. Allen could say about his trip to Cairo.

Mr. Allen replied that as a result of his trip to Cairo he had formed certain opinions, among them were: the Czech-Egyptian transaction would go through; it would not be of token proportions; the USSR having committed itself would make every effort to deliver the goods. He did not know the size of the transaction, he had not asked Nasser and Nasser had not volunteered the information. Mr. Allen was not in a position to comment on newspaper speculation as to the items for which Egypt had contracted. We had to face the fact that Nasser had become a "man on horseback" with the Arabs. Nasser had been deeply impressed by accounts in the *New York Times* and elsewhere of massive Israel superiority in men and matériel over the Arab states. This feeling of inferiority in the face of Israel was shared by most Arabs. Nasser could not turn back from the deal even if he wished to.

Mr. Allen said he was disturbed by the recent tendency of the Egyptian press to speak of past U.S. aid to Egypt in derisive terms and to refer to the USSR as "objective". Nasser had first tried to justify this transaction to Mr. Allen on the basis that it was merely a commercial operation—an exchange of cotton which Egypt could not sell elsewhere for arms which Egypt could not obtain elsewhere—but while Mr. Allen was still in Egypt, Nasser had alleged that the West was intriguing to keep Egypt inferior. Mr. Eban noted that everything Mr. Allen had said made Israel's anxiety more profound. He wished to describe how the situation looked to Israel and then

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–1155. Secret. Drafted by Bergus.

explore the possibilities of what the U.S. could do to help in this crisis.

Mr. Eban understood that the Secretary had agreed with his analysis regarding the gravity of the situation. A near Eastern government had opened its door to Russia after Russia had been kept from the area for over 200 years. The area had been kept free from Communist influence ever since the Soviet revolution. This action on the part of Russia so soon after the Geneva conference increased Israel's skepticism of Russia's professed intensions. He was sure that similar thoughts were present in our minds.

From the local view point there was a regime in Egypt which was willing to superimpose an international conflict on a local conflict and bring the horrors of an arms race to the area. Israel had scrapped any feelings she may have had that in Nasser lay a hope of working toward a Near Eastern settlement. The U.S. should do the same. Israel had "utterly and irrevocably" lost the belief that progress could be made with the Nasser regime. In her relations with Nasser they found nothing but a trail of broken promises.

Before the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Suez Base agreement Israel had pointed out that she did not oppose Egypt's obtaining her national aspirations. However, Israel thought that before British evacuation took place Egypt should firmly commit herself to working toward "our" objectives of peace and stability in the area. The U.S. and others had said that first Egypt should be given the benefit of British evacuation, after which the Egyptians should be prepared to work toward a settlement. An Egyptian assurance of a desire quickly to press forward on a settlement with Israel had been relayed to the Israelis.

Mr. Allen here interposed that one thing which had surprised him during his visit to Egypt had been that every foreign observer with whom he had talked agreed that Egypt's attitude toward Israel had changed sharply since the Gaza raid of February 28, 1955.

Mr. Eban resumed and pointed out that the process had begun well before that time. There had been no movement toward a settlement after evacuation. When Egypt occupied the two islands in the Straits of Tiran in 1950 she had submitted a memorandum that there would be no interference with the right of innocent passage.[2] Every year since then has seen her siege of the Straits tighten. There were Egyptian assurances that the blockade of Israel would be relaxed. There has been no evidence of such relaxation. During this period of no progress Nasser had been "smothered, indeed pam-

[2] For information on the Egyptian occupation of these islands in the Straits of Tiran, see telegrams 102 and 122, January 30 and February 5, 1950, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 711 and 722.

pered" with aid by the West. He had been given economic aid without conditions attached to it. He had been offered military aid. The reasons he had rejected it looked sinister. He evidently had been unwilling to sign a commitment against aggression.

Mr. Allen here interposed that he felt that this was not the reason, since Nasser had already signed such an undertaking in his 408(e) agreement with the U.S. The difficulty there had been the U.S. requirement that it send a military mission. Nasser had feared that he could not permit such a mission to operate in Egypt in view of the opposition such a mission could create in Moslem Brotherhood and similar circles.

Mr. Eban said he would like to finish the catalogue. Nasser had promised that there would be no death sentences for the "Zionist spies" who were tried in Egypt last December. Several of these people were then hanged. This had played a major part in the Israel raid on Gaza of February 28. In mid-August General Burns and others had conveyed to the Israelis the message that Nasser would prevent infiltration into Israel from Gaza. He then sent commandos into Israel territory. Although this behavior had been utterly unprovoked Egypt had boasted of her accomplishments. Even before the deal with the Soviets Israel had reason to be skeptical of Nasser.

Any illusions which Israel held had now been shattered by this deal with the Soviets. If Nasser were going to bring the Communist conspiracy to Israel's doorstep, if behind him there should arise a hinterland of Soviet support, this was a menace to Israel's survival. The USSR would have no compunction in being a party to Israel's extermination. Israel could not bear such a development.

Mr. Eban said that he would have thought that the U.S. would have a similar reaction. Nasser could no longer be believed. The assurances that even after he obtained superiority over Israel he would not attack her could not be accepted. The facts needed a harsh examination. This was not the kind of Near East that Israel could live in. Israel was disturbed by press reports, which seemed semi-official in character, and which gave the impression that the U.S. viewed the situation less drastically. He hoped the U.S. could agree that Egypt was not inferior but superior to Israel in war matériel. While Israel would win in a fight with Egypt it would not be because of an Israel advantage in war equipment. Mr. Allen stated that if Mr. Eban were referring to the story from Cairo quoting a "high diplomatic source" he wished to make it clear that although his name had been mentioned later in the article, he had not been that source. Mr. Eban rejoined that he was disturbed at the tendency to play this matter down. He had been relieved that earlier in the conversation Mr. Allen had taken a very serious view of the developments.

Mr. Eban continued that a situation existed where one Arab state had made a deal with the Soviets, others might also do so. Economic aid had also been offered. The USSR and her allies had approached Israel saying that she too could avail herself of Soviet aid. There had been approaches from the Poles. A member of the Soviet delegation to the UNGA had invited Mr. Eban for dinner tomorrow night. The Soviet bloc representatives were frank in saying that they wish to extend Soviet influence in the Near East. They felt that so long as there was no such influence the area remained a vacuum which inevitably America and her allies would fill. They wished to build up Soviet influence so as to carry out the "peaceful objectives" of the USSR in that area. Mr. Allen asked why Israel did not publicize this offer. Mr. Eban replied that a Soviet representative in Washington had invited the leading Israel journalist to lunch today to tell him the same story. In this conversation the Soviets also stressed their dissatisfaction with the present vacuum in the Near East.

Mr. Allen said that many Arab nationalists thought that the most pressing problem of the Near East was the removal of imperialism from the area. We had replied by pointing out Soviet intentions to penetrate the region. The Arab nationalists then rejoined by saying that Israel is an extension of the West and therefore an instrument of imperialism.

Mr. Eban said that the remedies as Israel saw them included the hope that the West would not compete with the Soviets in furnishing arms to the Arab states. Israel appreciated U.S. assurances to this effect and hoped they would be maintained. This was not enough, however, to preserve the present balance. At this point Israel must invoke the long declared policy of the three Western powers of maintaining a balance in the area. Israel hoped that the West would assure her that she would not be overtaken in the quest for arms. Israel did not wish to divert a high proportion of her slender resources to arms but circumstances required this. There was a framework for Israel arms purchases in this country in the 408(e) agreement between us.[3] Israel would shortly be making a request to purchase arms in this country which she hoped the U.S. would sympathetically consider. The Secretary of State had said at least four times recently that the basic solution to this problem lay not in an arms race but in a collective security guarantee. His argument that such a guarantee should be linked to a settlement was now outmoded. The time for such security measures was now. Israel

[3] Israel and the United States concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on July 23, 1952. For texts of the notes exchanged, see 3 UST (pt. 4) 4985.

would undertake not to attack her neighbors in exchange for guarantees that she would not be attacked.

What were the alternatives for Israel? To stand back and watch a hostile power increase in strength? Israel public opinion would not permit such a development.

Mr. Allen referred to a hint earlier in the conversation that Israel felt a change of regime in Egypt was in order. Mr. Eban replied that he had made no such hint but would be interested in hearing what Mr. Allen had to say on the subject. Mr. Allen said that while he did not wish to minimize the implications of this development it was possible that Nasser, or for that matter any of the Arab leaders, would not wish to shake the hand of the Communist powers to the extent that it would endanger their own position in their own countries. Mr. Eban replied that the Egyptian deal and similar arrangements in other Arab states could mean that the Arab world was closely linked to the Soviet orbit. The momentum toward complete Communist penetration would be hard to stop. Mr. Allen replied that perhaps what Moscow desired in the Near East was a bloc of neutral states. It was not a foregone conclusion that the USSR desired major hostilities in the area. Moscow could be the loser in such an eventuality. A final tie-in of Soviet objectives with those of the Arabs could be fatal.

Mr. Rafael pointed out that the signal for hostilities would not have to be given by Moscow. Once strengthened by the Soviets, the Arabs could act independently without their help. The USSR in offering arms to Israel had laid down two conditions: (1) that Israel forego any security arrangement with the West and (2) that the deal be worked out in the framework of a commercial transaction.

Mr. Allen said, semi-seriously, that perhaps the Soviet offer to Israel should be developed further, to find out what the Soviets had in mind. Colonel Salmon evidently expected Mr. Allen to urge the Israelis to publish the Soviet offer. He stated that publishing the offer would help the Arabs by taking them off the hook and permitting them to say that Israel also had been offered the same facilities which the Arabs were accepting. Speaking to the same point, Mr. Eban said that he opposed publication because there were a few people in Israel who would urge his government to accept such an arrangement. Israel could not be a party to any arrangement which might increase Soviet ability to bring her influence to bear either in Israel or elsewhere. Mr. Allen said what he had in mind was that he was curious as to what a probing of the Soviet offer to Israel would reveal. Mr. Eban replied that what the USSR wanted was an assurance that Israel would not permit an extension of U.S. influence in the area. Mr. Allen commented that Nasser had maintained that there had been no such condition attached to his deal.

Mr. Rafael said that the Soviets had told the Israelis that their deal with Nasser had been not only commercial but they had also obtained from him assurances that he would not link Egypt in any way with the West. When the Israelis pointed out to the Soviets that Nasser was already linked to the West by the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, the Soviets had stated that they had received further assurances from Nasser that he considered this arrangement to be a dead letter.

Mr. Eban said that as regards the Gaza raid of February 28 the Israelis' theory was that it had not been this development but the conclusion of the Turk-Iraq pact which had changed Nasser's attitude toward Israel and the West. He asked if the U.S. were any nearer a position whereby a reply to Israel's proposals for dealing with this situation could be expected. Mr. Allen replied negatively. He had been able to report on this matter only hurriedly to the Secretary. We had not as yet come to a fixed policy on the subject. It was hard to make an estimate on the situation when there was so little real information available.

Mr. Rafael returned to Israel's experience with Nasser and emphasized that Nasser had been forthcoming with promises but not with performances. Israel was convinced that since the Gaza cease-fire had come into effect Nasser had moved the base of terrorist operations to Syria and Lebanon. These operations were being conducted partly by people who had been locally recruited and partly by trained Egyptian agents who had been sent through Israel to the other Arab states.

Colonel Salmon stated that he was leaving for Israel that night. He wondered if he could convey any contemplation on the part of the U.S. Government of available courses of action. Mr. Allen said that there was one thing in the air, which was a possibility of an agreement on the Jordan water scheme. He had been discouraged by Lebanese opposition to such a scheme which had recently emerged. Mr. Eban recalled that the USSR had been consistently hostile to the Johnston Plan. He said that at the time of the Jisr Banat Ya'aqub discussion in the Security Council, Vishinsky had told him that the Soviets had used their veto only because they thought that Israel's action on the upper Jordan River had been an implementation of an American plan. The Soviets were obsessed over the point of American influence in the area.

In departing Mr. Eban said that he would be in touch with the Department relative to the arrival of the Israel Prime Minister in this

country.[4] Mr. Sharett wished to discuss these questions with the Secretary before he went to Geneva. If this were not possible then Mr. Eban might be asking to see the Secretary some time before the Geneva conference.

[4] According to a memorandum from Russell to Hanes on October 19, the Israeli Embassy advised the Department that Sharett had to defer his visit to the United States and cancel an October 21 appointment with Secretary Dulles because his designated successor as Prime Minister, Ben Gurion, was ill. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.84A11/10–1955) Lawson informed the Department of State on October 21 that Sharett "was seeking urgently appointment with Secretary Dulles in Europe." (Telegram 389 from Tel Aviv; *ibid.*, 684A.86/10–2155) Dulles met Sharett in Paris on October 26; see Document 359.

334. Editorial Note

On October 11, Secretary Dulles met with President Eisenhower at Fitzsimons Hospital, Denver, Colorado. A memorandum of the conversation by Dulles reads in part as follows:

"We then spoke of the Soviet arms deal for Egypt. I said that this was creating widespread repercussions, which could not yet be fully appraised, and it might at a later date require considered attention by the two of us. I thought, however, that it would be useful now to indicate to Bulganin that the matter had the President's attention and concern. I said that Eden had written a quite long and strong letter to Bulganin, but I felt that it was better from the President's standpoint only to touch on the matter lightly.

"I then showed the President a suggested form of letter, which he read and indicated met fully with his approval, and he then signed it." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

The letter from the President to Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Nicolai A. Bulganin reads as follows:

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

"I am concerned about the new prospective arms shipments to Egypt. I fear that they will not promote the goals which, I hope we have in common—that is a relaxation of tensions between us and a peacefully constructive solution of the Arab-Israel problem.

"I write this in the same spirit of frankness that you invoked in your letter to me of September 19th.

"With best wishes,

"Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower"

It was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 432, October 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–1155) Telegram 872 from Moscow, October 12, reported that Chargé Walter Walmsley had delivered the message that day. (*Ibid.*, 774.56/10–1255)

For information concerning Bulganin's September 19 message to Eisenhower, see footnote 4, Document 303.

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335. Special National Intelligence Estimate [1]

SNIE 30–3–55 *Washington, October 12, 1955.*

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMS DEAL WITH THE SOVIET BLOC [2]

The Problem

To estimate, in the light of the recent Egyptian arms deal with the Soviet Bloc: (a) the likelihood of Israeli or Egyptian-instigated hostilities assuming no change in present US policy; (b) the effect of certain possible US courses of action on the situation; and (c) the outlook for Soviet exploitation of this and possible similar deals with other Arab states.

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[1] Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems on an immediate or crisis basis. SNIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of SNIEs.

[2] According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff." This estimate was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on October 12, 1955. "Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

Conclusions

1. The Soviet-Egyptian arms deal has substantially increased the risk that Israel will launch a "preventive war." Such Israeli action is not likely within the next few weeks. The Israelis will probably wish to determine more precisely the magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet Bloc willingness to arm the Arabs, to exploit the favorable trend of Western public opinion, and, most importantly, to determine how far Israel can realistically depend on Western and particularly US support in maintaining its territorial integrity. In the absence of convincing evidence of Western determination to preserve the territorial status quo, there is very real danger that Israel will undertake "preventive war," possibly in the next few months, and it would almost certainly be more willing to take risks which could touch off a new round of hostilities. An Israeli "preventive war" may start in the form of border raids where responsibilities and intentions may initially be obscure. (Paras. 11–13)

2. If it became unmistakably clear to both sides that the US was prepared to use any means necessary, including military force, to halt aggression, it is almost certain that no "second round" would develop. However, if the US declined to guarantee the territorial status quo in a new and more direct pledge than that contained in the Tripartite Declaration, it would be extremely difficult to deter Israeli preventive action, since neither the Israelis nor the Arabs would be likely to believe that the US would in fact intervene effectively against Israel. (Para. 16)

3. Assuming that it is actually implemented, the arms deal is likely to strengthen a tendency toward Egyptian militancy, and increase the danger that local clashes will develop into large-scale fighting. However, pending absorption of the new equipment Egypt will probably feel constrained to avoid serious difficulties with Israel. Over the longer run, the growth of Egyptian military strength will almost certainly stimulate some Egyptian interest in a "second round" against Israel. (Paras. 8, 14–15)

4. Should a "second round" occur in the near future, in which the US simply let events take their course, an Israeli victory would be almost certain. Under these circumstances Israeli ability to seize and hold considerable portions of all its neighbors' territories would be limited largely by its lack of reserve supplies and the probability of UK intervention if Jordan were invaded. The effects of a "hands off" policy on the part of the US would have an extremely adverse effect on its position in the Arab world and would retard US efforts to build indigenous Middle East defense. (Paras. 18–19)

5. A convincing indication of US determination to intervene effectively in the event of aggression would reassure both sides.

Nevertheless, the Arabs would regard it primarily as a guarantee of Israel's present position. Arab resentment would in time increase, particularly if growing Arab military capabilities placed the Arabs in the position of the ones being restrained. (Para. 17)

6. Soviet arms aid to Egypt will complicate if not block the achievement of two major US objectives in the Middle East: an Arab-Israeli settlement and the creation of effective regional defense arrangements against Communism. It is likely to stimulate neutralist tendencies in Egypt and other Arab states, and to enhance the capabilities of local Communists for subversion and political penetration. Although we believe that the RCC is determined to avoid close political alignment with the Soviets, increasing military and economic dependence on the Bloc might eventually deprive it of some of its freedom to choose its orientation. (Paras. 20–23)

Discussion

I. The Arms Deal and Its Military Implications

7. On 21 September 1955 the Soviet Bloc agreed to furnish in exchange for Egyptian cotton a supply of arms at bargain rates . . . . Bloc technicians would be made available over a 90-day period to instruct the Egyptians in maintenance and operation.

8. Assuming that the Bloc actually supplies these items, in terms of military hardware alone the deal would: (a) give Egypt marked qualitative and quantitative superiority in combat aircraft over Israel, which is already inferior in numbers of aircraft to the Arab states as a group; (b) significantly reduce Israel's present numerical superiority in tanks; and (c) furnish Egypt with means of harassing Israel's shipping. Some of the equipment will probably be placed in operation within a few months after delivery. However, it is estimated that even under optimum conditions, involving large bloc training missions over an extended period, at least a year would probably be required after delivery before most of the equipment could be effectively used in unit operations.

II. The Effect on Israeli Courses of Action

9. The arms deal constitutes a severe psychological blow to Israel. At a minimum it will in time make the Egyptians more able and willing to stand up to or retaliate against Israeli military raids, thereby lessening the likelihood that Israel's activist raiding tactics will force the Arabs to make peace. At a maximum it brings materially closer the spectre of a growth of Arab military strength which would leave Israel incapable of defending itself effectively. Although the Israelis probably recognize that the military effects of

the arms deal will not be immediately felt, they probably believe that they have only limited time to adjust to the situation.

10. These considerations are almost certainly stimulating increasing pressures within Israel for a bolder and more aggressive effort to resolve the basic problem of security once and for all. The Israeli government has responded with strong pressures on the US for compensating arms aid and for a specific security guarantee, and it will almost certainly make additional efforts, within the relatively narrow limits of its potential resources, to procure arms elsewhere if they are not available from the US. Meanwhile, Israel is almost certainly canvassing the possibilities of military solutions. Prime Minister-designate Ben Gurion had previously announced that Israel will take forcible measures if necessary to end the Egyptian blockade of the sea route to Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba.[3] The Israeli General Staff, which recommended expulsion of the Egyptians from the Gaza strip a few months ago, is probably pressing for at least limited territorial advances for the purposes of eliminating trouble spots and otherwise improving Israel's position at tactically vulnerable places along the border. Moreover, consideration is probably being given to the merits of a "preventive war" while Israel still holds a decisive military edge.

11. The Soviet-Egyptian arms deal has substantially increased the risk that Israel will launch a "preventive war." It is unlikely, however, that Israel will initiate such action in the next few weeks. Before committing themselves to an outright war policy, the Israelis will probably wish to determine more precisely the magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet Bloc willingness to arm the Arabs, to exploit the favorable trend of Western public opinion, and, more importantly, to determine how far Israel can realistically depend on Western and particularly US support in maintaining its territorial integrity.

12. Particularly if the prospects of UN and Western counteraction in curbing incidents are uncertain, we believe that Israel, in its present mood, will almost certainly be more disposed than before the arms deal to take chances in execution of its activist policies. Such a move might touch off a new round of large-scale hostilities, whether by design or otherwise. Israel's proposed move to force the Gulf of Aqaba might prove such a stepping stone to war, as might

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[3] Ben Gurion stated this during a campaign speech on July 8, 1955. (Telegram 18 from Tel Aviv, July 11; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.00/7–1155)

On September 10, Egypt announced new and more stringent regulations to govern shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. According to the new rules, all ships intending to sail through the Gulf had to obtain Egypt's permission at least 72 hours in advance since they would be passing through Egyptian territorial waters. Egypt refused to grant the right of passage to Israeli ships since a state of war existed between Egypt and Israel.

also an Israeli move to intercept arms shipments to Egypt or resumption of the work to divert the Jordan waters in the demilitarized zone at Jisr Banat Yacub on the Syrian border. Should Israel find itself engaged in major clashes with one of the Arab states it would probably be increasingly disposed to take advantage of the situation to seize the troubled area or otherwise improve its tactical position. Should the intervention of other Arab states appear to be in the offing it would probably attempt to seize the initiative and in so doing make a general conflict inevitable.

13. Moreover, in the absence of convincing evidence of Western determination to preserve the territorial status quo, there is very real danger that Israel will undertake a "preventive war," possibly within the next few months. The Egyptian arms deal, particularly if followed up by a similar deal with Syria, threatens Israel with an arms race which it cannot afford to sustain with its own resources and which ultimately threatens to leave it incapable of defending itself effectively. Unless Israel obtains countervailing arms aid or a new and more direct US pledge of prompt and effective military intervention to preserve the territorial status quo than is now provided in the Tripartite Declaration, it is likely to conclude that war offers the only way out. Under such circumstances, Israel is also likely to play down the possibility of effective Western intervention against a "preventive war" by Israel, which the latter would portray as a defensive reaction to Arab aggression inspired and armed by the Soviet Union and which was accompanied by offers to negotiate a firm peace. An Israel "preventive war" may start in the form of border raids where responsibilities and intentions may initially be obscure.

III. Effect on Egyptian Courses of Action

14. We believe that Egypt's acceptance of Bloc arms has been motivated far less by thoughts of a "second round" than by: (a) the necessity to shore up armed forces morale; (b) an acute sense of vulnerability to Israeli military harassment and possible invasion; and (c) its desire to follow through on its announced policy of independence from both great power blocs. However, the arms deal, assuming that it is actually implemented, is likely to strengthen a tendency toward greater militancy vis-à-vis Israel already manifest in the Egyptian government's recent sponsorship of commando operations in the Gaza area. This will increase the danger that local clashes will develop into large-scale fighting. For the immediate future, the Egyptian regime will probably feel constrained to avoid serious difficulties with Israel, pending the arrival of the new equipment and the training of combat-effective units. However, even

during this interim period the difficulty of holding Egyptian local commanders and troops in check will probably create increased hazards of a flareup.

15. Over the longer run, the growth of Egyptian military strength will almost certainly stimulate some Egyptian interest in a "second round" against Israel. Although the RCC regime has manifested concern over the fact that Israeli possession of the Negev cuts Egypt off from land communication with the other Arab states, it has no territorial ambitions of its own in Israel, will probably retain a healthy respect for Israeli combat effectiveness, and—despite its attempts to free itself from dependence on the West—will probably remain fearful of Western sanctions. Assuming that Egypt believes itself greatly strengthened by Soviet arms and support, it might be tempted to make war on Israel as a means of solidifying its leadership in the Arab world. While the deterrents mentioned are likely to prevent such action, at least in the near future, Egypt will almost certainly do its best to impress the Israelis with its will and ability to defend its interests and may therefore end up with fully as aggressive and activist a policy as that now being pursued by Israel.

IV. Consequences of a Strengthening of US Policy Regarding Intervention

16. If it became unmistakably clear to both sides that the US was prepared to use any means necessary, including military force, to halt aggression, it is almost certain that no "second round" would develop. However, if the US declined to guarantee the territorial status quo in a new and more direct pledge than that contained in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, it would be extremely difficult to deter Israeli preventive action since neither the Israelis nor the Arabs would be likely to believe that the US would in fact intervene effectively against Israel.

17. A convincing indication of US determination to intervene effectively in the event of aggression would reassure both sides. Nonetheless, the Arabs would regard it primarily as a guarantee of Israel's present position. Over the long run, the concept of the US as a policeman, even if backed by the UN, would be a source of increasing Arab resentment, particularly if increasing Arab military capabilities placed the Arabs in the position of the ones being restrained.

V. Probable Consequences of a US "Hands Off" Policy in Response to an Israeli Attack

18. If aggressive Israeli action should lead in the near future to a "second round," in which the US stood aside and let developments take their course, all the Arab League states would almost certainly

become involved, and an Israeli victory would almost certainly be the outcome. Against Arab opposition alone, we estimate that Israel could now seize all of Arab-controlled Palestine, portions of Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese territory contiguous to Israel, and some Jordanian territory east of the Jordan River. Israel would probably have to reckon with UN intervention. However, the most important limitations to Israel's ability to consolidate these gains would be its own lack of reserve supplies and the probability that the UK, because of its special treaty obligations, would feel compelled to intervene, at least with air and naval forces, if Jordan were invaded. Egypt's capabilities would be substantially improved if it could actually employ Soviet Bloc military personnel in using its new weapons against Israel. However, it appears unlikely that the USSR, under present circumstances, would be willing to accept the risks of hostilities with the West which such a move would involve. A defeat of the Arabs would probably be followed by a period of disorder in one or more of the Arab states, a condition which the USSR would almost certainly attempt to exploit.

19. A "hands off" policy on the part of the US would have an extremely adverse effect on its position in the Arab world, and would retard US efforts to build indigenous Middle East defense.

VI. Probable Soviet Objectives and Prospects for Success

20. The arms deal with Egypt represents the most dramatic move in a Soviet campaign in the Middle East which has been under way for some time. A major objective of this campaign is almost certainly to stiffen Arab resistance to Western policies in the area, particularly the efforts of the US and UK to develop anti-Communist defense arrangements and to retain their bases. Since the signing of the Baghdad Pact,[4] Egypt has led Arab opposition to Western defense efforts, and Syria and Saudi Arabia, the other recipients of Soviet arms offers, have been Egypt's chief supporters. Moreover, the USSR almost certainly appreciates that US–UK difficulties in creating a defense system will be seriously increased: (a) by any heightening of Arab-Israeli tensions; (b) by the Western Powers losing the advantage of being the only significant source of arms for the Arab states; and (c) by invidious comparisons in Arab minds between the spectacular amount and easy terms of Soviet aid promised to Egypt, and the relative handful of matériel which Iraq has been receiving as a member in good standing of the "northern tier" group of nations.

[4] Turkey, Iraq, the UK, and Pakistan are now members of this pact. [Footnote in the source text.]

21. In addition to its usefulness in undermining Western defense efforts in the area, the USSR probably regards the arms deal as a means of strengthening neutralist tendencies in Egypt and other Arab states, if only by weakening their dependence on the West and increasing Soviet bargaining power. Egypt's decision to accept arms from the Bloc in exchange for cotton, together with recent agreements for substantially increased barter trade in nonmilitary items, would probably increase Egyptian reliance on the Orbit for continuing training needs and maintenance supplies and possibly as a market for Egypt's primary export item. Finally, the Soviets probably will see increased opportunities for subversion and political penetration, not only through increased Soviet influence, but also through the introduction of Soviet technical and commercial personnel in the Arab states.

22. We believe that the RCC is determined to avoid any kind of close alignment with the Soviet Bloc. It is most unlikely that Egypt would pay a price for Soviet arms in the form of any kind of political commitments when it has been unwilling to pay such a price for Western arms. The same apprehensive, suspicious nationalism that caused Egypt to reject alignment with the West in a Middle East defense organization will probably work with equal force against any efforts of the Soviets to obtain a special position in Egypt. Should Egypt become increasingly dependent on the Bloc economically and militarily, and at the same time more isolated from the West, it might eventually lose some of its freedom to choose its orientation.

23. On the other hand, Soviet chances for fostering Egyptian neutralism are more promising and immediate. Strong neutralist tendencies already exist within the RCC and among its supporters. Egyptian receipt of Soviet arms aid is likely to strengthen this inclination, particularly since Soviet aid will raise Egyptian hopes of the advantages to be derived from playing off the Soviets and the West against each other. Initially at least, indigenous Communist standing will be improved by Egyptian acceptance of Soviet Bloc aid.

24. At present, the RCC regime probably overestimates its ability to handle both the short and longer-range risks of accepting the Soviet arms offer. The sheer technical problems of assembling and maintaining the relatively modern matériel involved, quite aside from training Egyptian personnel to use it effectively, will place the regime under strong compulsions to admit greater numbers of Bloc technicians and training personnel for longer periods than it probably now thinks will be necessary. Having acquired the arms, Nasr will be reluctant to close Egypt's doors to the personnel needed to make them useful. Particularly if the USSR itself and the Bloc representatives sent to Egypt are careful at the outset to avoid the

appearance of having political or subversive designs, this reluctance will become even greater. And if Israel should continue to provoke and frighten the regime by activist policies on the border, the pressures to seek Bloc technical and military help would be great. This, in turn, would lead to increased Soviet bargaining power and opportunities for penetration, with consequent advantages to long-term Soviet political goals. Similarly, growing economic dependence on the Bloc as a market for Egyptian cotton might give the USSR increased power to influence Egypt either by threats or inducements. In accord with its current policy of relaxation of tensions, the USSR will probably be very circumspect in its relations with Egypt in order to encourage nations around the periphery of the Communist Bloc to adopt a neutralist course as an inexpensive and, indeed, profitable means of assuring their independence and security.

25. Egyptian acceptance of Bloc arms and assertion of an "independent foreign policy" has made a profound impression in other Arab states and increases the chances that Syria would accept a Soviet arms offer. In view of the basic instability of the Syrian political situation, the greater potential of the well-organized Syrian Communist Party (whose leader is a member of Parliament), and the strength of leftist elements in the army, the possibilities of an increasingly leftist course in Syria are considered greater.

26. Saudi Arabia's resistance to Bloc penetration is probably much greater than Syria's and the chances of its accepting large-scale Bloc arms aid may be considered less. However, its increasing conflict with the UK and the strong feelings of the ruling family regarding the threat from Hashemite Iraq and from Israel would incline the Saudi government to help finance Arab arms deals from whichever source as long as Arab capabilities against Israel are thereby strengthened and/or Iraq's plan for hegemony among the Arab states checked.

VII. By-Products

27. Apart from the improved prospects for local Communists and the encouragement to neutralism in the Middle East arising from the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, it is possible that the USSR has in view the development of further contentions and difficulties in the Middle East. The appearance of a leftist trend in Syria, for example, would probably bring heavy pressures on the US and UK from Turkey and Iraq to permit intervention in Syria before the situation became irretrievable. This might confront the West with the choice of either permitting a serious increase in inter-Arab tensions or imperilling the Baghdad Pact structure. Furthermore, the greatly increased danger of arms races and armed conflicts in the area

resulting from the deal is likely both to set one part of the Arab world against the other and the Arab world as a whole against Israel. The fact that these basic cleavages in effect run at cross-purposes to each other is likely merely to add to the confusion and to the prospects of general deterioration that would probably offer much greater long run advantages to international Communism than would the pursuit by the Arab states of neutralist policies. It is possible that the USSR will attempt both to exploit the "spirit of Geneva" and to disrupt the Western position in the Middle East by offering cancellation of the Egyptian arms deal in return for US withdrawal from the Dhahran base and the abandonment of British military arrangements with Jordan and Iraq. The USSR might also propose a stabilization of the Arab-Israeli situation by a quadripartite (US, UK, France, USSR) guarantee.

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336. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, October 14, 1955—noon.

112. From Johnston. [2] Following are highlights of Cairo meetings regarding JVP.

1. Initial meetings four Foreign Ministers [3] confused by elimination technical personnel and presentation "Damascus plan" by Lebanese and Syrian delegations. Plan apparently called for diversion Hasbani and Banyas into lower Litani, two storage dams on Yarmuk and diversion tunnel through mountains above DMA. While it quickly obvious plan completely impractical, Lebanese and Syrian delegations reportedly pressed for outright rejection JVP through October 9. Egypt and Jordan favored JVP, though former did not make all-out effort and latter indulged in much vacillation. States not directly concerned apparently made little effort influence four delegations. Saudi Arabia was reportedly unsympathetic but inactive, Libya and Yemen were willing follow Egypt's lead and Iraq was favorably disposed although unable resist twitting Egypt for its support of JVP in view past criticism of Iraqi cooperation with West.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.13/10–1455. Secret. Received at 11:26 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, London, Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Paris, Jidda, Tripoli, and Benghazi.

[2] Johnston proceeded to Jerusalem on October 12.

[3] Fawzi of Egypt, Ghazzi of Syria, Mufti of Jordan, and Lahoud of Lebanon.

2. By evening October 10 Lebanese opposition had weakened but they reluctant break with Syrians. We worked out face-saving proposal for Lebanese wherein four Foreign Ministers would ask Arab League recognize technical validity JVP, find it compatible with Arab policy, and permit states concerned approve it in own time according to their constitutional requirements. Lebanese accepted proposal afternoon of October 11 subject to Syrian concurrence.

3. I immediately saw Ghazzi who unwilling even come to grips with problem much less modify intransigent stand. Meeting four Foreign Ministers followed in which they recommended further study and postponement decision. [4]

4. In discussion Nasser after meeting he regretted inability secure more concrete action, urged patience, described JVP as only sound proposals and agreed continue his support of project. Said it could be adopted in two to three months time. Ghazzi morning October 12 said Syria would accept JVP, alleging he had been misinformed. Asked for more time arrange acceptance.

Comment. Despite references to further problems to be resolved, it clear to all delegations that program in fact has received technical acceptance. [5] Problem is one of inability weak governments take decision requiring any measure political courage. Am now endeavoring dissuade Israelis from taking precipitate action JISR Banat Yaqub or elsewhere which will close door on JVP. Israelis have proposed fixing time limit for acceptance or rejection by both sides. I replied I unable accept suggestion here, but would transmit to Secretary State next few days. This mentioned in joint communiqué issued here which also stated technical differences two sides now insignificant and readily adjustable. [6] Wish consult on possible lines action at earliest opportunity Washington next week.

Cole

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[4] The resolution adopted on October 11 stated that the Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Egyptian representatives had studied the Arab plan for the Jordan Valley and had decided "that the experts be asked to pursue the mission with which they have been entrusted until an agreement safeguarding Arab interests is reached." The text was transmitted to the Department in telegram 728 from Cairo, October 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/10–1255)

[5] Telegram 747 from Cairo, October 15, transmitted the text of a letter of the same date from Arab League Secretary General Hassouna to Johnston enclosing a copy of the Political Committee's October 11 resolution "approving the decision taken by the four states concerned with the plan for the development of the Jordan Valley and its tributaries." (*Ibid.*, 684A.85322/10–1555)

[6] The joint communiqué issued in Jerusalem on October 13 following Johnston's conversations there stated that Johnston had informed the Israel representatives that differences between the Arab States and Israel on technical aspects of the plan were "now so small as to be, in his view, insignificant" and easily adjustable. The text was transmitted to the Department in telegram 357 from Tel Aviv, October 14. (*Ibid.* 684A.85322/10–1455)

337. Editorial Note

On October 13, at the 261st Meeting of the National Security Council, with Vice President Nixon presiding, Secretary of State Dulles requested the opportunity to comment on the situation in Iran, the possible repercussions of Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact, and the Soviet Union's reaction to Iran's announcement that it would become a member of the Baghdad Pact subject to the agreement of the Iranian Parliament.

In addition to discussing the events that had transpired in Iran, Secretary Dulles reported that the Soviet Union had duplicated its offer of arms to Egypt by offering them as well to Saudi Arabia and Syria, both of whom had also asked the United States for additional weapons.

A brief discussion relating to the Arab-Israeli problem followed. The relevant portion of a memorandum of discussion, October 14, reads as follows:

"Turning to the Arab-Israeli problem, Secretary Dulles said that he understood that a paper with recommended courses of action on this subject was in course of preparation in the National Security Council Planning Board but that progress on the paper had been poor. Turning to Admiral Radford, the Secretary said that he hoped we could get as much help on this problem from his people in the Joint Chiefs of Staff as possible. Had it not proved rather difficult to get such assistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff people in the initial stages of the preparation of this report?

"Mr. Dillon Anderson broke in to state that while progress on the preparation of the report by the Planning Board had been difficult at the outset, it was now proving much easier and he anticipated that a paper would be ready for Council consideration at next week's meeting.

"Secretary Dulles continued that the heart of what we needed to study now with respect to the danger of war between Israel and the Arab States was what the United States could do in case it was unable to convince the world that one or another of the two antagonists was guilty of a clean-cut aggression. We also needed to know how vulnerable Egypt and Israel would be to a blockade and finally whether we could make use of NATO-committed U.S. forces without leaving NATO with the feeling that it was being wrecked.

"Admiral Radford assured Secretary Dulles that the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves had discussed the Arab-Israel problem. They had reached the conclusion that it would be relatively easy to establish and to maintain a maritime blockade. It would probably be also possible to establish an aerial blockade although there were no precedents to go on here. Admiral Radford also expressed the view that we would not be obliged, in the contingency of war between Israel and the Arab States, to go as far as instituting an aerial blockade." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

338. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, October 14, 1955—7 p.m.

356. Rome for Ambassador Johnston. [2] Ambassador Johnston's talks with Israel Prime Minister and Finance Minister and their staffs went very well. [3] On technical side the two ministers indicated, although reluctantly and after some discussion, that the compromise proposal of dividing the salt water 50–50 between Arab States and Israel would be acceptable to them although, in view of the uncertain status project on the Arab side, they do not plan formally to submit it to the new Cabinet at this time. It thus appears that informally both Israel and the Arab States have reached a common basis on a water settlement formula and that the sole but formidable remaining obstacle is to obtain Arab concurrence at the political level.

In the earlier discussion yesterday, both Sharett and Eshkol took position that, having reached agreement with Ambassador Johnston, and two years having elapsed since negotiations commenced, Israel should regard itself as free to proceed with its work at Bnat Yaacov. After Johnston had discussed political implications of this and the assurances which had been given him by Nasser and other political leaders on Arab side that Arab states could be brought within two or three months to point of agreeing to plan, the Israel Ministers finally agreed to defer resumption of work for temporary period. Finance Minister Eshkol talked in terms of similar two or three months period, but in subsequent conversation with Sharett, Johnston was assured that work at Bnat Yaacov would not be resumed until March 1 and that if an agreement with Arabs was a real prospect at that time, resumption of work might be deferred for short additional period. Both Sharett and Eshkol expressed skepticism regarding sincerity of Arab desires for water settlement and emphasized the firm intention of GOI to proceed with Israel's water program should Arabs fail to give political concurrence to technical understanding within period indicated. Eshkol expressed hope that USG would give moral and material assistance to Israel in proceeding with its unilateral water development should Arabs fail to accept the plan within time

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/10–1455. Confidential; Priority. Received at 8:28 a.m., October 15. Sent priority to Rome and repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Beirut.

[2] Johnston stopped in Rome on October 14 before proceeding to the United States.

[3] No other record of these meetings has been found in Department of State files.

limitation. Johnston replied he would submit Finance Minister's request to Secretary and other US Government officials upon his return to Washington.

Following telegram transmits joint communiqué of 2 delegations which was issued last night upon conclusion conversations. [4] Johnston left Israel by plane this morning en route to New York and Washington.

Lawson

[4] See footnote 6, Document 336.

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339. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, October 14, 1955—8 p.m.

359. Rome for Ambassador Johnston. In course conversation yesterday evening on water plan, Ambassador Johnston took opportunity to inquire of Prime Minister Sharett latter's view as to how problem Soviet arms to Egypt should be met.

Sharett said Nasser must go; that he was unreliable and troublemaker as indicated by his activities in the Sudan, in North Africa and in the Middle East; and that Nasser had returned from Bandung with a swelled head and inflated idea of his position and importance. He concluded that Nasser must be destroyed.

Sharett said there were the following four possible means of coping with Soviet arms aid program:

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–1455. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 9:25 a.m., October 15. Sent to Rome and repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Ankara.

1. The US could deal directly with Soviet Union to force her to abandon her program. When Johnston pointed out that USG confrontation Soviets other cases, such as Berlin airlift, Korea and Western Europe had required presence US forces and inquired how that pattern could be followed in this area, Sharett replied this was problem USG would have to work out.

2. As second alternative, the Prime Minister said, although he did not necessarily agree, many people in Israel advocated a preventive war against Egypt. These people believed that Soviet arms should be destroyed, either en route or upon arrival, before they could be put into use by Egypt. (Embassy despatch 259 October 8). [2] Johnston replied that he believed such a course action would involve entire area in war and that it would not be solution to Israel's problems.

3. US could give Israel arms equivalent to those received by Egypt. Johnston inquired whether, in view population and other limitations, Israel would not soon reach the saturation point in ability utilize additional equipment.

4. Fourth alternative was for US to conclude security guarantee treaty with Israel. Johnston pointed out Soviets might respond with similar guarantee to Egypt, thus laying basis general conflagration.

When Sharett inquired of Ambassador Johnston as to latter's ideas solution Soviet arms problem, Johnston replied he held personal views this subject but, in view fact matter was outside his terms of reference, he did not feel justified in setting them forth to the Prime Minister.

Lawson

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[2] The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported in despatch 259 that Cyrus Sulzberger of the *New York Times*, in an off-the-record interview with Ben Gurion, had asked Ben Gurion what Israel's response would be if the Egyptians did receive large-scale arms deliveries, including MIG fighter aircraft, from the Soviet Union. Ben Gurion's reply was that "we would have to smash them." (*Ibid.*, 774.56/10–855)

340. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to Members of the Council [1]

Washington, October 17, 1955.

SUBJECT

Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict between Israel and Egypt or other Arab States

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5428 [2]
B. NSC Action No. 1447–c [3]
C. SNIE 30–3–55 [4]

The enclosed draft report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1447-c, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, October 20, 1955.

It is recommended that if the Council adopts the enclosed recommendations for revision of NSC 5428, they be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve them; direct their implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the United States Government; and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

Further review by the Planning Board of U.S. policy in the Near East is under way and recommendations for additional revisions of NSC 5428 will be submitted at a later date.

James. S. Lay Jr.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5428 Memos (Nov.–Dec. 1955). Top Secret. Lay sent copies of this memorandum and its enclosure to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 326.

[3] See footnote 9, Document 326.

[4] For text, see Document 335.

[Enclosure]

DRAFT

Report on
Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict Between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States

Problem

1. To review the continuing validity of the courses of action set forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of "Supplementary Statement of Policy on the Arab-Israeli Problem" contained in NSC 5428, approved by the President on July 23, 1954, as a means of deterring major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states in the light of the present and prospective situation in the Near East.

Analysis

Changes in the Near Eastern Situation Since Mid-1954

2. The analysis of the Near Eastern situation on which the objectives and courses of action of NSC 5428, including paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the "Supplementary Statement", were based foresaw increasing tension between Israel and the Arab states, possibly leading to major armed conflict, and increasing Soviet activity in the Near East directed toward courting and supporting the Arab states. The analysis did not, however, anticipate that the Soviet bloc would make large quantities of heavy military equipment available to the Arab states. The Soviet bloc has now agreed to supply sizable quantities of arms to Egypt and may make similar deals with other Arab states; and has informally indicated that it would be receptive if Israel should seek to purchase Soviet bloc arms. The Western powers no longer exclusively control the means of maintaining an arms balance between the Arabs and Israelis. The new Soviet initiative has serious implications for (a) the Israeli-Arab conflict and (b) the Soviet influence in the area. This paper deals only with the first aspect. The broader review of U.S. policy toward the Near East is now under way.

3. The Soviet-Egyptian arms deal has substantially increased the risk that Israel will launch a "preventive war." Such Israeli action is not likely within the next few weeks. The Israelis will probably wish to determine more precisely the magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet bloc willingness to arm the Arabs, to exploit the favorable trend of Western public opinion, and, most importantly, to determine how far Israel can realistically depend on Western and particu-

larly U.S. support in maintaining its territorial integrity. In the absence of convincing evidence of Western determination to preserve the territorial status quo against change by force, there is very real danger that Israel will undertake "preventive war," possibly in the next few months, and it would almost certainly be more willing to take risks which could touch off a new round of hostilities. An Israeli "preventive war" may start in the form of border raids where responsibilities and intentions may initially be obscure. (Paragraph A of Conclusions of SNIE 30–3–55).

4. Assuming that it is actually implemented the arms deal is likely to strengthen a tendency toward Egyptian militancy, and increase the danger that local clashes will develop into large-scale fighting. However, pending absorption of the new equipment Egypt will probably feel constrained to avoid serious difficulties with Israel. Over the longer run, the growth of Egyptian military strength will almost certainly stimulate some Egyptian interest in a "second round" against Israel. (Paragraph B of Conclusions of SNIE 30–3–55).

Effect of Changed Situation on U.S. Objectives

5. The analysis in NSC 5428 led to the conclusion that major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states would be inimical to U.S. national security interests. This conclusion is reflected in the stated objective of deterring armed attack by Israel or the Arab states. (Paragraph 9–a of the "Supplementary Statement"). It has been argued that the Egyptian acceptance of Soviet bloc arms has so fundamentally changed the Near Eastern situation that it would now be in the U.S. interest if Israel won a "second round" of Arab-Israeli hostilities. This proposition must, however, be assessed in the light of the following considerations.

6. Should a "second round" occur in the near future, in which the U.S. simply let events take their course, an initial Israeli victory would be almost certain. Under these circumstances Israeli ability to seize and hold considerable portions of all its neighbors' territories would be limited largely by its lack of reserve supplies and the probability of UK intervention if Jordan were invaded. The effects of a "hands off" policy on the part of the U.S. would have an extremely adverse effect on its position in the Arab world and would retard U.S. efforts to build indigenous Middle East defense. (Paragraph C of Conclusions of SNIE 30-3-55).

7. If the U.S. adopted a "hands off" policy in the event of an Israeli attack on its neighbors, it may be confidently predicted that Egypt and Syria would appeal to the USSR for political and material support which the USSR has indicated it would provide. Jordan and Lebanon would presumably first look to the other Western powers

but if dissatisfied with their response might well turn to the USSR. Saudi Arabia and Iraq would be unlikely targets of Israeli invasion, but the former's bitterly anti-Israel regime would make common cause with the invaded Arab states and would react strongly against the Western powers. Iraq might well succumb to anti-Western emotions and Arab pressures and withdraw from the Baghdad Pact. In the chaotic aftermath of an Israeli success, political conditions in Arab states would be ripe for Communist exploitation. A likely result would be to solidify the Arab world under Soviet political guidance and with further Soviet support.

8. It may be concluded, therefore, that although as a consequence of the introduction of Soviet bloc arms the risk of major armed conflict in the Near East is now more acute and more immediate, this change in the present and prospective situation in the area as compared with that prevailing and foreseen in mid-1954 is of degree rather than of kind. It is still and even more in the U.S. interest to deter major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states.

Elements of an Effective Deterrent

9. The effectiveness of the deterrent to major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states will depend on: the extent to which these states are persuaded that effective punitive measures will be applied; the prospect of firm UN action; the number of states that would apply deterrent measures; the economic, financial and military measures which the cooperating states are prepared to take; and whether both sides, but especially Israel, believe that their security can be achieved by measures other than a "preventive war." U.S. determination to cooperate in preventing major armed conflict is the sine qua non of an effective deterrent. Given, in reasonable degree, the prospect of the deterrent factors mentioned, it is probable that neither Israel nor the Arab states would attempt armed measures to seize and hold territory outside their borders. If, nevertheless, either side should embark upon a preventive war, it would be in United States interest for action to be taken to compel the withdrawal of the aggressor's forces. The continued holding of Arab territory by Israel (which is the more immediate danger) without Western action to compel withdrawal would alienate the entire Arab world from the West. The immediately succeeding paragraphs consider whether the courses of action outlined in paragraph 10 of the "Supplementary Statement" of NSC 5428 could be put into effect quickly and would impel a Near Eastern state that had seized territory beyond its side of the Armistice Line of January 1, 1950, to withdraw its forces and relinquish such territory.

Discontinuance of U.S. Government Aid

10. The Executive Branch of the U.S. Government could, of course, promptly stop the flow of U.S. aid to and withdraw its technical assistance personnel from Israel or any Arab state. This step would have a psychological effect. It would be more hurtful to Israel than to the Arab states, but it would not have sufficient impact on any of the area states to cause them to abandon seized territory.

Embargo on Trade With the U.S.

11. Statutory authority exists under the Export Control Act of 1949 [5] and the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 [6] promptly to embargo U.S. trade, including calls by U.S. ships and aircraft, with the Near Eastern states. As trade with the U.S. is not of major significance to the economies of any of these countries, except that Israel would have to find alternative sources for foodstuffs, this measure would not be particularly effective.

Blocking of Transfers of Funds From the U.S.

12. Authority exists under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 promptly to block transfers of funds from the U.S. to the Near Eastern states. This measure would have extremely serious effects for Israel and would in time almost certainly force Israel to surrender seized territory. Unless other Western powers adopted similar measures, however, the Israelis might hold out for a considerable period during which the Communists would be exploiting the inevitable turmoil in the Arab world. Blocking would have little effect on the Arab states bordering Israel but would provide strong leverage on Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Adoption of Foregoing Measures by Other Countries

13. Excepting Jordan, no Near Eastern state is receiving significant aid from western governments other than the U.S. The trade of the area with the UK and France is, however, of great importance and if an embargo by these countries and perhaps other Western powers could be brought about the economies of Israel and the contiguous Arab states would be seriously disrupted and critical shortages of such items as petroleum products would develop; it should be noted in this connection that Israel's stockpile position is

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[5] For text of the Export Control Act of 1949, which became Public Law 11 on February 26, 1949, see 63 Stat. (pt. 1) 7.

[6] For text of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, which became Public Law 91 on October 6, 1917, see 40 Stat. (pt. 1) 411.

better than that of its Arab neighbors. It is, of course, possible that the Soviet bloc and perhaps some other countries would continue to trade with the Arab states, and otherwise to render ineffective the control measures mentioned above; and it is also possible that such states would take the same action with respect to Israel. If this did not happen, an embargo by the Western powers would in time reduce Israel or any of the contiguous Arab states to surrender.

14. As most of the Arab states clear their international accounts through and have sizable funds on deposit in London, blocking action by the UK would have marked adverse effects on their economies and would in time force them to capitulate. The effect of U.S. blocking of Israel would be reinforced if the Federal Republic of Germany ceased its reparations payments and the Union of South Africa blocked transfers of funds from its highly organized Jewish community.

Blockade

15. It would be desirable to establish a blockade as soon as possible after the outbreak of major armed conflict between Israel and one or more Arab states. Since a blockade would involve the use of military force, its legal basis would have to be found either in an appropriate UN resolution or in Congressional authorization. It should be possible to secure a UN resolution in a matter of days and if advance consultation had enlisted Legislative Branch support for Executive Branch plans, to obtain Congressional authorization without undue delay. Even if a UN resolution were obtained as a legal basis for the blockade, it would still be desirable to obtain Congressional authorization before applying the blockade.

16. A maritime blockade of Israel, surrounded by hostile states and with limited sea coasts, would be relatively simple and almost completely effective. Additionally, an aerial blockade, while unproved, would undoubtedly augment the maritime blockade. A full blockade would reinforce the effects of any trade embargo and blocking of transfers of funds and would almost certainly force Israel to surrender seized territory in a matter of months. Blockade of any one Arab state would present more difficult problems, because supplies could filter through from adjacent friendly countries, and the Soviet bloc might attempt to force the blockade. It is nevertheless probable that the blockade would be reasonably effective in minimizing the inflow of supplies, and it should in time bring about the capitulation of the Arab state affected.

Military Intervention

17. a. The most powerful and possibly the only effective deterrent to major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states would be their conviction that aggression would be countered by the armed forces of the U.S. or other free world powers. The U.S. and UK have in the Mediterranean area and in Europe forces which could be brought to bear possibly within hours and certainly within a few days. If this power were applied promptly against troop concentrations, it might well check a major armed conflict before it was fairly launched. Air and naval intervention might be sufficient to accomplish the mission, but we cannot rule out the possibility of intervention on the ground. Failure to take all measures, required to check Israeli aggression, including armed intervention if necessary, would disastrously weaken the U.S. position among the Arabs.

b. On the other hand, armed intervention would have certain undesirable effects. It would put the U.S. in a disadvantageous position aggravating the maldeployment from which we now suffer and force the U.S. to expend manpower and ammunition against forces other than communist forces. If it became known that the United States was prepared to commit troops in this area, the Soviet bloc might well attempt to create a situation in the Near East or elsewhere which would force our hand to our disadvantage. If U.S. troops were committed against Israel, we could alienate Israel as well as cause adverse domestic reaction; on the other hand, in committing troops against any of the Arab states, there is grave danger of alienating all the Arab and Moslem nations.

c. In any event military intervention would have to be based either on UN action or on the request of the victim of aggression.

UN Action Prior to Hostilities

18. The UN has a continuing responsibility for the situation in the Near East as Israel was established by UN action and the existing armistices and armistice lines between Israel and the contiguous Arab states were established under UN auspices. It is, therefore, necessary to consider whether early and additional UN action would serve to deter major armed conflict in the present situation of heightening tension. This action might consist of a Security Council or General Assembly resolution calling upon the parties to the Palestine Armistice Agreements to take all steps necessary to bring about order and tranquility, to continue the existing cease-fire in full force and to conform to their obligations under the armistice agreements and the UN Charter not to resort to force. The resolution could also express the determination of the Council or the Assembly to take any requisite action in the event of a deterioration of the

situation and could set up subordinate instrumentalities and procedures for observing and reporting developments.

19. UN action of this type would focus world opinion on the present dangers in the Near East and might strengthen the more moderate and responsible elements in Israel and the Arab states. The instrumentalities and procedures established might also make it easier to determine responsibility for an outbreak should it occur. As against these advantages, an attempt to utilize the UN in the present context and in the shadow of the Soviet bloc-Egyptian arms deal might well have the effect of drawing the Arab states and the Soviet bloc closer together, of leading Arab and Israeli representatives to take public positions even more extreme than in the past and of further inflaming the situation in the area. The resolution described would very probably be adopted, but it would add little to existing resolutions and would have slight deterrent effect. A more vigorous resolution looking toward the imposition of sanctions if major armed conflict should occur would have difficult passage in either the Security Council or the General Assembly. On balance and unless there are further developments which would alter the preceding adverse assessments, it does not appear that an attempt to obtain UN action at the present time would be constructive.

UN Action in the Event of Hostilities

20. If major armed conflict does break out, it should, of course, be possible to obtain a Security Council or General Assembly resolution calling upon (a) the parties to cease fire and to withdraw their forces behind the armistice lines and (b) all other member states to assist in re-establishing the status quo and to withhold support from the party or parties refusing to comply with the resolution. Such a resolution would provide a basis for the collective application of the sanctions of embargo on trade and blocking of transfers of funds previously discussed. It would also provide a basis for blockade or military intervention by the U.S. and other powers.

21. If it acted in the absence of a UN resolution, the U.S. would expose itself to the charge of interference in the affairs of other nations, to an adverse reaction in world opinion, and to greatly increased enmity from the nation acted against. These adverse effects would be greatly intensified if hostilities followed a confused series of events tending to obscure the identity of the aggressor. Finally, failure to invoke the UN would tend to impair its future effectiveness. On the other hand, under a UN resolution the USSR might decide to tender armed forces for use in the area. While this would remove the onus of interference from the U.S., it would increase Soviet influence with either the Arab states or Israel and would give

the USSR a stronger voice in Near East affairs. On balance, the risks of seeking a UN resolution appear far more acceptable than the disadvantages of proceeding without one.

Collaboration With the UK and Other Western Powers

22. The UK has been working closely with us in matters relating to the Arab-Israeli dispute, retains considerable influence in the Near East, and has armed forces in the area. We should as a matter of great urgency plan fully with the UK for appropriate UN action, the application of economic sanctions, the establishment of blockade and such other military measures as are decided upon in the event of major armed conflict.

23. France is a party to the U.S.–UK–France Tripartite Declaration of May 26, 1950 and undoubtedly shares the U.S. and UK desire to deter Arab-Israeli conflict. However, France has tended to pursue its own independent course in the Levant, is exceedingly unpopular among the Arabs because of its North African policies and could make no significant military contribution to quelling major armed conflict between Israelis and Arabs. Accordingly, we should not discuss blockade or military intervention with the French, but we could be reasonably forthright in consulting with them on the broad outlines of our plans for UN action and economic sanctions. Some of this might well leak from the French to the Israelis, a development that would not necessarily be disadvantageous.

24. Paragraph 11 of the "Supplementary Statement" refers to collaboration with Turkey as well as the UK and France. We should keep the Turks generally informed of our plans and urge them to use such influence as they possess among the Arabs and Israelis in the direction of peace.

Possibility of Unilateral U.S. Action

25. If despite all deterrent efforts major armed conflict should occur, there are situations in which we might wish to respond unilaterally. In a clear case of aggression we might choose to react immediately and in anticipation of subsequent and early UN action. Similarly if the UN for some presently unforeseeable reason should fail to act, we might decide to move alone. Even in these unlikely situations, the UK would almost certainly be willing to apply sanctions with us. Hence, although we should on principle not tie our hands against acting alone, the chances that we should find it necessary or desirable to exercise this freedom of action are slight.

Problem of Identifying the Aggressor

26. There is a strong probability that major armed conflict between Israel and one or more of the Arab states would develop in circumstances that would make it difficult to establish, particularly in the minds of the general public, the identity of the aggressor. This situation would make it more difficult to act unilaterally. However, once a UN resolution had been adopted calling upon the parties to the struggle to withdraw behind the armistice lines, the identity of the party in defiance of the UN would quickly be established by non-compliance with the UN directive. It would thereafter be possible to apply sanctions to the offending party. Should both parties stand in defiance of the UN order, sanctions could be applied impartially to both, a situation which might have certain advantages from the U.S. point of view.

Informing Israel and the Arab States

27. We should seek an early opportunity to impress upon the governments of Israel and the Arab states, in accordance with Paragraph 12 of the "Supplementary Statement", our determination: (a) to deter major armed conflict between them and to prevent any territorial change by force, and (b) to impose vigorous sanctions and to take such other action as may be necessary for this purpose. As regards Israel, it will be necessary to persuade the government that the U.S. determination is continuing and will provide a shield for Israel against aggression if and when the armed strength of the Arab states is significantly increased. As regards the Arab states, their governments must be persuaded that the U.S. can and will restrain Israeli expansionism. At the same time, the U.S. should emphasize its continued interest in constructive solutions of Near East problems.

28. These approaches to the Near Eastern governments can best be made within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration of May 26, 1950. It is neither necessary nor desirable that this Declaration be publicly reaffirmed, and even specific private reaffirmation can probably be avoided. It is only necessary to imply that the U.S. Government is still guided by the principles enumerated in that Declaration, would act accordingly in the event of major armed conflict, and if necessary would judge for itself where responsibility for the conflict lay. These private approaches should be supported by public statements of high U.S. officials on appropriate occasions stressing our concern over the Near Eastern situation, our conviction that any resort to force would have seriously adverse effects on all concerned and our continuing efforts to preserve the peace and to contribute to a solution of the area problems. The effects of our démarches would

be reinforced if the UK made parallel approaches at about the same time. French approaches to the Arab states would probably not be helpful, but France might exert some influence on the Israelis.

Enlisting Congressional Support

29. Unless Congressional opinion has been prepared in advance, substantial Congressional support may not be forthcoming for a program of deterring hostilities with the result that both Israelis and Arabs would question U.S. determination. The increased risk of major armed conflict between Israel and its Arab adversaries now makes it a matter of utmost urgency to undertake the consultations with Congressional leaders contemplated by Paragraph 13 of the "Supplementary Statement". Any program of sanctions would require Congressional support, while blockade or military intervention would require Congressional authorization.

Conclusion

30. The foregoing analysis indicates that the basic approach outlined in the "Supplementary Statement" of NSC 5428 is that best calculated to deter major armed conflict between Israel and one or more of the Arab states and, should such conflict occur, to bring about a restoration of the territorial status quo. However, recent developments in the area suggest the following proposed revisions in the Supplementary Statement of Policy in NSC 5428.

[Annex]

DRAFT REVISED PARAGRAPHS FOR THE SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF POLICY IN NSC 5428

10. In the event of major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states, the U.S. should take the following action against the state or states which are determined by a UN finding or, if necessary, by the U.S., to be responsible for the conflict or which refuse to withdraw their forces behind the Palestine Armistice line of 1950:

Economic Action

a. Discontinue U.S. Government aid.
b. Embargo U.S. trade.
c. Prevent the direct or indirect transfer of funds or other assets subject to U.S. control.

Military Action

d. [If it appears that the foregoing actions are not likely to end the hostilities promptly, consider establishing] [7] [Establish] [8] a blockade with Congressional authority.
e. If it appears that the foregoing actions are not likely to end the hostilities promptly, [consider providing] [9] [be prepared to provide] [10] military forces with Congressional authority in response to a UN resolution or the request of a victim of aggression. [11]

Other Action

f. Urge other countries as appropriate to take similar action.
g. Make every effort to secure UN sanction and support for all the above actions.

11. In collaboration with the UK, and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey, develop plans, including military plans as appropriate, to support the measures in paragraph 10 above. (No change from NSC 5428)

12. Make known to Israel and to individual Arab states the policy in paragraph 10 [a, b, and c] [12] above at a time and in a way deemed most likely to deter resort to major hostilities by any of them.

13. As a matter of urgency, enlist Congressional support for the measures in paragraphs 10 and 12 above.

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[7] Treasury, Budget and Disarmament proposal. [This footnote, all succeeding footnotes, and all brackets appear in the source text.]
[8] State, Defense, JCS proposal.
[9] Treasury and Disarmament proposal.
[10] State proposal.
[11] Defense, JCS and Budget propose deletion of subparagraph e.
[12] Treasury, Budget and Disarmament proposal.

341. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 17, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Call of the Egyptian Ambassador on the Secretary

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Ambassador of Egypt
Mr. George V. Allen, Asst. Secretary, NEA
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, Director, NE

The Egyptian Ambassador, in calling on the Secretary this noon, said that he had a message from Colonel Nasser, the Egyptian Prime Minister, which covered the following points:

1. Egypt had been subject to many threats and provocations from Israel during recent years and Egypt itself had been in a weak position militarily. Egypt had endeavored without success to obtain arms; consequently when the Soviet Union had offered arms, Colonel Nasser had been unable to persuade his colleagues in the RCC not to accept them. Colonel Nasser had, in effect, been powerless to prevent the conclusion of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Agreement.
2. Colonel Nasser wished the Ambassador to say however that Egypt had no aggressive intentions against Israel whatsoever; Egypt wished merely to strengthen its armed forces.
3. The Czech-Egyptian Arms Agreement was a commercial transaction without any political provisions. It was a single transaction and did not require subsequent transactions.
4. Colonel Nasser wanted to maintain the long-standing relations between Egypt and the United States and hoped that he would be able to strengthen them in the future.

The Secretary responded by expressing appreciation for Colonel Nasser's message conveyed by the Ambassador. The Secretary said that in all frankness he must state that he found it very disturbing the way developments were taking place. He pointed out that the Administration had tried very hard to conduct relations between Egypt and the United States in a fair and objective manner and pointed out a number of cooperative moves which the United States had made; among these he cited the following: The United States had worked to assist Egypt and Great Britain to reach a settlement regarding the Suez Base. These efforts had been made in spite of contrary views among Israelis and American Jews that a settlement of the Suez Base would increase difficulties between Egypt and Israel. The United States had extended substantial amounts of tech-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/10–1755. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins.

nical assistance and economic development aid to Egypt. The United States had taken steps with others to prevent Israel from diverting the Jordan River at Banat Yaq'ub. Grant military aid had been offered to Egypt within the provisions of American legislation on this subject which many other great nations had found acceptable but which Egypt had chosen to refuse. A reimbursable military assistance agreement had been concluded with Egypt under which in June we had offered to sell Egypt a substantial quantity of arms. The United States had made sincere efforts to handle its cotton sales in such a way as to reduce difficulties for Egyptian cotton exporters. We had always been ready to extend help with respect to the High Aswan Dam.

The Secretary continued that the present shift by Egypt in its policy could not be described as a simple arms purchase. The conclusion of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Agreement had been accompanied by press and radio attacks on the United States from high places in Egypt. In view of this shift and these attacks and in the light of the various constructive moves which the United States, for its part, had made, the question arose whether Egypt wanted a continuance of good relations with the United States.

The Egyptian Ambassador replied that Egypt appreciated the help and the assistance which the United States had given it and repeated, in concluding the Czech-Egyptian Arms Agreement, Egypt was merely acting to defend itself and that the Agreement was a single commercial transaction without political overtones.

The Secretary replied that he did not in any way question Colonel Nasser's sincerity. He realized that Colonel Nasser was looking at it from an Egyptian point of view but he wanted to note at the same time that he, himself, had been studying the theory and practice of the Soviet Union all his life and he was convinced that the USSR was plotting and planning to gain control of the Middle East. The Soviet Union was not interested in what would happen to Egypt or any other single state in the Middle East as long as the Soviet Union itself was able to exert its influence. The Soviet Union would be satisfied to see the Arabs commit suicide if it was in line with Soviet policy. The Secretary added that if the Egyptians thought that they would be able to outsmart the Soviet Union, he was very dubious about their success in this respect. He believed the Egyptians would find themselves playing the Russian game to their disadvantage. The Soviet Union wished to dominate the Middle East. The United States, on the other hand, did not wish to dominate the Middle East and, in fact, had consistently endeavored to help it as the various moves which we had made indicated. The Secretary again stated that, as he had said repeatedly and as he had informed

his colleagues from time to time, we regarded Colonel Nasser as the outstanding leader in the Arab world.

The Egyptian Ambassador said that Colonel Nasser and his colleagues were well aware of the dangers of international Communism in the Middle East. It was the Egyptian belief that they would be able to keep the situation under control and that they would be able to reduce the number of Soviet technicians to a minimum who would be needed under the Czech-Egyptian Agreement. The Czech-Egyptian Agreement was, as he had said before, a straight commercial transaction without political provisions.

The Egyptian Ambassador said he had a number of additional points which he wished to raise:

1. Colonel Nasser was extremely anxious to take a constructive line in the Middle East and, to this end, had endeavored during recent meetings of the Arab League to push actively present plans for the Jordan River developed by Ambassador Johnston.

2. Furthermore, Colonel Nasser would cooperate to stabilize Syria. The Egyptian Ambassador added that he hoped good relations between Egypt and the United States would continue and that the United States would be able to move forward on one or more of the following items: 1) he hoped the United States would be able to help with regard to the High Aswan Dam. He said that two months ago the Russians had offered help and recently they had specifically promised material and technicians over a number of years at a cost of only 2% in interest. [2]

2). A continuation of technical assistance and economic aid.

3). Agreement to supply Egypt with 360,000 tons of grain under P.L. 480.

4). A second visit by the Secretary to the Near East or, alternatively, a visit by Colonel Nasser to the United States.

5). Continuation of efforts by the United States to prevent Israel from engaging in preventive war against Egypt.

The Secretary replied that the United States wished to continue its long and friendly relations with Egypt as indicated by the many constructive steps which the United States had already taken. He felt it necessary to point out, however, that the conclusion of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Agreement enormously complicated his task. It complicated his task with the other Arab states; with Israel; and with many groups in the United States, including American Jewry, which strongly supported Israel. The United States had from time to time made efforts to calm the situation between Israel and the Arab states and had specifically cautioned Israel against aggressive moves. He had spoken in terms of broad principles in his statement of August

[2] See footnote 6, Document 321.

26. The Arabs had regarded his statement as being favorable to Israel. The Secretary did not understand why this should be the case because Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, when discussing the possibility of a statement of this general substance, had thought it a good idea. The Secretary and his colleagues in this Administration had persevered in an objective and even-handed policy, but that it seemed to have come to naught. Many Jewish leaders in the United States now claimed that this Administration's policy had failed. Colonel Nasser had his own problems but, the Secretary said, he had equally heavy ones. Now it was difficult to convince many Americans that an objective policy was right and it was equally difficult to convince other Americans that Israel should be pressed not to take action or should be prevented from taking action. What, the Secretary concluded, should he say to such critics?

The Egyptian Ambassador repeated his previous statement that Egypt had no aggressive intentions of any type against Israel. The Secretary replied that he was convinced that this statement could be made at the present moment but in the future, following the receipt of arms, different attitudes might prevail. In any event, it would be difficult to say who began the attack. In the final analysis, Egypt and the United States should not be working at cross purposes but should be working together.

The Egyptian Ambassador asked if the Secretary had any suggestions for the future. The Secretary replied that he could tell Colonel Nasser that he did not question his sincerity in any way, but that he should realize that what Egypt had done made it extremely more difficult for the United States. The United States did not regard Egypt's action in a vindictive spirit or with any animosity. The Secretary stated that he could not give any answer with respect to the various steps which the Ambassador had proposed other than to say that we were studying them. The U.S. still wished to be on the friendliest of relations with Egypt in the future as it had been in the past. [3]

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[3] On October 20, the Department transmitted a summary of this conversation in Circular 263 to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Damascus, Ankara, and Tripoli. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/10–2055)

342. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, October 18, 1955—noon.

759. This message should be read in conjunction with Embassy telegrams 563, 694, 687, and Tel Aviv's 342. [2] It contains our recommendations as to policy U.S. Government should follow with respect to Arab-Israeli relations as result recent Soviet moves.

Although immediate motivation Nasser's acceptance Soviet arms was domestic pressure to strengthen Egypt in face "imminent Israeli threat", fundamental factor behind Arab receptivity to Soviet offers is, as we stressed in penultimate paragraph Embassy telegram 694, [3] fundamental lack of confidence on part of GOE and preponderant majority area leaders in U.S. and other Western intentions toward Arabs regarding relations between Arabs and Israel. Arabs for many years have resented "pro-Israeli" Western stand but until Soviets were in position intervene on Arab side have been unable to express themselves concretely. Soviets have now given Arabs confidence that they can maintain a firm anti-Israeli stand for an indefinite period of time at same time preventing publicly their pentup frustrations against West. We believe it vital in assessing subsequent U.S. moves to counter Soviet offensive in Middle East that these facts be recognized. We assume U.S. does not intend to abandon Middle East to Soviets by default but feel that there is real risk in our doing so in absence fundamental reassessment our approach to Arab-Israeli problem. Alternative to such reassessment will in our opinion lead to growing identification of West with Israel which identification would be used with increasing effectiveness against U.S. efforts in area and against Iraqi membership in northern tier.

Thus importance of removing or at least substantially reducing Arab-Israeli problem assumes paramount importance since unless this is done we see no hope of establishing any substantial point of political interest in common, with which to "hold" or more correctly "win back" Arab States to attitude they held toward West in 1946.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–1855. Top Secret. Received at 2:29 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, Amman, Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, Tripoli, Benghazi, USUN, and Paris.

[2] None printed. (*Ibid.*, 774.56/9–2455, 101.21–NIS/10–955, 786.00/10–855, and 101.21–NIS/10–955, respectively)

[3] It reads in part as follows:

"In determining US policies in light this Soviet penetration, we think it of utmost importance we bear in mind fact that basic reason why US suffered this setback is because GOE—and preponderant majority area leaders—had become convinced that US, UK and French arms policy would have indefinitely relegated Arabs to inferior and therefore untenable military position vis-à-vis Israelis." (*Ibid.*, 101.21–NIS/10–955)

It seems to us self-evident that Israel's interest in this connection should be identical with that of U.S. Loss of strategic positions in Middle East would be extremely serious to West but isolation in face Soviet-armed and supported Arab States would constitute great danger to Israel and might well mean ultimate extinction.

Prior to February 28, Israeli attack on Gaza there had been reason believe Nasser would welcome modus vivendi with Israel in order permit him devote primary attention to internal political and economic problems. However following signature Turk-Iraqi pact (which Nasser visualized as preliminary to political offensive aimed at isolating Egypt from other Arab States and leaving her alone facing Israel) and as result Gaza attack (which convinced Nasser Israeli action against Egypt of sufficient size to threaten stability his regime was possible at any time) Nasser's desire cooperate with West on Arab-Israeli settlement perceptively diminished. On contrary GOE adopted counter plan which involved building up Egypt militarily as quickly as possible and politically by opposition to additional Arab adherences to Turk-Iraqi pact. At same time GOE made clear it had not completely discarded possibility of settlement with Israel but on Egypt's terms i.e. "defensible" land link through Negev with Jordan.

Nasser's arrangements with Soviet Bloc particularly if similar deals are made by Soviets with Syria and Saudis are unlikely to modify GOE attitude. On contrary there is much risk that if Arabs feel they can obtain effective military aid from Soviets that they will adopt uncompromising position based on 1947 resolutions as minimum. While there is no reason yet to reverse our earlier conclusion that Arabs in absence settlement would continue to harbor vague ideas about an eventual war of extermination against Israel, there is question that they believe that eventually increasing Arab military strength, continuation of blockade and, they hope, falling off of economic aid both public and private from the U.S. would bring about a situation where Israel would no longer present a serious threat to any part of Arab world in which case it could be ignored and eventually absorbed. Given this attitude it is obviously likely to be much more difficult for a peaceful settlement to be reached than was case when Israel out-gunned Arabs, but we believe it must be tried in interests of U.S. and of Israel itself. We exclude as detrimental our own and Israel's interests, alternative of Israeli launched preventative war for reasons given para 3 of Embassy telegram 694. [4]

[4] It reads in part as follows:

"If such an attempt were successful we feel it would produce chaos in Middle East and in effect hand area to Russians on silver platter." If Israeli attack were unsuccessful e.g. as result Russian intervention or long drawn out conflict which would necessarily involve Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia as well as

(Continued)

We assume Israel has no interest in other alternative to a formal settlement which we have outlined above.

Question therefore arises as to how to go about reaching settlement. In our opinion Secretary's speech of August 26 still provides proper foundation this effort since it appears sufficiently responsive Arab requirements to permit Arab governments to reach settlement with Israel provided Israelis prepared to make substantial territorial concessions at least in Negev and possibly—if necessary—in regions Western Galilee and Tiberia.

We are of course aware from messages we have seen from Tel Aviv that settlement on these terms offers no attraction to Israel and indeed may well appear completely unacceptable to Israelis. However we think it necessary for Israel, United States and other Western States recognize fully new situation which created by Soviet offensive in this area. While in past we have apparently operated on hope Arabs in state of weakness could be persuaded accept settlement which would generally satisfy Israelis and their supporters in United States, change in Arab capabilities necessitates revision of this point of view. We should recognize that our objective now in seeking liquidate Arab-Israeli problem is not so much to find middle ground but to eliminate as quickly as possible situation which has so poisoned our relations with a vast area of primary strategic importance to West, that we are now in danger of losing it completely. It seems to us improbable that American public would be willing to hand over Western interests in area as a whole to Soviets in order to maintain small foot hold in an Israel threatened with armed attack from day to day, nor to satisfy demands of pressure group in American electorate.

Therefore we recommend Department consider approach designed to convince Israel that United States Government sees itself obliged either work now for basis of permanent Israel-Arab settlement or alternatively must reluctantly give Israel but secondary consideration pending achievement of wider free world objectives in ME on which Israel's very existence must in any case totally depend. To make United States efforts in favor settlement possible Israel must offer territorial concessions. Otherwise there is no hope of Arab consideration and United States, since February 28 attack and resultant Soviet arms deal, had no leverage to achieve Arab acceptance. In fact, Czechoslovakia arms deal—which may soon be adopt-

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(Continued)
Egypt Israelis position would be even worse. In latter case we would foresee pressures brought to bear in favor US intervention in support Israeli action which would be vigorously resisted by British and possibly other western European states who depend on Arab sources for oil supplies and who are wary of direct conflicts between US and Soviets. Resulting conflict would strain US relations with NATO allies if carried too far." (*Ibid.*)

ed also by Syria and perhaps by other Arab States—makes time short for this effort which United States Government would make pursuant Secretary's offer August 26. Should Israel instead of signifying its acceptance this view point adopt policy of "preventive action" United States Government will move to restore situation, militarily if necessary, under principles of tripartite declaration (as it would if Arabs attacked), but in so doing it could not abate new and more determined hatred against Israel that would result from such Israeli action which would render permanent settlement out of question in our time.

We inclined believe that if Israel is willing to make move in direction settlement of Negev question, Nasser at least would be receptive, although Nasser and Arabs might adhere at least at outset to standard Arab position on Palestine settlement, that is settlement based mainly on fulfillment 1947 and subsequent United Nations resolutions re borders, refugees, Jerusalem etc. Since Nasser wants land connection with Jordan by Israeli cession of most of Negev to Jordan, Nasser would veto seek [*seeking*] substantial modification 1947 partition scheme and might reasonably encourage Arab States to move away from these partition lines in favor of "compensatory" cession in Negev by Israel. Such settlement might we believe be politically possible for Nasser by enabling him to represent it to Egyptian army and other Arab States as victory for Egyptian and Arab diplomacy. We cannot of course be sure that Nasser will seek conciliation even if Israelis were prepared to meet his territorial desires. We are however encouraged by his reported approach to Nuri Said this subject (Baghdad's 76 [5]) and in any case believe we cannot afford to overlook what to us seems only way to meet basic issue facing us in this area.

If move is to be made to regularize Arab-Israeli relations and thereby remove greatest obstacle to good Arab-Western (and also Israeli-Western) relations, it must be taken as soon as possible, before Arabs become too strong to be willing to "recognize" Israel and before Israelis—in spite of our warnings—become desperate. Regrettable as it may seem, both we and Israelis must realize that Arabs no longer feel obligated make concessions, and that as time goes by they will be increasingly less willing to consider any form of settlement but will rely on superior numbers, increased armaments, and blockade to bring about Israel's disappearance. At same time we cannot permit Israeli desperation involve us directly or indirectly in war against Arabs; there is no question whatever that Israeli attack would be interpreted throughout area as United States reply to Soviet arms deal. Our political, economic, and military interests in

[5] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 774.56/10–755)

Arab world are such that we cannot afford at this time to be pushed into role in which we support Israelis in hostilities against Soviet-backed Arab world.

Alternative we have proposed represents, we think, sound policy—in our interest and in that of Israel itself—which in spite of its difficulties offers best and perhaps only hope preventing continued deterioration in Middle East from which only Soviets can gain.

Byroade

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343. Memorandum of a Conversation With the Secretary of State, Washington, October 18, 1955, 3:30 p.m.[1]

PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President	Secretary Humphrey
Secretary Wilson	Attorney General Brownell
Mr. Hoover, Jr.	

I said I wished to discuss certain aspects of the Near East situation which had political implications. We were in the present jam because the past Administration had always dealt with the area from a political standpoint and had tried to meet the wishes of the Zionists in this country and that had created a basic antagonism with the Arabs. That was what the Russians were now capitalizing on.

I said I thought it of the utmost importance for the welfare of the United States that we should get away from a political basis and try to develop a national non-partisan policy. Otherwise we would be apt to lose the whole area and possibly Africa, and this would be a major disaster for Western Europe as well as the United States. There was great danger that this matter would get into politics, particularly during the coming campaign, and that the Israelis would make some moves at that time which for political reasons it might seem to the advantage of some to back, but with disastrous consequences.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Israeli Relations 1951–1957. Confidential; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. The time of the meeting is from Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

I asked whether the group agreed that we should try to deal with this on a bipartisan basis and if so, how. I suggested we might try to get some Democrat to work on this topic in a consultative capacity, much as I had worked on the Japanese Peace Treaty.

The Vice President said he thought it was of the utmost importance to deal with the matter on a non-partisan basis, recognizing that it might alienate much of the Jewish vote. He felt we should try to get a bipartisan basis, but it was doubtful whether in fact this would work out. Other persons present expressed the view that whatever agreement on a major policy might be arrived at at the top level, this would not keep the matter out of politics at the district and precinct level.

The thought was that if I could get a Democrat in whom I had confidence and who had ability to hold the Democrats in line, this would be a good thing, but that it would be dangerous to take someone whom the Democrats themselves proposed as that would destroy the authority of the President and myself. They doubted whether there was anyone who could play in this situation a role comparable to that I had been able to play because of my qualifications and close relations with Vandenberg and Dewey.

I suggested that it might be possible to get someone acceptable to Senator George, Stevenson, and Harriman, but the general feeling was that this would be rather difficult and might expose us to having to work with somebody who did not feel a primary loyalty to the President and myself and did not accept the discipline necessary for the proper conduct of foreign affairs.

The suggestion was made that Senator Mansfield might be used in this situation, but it was recognized that he could scarcely put himself under the order of the President and myself as executor of policy in the day to day conduct of foreign relations.

JFD

344. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) [1]

Washington, October 19, 1955.

SUBJECT

Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict Between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding a draft report on the above subject [2] by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the Council at its meeting on Thursday, 20 October 1955. [3] In view of the limited time available for examination of this paper, the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been directed to the military aspects of the "Draft Revised Paragraphs for the Supplementary Statement of Policy in NSC 5428" set forth on pages 20 and 21 of the report.

2. *Subparagraph 10 d.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that all possible measures short of military force should be taken to cause the aggressor state to desist and to withdraw within its own boundaries before resorting to a blockade in order to bring this about. However, they feel that the policy should be clear with respect to whether a blockade would or would not be imposed in the event that it appeared unlikely that economic action would end hostilities promptly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would therefore favor neither of the bracketed phrases in this subparagraph and would recommend substitution of the following:

"d. If it appears that the foregoing actions are not likely to end the hostilities promptly, establish a blockade with Congressional authority."

3. *Subparagraph 10 e.* In the event of major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab States, forces engaged could number between four and five hundred thousand. To intervene successfully in an action of this magnitude would, under existing force levels, require large-scale withdrawal of forces from other commitments. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not rule out the possibility that a situation might develop which would impel military intervention by

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5428 Memos (Nov.–Dec. 1955). Top Secret. The source text is a copy that Lay circulated on October 21 as an enclosure to a memorandum to the members of the National Security Council as well as to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

[2] See the enclosure to Document 340.

[3] See *infra*.

the United States, they are of the opinion that a decision to take such action or to refrain from doing so should be made in the light of the conditions prevailing at that time. They would therefore favor the deletion of this subparagraph.

4. *Other Action.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff assume that the actions indicated under subparagraphs 10 f and g under this subtitle would either precede or be concurrent with the actions outlined in the preceding subparagraphs. For clarity they suggest that these other actions be included in a new paragraph 11 (subsequent paragraphs to be renumbered accordingly) to read as follows:

"11. The following actions should be taken either before or concurrent with measures outlined in paragraph 10:

"a. Urge other countries, as appropriate, to take action similar to that of the United States;

"b. Make every effort to secure United Nations sanction and support for all such actions."

5. *Paragraph 11.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the combined planning for the military measures contemplated in paragraph 10 should take place only after it has been established that the United Kingdom, and possibly France and Turkey, are in general agreement with these measures and have indicated a willingness to participate in combined economic and military action pursuant thereto. Consequently, they recommend that old paragraph 11 be amended, and a new paragraph be inserted (subsequent paragraphs to be renumbered accordingly), as follows:

"12. In collaboration with the United Kingdom, and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey, develop plans to support the measures in subparagraphs 10 a, b, and c above."

"13. Develop plans, as appropriate, to support military measures in paragraph 10 above; and, at such time later as it may be indicated that combined military action will be taken, collaborate in such planning with the United Kingdom and to the extent desirable with other nations."

6. *Paragraph 12.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the timing and manner of disclosure of information, as envisaged in this paragraph, is primarily a matter of political tactics. However, to disclose the circumstances under which certain units of the Fleet would be diverted to a specific task might be unwise. Such a disclosure might also result in stockpiling in order to render a blockade less effective. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer that any reference to military action be of a very general nature.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, subject to the foregoing comments, you concur in the "Draft Revised Paragraphs."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford [4]
Chairman

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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345. Memorandum of Discussion at the 262d Meeting of the National Security Council on Thursday, October 20, 1955, 9:30 a.m. and 2 p.m. [1]

Present at the 262nd meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; [2] the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament; [2] the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; [2] the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Assistant to the President; [3] Special Assistant to the President Dillon Anderson; Special Assistant to the President Nelson Rockefeller; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

[Here follow, at the morning session of the meeting, a report by Dillon Anderson of his conversation with President Eisenhower on October 19 at Denver; discussion of the forthcoming Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva; a report by the Director of Central Intelligence about significant world developments affecting United States security; an account of the recent NATO Defense Ministers meeting at Paris; a consideration of the psychological implications of the Geneva Conference for United States information programs; an acknowledgement of the progress report on developments in United

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on October 21. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Appointments. (*Ibid.*)

[2] Did not attend the reconvened meeting at 2 p.m. [Footnote in the source text.]

[3] Did not attend the morning session of the meeting. [Footnote in the source text.]

States policy toward Iceland; a discussion of United States policy toward South Asia; and a further consideration of the impending Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva in light of a meeting that the Secretary of State had just concluded with bipartisan congressional leaders.]

8. U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East (NSC 5428;[4] NSC Action No. 1447–c;[5] Memorandum to NSC from Executive Secretary, NSC, dated October 17, 1955, subject, "Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict Between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States."[6])

At the beginning of the afternoon session of the National Security Council, Secretary Dulles said he would like to comment briefly on the two hour meeting he had had between eleven and one o'clock with the legislative leaders of both parties.[7] He said that he had briefed the Congressional leaders on the prospects and possibilities for the Geneva meeting of the Foreign Ministers.[8] The briefing had gone off very well as even General Persons had agreed and "Jerry" Persons was knowledgeable in these matters. Senators Clements and George had both made nice statements of support, had raised no particular questions of substance and seemed to go along with the courses of action outlined by Secretary Dulles. Two courses of action with respect to the agenda item on contacts between East and West, it was agreed, might require Congressional action in the shape of amendments to the McCarran Act[9] and the Agricultural Act.[10] The leaders had said that if I thought well of these proposed courses of action, it was all right to suggest them at the Geneva meeting, but of course that they could not speak for the Congress as a whole.

Mr. Dillon Anderson reminded the Council that the Director of Central Intelligence had postponed his briefing on the Near East until this afternoon in order that it might be taken up in connection with the Planning Board report on the subject which was to be

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[4] See footnote 4, Document 326.

[5] See footnote 9, Document 326.

[6] See the enclosure to Document 340.

[7] A summary of this meeting that Dulles conducted with six Senators and eight Representatives is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

[8] For further documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union at Geneva, October 27–November 16, 1955, see volume V.

[9] Reference is to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which became Public Law 414 on June 27, 1952. For text, see 66 Stat. 163.

[10] Reference is to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954.

considered by the Council this afternoon. He then called on Mr. Allen Dulles for his intelligence report.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that he had at hand a detailed play-by-play account of the origin and development of the arms deal between the Soviet Union and Egypt.[11] He warned that this report was made on the basis of the highest classification of intelligence materials. He also pointed out that the intelligence community viewed what had happened in connection with the arms deal with the highest degree of gravity. Such Soviet maneuvers could easily have a devastating effect on the position of the Free World in the Near East.

Mr. Dulles then proceeded to read his account of the development of the arms deal from its origins in March 1955. He followed this by a brief comment on approaches made by the Soviet Bloc to other Arab States than Egypt.

At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles' report, Mr. Dillon Anderson commenced to brief the Council on the background of the draft report, submitted by the Planning Board, as a revision of the "Supplementary Statement of Policy" set forth in NSC 5428. (A copy of the brief along the lines of which Mr. Anderson reported to the Council is included in the minutes of the meeting.)[11]

Mr. Anderson first read the objectives and courses of action in the existing statement of policy with respect to the tensions between Israel and the Arab States. He thereafter summarized the content of the draft report submitted by the Planning Board revising the earlier statement. The analysis, he pointed out, in the new draft had been formulated in the light of the recent Soviet maneuvers in the Near East. He concluded by reading the revised courses of action in Paragraphs 10 through 13 and explained the reasons underlying the splits in these paragraphs.

The Vice President addressed to Admiral Radford a question as to the effectiveness of a blockade in deterring or ending a war between Israel and the Arab States. Would such a blockade suffice or would the United States have to contemplate further action?

Admiral Radford replied that in the case of Israel a blockade would probably prove very effective in a very short period of time. Israel simply did not have sufficient resources to fight for any considerable length of time. In the case of Egypt, the effect of a blockade would not be felt so quickly.

Secretary Wilson said that he believed one of our difficulties might be that of insuring the support of the major countries for a blockade which we might establish. Admiral Radford replied that, of

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[11] Not found.

course, a blockade would have to be effective in order to be recognized. Secretary Wilson added that if the blockade were challenged, it would mean war.

Secretary Humphrey then stated that he wished to inform the members of the Council that he disagreed completely with the views of his representative on the NSC Planning Board [12] with respect to the revised courses of action presented in the Planning Board revision.

Admiral Radford explained that he wished to inform the Council of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Planning Board report. [13] He pointed out that there had not been sufficient time to circulate these views prior to the meeting and that he would therefore read them now. He stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff took no issue with the non-military courses of action either in this paper or in the existing U.S. policy in the event of war between Israel and the Arab States. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned with the timing of the application of these non-military courses of action. With respect to Paragraph 10–d which dealt with the establishment of a blockade in the event of aggression by Israel or by one of the Arab States, Admiral Radford stressed the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that all possible preventive measures should be taken before there was any resort to such a blockade but nevertheless the blockade action should be clearly set forth in the policy statement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended wording which indicated in sub-Paragraph 10–d that if it appears that the non-military courses of action are not likely to end the hostilities promptly, a blockade should be established with Congressional authority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that the paragraph should read merely that the United States would consider the establishment of a blockade. As to sub-Paragraph 10–e which called for military intervention to end hostilities in the event that economic sanctions and blockade did not end the hostilities, Admiral Radford pointed out that U.S. military intervention in the Near East would inevitably involve a very large withdrawal of U.S. military forces from other areas in the world to which they had been committed. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to any reference in this policy to the possibility of military intervention by the United States in a war between Israel and the Arab States. While it might be necessary to contemplate such intervention, the decision to do so or not to do so should be made in the light of the situation existing at the time. Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would

[12] Andrew N. Overby.
[13] See *supra*.

proceed to make military plans to enable the United States to meet such a contingency if it arose. Admiral Radford indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the courses of action set forth in sub-Paragraphs 10–f and 10–g should either precede or be concurrent with the courses of action in sub-Paragraphs 10–a through 10–e.

As for Paragraph 11 which called for U.S. collaboration with the United Kingdom and other friendly countries in the development of military plans in support of the measures in Paragraph 10, Admiral Radford explained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that such collaboration by the United States should occur only after it has been clearly ascertained that these other countries will join with the United States in carrying out the courses of action in Paragraph 10. The Joint Chiefs also desired a clarification of the time phase during which our military people would discuss plans for joint military action with other nations. It was obvious that when we do get down to discussing military plans with other nations, knowledge of these plans would leak and become known widely.

With respect to Paragraph 12 which called on the United States to make known to Israel and to the individual Arab States the policy in Paragraph 10 at a time and in a way deemed most likely to deter resort to major hostilities by any of them, Admiral Radford pointed out that such disclosure entailed certain serious disadvantages. In thus making known our policy, particularly with respect to military action, the disclosures should be made only in very general terms lest detailed knowledge of it reveal in advance our military movements and naval maneuvers. (A copy of the written views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from which Admiral Radford commented, are included in the minutes of the meeting.)

Secretary Dulles informed the Council that the policy problem to which the Council was now addressing itself was a heritage from the previous Democratic Administration which had dealt with the Arab-Israeli problem on a purely political basis. The views of the Departments of State and Defense had generally been overruled by the White House on purely domestic political grounds. Secretary Dulles cited an instance of this which occurred at Paris in 1948. The recommendations of General Marshall who was then Secretary of State had been overruled in such humiliating fashion that if General Marshall had not been a real patriot, he would have felt himself compelled to resign.

As a result of this method of handling the Arab-Israeli problem, we are now confronted with a situation which has never been accepted by the Arab States. Unless it can be settled, this situation will continue to be a source of very grave danger to the United States and to the Western World. Basically, close ties exist between the Arab World and the West. One such obvious tie was religious.

The religious beliefs of the Arabs were incompatible with Communism. Beyond this there were strong economic ties represented by the oil resources of the various Arab States, particularly Saudi Arabia. Thus, while we have these two fundamental ties operating to keep the Arab and the Western Worlds together, the Israeli issue operates to keep them apart and is, moreover, a highly inflammable issue. Secretary Dulles predicted that this danger would never end until a real and a final settlement could be made along the lines of his own statement on the subject of August 26, 1955.

Secretary Dulles then pointed out that of course the present draft report did not deal with the broad sweep of U.S. policy for the Middle East as a whole. Such a report will be forthcoming from the Planning Board at a later time. The present report dealt strictly with the problem of Israel and its neighbors, especially Egypt, a problem now made critical by the recent Soviet arms moves. The basic U.S. purpose in dealing with this problem must be to prevent the situation from getting worse, and to explore every possible way toward an acceptable solution along the lines of the August 26 statement. The Soviet arms deal with Egypt, continued Secretary Dulles, does not exclude the possibility of achieving such a settlement even though the receipt of arms from the Soviet Bloc might well cause the Arabs to insist on a more favorable settlement from their point of view than they had been demanding heretofore. Moreover, the increased military resources of the Arab States might conceivably induce the Israelis now to make concessions in the direction of a settlement which they have not hitherto been willing to consider.

In the opinion of Secretary Dulles the principal obstacle to any genuine settlement of the quarrel between Israel and Egypt was the disposition of the Negev Triangle. Colonel Nasr professes that he is prepared to move to secure that portion of the Negev Triangle which would be necessary to provide a direct border and corridor between Egypt and its Arab neighbors. Difficult as this claim would make the settlement, Secretary Dulles said he did not exclude the possibility of achieving a permanent settlement in this area—a settlement which the national interests of the United States requires. Obviously, however, if the Soviets continue to throw fuel on the fire, achievement of such a settlement will become increasingly difficult. Secretary Dulles added that he did not think that it would be Soviet policy to keep adding fuel to the flames in the Near East. The Soviets were well aware of the influence of Judaism and Zionism throughout the world. If they had not been aware of this influence, they would have moved even sooner to stir up trouble for Israel.

The immediate problem which the United States faces is what to do in the face of certain practical problems and certain practical

questions which will require answer almost in a matter of hours. The Israelis have made known to us that they desire armaments sufficient to match those which the Egyptians will obtain from the Soviet Bloc and/or a security guarantee from the United States of the present armistice lines. Lacking one or both of these desiderata, they have implied that they might start a preventive war while still in a position to win it. An answer must be given by the United States to the Israelis within the next two or three days. Prime Minister Sharett was going to meet with Secretary Dulles in Paris shortly.

Meanwhile, for their part, the Egyptians are telling us that their arms deal with the Soviet Bloc does not portend an anti-Western policy nor a refusal to settle their dispute with Israel. The Egyptians say that all they want is to place themselves in a stronger defensive position and that they had purchased their arms where they could buy these arms most advantageously. The arms deal, therefore, had no political significance.

At this point Secretary Humphrey interrupted Secretary Dulles as to the Israeli demands to which Secretary Dulles had just referred. In reply Secretary Dulles pointed out that in his statement of August 26, he had said that if both sides could reach agreement on a boundary, the United States might agree to undertake to guarantee such a boundary. Secretary Dulles warned that if the United States replies in the negative to the requests of the Israelis, mentioned above, the Administration would not be popular with certain elements in the community.

Dr. Flemming inquired of Secretary Dulles whether if we agreed to do what the Israelis were asking, the result would not be a further increase in the mischievous activities of the Soviet Union. Secretary Dulles replied that for the United States to sponsor an arms race between Israel and the Arab States would be a very futile action. For one thing, Israel, with its small territory and population could not absorb more than a certain amount of armaments, much less than the Arab States with their large territories and populations. He was, accordingly, inclined to feel that our best course of action is to assume that the arms deal between the Soviet Bloc and Egypt was a "one-shot affair" and reply in the negative to all three of Israel's requests. While, said Secretary Dulles, he would not be adverse to seeing Israel get a certain amount of additional armament, he did not wish this to extend to the point where it looked as though the United States was participating in an arms race among the nations of the Near East. In any event, we would probably lose out in backing Israel because in the long run the Arab States can absorb much more armament.

As for the security guarantee sought by Israel, Secretary Dulles very much doubted its practicality. Such a U.S. guarantee of the

boundaries of Israel would, of course, have to be ratified by the U.S. Senate. Such ratification was unlikely although admittedly no one could predict what Congress might do in an election year. In any event, however, Secretary Dulles stated that it would be a severe strain on his own conscience to recommend any such guarantee to the Congress unless a boundary agreement had previously been reached between Israel and the Arab States. Finally, it was obvious that the United States must make clear to both sides of the fight that in some fashion or other, the United States would react against an act of aggression by either side even though it might be extremely difficult to discern which side had been the aggressor. Secretary Dulles pointed out that we certainly have the capability of clamping down on Israel because of that country's heavy financial dependence on the United States. While it would make us very unpopular thus to clamp down, it was hard to see how we could recommend any other course of action. What particularly troubled him, continued Secretary Dulles, is the absence of any comparable pressures which we could apply to Egypt. A blockade against Egypt or even financial sanctions applied to Egypt would, of course, cause most unfortunate repercussions throughout the entire Arab World. On this point Secretary Dulles turning to Mr. Anderson asked him whether he and the NSC Planning Board had considered another possibility; namely, the effect of an Arab blockade of Western Europe. He said, of course, that he was not referring to a physical blockade but to the possibility that the Arabs would shut off their oil exports on which Western Europe was so heavily dependent. While such an action would be suicidal for the Arabs, many of them were fanatics and were capable of such misguided action. Secretary Dulles said he felt that the present policy did not adequately weigh the consequences of Arab reaction to pressures which the Western World might place on Egypt.

As for the rest of the paper, Secretary Dulles explained that he could not attach very much importance to the disagreements on wording in sub-Paragraphs 10–d and 10–e. There was not much substance in the distinction between "considering" establishing a blockade or military intervention and "establishing" a blockade or intervening with military force. The reason for this was that you would have to consider and reconsider such courses of action when you go to Congress to request support for these courses of action.

Turning to Secretary Dulles, Secretary Humphrey asked just what was the real basic bone of contention between Israel and its Arab neighbors and how could the misunderstanding be fixed up.

In reply Secretary Dulles said that the basic issues were three in number at the present time. The first issue concerned the fate of some 900,000 Arab refugees who had been driven from Palestine by

the Israelis. The Arabs were insisting that Israel take back these refugees and Israel refused to accept them. Since, as a matter of fact, the State of Israel was already packed-jammed with people, the demand of the Arabs for the resettlement of the refugees in Israel was altogether impossible to accept. Our proposed solution to this problem was for the United States to put up the money to irrigate existing lands in the Arab States and put these unfortunate refugees on the newly irrigated lands. The second bone of contention between Israel and the Arabs went back to the 1947 United Nations Resolution on Israel's boundaries. The Arabs wished to go back to the boundaries established at that time but this would deprive Israel of considerable territories in the northern part of the State which they seized from the Arabs in the hostilities which followed the United Nations' finding. Secretary Dulles did not believe that this Arab demand was practical either. The third issue was the disposition of the Negev area which was of very special interest to Egypt since Israel's possession of the Negev Triangle deprived Egypt of land access to Saudi Arabia. The Egyptians, accordingly, want a slice of the Negev territory. This matter, Secretary Dulles said, could be settled if the Israelis could be persuaded to give up a good portion of the Negev territory.

Mr. Allen Dulles interposed at this point to say that he was impelled to point out his own view that neither side to the Arab-Israeli dispute really desired a permanent solution. They were merely using the issues just analyzed by Secretary Dulles as a means of keeping their quarrel alive.

Admiral Radford expressed the belief that Israel desired to keep the Negev area because of its hopes that oil would be discovered there. He doubted very much if the Israelis really needed a port on the Gulf of Aqaba. After further discussion of this point the Vice President stated that it seemed to him that as far as courses of action 10–d and 10–e which called for a blockade or military intervention by the United States, even assuming that we could establish the identity of the aggressor, we would have "a hell of a time" getting Congressional support for sending U.S. forces to fight the Israelis. As far as the Vice President could see the only useful purpose served by sub-Paragraph 10–e was to use this as a threat to Israel and a deterrent but not certainly as a practical course of action which could be followed. As for sub-Paragraph 10–d, the Vice President expressed the opinion that it was pretty generally agreed that the immediate danger of aggression came from Israel and that the establishment of a blockade would be very effective action against Israel. Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that the course of action in sub-Paragraph 10–c which would "prevent the direct or indirect transfer of funds or other assets subject to U.S. control"

would be in itself quite sufficient to stop Israeli aggression. Actually, a blockade of dollars would be more effective than a blockade by boats.

Secretary Humphrey stated that it seemed to him a singularly poor time for the Administration to have any policy paper on this subject at all. The existing policy on U.S. action in the event of war between Israel and the Arab States was now wholly "out of place". As far as this proposed new draft was concerned, Secretary Humphrey believed that the State Department was in the position simply to take the stand that we would prevent the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States without stating at all how we would do this. This State Department position was all that we needed in the circumstances. To spell out what we would precisely do to deal with or prevent such a war inevitably meant that we would be closing doors on other courses of action which might prove useful. Meanwhile, if this simple position were adopted, there was nothing to prevent the Joint Chiefs of Staff from continuing to make military plans to meet any contingency which might arise.

Admiral Radford interposed to state that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been directed under the existing policy in NSC 5428 to develop military plans in collaboration with the United Kingdom and if feasible with other countries. They strongly objected and continued to object to concerting their military planning with the United Kingdom or any other country. What they needed therefore was a revision which would authorize unilateral U.S. military planning for the contingency of Arab-Israel hostilities.

Secretary Humphrey then forcefully reiterated the position he had taken above. He insisted that all that was required was that Secretary Dulles talk with the British and the French and try to find the opportune method, manner and time for getting a solution of the Arab-Israel problem by recourse to the United Nations and to achieve a territorial boundary settlement which might be expected, said Secretary Humphrey, to quiet this strife down for at least a long period of time to come. Accordingly, Secretary Humphrey said he would omit all of the specific courses of action set forth in Paragraph 10.

At this point Secretary Dulles arose and said that he must leave to go and talk with the Ambassador of Iraq and that Mr. Hoover would take over for him. Before leaving the room, Secretary Dulles said that while, in general, the present draft report was acceptable to him, he did not place much value on the courses of action in Paragraph 10–d and 10–e (calling for blockade and military intervention) except as things "to think about". Admiral Radford agreed with him that this was a situation which could not be covered by policy made ahead of the event.

The Council agreed to what Secretary Dulles proposed to say to Prime Minister Sharett in response to the demands which it was believed the Prime Minister would make on the Secretary when they meet in Paris.

After Secretary Dulles had left, Mr. Dillon Anderson pointed out to the Council the problem with which it was now faced. NSC 5428 was approved Presidential policy. Accordingly, it would remain in effect unless the Council determined that the policy was invalid in part or in whole or, unless the proposed new policy was substituted with or without modification for NSC 5428. In short, the matter could not be left to the solution suggested by Secretary Humphrey. Secretary Humphrey replied that the policy we have (NSC 5428) was "no good". We should get rid of it. It will do nothing but get us into trouble and its removal was the first thing to insure. As for a substitution, until we knew what we wanted to do there was no sense whatever in writing down another series of actions. Secretary Humphrey repeated his conviction that it was enough for Secretary Dulles to say to the Israeli Prime Minister what he has just been authorized to say.

On the contrary, Dr. Flemming said he was much opposed to this idea of abandoning any attempt to formulate a policy to deal with the Arab-Israel problem. He expressed the opinion that the Planning Board's draft which the Council was now considering had been very responsive to the Council's request. Moreover, he added that he warmly approved of the revisions suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, if the Council could now agree on a paper revised in the light of the proposals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we would be much better off in the long run. Otherwise the Council would find itself entertaining different views as to what it had agreed to at this discussion. The Secretary of State had seemed to be willing to accept the revisions suggested [illegible] the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dr. Flemming said he agreed with the Secretary.

Secretary Humphrey still insisted that a one-page paper simply authorizing the Secretary of State to say to the Israeli authorities what he had just told the Council he desired to say, and which would include authorization for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to proceed to make their military plans, was really all that was necessary and feasible at this time. Emphatically, specific courses of action should not be included as a means of insuring a deterrent to warfare. It would be a terrible mistake to specify such courses of action. Secretary Wilson then read to the Council a very short restatement of Paragraph 10 which he believed would meet the point made by Secretary Humphrey.[14] Secretary Wilson said that this confined

[14] Not found.

itself to listing the things that the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to say and to do.

The Vice President then called on Under Secretary Hoover to explain to the Council what the State Department might need by way of authorization for the Secretary of State to respond to the Israeli demands. Secretary Hoover replied that any paper adopted by the Council should contain courses of action which would cover ultimate possibilities and alternatives. The Secretary of State wanted to be in a position to state to the Israelis that we would not sell them arms or provide them with funds with which to buy arms elsewhere. Thirdly, and finally, that we believed that the Israeli Government must go ahead and attempt to work out a solution. Meanwhile, we would see to it that the Egyptians do not start anything if the Israelis themselves avoid a preventive war.

The above statement by Secretary Hoover of what Secretary Dulles wished to say to the Israeli authorities seemed to Secretary Humphrey to omit one important point that Secretary Dulles had made; namely, that the United States would make no guarantee of the borders of Israel unless and until a boundary settlement had been achieved with the Arabs.

Secretary Wilson then again called attention to his own one-page solution. Secretary Hoover said he took no particular exception to Secretary Wilson's paper as such, but that the Council should realize that NSC policy statements constituted the guides to action for all the operating departments and agencies of the Government. Accordingly, by inference, the proposals of Secretary Humphrey and of Secretary Wilson could not be a reasonable substitute for a full policy paper. Accordingly, Secretary Hoover recommended that the draft report presented by the Planning Board should be adopted with such modifications as the Council deemed desirable.

In response to a complaint by Secretary Humphrey that the policy reports presented to the Council by the Planning Board were always too long and involved, Mr. Dillon Anderson pointed out that the length of the present draft was occasioned by the inclusion of a detailed analysis of the problem. As far as the U.S. objectives and courses of action were concerned, these took up little more than a page in the Planning Board report. He went on to warn that if the Council now chose to invalidate a Presidentially approved existing policy, it was under obligation to accept a substitute for the existing policy. Mr. Anderson also pointed out that the economic sanctions listed in sub-Paragraphs 10–a, b, and c were actions which could be taken by the Executive Branch of the Government acting alone and on its own initiative. Admittedly, the military courses of action in sub-Paragraphs 10–d and e would require Congressional support or Congressional authorization. Secretary Humphrey replied by stating

that he not only disapproved of the proposed military courses of action, he likewise disapproved of the economic sanctions set forth in sub-Paragraphs 10–a, b and c. There was simply no occasion whatsoever for listing these courses of action.

The Vice President commented that in his view the National Security Council had reached an impasse in its consideration of this policy. In point of fact it could not agree on precisely what the Secretary of State had a few moments ago said that he wanted to say to Prime Minister Sharett in Paris. The Vice President said he was quite sure that Secretary Dulles had expressed a willingness to go along with the economic sanctions set forth in sub-Paragraphs a, b and c but that he would substitute for the specific military action described in sub-Paragraphs d and e a generally-worded statement of willingness to undertake further action necessary to deter aggression and prevent war between Israel and the Arab States. If his understanding was correct, the Vice President could not see why the Council should not accept sub-Paragraphs 10–a, b and c and request the Planning Board to revise sub-Paragraphs 10–d and e along the lines suggested by the Secretary of State and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and present this revised statement to the National Security Council in its meeting next week.

Secretary Humphrey said he strongly objected to this approach to the problem. Admiral Radford also expressed doubt as to whether Secretary Dulles would wish to follow the course of action set forth in Paragraph 13 which read "as a matter of urgency enlist Congressional support for the measures in Paragraphs 10 and 12 above." Secretary Humphrey commented that in his opinion this was just about the last thing on earth that we would want to do.

Dr. Flemming expressed very grave anxiety as to the dangerous course of action the Israeli Government might decide to take after Secretary Dulles talked with Prime Minister Sharett and gave him negative answers to his request. In such a situation the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government ought to know how to plan for what might transpire. Such difficult problems as this should certainly not be played entirely by ear. Admiral Radford said that supposing that, after Secretary Dulles talked with the Israeli Prime Minister and turned down his demands and that Sharett then said that the Israelis would have to consider a preventive war, the Secretary of State might feel obliged to issue a warning to Sharett. He might even want to be very specific as to the terms of the warning but in any case it would have to be a strong general statement. Secretary Humphrey commented that the less the Prime Minister knew about what specific actions the United States was planning, the better it would be.

After further discussion and a calling for a consensus by Dr. Flemming, the Vice President felt able to state that in his opinion the Council had reached a consensus. It had agreed to make all of the actions in Paragraph 10 permissive rather than directive and had changed the introductory language in this sense. The Council had also agreed to recommend adoption of the economic sanctions set forth in sub-Paragraphs 10–a, b and c in the light of the permissive character of the paragraph as a whole. As for sub-Paragraphs d and e these were to be returned to the Planning Board to be revised in the light of the views expressed in the discussion. As for Paragraph 13, it was agreed that this should be revised to remove the suggestion of immediate resort to Congress for support of the courses of action which were proposed.

At the end of the meeting Secretary Hoover pointed out that in view of the President's absence and in view of the approaching interview between Secretary Dulles and Prime Minister Sharett, the Council's Record of Action should show that the Secretary of State had been authorized by the Council to state to Prime Minister Sharett the position which had been outlined earlier at this meeting.

The National Security Council: [15]

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the situation in the Near East following the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal.

b. Noted and discussed the draft report prepared by the NSC Planning Board, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1447–c, and transmitted by the reference memorandum, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as read at the meeting.

c. Noted and concurred in, as being within existing policy, a proposal by the Secretary of State to advise the Israeli Government generally as follows:

(1) The United States will not provide to Israel at this time grant aid in the forms of arms or funds to buy arms but will not interpose objections to Israel's buying moderate amounts of arms with its own resources.

(2) The U.S. Government will not now consider a treaty guaranteeing Israel's borders, except under the conditions stated in the speech by the Secretary of State on August 26, 1955.

(3) The United States, in accordance with existing policy, will seek to prevent resort to armed aggression by either Israel or the Arab States, and that we expect to make this position clear to the Arab States as well as to Israel.

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[15] The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1460. (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 262d Meeting held on October 20, 1955, and approved by the President on November 2, 1955. Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

d. Tentatively agreed to recommend the following revisions in the supplementary statement of policy in NSC 5428:

"10. In the event of major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab States, the U.S. should be prepared to take the following action against the state or states which are determined by a UN finding or, if necessary, by the U.S., to be responsible for the conflict or which refuse to withdraw their forces behind the Palestine Armistice line of 1950:

"Economic Action

"a. Discontinue U.S. Government aid.
"b. Embargo U.S. trade.
"c. Prevent the direct or indirect transfer of funds or other assets subject to U.S. control.
"13. As appropriate, enlist Congressional support for the measures in paragraphs 10 and 12 above."

e. Referred the draft revisions of paragraphs 10–d through g, 11 and 12 back to the NSC Planning Board for review in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the discussion at the Council meeting, and report back to the Council at its next meeting.

Note: The action in c above [was] subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State.

S. Everett Gleason

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346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, October 20, 1955—6:20 p.m.

2169. Dept has considered UK position re Jerusalem (London tel 1531 [2]). Also have discussed matters with French who propose action along lines US recommendation that Sharett offer (Tel Aviv's 279 [3]) be accepted. Convey to FonOff following proposal of Dept which

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.0084A/10–1755. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Allen, who initialed for Dulles. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Tel Aviv.

[2] Dated October 17, it reported the British reply to the U.S. views on the Jerusalem problem sent in Document 332. The British suggested the following modification of Sharett's proposal:
"Sharett would be asked fix one day in week when he would be in Tel Aviv to transact business with ambassadors, implication being that we would be willing go Jerusalem see him on other days." (*Ibid.*)

[3] Document 295.

represents attempt to harmonize US-UK-French views on this matter. You should point out relative urgency need to arrive at agreed position on this question which has been under discussion among the three governments for nearly three months.

1. After formation new government, three Ambassadors would call individually on Israel Prime Minister in Jerusalem and inform him of our acceptance Sharett's proposal. They would inform Primin that they were authorized call on Foreign Minister at his Ministry in Jerusalem from time to time on understanding that Foreign Minister would be available at Tel Aviv on a reciprocal basis. To facilitate conduct diplomatic business, Ambassadors would suggest that they work out with Foreign Minister an arrangement whereby latter would make periodic visits to Tel Aviv perhaps once weekly and not less often than once a fortnight.

2. In advising Prime Minister of our acceptance Sharett's offer, Ambassadors would point out that our position relative to ultimate settlement of Jerusalem problem remained unchanged.

3. Ambassadors would also recall Sharett's undertaking that there would be no publicity regarding new arrangement.

4. Ambassadors would be authorized make calls at Foreign Ministry in their discretion when business with which they were entrusted was of sufficient importance warrant such calls.

5. Acceptance social invitations in Jerusalem would be left discretion Ambassadors under conditions which presently apply.

6. Dept continues feel that support of agreed position from other friendly powers should be sought in first instance by Ambassadors in Tel Aviv. Would not object however if UK and French wish to take additional action in capitals of countries concerned.

While 2 above represents present official position of 3 governments it is not intended to derogate from statement in August 26 speech that US Government would be willing, inter alia, reexamine question status of Jerusalem. [4]

Dulles

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[4] The Embassy delivered the Department's proposal in memorandum form to the British Foreign Office on October 21. (Telegram 1628 from London; Department of State, Central Files, 601.0084A/10–2155)

347. Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, October 20, 1955—9 p.m.

1602. From Foster. During temporary absence of Ambassador Aldrich from London this afternoon Eden sent for me urgently and expressed in strong terms his personal interest in proposals concerning the High Dam in Egypt which Makins was instructed today to discuss in Washington "at the highest possible level as soon as possible". Eden will see Ambassador Aldrich at noon tomorrow to reiterate his views but meanwhile he wished me, in view urgency situation, to send this message.

Prime Minister said he knew Washington shared HMG's increasingly grave concern over Middle Eastern situation, which had been subject of a number recent Cabinet meetings. He thought Russian arms offers were most sinister event in East-West conflict since Soviets took over Czechoslovakia. He saw no solution for the West in trying to out bid Soviets with still greater arms offers. As to Egypt, he did not know whether United States might have reached point of feeling that in view Nasser's present position United States could give Egypt nothing further. I interjected to say I was sure United States had not reached such a point but on contrary was giving very active consideration to possible means countering Soviet arms program.

Prime Minister then outlined proposals regarding High Dam as communicated to Makins today and gave me copy Macmillan's telegram to Makins. (Although Makins will no doubt give Department full details, I am nevertheless sending text Macmillan's message in following telegram. [2])

Prime Minister said that Macmillan planned discuss proposals with Secretary in Paris next week. [3] He supposed that in view Secretary's trip to Denver [4] and imminent departure for Europe he might not be able consider them personally before leaving Washington. He added that Butler was communicating directly with Black of International Bank.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/10–2055. Secret; Niact. Received at 6:58 p.m. Repeated to Cairo and Paris.

[2] *Infra.*

[3] Prior to the convening of the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers on October 27, Dulles was in Rome and then in Paris, October 22–26.

[4] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, the Secretary visited the President in Denver on the morning of October 19. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

Prime Minister concluded by saying he regarded proposals as of such major importance as a counter measure to Soviet penetration Middle East that if it were not for the President's illness he would have sent a personal message to him to urge acceptance and support of them.

Aldrich

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348. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, October 20, 1955—9 p.m.

1603. Regarding Embtel 1602, [2] following is text Macmillan's secret message to Makins today:

"I am much concerned about the need for prompt action to forestall any move by the Russians to undertake the construction and financing of the High Dam. Coming on top of the recent Czech sales of arms to Egypt, this would be a serious blow to Western prestige and influence in the Middle East and might mean that the Russians would come to exercise a preponderating influence politically and economically in what is to us, both strategically and economically, a vital area.

2. As you know, negotiations have been going on for about a year between the Egyptian Government and an Anglo-French-German consortium. Their object has been to conclude a contract for the building of the Dam and the Associated Hydro-Electric Works. The total cost of this is estimated to be at least pounds 250 million, but the foreign exchange cost covering the work to be done by the consortium is estimated at pounds 100–140 million. This would be divided between the three participants and the United Kingdom firms (English Electric and others) would therefore be contracting for work costing pounds 33–46 million. A schedule of payments has been worked out covering the first 10 years of the project which provides for a maximum credit element of pounds 15 million, to be repaid within 4 years from the completion of the work. The companies concerned are willing to put up credit for this amount provided

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/10–2055. Secret; Niact. Received at 9:46 p.m. Repeated to Cairo and Paris.

[2] *Supra.*

that Her Majesty's Government, through the Export Credit Guarantee Department, will guarantee repayment.

3. The report which has recently been presented by the International Bank Mission shows that the project is technically and economically sound. It expresses the view that Egypt should from her own resources be able to finance all but about half of the foreign exchange cost, provided that she exercises careful fiscal and economic policies and tailors the rest of her development programme severely. The implication of this is that something of the order of pounds 50–70 million would have to be found from outside Egypt.

4. Apparently the Egyptians have not yet actually asked for an International Bank loan for the project. As you know, the President of the International Bank [3] has made it clear that if the Bank were to make a loan, it would only be on the basis that the project was put out to international tender and was fully supervised by the International Bank from the beginning.

5. I understand that the Egyptian Government will shortly send representatives to Washington to carry on technical discussions about the High Dam project, so that further progress can be made when the Egyptian Minister of Finance visits the U.S.A. in the middle of November.

6. I see two main difficulties in relying on the participation of the International Bank in the project. The first is the delay. The Bank will expect to follow their usual thorough and careful methods and will wish to put the project out to international tender. All this will take time, and in the meantime the Russians may get in ahead of us. The second is that if international tenders are called for it will not be possible to exclude the Russians or their satellites from the bidding. I attach more importance to the first. We may perhaps be able to rely on Mr. Black to find a way round the second.

7. I have considered whether as an alternative the consortium could not go ahead and endeavor to conclude the contract without waiting for the conclusion of negotiations with the International Bank. The difficulties here are, first the risk that to do so might prejudice our relations with the Bank in the future, secondly the serious financial burden we should have to shoulder. The outlook for Egypt's balance of payments is precarious with cotton prices at their present level. We estimate that after taking account of all Egypt's foreign exchange resources (including her sterling balances) and setting against them her need for foreign exchange over the next 10 years (including the cost of the Dam) there would be a shortfall of at least pounds 50 million. But this assumes that Egypt manages her economic policy prudently and sensibly and that she is willing

[3] Eugene R. Black.

to cut down the rest of her development programme. It also assumes that she spends say pounds 50 million on arms purchases, an amount which appears likely to be substantially exceeded.

8. There is a great risk therefore that Egypt might default on a substantial part of the payment due under the contract. It may be argued that in practice Her Majesty's Government would not be at risk for as much as pounds 33–46 million, since if default occurred some part of the payments would have been made already and not all the expenditure would have been incurred by the contractors. But we should then have to decide whether to let the whole project come to grief and, if not, what we should do if the French and German Governments would not put up any more money.

9. Having regard to all the other overseas commitments, present and prospective, with which we are faced, I am bound to agree with the Chancellor [4] that in our present balance of payments situation, it would be a heavy risk for us to take to underwrite our share of the consortium's risks unless there is a prospect of some further assistance for Egypt from some other quarter.

10. If the International Bank must be ruled out on grounds of urgency, can we look to the prospects of further economic aid for Egypt from the American Government? And if so, would the administration be prepared to see the consortium go ahead and conclude the contract as quickly as possible, on the ground that only by that means have we a chance of forestalling the Russians. Prime Minister and Cabinet feel that there is so much at stake in this order, that they very much hope this may be possible. They are also conscious that if there is delay consequences would be incalculable.

11. Alternatively, is there any hope that because of the overriding need to conclude a contract urgently the Bank would agree to participate even if the consortium had gone ahead and concluded a contract with the Egyptians? It looks as if Mr. Black would be hard to convince that this was necessary. Moreover, we have ourselves been foremost in pressing for the principle of international tender, and there would be great risks for us in proposing that it should be ignored in this instance. Nevertheless, if the United States administration agree with us about the extreme importance of this case, they might be prepared to support us in urging Mr. Black that it should be treated as being altogether exceptional.

12. I should therefore like you to discuss this whole question at the highest possible level as soon as possible, making it clear that I shall wish to raise the matter with Mr. Dulles in Paris next week. Our object is, as you will see, first to find out what prospects there are of further American economic aid to Egypt on a scale which

[4] Chancellor of the Exchequer Richard A. Butler.

would give us reasonable security that they would not default on their payments under the contract. Secondly, to ensure that if the consortium went ahead they would do so with sympathy and support not only of the United States administration but of Mr. Black and the International Bank, and finally to ascertain whether there would be any possibility of the International Bank participating by some method which would not involve too much delay".

Aldrich

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349. Message From Prime Minister Bulganin to President Eisenhower [1]

Moscow, October 20, 1955.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message concerning the sale of arms to Egypt. [2]

We fully share the opinion you have expressed that our common purpose is the relaxation of tensions between us. For our part, we are ready to contribute to this by every means, as well as to a solution of various problems, including the Near East.

I would ask you to acquaint yourself with the message that I sent some days ago to Prime Minister A. Eden, which I enclose. It refers specifically to the question that interests you. I should like to assure you that there are no grounds whatever for concern.

I beg you to accept my very best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

N. Bulganin [3]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower/Bulganin Correspondence, 1955–1958. Secret; Eyes Only. Translation. Attached to the source text is the signed original of the message and its enclosure in Russian.

The text of Bulganin's message and its enclosure were transmitted to the Embassy in Rome in telegram 1329, October 21, priority and eyes only for Secretary Dulles, and to the Embassy in Moscow in telegram 491, priority and eyes only for Chargé Walmsley. According to the telegram, the Soviet Chargé personally delivered these English translations of the source text and its enclosure at 4:30 p.m. that afternoon to Under Secretary Hoover. (Department of State, Central Files, 774.561/10–2155)

[2] See Document 334.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[Enclosure]

TEXT OF REPLY OF N.A. BULGANIN TO PRIME MINISTER A. EDEN[4]

Thank you for your message of October 5[5] in which you expressed with all frankness your views on the deliveries of arms to Egypt.

We highly appreciate your concern for peace and fully share your desire to guarantee the preservation of peace in the region of the Near and Middle East. However, in this connection the decision of the Egyptians to purchase arms in Czechoslovakia is no cause for concern.

It is known that the Egyptian Republic has an army and also has heretofore received arms for it from other countries. It is understandable that in the interests of its own defense and the safeguarding of the country's independence it needs arms in some quantity. It is natural that the Egyptian Republic desires to acquire these arms in exchange for the products of its own labor, not binding itself with any obligations whatever that might impair its sovereign rights. It is apparent from the statements of the Egyptian as well as Czechoslovak Governments that the contract concluded between them is of just that character. Moreover, there are no grounds for speaking in this instance of any arms race or for considering that these arms deliveries may lead to a violation of the peace.

On the other hand, you well know that the United Kingdom and the United States of America over many years have been delivering at their own discretion considerable quantities of arms to various countries of the Middle and Near East. These arms are delivered, as a rule, under well known political conditions, for example, on condition of the participation of the countries purchasing arms in definite military groupings aimed against other states, which actually leads to an armaments race. I should like to recall in this connection that the proposals for arms deliveries were made by the Western Powers to Egypt as well, on the condition of subordinating the Egyptian army to a so-called "Middle East Command", or of the entry of Egypt into military groupings created there. If Egypt did not want to follow this road and is defending its national rights and legal interests, this should not give any cause for charges that it is allegedly not interested in the preservation of peace. At all events,

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[4] The source text indicated that Bulganin's message to Eden was dated October 11.

[5] See footnote 2, Document 324.

the Soviet Government has no grounds for thinking that Egypt is interested in preserving peace any less than any other state in this region.

Moreover, we share the desire expressed in your letter that the great powers which bear special responsibility for the preservation of universal peace should show necessary concern for the lessening of tensions between Egypt and Israel and generally in this region. Achievement of these aims would contribute to a situation wherein all states of this region will have confidence in the inviolability of their rights and national interests. In this connection the achievement by us of joint successes also in settling the basic question of a general reduction of armaments would be of great importance.

I should like to hope that this reply of mine will contribute in some measure to dispel the apprehensions which you expressed.

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350. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, October 23, 1955—8 p.m.

400. Paris for Russell. In my conversation with Sharett today on eve his departure Lydda airport for Paris, I asked specifically what might be significance of Chief of Staff Dayan's sudden recall from European vacation. I suggested there was certain to be active and widespread interpretation of this move in relation to rumors of Israel's "preventive action" under certain conditions. Sharett told me definitely there was no such significance involved—that Dayan had been called back solely for purpose assisting in drawing up an arms purchasing program. He said Dayan was at that moment closeted with Cabinet which was engaged in very serious and unhappy task of deciding which categories of national budget funds must suffer diversion of money to be used for arms purchases. This was considered such an important and far reaching decision that GOI deemed it necessary that Dayan participate in discussions. He then said "This

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/10–2355. Confidential. Received at 10:22 a.m., October 24. Repeated to Paris, London, and Cairo.

is not only a reason to be handed out by the government but it is an actual fact". [2]

Lawson

[2] Dayan later wrote that at a meeting with Ben Gurion on October 23 he received orders to initiate preparations for the capture of the Straits of Tiran to ensure freedom of shipping through the Gulf of Akaba and the Red Sea. (Moshe Dayan, *Diary of the Sinai Campaign* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 12)

351. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the Members of the Council [1]

Washington, October 24, 1955.

SUBJECT

Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict Between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5428 [2]
B. SNIE 30–3–55 [3]
C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 17 and 21, 1955 [4]
D. NSC Action No. 1447–c [5]
E. Draft Record of Actions, 262nd NSC Meeting, Item 8 [6]

The enclosed draft paragraphs, proposed as substitutes for paragraphs 10–13 of the supplementary statement of policy in NSC 5428, are transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, October 27, 1955. [7]

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351. NSC 5428 Memos (Nov.–Dec. 1955). Top Secret. The source text indicates that Lay also sent copies of this memorandum and its enclosure to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 326.

[3] Document 335.

[4] Document 340 and footnote 1, Document 344, respectively.

[5] See footnote 9, Document 326.

[6] See footnote 16, Document 345.

[7] See Document 361.

The enclosure includes the revisions tentatively agreed on by the Council at its meeting on October 20 (Reference E, item 8–d) and revisions prepared by the Planning Board as directed by the Council (Reference E, item 8–e).

It is recommended that the enclosed recommendations for revision of NSC 5428, in the form adopted by the Council, be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve them; direct their implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the United States Government; and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

DRAFT REVISION PROPOSED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR PARAGRAPHS 10–13 OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF POLICY IN NSC 5428

10A. In the event of major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab States, the U.S. should be prepared to take the following action against the state or states which are determined by a UN finding or, if necessary, by the U.S., to be responsible for the conflict or which refuse to withdraw their forces behind the Palestine Armistice line of 1950:

a. Discontinue U.S. Government aid.
b. Embargo U.S. trade.
c. Prevent the direct or indirect transfer of funds or other assets subject to U.S. control.
[d. If it appears that the foregoing actions are not likely to end the hostilities promptly, establish a blockade with Congressional authority.] [8]

[10B. Because the actions in 10A, a, b and c may not be sufficient to end the hostilities promptly, study the desirability and feasibility of taking military action, including a blockade.] [9]

10C. The following actions should be taken either before or concurrent with measures outlined in paragraph 10A;

a. Urge other countries, as appropriate, to take action similar to that of the United States.
b. Make every effort to secure United Nations sanction and support for all such actions.

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[8] Defense–JCS proposal. [Footnote and brackets appear in the source text.]
[9] State proposal. [Footnote and brackets appear in the source text.]

11A. In collaboration with the United Kingdom, and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey, develop plans to support the measures in subparagraphs 10A, a, b, and c above.

11B. Develop plans unilaterally, as appropriate, to support the military action referred to above; and, at such time later as it may be indicated that combined military action will be taken, collaborate in such planning with the United Kingdom and to the extent desirable with other nations.

12. At a time and in a way he deems most likely to be effective, the Secretary of State should inform Israel and the Arab States privately that the United States, in accordance with existing policy, will seek to prevent resort to armed aggression by either Israel or the Arab States and, if it should occur, will seek to stop it quickly.

13. As appropriate, enlist Congressional support for the measures in the above paragraphs.

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352. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Paris, October 24, 1955—noon.

Dulte 4. Eyes only Hoover. Please suggest following to Denver. [2] Macmillan has seen and approved.

"Dear Mister Chairman:

I received on October 22 your message regarding the sale of arms to Egypt. [3] I note that you feel that there are no grounds whatever for concern. However, on the basis of all my information, this large transaction has created a greatly increased danger of a major outbreak of violence in the area.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–2455. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:52 a.m.

[2] A note attached to the source text from Barnes to Hoover indicated that the draft reply from Eisenhower to Bulganin contained in Dulte 4 had been repeated to Sherman Adams in Denver at Hoover's request with a note indicating Hoover's desire to discuss the draft message over the telephone with Adams. Barnes' note also indicated that George Allen had seen the draft message and "thought it looked satisfactory."

The text of the telegram which the Department transmitted to Governor Adams on October 24 is *ibid.*

[3] Document 349.

I am asking Mister Dulles to discuss this situation further with Mister Molotov at Geneva." [4]

Dulles

[4] The Department transmitted the text of this message on October 25 to the Embassy in Moscow, priority and eyes only for Chargé Walmsley, in telegram 507, and repeated it priority to the Embassy in Paris. Accompanying the message were instructions for Walmsley to observe "utmost secrecy . . . regarding message" and to deliver it "personally immediately on receipt telegram." (Department of State, Central Files, 774.561/10–2555)

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353. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Paris, October 25, 1955—10 p.m.

Dulte 10. Eyes only Hoover from Secretary. Follows text of message from Eden to Bulganin October 20, left with Secretary by Macmillan October 21:

Begin verbatim text. "Thank you for your telegram of October 11 [2] in which you replied to the message I had sent you about the supply of arms to Egypt. [3]

The purpose of my message was to draw your attention to the risks to peace which must flow from the supply of armaments to Egypt and Israel on a considerable scale. My present information suggests that the contemplated scale of deliveries to Egypt is very large. If fully carried out, these deliveries are sufficient to destroy any hope that an arms race between Egypt and Israel can be avoided. I cannot accept the view that because the contract is said to be without political conditions it therefore cannot lead to an arms race or to a breach of the peace.

I also find myself obliged to point out that, contrary to what is stated in Your Excellency's message, Her Majesty's Government have not imposed political conditions for the supply of arms to Egypt.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–2555. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:34 p.m. Repeated to Moscow and London.

[2] Bulganin enclosed the text of his message of October 11 to Eden in his reply of October 20 to Eisenhower. See Document 349.

[3] Reference is to Eden's message of October 4 to Bulganin, which Bulganin received on October 5. For further information concerning the contents of Eden's message, see Document 324.

We have tried to keep deliveries to both sides within limited proportions with the sole purpose of preventing an increase in tension. The sales of arms which have been authorized in recent years, both to Egypt and to Israel, for legitimate purposes of self-defence, have been made on a commercial basis and without political conditions of any sort. Allow me also to point out that my message to Your Excellency did not contain any accusation to the effect that Egypt is not interested—or is less interested than other states in the area—in securing peace.

I am glad to note your statement that the Soviet Government share our concern for lessening tension between Egypt and Israel. Her Majesty's Government are no less anxious than the Soviet Government that all states in this area should be sure of the inviolability of their rights and national interests. They cannot agree, however, that these purposes will be served by the consignment to one party to the dispute of very large quantities of armaments. I cannot emphasise too strongly the dangerous consequences of such deliveries both in the area itself and in the general context of world tension.

I agree that joint success in solving the wider question of a general reduction of armaments would also be of great importance. But this does not absolve us from the duty of reducing the danger of war between these two countries, with all the unforeseeable consequences which that could involve."

Aldrich has seen in Paris. *End verbatim text.*

Dulles

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354. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings in Paris [1]

Washington, October 25, 1955—7:35 p.m.

Tosec 28. Humphrey, Black and I discussed High Aswan Dam and related projects yesterday. It is clear that British, Egyptians, Sudanese, IBRD and USG, including Congress, will need to be consulted and to agree on many points. We think agreement can be achieved but that it will require prior agreement between the British,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/10–2555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wilkins and approved and signed by Hoover.

the Bank and ourselves before we approach the Egyptians and hope, as suggested in my earlier telegram, we can shortly begin talks here.

Whole project for High Aswan Dam shapes up in our tentative thinking along following lines:

Reduced to simplest terms High Aswan Dam seems to be useful enterprise, total cost of which with its related projects will aggregate, under present estimates, 1.3 biilion dollars. Of this amount four hundred million dollars is required in foreign exchange and nine hundred million dollars in domestic funds in Egypt.

With respect to the 400 million dollars, IBRD would be willing lend 200 million at rate of about 15 million dollars yearly provided Egyptians make proper arrangements to implement project, providing there is agreement with Sudan re Nile water and providing balance of 200 million dollars in foreign exchange can be found. With respect to this balance we estimate between 15 and 20 million dollars yearly will be needed for 15 years on grant basis. US and UK will wish to assist in this respect providing Egyptians and Sudanese play their part. This amount would be in addition to other grant aid which US is now giving to Egypt. To start conversations we propose that UK would contribute one-third and US two-thirds of 200 million dollars. Approval of US Congress would be required. US contribution would be spent in US. UK contribution would not be paid out of Egypt's blocked sterling in London but out of other British funds.

With respect to the 900 million, Egypt would agree to make 60 million available yearly for 18 years in local currency for expenditure in Egypt.

Humphrey and I are planning to see Makins tomorrow and talk to him along lines indicated herein. [2]

In view Black and Humphrey located in Washington, I suggest subject to your approval we carry on exploratory conversations here rather than in Geneva. If you agree we will of course keep you fully advised.

Hoover

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[2] See Document 360.

355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings in Paris [1]

Washington, October 25, 1955—7:35 p.m.

Tosec 29. London tels 1602, 1603, [2] 1632, [3] Dulte 5. [4]

1. We share British concern threat posed by Soviet offer to construct High Aswan Dam and recognize desirability proposing some course action looking toward Western financing of project. Believe threat can be successfully met unless Egyptians impervious all tenets sound planning and implementing of project this type and Soviets completely disregard all commercial considerations. In such event doubt we in any position to compete. We cognizant danger of involving US in such long range project since inability carry through would damage our prestige and invite exploitation of situation by Soviets.

2. Bank's engineers have just arrived Cairo at GOE request. Black is hopeful they will make significant progress in explaining proper role of consulting engineers for this project and in getting GOE understanding and acceptance. Engagement internationally recognized firm on terms acceptable to Bank could then follow. (British Foreign Office under impression Sir Alexander Gibb and partners already appointed.) Black believes forthcoming talks with Kaissouni will also enable progress be made on other aspects of loan.

3. According IBRD, preliminary study over-all cost of dam complex estimated £469.7 million ($1.3 billion) of which foreign exchange expenditures represent £142 million ($408 million); remainder of financing considered local currency costs. Whereas dam and power facilities may be constructed over period 10 years, irrigation and other land spreading phases will not be completed for 18 years. Since financing of project even with substantial outside help bound place great strain on Egypt's resources, careful budgeting of resources, over-all planning and establishment of priorities for both armament and development expenditures will be necessary. If this is

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/10–2255. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Gay and Shaw; approved and signed by Hoover. Repeated to London and Cairo.

[2] Documents 347 and 348.

[3] Dated October 22; it transmitted background information supplied by the Foreign Office in support of the proposal outlined in Documents 347 and 348, including a summary of a memorandum which the Foreign Office had given the Embassy. (Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/10–2255)

[4] Dated October 24; it requested a report on an October 21 meeting between Hoover and Humphrey and Black. (*Ibid.*, 874.2614/10–2455) Hoover responded in Tedul 7 to Paris, October 24, that the October 21 meeting was preliminary and that he would report the next day on another meeting that afternoon. (*Ibid.*) For the October 24 meeting, see *supra*.

done, Bank study indicates Egypt should be able finance about one-half foreign exchange component £71 million ($204 million) from own resources; this predicated among other things on continued foreign aid amounting at least £3.5 million ($10 million) annually and access to blocked sterling assets at faster rate than at present. We are doubtful that Egypt will in fact be able to make such large allocation of her own foreign exchange, and that over and above loan of at least $200 million approximately $200 million of foreign grant aid may be required during construction period to enable Egypt to successfully finance other essential requirements.

4. Re British proposal, para 2, London's 1603, Dept observations as follows:

a) Figure given for total cost of project (around $720 million compared to Bank's total estimated cost of $1.3 billion) appears cover only the dam, power installation and some water spreading phases but not entire project envisaged as essential by Bank in order to produce the necessary results in the Egyptian economy.

b) Since, according to Bank estimates, foreign exchange costs probably in excess £140 million, maximum figure in range suggested by British (£100–140 million) will be used in following analysis.

c) British group appears willing carry £15 million for only 4 years beyond completion of work. However, much longer credit period is necessary due Egypt's precarious balance of payments situation. Black talked with consortium members last month and believes consortium unable extend long term credits. IBRD loan would presumably extend over 20–25 year period. Implication though not stated is that US would carry after the 4 year period in the consortium proposal.

d) Actually therefore assurance requested in para 12 reftel 1603 if accorded would obligate US assume ill defined and potentially large risks. Under most favorable conditions our obligation might not be greater than maximum credit element £15 million mentioned para 2. This, however, leaves £31 million unaccounted for which according para 8 might conceivably (and probably would) come under default. Furthermore, if US assumes this obligation for Britain, we might well be asked to assume comparable French and German obligations aggregating around £94 million. In addition to project risks British wish us support Egyptian economy to at least £50 million (see para 7), which they regard as minimal since Egyptian expenditures on arms and ability to cut back outlays other development projects uncertain. As practical matter, identifiable liabilities which US might have to assume total £190 million ($545 million). Commitment might conceivably involve US in financial obligations far beyond this figure, particularly were Egypt to engage in military undertakings during this period.

e) Aside from other considerations, we strongly doubt Congressional sentiment would support consortium approach unless American firms given opportunity to participate. IBRD procedure of normal competitive bidding seems to us desirable.

5. Department understands (from Black) that IBRD would not be able participate under terms presently proposed by consortium. Bank requires contracting for construction through international competition and objects to consulting engineers participation such competition. Bank further requires 1) agreement between Egypt and Sudan on division of Nile waters and 2) assurances covering necessary financing over and above its own loans e.g. how will GOE procure and assure adequate local resources.

6. US Government believes international character IBRD and its experience gives best assurance to both GOE and to the West of successful project and that relations with respect to project will be kept amicable. Moreover, Bank virtually only source from which GOE can obtain adequate long term credits. No ordinary Bank or group of Banks would appear able underwrite project. IBRD policy on tenders would conceivably reduce cost of project. GOE concern with Bank policy in this regard appears unfounded since Bank officials believe Eastern European countries would not be able to qualify.

7. Would seem to us what Egypt needs and wants is our assistance in removing obstacles which interfere with IBRD financing. UK could make most significant contribution by obtaining Sudan's consent soonest to Egypt's use at least additional 10 mcm of Nile water. US and UK could also contribute by assuring GOE their intention grant foreign exchange assistance necessary fill gap between total foreign exchange requirements and amount forthcoming from Bank. This would be over and above release UK blocked sterling held by Egypt.

8. Proposed course of action:

a) UK and US would assure GOE that they will exercise best efforts to bring GOE-IBRD negotiations to prompt and successful conclusion.

b) UK would immediately exert maximum influence with Sudan to reach an agreement with Egypt which will satisfactorily meet that country's water requirements.

c) US and UK would, if developing situation requires, express intention, provided GOE shows constructive attitude towards ME problems, to extend subject to continuing appropriations substantial grant economic aid over the next ten years. We would expect UK to assume about one-third this obligation over and above release Egyptian blocked sterling.

Hoover

356. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, October 26, 1955—5 p.m.

976. Eyes Only for the Acting Secretary. Geneva Eyes Only for the Secretary. Regarding Deptel 507 (Tedul 10). [2] Bulganin at my request made through Foreign Office protocol this morning, received me at three p.m. Moscow time today in Kremlin.

I stated that under instructions I wished to deliver message from the President to him.

After he had had it translated to him I asked whether he had any preliminary oral message he wished me transmit. After asking interpreter to repeat slowly the translation second paragraph President's letter, Bulganin spoke as follows:

He was appreciative of President's very prompt reply to his own message [3] and was glad to know that Secretary had been asked to talk with Molotov in detail. He said this exchange between Secretary and Foreign Minister should make issues clear in same spirit in which President and he had expressed themselves previously.

Bulganin nevertheless evinced surprise at importance attached this transaction between Czechoslovakia and Egypt. He said that in past United States and Western European countries had sold arms to different countries and that no concern had been expressed. For example arms had been sold Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Arabia until recently and there had been no reaction. But now he said so much "noise" is raised about this transaction. Furthermore, Egypt and Israel had bought arms in United States and United States had delivered arms to Egypt, including, he understood, tanks.

He then arrested himself and said that he would not enter further discussion of matter at this time. He repeated his thanks to President for quick reply and stated he was sorry that President in his present state health had to deal with such questions and concluded by requesting that I send his most sincere wishes for good health and fast recovery of President and his warm personal regards.

I said to Prime Minister that I was not in position to comment on what he had to say although I was sure that if he were properly informed the information in his possession and that in the Presi-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10–2655. Secret; Priority. Received at 11:13 a.m. Repeated priority to Geneva. Transmitted to Denver for Sherman Adams as Toden 2. (*Ibid.*)

[2] See footnote 4, Document 352.

[3] See Document 349.

dent's should not differ greatly and that I would merely transmit what he had to say together with his personal messages.

Walmsley

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357. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) [1]

Washington, October 26, 1955.

SUBJECT

Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict Between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding a document entitled "Draft Revision Proposed as a Substitute for Paragraphs 10–13 of the Supplementary Statement of Policy in NSC 5428," [2] which was prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 27 October 1955. [3]

2. In their memorandum to you dated 19 October 1955, subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff [4] submitted comments on the previous Planning Board draft report dated 17 October 1955. [5] They note that, in general, the substance of their comments has been incorporated in the draft revisions now under consideration.

3. *Subparagraph 10 A d.* The wording of this bracketed subparagraph is the same as that recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum referred to above. For the reasons previously given, they favor the retention of this possible course of action in the statement of policy to be contained in paragraph 10 A.

4. *Subparagraph 10 B.* This paragraph proposed by the Department of State indicates that, since economic actions may not be adequate

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5428 Memos (Nov–Dec. 1955). Top Secret. The source text is a copy which Lay circulated on October 26 as an enclosure to a memorandum to the members of the National Security Council as well as to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

[2] See the enclosure to Document 351.

[3] See Document 361.

[4] Document 344.

[5] See the enclosure to Document 340.

for the purpose, a study should be initiated now to determine the desirability and feasibility of taking military action, including a blockade. A study undertaken at this time, with respect to military actions other than a blockade, would necessarily be based not only upon many imponderables but also upon the assumptions the validity of which would be open to question. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously pointed out that a decision to take such military action or to refrain from doing so should be made in the light of the situation then existing. The desirability and feasibility of such action would be taken into consideration in making that decision. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend the deletion of this paragraph from the policy. This deletion would in no way affect the continuing planning function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, subject to the foregoing comments, you concur in the draft revised paragraphs.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford [6]
Chairman

[6] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

358. Memorandum of a Conversation, British Embassy, Paris, October 26, 1955, 10 a.m.[1]

USDel/MC/5

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*United Kingdom*
The Secretary	Mr. Macmillan
Mr. Merchant	Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. MacArthur	Mr. Shuckburgh
Ambassador Aldrich	Mr. Hancock
Ambassador Byroade	
Ambassador Lawson	
Mr. Russell	

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Russell on November 2. The time of the meeting is from Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

SUBJECT

Israeli Request for Arms Credit and Security Guarantee

The Secretary opened the discussion by saying that Israel Prime Minister Sharett had given us a preview of the position he intended to take in his discussions later that day with Mr. Macmillan and the Secretary [2] by making a television recording for release in the United States at the very time he would be seeing the Secretary. We had received information that he would be saying on television that the Israel Government placed its principal reliance on the United States because Great Britain was already involved with Jordan and the French were preoccupied with Morocco. He would be saying that Israel wants: (1) long-term credit for arms sufficient to balance the Soviet arms to Egypt; (2) a security guarantee; and (3) pressure on the Soviet Union to desist from providing arms to the Arabs. Mr. Sharett indicated that if Israel is not given the first two it may have to strike first. The Secretary said that it would not be easy for the United States to give him nothing and still keep Israel quiet. The Israeli Government may gamble that regardless of what the Secretary may say, Jewish influence would be a deterrent to United States action against Israel. Also, Israel would have the support of those in the United States who want to take a tough line against the Soviet Union. Mr. Macmillan commented that Israel might start a preventive action, counting on the International Community calling it off after a while. The Secretary said that it was difficult to see how there was anything decisive about any preventive action which Israel could take.

Mr. Macmillan said that he thought he would take the following line with Sharett: (1) he would listen sympathetically to anything Sharett said; (2) Britain could give no unconditional guarantee beyond that contained in the 1950 Declaration; (3) Britain could not embark upon a policy of equating to Israel arms in whatever amount the Soviets might make available to the Arabs, but it would continue to permit shipments of some arms to Israel; (4) there is no future for Israel in the long run unless it makes peace with the Arabs. If the present situation continues only the Soviets will benefit. There must be concessions from both sides. A settlement is more important than village lands here or there. Israel should make concessions in the Negev in the form of border triangles or even relinquishing Elath.

The Secretary said that he believed that might be a good line. Before he left Washington he had had a talk with the Iraqi Ambas-

[2] See *infra*.

sador,[3] who had said that he was convinced that the Arabs would have to make a settlement with Israel but that each year that passed it would become harder. The Iraq Ambassador had suggested that discussions might start on the basis of the 1947 UN Resolutions. The Secretary said that he had pointed out that they gave part of the Galilee to the Arabs but gave the Negev to Israel. The Iraq Ambassador said there could be an exchange of part of the Negev to Jordan or Egypt for a retention of Galilee territory by Israel. The Secretary said the Israelis would probably not start negotiations on the assumption they would have to make large concessions but they are in a bad way. It is becoming apparent that there is the same psychology there that there is in Korea and Formosa, a belief that their only hope lies in a global war since they cannot themselves alone defeat the Arabs conclusively. The influence of world Jewry to support developments in that direction would be considerable. We should not minimize the pressures that would come from: (1) pro-Israel elements and (2) the group that favors generally an early showdown with the Soviets.

Mr. Macmillan said there was a similar situation in Great Britain except that there the extremists included those who opposed the policy of turning over the Suez Base to Egypt. The only way to meet that pressure is to develop a line of support for our friends, that is the Iraqis and the rest of the Northern Tier. We can exercise little weight in Egypt today but we can in Iraq. Mr. Macmillan asked whether it would not be possible to make a reaffirmation of the 1950 Declaration which would in fact be a guarantee of peace and might deter any contemplated preventive action. Such a reaffirmation would not be what the Israel Government is asking for but it might be something just short of it.

The Secretary said that the 1950 commitment already goes somewhat beyond what is authorized under our Constitution. He believed however that we can say that it is our present policy to seek to deter a country that sends troops beyond its borders, to seek peace and to support UN action. We can say that that is our present policy but the Secretary believed that the Executive Branch of the Government in the United States could not make a commitment that we would take armed action in the future. He said he was extremely dubious of any willingness on the part of the Senate to give a security guarantee. In a discussion that he had with Senator George, just before leaving Washington, the Senator had expressed his doubt

[3] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, Dulles and the Iraqi Ambassador, Moussa Al-Shabandar, met at 4 p.m., October 20. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) The memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199.

that the Senate would take such action.[4] It must be remembered that it required a two-thirds' vote. There might be a better chance of getting a joint resolution which only requires a majority in both houses. As next year's elections draw nearer, the pressure for a joint resolution would grow.

Mr. Macmillan asked about the feasibility of a policy of: (1) reaffirming the 1950 Declaration, possibly followed later by a joint resolution in the United States and (2) the United States acceding to the Baghdad Pact. These would balance off as between Israel and the Arab states. The Secretary said that if we should be forced into giving a new guarantee to Israel it probably could be balanced by the United States joining the Baghdad Pact. The latter would also however require Congressional action. There could be no treaty unless the Executive took the initiative, although there can be a joint resolution on Congressional initiative. Both an Israel security measure and a Baghdad Pact could be done by joint resolution. Mr. Macmillan noted that if the United States should give a security guarantee to Israel and not adhere to the Baghdad Pact, it would have the effect of splitting the United States and the United Kingdom in the area, which would be a tremendous gain for the Soviets. Mr. Dulles said that Sharett, in trying to split the United States and the UK, was helping the Soviets to achieve that end.

The Secretary said that he might summarize the position which he intended to take with Sharett: (1) we are strongly opposed to any move toward a preventive war; (2) emphasize that our policy, in accordance with the 1950 Declaration, is to oppose both aggression and an arms race; (3) urge that Israel make a settlement with the Arab states as the only permanent solution and that it consider seriously what concessions it can make toward that end. With respect to general policy in the area the Secretary said he believed the Northern Tier as a basic concept is and was sound. There may be some differences between the United States and the UK because of conflicting views of the military people of the two countries in the area. The Secretary said that neither he nor the President are concerned over the question of U.S. versus British equipment in the area although our military people object to using U.S. funds for offshore procurement of British equipment for other countries since,

[4] According to a memorandum of conversation by Dulles of a conversation with Senator George on October 21, Dulles asked the Senator whether he thought the Senate would approve a security treaty with Israel that would guarantee the present armistice lines once the Arab States and Israel had negotiated an agreed settlement; Senator George expressed doubt that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the full Senate would approve a security treaty under these circumstances. (Memorandum of Conversation, by Dulles, October 21; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, "Sen Walter George")

if the funds are used to send obsolescent U.S. equipment abroad, the proceeds can be used to purchase new equipment for the U.S. military. Mr. Macmillan said that the whole line of supply in the Middle East now is British equipment. It is very small in any event but he believed that it was impractical to mix it up. He felt that there might be, however, an agreement to divide up the types of equipment which each of the two countries might provide. It was a matter of considerable importance to Britain that the tanks for the area be British, but on other things there could be a division with respect to the line of supply. The Secretary said that the United States would have political and military observers at the November 20 meeting in Baghdad and suggested that this might be one of the things to be discussed there. He said that he had told the Iraq Ambassador last week that we would look sympathetically on Iraq's effort to build up strength. The Secretary referred to previous discussions between Prime Minister Eden and the President about U.S. offshore procurement of Centurion tanks. He said that we had only had funds to purchase ten Centurions at the present time but that, in accordance with his previous undertaking to Macmillan, we intended to ask Congress for funds to buy more Centurions under offshore procurement in the coming year. Mr. Macmillan inquired whether it would be possible for the U.S. to tell Nuri that. Mr. Dulles replied that he doubted if we could be specific on that score but he would see what we could do.

The Secretary said that he was seriously concerned about the situation in Syria. It was the nearest of all the Arab states to becoming a Soviet puppet. The other Arab states feel that they can keep their independence. Ambassador Malik of Lebanon has been pressing us for a year to take action to prevent Syria from becoming a Soviet puppet. It is doubtful that Nasser could or would do anything to stop this trend. As a result of the Egyptian-Syrian Pact [5] there will be a flow of Soviet arms into Syria with the result that Israel will be newly threatened both from the north and the south. It is not clear just how Iraq intends to act with respect to Syria, whether by coup or attack. It would be hard for us to be benevolent about the latter. Mr. Macmillan said that Syria had been acting most badly in the way it was hiking its charges on the pipeline and threatening to hold up the passage of oil. Such a stoppage would be most serious for Britain and Western Europe generally; it would be a major blow to Iraq since it would cut Iraq's income in half. Up to now he had been discouraging Nuri with respect to taking action in Syria largely because it would put Iraq on the Israel border. But if

[5] On October 20, Egypt and Syria signed a mutual defense pact which provided for a unified military command.

Syria is going to become a Soviet puppet, Israel might prefer to have Iraq as its neighbor.

The Secretary said that the same pattern had been observed in Egypt . . . and Syria with respect to requests to purchase U.S. arms from the United States. They secretly negotiated a deal with the Soviets, then came to us asking about possible arms purchases, told us conditions were unacceptable (although they had not objected to them before and they provided only for no resale, no use for aggressive purposes and not giving away secrets relating to them) and then proceeded to announce a deal with the Soviets. Mr. Macmillan observed that the Arabs are paying the Soviets for the arms with our money: oil revenues, unblocked sterling or economic assistance. The Secretary said that Nasser is toying with forces far greater than he knows anything about. In the face of Communist methods of penetration he is a babe in the woods. The Secretary does not doubt his sincerity but does doubt his capacity to control the situation he is getting into. In purpose at least Nasser does not intend to allow Egypt to be taken over by the Communists. He would like to emulate Yugoslavia and get the best of both worlds. The difference, however, is that Yugoslavia knows the score, and is unlikely to fall again into the jaws of Moscow. Tito is a past master at dealing with the Kremlin. Nasser is completely unversed. The question is can we capitalize on his intention not to let the Communists take over. This leads to the question of the Aswan Dam. Mr. Macmillan said that he thought it was important to differentiate between Nasser and his arms deal and the people of Egypt and their genuine long-term interests. Arms are ephemeral. The dam will last for generations and be an outstanding symbol of benefit to the people. If we build it, it will help our position. Otherwise, the Kremlin will capitalize on it. The Secretary said that it would not be possible to commence construction on the dam until there was agreement between the Sudan and Egypt on a division of water and with respect to the land which would be covered by the reservoir. Mr. Macmillan said that he expected the Sudan Parliament to pass a resolution asking Britain and Egypt as the codomini to grant Sudanese independence. Britain will say that it approves. If there is a delay in independence it is certain that Egypt will spend money in an effort to interfere in any Sudanese election. Moreover, the Sudan will not agree on the water until there is independence. Mr. Macmillan asked whether it would not be wise to make a package for Nasser on the Sudan: (1) Sudanese independence and (2) agreement on the Nile waters.

Mr. Dulles read two telegrams which had just been received from Acting Secretary Hoover in connection with the Aswan Dam.[6] The Secretary said that he believes Egypt really would prefer to have the IBRD in on the building of the dam, and not to have it done by the Soviets, if it appears that it could be done expeditiously. Mr. Macmillan said that the reason for the entry of the British-German-French consortium was to keep the Soviets out. If the IBRD can handle the allotting of the construction contracts on a semi-political basis so that the Soviets would not be in on the construction and getting IBRD and Western funds, he would have no objection to going ahead through the IBRD. The Secretary said that he thought it ought to be possible to exclude the Soviets from IBRD contracts. The IBRD could build the dam with less cost to Egypt since the financial risk on the part of contractors would be much less. Mr. Macmillan said that he would immediately inform the Foreign Office that he wished to have discussions on the dam go forward in Washington as Mr. Hoover had suggested.

Mr. Macmillan said that he had been having trouble over the Sultan of Muscat. . . . He said that the British Prime Minister was making an announcement in Parliament that day which he hoped would help keep the Arabs from making outrageous claims. The Secretary said that unfortunately it looked as though U.S. and British aims are likely to conflict in Saudi Arabia. Our airbase concession is coming up for renegotiation next year and we have large oil interests there. The King of Saudi Arabia had told us that he expects us to support him in his efforts against the British in the south.

Mr. Macmillan said that with respect to arms for the Middle East the British plan to go ahead using NEACC. They do not intend to supply Centurions to Israel but would supply small stuff. Mr. Shuckburgh raised the question as to the utility of the NEACC in view of the entry of the Soviets into the Middle East arms picture. The Secretary and Mr. Macmillan agreed that Shuckburgh and Mr. Russell should hold discussions in London the following week on the future of NEACC. Mr. Macmillan suggested that the NEACC might be used for the exchange of information but not be expected to exercise controls.

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[6] Documents 354 and 355.

359. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, October 26, 1955—midnight.

Secto 38. At meeting with Secretary in Paris this afternoon [2] Israel Prime Minister Sharett said he believed both Soviet Union and Egypt should, as result of arms deal, be confronted by Western powers with necessity of making sharp choice. Soviet Union should not be permitted to have détente in one part of world while using it to create dangers in another. Sharett said Egypt similarly should be required to reject arms deal or forego any form of Western help or association. He said prior to deal Egypt had marked superiority over Israel in all heavy weapons in air, sea, and land; e.g. 160 tanks to 104; 83 jet planes to 28; 10 bombers to 2; 3 destroyers to 0. Sharett asserted present talk of preventive war came not from Israel but from world opinion. He said however he dreaded day when it may be a necessary resort for Israel safety. What is required to make preventive war unnecessary and prospect of Egyptian attempt annihilate Israel unthinkable? It may be I.G. cannot fully redress an arms imbalance resulting from arms deal but certain things absolutely necessary: jet planes comparable to Migs, tanks and naval aircraft. Sharett not asking for blanket commitment but for assurance that if I.G. submits list it will be considered sympathetically and on most favorable possible basis as to prices and credit terms. Secondly, he asked that U.S. give Israel security treaty without conditions mentioned by Secretary in August 26 statement as it impossible to conceive of time when such a treaty so critically necessary as now. Both arms and treaty would serve as powerful deterrent to Nasser. If these not quickly forthcoming there would be disillusionment in Israel and sentiment for preventive action. Sharett said he had just seen Macmillan who was vague and negative in his response.

Secretary replied that U.S. shares Sharett's view of gravity of recent developments in area. They constitute threat to Israel and broader threat to West Europe and all free world. Our information indicates Soviet arms going not only to Egypt but to . . . Syria. . . . Oil from Arab world virtually indispensable to economic life of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2655. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received at 10:30 p.m. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, Paris, and Moscow.

According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, he departed Paris on October 26 at 4:50 p.m. and arrived at Geneva at 6:20 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers convened the following day and continued in session until November 16.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 566)

Europe and Britain's economy especially would be threatened by loss of oil revenues. Moreover Egypt is gateway to Africa. This is most serious situation to arise since World War II, more far-reaching in consequence than Korea. We intend to deal with it as such.

With respect Sharett suggestion of confronting Soviet Union with sharp choice, Secretary said we recognize that world relaxation must be one and indivisible. Soviet Union cannot have good fellowship in one area while creating new front of attack in another. Secretary said he could assure Sharett our relations with Soviet Union will take that into account but timing and method of raising it must be carefully considered and he doubted wisdom of giving full publicity to it now. Concerning Egypt, Secretary doubted if complete withdrawal of West would help. If confronted with demand to make choice, Nasser would probably have no alternative but to go on with arms deal. Weter [*Western*?] economic aid not so important to Egypt as to overbalance in Nasser's mind sentiment in RCC which would result in his overthrow if arms deal now cancelled. We have considered both approaches carefully. We may as time goes on be forced to revise our position but our present thinking is that to confront Nasser with the requirement of choice between giving up arms deal and continuing association with West would not produce result we both want.

With respect comparative military equipment of Israel and Egypt, our intelligence figures indicate Israel has superiority in most categories. Perhaps we and I.G. should attempt to reconcile this conflict in our information. In any event we are not convinced that the arms deal will in itself produce decisive imbalance. Do not yet know condition of equipment or Egyptian ability to use it. We should not minimize effect of deal on Egyptian strength but neither should we exaggerate it.

With respect Sharett request concerning furnishing of arms to Israel, we do not believe it would be profitable to anyone to promote arms race in area. It is not possible for Israel, in view of wide disparity in populations, to have military superiority or even equality with Arab strength given willingness of Soviet Union to provide large scale arms. Even if Israel had 100 per cent of its arms absorptive capacity it could not in such a case maintain balance and it would be unwise to embark on that task. This does not mean that we rule out arms for Israel on a modest and normal basis. We will sympathetically consider any list that Israel submits but not on basis of embarking in race with Soviet Union to push arms into the area.

With respect security treaty, we have made clear by 1950 declaration we would seek to prevent active aggression by either side, that for us Israel is a permanent fact, and there cannot be action against Israel without strong reaction from U.S. Secretary said

he is doubtful about wisdom of trying to convert statements of present policy into a treaty. It would need a two-thirds vote of Senate. Senate not now in session and could not act to deal with present situation. Had lunch with Senator George before coming here [3] and he was extremely doubtful whether Senate would ratify such treaty if presented by administration. Moreover, not at all certain President would feel like recommending treaty in absence of settlement.

Secretary said Sharett should not draw conclusion however that only way out of present problem is preventive war. If there were preventive war by Israel we would, however embarrassed by the necessity, feel impelled to act under 1950 declaration. This not a threat or warning but merely a reminder that declaration works both ways. Israel could not except to have advantage of declaration without being itself denied right of aggression. Secretary said he could not see any salvation for Israel in preventive action. Suppose it won some battles. Area would be left with greater unsettlement than before and with Arabs more hostile than ever. In such case Israel would in the long run be submerged by attrition if not by war. Secretary said only way to deal with situation is for Israel to work out a settlement with the Arabs. Israel could probably have reached a better settlement last year than this and can make a better settlement this year than it probably can next. Israel ought seriously consider the extent of sacrifice it willing to make to obtain settlement.

Secretary concluded by saying Israel has tremendous asset in good will of all American people. What a people will do in assisting another country depends more on such things than on treaties. For this reason Secretary has negotiated security treaties on year to year basis. It is a matter of the greatest importance from the standpoint of Israel that it keep the good will of the American people and their support of our present policies that will afford protection to Israel. Israel can be sure we are continuing to work on policies promoting Israel security.

Secretary and Sharett agreed to discuss matter further in Geneva after Sharett talks with Molotov. [4]

Dulles

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[3] See footnote 4, *supra*.

[4] The Secretary and Sharett met again in Geneva at 5 p.m., October 30. For Dulles' summary of this conversation, see Document 371.

360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings in Geneva [1]

Washington, October 26, 1955—10:56 p.m.

Tosec 41. Re Department's Tosec 27,[2] 28 and 29.[3] When Secretary Humphrey and I met Makins re Aswan dam today we pointed out that US Government fully shared apprehensions of UK re Soviet activities in Middle East but we had serious reservations re any approach to Aswan project except through IBRD, for reasons stated in reftels. Makins said London was afraid delay might result in Russia's undertaking tremendous project halfway down in Africa and that chief advantage of consortium was that it was ready to sign. I pointed out that if US, UK and IBRD worked together energetically, we might give Nasser a sufficiently encouraging letter of intent to prevent his signing with USSR.

Humphrey emphasized that we could not rush into project of this magnitude. He said IBRD would lend $200 million on project but only on condition that US and UK would put up additional $200 million in grant aid. Moreover, he thought US and UK should be prepared to underwrite entire project if necessary, once we started. Egyptian contribution in local currency, approximately $900 million, amounting to perhaps $75 million per year, might be stopped at any time and we would then be faced with alternative of putting in additional money or of withdrawing and allowing Russians to pick up where we left off. Total liability of US and UK might reach one billion dollars, and we should be prepared for project to cost us at least $300 million each. Since US now holds about one billion dollars worth of surplus cotton, Congress would be highly skeptical of proposal to put that much money into Egypt, much of which would result in additional cotton production there. We would be flying directly into face of our whole agricultural program in US. I added that US public would have difficulty understanding large additional US commitment to Egypt at present, particularly if we rushed into project in which no US firms were participating. In view of all these considerations, we saw no possibility of producing money for consortium deal and were convinced that only possibility of progress was through IBRD.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2655. Secret. Drafted by Allen and approved by Macomber, who initialed for Hoover. Repeated to London, Paris, and Cairo.

[2] Tosec 27 to Paris, October 25, informed Dulles that he could expect to receive two messages concerning the Aswan Dam that would provide him with talking points for his conversations with Macmillan. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–PA/10–2555)

[3] Documents 354 and 355.

While Makins naturally made no commitment it was my impression he fully realized practical impossibility of implementing Eden proposal. On other hand he appeared to share our feeling that if preliminary agreement could be reached between US, UK and IBRD, a satisfactory approach could be made to Egyptians in reasonably near future.

In view of circumstances outlined Tosec 29, Makins appeared to agree that best location for further discussions was in Washington, especially because Egyptian Finance Minister expected arrive here in about two weeks. Makins stated he would recommend London that three-way conversations be held between UK, US and IBRD soonest possible. [4]

Hoover

[4] Makins informed Hoover the following day, October 27, that he had informed the Foreign Office of the recommendation that further exploratory talks take place in Washington. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199)

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361. Memorandum of Discussion at the 263d Meeting of the National Security Council on Thursday, October 27, 1955, 9:30 a.m. [1]

Present at the 263rd Council meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Mr. Robert Matteson for Mr. Harold Stassen, Special Assistant to the President; Admiral Paul Foster for the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 3); Mr. Ralph Spear for the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (Item 3); The Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Secretary of the Army (Item 3); the Secretary of the Navy (Item 3); the Secretary of the Air Force (Item 3); Assistant Secretary Gray of Defense (Item 3); the Deputy Director, Office of Defense Mobilization (Item 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Item 3); the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (Item 3); Admiral Donald B. Duncan for the Chief of Naval

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on October 28. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Appointments. (Eisenhower Library)

Operations (Item 3); the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (Item 3); the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (Item 3); the Director of Central Intelligence; Special Assistants to the President Anderson, Dodge, and Rockefeller; The White House Staff Secretary; the Naval Aide to the President (Item 3); the NSC Representative on Internal Security (Item 3); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows a report by Allen W. Dulles that King Saud of Saudi Arabia, as a result of a recent incident at the Buraimi Oasis, had ordered a break in diplomatic relations with Great Britain.]

Secretary Hoover said he thought that the Council would be interested in hearing his most recent reports from Secretary Dulles. Secretary Hoover proceeded to read a report of a discussion between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Macmillan on the situation in the Middle East.[2] This had become so extremely serious that the possibility existed that Iraq might be permitted to take action against Syria where Communist influence had reached such a serious point.

With respect to Secretary Dulles' conversation with Prime Minister Sharett,[3] the latter had demanded that Egypt be forced to withdraw from its arms deal with Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, Sharett had asked for a security treaty for Israel without the conditions to such a treaty which had been set forth in the speech of Secretary Dulles on August 26. In reply Secretary Dulles had indicated that the United States could not sponsor an arms race in the Middle East and that the United States Senate would not ratify a security treaty in the absence of the conditions set forth in his August 26 speech. Secretary Dulles had added that the United States did not object to a modest increase in Israel armaments. Finally, Secretary Dulles had said that if a preventive war were launched, the United States would stand by its commitments in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

With respect to a conversation with Senator George, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,[4] Secretary Dulles had told Senator George that in his opinion the problem of Israeli-Arab relations had been handled by the prior administration wholly in terms of domestic political considerations and without reference to the true national interest of the United States. He added that he

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[2] See Document 358.
[3] See Document 359.
[4] See footnote 4, Document 358.

himself intended to handle the problem in the light of the national interest. Senator George had seemed to comprehend and sympathize with this point of view.

By way of further comment Secretary Hoover pointed out that border incidents between the Israelis and the Egyptians continued. The latter were apparently responsible for the latest incident and a much heavier Israeli retaliatory attack must now be awaited. The situation was extremely serious.

[Here follows an additional report by Hoover to the effect that Dulles and Macmillan had agreed to conclude the Geneva Foreign Ministers' meeting by November 19 as well as an observation by Allen W. Dulles that the forthcoming vote of confidence in the French Assembly could overturn the Faure Government and could upset this timetable for the conference's adjournment.]

The National Security Council: [5]

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence regarding British-Saudi Arabian relations and the forthcoming vote of confidence in the French Assembly.

b. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Acting Secretary of State on conversations regarding the developments in the Near East which the Secretary of State had recently had with the British Foreign Secretary, the Israeli Prime Minister, and the Turkish Foreign Minister.

2. *U.S. Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East* (NSC 5428; [6] NSC Actions Nos. 1447 [7] and 1460; [8] Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict Between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States", dated October 17, 21, 24, and 26, 1955 [9])

Mr. Dillon Anderson explained the revisions in Paragraphs 10 through 13 in the Supplementary Statement of Policy in NSC 5428 which had been agreed to by the Planning Board in the light of the discussion of the paper by the National Security Council last week [10] and in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He pointed out that the three sub-paragraphs of Paragraph 10A, dealing with financial and economic sanctions against an aggressor or a potential

[5] The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1461. (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 263d Meeting held on October 27, 1955, and approved by the President on November 2, 1955. Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

[6] See footnote 4, Document 326.

[7] See footnote 9, Document 326.

[8] See footnote 16, Document 345.

[9] See Document 340; footnote 1, Document 344; Document 351; and footnote 1, Document 357, respectively.

[10] See Document 345.

aggressor, had been agreed to at last week's Council meeting. With respect to the establishment of a blockade or further military action against Israel or an Arab State, he pointed out that there was still a split in the present revised draft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in sub-Paragraph d of Paragraph 10A, were still calling for the United States to be prepared to establish a blockade with Congressional authority if it appeared that the financial and economic sanctions mentioned above seemed unlikely to end the hostilities promptly. The State Department, however, had offered its own paragraph on the subject of a blockade or further military intervention. This paragraph indicated that because the financial and economic sanctions might prove insufficient to end the hostilities promptly, a study should be made of the desirability and feasibility of taking military action including a blockade.

At the conclusion of Mr. Anderson's briefing, the Vice President inquired whether an embargo could be established against an aggressor in the Middle East by the Executive Branch of the Government on its own initiative and without Congressional authorization. Mr. Anderson replied that he understood this to be the case and that the authority of the Executive Branch derived from two acts of Congress: The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and the Export Control Act of 1949. The Attorney General commented that whether or not the Executive Branch could legally resort to a blockade without further specific Congressional authorization, a serious policy question remained as to whether we would want to do so.

Referring to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the new revised paper, Mr. Anderson suggested that either Secretary Robertson or Admiral Radford might wish to comment further on these views.

Admiral Radford stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred their own paragraph with respect to the possibility of resorting to a blockade. Personally, however, Admiral Radford said that he did not believe there was much to choose between the Joint Chiefs' language and the paragraph proposed by the Department of State. He pointed out that it was unrealistic and impossible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to formulate plans which contemplated U.S. military intervention beyond the phase of a blockade. Such further military intervention could not be planned for until developments between Israel and one or more of the Arab States had reached a point where we could determine which of the Arab States was going to attack Israel. Accordingly, concluded Admiral Radford, if the limitations on the capability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make plans to meet all the possible contingencies in a war between Israel and the Arab States were clearly kept in mind, he would be willing to accept either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the State versions of the disputed para-

graphs. In any event, the present new draft was a great improvement on its predecessor.

The Vice President said that he judged from Admiral Radford's statement that with certain qualifications the Joint Chiefs would be willing to accept the State version. He then asked if there were any further comments on this point.

Secretary Hoover explained the reasons why the State Department felt quite deeply that their own wording in Paragraph 10B was preferable to the wording proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wording seemed to the State Department to make a blockade more or less mandatory. State, on the other hand, felt that, looking at the matter practically, any U.S. move to impose a blockade on an aggressor would first have to come before the National Security Council for a decision whatever the circumstances then prevailing. Accordingly, Secretary Hoover felt that the State Department's language, calling merely for a study of the feasibility and desirability of a blockade, was preferable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff version.

Secretary Humphrey said, that as he understood the problem from Admiral Radford's remarks, any studies of this problem undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be strictly confined to advance planning but would not comprise any military or naval movements or any allocation of forces or additional expenditures until such time as the actual outbreak of war occurred. Admiral Radford replied that in the matter of a blockade, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be in a position to formulate very detailed plans which could be implemented very promptly. Secretary Humphrey said he very much preferred the plan proposed by State to that proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford added that he shared Secretary Hoover's opinion, that none of the major decisions set forth in National Security Council policy papers were ever actually made in advance of the occasion. You decided on what course of action to take at the time you were faced with the necessity for decision. That was why he had so strenuously objected to the courses of action with respect to hostilities between Israel and the Arab States set forth in the original Supplementary Statement of Policy in NSC 5428.

Dr. Flemming and Director Hughes said that they were willing to go along with the language proposed by the State Department although Mr. Hughes said that his agreement depended upon a clearer understanding that the military study called for in the State Department paragraph would not involve the actual allocation of naval vessels or additional military forces. Admiral Radford reassured Mr. Hughes that in response to the language in Paragraph 10B, the Joint Chiefs would simply proceed to make a general

appraisal of the situation in its studies and plans. Secretary Humphrey, however, felt that the qualifications on military planning which he and Mr. Hughes had been speaking of should be made clearer so that no military plans would proceed to the point of actual programming as opposed to planning in the strictest sense.

Secretary Hoover pointed out that the courses of action set forth in the present paper would gradually become known down the line in the staffs of the various responsible departments and agencies and accordingly were likely, ultimately, to leak out. He therefore wanted to make the courses of action as tough as they could feasibly be. He believed that if there were mental reservations among the members of the Council as to the proposed courses of action, such mental reservations should be made explicit and discussed by the Council. Dr. Flemming agreed with Secretary Hoover and said that he did not want the language presently set forth in the State Department's proposed Paragraph 10B to be watered down further by qualifications on the kind of studies and plans that the military would make for possible military action. He believed that such studies and plans should be promptly carried to their conclusions in order that the United States could act quickly if developments between Israel and the Arab States made such action necessary. Secretary Hoover said that naturally we hoped that we would never be called upon to take the courses of action outlined in the paper but, in point of fact, we might be compelled to and, accordingly, he agreed with Dr. Flemming's point of view. Mr. Nelson Rockefeller said he also favored a tough statement to the Israelis as a deterrent to preventive war. He felt that the possible application of military force would constitute a much more effective deterrent in this instance than the financial and economic sanctions.

The Vice President recalled to the National Security Council that in their discussion of this problem last week, Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that the financial and economic sanctions in sub-Paragraphs 10–a, b and c were sufficient to stop the Israelis from undertaking preventive war. As for the additional courses of action which contemplated military action against Israel, in the form of a blockade or actual intervention, these additional courses were "very frankly a bluff".

Admiral Radford observed that a blockade of Israel could be very effective indeed although less so in the case of Egypt. A second step open to the United States would be to destroy certain key military installations within the territories of the aggressor state by precision bombing. Such a move, he believed, would really hamper the Egyptians and the Israelis. However, if the United States were to proceed from this step to the next step of direct military intervention with ground forces, such intervention would constitute a major

military task. Admiral Radford estimated that in the event of hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors, as many as 500,000 troops might actually be involved. This figure indicated the magnitude of the task which would face any U.S. force which was to intervene in the struggle.

The Vice President warned the Council again, as he had at the previous meeting, that we could never get the Congress to agree to a course of action which involved the United States in hostilities against Israel. [11] On the other hand, he thought the present draft was essentially what the Council had asked for and desired provided the Council kept clearly in mind that in certain instances we were talking about courses of action which we are very unlikely ever to take although we might threaten to take such courses of action as a deterrent.

Admiral Radford stated that if the Council had now agreed to accept the State Department Paragraph 10B on the study of desirability and feasibility of taking military action, he would like to suggest certain changes in Paragraph 11B. There ensued a considerable discussion of language appropriate to revising Paragraph 11B, the upshot of which was Council agreement to accept a revision of Paragraph 11B suggested by Mr. Dillon Anderson.

The National Security Council: [12]

Agreed to recommend to the President the revision of the Supplementary Statement of Policy contained in NSC 5428 by substituting the following for paragraphs 10 through 13 thereof:

"10. a. In the event of major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab States, the U.S. should be prepared to take the following action against the state or states which are determined by a UN finding or, if necessary, by the U.S. to be responsible for the conflict or which refuse to withdraw their forces behind the Palestine Armistice line of 1950:

(1) Discontinue U.S. Government aid.
(2) Embargo U.S. trade
(3) Prevent the direct or indirect transfer of funds or other assets subject to U.S. control.

b. Because the actions in paragraph 10–a above may not be sufficient to end the hostilities promptly, study the desirability and feasibility of taking military action, including a blockade.

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[11] The Vice President subsequently made clear that the term "hostilities" as used here did not apply to a U.S. blockade but to physical intervention with U.S. troops. [Footnote in the source text.]

[12] The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1462. (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 263d Meeting held on October 27, 1955, and approved by the President on November 2, 1955. Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

c. Take the following actions either before or concurrent with measures outlined in paragraph 10–a:

(1) Urge other countries, as appropriate, to take action similar to that of the United States.

(2) Make every effort to secure United Nations sanction and support for all such actions.

"11. a. In collaboration with the United Kingdom, and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey, develop plans to support the measures in paragraph 10–a above.

b. Make the studies regarding military action referred to in paragraph 10-b above unilaterally. At such time later as it may be indicated that combined military action will be taken, be prepared to collaborate in such planning with the United Kingdom and to the extent desirable with other nations.

"12. At a time and in a way he deems most likely to be effective, the Secretary of State should inform Israel and the Arab States privately that the United States, in accordance with existing policy, will seek to prevent resort to armed aggression by either Israel or the Arab States and, if it should occur, will seek to stop it quickly.

"13. As appropriate, enlist Congressional support for the measures in the above paragraphs."

Note: The above action subsequently approved by the President. The revised paragraphs subsequently circulated for insertion in all copies of NSC 5428.

[Here follows discussion of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee's first annual report.]

S. Everett Gleason

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362. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, October 27, 1955—11 p.m.

Secto 44. Paris for Byroade. Appreciate analysis contained Tosec 27, [2] 28, 29 [3] and approve recommendations therein specifically sec-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2755. Secret. Received at 10:08 p.m. Repeated to London, Cairo, and Paris.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 360.

[3] Documents 354 and 355.

ond paragraph Tosec 27[4] and first and last paragraphs Tosec 28. There was discussion on Aswan Dam at meeting Paris yesterday with Macmillan, Shuckburgh, Byroade and myself present.[5] With respect Tosec 29 paragraph 8 A, I will discuss with Byroade here tomorrow[6] best means of approach to Nasser to convince him of soundness from GOE point of view of IBRD handling of project and of US–UK desire and ability to provide indispensable cooperation with respect Sudan and financing; and also to ascertain whether in return GOE can be expected to show constructive attitude toward ME problems.

At Paris meeting Macmillan suggested package approach to Nasser re Sudan: (1) Sudanese independence and (2) Sudanese agreement immediately thereafter on division of waters and use of lands for reservoir. Macmillan also said reason for consortium was belief that IBRD might not be able act expeditiously enough to keep Soviet out of project and that under IBRD principle of competitive bidding Soviet bloc firms might be able make lowest bids (for political objectives). Macmillan said if matter can be so handled by IBRD that Soviet bloc firms will not obtain contracts he has no objection that approach.

Department should work as expeditiously as possible with IBRD and British representatives Washington to formulate course of action which will put us in best position to hold out to Nasser solid advantages of working with IBRD and US–UK provided we decide that we can afford to work with Nasser. This in turn involves question of Egypt Soviet relations and consequences with Northern Tier of seeming to reward flirtation if not more with Soviet Union. Please keep me informed.

Dulles

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[4] It reads as follows: "After full consideration of all aspects of this project, we are firmly of opinion that there is no practical alternative to continuing support for IBRD and that US and UK should join together in carrying forward project through that agency." (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/10–2555)

[5] See Document 358.

[6] No account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

363. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, October 28, 1955, 11:15 a.m.[1]

USDel/MC/7

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Merchant
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Russell

United Kingdom

British Foreign Secretary
Mr. Hancock

SUBJECT

Middle East Situation

The Secretary showed Mr. Macmillan a copy of the President's letter to Bulganin[2] and a copy of the latter's reply.[3] He did not leave a copy of either of the letters with Mr. Macmillan.

Mr. Macmillan said that he was seeing Molotov tomorrow. It was his thought that the three Western Foreign Ministers might see Molotov about the Middle East separately. Depending on developments they might wish to see him together at some later time. The Secretary read from a memorandum of points which he intended to make with Molotov when he saw him, probably on Sunday.[4] Mr. Macmillan commented that he thought the line which the Secretary intended to take was excellent. It hinged the problem on the Israel-Arab dispute and not on large Middle East problems which would give the USSR an opening for attempting to assert a role in the area. Molotov may say that the Western Powers are increasing tension by promoting the Northern Tier. Our reply should be that we are not talking about that but about the tension between Israel and the Arab states which threatens to blow up into full scale warfare if the Soviets continue along their present course. Mr. Macmillan said he had cabled the Prime Minister that he felt the present farcical situation of our smiling pleasantly at the Soviets while they fo-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 567. Secret. Drafted by Russell on November 3.

[2] Document 334.

[3] Document 349.

[4] That same afternoon, the Secretary transmitted the text of this proposed statement to the Department of State and invited suggestions. (Secto 60 from Geneva; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2855) The Department responded with comments on October 29. (Tosec 77 to Geneva; *ibid.*, 396.1–GE/10–2955) On October 31, the Department was informed that "Secretary did not leave any paper with Molotov [on October 30]." (Secto 101 from Geneva; *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 570)

mented discord and tensions in the Middle East could not go on indefinitely. The question is largely one of timing and of how to make clear where the responsibility for the difficulty lies. We cannot raise the matter too sharply at the beginning of this Conference and run the risk of disappointing the Germans or being held at fault by world opinion and ending the "Geneva Spirit".

The Secretary said that he thought he might leave a copy of the paper he had just read from with Molotov as an aide-mémoire. Mr. Macmillan said he thought that might be desirable.

The Secretary summarized the statement which he had made to Sharett in Paris. Mr. Macmillan said that his statement had been very similar.

Mr. Macmillan went on to say that he thought that it might be good idea to try and push Jordan in the direction of its Hashemite cousins, Iraq. It might be that Jordan could be induced to move toward a settlement with Israel if it had the backing of Iraq.

It was agreed that at the 11 o'clock trilateral meeting the following day (October 29) the question of the Middle East might be raised with the French in a cursory way. This would have the effect of not excluding them from any consideration of the problem but also of not becoming too heavily involved with them on it.

The Secretary said that Prime Minister Sharett was trying desperately to see Molotov but was not sure he would succeed. He thought it would be a good thing for each of them to meet the other. Molotov's obvious reluctance to see Sharett appears to tie in with Soviet objectives in the Arab world, i.e., showing that the Soviets are having little or nothing to do with Israel and devoting themselves to the Arabs. In any event the Secretary had agreed to see Sharett while he was in Geneva.[5]

The Secretary said that our people in Washington had been annoyed about the suddenness of the British action in Buraimi and the absence of any prior information about it. Mr. Macmillan replied that the reason for not informing us was that the British had felt that we would prefer to be in a position of not appearing to have been committed to the action by any prior word of it.

With respect to the Aswan Dam, the Secretary said that if we go ahead with it, it will be portrayed as a result which the Egyptians have achieved from us by playing around with the Soviets. It will seem to justify Nasser's policy. Our friends will complain and will demand their more substantial evidence of reward for their friendship. It will make the area very expensive indeed. Mr. Macmillan said the problem basically is whether we can win Egypt back or whether we should concentrate on other Arab countries. The Secre-

[5] See Document 371.

tary said that he felt that we should not enter upon the construction of the Dam on a blind gamble. Aside from the political hazards involved, it was essential for purely economic reasons for Egypt to be on a peace basis before the construction was undertaken. The construction will require substantial contributions by Egypt both in the form of domestic resources and foreign exchange. It will not be in a position to provide these if it is buying arms on a large scale. It has been demonstrated that, particularly for small countries, the cost of maintaining modern arms equipment is a huge burden. We should have a clear understanding from Nasser with respect to a settlement with Israel and with respect to their future cooperation with the West before we undertake to cooperate in the construction of the Dam. Mr. Macmillan suggested that we proceed to complete plans for financing the Aswan Dam and satisfy ourselves that it is feasible. We could then tell Nasser we are prepared to undertake it if he meets two conditions: (1) not buying unnecessary arms; (2) settling with Israel (which would make large-scale arms unnecessary). The Secretary said that such an approach would also help with respect to the Northern Tier countries as the Dam would appear not as a reward for doing business with the Soviets but as an inducement to make peace with Israel.

Mr. Macmillan handed the Secretary a memorandum stating that he had received information that the Egyptians will probably inform the political opponents of the Libyan Prime Minister of the Egyptians' offer to provide arms to Libya and that it was essential that the Prime Minister should very shortly be able to go to the country with a statement about U.S. willingness to give arms to Libya. Otherwise, it will be politically impossible for him to refuse the Egyptian offer. The Libyan Prime Minister has stated that he realized the difficulty of immediate shipment of arms but he suggested that staff talks, to which he could allude publicly, should start shortly.

364. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, October 28, 1955—2 p.m.

426. Geneva for Lawson and Russell. Was informed last night by two sources within GOI that Cabinet at its meeting October 23 made definite decision expanded arms procurement program subject only to reservation Finance Minister Eshkol "money had to be found". One source said that program totaled $50 million with heavy concentration French Mystere IV jets and French AMX tanks. When I inquired re prospective reaction French Government these orders, source replied French Minister Defense was most cooperative but Quai D'Orsay "might prove sticky".

Comment: I believe this report to be substantially correct, particularly as it is consistent with highly restricted information obtained from entirely different source and transmitted MAI 822 to Department Army by USARMA. [2] Financial problem execution program this magnitude obviously difficult one, particularly foreign exchange aspects. While Israel could in part meet financial problem by cutbacks consumption, short-term borrowings and utilization of reserves, execution complete program would depend US economic aid factors set forth Embtel 417. [3]

White

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/10–2855. Top Secret. Received at 11:27 a.m. Repeated to Geneva, Paris, and London.

[2] No copy of this message has been found in Department of State files.

[3] The Embassy informed the Department in telegram 417, October 27, that since "US economic aid funds provide the primary foreign exchange for imports food, petroleum and industrial raw materials, thus releasing large portion Israel's own foreign exchange earnings armament procurement abroad," the Embassy believed that, in light of the reported Israeli Cabinet decision to accelerate arms procurement abroad, it was "reasonable to assume larger proportion Israel's future exchange earnings will go armaments." (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/10–2755)

365. Telegram from the Department of State to the Consulate General at Geneva [1]

Washington, October 28, 1955—5:55 p.m.

1037. Eyes only Russell. . . . Nasser reportedly anxious reach earliest possible settlement with Israel and discuss "all other outstanding problems of area" with US. Nasser quoted as saying "if 1947 resolutions not possible basis of settlement then I want someone to tell me what is possible basis". Nasser finds Secretary's August 26 speech vague and fears Secretary thinking only of minor territorial adjustments.

Nasser much concerned over Secretary's conversations with Molotov on Near East questions. Believes they imply "sphere of influence" thinking on part of both US and Soviets which unacceptable if Egypt is to be regarded as independent country. Nasser fails understand why Secretary does not discuss Middle East with him.

. . . source denied GOE has knowledge of possible Soviet deals with other Arab states but believes Nasser probably encouraging Syria and possibly Saudi Arabia to enter into limited Soviet deals.

Limit strictly distribution this information.

Hoover

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2855. Secret. Drafted and approved by Burdett, who initialed for Hoover.

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366. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva [1]

Washington, October 29, 1955—5:33 p.m.

Tedul 30. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2955. Secret. Drafted, approved, and signed by Hoover.

1. Dean Rusk called at my office and we discussed project envisioned in Tedul 12 [2] and Dulte 11. [3]

2. While Rusk was most interested and obviously desired to be helpful he pointed out the following problems:

a. Important meeting of Rockefeller Foundation covering all aspects of foreign operations planned for early December. He unable devote much if any time to project until conclusion of meeting. I advised him that while we had no firm time schedule now in mind, it probable that action would be desirable before that date.

b. He stated that while Israelis would probably have confidence in him, Arabs might not. The reason was that in past negotiations each time he made firm proposal to Arabs former Administration pulled rug out from under him.

c. He has already been informally approached by both Arabs and Israelis for informal conversations in New York. I suggested he proceed, keeping us advised of developments, which he promised to do.

3. In discussing above developments with Allen Dulles this morning, he suggested George Brownell as substitute in event Rusk unable to accept responsibility. While I do not know Brownell personally, all reports would indicate he might be quite satisfactory. I will take no action pending advice from you. [4]

Hoover

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[2] On October 25 in Tedul 12 Hoover suggested to the Secretary that he, Hoover, approach Arthur Dean, "looking toward possibility that he undertake mission to Arab States and Israel which would include talks with Nasser on subjects discussed your statement of August 26 and question of High Aswan Dam." (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/10–2555)

[3] Dulles replied in Dulte 11 from Paris, October 26, that while he believed Dean was "best qualified for this particular mission", he really preferred Dean Rusk for the task, as Rusk was "persona grata with both Israelis and Arabs. Fact that he served under Democratic Administration is further asset in this situation which calls for bipartisanship." (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 621)

[4] Hoover cabled Dulles on November 1 that he and Allen Dulles doubted Rusk would accept the assignment. (Tedul 44 to Geneva; *ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/11–155) Hoover further informed Dulles on November 5 that Rusk had declined the invitation, and that Humphrey had suggested Robert Anderson. Hoover telephoned Anderson that day "and put it up to him on tentative basis. I believe he will accept if formally asked. He expects to be in Washington next Tuesday [November 8] and if you think well of it I will talk with him more definitely. Allen Dulles agrees with me that Anderson is probably the most ideal person available." (Tedul 59 to Geneva; *ibid.*)

367. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva [1]

Washington, October 29, 1955—5:44 p.m.

Tedul 32. Secretary from Acting Secretary. 1. USUN called up this morning to say General Burns greatly worried by rumors impending action on Israel-Arab frontier. They submitted draft statement which we approved from General Burns addressed to Fawzi and Kidron as representatives of Egypt and Israel respectively for release newspapers Sunday morning October 30. [2]

"I have the honor to draw to your attention the very serious situation prevailing in the Elauja demilitarized zone and vicinity.

"It appears that both parties have recently been sending additional armed personnel into the area and occupying new defensive positions.

"The grave incident in which Egyptians attacked an Israeli police post in the demilitarized zone inflicting casualties and taking prisoners was followed by violent Israeli retaliation at Kuntilla of more serious extent.

"The Security Council has repeatedly condemned aggressive activities and retaliations which can only cause the situation between the parties to deteriorate.

"In view of my responsibilities, I formally request both parties to issue orders to their forces in the vicinity of the Elauja demilitarized zone, and at all other points where they are close together to cease all aggressive activities and retaliations, and restrict their operations to defense, in keeping with the terms of the General Armistice Agreement.

"I call to attention of both parties the grave moral responsibility that will be borne by the party which takes offensive action of any kind which, in this situation, may result in the gravest consequences.

"I am authorized by the Secretary General to state that he has seen this letter and that this demarche is made also on his behalf."

2. Lodge asked Burns if more UN personnel for patrol of borders were needed and indicated our willingness supply our share. Burns answered "How many divisions are available?" In other words Burns said few hundred additional personnel unnecessary unless UN prepared to furnish forces roughly equivalent to those now deployed on either side of frontiers.

3. With regard to letter quoted paragraph 1 above, Lodge wishes following note transmitted to Secretary Dulles at Geneva:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2955. Secret. Drafted, approved, and signed by Hoover.

[2] The Mission at the United Nations transmitted the draft text of Burns' letter to Fawzi and Kidron as well as Lodge's note to Dulles in telegram 389, October 29. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/10–2955).

"The Secretary General has asked me, on transmitting the text of the letter to the two parties, to inform you that General Burns and he share the gravest concern about the situation and fear the prospects of precipitated Israeli action on a large scale. In this situation he feels that you and your colleagues from the Western powers may wish to consider the possibility of using the presence of Mr. Sharrett in Geneva for direct support of their request to the two parties. He feels that such further demonstration of your concern might considerably reduce the risk of an immediate further deterioration. Mr. McMillan and Mr. Pinay are being informed by the British and French delegations about this suggestion to you." [3]

Hoover

[3] Dulles instructed the Department on October 31 to inform the Mission at the United Nations to "tell Hammarskjöld I emphasized to Sharett this afternoon [see Document 372] concern US feels over Israel–Egypt border situation and importance we attach to restraint by Israel and its cooperation in preventing process of one border difficulty leading to another in a crescendo that held danger of large-scale war." (Secto 101 from Geneva; *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Geneva Conference—Oct. 27–Nov. 17, 1955. Telegrams—Incoming & Outgoing (Wash. & Geneva))

368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva [1]

Washington, October 29, 1955—8:29 p.m.

Tedul 36. Eyes Only Secretary from Acting Secretary. I had two hour meeting this morning with Allen Dulles, Murphy and Allen covering present Middle East problem.

1. Following your instructions we have advised Embassy Baghdad inquire from Nuri his thinking re Syrian project without implying any concurrence on our part looking toward action by him.

2. Re Nasser it is our feeling that we should have one more good go-around with him in an endeavor to reach an understanding. If we fail then we can reassess our position and determine what to do next with considerably more flexibility than we feel free to do at present. If on the other hand he gives convincing evidence that he wishes to cooperate then we have much to gain by arriving at an understanding.

3. We believe there are a number of things which the US and UK could do for him and that in turn there are things which he

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–2955. Top Secret. Drafted, approved, and signed by Hoover.

could do for us. It is improbable that all of them could be arrived at in a single bite but it might be possible to start. The approach would be on a pari passu basis without attempting to list those items in order of their importance or the manner in which they would be balanced off against each other. The following are some of the things which US and UK might be able to do for him.

a. Continuance of existing economic aid program including those items now held in abeyance (such as PL–480 80,000 tons of wheat recently requested by Egypt and substantial locomotive deal included in this year's program).

b. Active approach by IBRD on Aswan Dam of which Sudanese agreement to water rights is essential element.

c. Possibility of deferment of action looking toward a security pact for Israel.

d. Refrain from dumping US cotton on world markets in competition with Egyptian products.

e. Unfreezing of sterling balances in London.

4. On other hand, some of the things that US and UK would wish from Egypt could likewise be listed as follows:

a. Take more constructive attitude towards peace in the area, including both short and long term aspects.

b. Acceptance of Jordan Valley project.

c. Refrain from existing press and radio attacks on US and UK.

d. Limit activities of Soviet missions in Arab states.

e. Use influence with Syria to minimize communist penetration.

f. Use influence with Saudis to take more friendly attitude towards US.

g. Stop acting as intermediary on arms sales to other Arab states.

5. We feel that the above approach is desirable in the near future in particular endeavor to prevent a deterioration of existing relations with the West and forestall sporadic military operations which may lead to more serious conflict with Israel.

6. Method of approach to Nasser could either be (a) through US and/or Embassies, or (b) through special emissary, such as Dean Rusk or other suitable individual. Latter could follow through, if successful, in larger context of endeavoring to bring some understanding between Arab states and Israel.

7. In carrying forward such an approach it should be borne constantly in mind that in such things as economic aid for Egypt we must obviously receive something concrete in return in order to forestall general deterioration of our relations in the area as outlined by Zorlu in his conversation with you. [2] In particular we think that

[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, Dulles met with Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu in Paris at 3:30 p.m., October 26. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) The U.S. Representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-

Aswan Dam project should be to all appearances purely an IBRD project, although there is risk that other countries will be suspicious that US and UK have underwritten the deal.

8. We will continue investigating these possibilities in more detail pending your comments as well as any other alternative courses of action. Among latter might be direct appeal to Nehru, who has undoubtedly been counseling Nasser closely, although at present we do not see any clear advantage to be gained.

. . . . . .

Hoover

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zation sent the Department of State a summary of this conversation in Polto 649 from Paris, October 26. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/10–2655)

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369. Telegram From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) [1]

Washington, October 29, 1955.

Please pass Sec State from Dulles. Following is CIA intelligence background for Tedul cable from State tonight re Egyptian situation. [2]

1. Nasser has won prestige and a position of leadership in the Arab world by the Soviet arms deal. He is determined to do everything possible to maintain this position.

2. He is today no more anxious to come under Soviet domination than to join a Western alliance and is still convinced he can hold to a middle path.

3. If he can maintain his independence and prestige through an arrangement with the West, he would prefer that to a close tie-up with Soviet.

4. If he feels that the West has definitely turned its back on him, he will accept further Soviet aid, if proffered, and endeavor,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.00/10–3155. Top Secret; Personal. Dulles transmitted the telegram to Hoover under cover of a memorandum dated October 31.

The copy of the telegram in the Dulles Papers bears a notation that the Secretary saw this message. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda)

[2] *Supra.*

probably with a good chance of success, to bring Syria and Saudi Arabia along with him.

5. Western negotiations with Nasser would be long, difficult and uncertain. If, however, the chosen alternative to this is an effort to isolate Egypt and destroy Nasser, this presents grave danger, as it would probably tempt Israel to attack Egypt.

6. If we favor Nasser with economic and other aid, we will of course, be importuned to bring comparable additional aid to our friends in the Northern Tier and to refuse to do so would place us in an invidious position towards our friends.

7. If Nasser should for any reason be eliminated by death, it is likely that the RCC would continue temporarily in control probably under Chief of Staff, Amer, who would probably be more under control of army than Nasser.

. . . . . .

9. Jordan's adherence to Northern Tier at this particular juncture would reduce possibilities of negotiations with Egypt.

10. There is no good solution immediately available to us, but if the Egyptian-Israeli situation can be kept from erupting into open conflict, we may have some time in which to explore alternatives, both with Egypt on the one hand, and with Turkey, Iraq, etc., on the other.

11. Foregoing assumes that neither USA nor UK are prepared to enforce a policy within the area with their own armed forces.

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370. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, October 30, 1955—midnight.

Dulte 33. Secretary met with Molotov for hour this afternoon at latter's villa. [2] Gromyko, Troyanovsky, Bohlen and Merchant present.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/10–3155. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 9:13 p.m. Repeated to Moscow.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 570)

Secretary referred to exchange of letters between President and Bulganin [3] on situation in Near East arising from Czech arms sale to Egypt. Molotov said he was familiar with correspondence. Secretary said President unable understand Bulganin view no grounds existed for concern and asked him to explain our concern and if possible ascertain why Bulganin felt no concern warranted. Secretary said two facts were indisputable as result arms sale: (1) risk of war between Israel and Arab neighbors had increased greatly; (2) anti-Soviet public opinion had risen in US. He hoped Molotov could explain why these two developments gave Soviets no grounds for concern.

Molotov replied that Bulganin letter to Eden set forth in detail Soviet view this subject. As to estimate of situation Molotov said had read recent statement by General Burns (which Gromyko later produced in October 27 *Herald Tribune*) [4] to effect no danger hostilities in area. Secretary assured Molotov this statement did not coincide with Burns' private views. Molotov said USSR, in conformity with general policy for peace, was pursuing similar aims in Near East and had not felt it necessary prevent arms sale to Egypt. However, he appreciated Secretary calling attention to rise in anti-Soviet feeling in US which was matter deserving attention. Soviet Government had done nothing to justify any hostility. Up to present sale of arms to Near East area by US, UK, France had been considered entirely proper. Any piling up of arms had come about not from Czech sale but from above sources. Therefore small quantity arms Czech selling Egypt on normal commercial basis could not increase danger in area. Molotov then inquired what specifically was expected from Soviet Union.

Secretary said he did not know whether Molotov intended to see Sharett here but that if he did he would have opportunity judge for himself extent of danger. There was widespread feeling in US that Israel was placed in jeopardy. This was also official view Israel Government.

Secretary said he had no desire to argue rights of Soviets or Czechs to sell arms or right of Egypt to purchase them. Question was how to prevent two developments he had mentioned earlier from going further. US had tried to exercise restraining influence, as proper, on Israel to prevent what was termed a preventive war. Israel understandably found it difficult stand by doing nothing while hostile forces built up armaments to point where it might be destroyed. Molotov again asked what was expected of Soviet Gov-

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[3] Documents 334 and 349.

[4] For text of this article, entitled "Mid-East 'Shooting War' Not Expected by Gen. Burns," see *New York Herald Tribune*, October 27, 1955, Section 1, p. 2.

ernment. Secretary said it would be presumptuous for him to advise Soviets; he had merely pointed out two results of recent events. As to how counteract these consequences, he could only say that there had been considerable mystery and speculation as to what going on and whether program of arms deliveries would be extended to other Arab countries. If transaction were isolated and limited and if Soviet Government would so state, it might be easier deal with. If this was merely start of vast arms transaction, that was another matter. Secretary said he was not making suggestion since US lacked pertinent facts, which he was not asking for, but Soviets were in possession of all facts and hence in better position to determine available steps.

Molotov inquired whether exchange of information regarding sale of arms to other countries was sought. Secretary replied that he had drawn Molotov's attention to two facts. In reply to Molotov's question he had merely observed that if Soviet program for delivery arms to area was limited and this could be stated publicly, it would be easier to exercise restraint on Israel and American public opinion. He was not suggesting exchange of information.

Molotov said there were no new considerations in Soviet policy and that there were no grounds for concern in view of small amount of arms involved, their purely defensive character, and fact transaction was strictly commercial. Molotov alluded to recent statement in US by Israel Minister whose name could not recall concerning preventive war. He said it would appear that threat was not from Egypt but Israel. Threat from this quarter also deserved attention. He also asserted that for reasons unknown to Soviets Western powers had ceased arms shipments to Egypt which certainly had right to look elsewhere for defensive armaments.

Secretary said that danger of war should concern us all. He was neither partisan of Israel nor Egypt but of peace and good relations with Soviets. He did not deny right of Soviets or Czechs to sell arms or of Egypt to buy, but some rights exercised without restraint or concern for consequences tend to produce bad results. US had limited its right to sell arms to Egypt and Israel in order to avoid increasing dangers in area. US is now strongly urged to sell Israel comparable quantity of arms Egypt had received. This question must be decided but anything US did would be solely for purpose preserving peace in area. He hoped Molotov would ponder two aspects of situation which he had raised.

Conversation closed with Molotov saying exchange had been useful and Soviets working for peace and good relations. His attitude throughout was thoughtful. [5]

Dulles

[5] Dulles transmitted a summary of this conversation to Eisenhower. (Dulte 32 from Geneva, October 30; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–3055)

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371. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, October 31, 1955—1 a.m.

Secto 90. Israel Prime Minister Sharett called on Secretary today. [2] In addition to arguments advanced in Paris, [3] asserted as evidence of Nasser's duplicity that Quwatli of Syria had said purpose of Egypt–Syria pact was to deal with situation on Jordan River following Arabs turn-down of Jordan plan. Sharett said arms deal made area settlement less likely as Nasser would be arrogant and Israelis fearful. Said IG would submit arms purchase list pronouncedly defensive in nature: anti-aircraft, anti-artillery, anti-submarine. He asked whether IG could expect purchase such arms on existent terms. Re IG request for border guarantee by West, IG in situation of thereby hurting relations with Soviet Union and thus diminishing chances of Jews leaving Iron Curtain countries, while unable to obtain guarantee from Western powers. He said IG would additionally like definite indication whether security guarantee to be forthcoming, since, if not, it would have to place greater reliance than ever on its arms. Sharett said IG would prefer US not send arms to Iraq but if it does would prefer to have US join Baghdad Pact and be in position to supervise them; assumed that if US joins Baghdad Pact it would at least simultaneously give security guarantee to Israel.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–3155. Secret. Received at 1:34 a.m. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, and Cairo.

[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, this conversation began at 5 p.m., October 30. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 570)

[3] See Document 359.

Secretary said American foreign policy has as one of its constituent elements the survival of Israel. Not aware of any policy we might adopt that would lessen that. That should be a factor of importance to Israel and a matter of hope. While IG may be impatient with US for not expressing it more quickly and emphatically it must remain a source of satisfaction to Israel. Naturally our foreign policy based on securing interests of US. In face of development such as Soviet-Egypt deal we must think not only of Israel but of viability of Western Europe, of NATO, and free world generally. We are developing our policy. All factors not yet entirely clear. Not sure Arabs intend attack and destroy Israel. We must ascertain whether such a purpose has crystallized, and, if not, how prevent it. Re arms for Israel, cannot give answer here. Must be considered by Defense Department and Cabinet. We will give sympathetic consideration. With respect security guarantee, original soundings re Congressional attitude not encouraging nor is it clear executive would urge one on Congress in present state of affairs. Questions of borders and security guarantee hard to divorce. Have crossed bridge of saying will recommend guarantee of borders in context of settlement. That in itself is major step. Do not believe wise for any of us to talk too much at this time about new security guarantee. If Sharett compels Secretary say yes or no now, answer must be no because answer cannot be yes for reasons given. This does not mean that it would be in any way wise for Israel starting preventive war. US good will is great asset for Israel and preventive war would injure it. Secretary emphasized that greatest danger is that of one border incident leading to another with a crescendo culminating in war, and urged IG do everything in its power to stop this process of events. In answer Sharett's query re any deterrents Western powers had over Arabs, Secretary said economy of Arab countries dependent on exports, notably oil and cotton. Egypt needs Sudan agreement of Nile waters. Many reasons why Arabs should work with US and they must know they will lose greatly with US by attacking Israel.

Secretary concluded that he knew above US position not entirely satisfactory to IG but hoped it would be substantially so and that IG would give careful thought frontier problem. [4]

Dulles

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[4] Dulles transmitted a separate summary of this conversation to Eisenhower. (Dulte 32 from Geneva, October 30; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–3055)

372. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, October 31, 1955—5 p.m.

Dulte 35. Along lines Dulte 33, [2] Secretary this morning reported briefly to Macmillan and Pinay re yesterday's talk with Molotov about Egyptian arms sales. Secretary told them he had emphasized two points. Quite apart from juridical aspects of sales: (1) such sales increase danger in area, and (2) increase anti-Soviet feeling in US. Secretary said he refused enter into argument with Molotov about right to sell arms but was simply pointing out two factors. In reply Molotov's question re usefulness of exchange of information or whether we had any suggestions to make, Secretary had stated we do not know facts as, for instance, whether sales to Egypt . . . are isolated instances or whether program would be expanded throughout Middle East. Molotov did not reply these questions.

Macmillan reported he had taken about same line in his talk with Molotov but in a formal way at request his Prime Minister. He had referred to Molotov's October 27 and 28 conference statements re arms race and had asked why, if such a race was dangerous in Europe, it was not similarly dangerous in Middle East. Molotov had talked about anti-Soviet Middle East pacts and of desirability of exchange of information, also requesting suggestions. Macmillan had pointed out inconsistency calling for application of spirit of Geneva in one part of the world and disregarding it in another.

Pinay observed Egyptian transaction more than commercial since must be assumed Egypt has not means to purchase and must be counting on obtaining wider support as well as assistance through Communist experts. Secretary mentioned danger introduction Soviet submarines in Mediterranean.

Macmillan said that after our protest we were in somewhat of dilemma. We should avoid making Soviets partners in Middle Eastern affairs. On other hand, might be practical if we could tie them down to specific consideration Egyptian-Palestine question, but would be dangerous if we brought Soviets into complete range Middle East affairs. Macmillan said next move presented difficulties.

Pinay agreed, referring to risk drawing Communist countries into Middle East organization, which would include Czechoslovakia and possibly others.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–3155. Secret. Received at 1:05 p.m. Repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.

[2] Document 370.

Would appreciate Department's views on this problem.

Dulles

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373. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, October 31, 1955—7:24 p.m.

299. View imminent formation new Israel Govt you authorized proceed make arrangements for conduct of business in accordance with Deptel 269. [2] You should seek support this course action from British, French and other colleagues but should not permit delay in their responses to hamper you from establishing effective relations with new govt at earliest possible date. Embassies London and Paris should communicate foregoing to FonOffs. You should add that it appeared to us there was sufficient agreement to proposal made Deptel 269 to enable us go forward this course action. While we appreciate changes suggested in London 1747 [3] and in similar French reply made by French Embassy here Oct 28 [4] we feel these changes are matters of detail to be worked out in field. Believe it essential we maintain as effective representation as possible in Israel during present critical period.

Hoover

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.0084A/10–2855. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Allen, who signed for Hoover. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Printed as Document 346.

[3] Dated October 28; it reported that the Foreign Office was in general agreement with the Department's proposals in Document 346 but suggested some revisions, most significantly, the suggestion that Sharett should specify one day when he would be available in Tel Aviv each week. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.0084A/10–2855)

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

374. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, October 31, 1955—8 p.m.

393. Re Palestine in SC. During meeting with Dixon (UK) and Alphand (France) held at British request this noon, it was agreed that we should seek to determine what position of Secretary General and General Burns was on desirability having Council meeting in light of present situation at El Auja. We also discussed problem created by likely injection into any SC debate of Soviet arms deal with Egypt.

At meeting this afternoon with Burns and Hammarskjold present we considered private report in nature of "Program of Action" made by General Burns to Secretary General, text of which contained in immediately following telegram. [2]

Purpose of "Program of Action" in Secretary General's words was to seek practical answers to developing situation between Egypt and Israel. Hammarskjold felt solution lay more in direct implementation of this program by Burns with parties supported by vigorous joint démarches by UK, France and US Ambassadors in two capitals. He felt it was hopeless to attempt negotiate in SC since parties would only freeze positions in any public debate.

Secretary General also felt SC meeting now undesirable because, while Egypt might agree to implementation of Burns' "Program of Action" without insisting that Israel withdraw Kibbutz from DZ, if matter discussed in SC they would most assuredly point out paramilitary character of Kibbutz and demand its withdrawal.

Since Israel would obviously refuse to do this, whole program would fall. He did not rule out, however, possibility of SC action confirming this program of General Burns if in circumstances as they develop this seemed desirable or necessary.

Hammarskjold regards this program as a coordinated approach for which agreement of three governments necessary and no action will be taken on it until comments and concurrence of three governments available.

Hammarskjold envisages that three points made in Burns' "Program of Action" be put forward essentially as a simultaneous and unified proposal which, however, could be implemented in certain

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/10–3155. Confidential; Priority. Received at 8:48 p.m. Transmitted priority to Geneva on November 1 as Tosec 105 and repeated to London and Paris. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 618)

[2] Telegram 394 from USUN, October 31, not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 674.84A/10–3155)

logical steps. He therefore believes that General Burns should proceed from point three, that the old international frontier be demarcated. This idea could be acceptable to Israelis if done by UNTSO, acting alone, provided they silently acquiesced in it and did not openly push their claims, which SYG regards as very weak, for sovereignty over present demilitarized zone up to old international frontier.

Second logical step of program would be point two, i.e., withdrawal by Egypt of checkposts which are now on Israeli side of old frontier line and in DZ. From his talks with Fawzi (Egypt) Hammarskjold believes Egyptians realize that once frontier has been marked by UN, position their checkposts beyond it will be untenable and they can see their way clear to withdrawal.

Thereafter point one of program could be implemented, i.e., withdrawal by Israel of military personnel in excess of Kibbutz inhabitants and civilian police who were present prior to 26 August. General Burns at several points in discussion emphasized strongly necessity of complete and immediate backing of his action with parties by tripartite approaches in capitals.

It was agreed that three delegations would transmit text of "Program of Action" to their governments for instructions. I said we should not decide in principle against having SC meeting nor should we prejudice General Burn's efforts in implementing his program by premature meeting. Continuing to speak personally I felt it might be desirable to start with General Burns implementing his program. Meanwhile we could jointly consider desirability of SC meeting with attendant publicity if that appeared in the circumstances to be desirable. Hammarskjold said he agreed 100 per cent with this approach. It was understood that Burns would not undertake any action on his program until comments and concurrence of three governments had been received.

Request Department's comments on suggested plan of action.

Lodge

375. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Molotov, Geneva, October 31, 1955, 9 p.m. [1]

At Mr. Molotov's dinner the only significant conversation that took place was with reference to the Near East situation. I referred to the visit which Mr. Sharett had just paid on Mr. Molotov. [2] Mr. Molotov expressed the view that Sharett was somewhat passionate in his presentation and wondered how strong a character he was. I said that I felt that he had considerable influence; that probably he was not as strong a man as Ben Gurion (although I did not know the present state of Ben Gurion's health) and that Sharett represented the more moderate elements who were opposed to a preventive war.

Mr. Molotov said that he could not see any advantage to Israel in a preventive war. I said that I agreed but that there were many people in Israel who felt that they should strike while they still had superior power and not wait until they could be swamped by the superior manpower and armament of the Arab States.

Mr. Molotov said he did not see that the Arab States would want to try to destroy Israel. I said that many, including some of considerable authority, professed that to be their desire. I said that all this was the result of arms shipments being made from the Soviet bloc to Egypt and probably other Arab States. Mr. Molotov said that he was convinced that no aggressive purpose was in the minds of the Arabs and that if they should make an armed attack on Israel, they would be stopped by other nations through the means of the United Nations which afforded protection to Israel.

I said that many of the Arabs seemed now to believe that the Soviet Union would veto any resolution directed against them so that they would get immunity. Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Union would abide by the principles of the United Nations. [3]

Dulles

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. The meeting took place at Molotov's villa. The time was taken from Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book. Dulles was accompanied by Secretary of Defense Wilson, Merchant, Bohlen, Phleger, and Bowie. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[2] Sharett and Molotov met on October 31; see Document 377.

[3] Dulles transmitted the contents of this memorandum of conversation to Hoover on November 1. (Telegram 387 from Madrid; Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/11-155)

376. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 1, 1955—8 p.m.

395. Re Palestine in SC—ourtels no. 393 [2] and 394, [3] October 31.

Following is draft text of letter which Hammarskjold would send to Egyptian and Israeli reps for transmission to their governments. He has given this to us so that our comments can be directed to the precise wording of the letter, rather than to the "Program of Action" contained ourtel 394:

"The situation which has developed in the El Auja Demilitarized Zone and nearby as a result of successive violations by both parties of the provisions of Art VIII of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement puts the parties concerned and the UN under the obligation to cooperate in order to eliminate without delay the direct causes for the increase in tension.

Present tensions and the risk of further serious incidents in the area will be reduced if immediate effect is given to the following three points:

(1) Completion of the marking of the old Egyptian-Palestine frontier along the western boundary of the Demilitarized Zone;

(2) Withdrawal by Egypt of all checkposts and defended posts, comprising personnel, obstacles and mines, from all positions within the Demilitarized Zone;

(3) Simultaneous withdrawal by Israel of all personnel in excess of the inhabitants of Kubbutz Ksiot and the thirty civilian police allowed for the protection of civilian activities, and the removal of all obstacles and mines.

The marking should be done by the UNTSO alone. The purpose of this marking is to define a clear line of separation between the personnel under the control of one party and those under the control of the other. Such marking, or the way in which it is undertaken, in no way affects the rights of the parties under para 3 of Art IV [4] and

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–155. Confidential; Priority. Received at 8:49 p.m.

[2] Document 374.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/10–3155)

[4] Article 4(3) of the Egypt–Israel General Armistice Agreement (U.N. doc. S/1264/–Corr. 1 and Add. 1) stated that the Armistice Agreement was only a military document, that its provisions were valid only for the duration of the armistice, and the the purpose of its provisions was not to establish, to strengthen, to weaken, or to nullify, in any way, any territorial, custodial, or other rights, claims, or interests of either Egypt or Israel in the area of Palestine.

para 2 of Art V [5] of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement.

In order that these proposals may be implemented and to ensure against further breaches of the General Armistice Agreement, both parties should give specific assurances that UN military observers will have full freedom of movement and observation.

In the absence of General Burns, who is en route to Palestine, I have the honor to transmit the proposals to the Govt of Israel (Egypt) on his behalf as well as on my own.

General Burns, or his rep at the TSO Hqs at Jerusalem, would be glad to receive at the earliest possible moment the agreement of your govt to the measures proposed. Upon receipt of the assent of both parties, immediate arrangements will be made for their timing and execution."

Lodge

[5] Article 5(2) of the Egypt–Israel General Armistice Agreement (*ibid.*) asserted that the Armistice Demarcation Line was not to be construed to be a political or territorial boundary, nor was it to prejudice the rights, claims, and positions of either Egypt or Israel in any final settlement of the Palestine question.

377. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, November 1, 1955

Secto 121. Eyes only Acting Secretary and Chiefs of Mission. Eban, reporting on Sharett meeting with Molotov yesterday, [2] said Sharett held no punches in his presentation of Israel's complaint to Molotov. Eban said Molotov made following points (several of which obviously inconsistent). Egypt, small and defenseless country, had asked Soviet Union for arms and since Egypt could not get them elsewhere obviously duty of USSR to help which it had done without any conditions. Soviet Union had witnessed Turko-Iraq Pact accession to it of Great Britain and talk that US would join. USSR, therefore, obviously had to do something. Shortly thereafter Molo-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–155. Secret. Received at 10:14 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Cairo, London, and Moscow.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Geneva Conference—10/27/55–11/17/55: (1) Memos of Conversation; (2) Intelligence Briefing Notes)

tov asserted sale was pure commercial transaction between Czechs and Egypt and Israel, therefore, had no right to complain.

Sharett said Israel desired close and friendly relations with Soviet Union and Molotov replied she could have them any time she wanted (presumably by giving up reliance upon Western Powers for security). Molotov also made point Israel not friendless and alone as Dulles and Macmillan had been working for it with him here at Geneva. At one point Molotov without amplifying suggested maybe there should be conference of some kind to talk over situation. Sharett had impression discussions and press of last few days had possibly made some impact on Molotov as affecting USSR position as advocate of peace.

Representative of press informed US delegate that Israel press correspondent later pressed member of Israel delegation hard on question whether Sharett had specifically asked Molotov for Soviet bloc arms for Israel. Only answer was repeated "No comment". Israel correspondent then said to American press representative that unless Sharett could say in response to questions in the Knesset that he had asked Soviet Union for arms there would be no new government this week (presumably referring to Mapam). [3]

Dulles

[3] On November 2, Ben Gurion announced to the Knesset the composition of his new five-party cabinet, which included nine Mapai members, two representatives each from the Mapam, Hapoel Hamizrachi, and Ahdut Avodah parties, and one member from the Progressive Party. The Knesset on November 3 approved Ben Gurion's cabinet by a vote of 73 to 32, with 3 abstentions.

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378. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon [1]

Washington, November 2, 1955—4:40 p.m.

679. In accordance with suggestion from the Secretary addressees authorized in their discretion as appropriate to make points given below in discussions with officials Governments to which accredited.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–255. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Allen, who signed for Hoover. Also sent priority to Baghdad, Cairo, Amman, Jidda, Damascus, and Tripoli. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Ankara, London, and Paris.

Missions at Tel Aviv, Ankara, London and Paris should inform Governments:

1. US believes recent developments give evidence of determination by Soviet bloc direct its attention and efforts at subversion in Middle East as it has previously done elsewhere in world. Can be little question but Soviet bloc will endeavor exploit and extend its influence by shipment of arms via Czechoslovakia into area. US does not question right of Soviet bloc to sell or right of Arabs to buy. We do point out arms sales are never purely commercial transactions and have never been permitted by Soviet bloc except with political motivation. We also point out communism is and would be mortal enemy of Moslem religion and we assume it is not desire or intention of any of Arab Governments to collaborate with communist bloc in its effort at penetration of area.

2. US believes a rapid and large-scale increase in modern offensive weapons by either or both sides of Israel-Arab controversy holds great danger for civilian populations of area. US does not intend contribute to such a development. It has been willing provide moderate amounts arms to either side for internal security and legitimate defense. It will do everything it can to prevent all-out arms race.

3. Present policy US is in accordance with Tripartite Declaration of 1950 both re preventing arms race and prevention aggression by either side. Our policy re further security guaranties for area was set forth in Secretary Dulles' speech August 26. We have no present intention giving any special security guaranties other than in conformity with that statement and 1950 Declaration.

Hoover

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379. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Secretary of State, at Geneva [1]

Cairo, November 2, 1955—3 p.m.

15. Believe last night's discussion Nasser profitable. My general purpose was to try put in better perspective nature your concern re

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–255. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received at 6:06 p.m. The source text is a copy sent priority to Washington as telegram 865. Repeated to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Tripoli, and Benghazi.

developments in Middle East and Africa [2] and to urge most strongly that he on his part should see advantages of early move on settlement with Israel.

Told him I found you fully familiar with all aspects of problem here. Frustrations he had felt at what he termed lack of response on arms from us had [not?] been due to inattention to his problems. On contrary you held very strong view based upon intense study of area over long period of time that only salvation for Middle East was settlement of Arab-Israeli problem on peaceful basis. You had not felt injection from any source of arms in quantity could further that cause but that resulting tensions would only make settlement more difficult to achieve. If there had been difficulties it was only because we were dedicated to a principle we believed right and best for Egypt as well as all of us and not because we were insensitive to his desire for greater security which we fully shared.

I told him we had no punitive feelings toward him and that he must understand our concern went far beyond one specific arms deal. In fact we less concerned immediate dangers inside Egypt under his management than elsewhere in area where there were already weak and leftist-ridden governments. In view of this concern, he must not feel that question of our relations depended entirely upon acts by US. We were willing to proceed in full cooperation with him to extent allowed by public and congressional opinion as long as we convinced he would cooperate wherever possible against spread of Soviet influence through Middle East. This not only meant inside Egypt where he had direct control but also in refraining from acts that would further arouse anti-Western feeling or boost Soviet influence in weaker states around him. Also we hoped for his cooperation in seeking ways reducing great danger of early hostilities in area. Further we firmly believed settlement Arab-Israeli controversy more important to Egypt and area as a whole now than ever before. With his new strength we hoped he would adopt statesmanlike approach and be willing discuss such a possibility without delay. I said it impossible to separate High Dam, from a purely practical viewpoint from state of affairs that would be existent here over next ten years i.e. war or peace question of necessity for large scale military expenditures on part of Egypt etc.

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[2] Byroade was present at Dulles' October 26 meeting with Macmillan (see Document 358). He was also present, according to the Secretary's Appointment Book, at two other meetings with Dulles on the Middle East in Paris on October 26. The first session began at 9 a.m. and included Lawson, Russell, MacArthur, Merchant, and Dillon. The other meeting, which started at 12:25 p.m., included Russell, MacArthur, and Lawson. According to Dulles' Appointment Book, Byroade met once again with the Secretary and Russell in Geneva at 10 a.m., October 29. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) No accounts of these meetings have been found in Department of State files.

As regards tactics of settlement told him I speaking without directive from you but my own feeling was that it would be to his advantage if we worked together here rapidly to see if general understanding could be reached as to what might be practical terms of settlement. This would allow US to proceed from strength in trying to convince Israel she should make concessions. If through this approach problems could be reduced to one or two major items (which I thought possible) we would then be in a position behind him and could perhaps through intensive effort cause Israel to begin to narrow the gap between our positions and her own.

In the two and one half hour discussion following points of interest appeared:

1. He would be willing at any time, on highly secret basis, discuss with me specifics of settlement. If he and I could handle major aspects, Fawzi could be brought in on details.
2. He agrees that internal dangers of communism are increasing in Middle East generally, although he not quite as concerned as we re Syria.
3. He agreed to exert moderation on press primarily because of its effect on number (2) above. As matter of fact he had already taken steps this direction during my absence.
4. Intra-area arrangements with Soviets had not progressed as far as assumed. Egypt not as yet a source of arms to Syria and Saudi Arabia. Syria a very poor country and had little to offer Soviets commercially. Syria wished arms from Egypt but could not pay. He did not see that Egypt had resources to provide arms, for which she had to pay, to Syria free of charge. Saudi Arabia also in quandary and probably passing through crisis stage with us. He thought we should bear in mind that one factor here is that Saudis do not like to see much greater strength in Iraq. Saudi mission, accompanied by Egyptian, now in Western Europe seeking arms. He felt they were going through somewhat same cycle that he had done, and that they would not be able to obtain the heavier types of equipment they wished. He, only last week, advised them that it probably better in view of intense reactions to Egyptian-Czech deal that they [not?] try to deal with Soviet Bloc. He therefore advised they try again in U.S. He thought that they probably would not obtain satisfaction from U.S., partly because we would think their demands excessive as regards their capabilities. He then envisaged they will turn back to him and offer to pay him in foreign exchange for arms. Stated this would put him in a quandary which he would find it difficult to refuse. I told him general nature our difficulties with Saudis this subject.

Saudi troops not to be "stationed" on Egyptian soil as I previously understood. Some would come for joint maneuvers but he proposed to let no foreign troops, even Arab, be stationed in Egypt in peace time.

5. He hoped coming period would be one of less tension with America. He was not going to ask for arms; therefore that irritant had been removed. He understood we wanted to strengthen the north but hoped pressure would not be applied for new adherents at this stage. Told him I thought this our position but knew that others

felt strongly otherwise. I certain if general conclusion were ever reached that Egyptian cooperation impossible then very quick attempt would be made obtain additional adherents. This he took in understanding way.

6. He and Minister of Finance Kaissuny were about only ones holding out for World Bank in connection with Dam. He felt this most practical way of proceeding but there was considerable feeling his other advisers that World Bank for one reason or another would only stall and delay. Only alternative he mentioned was Western consortium.

7. Now that Hussein had asked Secretary about wheat[3] he hoped we could be helpful. He somewhat irked at Hussein as he had told Hussein not to raise subject with you. He concerned regarding U.S.-Egyptian relations and wished not to ask us for anything we would have to turn down because of effect upon his associates.

8. He did not know what we would do regarding economic aid in future. If we could assist Egypt he hoped our assistance could be turned without delay towards preparations for High Dam. He volunteered that if Egypt undertook this project she could no longer afford to devote her resources to some of the other programs on which we were now assisting.

In summary would say I found Nasser more conscious of true nature our concern and apparently willing to make more of an effort improve our relations. His attitude with visiting Congressmen yesterday pointed decidedly in this direction.

Byroade

[3] See Document 341.

Present at the 264th Council meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Mr. H. Chapman Rose for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Mr. Robert Matteson for the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; Assistant Secretary of State Holland (for Item 5); Mr. Harry H. Schwartz, Department of State; the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Acting Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 5 and 6); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General W. B. Palmer for the Chief of Staff,

U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, General Thomas D. White for the Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force, and Maj. Gen. Robert E. Hogaboom for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 5 and 6); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Anderson and Rockefeller; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows Allen W. Dulles' assessment of the previous day's vote of confidence in the French Chamber of Deputies.]

Mr. [Allen] Dulles stated that the Arab-Israeli situation had taken a serious turn for the worse during the night, though what had happened was not unexpected as a result of the reports from our Military Attaché pointing out the steady Israeli reenforcement of the El Auja demilitarized zone. According to the report received this morning, the Israelis had attacked the Egyptians in the El Auja area, and this attack had turned out to be the bloodiest encounter since 1949. 50 Egyptian soldiers had been killed. [2]

Mr. Dulles then pointed out the level of Arab and Israeli forces in the various areas surrounding Israel. He indicated that the Israelis were now estimated to have 86,000 men under arms. This could be increased very rapidly to 200,000.

Admiral Radford pointed out that a report from the Military Attaché in Tel Aviv received this morning clearly indicated that the Israelis were mobilizing. [3]

The Vice President inquired what excuses the Israelis had given for their attack on the Egyptians. Mr. Dulles replied that the Israelis

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[2] Israeli forces had attacked an Egyptian position at al-Sabha, near the border of the El Auja demilitarized area. The Israelis claimed they had killed 50 Egyptians and had taken 40 prisoners while suffering 4 killed and 19 wounded. (Telegram 451 from Tel Aviv, November 3; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–355)

[3] The Department of State received a report from the U.S. Military Attaché in Israel on November 2 that heavy military traffic was proceeding toward Negev, and that the Israelis were massing tanks and were establishing fuel and ammunition dumps. (Telegram MAI 849 from Tel Aviv; *ibid.*, 674.84A/11–255)

had simply stated that the Egyptians had no business being in the El Auja zone, and were determined to drive them out. Both Mr. Dulles and Admiral Radford reminded the Council that neither the Israelis nor the Egyptians had any right to put forces in the demilitarized zone.

Mr. Dulles went on to point out that Israel was continuing to approach the various Western powers to procure armament or to induce them to put pressure on Egypt. The latest instance was a detailed list of arms which the Israelis desired to purchase in Italy. Tel Aviv has also made representations to the Czechs and Russians, as well as launching an international arms loan drive. Since they were likely to have considerable success in raising a loan to purchase armament, Mr. Dulles was inclined to question the efficacy of financial sanctions in deterring the Israelis from launching a preventive war against Egypt. In any case, he doubted whether this course of action, affirmed by the National Security Council last week, would immediately bring the Israelis to book.

Mr. Dulles concluded his comments on this subject by giving the over-all military strength figures for Israel and the Arab States. He pointed out that, quite apart from the matter of numbers, the Israelis enjoyed a very substantial advantage in terms of effectiveness, morale, and efficiency.

The Vice President inquired whether the Zionist leaders in the United States were in a position to exert any appreciable influence on the Israeli Government. Had we made any exploration of the possibility of inducing the Zionist leaders to exert such influence?

Mr. Dulles replied by stating his belief that Zionist leaders in the United States would encounter severe difficulty in asserting a moderating point of view. While such leaders might have considerable influence on Ambassador Eban and he in turn on the Israeli Government, Mr. Dulles was not at all sure that the Zionist leaders could be mobilized for this purpose. Many of them regard this as a life-and-death struggle for Israel.

Secretary Hoover supported Mr. Dulles' doubts in this matter. He indicated that there was no unanimity of feeling among Zionist leaders in the United States. Some of them were greatly concerned about extremist action by the Israeli Government. Others took a very emotional view of the situation. It was hard to say whether these leaders could play a useful role in preventing hostilities.

[Here follows Dulles' report to the effect that Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany was extremely ill and was not expected to recover.]

The National Security Council: [4]

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with particular reference to the implications of yesterday's vote of confidence in the French Chamber of Deputies; and the Arab-Israeli situation.

[Here follows discussion of United States policy toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China and a consideration of United States policy toward Turkey.]

4. The Arab-Israeli Situation (NSC Actions Nos. 1460 [5] and 1462 [6])

Secretary Hoover said he wished to report that Secretary Dulles had now completed his conversations with Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett. [7] Secretary Dulles had taken the line which he had discussed earlier in the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 1460–c, October 20, 1955). Sharett had appeared somewhat "crestfallen".

The Vice President said that it was hard to understand why, after this conversation, the Israeli attack in the El Auja area should have occurred. Admiral Radford commented that if there was a general Israeli mobilization the United States was immediately confronted with a desperately serious situation. The Vice President asked Mr. Andersen to explain that in the course of Mr. Anderson's visit with the President on Wednesday [8] the latter had concurred in the recommendations of the National Security Council at its last meeting with respect to courses of action to forestall hostilities between Israel and the Arab States. The President had likewise approved of the statement which Secretary Dulles had made to Foreign Minister Sharett.

Secretary Hoover pointed out that the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations was now actively exploring the possibility of action by the UN Security Council to deter hostilities.

Admiral Radford warned the National Security Council that it might be faced at once with the necessity of executing the recently agreed courses of action if it turned out that the Israelis were actually carrying out a general mobilization.

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[4] The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1465. (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 264th Meeting held on November 3, 1955, and approved by the President on November 18, 1955; *ibid.*, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

[5] See footnote 16, Document 345.

[6] See footnote 12, Document 361.

[7] For summaries of Dulles' conversations with Sharett on October 26 and October 31, see Documents 359 and 371.

[8] November 2.

The National Security Council: [9]

Noted and discussed a report by the Acting Secretary of State on Secretary Dulles' recent conversation with the Israeli Foreign Minister.

[Here follow discussion of the situation in Brazil following the national elections and a report on the status of national security programs as of June 30, 1955.]

S. Everett Gleason

[9] The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1468. (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 264th Meeting held on November 3, 1955, and approved by the President on November 18, 1955; Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

381. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 3, 1955—5 p.m.

397. Re Palestine—mytels 393, [2] 394 [3] and 395. [4] Hammarskjold called meeting of US, UK and French this morning on latest developments in Palestine situation. Hammarskjold said that it was regrettable that Burns and he had not been able to pursue their program of action in El Auja before last night's attack, [5] but that he felt now that yesterday's events made it even more desirable to proceed. He hoped therefore that he could go ahead with his letter to Israel and Egypt but, at same time, he could not act as though nothing had happened last night. He was extremely concerned with Israel's "grave interference" last night with UN observers, [6] and circulated a draft of a new letter which he proposed sending immediately to Israeli representative. He also believed that with appropriate amend-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–355. Confidential; Priority. Received at 5:43 p.m.

[2] Document 374.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/10–3155)

[4] Document 376.

[5] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[6] Cole in Jerusalem reported that Israeli officials at midnight, November 2/3, ordered U.N. observers in the Demilitarized Zone to get indoors and remain there. (Telegram 139 from Jerusalem, November 3; Department of State, Central Files, 764.84A/11–355)

ments to bring it up to date, Burns' program of action re El Auja should be sent by him forthwith to the parties.

Commenting on Hammarskjold's proposals, Dixon (UK) said he was not sure it was now desirable to carry through with original letter to parties relating to El Auja situation. That letter had been designed to stop what had in fact happened yesterday, and he felt it was rather unreal now to send the letter in these circumstances. He felt that we could not overlook the fact that Israel had taken the situation into their own hands and believed that some condemnation should be passed upon them.

Crosthwaite added that removal of the Egyptian check-posts which Burns had intended proposing had now been accomplished by force and he, too, thought the Burns proposals were now obsolete. Dixon concluded that SC would have to act in situation, particularly since Israeli action was not strictly a retaliation and hence all the more reprehensible.

Hammarskjold replied to Dixon that he remained very doubtful as to the desirability of SC action but he felt strongly that a protest from the UN to the Israelis was a "must" for today. He continued to feel also that the only practical course of action lay in Burns' three points as contained in his proposed letter.

After considerable discussion, British and French agreed that Hammarskjold should address a letter of protest to Israel on his own responsibility and that the Burns proposals, with appropriate amendments, should also be forwarded to Israel and Egypt. They agreed, likewise, with Hammarskjold's proposal to issue a press release referring to his actions.

Alphand (France) said that French FonOff did not feel that three powers should make démarches to Israel and Egypt in support of Burns' proposals for dealing with El Auja situation, in view of fact three FonMins would be considering whole Middle East question. He did not object to Hammarskjold sending the proposals to the parties, however, nor did he object to having it known three powers had concurred in desirability these proposals "prior" to last night's attack. Dixon agreed that if proposals were sent forward, three governments' démarches would be deferred for time being, pending decision as to any additional action that might be taken.

I said I would have to submit to Department the final texts of Hammarskjold's letter to Israel and his letter to both parties containing the Burns proposals. Hammarskjold argued that his final texts would be little different in substance from what we now had before us, but did finally agree to hold up issuance of texts until after we had been able see final version and receive and communicate Washington's comments. Final versions as now received from Hammar-

skjold have been telephoned Department and are contained in next following telegram.[7]

Lodge

[7] *Infra.*

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382. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 3, 1955—5 p.m.

398. Re Palestine.

1. Following text letter Hammarskjold proposed send today to Israel representative as reported in immediately preceding telegram: [2]

Begin text.

In a letter from General Burns of 29 October [3] in which the Chief of Staff spoke also on my behalf, your attention was called to the grave moral responsibility which would be borne by a party which, in the present situation in the El Auja area, took offensive action of any kind.

When I invited the Chief of Staff to come here for consultations an undertaking was given to him by the Israeli Government to abstain during his absence from actions that might aggravate the situation.

In a letter to you on an earlier occasion, I found reason to draw attention to the very serious view the United Nations must take of an interference with the activities of its observers, especially in a situation where their contribution might have been of special importance. [4]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–355. Confidential. Received at 6:20 p.m.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] See Document 367.

[4] On August 31, Cole reported that the Israelis had prevented U.N. officials from discharging their duties as observers by detaining them at Beersheba. (Telegram 66 from Jerusalem; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/8–3155) Ambassador Lodge in New York informed the Department that Hammarskjöld on August 31 had "summoned Israeli rep and given him an ultimatum as to . . . the detention of UN personnel." (Telegram 191 from USUN, September 1; *ibid.*, 674.84A/9–155)

This view was most recently expressed in the resolution adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 8 September 1955.[5] In paragraph 4 of that resolution, the Security Council, "Declares that freedom of movement must be awarded to United Nations observers in the area to enable them to fulfill their functions."

I find it necessary to remind you of these facts with all emphasis, in view of the action taken by Israel last night.

According to official Israeli sources, an Israeli Army unit attacked and occupied positions established by the Egyptian Army within the demilitarized area. This action is all the more unwarranted because, as the Israeli authorities know very well, General Burns and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization have been engaged during the past few weeks in intensive efforts to secure the removal from the demilitarized area of positions established therein by both parties in violation of the General Armistice Agreement.

In a comment released by the Israeli Foreign Office today it is stated that "full freedom of movement in El Auja for United Nations military observers has been granted again."

According to our own observers, they have been denied access to observation posts in the El Auja area during the night and they were also denied access to the Rafah, Ismailia and Birein roads. In a statement to the United Nations military observers in El Auja the senior Israeli delegate stated that only the Beersheba–El Auja road was free to observers but that "all other roads in the Demilitarized Zone and all the Demilitarized Zone area are restricted until further notice."

In another démarche today I am putting forward, jointly with General Burns, certain proposals which in our view represent minimum requirements if order is to be re-established in the El Auja area and vicinity.[6] These proposals were discussed with General Burns during his visit and prior to the latest developments. The possibilities of proceeding with these proposals and of achieving stability in the area are considerably reduced by the attitude of the Israeli Government most recently reflected in the military action yesterday.[7]

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[5] See Document 262.

[6] See Document 394.

[7] Hammarskjöld subsequently made several changes in the text of this letter. A copy of the final text is filed as an attachment to a memorandum of November 3 from Barco to Niles Bond, Director of the Office of U.N. Political and Security Affairs. The most significant change was in the last sentence, which, in the final text, reads as follows: "The possibilities of proceeding with these proposals and of achieving stability in the area are considerably reduced by such military action as that of yesterday." (Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237, Palestine—General Correspondence)

End text.

2. Following is substitute numbered paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Hammarskjold–Burns letter to Israel and Egypt as contained in mytel 395, November 1. Text contained in reftel otherwise remains unchanged. [8]

Begin text.

1. Completion of the marking of the old Egyptian-Palestine frontier, along the western boundary of the Demilitarized Zone.

2. Restriction of all Egyptian checkposts and defended posts to positions west of the western boundary of the Demilitarized Zone, and the removal of personnel, obstacles and mines from all positions within the Demilitarized Zone.

3. Simultaneous removal by Israel of all obstacles and mines and the limitation of Israeli personnel in the Demilitarized Zone to the inhabitants of Kibbutz Ktsiot and the thirty civilian police allowed for the protection of civilian activities, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement, through the machinery provided in the General Armistice Agreement, of the question of the existence of such a settlement in the Demilitarized Zone and subject to the reservations made by General Burns on 29 September 1955 [9] as regards the maintenance of civilian police based on such settlements. [10]

End text.

Lodge

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[8] Hammarskjöld subsequently made several changes in the text of this letter. A copy of the final text is filed as an attachment to the memorandum cited in footnote 7. In the final text, the sentence preceding numbered paragraph 1 reads as follows: "Present tensions and the risk of further serious incidents in the area will be reduced if, without prejudice to any of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, immediate effect is given to the following three points:"

[9] See Document 328.

[10] In the final text of the letter, cited in footnote 8, the third numbered paragraph reads as follows: "Simultaneous removal by Israel of all obstacles and mines and the limitation of Israeli personnel in the Demilitarized Zone to the inhabitants of Kibbutz Ktsiot and the thirty civilian police allowed for the protection of civilian activities, subject to the reservations made by General Burns in his letter of 29 September 1955."

383. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, November 3, 1955—3 p.m.

Secto 145. At tripartite meeting November 2, on Pinay's request Margerie reviewed French thinking re Middle East. [2] He said three Western powers faced with new fact. This is reentry of Russia in Middle East.

He said all French relationships with Arab countries under shadow of events North Africa. While attitude of Arabs in UN and elsewhere often not helpful or friendly, bilateral relationships between France and Arab countries continue on reasonable basis. As example mentioned there never so many Arab students enrolled in French schools in such countries.

He went on say problem is prevent other Arab States from taking same path as Egypt re receiving arms and aid from Soviet bloc. France never thought Baghdad Pact good idea and believe it one principal reason for Russian reentry into Middle East. However Pact was fact which must be accepted and problem is to prevent Arab States from turning to Soviets. France had still powerful influence in Syria and Lebanon. Lebanese fearful of Soviets. While situation Syria not good, French felt with some modest arms shipments from West, Syria could be kept on side of West. French believe Syria, Lebanon, and possibly even Egyptians, prefer receiving arms from France and West rather than Russia.

Margerie said French thought three Western powers should talk to Syrians and Lebanese and offer modest quantity of arms. From discussions with Sharett, French believe Israel would agree modest arms shipments to Lebanon and Syria particularly because Israel wants Syria remain independent and not absorbed by Iraq.

Re Egypt, France would only furnish arms if latter adopted favorable attitude re French North Africa. By favorable attitude he meant Egypt must 1) stop inciting French North African Arabs by Cairo radio; 2) stop training commandos for infiltration North Africa; 3) stop smuggling arms North Africa via Libya. (He mentioned Libyans behaving well since agreement on Fezzan and beginning evacuation French forces from there.)

Re 1950 Declaration, French still believe it good policy because its basis is avoidance of arms race. However it a bit outmoded and

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:37 p.m. Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Geneva Conference—10/27/55–11/17/55: (1) Memos of Conversation; (2) Intelligence Briefing Notes)

possibly three Western powers could expand it not going so far however as to guarantee existing borders of Israel. French also thought General Burns' proposals on UN action sensible but believe it wiser not to support them by tripartite statement, but by separate démarches to Israel and appropriate Arab States.

In reply to query as to type arms French envisaged for Syria and Lebanon, Margerie said thirteen-ton tanks, some artillery, and mortars. Specifically, about forty such tanks for Syria. He reiterated France convinced with modest shipment arms and French influence, Syrian military could be swung from present dangerous drift to left. In reply question how Syrians would apply for equipment, Margerie vague, indicating Syrians had blocked Francs Paris and also transactions could possibly be financed through "Banque de Liban et Syrie".

Secretary inquired whether France had pending any arms orders for Israel. Margerie replied affirmatively but said all shipments had been suspended. However position of Israelis difficult, and France believed some defensive weapons such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns should be provided.

Secretary said greatest danger in Arab-Israel situation is that war could start with no one being able determine responsibility. If UN could make some arrangement for demilitarized area around borders of Israel so aggressor could clearly be identified, this would greatly reduce risk of conflict.

Secretary said it important that France, UK, and US coordinate their activities in Middle East area particularly re arms shipments. Macmillan fully agreed and said this important matter of policy. He had impression NEACC not effective in attaining such coordination. It low level committee which some paid little attention. Margerie said it had become simply group where information was exchanged re arms shipments, but often after shipments made.

Macmillan suggested in view gravity situation Middle East, might be well coordinate policy, including arms shipments, through diplomatic channels, with NEACC continuing serve as group which kept records, etc. He added if Arabs got into an arms race they would soon go bankrupt which was one of objectives Soviets, since bankruptcy and economic difficulties would lead to social and political deterioration.

Above meeting ended inconclusively with no conclusions reached on future activities NEACC or means by which policy re arms shipments to Middle East could be coordinated although it generally agreed effective coordination necessary and possibly could best be done through diplomatic channels.

In a later discussion Henri Roux, in charge of Middle East affairs in French Foreign Office, and presently in Geneva for a few

days, said he believed chances good of getting Egyptian agreement on three points mentioned above and that French would shortly release shipments of arms Egyptians had ordered and paid for but which French had held up because of Egyptian policies in North Africa. [3] Roux indicated French policy currently is to try influence Near East Arabs to cease anti-French policies in North Africa rather than apply sanctions against them. Result appears to be less clearly Israel-oriented French policy in Near East.

Dulles

[3] The memorandum of this conversation between Roux and Russell on November 2 is not printed. (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

384. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, November 3, 1955—5 p.m.

Secto 151. Limit distribution to Acting Secretary and Allen. Following is summary of informal memo on Middle East problems prepared by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick who is here with British Delegation. [2] Secretary and Macmillan plan have discussion November 9 on overall policies toward Middle East. Would appreciate receiving by November 7 Dept's comments on Kirkpatrick paper and other suggestions for approach to problem which might be discussed at meeting. [3]

Following is Kirkpatrick memo:

"Following premises on which our policy should be based:

1. Russians have deliberately elected open new cold war front in ME. Recent exchanges showed they are not to be moved.

2. We must therefore be prepared settle down long contest and consistent long term policy must be devised.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Top Secret. Received at 4:05 p.m.

[2] Russell transmitted Kirkpatrick's memorandum of October 30 to Dulles on November 1 under cover of a memorandum to the Secretary which indicated that Kirkpatrick had handed the memorandum to Russell the previous day during the course of an informal conversation. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/11–155)

[3] See Document 388.

3. Western policy must be based on need have most inhabitants this large area with West and on their willingness let West have easy access their oil fields.

4. Obligations of Western Powers to Israel under 1950 Declaration must be fulfilled. But Israel must understand West cannot afford estrange Moslems otherwise Arab States will come under Russian domination and it will then be impossible for West effectively protect Israel.

5. In coming contest with Russia West enjoys certain solid advantages. Not reason be stampeded into panic measures; or give Russians and Arabs impression we have lost confidence in our ability protect our interests.

6. In particular Northern Tier can constitute solid bastion of Western influence. Must be sustained and strengthened. Must demonstrate association with West pays.

7. Egypt is largest of Arab States and no Western policy in the Middle East which is actively opposed by Egypt will be entirely satisfactory. Effort should be made to prevent Egypt falling completely under Russian domination. If this fails we must try ruthlessly to isolate Egypt.

8. In meantime we must try prevent uncommitted Arab States joining Egypt-Syria-Saudi combination.

9. Finally must recognize it is Israel-Arab conflict which has weakened Western influence in Middle East and opened door to Russia. If we wish maintain position of influence with Arabs we must bring conflict to an end as soon as possible. This means strong pressure on Israel and also on those Arab States in which we still have influence.

If above premises accepted it would seem our Middle East policy should be on following lines:

Northern Tier

(a) The United States should accede to Baghdad Pact or at least declare its active support.

(b) Effective steps should be taken to supply arms to participating states especially Iraq. In particular advantage might be taken of forthcoming Baghdad meeting to announce creation of machinery (with US participation) to consider and satisfy arms requirements of countries concerned.

Jordan

(a) Put concerted pressure on Jordan to join Baghdad Pact.

(b) Press Jordan to open direct negotiations with Israel for settlement of frontier.

Lebanon

(a) Bring pressure on Lebanon not join Egypt-Syria-Saudi combination. Offer arms and a joint examination of economic aid. This should be done urgently.

(b) As soon as Jordan joins Baghdad Pact, bring pressure on Lebanon to do same.

Israel

(a) Israel should be allowed buy sufficient arms for reasonable defensive purposes. But it would be a mistake attempt match Russian deliveries to Egypt. This would not only involve US in arms

race in area but we should also have to give arms to Jordan to enable her to keep up with Israel. Question of arms deliveries to Israel should be subject Anglo-American joint study and agreement.

(b) Israel should be urged in her own interests try reach settlement with Arab States. If she is to survive, she cannot afford pursue policy which estranges Arabs from West.

Egypt

Egypt constitutes most difficult problem. We should not write her off or drive her irrevocably into Russia's arms. On other hand it would be mistake give impression blackmail pays.

Attempt should be made detach Egypt from Russia. But it would be mistake make representations to Nasser at this stage. If he were reject them, relations with Egypt would be exacerbated. If he complied, we should not be ready with measures to reward him and relations would once more deteriorate.

Moreover reports from Cairo describe Nasser as being intoxicated with popularity which defiance of West has brought him. Moment does not seem propitious.

Finally, approach to Nasser now would be regarded in Turkey, Iraq and elsewhere as appeasement. Would be better fortify Northern Tier before undertaking any move in Cairo.

Nevertheless UK and US Governments should begin now to concert package deal which should be put to Nasser at first favourable opportunity after necessary preparatory work has been done. Following would be elements of package deal.

A. Nasser would undertake:

(a) Turn away from Russia on completion present arms deal, which would be a once and for all commercial transaction.

(b) Limit arms purchases thereafter to expenditure Egyptian economy can bear, having regard to regime's commitments in social welfare.

(c) Agree open negotiations with Israel for settlement.

B. Western powers would undertake:

(a) License sale of weapons to Egypt within limits defined in A(b).

(b) Bring concerted and strong pressure on Israel to agree to just settlement.

(c) Finance cost of High Dam.

(d) Use such influence as they have in Iraq and Sudan to put Egyptian relations with these countries on sound footing.

These terms would be negotiable, but if Nasser rejects collaboration with West on these lines we should:

(a) Refuse all economic aid to Egypt.
(b) Cut off all further arms deliveries.
(c) Endeavour isolate Egypt.

And make it plain to Nasser that we have vital interests in area and will shrink from nothing to protect them from Soviet encroachments.

Syria

. . . . . .

. . . Syria is at moment so much under Egyptian influence that future of Syria may depend on developments in Egypt. We should consequently hold our hand there and in meantime give what short-term encouragement we can to our friends.

. . . . . .

Persian Gulf

Persian Gulf States are at moment probably only completely Western-minded Arab States. Represent Western sphere of influence which it is essential preserve from outside encroachment.

This is primarily a UK responsibility.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi relations with Egypt and Saudi plans for territorial aggrandizement at expense of Persian Gulf States and Aden Protectorate have caused Saudi-United Kingdom relations to deteriorate to point where UK can profitably take no initiative. If progress made in Egypt it will be for US Govt to endeavor to induce Saudi Arabia to conform. But for moment situation warrants no move by Western powers."

Dulles

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385. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, November 4, 1955—7 p.m.

1861. Geneva for Secretary. Since Ambassador Aldrich dealt personally with the High Aswan Dam problem with the Prime Minister, he may well wish to comment on Cairo's 868 [2] following

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/11–455. Secret; Priority. Received at 4 p.m. Repeated to Cairo and Geneva.

[2] Byroade informed the Department in telegram 868 on November 3 that he had a discussion the previous evening with Minister of Finance Kaissouni about the financing of the Aswan High Dam. According to Byroade,

"British have been highly deceptive on this subject. As explained in longer message [telegram 879 from Cairo, November 5, not printed; *ibid.*, 033.7411/11–555] consortium plans to go ahead in absence of Nile waters agreement, knowing this stumbling block for World Bank. Our efforts to urge British seek waters agreement, and our offers to be of assistance in this regard, have in past been brushed aside. It seems to me their lack of cooperation on waters agreement, coupled with fact they

his return to London on Monday. In the meantime it may be helpful to the Department if the Embassy (which has not yet seen Ambassador Byroade's report of his conversation with Kaissuny mentioned Cairo's ref tel) were to recall certain previous interchanges on subject.

As indicated in Embtel 1632 [3] British had obviously not thought through matter when Eden made his original proposal (Embtels 1602 [4] and 1603 [5]).

As far as Sudanese attitude on Nile waters is concerned, Embassy reported in para 2 of Embtel 1632 that British are well aware of need for agreement on Nile waters. Foreign Office official subsequent in conversation described such agreement as "essential".

Furthermore, Department will recall from Embtels 667 August 22 [6] and 1165 September 22 [7] that British reluctance at that time to press Sudanese to accept Egyptian offer on division of waters was based partly on belief Egyptian offer unsatisfactory and partly on feeling it preferable postpone any approach pending further developments re future of Sudan. In view developments re latter subject reported Embtel 1835 November 3, [8] it may be British would be willing reconsider matter.

Butterworth

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seek our assistance in arrangements which exclude American competition, gives us basis for fairly frank talk." (*Ibid.*, 874.2614/11–355)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 645W.74322/10–2255)

[4] Document 347.

[5] Document 348.

[6] See footnote 2, Document 204.

[7] Document 298.

[8] The Embassy in London reported in telegram 1835 that in view of Sudanese Prime Minister Azhari's public statement of October 29 indicating that he favored a plebiscite to determine the Sudan's political future, the British Foreign Office had instructed Ambassador Trevelyan in Cairo to inform Nasser that the British Government concurred in Egypt's counterproposals for a plebiscite, a Constituent Assembly, and an International Commission. (Department of State, Central Files, 745W.00/11–355)

386. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings in Geneva [1]

Washington, November 5, 1955—1:09 p.m.

Tosec 172. Re Tosec 171. [2] In separate talks today with Israeli and Egyptian Ambassadors, Allen emphasized US support for UN efforts and said US would condemn either nation which started all-out war. [3] Both Ambassadors declared on behalf their Governments that their countries had no aggressive intentions and had acted and would act only defensively.

Allen asked Eban whether this meant specifically that Israel would not undertake preventive war no matter how strong Egypt might become as a result of Soviet Bloc arms. Eban answered with positive "yes", but added that Egypt was becoming more inflated by these arms and consequently more likely to start fighting.

Eban made special point that recent Egyptian action in "digging in" in Demilitarized Zone was first time Egypt had established and attempted to hold position beyond Egypt's long-established international border sanctioned by armistice agreement. Allen pointed out that even so, GOI had assured General Burns it would not take military action. Eban said GOI could never assure Burns or anyone else that Israel would not defend itself if foreign power "dug in" on Israel soil.

Ambassador Hussein was very unhappy about Department's position. He said once again US was treating Egypt and Israel on equal plane when Israel was clearly guilty of resort to force in latest incident when fifty Egyptians killed and forty taken prisoner. He said Arab public would be convinced that US supported Israeli action. Allen said US condemned Israeli resort to force and would condemn either side in future. Speaking personally and in most friendly manner, Allen said he thought Egyptians had walked into trap by installing troops in DZ.

Hoover

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–555. Confidential. Drafted by Allen and approved by Gordon, who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and USUN.

[2] In Tosec 171, November 5, the Department transmitted to Geneva the text of a statement issued to the press that outlined the U.S. position if hostilities began between Egypt and Israel. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 619) For text of press release 638, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1955, p. 786.

[3] No other accounts of these conversations have been found in Department of State files.

387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General at Geneva [1]

Washington, November 5, 1955—6:57 p.m.

Tosec 177. Re Secto 151. [2] We have studied Kirkpatrick's informal memo on ME problems and are summarizing below our preliminary views.

We find ourselves in substantial agreement with points made in British memorandum, subject to point-by-point comment which is set forth below. We are unclear however as to British views re timing and tactics of recommended policies. British memo seems to indicate present moment not ripe for approach to Nasser but that heavily increased US–UK promotion of and support for Northern Tier should begin at once. Our view has been that strengthening of our friends in NE should not proceed in such a way at this stage as to alienate Nasser completely. We have had in mind the sending of high level negotiator to Cairo at a very early date to discuss matters generally with Nasser. While we are not sanguine over prospects of Nasser's being willing or even able to cooperate along necessary lines, we have felt that another attempt would be made. If we conclude Nasser will not cooperate, we could then press Jordan and Lebanon to join Pact; and consider adhering ourselves. Concurrently we could make strong effort induce northern Arab states reach agreement with Israel. U.S. thereafter if agreement concluded on boundaries could extend security guarantee to Israel.

Point by point comment follows:

Premises.

Agree generally subject to reconciliation of items 6 and 7 along lines set forth above or by some other means.

Northern Tier.

Re (A) We should defer adherence for reasons in para 1 but continue present active support.

Re (B) Since British sending Macmillan and Chief Imperial General Staff to Baghdad meeting (Secto 164 [3]) we would recommend sending observers at level Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and G–3 Army or his Deputy. We note Turks are suggesting to other

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Drafted by Bergus and Burdett, cleared with Allen and Murphy, approved by Hoover, and signed for Hoover by Wilkins.

[2] Document 384.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–455)

Baghdad pact members that form of permanent U.S. liaison be discussed at November 20 meeting. Dept agrees increase in supply arms to Northern Tier states and U.S. participation in arms machinery and discussion equipment priorities initial meeting desirable in principle. However shortage MDAP funds, other demands in funds, and fact Defense not yet prepared for such discussions at which commitments would be expected create practical difficulties. Going ahead will require high level decision.

Jordan.

We should follow present policy on Jordan adherence until after approach to Nasser. Pressure for negotiations with Israel should accompany or follow efforts to enlarge Baghdad pact.

Lebanon.

Unless situation changes, pressure not needed keep Lebanon from joining ESS combination but we should not overlook this country. Believe military offer might be more fruitful and justifiable than economic though do not object joint examination of latter, and assume UK would participate substantially. Believe offer to improve facilities Beirut airport would do most of all to stiffen ability of Lebanese to deal with Syrians and pro-Soviet pressures. [4]

Israel.

Re (A) Agree Israel should be allowed buy sufficient arms for reasonable defense. Would point out Israel making heavy efforts purchase arms France, Italy and elsewhere with prospects considerable success. May well be that Israel will confine her requests to U.S. for arms that can be considered "defensive" such as anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and anti-artillery weapons. In these circumstances although Anglo-American study useful we would have to enlist cooperation of other countries in order to keep Israel arms at reasonable level.

Re (B) Israel should be strongly pressed to make boundary agreements with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. If Nasser unwilling Israel should redouble efforts with northern states.

Egypt.

See para 1 for timing of approach to Egypt.

Re proposed undertakings by Nasser:

(A) Egyptian payment for Soviet arms understood to be scheduled over a protracted period and to be made by shipments in kind.

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[4] For documentation concerning U.S. relations with Lebanon, see volume XIII.

Will be difficult for Nasser to turn away from Russia and exclude Soviet bloc trade mission arranging shipments of Egyptian goods for some years to come. However we should request specific commitment re number technicians, additional purchases, and efforts prevent other Arab states from following suit.

(B) Limitation of further Egyptian arms purchases to "expenditure Egyptian economy can bear" would probably mean low arbitrary figure or possibly agreement by U.S. and U.K. to supply grant aid. View long term commitment supply cotton and rice to Soviet bloc plus fact high dam construction will utilize very high portion of rest of Egypt's remaining assets, Egypt would have very little to spend on arms.

(C) Also should give more vigorous support to Johnston proposals and agree to proceed with Sinai refugee project.

Re undertakings of Western powers:

Re (A) see point (B) above. Would require cooperation numerous countries in addition to Tripartite powers.

Re actions with Egypt in event Nasser refuses cooperate:

Re point (B) Dept has evidence of Egyptian efforts purchase arms in Spain, Italy and Japan. Cooperation of these and other countries would need be sought prevent Western arms deliveries to Egypt.

Syria.

(A) Agree.

. . . . . .

. . . We believe Iraq might be encouraged proceed with economic pact with Syria, liberalize trade conditions and perhaps extend loan, i.e. for Baghdad–Damascus highway. Syro-Iraqi military agreement could involve Baghdad Pact more directly in Arab-Israel issue and should be discouraged for present.

GOS request for purchase military transportation equipment remains under study and is example of short term encouragement that might be given to our friends in Syria.

. . . . . .

Persian Gulf.

We receive continuing reports activities Communist, other dissident elements in Persian Gulf oil-producing states . . . . U.S. and U.K. however both have important interests there.

Saudi Arabia.

U.S. has large stake in Saudi Arabia and believes has right expect British cooperation in taking all practical measures to keep Saudis from turning from West. British action in Buraimi has created possible new opportunities to those who seek to destroy Western influence in Near East and is likely make adoption peaceful measures in settlement area border disputes increasingly difficult. Feel British should be prepared consider boundary policies on peninsula in light overall necessity maintaining good relations Arab states. We favor either direct talks between SAG and U.K. or resumption arbitration.

General Comment: It is noted that NSC 5428 which relates to American policy in the NE is currently being studied with a view to possible revision. Certain sections of NSC 5428 were amended just prior to the Secretary's departure for Geneva.[5]

Hoover

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388. Telegram From the Consulate General at Geneva to the Embassy in France [1]

Geneva, November 7, 1955—noon.

199. From Secretary. Reference Tosec 176 (1838 to Paris [2]), 173 (Paris tel 2226 to Dept [3]); Deptel 1139 (2229 to [*from*] Paris [4]); Secto 145 (179 to Paris [5]).

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–755. Secret; Niact. Received at 6:35 a.m. The source text is a copy of the telegram repeated to Washington as Secto 199. Also repeated to London.

[2] Dated November 5, it conveyed a suggestion from Hoover that Dulles point out to Pinay that "it would seem wise to refrain from large arms shipments to either side at this stage in view tense situation in Near East" and that "shipment of MDAP-financed planes requires prior US approval." (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 619)

[3] Telegram 2226 from Paris, November 4, repeated to Geneva by the Department on November 5 as Tosec 173, reported that the French Government was about to recommence arms deliveries to Egypt and, to offset this, to authorize delivery of 12 Mystere aircraft to Israel. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 784A.56/11–455)

[4] Telegram 2229 from Paris, November 4, repeated to Geneva by the Department on November 5 as telegram 1139, reported that the French planned to finance the Mysteres initially with MDAP funds. (*Ibid.*)

[5] Document 383.

As Pinay is in Paris, Embassy Paris requested make statement to Foreign Office along lines tosec 176. If FonOff refers to tripartite meeting November 2 (Secto 145), it should be informed that no indication was given by Pinay of prospective shipment of Mysteres to Israel, certainly not to MDAP financed shipment. Moreover there was agreement at meeting on desirability of US, UK and French coordination on arms shipments to Middle East. You may say I suggest that three Ministers may wish discuss at Geneva general question of future machinery for coordination but that in meantime we believe prior information of intended shipments should be given NEACC. [6]

Dulles

[6] Telegram 2273 from Paris, November 7, reported that the Secretary's message had been conveyed to the French Foreign Office, which would inform Pinay of his concern. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/11–755) Telegram 2287 from Paris, November 8, reported that the Mysteres had not left France and that Pinay planned to discuss the subject with Dulles and Macmillan at Geneva. (*Ibid.*, 784A.56/11–855)

389. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, November 8, 1955—noon.

Dulte 55. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. Reported visit of Sharett to US will pose for US a most serious problem. [2] It is obviously an effort on his part to go over the heads of our government and the position which I announced to him and to force administration into policy of supporting Israel to a degree and in a manner which will surely antagonize entire Arab world and allow Soviet Union to become dominant in that area. Consequences in terms of jeopardy to oil for Western Europe and in terms of Africa

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–855. Secret; Niact; No Distribution. Received at 6:32 a.m. Transmitted to Denver for Sherman Adams as Toden 18. (*Ibid.*)

[2] The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported on November 7 that Sharett was planning to leave for the United States on November 9. According to the Embassy, the "Principal purpose of trip is to address series of meetings in support of Israel bond and U[nited] J[ewish] A[ppeal] drives. First speech scheduled Chicago Nov. 12. Foreign Ministry indicated that Sharett would spend two or three weeks in United States." (Telegram 477; *ibid.*, 033.84A11/11–755)

are immense. On other hand it is very difficult for US to make publicly a case for not matching in arms to Israel Soviet arms to Arab countries, and at same time being unwilling to give any firm security guaranty to Israel.

I feel this is situation which only President can deal with and we should consider promptly asking him make statement of US position, preferably in anticipation of Sharett's arrival.

I believe our basic position should be that nothing has so far happened that leads us to revise our policy of being friends both of Israel and Arabs. We believe basic security of Israel can be assured through UN action which would be along lines of 1950 tripartite policy statement; that in view of above we do not believe we should commit ourselves to backing Israel in arms race with Egypt backed by Soviet Union, although we quite recognize right of Israel as well as Arab States to buy arms for defense.

Suggest you discuss this matter with President when you see him on Wednesday and if he approves this course of action, suggest Dept submit draft statement and if time permits send to me here for comments.

Dulles

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390. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings in Geneva [1]

Washington, November 8, 1955—4:24 p.m.

Tosec 192. Israel Ambassador called his request on Allen seventh. [2] Eban stated Israel did not claim "philosophical parity" of arms with Arab states but that Israel wished to be as strong as she "should be". He would be submitting list shortly. Stressed urgency as IG had information Czech-Egyptian deal would be consummated within year. Said Israel would want defensive weapons against air attack—fighters and anti-aircraft guns. Recalled discussion of two years ago when Israel hoped purchase F–86s. Said Israel would want

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–855. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Allen, who signed for Hoover. Also sent to London and Tel Aviv and repeated by pouch to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda.

[2] No other account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

defense against Egyptian submarine threat but did not specify equipment. Also wanted anti-tank matériel. Said Israel would wish easiest possible terms of repayment. Also pointed out US could help indirectly by licensing for sale to Israel arms manufactured under US auspices in Canada and Western Europe.

Eban recalled Israel's request for security guarantee and stated quite positively that Israel would have no objection if USG balanced it off by adherence to Baghdad Pact. (Israelis have undoubtedly made this known to American Jewish leaders as they are now beginning to echo this line at Dept.) Eban emphasized security guarantee to Israel should be granted prior to or at least simultaneously with US adherence Baghdad Pact. Stated Israel did not wish repetition "Suez Base affair." Allen pointed out Nasser's action had made him popular throughout Arab world including Iraq. Matter of timing of any US adherence to Baghdad Pact therefore one of considerable delicacy. Eban urged US make every effort make Nasser less popular, cut off economic aid and let him "stew in Russian juice". Allen pointed out effort to "purge" Nasser might add to his stature internally such as had happened in cases Peron and Franco.

In concluding Eban said he had noted recent inklings in press now was time force Israel make substantial concessions to Arabs since Israel frightened. Eban emphatically reiterated Israel would make no territorial concessions. Derided Egypt's desire for land contiguity with other Arab states. Said it was in Western interest keep Egypt isolated at this time. In present circumstances Egypt should not have land corridor to Jordan and if Arab-Israel peace were achieved Egypt would not need such corridor as she would have full transit rights across Israel. Eban predicted he would not live see serious change in Israel's frontiers. Indicated IG would shortly be asking to open discussions with USG re proposal Secretary's August 26 speech on financing compensation to refugees. Strongly implied Israel would stand adamantly against sizeable repatriation.

Hoover

391. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, November 9, 1955, 10 a.m.[1]

USDel/MC/32

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*United Kingdom*
The Secretary	The Foreign Minister
Mr. Merchant	Sir Ivan Kirkpatrick
Mr. MacArthur	Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. Russell	Mr. Hancock

SUBJECT

The Middle East

Mr. Macmillan said he thought it would be a good idea for the US and the UK to agree on the general line we would take in the Middle East during the next few months. Mr. Dulles agreed and said he thought Mr. Macmillan would be interested in a statement which he was suggesting that the President make from Denver. He read the proposed statement.[2] He said that Mr. Sharett is leaving for the United States in a day or two to make a popular appeal over the head of the U.S. Government against the decision on Mr. Sharett's request for a special security treaty and for U.S. support in making available to Israel arms to balance those given to Egypt by the Soviet Union. The proposed statement by the President would put him on record against Sharett's appeal. Mr. Macmillan said that Prime Minister Eden is making a speech tonight[3] in which he will refer to the Secretary's August 26 speech and renew Britain's appeal for a settlement and its offer of a formal guarantee in the context of a settlement. It will say that the Arabs take their stand on the 1947 Resolutions and the Israelis take theirs on the armistice agreement and the present situation. Eden will ask whether these positions are so wide apart that no negotiation is possible and will say that if the people of the area want peace there must be some form of compromise. The Secretary commented first that Mr. Eden might want to say something about the offer of economic aid; and secondly, that

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF580. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Russell on November 12.

[2] The draft is not attached to the source text. Tedul 71 to Geneva, November 8, transmitted the Department's draft statement. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 674.84A/11–855) Dulles suggested several revisions in Dulte 63 from Geneva, November 9. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11–955)

[3] For text of Eden's Guildhall speech on November 9 at the Mansion House, London, see Frankland (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs, 1955*, pp. 382–385.

the Arabs do not want the 1947 Resolutions boundaries so much as they wish to base their negotiations upon them. The '47 Resolutions give the Negev to Israel. What Nasser suggests therefore is that Israel be given some of the Galilee which the '47 Resolutions would have denied to Israel, and that Israel give the Negev to Egypt.

Mr. Macmillan raised the question as to the extent to which Molotov's speech of the previous day, stating bluntly that the Soviets would not agree to all-German elections, affected our appraisal of Soviet intentions in the Middle East. The Secretary said it is clear that the Soviets are reverting to a tough line. The soft line which the Kremlin has been taking has resulted in problems and weaknesses among the Satellite countries. It must have appeared therefore to the Kremlin that the soft line had disadvantages for it in Europe while the tough line had proven to have advantages for the Soviets in the Middle East and they had therefore decided to forgo the Geneva spirit. Mr. Macmillan said he had not come to Geneva expecting agreement by the Soviets on Germany but he had thought the Soviets would permit the illusion of a possible agreement to continue.

Mr. Macmillan said he thought that with respect to the Middle East there were two immediate questions: (1) the Northern Tier and (2) Egypt. The Secretary said that with respect to the Northern Tier it was obvious that there was tremendous sensitivity on the part of the Soviet Union about Iran. They were fearful that Western air bases in Iran might threaten the Baku oil fields and other important installations in that vicinity. The Secretary said that he had had some doubts about the advisability of Iran adhering to the Baghdad Pact at this time but considerable momentum had developed around it and it had appeared to be a question of now or never. We have got to recognize that if we are to have military relations with Iran we must expect the Russians to react. Half way measures will be no good. We should either handle the Northern Tier as a nominal matter or make a really big effort, somewhat comparable to NATO. The Secretary said that he was not prepared to say at this time that the United States can put substantial resources into it. There are military considerations which of course involve our Department of Defense and there are budgetary questions which involve Treasury and Congress. Mr. Macmillan said that he thought we should move ahead vigorously. The Secretary said he thought he should point out that the United States would not in any event be able to foot the whole bill. There would have to be substantial contributions by the UK. The Secretary went on to say that it was obviously impossible to work out a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union in this area at this time. They would merely think we were pleading with them. We should not, however, discard completely the possibility that

ultimately, after we have some firm policies and a position of strength, we might come to an understanding with the Soviet Union concerning the area. Mr. Macmillan suggested that it might possibly take a couple of years or so. In the meantime we should do what we can with the Baghdad Pact. One of the first things was to bring in Jordan. The Secretary said that in his opinion there was a serious question about our urging any of the countries which border upon Israel to join the Pact unless they were prepared to make peace with Israel, which he regarded as doubtful. If we gave substantial military assistance to the Pact countries bordering on Israel, we would have no guarantee in the absence of a settlement that they would not use the arms against Israel. The Secretary expressed his doubt that Jordan, Syria or Lebanon would be willing to take the initiative in making a settlement with Israel. The two leaders of the Arab world are Iraq, which does not border on Israel, and Egypt. We are therefore pretty much dependent upon Egypt for initiative on the Arab side in moving toward a settlement. The Secretary said that Sharett has taken the line that Israel would agree to the United States joining the Baghdad Pact if we simultaneously gave Israel a security treaty. The Secretary said, however, that he did not see how we could do the latter until the borders had been agreed upon. The key to the whole problem is a settlement. If Sharett fails in his efforts to go over the head of the U.S. Government, Israel might agree to a settlement. On the other hand, Israel might wait until after the U.S. elections next year. It would hope to secure the support of the Democratic Party and hope for a Democratic victory. Mr. Macmillan said that every year Israel waits before making a settlement its situation will get worse as the imbalance of arms becomes greater.

The Secretary said that whether to let the Baghdad Pact simmer or to go ahead with it in a big way is a diff[illegible] question. It does not have a solid foundation. Neither Iran nor Iraq has great political stability. Of course it is true that giving military aid may help create political strength but then it becomes necessary to give economic aid too. Iran is economically badly off and so is Pakistan. Mr. Macmillan said that Britain might go ahead then with the Pact and the United States will decide on its position.

With respect to Israel, Mr. Macmillan said that he believed our policy should be to give arms on the basis that we would have given them before the Soviet-Egypt arms deal. The Secretary said that the United States may wish to give them a little more since actually they have been buying very little indeed from us. He said we should have some consultation on any arms which any of the Tripartite Powers propose to send, not merely continue an ex post facto adding machine operation. Mr. Macmillan said he thought the problem

should be handled in Washington at an ambassadorial level. The Secretary expressed his strong belief that Italy should be brought into the discussions. It would help Italian morale and strengthen the government there. It would also help to strengthen the arms controls. Mr. Macmillan suggested that the Ambassadors of the four countries draft an agreement about the policy to be followed and then consult with the other NATO countries. We would not give them a veto over any particular arms shipments but we would give them information and give them a right to comment. This should make it possible to achieve some overall coordination of arms shipments to the area.

Mr. Macmillan then inquired what policy we should pursue with respect to Egypt. He said that Nasser is presently riding high and would be difficult to reach an agreement with. At the end of a few months he may have sobered down and we might at that time go to him with a package deal. In the meantime, we should be working out between us what the nature of that package would be. We wish from him an undertaking to turn away from the Soviets and to cooperate in preventing further Communist penetration in the area; and also to cooperate on working out an Israel-Arab settlement. In return we would agree to help in the construction of the Aswan Dam both financially and in securing Sudanese agreement on the Nile waters. We would also bring pressure on Israel to agree to a reasonable settlement. The Secretary commented that the Sudan might be the key to the situation. He assumed that the Aswan Dam could not go forward without Sudanese concurrence and that it would be impossible for Nasser to get the latter without Britain's cooperation. He thought that even during the period immediately ahead talks with Nasser on the Aswan Dam should continue. Mr. Macmillan said that the British Government had concluded that it would be impossible to build the dam other than through the IBRD. The Secretary said that he did not believe that anyone, including the Soviets, would find it feasible to begin work on the dam until there had been an agreement with the Sudan and a settlement of the Israel-Arab problem.

392. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, November 9, 1955—1 p.m.

907. Geneva for Secretary. Talk with Fawzi last night ranged considerably beyond purpose my visit which was to support recent border suggestions by SYG and General Burns. [2] End result was that Fawzi volunteered he wished talk to me about possible terms, and tactics of approach thereto, of Arab-Israeli settlement. He stated he so involved this week with Arab Foreign Ministers and visit of Pearson of Canada that our discussion should wait until early next week.

Department will recall that Nasser told me (Embtel 865 November 2 [3]) on first conversation following my return from Geneva that he ready to discuss terms of possible settlement at any time.

Although opportunities have presented themselves, have felt should not carry subject further in view of injunction placed upon me to restrict my talks here to generalities pending further instructions. (Reference Geneva's number 11, repeated Department SECTO 85. [4])

Although am not hopeful as to any immediate outcome, can see from here no harm in trying without delay ascertain whether Egypt willing to talk seriously about terms of settlement and as to how matter might be approached. On other hand may well be harmful to fail to respond Egyptian proposal. Do not feel in need of detailed instructions as old Alpha plan good enough basis to start except as regards Negev.

This point would hope could have considerable latitude to explore minimum Egyptian demand without any commitment our part whatsoever, as of course would be the case on all aspects of problem.

Would hope for answer this message at latest by coming weekend.

New subject: If it Department's intention that we make really serious effort on Arab-Israeli settlement, timing blame for what

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–955. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Received at 11:21 a.m. Repeated to Geneva.

[2] Telegram 918 to Cairo, November 5, also sent to Tel Aviv, instructed Byroade and Lawson to concert with their British and French colleagues for this purpose. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/11–555)

[3] Printed as Document 379.

[4] Dulles instructed Byroade on October 30 in telegram 11 to refrain from speaking in specific terms to Nasser about an Arab-Israeli settlement because "our thinking is still in process of evolution." (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–3055)

Turkey attempts to do in Arab world, would seem essential that there be more understanding between us as to objectives and priorities thereto. As example, would think they should know our desire avoid new frictions until further effort is made obtain settlement.

Byroade

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393. Editorial Note

On November 9, Acting Secretary of State Hoover met with President Eisenhower in Denver at 12:10 p.m. During the course of their conversation, which lasted approximately 20 minutes, the President and the Acting Secretary reviewed the current situation in Geneva at the meeting of Foreign Ministers and then discussed the status of Alpha. According to the memorandum of conversation:

"Mr. Hoover told the President of the hope of the State Department to send Bob Anderson to that spot, first going to London to get lines squared off with the British, then going to Egypt and then to Israel. There are two objectives: (1) to try to get Colonel Nasser back on the track; second, to try to bring peace to the area and revive the Alpha project of the Secretary of State.

"The President's only comment to Bob Anderson's selection was: you certainly have picked a good one.

"The Acting Secretary told the President that the State Department did not think Israel and Egypt would move within the near future."

After informing President Eisenhower about the Soviets' explosion of another atomic bomb and describing his conversation with the President of Guatemala, Acting Secretary Hoover and "The President went over draft of statement to be issued on Mid East, in connection with Sharrett's visit to this country. Statement is to be issued, saying it has the Secretary's concurrence." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) For text of President Eisenhower's statement of November 9, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 21, 1955, page 845.

394. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, November 9, 1955—5 p.m.

493. Reference Deptel 299 [2] French Ambassador informed me his Government in agreement our formula and he prepared to go ahead that basis. However as of 16:00 Tuesday November 8 British colleague had not received approval our formula which he endeavored get London to accept.

In view of Foreign Minister's departure for US November 7 it was agreed three Ambassadors pay courtesy call on Sharett [3] in Jerusalem, French [*British?*] Ambassador feeling that as *doyen* concurs he should not delay call until return of Sharett. It was likewise agreed that I should inform Foreign Minister we in agreement with principles as expressed in views presented to me; that principle of reciprocity in receiving Chiefs of Missions in Tel Aviv as well as Jerusalem was implicit in our authorization to call on him in Jerusalem; that our position of adherence to UN resolution [4] until ultimate settlement Jerusalem problem remained unchanged; and that it clearly understood there is to be no publicity our current visit to him in Jerusalem or reference arrangement at any time.

I made presentation as indicated with full support British and French Ambassadors. In view fact British colleague not authorized to agree our formula approach (Deptel 269 paragraph 1) [5] merely suggesting "arrangement whereby either would make periodic visits to Tel Aviv perhaps once weekly or not less than once fortnight" (London insisting we pin down Sharett to specific day each week) we agreed to postpone statement of particulars as to operations under "reciprocal basis". It so happened Sharett although mildly objecting to term reciprocity volunteered statement he expected to continue his custom of visiting Tel Aviv weekly, usually on Fridays, and drew our attention to fact he still maintaining office in Tel Aviv. He foresaw no possible difficulty of an equitable operation of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.84A/11–955. Confidential. Received at 1 p.m., November 10. Repeated to London.

[2] Document 373.

[3] Lawson reported on November 2 in telegram 449 from Tel Aviv that he and his British colleague agreed that it would be preferable to discuss this subject with Sharett rather than with Ben Gurion. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–255)

[4] General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), adopted November 29, 1947, provided for the partition of Palestine, with international status for Jerusalem. The text is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. V, p. 1709. General Assembly Resolution 303 (IV), approved November 9, 1949, reaffirmed the international status of Jerusalem. The text is printed *ibid.*, 1949, vol. VI, p. 1530.

[5] Printed as Document 346.

formula as agreed in principle and gave UK definite assurances reference no publicity, application of this formula to all Chiefs of Missions, and continuation of principle of interchange of visits in both cities by Mission and foreign affairs officials.

We feel we now have workable arrangement for effective representation but propose to see Sharett on his return to Israel and supplement our talk with comment along following line:

"In view your statement that you usually visit Tel Aviv once a week and would as rule be available to Chiefs of Mission on Fridays we have been authorized to call on you in Jerusalem whenever circumstances demand it." Under my instructions I assume this is acceptable procedure and will be acceptable to French. British Ambassador is submitting suggestion to London.

I anticipate not slightest tendency Sharett to deviate from past practice of balancing up Tel Aviv and Jerusalem loci of meetings with us. [6]

Lawson

[6] The Embassy in London informed the Department on November 14 that the British Foreign Office had instructed the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv to join in the approach to Sharett on the Jerusalem question along the lines indicated in telegram 493 from Tel Aviv. (Telegram 1984 from London; Department of State, Central Files, 601.0084A/11–1455)

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395. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, November 10, 1955—7 p.m.

Secto 242.

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Gijeon Raphael of Israel Foreign Ministry, who is currently in Geneva for liaison during quadripartite conference, told member USDel today that IG has as its objective overthrow of Nasser regime. Also expressed confidence that if Soviets should receive cooperation from government of any other Arab States it would be able bring

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1055. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:52 p.m.

about their overthrow also by the expression IG's firm opposition to efforts of tripartite powers to sense cooperation of Nasser regime.

Dulles

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396. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, November 10, 1955—8 p.m.

Secto 243. Following is draft of proposed agreed position between US and UK on Middle East policy incorporating suggestions in Secto 151 [2] and points made by Secretary and Macmillan in discussion yesterday. [3] Secretary and Macmillan propose consider paper further and to discuss Middle East policy with Pinay [4] along lines of memo (without however referring to existence of memo). Russell planning see Roux [5] in Paris on return from Geneva and Shuckburgh may go to Paris for discussion there. Believe desirable an indication [from] French our desire work with them in connection Middle East problem. Would appreciate Department's comments on memo. [6] Memo follows.

"The Middle East

The Premises

1. Our policy in the Middle East has been directed towards retaining the area within the free world, developing the oil resources, assisting the economic and social development of the countries concerned, ensuring an adequate defense arrangement for the area as a whole, keeping a reasonable arms balance between Israel and the Arab States working toward a settlement of the Israel-Arab dispute.

2. The Russians have now elected to open a new cold war front in the Middle East. Our recent exchanges show that they are not to be moved from this policy.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-1055. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:46 p.m.

[2] Document 384.

[3] See Document 391.

[4] This discussion took place on November 13. For a summary, see Document 404.

[5] Henri Roux, Director of Afrique-Levant Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry.

[6] See Document 407.

3. In consequence we must be prepared to settle down to a long contest. This means that a consistent long term policy must be devised. There is no short cut.

4. This Western policy must be based upon the need to have most of the inhabitants of this large area with the West and upon their willingness to let the West have easy access to their oil fields.

5. The obligations of the Western powers to Israel under the 1950 Declaration must be fulfilled. But Israel must be made to understand that the West cannot afford to estrange the Moslems. Otherwise the Arab States will fall away, come under Russian domination; and it will then be impossible for the West effectively to protect Israel.

6. In the coming contest with Russia the West enjoys certain solid advantages. There is no reason to be stampeded into panic measures, or to give the Russians and the Arabs the impression that we have lost confidence in our ability to protect our interests.

7. Egypt is the largest of the Arab States and no Western policy in the Middle East which is actively opposed by Egypt will be entirely satisfactory. An effort should be made to prevent Egypt falling completely under Russian domination. Only if this is seen to have failed should we have recourse.

8. Meanwhile the northern tier can constitute a focus of Western influence. It must be sustained and strengthened. We must demonstrate that association with the West pays.

9. We must try to influence the smaller Arab States against association with Egypt or Saudi Arabia for purposes hostile to our policies.

10. Finally we must recognize that it is the Israel-Arab conflict which has weakened Western influence in the Middle East and opened the door to Russia. If we wish to maintain a position of influence with the Arabs we must bring the conflict to an end as soon as possible. This means strong pressure on Israel and also on the Arab States.

Future Policy

11. Generally we must continue to make plain to the people of the Middle East our policy of equal friendship and desire to assist in the development of the area. We must avoid being pushed by the Russians into a position of opposition to Arab interests. We must not start a competition with the Soviet Union to arm the countries of the area.

12. The Soviet Union. We should make no further attempt to plead with the Russians to abandon their present offers to the Middle East countries, although we should continue to make it plain to the world that we regard this as incompatible with the Soviet

pretense to desire reduction of tension. We should resist any effort by the Soviet Union to claim as of right to participate in decisions regarding Middle East affairs. Means should be found of assuring the Soviets that it is not the purpose of the Baghdad Pact to provide the Western powers with strategic air bases in countries contiguous to the Soviet Union. This must be considered in the light of the British position in Iraq. Subject to this, we should continue our efforts to build up a defensive system in the area while keeping open the possibility, when our position is stronger, of working out some modus vivendi with the Soviet Union.

13. Israel. Under present conditions the US and the UK should not grant a special security guarantee to Israel. Such a guarantee will continue to be offered to Israel in the context of a settlement of the Palestine question. This policy might have to be reviewed if it should develop that Egypt was working closely with the Soviet bloc and there was no chance of bringing about a reversal of this trend. In such an event the US might adhere to the northern tier and grant a guarantee to Israel at the same time.

Israel should be urged in her own interests to try to reach a settlement with the Arab States. If she is to survive, she cannot afford to pursue a policy which estranges the Arabs from the West. This will involve a willingness to agree upon some compromise between the United Nations resolutions of 1947 and the present armistice frontiers.

14. Armament supplies. We should try to arrange a coordinated policy of arms supplies to Middle East countries on the part of the tripartite powers, Italy, and perhaps other NATO powers. Machinery to this effect should be worked out in Washington at an Ambassadorial level between the three powers. Consideration [should] be given to the question of associating Italy in this study.

Our guiding principle is that we should not seem to be moving in to supply Israel with arms on a large scale to offset those supplied by the Iron Curtain. The Western powers have in the past supplied arms to both sides under the principles of the 1950 Declaration and this should continue to guide our arms shipments to the area. With respect to Israel, arms shipments by any one of the Western powers should take into account shipments to Israel made or contemplated by other powers, and should reflect the security afforded to Israel under the 1950 Declaration. It should be our purpose not to allow a substantial increase in the striking power of the Israeli Armed Forces, although some increase in their defensive equipment should be contemplated.

15. Egypt. We should not write off Egypt or drive her into Russia's arms. There are indications that Nasser does not desire to be identified with the Soviet bloc. It is probable that he envisages a

neutralist policy in which the Arab world, with Egypt at its head, would be in a strong bargaining position. His present attitude to the West has been affected (a) by the Israel question and (b) by his opposition to the development of the Baghdad Pact. We should not make an immediate approach to Nasser on either of these two issues. He is intoxicated by his present popularity and this is clearly not a propitious moment. We should not of course reject any overture Nasser might make. We should hope that the next few months will show whether he is ready to mend his fences with the West and avoid further involvement with the Soviet bloc. We should assist him in this period by refraining from any punitive measures, and keeping contact with him over such matters as the Aswan Dam, the Sudan, and other subjects of common interest. The object would be to reach a point at which Egypt would be willing in effect to turn away from Russia as a source of arms, to limit arms purchases to her economic capacity, to give support to the Jordan Waters Plan, and to agree to open negotiations for a settlement with Israel. In such a case we would offer to supply Egypt with her reasonable arms requirements, assist in the financing of the High Dam, bring influence on Israel to agree to a just settlement, and help Egypt to play a role of leadership in the Arab world. An opportunity might be made at the November 20 meeting at Baghdad to make it plain that behind the defense of the free countries of the area provided by the Baghdad Pact it is our object to foster cooperation among the Arab powers for constructive purposes, and that this need not be confined to members of the Pact. Egyptian leadership in such an effort is not excluded.

If all this fails and Egypt is clearly lost to Western influence, we should have to consider policies which would minimize the harm which she could do to Western interests.

16. Northern tier. It is the intention of the United States to maintain liaison with the Baghdad Pact Council. The scope of the material support which the United States will give to the Baghdad Pact will depend on further studies by the US Government. These will take account of the sensitivity of the Soviet Union to Western military relations with Iran. Her Majesty's Government as a member of the Pact will seek to establish effective machinery for cooperation among the members in the interest of common security. It is the intention of both the US and the UK to give full public support to the Pact as evidence of Arab cooperation with the free world. Advantage might be taken of the forthcoming Baghdad meeting to announce the creation of machinery (with appropriate United States

participation) to consider and satisfy the arms requirements of the countries concerned."

Dulles

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397. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, November 11, 1955—1 p.m.

Dulte 68. Cairo 20 (907 to Department). [2]

Suggest Byroade be instructed:

(1) Inform Fawzi our gratification GOE's concurrence with US in sense of urgency with respect Israel-Arab settlement;

(2) Solicit Egyptian ideas with respect to terms of possible settlement;

(3) Attempt convince GOE that only step which will materially advance prospects of settlement and which can reveal whether settlement is possible is GOE's willingness actually embark upon Trieste type operation;

(4) To say that in this respect we have been willing let GOE determine time, level, method and personalities for initiating the process;

(5) Should not reveal to Fawzi details our thinking (Alpha) although no harm in attempting ascertain in conversation extent to which GOE likely be agreeable to settlement of some such kind as Alpha.

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1155. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:05 a.m.

[2] Document 392.

398. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, November 11, 1955—5 p.m.

1959. Geneva for Secretary. Department for Acting Secretary.

At Eden's request I saw him this morning. He wished to talk about Israeli-Arab situation. He said there were two problems: (a) to prevent outbreak of war and (b) to bring peace.

Regarding (a) he referred to statement made by President in Denver on November 9th. [2] He said that at a press conference this afternoon he is planning to say that this statement represents British view and that HMG entirely agrees with it.

Regarding (b) he referred to the following statement in his speech at Mansion House November 9th: [3] "The stark truth is that if these nations want to win a peace which is in both their interests they must make some compromise between these two positions." Eden said he thought that it would still further help the situation if President could take occasion at this time to say something to the effect that if Israelis and Arab countries expect to achieve a lasting peace each side must be willing to concede something.

I told Eden I would immediately convey his message to Secretary and Acting Secretary. [4]

Comment: I believe what Eden is seeking is the public support of the U.S. Govt for the position taken in his speech.

Aldrich

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1155. Secret; Priority. Received at 3:07 p.m. Repeated to Geneva.

[2] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 21, 1955, p. 845.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 391.

[4] Dulles responded as follows:

"While Eden's speech was in general good and while parts of it were shown me few hours in advance of delivery US is in no sense committed and I am not sure endorsement would preserve our most useful role. It was probably good to administer some shock treatment to Israelis about territory but am not sure we need to repeat it." (Secto 260 from Geneva, November 12; Department of State, Central Files 684A.86/11–1255)

399. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, November 11, 1955—5 p.m.

1960. Geneva for Secretary. When I saw Eden today about other matters we discussed High Dam and he showed me message which had just been sent by Butler to Makins to be transmitted to World Bank and United States Government, concerning results of conversation between Butler and Kaissouni. Gist of message was that Butler had told Kaissouni that British felt that matter should be handled by World Bank and that it was necessary to have the cooperation of United States; that obviously United States could not give financial assistance unless American firms were offered participation in consortium; and that he understood it was entirely satisfactory to everyone concerned to have Morrison-Knudsen participate. [2]

Eden said that in his own original approach to this subject he had deliberately ignored the Nile waters problem because he had been so anxious to forestall the Russians. He added that he preferred to have World Bank handle matter and he now felt there was less pressing danger of Russians being able to intervene successfully.

Aldrich

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/11–1155. Secret; Priority. Received at 3:04 p.m. Repeated to Geneva and Cairo.

[2] The Department, on November 12, informed the Embassy in London that the United States had "not at any time insisted on participation by American firms in Consortium or in Aswan project. We have constantly supported IBRD in fulfilling its requirements regarding international tenders." (Telegram 2685 to London; *ibid.*)

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400. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, November 12, 1955—3 p.m.

934. For the Secretary. Have no basis from here to form judgment probability Israelis may act in accordance Department telegram

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–1255. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 1:19 p.m. Repeated priority to Geneva.

964.[2] While making this reservation clear, told Secretary in Paris it my general feeling chances such Israeli action probably about 50 percent. Also stated I felt time estimate of some persons this stage might be reached in 4 to 6 months excessive, and that if it came probably first 2 months more likely.

We have some doubts that Nasser would topple now without really decisive destruction his forces. It would have been easy during period when he was hesitating about accepting Soviet arms.

It is perhaps worth repeating that if Israel takes such action we believe it will be widely interpreted in Middle East as our response to Soviet arms deal and that Israeli action either suggested or condoned by United States. In such event United States position in Middle East would be virtually untenable. While use of force dreadful to contemplate, believe in end we in all implications clear, American public would criticize us for not doing everything possible including use this ultimate step. Trouble is Israelis would probably feel that they could finish job before we could move. If this the case, and intelligence sources considered good enough, suggest we might consider supplementing warning reference use of force by indication we would close America as any source of supply to Israel, including transfer of capital. This would not be done during just few days of operations but extended to point of lasting detriment (this of course would be extremely difficult to maintain). Another thought is that we might say as far as we concerned she would lose her right to participate as equal in peace settlement. We would work one out with Arabs and use all resources our disposal force her to accept it.

Byroade

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[2] In telegram 964 to Cairo, November 11, repeated for action to Tel Aviv as telegram 340, the Department requested comments on reports to the effect that the Israelis intended to effectuate Nasser's overthrow by attempting to "drive to Suez across Sinai in endeavor to trap Egyptian forces thereby causing Nasser's downfall." (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/11–1155)

401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva [1]

Washington, November 12, 1955—5:56 p.m.

Tedul 84. In accordance with Dulte 67 [2] we sent following msg to Byroade. Our intention is to keep channel open pending results discussion with Anderson.

"We were pleased to learn of Fawzi's initiative in seeking discussion re Israel settlement. In view of present atmosphere in Egypt we believe that you should continue to let Egyptians take lead and that we should not be too quick to respond at this stage. If and when matter is further discussed we would be particularly interested in any indications of seriousness of Egyptian desire to reach settlement and terms which Egypt has in mind." [3]

I have talked on several occasions with Anderson re his projected assignment. While he has not finally committed himself to the mission, I have little doubt he will accept. He will be in Washington on Nov 18 and I will make appointment for him to review situation with you following your return.

Hoover

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1255. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Wilkins, discussed in substance with the Acting Secretary, and approved by Allen, who signed for Hoover.

[2] Dulles informed Hoover in Dulte 67 from Geneva, November 1, that Russell had prepared "suggested instructions for Byroade in immediately following Dulte 68 [Document 397] in answer to Cairo's 20 to Geneva (907 to Department) [Document 392]. He of course has no knowledge of possible arrangement with Anderson. If latter develops, which I ardently hope, you may wish to defer initiating negotiating process, in which case I assume you would not forward these instructions to Byroade." (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1155)

[3] The Department transmitted this message as telegram 970 to Cairo, November 12. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11–955)

402. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings in Geneva [1]

Washington, November 12, 1955—6 p.m.

Tosec 246. There follows copy of message dated November 10 from British Embassy Cairo to Foreign Office re conversations between British and Egyptians:

"*Palestine.*

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and put to him the points in your two telegrams under reference. He replied as follows:

(a) He told me confidentially that the Egyptian Government welcomed the statement, [2] and would be prepared to associate themselves with the task of seeking a settlement. He was not prepared to commit himself to saying on what basis this settlement would be, nor would he say that they would necessarily start from the point of the 1947 resolution. He said that the Bernadotte proposals of 1948, [3] for example, might be more acceptable to the Arabs as a start. He reiterated the view, which he had previously expressed, that the Arabs would have to have the Negev, including Beersheba, and that they would not accept either Jewish corridors through an Arab Negev, nor Arab corridors through a Jewish Negev. He expected no difficulties over Jerusalem and probably no serious difficulties over the refugees.

(b) They would do their best to see that reactions to the Prime Minister's speech on the press and radio were not too critical. He said that we must understand that it would be a tactical mistake for the Egyptian press and radio publicly to support the speech. Everybody would suspect that there was some conspiracy with the British, and the chances of making progress would be diminished. They would, however, try and taper off public opposition to a Palestine settlement both in Egypt and the other Arab States, and try to create an atmosphere which would help to lead to a settlement. The Egyptian Government would not issue any statement themselves on the speech, since this would be bad tactics at the moment, and would reduce the chances of working towards a settlement.

(c) They would not be willing to negotiate directly with the Israelis. Any form of negotiation on a multilateral basis which brought in the other Arab States would kill all possibilities of a settlement. They would, however, be prepared to discuss the details

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[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 619. Secret. Received at 2:59 a.m., November 13.

[2] Reference is to Eden's Guildhall speech on November 9.

[3] For text of suggestions put forward by Count Folke Bernadotte, U.N. Mediator on Palestine, on June 28, 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1152–1154. For text of Bernadotte's report to the U.N. General Assembly of September 16, 1948, which contained revised proposals for a Palestine settlement, see U.N. document A/648; excerpts are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1401–1406.

of a settlement with ourselves and the Americans, either separately or together, in a way which would not attract notice. As they had said before, the conversations must be extremely confidential and known to those only directly concerned in London, Washington and Cairo;

(d) They would be prepared at the right time to "stick their neck out" more than was prudent for them, as they had in the case of the Jordan waters. For the present, he would do what he could cautiously to improve the reactions of the other Arab States to the Prime Minister's speech. Incidentally, he wished to tell me, as he had told Mr. Johnston in New York, that they were doing their best to bring the Jordan waters' scheme to the surface again;

(e) They would exercise the greatest restraint on the borders, and abstain from every kind of provocation.

2. Your instructions arrived just after I had seen Nasser yesterday. He will probably be able to see me on Saturday. I think it better not to press for an earlier interview, particularly as he has to see Mr. Pearson and General Burns tomorrow, and was very tired when I saw him yesterday. Moreover, by Saturday I shall be able to get a more useful reaction from him than if I were to insist on pursuing this with him immediately.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and my American colleague are dining with me in a small party on the 6th at which no other foreigners will be present. Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees that this will be a suitable opportunity for an informal tripartite discussion. I have discussed this with my American colleague who also agrees. [4] I hope that by that time he and I can have instructions from Washington and London which will enable us to take the matter some way further, both as regards method of procedure and on the boundary question. On this latter question we hope that we can have general instructions, which will enable us to try and move towards something more possible than the Beersheba line, without committing Her Majesty's Government or the United States Government.

4. We both consider that the Minister's reaction was quite encouraging and that our best chance of getting anywhere is to proceed on the lines which the Egyptians propose, by confidential Anglo-American discussions with them. Nasser's views may not be the same, but I have heard of a Scripps Howard report of an interview with him, published in today's American press, which apparently records him as going surprisingly far."

Hoover

[4] See Document 416.

403. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, November 12, 1955—4 p.m.

496.

. . . . . .

Foreign Minister Sharett on October 13, Embtel 359, [2] stated that Nasser must be destroyed. Department will recall that beginning last spring when Egyptian forces appeared to be emulating Israeli activist practices, debate within Israel Cabinet ensued whether Nasser survival advantageous or otherwise. Holders former viewpoint have consistently lost ground and last vestige support for Nasser disappeared with his adoption vigorous Fedayeen activity within Israel last week August and through other Arab States in September.

IDF military doctrine Egyptian presence should be removed from Gaza–DZ area and Sinai Desert established as buffer between two countries as means increase Israel security is well known here. While this thesis has been subject both governmental and public debate, there is no evidence that it has yet been adopted as governmental policy.

Israelis have been hoping internal forces in Egypt, possibly aided and abetted by US would bring about Nasser's downfall particularly if Nasser was to receive set backs as result of localized military activities along border. This has not come about and Israelis are bit non-plussed by failure of USG to adopt more vigorous policy towards Egypt since conclusion latter's Soviet arms deal.

Two sources of evidence which point to GOI reluctance inaugurate preventive action are: (1) reported Cabinet decision large-scale military procurement which appears to many here as alternative to preventive war if it can be executed and (2) failure Israel Army to utilize large-scale force available to it in south to engage Egyptian divisions in Sinai at time of recent Nitzana action when Israel had good pretext for doing so; i.e., presence Egyptian forces on Israel soil.

Although absence affirmative decision by Israel Cabinet appears to stand between IDF and large-scale military action in Sinai, GOI reluctance to adopt such measure may be overcome by one or combination of developments. Firstly, adoption by Egypt of new

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–1255. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:23 a.m., November 13. Repeated to Geneva and Cairo.

[2] Document 339.

aggressive measures such as large-scale Fedayeen activities within Israel. Secondly, failure of Israel to obtain from Western Powers assurances of arms supply which will prevent shift balance of military power to Egypt. Thirdly, Western Powers support of program for territorial emasculation of Israel of such dimensions as to foreshadow Israel's eventual obliteration.

Israel would adopt policy of preventive war with great reluctance and only if there appears to be no clear alternative. In event such action is determined Embassy repeats its belief that it will follow an incident for which Egyptians appear primarily responsible.

Lawson

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404. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, November 13, 1955—8 p.m.

Secto 282. At meeting of Secretary, Macmillan and Margerie (who said he fully authorized by Pinay speak for him) yesterday [2] Macmillan summarized UK views with respect recent developments in Middle East as follows. Clear Soviets have decided open up cold war in new part of world and not going to be moved to give up that effort. Western Powers must formulate both short and long term policy. Matter of first importance for West have majority people in area on side of West.

Must of course fulfill obligations to Israel including those under 1950 declaration. At same time must make clear to Israel we cannot let Soviets gain Moslem world. This also to Israelis benefit as we cannot protect Israel unless on good terms with Moslems. We have strong assets. Most important immediate question is determine on policy re shipment of arms to Israel and neighboring Arab states. Western Powers should make clear not going into arms race.

As result ensuing discussion it was agreed that representatives of three delegations would draw up paper for approval three ministers [3] along following lines:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-1355. Secret. Received at 3:31 p.m.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 583)

[3] See Document 409.

(1) The French and British Ambassadors in Washington, working with a representative of the State Department, will formulate procedures to maintain consultation with respect to arms deliveries to Israel and Arab states bordering on it. They should consider what functions the existing NEACC can usefully perform as a part of these procedures. In formulation of these procedures they should take into account desirability of including in such coordination shipments to the area by other friendly governments.

(2) Three governments agree they will make no shipments on contracts for sale heavy military equipment without consultation.

(3) With respect types of light equipment agreed upon, shipments may be made without consultation but there should be current and complete exchanges of information.

(4) Pending establishment of agreed procedures, existing contracts may be carried out except where substantial quantities involved. Information about all existing contracts should be exchanged.

(5) Governments concerned should continue accordance tripartite declaration oppose arms race between Arab states and Israel. As regards deliveries to Israel, however, not policy of three governments approve shipments in amount to balance current Soviet deliveries to Egypt. Would give priority to defensive equipment as opposed weapons of offense.

(6) Committee should draw attention of governments to cases in which representations might usefully be made to other friendly governments about supply of arms to countries concerned. In any event, committee should take into account shipments made by other friendly powers in determining upon advisability of shipments by any one of three governments.

(7) Committee should examine relative strengths in armaments Israel and bordering Arab states and exchange intelligence.

(8) Desirable full and early agreement be reached in Washington on detailed arrangements.

Macmillan said we should not consider Nasser as determined put Egypt in Soviet hands. While Nasser undoubtedly feels he has scored a popular success and is in good bargaining position he is also probably somewhat alarmed by what has happened and time may soon come when he will wish return to closer association with West.

Margerie said that despite hostility of Arabs in North Africa and in UN, bilateral relations between France and Arab states very good and political relations in North Africa improving. France has come to understanding with Nasser whereby it releasing arms which Egypt had already paid for in return for Egyptian agreement cease Cairo radio attacks and prevent smuggling of arms through Egypt to North Africa. He agreed game by no means lost in Arab world. France quite ready reaffirm its solidarity behind 1950 tripartite declaration.

Secretary agreed nothing irrevocable has happened as far as losing area to West concerned. Have two assets: (1) Arab states dependent upon West for sale of oil: (2) Moslem religion strongly

opposed to communism. While Arabs may be inclined play us off against Soviet that is far cry from their coming under Soviet control. It is US policy to follow along lines 1950 declaration. Secretary said he had made clear to Sharett that if Israel started war we would have to take financial and economic measures against Israel. Israel could not exist long without governmental and private aid from us. We do not intend engage in arms race. We must all work hard for settlement along lines August 26 speech. Macmillan said UK strongly supported tripartite declaration policies.

Dulles

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405. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 14, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

High Aswan Dam

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
G—Mr. Robert Murphy
E—Mr. Herbert V. Prochnow
NEA—Mr. George V. Allen

Speaking under instructions, Sir Roger stated that the U.K. Government wanted to "work through the IBRD" in connection with the High Aswan Dam, and said he was ready to talk with the United States and IBRD authorities with a view to agreeing on proposals to be put to the Egyptian Finance Minister, Mr. Kaissouni, who is seeing Mr. Black on November 23. He said he presumed that the United States would wish the Bank to take the lead in the matter.

Mr. Hoover said we did since, if we were out in front, we would be called on for assistance on many other projects in the Middle East.

Sir Roger said his Government wanted to discuss: (1) the upper limit of the IBRD loan, (2) whether any "medium credit" extended by construction firms would reduce the amount of IBRD loan, and

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[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Allen.

(3) what simplification the Bank would accept regarding international tenders. Mr. Hoover said he understood the Bank was thinking in terms of a $200 million Bank loan, that any credits extended by construction firms would reduce this amount, and that no time would be lost by the Bank's requirements for international tenders since at least one year would be needed before construction contracts could be let.

Mr. Allen asked whether Sir Roger thought the United Kingdom would impose any political conditions on its contribution towards the Aswan Dam. Sir Roger said it would not but that he had been asked to find out what conditions the United States might impose.

Mr. Hoover asked about the Sudan. Sir Roger said that the Sudanese Government had fallen on the very day the last British soldiers left the Sudan and that some time might be required before another functioning government was in office.[2] He said Mr. Kaissouni had proposed that "any additional water that becomes available as a result of the Aswan project be divided 50–50 between Egypt and the Sudan."

Sir Roger emphasized that his Government regarded the Aswan project as one of the highest urgency, requiring promptest action. Mr. Hoover said that the United States shared this view and was ready to proceed with the talks. He thought, however, that a "letter of intent" by the Bank would take care of the Soviet threat.

Sir Roger said that during Mr. Kaissouni's conversations in London, the latter had urged: (1) that the IBRD accord a higher credit-worthiness figure for Egypt; (2) that the consortium increase the medium-term credit it was prepared to extend; and (3) that the Sudan hurdle be "got over."

It was agreed that the meeting with IBRD and Treasury officials be set for November 16.

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[2] On November 10, the government of Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari was defeated on a motion in the Sudanese Parliament, and al-Azhari resigned. Five days later, however, he was returned to power as Prime Minister.

406. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, November 14, 1955—2 p.m.

501. Eytan, Director General Foreign Ministry, yesterday evening gave Embassy his account of conversation Friday with British Ambassador here re Eden's Mansion House speech. According to Eytan UK version presentation of British Ambassador's appeared to follow that set forth in London's 1950 [2] to Department except for two variations: 1. He quoted Nicholls as saying that Macmillan had shown Dulles copy of Eden's address and latter had said he was in complete agreement with it and 2. British Ambassador made no reference to Secretary's conversation with Sharett in Geneva.

Eytan said that two principal Israeli objections to Eden's address were (1) that unlike Dulles August 26 statement which had placed refugee resettlement, compensation, and territorial problem in balance, Eden's statement focused entirely on territorial question and gave scant attention to other aspects settlement problem. Secondly Eden had greatly complicated matters by his emphasis on UN resolution of 1947 [3] when in fact armistice lines had to be starting point because those were ones in existence today. Eytan added he had told British Ambassador that, while it was tactically impossible for Israel to take initiative in making suggestions re territorial question, GOI was quite prepared to discuss it.

Eytan said Cabinet yesterday had decided Eden's address should be answered by Ben Gurion in Knesset statement but that date had not been determined because Ben Gurion is ill at Sde Boker. He said Foreign Ministry had received radio inquiry from Ben Gurion inquiring whether Washington agreed with Eden's statement. In view this and anticipation of other inquiries, would appreciate guidance from Department as to line I should take in discussions this matter. In

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11-1455. Confidential. Received at 4:04 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tripoli.

[2] Dated November 10, it reported that British representatives in Arab countries and Israel had been instructed to approach those governments concerning Eden's speech. The Ambassador in Tel Aviv was to say that Eden's reference to U.N. resolutions did not mean any change in British policy but that the resolutions were the Arab starting point and that Israel must realize any settlement would require concessions. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11–1055)

[3] General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), adopted on November 29, 1947. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, pp. 1709–1730.

interim Embassy limiting its comments to those set forth Department Circular 318.[4]

British Ambassador called on me this morning to comment on his presentation. He said he had informed Eytan that Eden's speech had been shown to Secretary Dulles who made a few suggestions and agreed with it; that British were in agreement with Dulles August 26 speech and US agreed with Eden's speech; that Eden was suggesting starting point for discussion of settlement without commitment on either side and therefore strong rejection of necessity of concessions by either side was not helpful; that mention was made of refugee problem and territorial problem was not over-emphasized although it is most difficult one.

He said Eytan inquired whether recent speech proposed UK as mediator or merely designed to point up problems. He replied by referring to UK and US willingness to aid in every possible way, even on confidential mediator basis.

In summing up, Nicholls said he thought Eytan's reaction less explosive than might have been expected and Eytan not in real argumentative mood. Nicholls will inform me of any conversation he holds with acting Foreign Minister Golda Myerson if and when she calls him in.

Comment: It is my belief that real line of GOI will be revealed in coming Ben Gurion speech to Knesset.[5]

Lawson

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[4] Circular telegram 318, November 10, instructed addressee embassies to emphasize, when appropriate, that the President's statement "means just what it says and has no veiled significance." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/11–1055)

[5] Ben Gurion presented Israel's official response to Eden's speech in an address before the Knesset on November 15. Ben Gurion in part charged that Eden's proposals would "truncate Israel for benefit of neighbors . . . instead of bringing peace nearer"; that Eden had failed to place primary responsibility for the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal upon Egypt; and that the United Kingdom was in no position to urge a return to the U.N. General Assembly partition resolution of November 29, 1947, in light of the United Kingdom's behavior in the wake of the resolution's adoption. (Telegram 508 from Tel Aviv, November 16; *ibid.*, 684A.86/11–1655)

407. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings in Geneva [1]

Washington, November 14, 1955—7:09 p.m.

Tosec 258. Re Secto 243. [2] There follow comments on numbered paragraphs in reftel.

5. As a premise, concept would be strengthened by addition of phrase "and Arab states" after "Israel". Same balance, it seems to us, should be kept elsewhere in memorandum, for example in paragraph 14.

8. Concept might be broadened by addition of phrase "backed up by other states of NE" after "Northern tier".

10. Western influence has also been weakened by slow pace of economic and political development in the Arab world.

13. Tripartite Declaration contains broad language and should be sufficient for Israel's present needs. Security guarantee could probably go no further than Declaration but would be formal engagement and should be given only in context of general settlement. Egypt's relations with Soviet bloc will be important factor in considering US adherence to Baghdad pact. In this connection Saudi Arabia, Syria and other NE states might also be mentioned because their defection from the West might have bearing upon US adherence to Pact.

There are possibilities for agreement other than "compromise between UN resolutions of 1947 and the present armistice frontiers" which can be considered and perhaps quoted language is unduly restrictive. Such possibilities as condominium and trusteeships of certain areas might also be useful.

15. West could talk to Egypt now if Egyptians take initiative. Nasser continues appear very interested in economic development his country. We should not be forthcoming in giving to Egypt until Nasser willing take steps outlined this paragraph. We should start devising formula whereby Nasser while remaining outside Baghdad pact is able in some way to associate himself with it.

Hoover

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1055. Top Secret. Drafted by Wilkins and Bergus and approved by Murphy, who signed for Hoover.

[2] Document 396.

408. Editorial Note

On November 14, the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Henry R. Labouisse, submitted to the 10th session of the United Nations General Assembly his annual report covering the period July 1, 1954, to June 30, 1955. (U.N. doc. A/2978) Accompanying it was a special report covering the needs of refugee children, residents of the border villages, and other claimants for relief (U.N. doc. A/2978/Add. 1.) as well as a special report from the Advisory Commission of the Agency. (U.N. doc. A/3017) Between November 14 and 30, 1955, the Ad Hoc Political Committee held twelve meetings for the purpose of considering the question of assistance to Palestine refugees.

On November 28, the Representatives of Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted a joint draft resolution to the Ad Hoc Political Committee that would direct the Agency to pursue its programs for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the limitations imposed upon it by the extent of contributions, and would appeal to the governments of member and non-member States to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to fulfillment the Agency's programs. It requested the governments of the area to make a determined effort to seek and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees, and noted further the serious need of other claimants for relief. Finally, it requested the Director of UNRWA to continue to submit annual reports and budgets to the General Assembly. (U.N. doc. A/AC. 80/L.6.)

On November 30, the Ad Hoc Political Committee adopted the joint resolution by a roll call vote of 38 to none, with 19 abstentions. (U.N. doc. A/3057) At its 550th plenary meeting on December 3, the General Assembly adopted without debate General Assembly Resolution 916 (X), as recommended by the Ad Hoc Political Committee, by 38 votes to none, with 17 abstentions.

409. Telegram From the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, November 15, 1955—2 p.m.

Secto 302. Following draft of agreed minute meeting of Tripartite Ministers November 12 [2] prepared by Roux, Hancock and Russell for consideration Ministers: Pinay and Macmillan have indicated may not be able give it their attention until following close of conference and will inform us through Embassies Washington:

"1. The French and British Ambassadors in Washington, working with a representative of the State Department, will formulate procedures to maintain consultation with respect to arms deliveries to Israel and the Arab States bordering on it. They should consider what functions the existing NEACC can usefully perform as a part of these procedures. In the formulation of these procedures they should take into account the desirability of including in such coordination shipments to the area by other friendly governments.

2. The three governments agree that they will make no shipments or contracts for the sale of heavy military equipment without consultation through such arrangements as may be established.

3. With respect to such types of light equipment as may be agreed upon, shipments may be made without consultation but these should be current and complete exchanges of information.

4. With respect to existing contracts it was agreed that, pending the establishment of the procedures mentioned, such contracts might be carried out except where substantial quantities are involved. The committee, when established, should give prior attention to the question of shipments under such contracts. Information about all existing contracts should be exchanged.

5. The governments concerned should continue, in accordance with the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, to oppose an arms race between the Arab States and Israel. As regards deliveries to Israel, it is not, however, the present policy of the three governments to approve shipments in an amount to balance the current deliveries to Egypt. The governments would give priority to sales of defensive equipment as opposed to weapons of offense.

6. The committee should draw the attention of their governments to cases in which representations might usefully be made to other friendly governments about the supply of arms to the countries concerned. In any event the committee should take into account shipments made by other friendly powers in determining upon the advisability of shipments by any one of the three governments.

7. The committee should examine the relative strengths in armaments of Israel and the bordering Arab States and exchange intelligence on this subject.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1555. Secret. Received at 11:12 a.m. Repeated to London, Paris, and Rome.

[2] For a report on the tripartite meeting, see Document 404.

8. It is desirable that full and early agreement should be reached in Washington on the detailed arrangements for consultation." [3]

Dulles

[3] Dulles instructed the Department in Secto 303 from Geneva, November 15, to include Italy in these efforts to control the delivery of arms to the Arab States and Israel, on the grounds that the Italians were "emerging as prominent potential suppliers of arms to Middle East." (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-1555)

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410. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, November 15, 1955—4 p.m.

955. Fawzi and I shadow-boxed last night on subject Alpha with no concrete developments. On his part he apparently waiting in hope I would make concrete suggestions as regards territorial questions. This felt I should not do in view Department telegram 970. [2] Conversation therefore dealt mostly with procedures that might be followed to arrive at eventual settlement. Fawzi ruled out direct talks, at least initially. Concluded finally that secret approach by United States and/or United Kingdom still best method. He felt it of utmost importance other Arab States not be brought into matter until a later agreed time when we and Egypt had reached substantial understanding.

I stated seemed to me there was every advantage for plan to be worked out to be Egyptian from beginning. Recalled long period of time necessary convert American plan for Jordan Valley to what Arabs would call Arab plan. Question was how could realistic Egyptian plan be defined and what assistance could we provide? After all if Egypt really desired settlement, she would have her heart in matter and should be able take initiative with actual formulation of plan. Who then was to first put pencil to paper so our discussions could take concrete form? Fawzi hesitated and evaded reply until termination of conversation on other matters. He eventually said he did not know answer to my question but perhaps could have one by tomorrow night when we dine together with British Ambassador

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11-1555. Top Secret; Alpha. Received at 4:50 p.m. Repeated to London and Geneva.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 401.

Trevelyan.[3] I told him his answer to this question would greatly affect my own thinking as to their readiness to proceed with settlement arrangements.

Byroade

[3] See Document 416.

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411. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 36.1–55 *Washington, November 15, 1955.*

THE OUTLOOK FOR EGYPTIAN STABILITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

The Problem

To estimate probable trends in Egypt's foreign and domestic policies and in its internal stability over the next few years, and to assess the implications of these trends for US interests in the Middle East.

Conclusions

1. Barring such grave developments as assassination or military defeat by Israel, the Nasir regime is likely to remain in control of Egypt at least for the next year or so. The regime's power will

[1] Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIE's were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided contributions to all political and some economic sections of NIEs.

According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff." This estimate was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on November 15, 1955. "Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

continue to depend primarily on the support of the armed forces. (Paras. 19–20)

2. The position of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) has probably been strengthened during its more than three years of control. Its arms deal with the Soviet Bloc has won the approval of politically conscious civilian elements who share with the regime a desire to build up Egypt's military capabilities against Israel. On the other hand, most of the civilian population is apathetic toward the regime, and the more politically articulate civilian elements will remain opposed to the regime so long as they are effectively excluded from participation in power. Even if a parliament should be instituted, it would almost certainly be little more than an advisory body. Although such a reorganization might eliminate the RCC as an entity, most RCC members would probably retain considerable influence. Nasir himself would probably be even stronger than at present. (Paras. 14, 18, 20, 22–24, 43)

3. Neither the Nasir regime nor any foreseeable successor is likely to make great progress in coping with Egypt's fiscal and economic problems. Its export difficulties would become severe if a revision of the US cotton export policy were to confront Egypt with competition from US sales. Barter trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc may provide a solution to Egypt's chronic cotton surplus problem, but growing dependence on this outlet may make Egypt increasingly susceptible to economic pressures and inducements from the Bloc. (Paras. 33–34)

4. Even if Egypt succeeds in constructing the High Dam above Aswan, the project is unlikely to raise the Egyptian standard of living significantly, since the population will probably continue to grow at a rate sufficient to absorb the added resources without increasing per capita income. If the regime lost hope of obtaining satisfactory financing assistance from Western sources, it would probably seek an acceptable offer from the USSR. (Paras. 35–40)

5. The fundamental objectives of the regime's foreign policy are to be free of foreign domination, to acquire leadership in the Arab world, to strengthen Egypt against Israel, to establish influence in the Sudan, and to undermine the Western position in the Middle East and Africa. The regime almost certainly estimates that the arms agreement with the Soviet Bloc has substantially improved its domestic and international position. It would almost certainly not abandon this agreement in the face of Western pressure. (Paras. 53–55)

6. The RCC almost certainly underestimates the risks of accepting Soviet arms and other support. Growing Egyptian military and commercial dependence on the Bloc would increase Soviet ability to influence Egypt either by threats or inducements and would provide

added opportunities for subversion and political penetration. This would be particularly true if the USSR should extend assistance for construction of the Aswan High Dam. (Paras. 38, 60–62)

7. At a minimum, recent Soviet overtures are likely to foster Egyptian neutralism. We believe, however, that the RCC desires to avoid political alignment with the Bloc. In the long run, the main factors which will determine the extent of Soviet influence in Egypt are: (a) the regime's own estimate of its need for Western support to insure its independence; (b) the extent to which the regime's economic, political, and military aspirations are actually satisfied by the West; and (c) the degree of Egyptian satisfaction or dissatisfaction with Soviet performance. (Paras. 58–59, 63)

8. The arms deal has substantially increased the risk of Egyptian-Israeli hostilities, primarily because of the danger that Israel will take preventive action, but also because it is likely to strengthen Egypt's militancy and eventually its disposition to launch a "second round." Should an Egyptian-Israeli war develop in the immediate future, Egypt could probably defend the Sinai area for only a very short time. With the assistance of Soviet Bloc technicians, Egypt could have a limited number of tanks in operation in a few weeks after delivery and about 100 in operation within four to five months. However, about a year would be required before the new tanks could be effectively used in unit operations. Egypt would probably require at least six months to develop a significant air offensive capability against Israel. At least a year would be required before Soviet submarines could be effectively operated by Egyptian crews. (Paras. 48–50, 69)

9. The regime wishes to retain US friendship and support. However, its opposition to certain US policies, particularly those which it regards as favoring Israel or involving greater support of Iraq and the "northern tier" defense scheme will continue. Egypt would be particularly resentful of an Iraqi move to absorb Syria, and would hold the US and UK in great part responsible. (Paras. 77–81)

10. The Egyptian reaction to US moves to reassure Israel would depend on the extent to which such moves appeared to apply to both sides and to be designed to preserve the status quo. A reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 would probably produce only a slight reaction in Egypt and the other Arab states. A convincing demonstration of US determination to intervene effectively in the event of aggression would probably reassure and restrain both sides, although Egypt and the other Arab states would regard it primarily as a guarantee of Israel's security. If the US provided Israel with any amount of arms, even if labeled as being primarily defensive, or particularly if it extended to Israel alone a guarantee of its presently-held territory, US relations with Egypt and the other Arab

states would be severely strained. Such a US security guarantee, if accompanied by extensive shipments of arms, not only might lead Egypt to break off relations with the US, and even to accept a Soviet guarantee if offered, but would also endanger the position of the Western Powers throughout the Middle East. (Para. 82)

Discussion

1. Egypt's Present Situation

11. It has now been more than three years since the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the military junta organized and led by Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasir, and at first nominally headed by Major General Mohammed Naguib, assumed control of Egypt. Backed by the armed forces, particularly by a loosely organized group of three to four hundred junior and middle grade officers known as the Free Officers, the RCC committed itself to a vigorous program aimed at achieving sweeping internal reforms, gaining and exercising full Egyptian sovereignty, and strengthening Egypt's economic, military, and international position.

12. While the RCC regime has shown remarkable ability to function as a collective body, the dominant influence of Prime Minister Nasir has become increasingly clear. Nasir's personal ascendency has been consolidated by the elimination from the RCC of certain members, such as General Naguib and the former Minister of National Guidance and Sudan Affairs, Salah Salem. The strengthening of Nasir's personal position has been to some degree at the expense of moderation and good relations with the West, since he has had to rely on the extreme nationalists among the RCC's supporters in order to consolidate his control.

13. Nasir and his associates have had considerable success in crushing political opposition. The old-line nationalist Wafd Party, the reactionary Moslem Brotherhood, and the disunited Communists have been driven into a precarious underground existence by the regime's effective ban on political parties. [2] With few exceptions, the RCC enjoys the support of the armed forces and those elements of

[2] The Wafd was the dominant party under the old regime, and probably still retains considerable appeal both to Egyptian nationalists and to the upper classes. It has also succeeded in maintaining its political organization intact to some degree. The Moslem Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun), which was originally a purely socio-religious organization of Moslem zealots dedicated to reviving Islamic principles and combatting Western influence, later developed into a body drawn chiefly from the lower urban middle class, peasants, students, and religious elements who, in their political guise, favored the establishment of an Islamic theocracy. At its peak, Egyptian membership was estimated at 500,000, although probably less than 2,000 were engaged in its terrorist and clandestine activities. The Brotherhood generally did not take part in electoral contests, but represented a powerful force with which political leaders had to reckon. [Footnote in the source text.]

the civil service and security services which have benefited by the revolution.

14. On the other hand, the RCC's attempts to broaden its base of support have been relatively unsuccessful. The Liberation Rally, a political organization which it sponsored to provide popular support for the regime, has produced only negligible results. Opposition remains strong among urban intellectual and professional elements, the landowning classes who have sustained economic losses under the RCC's land reform program, and among former political leaders. Urban labor groups, at one time strongly in favor of the RCC, have become disillusioned with the results of its program. Finally, while the regime's land redistribution program has benefited a minuscule segment of the great mass of Egyptian peasants, and probably raised the hopes of others, there is little evidence that the vast majority is any less apathetic toward the RCC than toward its predecessors.

15. This failure to secure more widespread support results from several factors. Having abrogated the constitution, banned political parties, and instituted rule by decree, the RCC has inevitably incurred the resentment of the former parties and other politically alert civilian elements which are thus excluded from power and political life. Domestic opposition or apathy also results from the RCC's failure to meet expectations stimulated by its original promises to cope with fundamental social and economic problems, particularly the imbalance between Egypt's limited resources and its growing population.

16. In contrast to its indifferent success in meeting domestic problems, the RCC has achieved certain important objectives in the field of foreign relations. Chief among these were its agreements in 1953 and 1954 with the UK, providing respectively for the termination of the Sudan Condominium and British evacuation of the Suez Canal zone by 1956. In the Asian-African world, Nasir's position as a leader was strengthened by his role at Bandung. The RCC's claims to Arab leadership suffered a serious setback when Iraq joined the Baghdad Pact in early 1955 in defiance of Egypt's efforts to maintain a common Arab front against defense arrangements with the West. However, with Saudi support, the RCC has so far made Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon reluctant to follow Iraq's lead. The RCC has strengthened its prestige in the Arab world as a result of acquiring extensive military assistance from the Soviet Bloc—a move which it regards as a success for its foreign policy and a step of far-reaching significance in improving Egypt's military strength.

17. These achievements of the RCC have not solved, and in some cases have intensified the difficulties confronting it in the field of foreign relations. UK withdrawal from the Sudan and the Suez base released the other Arab states from the compulsion to follow

Egyptian leadership which they felt when it represented the spearhead of opposition to British imperialism in the Middle East. UK withdrawal has also forced Egypt to cope with a number of problems from which it had previously been insulated, particularly in regard to the Sudan. Egypt's vigorous opposition to Iraqi participation in Western-sponsored defense arrangements has cracked the thin facade of Arab unity, and brought Egypt into conflict with the US and UK. It has also strengthened Turkish support of Iraq's anti-Egyptian policy and has increased Turkey's efforts to counter Egypt's aspirations in the area. In the Sudan, the RCC has been largely unsuccessful in efforts to replace British with Egyptian tutelage. It has so far failed to secure agreement with the Sudanese over division of the Nile waters. Moreover, the regime's vigorous response to Israel provocations and its acceptance of Soviet Bloc military assistance have substantially increased the danger of war with Israel and have added to the strain in Egypt's relations with the US and UK.

18. On balance, the position of the RCC has probably been strengthened during its more than three years of control. Its members have gained experience, have eliminated dissidents, and have placed reliable supporters in key positions of the civil and military services. In foreign affairs, the regime has achieved sufficient success to demonstrate its dedication to Egypt's interests and its determination to achieve results. If its domestic efforts have shown less dramatic results, its failures have not been sufficient to evoke any real challenge, and opposition elements remain disunited, suppressed, or ineffective. Nasir and his associates, however, recognize the necessity to produce results. In striving for these, they will be confronted with enormous, perhaps insuperable, difficulties, and may take dangerous risks in foreign policies.

II. The Outlook for Political Stability and Political Policies

19. Barring such grave developments as assassination of certain key members or defeat in a war with Israel, the position of the RCC is not likely to be seriously threatened at least for the next year or so. Personality and policy differences within the RCC may lead one or more of its members to break off from the group, but Nasir and his closest supporters will probably be able to preserve their power within the junta.

20. The RCC is unlikely to make spectacular gains in achieving organized support from important Egyptian political elements during this period and its effective control will continue to depend primarily on the support of the armed forces. There is no indication that this support is likely to be weakened in the foreseeable future. The

regime has been successful in raising the morale and prestige of Egyptian officers and, as a result of the arms deal with the Soviet Bloc, can count more than ever on the backing of the military services.

21. Because of its dependence on the military, the RCC will remain under considerable pressure to accommodate its program to the ideas of the Egyptian officer corps—particularly the opinions of the Free Officers group. Practically all of these officers are strongly nationalistic and anti-UK. Many, in addition to being hostile to the Western Powers, are also leftist, although there are few, if any, Communists among them. Their bellicosity toward Israel will make it difficult for the RCC to be moderate on the Israeli issue.

22. The regime remains under civilian pressure to fulfill earlier promises to restore parliamentary government. Nasir and his associates may set up some form of advisory or puppet parliament and may also proceed with formulating a constitution—some plans for which have already been made. While little is known of these plans, they are apparently based on the concept of a strong chief executive. Reportedly, neither the chief executive nor his cabinet would be responsible to parliament, and the latter would not have the power to propose money bills or to question the basic program of the revolution or the measures of state security. The chief executive would presumably retain the power of veto over such legislation as the parliament could initiate.

23. Under such a form of government, Nasir would assume the role of chief executive. Most RCC members would probably continue to be cabinet ministers and would retain considerable influence in the formulation of policy, although the RCC as an entity might be eliminated. Nasir and his two closest supporters within the RCC, Zakariya Muhi al-Din and Abd al-Hakim Amir, probably would emerge from the process in even stronger positions than at present, if only by ridding themselves of their present obligations to act in concert with the RCC as a whole.

24. Such limited concessions to constitutionalism will almost certainly not weaken opposition to the regime among its civilian opponents or broaden significantly the base of its popular support. So long as most politically conscious elements in Egypt are excluded from a voice in the government, they will remain indifferent or hostile to the regime. Such organizations as the Wafd Party and the Moslem Brotherhood will continue to work for its downfall. The ability of these opposition elements to challenge the regime, however, is likely to remain limited, since no opposition group can hope to overthrow it without significant support from the armed forces.

25. The Communist movement in Egypt is now splintered into three competing factions with probably less than 4,000 adherents.

Religio-ethnic minorities and youth groups contain the largest number of members, while students and labor elements are the principal sympathizers. Communist potential and standing are likely to improve if the recent rapprochement between Egypt and the Soviet Bloc continues. Moreover, this rapprochement may lead to Communist support for the regime, particularly for its foreign policies and this, in turn, could result in a weakening of the RCC's internal security precautions and even to Communist infiltration of the government. However, the indigenous Communist movement is not likely to pose a serious threat to the regime so long as the security forces maintain their present surveillance.

26. If "parliamentary" government should be established, even in an advisory form, it would probably lead over a period of time to increasing demands by civilian elements for further concessions. The regime would come under growing pressure to relinquish some of the substance, as well as the appearance, of its present power, and its foundations might gradually be eroded. The effectiveness of such civilian demands, however, would depend on the ability of civilian elements to win the support of a significant segment of the armed forces.

27. The development of strong and active civilian opposition to the regime would probably affect the loyalty of certain elements of the armed forces to some extent, but no such development is presently foreseeable on a scale sufficient to threaten the regime's control of the military. For some time to come, the only occurrence likely to turn the armed forces against the regime would be defeat at the hands of Israel. It is extremely unlikely that Nasir or the regime could remain in power in the aftermath of such a disaster.

28. In the event of the overthrow of the Nasir regime, the character of its successor would depend in large measure upon the circumstances of the regime's fall. Defeat at the hands of Israel, with the consequent discredit cast upon the armed forces leadership, would probably be followed by the establishment of some form of Wafdist government supported by elements of the armed forces and police. The Wafd probably still retains considerable latent political power. Such a government would almost certainly not be pro-Western. If an overthrow resulted from a combination of relatively less dramatic foreign and domestic policy failures, the successor regime would probably be military, with a constitutional facade featuring Wafdist leaders.

29. Though the Moslem Brotherhood might temporarily align itself with a military-Wafdist group in the overthrow of the regime, it is not likely that the Brotherhood would be included among the leadership of the new regime because of the exorbitant demands it

would probably make. The Moslem Brotherhood would probably oppose any regime in which it did not have a strong influence.

30. It is possible that the leaders of a successor regime might restore the monarchy, possibly by establishing a regency for Faruq's son. Such a move would not be intended to restore the power of the Palace, but rather to supply a sense of continuity and legitimacy.

III. Economic Situation

31. The RCC inherited a number of serious and growing economic problems which previous governments had failed to deal with effectively. The basic problem arises from the fact that the population of Egypt, now roughly 23 million, is increasing by almost two and one-half percent per year, whereas national income shows no comparable rise. Moreover, Egypt is heavily dependent on a single crop—long staple cotton accounts for 80 percent of its exports—which it has had difficulty in selling in recent years. Nevertheless, Egypt attained a balance of payments on current account in 1954. Although its gold and foreign exchange holdings are large, primarily because of the wartime accumulation of sterling, much of this is still blocked by the UK. However, there are provisions for the gradual liquidation of this account. Over the past three years, the regime has succeeded in obtaining more than $50 million in economic aid from the US, including $40 million for economic development. During recent years Egypt has enjoyed a high degree of monetary stability. While this stability has been maintained under the RCC, this body cannot claim credit for establishing it. The accumulation of large exchange reserves during World War II, coupled with conservative banking practices inherited from the British, largely account for the favorable financial position. It is, in fact, this monetary stability and foreign exchange reserves which make major economic projects in Egypt feasible.

32. As a matter of first priority, the regime moved quickly against corruption and inefficiency in government which had adversely affected the economy. It also took emergency measures to dispose of a large cotton carryover which had been priced out of the world market. Finally, it promised to press forward with economic development programs which had been under consideration for years, and added measures of its own. It announced a sweeping program of land redistribution and land reform, labor reforms, liberalized investment laws, a stepped-up industrialization program, and a plan to increase the amount of land in cultivation—primarily through construction of a new high dam on the Nile above Aswan.

33. On balance, the regime's attack on economic problems is not likely to meet with great success. While the land program has won

some support for the RCC among the peasantry, its political value has decreased with the passage of time, as it has become apparent that only a tiny fraction—perhaps 150,000 out of nearly three million peasant families—will obtain land of their own through redistribution of the 750,000 acres involved in the program. The rest of Egypt's six million cultivable acres will remain in the hands of their present owners. Moreover, even if the program is quickly and efficiently implemented, rural living standards will not necessarily improve, because of the growing population. Underemployment among hired farm laborers may increase, and production may actually decrease as a result of the changes in ownership, production methods, and marketing channels. Government attempts to collect payments for the land from the new peasant proprietors will probably become a continuing cause of friction, even though payment rates have been set at half or less of the value of the land to be expropriated and are to be spaced over a 30-year period.

34. Despite some success in developing new markets for its cotton through increased sales to Israel and growing barter trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Egypt faces continuing problems in the disposal of the crop. These would become especially severe if a revision of US cotton export policy in 1956 were to confront Egypt with the competition of US surplus sales. In addition, Egypt's difficulties in selling long staple cotton to the US are increased by a rigid US import quota and by the growing competition of domestic equivalents and synthetics. In these circumstances, Egyptian trade with the Bloc, which in 1954–1955 took over 22 percent of Egypt's total cotton exports, is likely to increase. While such trade may provide a solution to the cotton surplus, growing dependence on this outlet may make Egypt increasingly susceptible to economic pressures and inducements from the Soviet Bloc, particularly if world cotton prices continue to decline.

35. The key project in the regime's internal development program is the construction of a new high dam on the Nile, a few miles south of the existing Aswan Dam. Over-all costs of the project, including land reclamation and hydroelectric installations, are estimated at approximately $1.3 billion, including about $400 million in foreign exchange components. Construction time for the dam is estimated at 10 years, with a total of 18 years required for completion of all the related projects. The dam should make possible the reclamation of about 1.5 million acres, making up to one-third more arable land available than at present. The hydroelectric installations would provide an important impetus to industry.

36. Financing the High Dam presents formidable obstacles, since it depends not only on foreign assistance, but also on Egypt's willingness to concentrate its own development resources almost

exclusively on this project, and to hold government spending to an absolute minimum in other respects. Failure to exercise this sort of discipline would probably result in unsound government financing with serious inflationary consequences. The Egyptians have engaged in extensive negotiations with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which has concluded on the basis of engineering studies that the project is technically feasible. The Bank has been reluctant, however, to advance a loan until it was satisfied that Egypt or other sources would provide a substantial portion (about 50 percent) of the outside financing necessary. It has also been hesitant to do so until agreement was reached between Egypt and the Sudan on the Nile waters. More recently, an international consortium of British, French, and German firms has done considerable planning for the project, and if financing can be obtained either through the IBRD or with direct Western governmental aid, appears to be ready to proceed.

37. Agreement with the Sudan on the division of presently unallocated Nile waters will be difficult to achieve. The Sudanese are studying an Egyptian proposal, but the good offices of the UK and possibly of the US may be required before agreement can be reached. The principal factors influencing the Sudan's position are its own rapid movement toward independence and the difficulties in reconciling Egyptian requirements with its own development plans and anticipated needs.

38. In the face of slow progress with the West, Egypt has received from the USSR an offer reported to have been of $600 million in Soviet goods and services to construct the dam. Payment for this would be in cotton and rice over a 30-year period at two percent interest. If the USSR actually followed through, the Aswan High Dam would constitute an enormous monument to Soviet industry. During the course of its construction, it would serve as an important vehicle for the extension of Soviet influence. In spite of certain technical and other objections, the Nasir regime is determined to carry out the project as evidence of its efforts on behalf of the Egyptian masses. If the regime lost hope of obtaining satisfactory financing assistance from Western sources, it would probably seek an acceptable offer from the USSR.

39. Even completion of the High Dam is unlikely to raise the Egyptian standard of living significantly, since the population will probably continue to grow at a rate sufficient to absorb the added resources without increasing per capita income. The regime's plans for increasing industrialization, including construction of a steel mill at Helwan and a fertilizer plant at Aswan, are also unlikely to have a substantial beneficial impact. Industry cannot expand in the future as rapidly as it has during the last 15 years, because of the limited

internal markets for those goods which can be economically produced in Egypt. Moreover, only a small fraction of Egyptian manufactures can meet the competition in world markets.

40. In sum, while some progress may be made in coping with Egypt's economic problems, the population growth factor is such that present reforms and development plans, even if fully implemented, would probably succeed only in holding the low standard of living at its present level. Egypt could probably make some adjustments in its economy by diverting considerable acreage from cotton to wheat, as was done in World War II. However, at present prices of wheat and cotton, Egypt is likely to prefer the production of cotton.

IV. Military Outlook

41. The Egyptian ground forces consist of the regular army, the Frontier Corps, and the National Guard. The regular army, with a strength of 76,000, is composed of 2 infantry division headquarters, 7 infantry brigades, 2 antiaircraft brigades, 1 airborne brigade, 3 armored groups (brigades), and 3 other units at brigade strength, together with smaller artillery, antitank, engineer signal and service units. The National Guard, with an estimated strength of 60,000 (including commandos), is loosely organized along lines paralleling the regular army, but suffers a lack of officers, noncommissioned officers, and equipment. Nevertheless, about 10,000 National Guard troops are serving on the Israeli frontier with the regular army. The Frontier Corps of 6,400 men is disposed along the frontiers in numerous small units. Prior to the Soviet Bloc arms deal, the Egyptian Air Force had 260 aircraft, including 52 jet fighters. Its personnel strength consists of 700 officers, 377 of whom are pilots, and 6,000 enlisted men and civilians. The navy has a personnel strength of 5,700, equipped with a variety of light escort, coastal patrol, and service vessels.

42. At the present time approximately 30,000 regular army and National Guard troops, primarily infantry with a small amount of artillery and tanks, are deployed in the Sinai Peninsula.

43. Throughout its tenure of power, the RCC has assigned a high priority to the improvement of the armed forces. Indeed, it was the poor condition of Egypt's forces under the old regime, and their consequent defeat in the Palestine War of 1948, which stimulated the RCC's rise to power. The regime will almost certainly continue its vigorous efforts to improve Egypt's military establishment. Its arms deal with the Soviet Bloc has won the approval of politically conscious civilian elements who share with the regime a desire to build up Egypt's military capabilities against Israel.

44. The RCC has been highly successful in improving the morale of the armed forces. It has increased military pay and allowances and improved quarters for the forces. Considerable dead wood among senior military officers has been eliminated. Training and performance, primarily at the infantry battalion level, have been considerably improved, in part through the efforts of an unofficial German advisory mission. Morale in all services has also been substantially raised by the government's success in procuring quantities of relatively modern arms and by its tougher military policy toward Israel.

45. Egypt's actual military capabilities, however, have probably not been significantly improved as yet. The high command and staff are still markedly deficient in professional knowledge and experience. Serious problems of supply and logistics would have to be overcome before the forces could perform efficiently in combat. The political and administrative role played by top level army and air force officers has diverted their attention from military matters. It would take considerable time, effort, and money to make the Egyptian Navy, which lacks modern combat vessels and trained personnel, an effective organization.

46. Until recently, the regime's efforts to modernize and reorganize the forces have been frustrated by its failure to procure modern weapons. Most of the weapons which have been obtained from various foreign commercial sources have been obsolete and heterogeneous. Since 1954, Egypt has obtained about 29 Centurion tanks and 30 jet fighters from the UK, and other military items, including two destroyers, are on order from the UK. France has agreed to resume arms shipments which were suspended as a result of Egyptian support for the North African nationalists. In 1954, Egypt declined an offer of US grant military aid on the grounds that it could not accept the legal conditions required by the US Military Defense Assistance Program. In the summer of 1955, the US approved an Egyptian request to purchase 100 medium tanks, 50 light piston bombers, and other equipment, but conclusion of the agreement was delayed because of Egypt's difficulties in finding the dollars to pay for these items.

47. Soviet agreement to sell military equipment to Egypt was first expressed to Nasir in the spring of 1955. Nasir announced in late September that Egypt had contracted with Czechoslovakia for an unspecified amount of equipment. Nasir has maintained that the contract is a purely commercial agreement. The agreement is said to be of five years duration and to include an initial order of: 200 jet aircraft; 100 "heavy" tanks; 6 motor torpedo boats; and 2 submarines—all with necessary spare parts. An initial shipment of 37 light jet bombers and 63 MIG–15's is reportedly to be delivered by

December 1955 and the 100 tanks are to be delivered at an unspecified early date. Some deliveries already have been made and Bloc technicians have arrived in Egypt to assemble the equipment and to instruct in maintenance and operation. The Egyptians claim that these technicians are to remain for limited periods only.

48. Assuming that the Bloc actually supplies all of these items, and that they are in good condition, in terms of military hardware alone the deal would: (a) give Egypt marked qualitative and quantitative superiority in both fighter and bomber aircraft over Israel, which is already inferior in numbers of aircraft to the Arab states as a group; (b) significantly reduce Israel's present numerical superiority in tanks; and (c) furnish Egypt with means of harassing Israel's shipping.[3] With the assistance of Soviet Bloc technicians, the Egyptian Army could have a limited number of tanks in operation in a few weeks after delivery, and within four to five months could have about 100 in operation. However, about a year would be required before the new tanks could be integrated and effectively used in unit operations.

49. The Egyptian Air Force (EAF) presently has about 30 pilots qualified and considered combat-ready, under Middle East standards, in British types of jet aircraft. Training of these pilots in Soviet aircraft may have begun already. Improvement of EAF offensive capability against Israel would nevertheless be slow due to inefficiencies in maintenance and supply. It would probably take at least six months for this improvement in offensive capability to become significant. Egypt's air defense capability, now considered negligible, would likewise improve with the addition of the new types of aircraft. However, the lack of radar, early warning, and a good communications system will minimize this improvement in air defense.

50. Although the motor torpedo boats could probably be used on receipt, at least a year would be required before Soviet submarines could be effectively operated by Egyptian crews.

51. The chief immediate effect of the arms deals on Egypt's combat capabilities has been to raise morale. Until the Egyptians are ready to use the new equipment in unit operations, they will probably remain extremely vulnerable to an Israeli attack in force. If such an attack should occur under present circumstances, we estimate that Egypt could defend the Sinai area for only a very short time. Even assuming a successful withdrawal from Sinai, Egyptian forces would probably not be capable of conducting offensive opera-

[3] A comparison of present Egyptian and Israeli armaments strengths, excluding those scheduled for Egypt from the Soviet Bloc, appears in an appendix. [Footnote in the source text.]

tions unless the greater part of Israeli forces were engaged on other fronts.

52. Egypt's efforts to improve its capabilities will be hampered by deficiencies in logistics, command and staff proficiency, and intangible military qualities such as esprit de corps. Over the long run, however, several factors must be considered in evaluating Egypt's military potential. It has a much greater population potential for expansion of the armed forces than does Israel, and in a war of attrition could absorb far more casualties. Together with its Arab allies, it commands economic resources superior to those of Israel, and is in a better geographical position to withstand blockade. If Egypt could absorb and effectively utilize extensive amounts of Soviet equipment, its present power relationship with Israel might be reversed.

V. Future Foreign Policies and Orientation

53. The fundamental objective of Egypt's foreign policy is to maintain freedom from foreign domination. To this end, the regime considers that it must maintain an independent position between the great power blocs. Although the RCC is opposed to local Egyptian Communism, it has welcomed Soviet Bloc support as a means of counteracting Western pressures on Egypt. It sees rivalry between the Bloc and the West as presenting an opportunity both to secure economic advantages and to advance its foreign policy objectives.

54. Specific Egyptian foreign policy objectives include: (a) acquiring leadership in the Arab world; (b) strengthening Egypt's military and political position vis-à-vis Israel; (3) establishing influence in the Sudan; and (d) a general undermining of the Western position in the Middle East and in Africa.

55. *The Sino-Soviet Bloc.* The RCC almost certainly estimates that the arms agreement has substantially improved its domestic and international position. It almost certainly will not abandon this agreement in the face of Western pressures and it will continue to welcome additional Bloc support.

56. Since the signing of the Turco-Pakistani Pact, which preceded the Baghdad Pact,[4] Egypt has led Arab opposition to Western defense efforts, supported by Syria and Saudi Arabia—the other recipients of Soviet arms offers. The USSR almost certainly appreciates that US–UK difficulties in creating a defense system will be seriously increased: (a) by heightening Arab-Israeli tensions; (b) by depriving the Western Powers of the advantage of being the only significant source of arms for the Arab states; and (c) by creating

[4] Turkey, Iraq, the UK, Pakistan, and Iran are now members of this Pact. [Footnote in the source text.]

invidious comparisons in Arab minds between the spectacular amount and easy terms of Soviet aid promised to Egypt, and the relative handful of materiel which Iraq has been receiving as a member of the "northern tier" group of nations.

57. In addition to undermining Western defense efforts and influence in the Middle East, present Soviet policies are probably aimed at lessening Egypt's dependence on the West, increasing Soviet bargaining power, and fostering the idea that the USSR shares common objectives in the area with Egypt and its Arab allies. The Soviets probably expect that Egyptian acceptance of arms from the Bloc in exchange for cotton, together with recent agreements for substantially increased barter trade in nonmilitary items, will require continued Egyptian reliance on the Bloc, thus providing increased opportunities for subversion and political penetration.

58. In the short run, the most promising and immediate opportunities open to the Soviets lie in exploiting the strong neutralist feeling of the RCC and its supporters. Nasir's trip to the Bandung Conference in April 1955, already had strengthened this neutralism, and Nehru may have encouraged Nasir's opposition to US and UK-backed defense pacts in the Middle East. Tito's success in developing a middle position has probably also impressed him.

59. We believe that the RCC intends to avoid political alignment with the Soviet Bloc. It is unlikely that Egypt would enter into political commitments in exchange for Soviet arms or economic aid. The same apprehensive, suspicious nationalism that underlay Egypt's rejection of alignment with the West in a Middle East defense organization will probably work with equal force against Soviet efforts to obtain a special position in Egypt. Egypt will continue to interpret any arms agreements with the Soviet Bloc as commercial transactions without political implications, and it will take the position that such transactions should not affect good relations with the West.

60. However, the RCC regime almost certainly overestimates its ability to handle both the short and long-range risks of accepting the Soviet arms offer. The sheer technical problems of assembling and maintaining the materiel involved, quite aside from training Egyptian personnel to use it effectively, will place the regime under strong compulsions to admit greater numbers of Bloc technicians and training personnel for longer periods than it probably now thinks will be necessary. Having acquired the arms, Nasir will be reluctant to close Egypt's doors to such personnel as may be needed to make them useful, particularly if the USSR itself and the Bloc representatives sent to Egypt continue to avoid the appearance of having political or subversive designs. Egypt will also remain dependent on the Bloc for spare parts.

61. To the extent that the RCC is alarmed and provoked by Israeli activist border policies, the urge to seek continuing Bloc technical and military help will increase. If war should actually break out between Egypt and Israel, assuming it continued for any considerable period, the urge would probably become irresistible.

62. Initially at least, the Bloc is likely to behave with circumspection in order to soothe Egyptian fears of Soviet political and subversive intentions. The USSR will also probably employ occasions such as Nasir's visit to Moscow, scheduled for 1956, and Chou En-lai's forthcoming trip to Cairo, to underscore the similarity of Bloc and Egyptian objectives in the Middle East. The USSR through such measures will also exploit Nasir's desire for prestige in the international community.

63. So long as the Soviets maintain this correct attitude, the RCC regime will be under strong pressure to accept continuing and even increased ties with the Bloc. The RCC appears sufficiently impressed by current Soviet "soft" tactics to believe that deals with the Bloc involve comparatively little risk. In the long run, barring a hardening of Soviet policy toward Egypt, the main factors which will determine the extent of Soviet influence in Egypt are: (a) the regime's own estimate of its need for Western support to insure its independence; (b) the extent to which its economic, political, and military aspirations are actually satisfied by the West; and (c) the degree of Egyptian satisfaction or dissatisfaction with Soviet performance. Should Egypt feel that it had been "written off" by the West, it would be forced into increasing dependence on the Bloc.

64. If the Soviet Bloc elected to supplement material offers to Egypt by a more active campaign on behalf of the Egyptian and Arab position on political issues in the area, the RCC would almost certainly welcome such support. The USSR has already indicated that it is prepared to take a more active political part in seeing that "justice," as Egypt conceives of it, is done in the Middle East. It has reportedly even assured Nasir that it will seek his prior approval before adopting policies on questions, such as arms aid to the Sudan, which affect Egypt's interests. A Soviet move in the UN in favor of Arab demands for implementing the 1947 UN resolution for the partition of Palestine would evoke powerful reactions of approval within Egypt and other Arab states. It would place the RCC under an obvious public political debt to the Bloc, and substantially enhance the prestige and potential of the Bloc and of Egyptian Communists. It would also place the Western Powers in an extremely difficult position, in view of their relations with Israel, and would intensify existing Arab resentment at the West's support of Israel.

65. *Relations with the US.* The strains on Egyptian relations with the US resulting from Egypt's arms deal have come on top of a

number of other policy conflicts. The Egyptians have long regarded US support for Israel as a serious if not fatal impediment to cooperation with the US. In the past year or so, US and UK-backed "northern tier" defense efforts have appeared to the RCC to run squarely against its interests, since these efforts involve support for Egypt's only potent Arab rival, Iraq. Additional Egyptian resentment toward the US has resulted from the regime's failure to obtain arms from the US on its own terms, from delay in securing US assistance for the high dam, from apprehensions that the US might undercut Egypt by subsidizing US cotton exports, from the RCC's conviction that the US has been unsympathetic to Egyptian objectives in the Sudan, and from the US position on the French North African question.

66. We believe that the RCC will continue to want friendly relations with the US, and its acceptance of Bloc support may even enhance the value it sets on Western assistance, both for its own value and as a counterweight. The Egyptians in any event will probably make use of Soviet offers in an effort to gain concessions from the US. At the same time, Nasir and his associates, strengthened in their belief that Soviet support has increased their bargaining power, will be more inclined than ever to resist concessions to the West which appear to them inconsistent with their goal of independence and pursuit of their objectives in the area.

67. *Relations with the UK and France.* Egyptian hatred for British "imperialism" remains strong and the UK, along with the US, continues to incur Egyptian resentment over Western defense policies and support for Iraq and Israel. At the same time, Egypt continues to have important economic and military ties with the UK. Egyptian leaders not only retain a certain respect for UK advice, but also recognize that the UK continues to exercise influence in Jordan and, to a lesser extent, in Iraq, the Sudan, and Libya. Thus in certain matters the UK may be in a better position than the US to influence Egyptian policy. For the most part, however, the RCC's relations with the US and UK are not likely to differ significantly.

68. Egypt and France share a certain interest in preventing the extension of Iraqi influence in the Levant. Nevertheless, relations have been strained by Egypt's opposition to the French position in North Africa and by Egyptian resentment of French sales of jet fighters and other arms to Israel. Although Egypt may tone down its support of the nationalist cause in French North Africa as a result of a French agreement to resume the sale of arms to Egypt, it is unlikely to abandon this support.

Policies Toward Middle East Questions

69. *Israel.* Recent Bloc support for the Arab side against Israel has diminished the chances that the RCC would move toward an accommodation with Israel. Indeed the arms deal has substantially increased the likelihood of an Egyptian-Israeli war. Israel may feel compelled to take preventive action. Egypt will probably respond more vigorously to Israeli border actions and, as its strength increases, may become more disposed to launch a "second round" against Israel. The regime is also likely to continue its intransigence with respect to Israel's demands for passage through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.

70. Barring a war, there is some chance that Egypt's growing military strength, by giving the Nasir regime self-confidence, would lead it to continue to put out feelers for an Israeli-Egyptian settlement—but only on Egypt's own terms. Nasir has suggested that if Israel would concede a defensible area in the Negev linking Egypt and Jordan and compensate the refugees, Egypt might be ready to negotiate some form of settlement. For the foreseeable future, however, there is little likelihood that Israel would accept a proposal involving any such alienation of its territory. Egyptian willingness to liquidate the Israel problem by some such form of settlement might be increased if the regime became preoccupied with problems relatively remote from the Arab-Israel area, notably its relations with the Sudan.

71. *Other Arab States.* In most of the Arab world, Egypt's arms deal with the Soviet Bloc was hailed as a bold assertion of independence from Western tutelage, and as a highly effective move toward overcoming Israel's military superiority. Among the Arab states the regime's prestige is now higher than ever, having largely recovered from the blow suffered early in 1955 when Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact and the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian Pact failed. The RCC is accordingly likely to pursue its objectives in the Arab world with increased vigor and greater hopes of success.

72. Foremost among these objectives is Egyptian leadership of the other Arab states. In this effort, the RCC finds itself seriously challenged only by Iraq. The latter's defense ties with the West violate Egypt's concept of a purely Arab defense arrangement, and combined with Iraq's recent maneuvers in Syria, raise the spectre of Iraqi domination of the northern Arab states. Such a development would be particularly repugnant to Egypt (and Saudi Arabia) since, the regime fears, it would leave Egypt isolated, and mean the continuation of US and UK special positions among the Arab states. The main arena of Egypt's rivalry with Iraq continues to be the strategically located but weak and divided state of Syria. Egypt

scored a success in October 1955 when it concluded a defense pact with Syria, providing for unified command, a joint military fund, and immediate mutual assistance in case of an Israeli attack.

73. Egypt is likely to attempt, on the one hand, to strengthen the Arab League, or a similar association, and concurrently to encourage bilateral military arrangements between Egypt and other Arab states (Iraq excepted). With Syria uppermost in mind, Egypt will almost certainly oppose amalgamation of any Arab states. It will almost certainly continue vigorous efforts to counteract Iraqi moves in Syria, and will accept financial support from Saudi Arabia to this end. It is unlikely that the RCC could be reconciled to Iraqi domination of Syria even if it recognized that the alternative might be Soviet penetration and ultimately Communist domination.

74. Should Egypt be confronted with an actual Iraqi take-over in Syria, its reaction would be extremely hostile and emotional. The Nasir regime would feel compelled to honor its alliance with Syria, although it could do little militarily. At a minimum it would probably step up its anti-Iraq campaign in Syria and other Arab states, with the vigorous help of Saudi Arabia. The RCC might even commit aircraft against Iraqi forces if the latter entered Syria.

75. *The Sudan.* The RCC is disturbed by the apparent failure of its Sudanese policies to produce a pro-Egyptian provisional government in the Sudan. It has reluctantly accepted the probability that when the present transitional period ends in 1956, the Sudanese will choose independence rather than some form of union with Egypt. Egypt fears that this development would jeopardize the prospects for agreement on the Nile waters. In addition, Egypt fears that an independent Sudanese government would be weak and unstable, and could not be relied on to uphold agreements on water use. Finally, an independent Sudan would end the RCC's hopes of exploiting Sudanese land resources to help solve Egypt's pressing population problems.

76. It appears unlikely that Egypt can prevent a Sudanese decision in favor of independence. However, it will probably continue its efforts to discredit pro-independence elements in the Sudan, to strengthen pro-union groups, and to foster conflict between the southern and northern areas of the Sudan. Should either the transitional Sudanese government or its successor reject Egyptian offers for a water agreement without leaving the door open for further negotiations, a serious crisis in Egyptian-Sudanese relations would almost certainly develop, possibly leading to the use of force by the RCC and thus to direct conflict with the UK. In the meantime, Egypt is likely to encourage the Sudan to pursue an "independent" and "neutral" policy toward the great powers, which might mean closer Sudanese ties with the Soviet Bloc.

VI. Probable Consequences of Possible US Courses of Action

77. While the RCC wishes to retain US support, it believes that Egypt's overriding interests justify actions such as the arms deal with the Soviet Bloc or opposition to the "northern tier" alliance. It also believes that the US should maintain a tolerant attitude toward such actions.

78. If the US reaction to the Soviet arms deal is relatively mild and involves no modification of former policies toward Egypt, the RCC's initial response probably will be one of relief. So far, the absence of any marked US policy reaction has resulted in RCC uneasiness as to the form US policy toward Egypt might eventually take. This uneasiness could lead to increased suspicion of the US and consequently to further restriction of US activities in Egypt.

79. A US or IBRD decision to assist Egypt in constructing the High Aswan Dam would be welcomed as a strong indication of continued US support. At the same time, the regime would conclude that such a decision was in direct response to the arms deal and to Soviet economic assistance offers, and that it could continue to obtain benefits by playing the West and the Bloc off against each other.

80. Although a US withdrawal of economic and technical aid already programmed would have little effect on the Egyptian economy, such a move would probably produce an angry and emotional reaction from the RCC. It would almost certainly lead Nasir to conclude that the US was attempting to isolate Egypt and bring about the downfall of the regime. The danger of violent anti-US disorders would be great. The RCC would probably rely increasingly on Soviet economic and technical support. These dangers would be greatly increased if in addition to withdrawing existing aid, the US should make other moves, such as the dumping of surplus US cotton. Such a policy or even the public threat of it would almost certainly have a highly unsettling effect on Egypt's economy.

81. A US decision to discontinue aid after the end of the current year's program would have only a limited effect on Egypt's economy. Adverse reaction in Egypt would not be as great as if existing programs were abruptly terminated. Such action, however, would be regarded by the regime as evidence of US opposition, or at least indifference, to the RCC's continued control of Egypt.

82. The Egyptian reaction to US moves to reassure Israel would depend on the extent to which such moves appeared to apply to both sides and to be designed to preserve the status quo. A reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 would probably produce only a slight reaction in Egypt and the other Arab states. A convincing demonstration of US determination to intervene effectively in

the event of aggression would probably reassure and restrain both sides, although Egypt and the other Arab states would regard it primarily as a guarantee of Israel's security. If the US provided Israel with any amount of arms, even if labeled as being primarily defensive, or particularly if it extended to Israel alone a guarantee of its presently-held territory, US relations with Egypt and the other Arab states would be severely strained. Such a US security guarantee, if accompanied by extensive shipments of arms, not only might lead Egypt to break off relations with the US, and even to accept a Soviet guarantee if offered, but also would endanger the position of the Western Powers throughout the Middle East.

APPENDIX

EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI MILITARY CAPABILITIES[5]

Personnel Strength

	Army	Air Force	Navy	Other	Total
Egypt	76,000	3,000	5,700	20,000–24,000	105,000–109,000
Israel[6]	8,000	2,000	3,000	112,000 (Reserves)	200,000

Matériel Strength of the Ground Forces

	Medium Tanks	Light Tanks	Armored Cars	Mortars & 75mm. Towed Fld. Arty.	AA Arty. 40mm. & Larger	Self-Propelled Arty.
Egypt	149		90	516	114	8
Israel	192	130	138	2,098	48	

Principal Aircraft[7]

	Jet Fighters	Piston Fighters	Bombers
Egypt	52	12	6
Israel	29	53	58

Principal Naval Strength

	Patrol Vessels	Amphibious Warfare Vessels	Minesweepers
Egypt[8]	16	4	9
Israel[8]	23	6	2

[5] The following tables do not take into account the arms Egypt expects to acquire from the Soviet Bloc, since firm details are not available. [This and following footnotes are in the source text.]

[6] Israel's highly trained reserves, which can be mobilized in 24–48 hours, give it a force approximately twice the size of Egypt's.

[7] Despite Egypt's numerical advantage in jet aircraft, it is estimated that at the present time the Israel Air Force could operate almost at will in the area against Egypt because of a higher aircraft-in-commission rate and the presence of well-trained crews.

[8] Egypt and Israel have each purchased two destroyers from the UK. Delivery is now estimated for late 1956.

412. Telegram From the Consulate General in Geneva to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Geneva, November 16, 1955—noon.

10. For Ambassador from Secretary. Macmillan told me yesterday Eden is concerned over impression in Tel Aviv that US Government does not fully support his Guildhall speech which UK Ambassador has assured Israeli Government had Secretary's "full agreement". He asks at minimum that Ben Gurion be told by you that US supports UK in this matter.

For your information:

While not desiring to disassociate myself from Eden initiative which on whole I consider constructive, you should know that I did not approve Eden speech in advance. In fact I was only shown by Macmillan single paragraph from speech at noon on day of its delivery and I raised question about point it discussed reference to UN resolution of 1947. [2] *End your information.*

Unless Department instructs you to contrary I suggest you might however let Ben Gurion know in general terms that US and

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/11-1655. Secret; Priority. The source text is a copy repeated to Washington as Secto 317. Received at 8:42 a.m. Also repeated priority to London.

[2] See Document 391.

UK see alike on imperative need for Arab-Israeli settlement even at some substantial sacrifice by Israel and US endorses Eden speech insofar as it supports my speech of August 26.

For Hoover. I understand British Embassy, Washington has copy UK cable from Tel Aviv on which Eden's concern based. [3] I incline strongly against public statement which cable suggests unless you were consulted more fully than I was and in timely advance of Eden speech.

Dulles

[3] Patrick Hancock of the British Delegation in Geneva gave Merchant a copy of the telegram from Tel Aviv under cover of a memorandum dated November 15. The telegram reported that Israeli press comment on Eden's speech was "increasingly uncompromising and unfriendly"; that "the Israel Government believes that the U.S. Government are not fully behind it"; and that the United States could best correct this misconception by issuing a public statement of support. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1555)

413. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 16, 1955[1]

SUBJECT

Israeli Request to Purchase Arms

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*Israel*
The Acting Secretary of State	Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador
G—Mr. Robert Murphy	Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister
NEA—Mr. George V. Allen	Col. Katriel Salmon, Military Attaché

Ambassador Eban said he had called in pursuance of a conversation between Foreign Minister Sharett and Secretary of State Dulles in Geneva regarding arms. [2] He emphasized that the Israeli Government had had no intention whatever of expending its resources for any considerable arms purchases until a few months ago, when the *massive* imbalance being created by the Czech-Egyptian arms deal became known. He said the Israeli request for arms sprang *directly*

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/11–1655. Secret. Drafted by Allen.

[2] Reported in Document 371.

from that imbalance. He was fearful that other Arab states might also obtain large quantities of arms from the Soviet bloc and cited the continued threats and hostile acts against Israel by its Arab neighbors as the basis for the dire apprehensions of the Israeli people.

Ambassador Eban said that Israel, like the United States, wanted to be strong militarily in order to *prevent* aggression.

The Ambassador explained that Israel came to the United States because the 1950 Tripartite Declaration led his Government to believe that it could expect United States help. (His succeeding formal presentation followed almost verbally the attached note to the Secretary of State. [3]

Mr. Hoover's reply was in accordance with the attached talking paper [4] and draft press release. [5] He emphasized the statement by President Eisenhower on November 9 and the statement of the Secretary of State on August 26, and United States support for the current proposals and efforts of General Burns, United Nations Chief of Staff in Palestine. He said that the State Department and other appropriate United States agencies would examine the Israeli request and that we would have to take into consideration the other governments which signed the Tripartite Declaration.

Ambassador Eban expressed appreciation for this clarification of the principles which would govern the United States in its examination of his Government's request, which, he felt, was fully in accord with President Eisenhower's statement opposing an arms race and stating that arms would be accorded for self-defense. He emphasized that the Israeli request for arms was *solely* for defensive purposes. He asked that the Israeli list of arms be kept strictly confidential, for security reasons. As regards General Burns' proposals, he said the General was already fully aware of his Government's approval. The only reason General Burns had not been authorized to inform the

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[3] The note, not attached to the source text, requested approval for Israel's purchase of arms and equipment, listed on an attachment. It declared that Israel's decision to expand its military procurement program was due to the "massive influx of Soviet arms into Egypt" under the Czech-Egyptian agreement which would enable Egypt to threaten Israel's population centers and to extend belligerent practices into the Mediterranean. It argued that in the past, the United States had opposed creation of an arms imbalance which could be used for intimidation or aggression, and it declared that Israel's proposed arms purchase program was intended "to strengthen Israel's capacity of legitimate self-defense to the minimal extent compatible with her security." (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/11–1655)

[4] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 784A.5–MSP/11–1555)

[5] No copy of the draft press release has been found in Department of State files. According to a conversation between Willie Morris of the British Embassy and Burdett, however, a Department of State spokesman read a statement to the press after the conclusion of the Hoover–Eban conversation. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11–1655)

Egyptian Government of this approval was a technical one, i.e., the Egyptians would have refused if they felt Israel had already agreed.

Mr. Allen asked whether the Israeli Government would agree to a demarcation of the entire El Auja demilitarized zone, pointing out that if United Nations observers are to certify the absence of military installations and personnel in the zone, they would need to know the precise boundaries of the zone on all sides. Mr. Eban said he would not wish to go beyond the Burns proposals [6] at this time since, if additional proposals were added, his Government might wish to ask, for example, that the area in Sinai beyond which Egypt is forbidden by the armistice to maintain troops and installations should also be demarcated.

Referring to Mr. Hoover's references to a general settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem, Mr. Eban spoke in strong opposition to the recent Mansion House speech of Prime Minister Eden. He said that references had often been made for the necessity for secret diplomacy when matters such as frontiers were to be discussed. Consequently, he had been shocked by Mr. Eden's proposals regarding frontiers made from the most public platform possible. Even more important, Israeli objections were to the substance of Mr. Eden's reference to the United Nations resolutions. Speaking frankly, he did not think the United Kingdom could qualify in any way as a mediator in this question, since the United Kingdom had tried to prevent the creation of Israel from the start and today has numerous and intimate treaty relations with the Arab states. He thought it remarkable that the United Kingdom would now invoke the 1947 resolution when, at the time it was passed, the United Kingdom denounced it bitterly and refused even to permit the United Nations commission to enter Palestine. He said the United States and France were in quite a different position since "you don't sign up with any Arab state that comes along while leaving Israel out." He said his Government would be ready at any time any Arab state asked for boundary discussions under the armistice. He spoke in highest terms of the Secretary's speech of August 26 on the grounds that it did not prejudge the territorial settlement. He felt that the most urgent matter referred to in the Secretary's speech was the question of compensation for refugees. His Government was ready and anxious to begin discussions on this question promptly.

In answer to a question by Mr. Murphy, Colonel Salmon stated that Israel had no substantial arms purchasing programs in other countries. Mr. Eban referred to press reports that Israel was obtaining Mystére fighter planes from France and said that not one single

[6] See Documents 376 and 382.

Mystére had been obtained. He did not know what possibility there might be for obtaining Mystéres.

As regards financing, Mr. Eban referred again to the statement in the note that Israel hoped we would extend the lowest possible prices and most liberal credit terms in view of his Government's difficult economic and financial situation. Mr. Hoover pointed out that the question of financing was a complicated legal one requiring serious examination. In answer to a question, Mr. Eban and Colonel Salmon stated that the Israeli request was *not* contingent upon special financial arrangements being accorded by the United States.

Mr. Shiloah said that Mr. Sharett had pointed out to Mr. Dulles in Geneva that Israel did not know how to fight submarines and would welcome consultations with appropriate United States authorities on this subject. Mr. Hoover remarked that anti-submarine weapons are often under highest security classification.

Mr. Eban terminated the conversation with renewed emphasis on the solemnity and importance of his call on the Acting Secretary, on a subject which his Government regarded as a significant landmark in United States-Israeli relations.

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414. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, November 16, 1955—6 p.m.

2029. Geneva for Secretary. I am puzzled and confused as to our government's attitude toward Eden's Guildhall speech on Arab-Israel situation. I have had no reply to my telegram 1959 [2] in which I transmitted Eden's urgent request for some public statement, preferably by President, in support of position taken in speech in question. With regard to Secto 317 from Geneva, [3] I can only say that rightly or wrongly British have definite impression Eden's speech although not its exact phraseology had Secretary's approval. As stated in our telegram 1926, [4] we were told by Foreign Office on November 9 that "Secretary has been informed in Geneva of Prime Minister's intention make such statement and has agreed."

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1655. Secret; Priority. Received at 3:19 p.m. Repeated priority to Geneva.

[2] Document 398.

[3] Printed as Document 412.

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–955)

Embassy assumes from Deptel 739 November 13 to Beirut repeated London as 2687 [5] that our representatives in Middle East have been authorized in their discretion indicate to governments concerned that Department regards Eden's initiative as helpful, but this seems to fall somewhat short of the type of support which Eden evidently had in mind when he spoke to me on November 11 and which from standpoint of American-British relations I hoped might be forthcoming. In this connection, I feel Department may wish remember that last August when Secretary made his speech on subject, Macmillan came out within 24 hours with a statement publicly supporting Secretary's position, also that in his remarks in House of Commons yesterday (Embtel 2005 [6]), Eden referred no less than three separate times to fact that British and American Governments were working together for settlement of Arab-Israeli dispute.

In light of foregoing, I hope it will be possible for Department to advise me precisely in near future what I should say to Eden in reply to his approach to my November 11.

Aldrich

[5] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11–1155)
[6] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11–1555)

415. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 16, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

High Aswan Dam

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Allen.

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. Coulson, British Embassy
Mr. W. Morris, British Embassy
Mr. M. T. Flett, Financial Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Eugene Black, President, IBRD
Mr. Robert L. Garner, Vice President, IBRD
Mr. W. Randolph Burgess, Under Secretary, Treasury
Mr. Andrew N. Overby, Assistant Secretary, Treasury
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary, G
Mr. Herbert V. Prochnow, Deputy Under Secretary, E
Mr. George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary, NEA

Mr. Hoover explained that the purpose of this opening discussion between United States, UK, and IBRD officials was exploratory, without definite commitments on either side. Sir Roger agreed. Mr. Hoover then explained to Mr. Black that the US and UK Governments supported the IBRD entirely in this matter and asked what the Bank considered to be the chief problems involved.

Mr. Black said the chief question was whether Egypt would obtain adequate foreign exchange and provide enough local currency for the project. The Bank wanted to know whether Egypt was sufficiently serious in this matter to cut down on other projects and tighten its belt for the next ten years. He said the Egyptians have been naive in thinking that a project of this magnitude was easy, and were suspicious that the Bank was dictated to by the United States and United Kingdom. He pointed out that this was the biggest single undertaking the Bank had ever gone into. The Bank felt that $200 million was the most it could lend since this was the maximum amount of loans Egypt could service under present circumstances. Consequently any other loans that Egypt incurred for *any* purpose would reduce the amount of the IBRD loan.

Mr. Hoover asked whether the Bank felt it had to undertake the whole job at one time or could the task be carried out successfully by starting on a part of it. Mr. Black said all the IBRD studies up to the present had indicated that anyone who undertook the project should be prepared to go through with the whole job. Mr. Garner said the hydro-electric and power installations might conceivably be delayed and that the work could be spread out over 25 years but that both of these alternatives were highly undesirable.

Mr. Prochnow asked whether Egypt would derive any income from the project before it was completed. Mr. Garner said that a nominal amount of additional irrigation might be possible after the coffer dam was completed. In response to a question, he said we must expect that Egyptian cotton production will be increased by this project.

Mr. Hoover asked about the dangers of inflation in Egypt as a result of the undertaking. Mr. Black said the dangers were sizeable and that stern management by the Egyptian Government would be required. He pointed out that although the Bank would not advance the entire $200 million at once, it would have to put aside the money, charging Egypt three-fourths of one percent interest on the money being held. He said this would be the longest "standby" operation the Bank had yet undertaken. In answer to a question, he said the Bank would continually review Egypt's credit worthiness. He was aware that the Egyptian Minister of Finance, Mr. Kaissouni, thought the Bank was too pessimistic regarding Egypt's ability to repay foreign loans.

Mr. Flett asked whether the hydro-electric development was necessary to make the project financially feasible. Mr. Garner was doubtful that the project could be justified without the income to be produced by the production of electricity, estimated at 700,000 kw. originally, to be doubled subsequently.

Mr. Hoover asked how the Bank contemplated the additional $200 million in foreign exchange and $900 million in local currency would be raised. Mr. Black said the additional foreign exchange would probably have to come from grants. The local currency would be raised by taxes and internal borrowings. Mr. Prochnow thought that in order to avoid serious inflation in Egypt, which would increase the cost of construction greatly, Egypt would need a large amount of foreign aid in the form of commodities.

Mr. Black expressed doubt that an actual local contract could be signed between the Bank and the Egyptian Government in less than two years, because of the many preliminary studies and negotiations required. He pointed out that the IBRD had already given the Egyptian Government a letter of intent, several months ago, indicating that *if* Egypt would do certain things, the Bank would be able to undertake the project. He said the *if* was a very large one, as he had explained to Mr. Kaissouni last month in Istanbul and would explain to him again in Washington on November 21. [2]

Sir Roger asked what the IBRD would require in the way of assurances regarding additional foreign exchange on a grant basis. Mr. Black said that if the Bank had assurances by the United States and United Kingdom Governments that they would continue to support this project and back the Bank, he did not think a definite commitment stated in figures would be required. Mr. Garner pointed out that Egypt would not need substantial foreign exchange for two

[2] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files, but see Document 423.

or three years and that five years would be required for the construction of the diversion tunnels and the coffer dam.

Sir Roger asked specifically what the Bank wanted from the Egyptian Government before the Bank could give Egypt a go-ahead to start the preliminary work on the project. Mr. Black recalled that perhaps the biggest *if* in the letter of intent concerned a water agreement with the Sudan. Sir Roger thought that four or five months would be required to settle that matter. Mr. Black said that division of the water was not the only problem, since thirty thousand farms and homes in the Sudan would be flooded by the lake. At this point Mr. Black distributed draft copies of a memorandum of what he proposed to say to Mr. Kaissouni on November 21.[3] Sir Roger expressed the thought that the opening paragraph seemed somewhat peremptory in its emphasis on what assurances the Bank must have from Egypt. Mr. Black said the language could be made more "diplomatic" as long as the Bank's requirements were made clear. Mr. Burgess said the memorandum made sense to him. Sir Roger suggested that the Bank take the lead in calling a meeting of United States, United Kingdom and IBRD economists to consider the matter prior to Mr. Kaissouni's arrival. Mr. Hoover said that Mr. Prochnow would represent the State Department; Mr. Burgess said Mr. Overby would represent Treasury, and Sir Roger said that Mr. Flett would represent the United Kingdom. It was agreed that the meeting would be held on November 17.[4]

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[3] No copy of this memorandum has been found in Department of State files.

[4] No account of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

U.S. Interest in Funding the Aswan High Dam, November 17–December 31, 1955

416. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, November 17, 1955—3 p.m.

976. In contrast past sessions in which Fawzi often vague and probing he discussed Alpha with Trevelyan and me last evening in forthright manner. He outlined his views without prompting and was obviously speaking with authority Nasser. In summary his position as follows:

Tactics. Egypt prepared to work towards settlement Arab-Israeli issues at earliest practical date. GOE welcomes good offices of U.S. and U.K. toward that end. Initial moves should be highly secret and through diplomatic channels but use of Trieste approach or even direct contact not ruled out in later stages. If matters could be moved to where Egypt believed there was "51 percent chance" of success, Egypt would at that time take lead with other Arab States even at risk severe opposition. Until this stage reached other Arab States should not be brought into picture. First step to guide further discussions should be for U.S. and U.K. attempt secure agreement of both sides on principles of approaches to major issues. On this basis Fawzi believed we should by now have Egypt's views clearly enough in mind to approach Israel. This approach should not be on basis that Egypt had specifically agreed to certain things, but that in view of conversations here we felt that Egypt might be willing to consider settlement along lines certain principles.

Substance. Egypt's position on "major issues" may be summarized as follows:

(a) Jerusalem—Egypt will accept any solution that is acceptable to world community. If internationalization is so acceptable and practical this would be welcomed by Egypt. If this not possible and acceptance of split city and adequate system of protection of holy

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1755. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Received at 4:08 p.m. Repeated priority to London.

places along lines of Swedish resolution were acceptable to world community, then this too would be all right with Egypt. In other words Egypt willing approach discussions on Jerusalem with completely open mind.

(b) Refugees—Egypt believes there should be repatriation to extent practicable although realizes this quite restricted. For remainder of refugees, resettlement and compensation only answer. Compensation to be based upon actual loss of physical property only. Egypt accepts fact that resources beyond those of Israel would be necessary and would not object to principle that others help Israel pay what is really her own debt to society.

(c) Territorial—Egypt recognizes concessions from traditionally previously held positions must be made by both sides. Only principle that need be recognized as far as she concerned was that actual continuity of Arab sovereign territory should be reestablished. By this GOE did not mean a corridor. Size of territory to be transferred need not be defined at this stage during which only agreement upon principle should be sought. (There was considerable discussion regarding peacetime use of Eilath. Fawzi made clear if we pressed him on this point at this particular time his answer would be an emphatic "no". However he saw no hope of forcing decision at this early date. We gained impression that ultimate concession may be possible on this point but in any case would not be obtained easily and certainly not early in talks.)

(d) Blockade—provided other things could be worked out Egypt realized this would mean complete freedom of transit of Suez. It would also mean end of Arab blockade as far as third countries were concerned. Extent of Arab desire reestablish trade and other ties with Israel would be matter for their own sovereign determination and would not form part of any settlement agreements. In other words Government of Egypt realized that type of settlement she envisaged would end state of belligerency and legislative and legal positions based upon it.

Comment: Trevelyan and I believe this to be positive approach and we strongly recommend our governments now approach Israel upon basis outlined. Fawzi's presentation is certainly more than we have obtained from Government of Egypt on serious basis heretofore and much more than could be envisaged as coming from any other Arab State. Fawzi did not once mention 1947 partition boundaries. His position, as reported many times before, seems fairly close to Alpha plan with exception of Negev, which he clearly envisages to be last great obstacle to settlement. He was careful last night avoid using term "whole of Negev" and we believe he feels that by starting with matter of principle, gap could be eventually narrowed between present positions on both sides to point where outside forces could perhaps obtain solution upon some middle ground that both sides might "reluctantly" accept.

We were at roughly this stage before (although Fawzi now more definite and forthcoming and speaking with greater authority) when I urged approach to Israel in Embtel 461, September 14.[2] Department's cables however sought some further "concrete evidence" that Egypt desired settlement. I gather from discussions in Paris and Geneva that what was meant at minimum of this phrase was Egyptian willingness to appoint representative to join in settlement discussions either with Israelis or some third party at some specified place. Do hope (and Trevelyan concurs) that this position will not be maintained since it is clear that Government of Egypt will not agree to start out in this fashion. In addition obvious political difficulties, there are in fact many practical considerations including communications, selection of representatives et cetera that would cause them to refuse. Such a course could not be kept secret and neither Government of Egypt nor, we assume, ourselves would be willing to see matter become public or other Arab States informed until Government of Egypt can see some possibility of success. Furthermore Nasser obviously wishes to keep RCC out of matter as well until this stage reached.

Repeat British Ambassador and I strongly urge early approach to Israel as next step in discussions. We can continue exploring here as opportunities permit but this should not delay approach to Israel. After such approach we can more clearly work out subsequent tactics.[3]

Byroade

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[2] Document 274.

[3] On November 19, Macmillan sent Dulles a message in which Macmillan recommended, on the basis of this dinner conversation with Fawzi, that American and British representatives "explore the ground with the Israelis. There are, of course, risks in going ahead without some firmer basis, but on the whole I think we should take the chance, as both our Ambassadors seem to advise. There doesn't seem much hope of getting anything further from Nasser at this point." According to a handwritten notation on the source text, the Secretary received Macmillan's message on November 20 and indicated he did not believe that it required a reply. (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 15)

417. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, November 17, 1955—4 p.m.

515. At Prime Minister's request I called at his apartment in Jerusalem yesterday afternoon. Obviously Ben Gurion concerned over Eden speech and arms supplies to Egypt. In our long conversation he discussed emphatically and seriously current security position Israel which he said greatly worried him especially in light of recent developments. He said threat to Israel security becomes more dangerous every day; Nasser has boasted he will wipe out Israel in six months; and Eden's speech greatly strengthened Egypt's intransigence.

He said UK selling Egypt 64 Centurion tanks of which 38 delivered but UK fails to deliver to Israel equipment it agreed to sell her. Thus UK has violated spirit of tripartite declaration. France also selling arms to Egypt; British and French arms plus Soviet arms giving Egypt superiority over Israel.

Ben Gurion said that if GOI were not able to purchase certain arms from US because they were too expensive then US should not prevent France and Italy from selling arms to Israel. When I denied we had taken such action he replied "may be not France but we know definitely Italy is being prevented from selling to us." I again expressed doubt regarding authenticity of his information and subsequent to meeting I informed one of his assistants that I believed report on this subject from the [garble] Rome had been misunderstood. In response to request of Israel Embassy Rome for meeting to discuss arms procurement with Israel Deputy Minister of Defense [2] American Embassy Rome, not in position advise re Italian arms supply to Israel, had suggested such discussion might more properly take place in Washington or Tel Aviv (Rome's 1686 to Department [3]); there was no attempt prevent shipment as Ben Gurion alleged.

Ben Gurion repeated he was very worried as to what would happen to Israel if she sat idly by while arms poured into Egypt and Israel got virtually nothing and in somewhat restrained manner commented "Israel cannot wait quietly to be struck down. Consciously or unconsciously UK is giving Egypt possibility of striking down Israel".

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/11–1755. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:26 p.m. Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] Presumably Shimon Peres, who was Director General of the Ministry of Defense.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/11–1455)

I said effectiveness of UK and French arms supply to Egypt seemed to depend on relative quantities involved and whether it would be continuing operation or merely covered orders already placed or in pipeline. Ben Gurion thought any arms added to those Nasser receiving from Soviets increase materially threat to Israel's security and he opposed such policy.

Subject of Eden's speech was very much on his mind. He was considerably exercised by British Ambassadors statement to Foreign Ministry that speech had been fully agreed to by Secretary Dulles. Although he felt certain British Ambassador had not made deliberate misstatement Ben Gurion could not reconcile this statement with what he considered basic differences in Eden's speech and President Eisenhower's statement also of November 9 nor could he visualize Secretary approving speech containing such contradictions with President's statement. He then made following comparison: Eden's speech denied (*sic*) British arms to Israel whereas President agreed to consider arms sales to Israel; made no reference to tripartite declaration whereas President did; did not speak against area arms race but President spoke against arms race.

He attacked Eden's mention of UN resolution 1947 along lines his Knesset speech November 15 (Embtel 508 [4]) underscoring particularly fact that resolution never contemplated sovereignty for any existing Arab state over any land now held by Israel or over area since taken by Jordan or Gaza now held by Egypt.

In reply my question how he interpreted Eden speech he said "it is an attempt to eliminate Israel—not by people of Great Britain but by present government which considers Israel nuisance and feels it could make deal with Arab states if Israel no longer exists." Re concession of land by Israel, he said, "I do not believe that people of Great Britain would permit their government to send troops to fight against Israel." He then referred to an interview he gave to British correspondent some months ago in which he said if UK wanted Israel to make concessions of its sovereign area then she must send troops to enforce that wish, in which event Israel would fight. That attitude re Eden's proposal of territorial concessions held good today, he said. He thought Eden's suggestion was move to isolate Israel in area as well as within western world.

I was unable to extract from Ben Gurion his own estimate of time before Egypt would be in position to employ incoming Soviet arms. But he implied that danger was closer than once believed and spoke of daily increase in danger. My impression was Israel would be able more accurately to assess imminence of danger in two or three months. I spoke of Egypt's need for trained pilots to fly MIGs.

[4] See footnote 5, Document 406.

Ben Gurion said Communist pilots would be supplied with planes. I replied that Nasser claimed to have sent his own men to Czechoslovakia for training but Ben Gurion said there would also be Czechoslovakian pilots and those to come over Israel would probably be Czechs—and every technician would be Communist agent.

Ben Gurion then discussed at some length design of Soviets to penetrate not only the Near East but entire African continent pointing to Egypt as ideal starting point. Nasser, he thought, was ideal instrument or agent who although probably legally anti-Communist would soon be unwitting tool of USSR. Ben Gurion wondered if USG was alive to this danger. I replied that I was certain that Secretary Dulles understood Nasser and that he was thoroughly aware of critical dangers of Soviet penetration and ambitions. Nor did I feel that he has been misled by the "Geneva smiles" as Ben Gurion thought possible. He expressed hope that I was right.

Although Ben Gurion appeared to be not well man he showed considerable vigor and his voice was strong. He was using cane in connection with his attack of lumbago but he escorted me down hall to entrance to his apartment with surprising freedom of action. His color was as high as usual but not usual healthy pink. He spoke with his usual emphasis but showed more emotion than I have ever noted in past and revealed, I thought, greater seriousness of attitude toward situation and reflected more obviously heavy weight of his responsibilities as Prime Minister. Herzog, of American section, Foreign Office who was present thought Ben Gurion showed more signs of worry and responsibility than he had seen since 1948 war days.

Lawson

418. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

Washington, November 18, 1955.

SUBJECT

Arms Shipments to the Middle East

Discussion:

Attached (*Tab B*) [2] is a memorandum on arms shipments to the Middle East prepared by representatives of the US, UK and France in Geneva and subject to final approval by the Foreign Ministers. The French subsequently expressed a reservation regarding paragraph 4 (*Tab C*), [3] and the US delegation at Geneva has suggested that final coordination of the memorandum take place in Washington. The memorandum calls for consultation in Washington by the French and British Ambassadors and a representative of the Department on arms deliveries to Israel and the Arab states.

On instructions from the Secretary we asked the Italians if they wished to participate in the consultations. The Italians replied affirmatively (*Tab D*). [4] The British and French have approved the suggestion (*Tab E*). [5]

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize us to invite the Ambassadors of the UK, France and Italy to call and that you preside at the first meeting.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., during the Geneva Conf., Nov. 1–Dec. 10, 1955. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and concurred in by Russell, Beale, and Bryan.

[2] Tab B is Secto 302, Document 409.

[3] Tab C, Secto 330 from Geneva, November 16, stated that Henri Roux had informed members of the British and American delegations that Pinay on November 15 had "expressed reservation with regard words 'where substantial quantities are involved' in para 4 and said his understanding was that Secretary and Macmillan had agreed with him previously that existing contracts could be discharged in full. Roux said Pinay hoping have word with Secretary and Macmillan today to clear this matter up." (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1655)

[4] Tab D, telegram 1706 from Geneva, November 16, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–WA/11–1555)

[5] Tab E, Secto 334 from Geneva, November 16, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/11–1655)

2. That at the meeting you suggest the procedures set forth in the attached paper (*Tab A*).[6]

[Tab A]

Procedures for Quadripartite Consultations with Respect to Arms Deliveries to Israel and the Arab States[7]

1. A committee of Ambassadors should be formed composed of the British, French and Italian Ambassadors and a representative of the Department. The committee should first consider the question of approval of the draft "Agreed Minute" of the Tripartite meeting at Geneva. Subsequently, it should consider broad policy questions; the policy to be followed regarding representations to other friendly governments; basic procedural matters; and any contracts and shipments or other problems on which there is disagreement at the NEACC level. The Committee would meet at the request of any member.

2. The present NEACC, expanded to include Italy and with the present level representation, should be continued. NEACC will be charged with the following responsibilities: a) maintenance of records on all shipments and all proposed shipments by members or by other countries including the Soviet bloc; b) preparation of current studies on the relative armament strengths and capabilities of Israel and bordering Arab states; c) preparation of an agreed list of light equipment which could be shipped without consultation and submission of the list for approval to the committee of Ambassadors; d) consideration in the first instance of proposed contracts or shipments by the participating countries; e) immediate examination of all existing contracts not previously approved by NEACC; f) submission of recommendations to the committee of Ambassadors regarding representations to friendly governments about the supply of arms. The procedural and secretarial arrangements of the present NEACC should be continued with the addition of Italy.

3. It should be agreed by the ambassadors that the existence of the Committee and its work should be kept secret.

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[6] Hoover initialed his approval of both recommendations.

The initial meeting of the Ambassadorial Committee occurred at the Department of State on December 9. As had been recommended, Under Secretary of State Hoover presided at this session. Those in attendance included Ambassador Makins for the United Kingdom, Ambassador Maurice Couve de Murville for France, and Ambassador Manlio Brosio for Italy. For the memorandum of this conversation, drafted by Wilkins, see *ibid.*, 480.008/12–955.

[7] Drafted by Burdett on November 18.

419. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, November 19, 1955—5 p.m.

527. Herzog, Chief American Section Foreign Ministry, yesterday referred to Ben Gurion's November 15 conversation with Ambassador (Embtel 515 [2]) and inquired whether Embassy had received information confirming or denying Macmillan's message that Secretary was in full agreement Eden's statement. In replying I avoided any direct answer but made the following points:

(1) US area policy had been set forth publicly in Secretary's August 26 address and President's statement November 9.

(2) The Secretary in his talk with Sharett at Paris [3] had emphasized need for Israel to give urgent consideration to sacrifices it would be willing to make to obtain settlement.

(3) The USG endorses Eden's speech insofar as it supports the Secretary's August 26 address.

In reply, Herzog in a tone of unwonted bitterness said that Nasser appeared to be getting everything he wanted. He was getting his arms from the Soviet Union, the High Aswan Dam from the US and now Eden had come along and offered him slices of Israel's territory. I commented it was not clear at this moment as to how any of these 3 matters were developing but suggested that perhaps Israel was too prone to look to the US to solve all of its problems and that the time had arrived for GOI to do some hard practical thinking re bringing about an Israel-Arab settlement. It appeared to me that if there was going to be a settlement an accommodation by both sides was required.

White

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1955. Secret. Received at 2:14 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, and Cairo.

[2] Document 417.

[3] See Document 359.

420. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 20, 1955, 6 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Israel-Arab Dispute

PARTICIPANTS

Department	*United Kingdom*
The Secretary	Ambassador Makins
The Under Secretary	Mr. Morris
Mr. Russell	

The Secretary referred to Ambassador Byroade's report of the meeting on November 16 with the Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi at Ambassador Trevelyan's residence[2] and said we had asked Byroade to give us any information which he might develop as to whether Fawzi had been speaking with the authorization of Nasir. Ambassador Makins said that Trevelyan had reported his belief that Fawzi had reflected Nasir's views. He said that he would give the Department any further information they received on it.

The Secretary said that he would be seeing Israel Prime Minister Sharett the following morning (November 21).[3] He said that Sharett was in this country for two or three weeks and was obviously doing more than merely selling bonds. He was attempting to go over the head of the U.S. Government in an effort to build up pressure here for Israel's demands for arms and a security guarantee. The Secretary said that the Israel Embassy had suggested to the Department somewhat belatedly that Mr. Sharett would like to make a courtesy call on the Secretary Monday[4] morning. The Secretary said that he intended to make the meeting somewhat more than that. He intended to say to Mr. Sharett: (1) that the Israel Government must accept the proposals of the Secretary's August 26th speech more unequivocally than it has; (2) with respect to territory, it must do more than make a few minor mutual adjustments, it must relinquish a section of the Negev to the Arabs to make possible a land connection between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world; and, (3) the Israel Government must undertake to keep the situation in the area calm. It must not take advantage of little incidents to launch reprisal riots.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 15. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Russell on November 21.

[2] See Document 416.

[3] See *infra*.

[4] November 21.

It must not attempt at this time to force the Gulf of Aqaba.[5] The Secretary said that he would tell Sharett that under those conditions the U.S. would do all that it could to persuade the Arab states to reach a settlement. Ambassador Makins observed that that would be entirely in harmony with the joint US–UK policy. The Secretary said that the Israel Government is obviously trying to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the U.K., especially following Prime Minister Eden's Mansion House speech. The Secretary said that he would have liked it a little better if he had had a chance to see the speech somewhat more in advance of its delivery. The Secretary said that he feels that the reference to the 1947 resolution was unfortunate. It is not, in fact, the basis of the present Arab position. No one really thinks that the Galilee can be taken from Israel and the Negev, which the Arabs do want, is given to Israel under the 1947 resolution. However, the Secretary said, practically speaking, the US–UK policies are in line and his remarks to Sharett would show that there is no material difference in the position of the two countries. Ambassador Makins said that there had been some anxiety on the part of the Egyptians about a possible difference between the U.S. and U.K. positions. The Secretary said that Sharett must understand that the present Near East situation imperils us as well as Israel and Israel "must put something more in the pot" to make a settlement possible.

The Secretary said that we have received quite a substantial request for arms from the Israel Government.[6] Most of the items are essentially defensive in nature but many of them could be turned to offensive purposes. A plan for coordinating Western arms deliveries to the Middle East was worked out in Geneva, which the Secretary feels is very important.[7] The French hold some reservations so that we are not yet in a position to go ahead with it but we should get it underway as soon as possible so that what one of our countries does is not nullified by what the others do.

The Secretary said that he felt that it was important for the Italians to be included in the arrangements.[8] Ambassador Makins inquired as to whether the Italians would be brought in on much the same basis as the Canadians and the Belgians for instance. The Secretary said that he believed it was desirable to bring in the Italians as one of a four power undertaking and it was his impres-

[5] On September 10, 1955, Egypt announced new regulations for shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba requiring all ships intending to sail through the Gulf to obtain Egypt's permission at least 72 hours in advance. Egypt refused to grant the right of passage to Israel's ships.

[6] See Documents 413.

[7] See Document 409.

[8] See footnote 3, Document 409.

sion that Mr. Macmillan had agreed to that. The Secretary said that he thought it would be helpful to the political situation in Italy in addition to making possible a more effective control of arms shipment. For these reasons he thought that the relationship on the part of the Italians should be one of equality with the other three powers. The U.K., U.S. and the French might meet in the first instance and draw up the general plan of operation but the Italians should be brought in as regular attendants at meetings after that. Ambassador Makins inquired whether the Italians should be a member of NEACC. The Secretary replied that he thought it would not be necessary for them to be a part of NEACC, although he had not made up his mind.

Ambassador Makins referred to an instruction that he had received from the Foreign Office to consult with the Department about action which might be taken in the event of necessity under the Tripartite Declaration. The Secretary said that he thought that was a constructive suggestion and that we should begin consultation now. The Pentagon is not keen on the U.S. becoming militarily involved in the area. However, we have the means of exercising effective restraint on Israel by economic and financial measures and Great Britain could bring pressure to bear on Egypt through Egypt's blocked sterling. Mr. Hoover said that the Arabs have recently been shifting their balances around, notably into Switzerland in order to remove them from British control.

421. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 21, 1955, 11 a.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Israel-Arab Settlement

PARTICIPANTS

Department	*Israel Government*
The Secretary	Foreign Minister Sharett
The Under Secretary	Ambassador Eban
Mr. Allen	
Mr. Russell	

The Secretary opened the discussion by saying that although he realized Mr. Sharett had requested an appointment in order to make a courtesy call, he wished to take advantage of the occasion to speak of a matter of the greatest importance. The Secretary said he believes there is a possibility of moving toward a settlement along the lines of his August 26th speech. Two things are necessary, however, if further progress is to be made. First, there must be self-control and restraint on both sides so that there will not be a build up to an explosive border situation. There must not be any effort to compel a settlement of specific issues by force, in the Gulf of Aqaba for instance. Secondly, the Israel Government must be prepared to make some concession in the Negev which would make possible an area of contact between Egypt and the other Arab states. Such an area would not necessarily be large nor of great value. And the compensation to Israel from effecting a settlement would outweigh any loss of territory. The position of rigidly standing on the present armistice lines is not tenable. If there is to be a settlement, a lot of people will have to make contributions. The United States has indicated the contributions that it is prepared to make. The Arabs will have to retreat some from their position. So will the Israel Government. The Secretary said that he can understand that the Israel Government would not want the Arabs to know what concessions it would be prepared to make for a settlement until negotiations were well underway. But we must know that there is flexibility if we are going to be in a position to push things along. The Secretary said he could assure Mr. Sharett that we are presenting our views on the other side as well although Mr. Sharett, of course, only sees one side of it.

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 16. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Russell on November 21 and revised by Dulles on November 25. Russell's original draft, which contains the Secretary's handwritten revisions, is *ibid.*

There are indications, the Secretary said, that Egypt is worried about the long-term consequences of its action in making a deal with the Soviet Bloc and that it is beginning to have second thoughts.

The Secretary handed an aide-mémoire to Mr. Sharett.[2] Mr. Sharett said that with respect to the first point, the necessity of maintaining calm along the borders, there had recently been a series of provocations along the Jordan border. Israel had made no reaction up to the present time and Mr. Sharett said he hoped it could continue to refrain from taking action, but he had to say there was a possibility that things would burst out of bounds.

Of graver concern was the Secretary's second point, Mr. Sharett said. The Secretary had mentioned several times the need for concessions from both sides. But the Arabs are only asked to give up things they talk about, not anything they possess. Israel, however, is expected to give up territory it already possesses. If Egypt is to be given contiguity with Jordan, it can be done only in one of two ways: (1) by giving up the port of Elat and shrinking northwards; or, (2) by cutting a belt of land out of the Negev, in other words by cutting Israel in two. This is not fair and the Israel Government should not be asked to do it. The contiguity which Egypt now seeks never existed before. The present situation existed under the British Mandate. There is nothing vital in that contiguity. There are no roads that go through that part of the country, no railroads, and no traffic. There is nothing that would start moving through it. It is only a national slogan and for that Israel is expected to cut itself in two.

The Secretary said he wished to emphasize that we are talking about something of the greatest seriousness, namely, the threat to Israel and the grave threat of the relation of the Middle East to the free world as a whole. The West has great stakes in the Middle East. Israel is one of them. The United States does not intend to allow any of its other extremely important stakes in the area to threaten the existence of Israel. By the same token, we do not think that in the present international situation the Israel Government should allow the contribution which it can make to a settlement and which would not violate Israel's vital interests, to stand in the way of a settlement. The extent and nature of the contribution should and must be a matter for discussion and development. But the Israel Government should not take the position of saying that it will not consider a solution that might be worked out.

Mr. Sharett said that Israel, by its geographic position, is the hub of the area and this imposes an obligation on it to be a good neighbor which it intends to be if the Arab states would only be

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[2] See Document 424.

good neighbors. Israel has offered to provide communication facilities for the Arabs across Israel territory, following a settlement, but giving up its sovereignty over present Israel territory to meet a whim of Nasir's is another matter. Who can tell what Nasir would then go on to request? It would be the beginning of a slippery slope.

The Secretary said we are not talking about a whim. We are talking about the continued existence of Israel. All we are asking is for the Israel Government to tell us what it would be prepared to do. That would not be the beginning of a slippery slope. The Secretary said that he had a rule in dealing with the Soviet group not to agree to a change in his position in reliance upon Soviet promises. That is a rather good rule to follow in most international negotiations. He does not expect to give up something of value in advance of getting an adequate return. He is not naive and recognizes that there are many risks in this situation and that there could be some duplicity. But we do believe that, as a result of a combination of pressures and inducement, there is a chance for a settlement, whether 50–50 or 1 in 10, no one could say. It cannot, however, be explored without knowing what Israel's position is going to be. If Israel says no then the possibility of a settlement is off and we shall all have to face the consequences. We believe that there is an appreciable chance for a settlement. It would give Israel peace. It would reverse the process of Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The Secretary said that he did not make this statement lightly. He was not engaging in mere wishful thinking. But any further attempt towards a settlement has to be based upon our knowledge that Israel will cooperate. We have not advanced far enough so that we are asking Israel to state its willingness to make concessions publicly but we must know whether Israel would be willing to make concessions or not. If "no" is the last word, then Israel is putting us all in great peril. If we have to make a choice of sticking to Israel in the face of all that the Middle East is to the safety and continued existence of the free world, Israel will be forcing us to make a very grave choice. If the present opportunities for a settlement are to be seized, it will be necessary for us to have Israel's position in the next few days. We can not go any further in developing the possibilities of a settlement with the Arabs until we know Israel's position.

Mr. Sharett said that he saw no certainty that Egypt, if it knew Israel would agree to a settlement, would itself agree. There was no certainty, if Israel agreed, that such a concession would close the breach in the wall against Soviet penetration in the area. Israel leaders sat with Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax at the beginning of World War II and heard them say that the clouds were gathering, that the Allies must gather the Arabs to them, and that on those grounds they were forced to repudiate the 1939 White

Paper. [3] War broke out but the Arabs did not rally to the Allies. The only thing that brought the Arabs to the Allied side was the Allied victory. Mr. Sharett said that he did not dispute the purity of the Secretary's intentions but it is results and not intentions that count. He said he did not see Israel capable of making the concession that the Secretary asked.

The Secretary said that in Korea and Formosa there were governments, faced by Communist mass power, that felt the only way out was in world war, wherever the U.S. would defeat their enemies. He said he assumed that Israel would not want to get into that situation vis-à-vis the Arabs, that it would not want to go down a road where there would be no solution short of general war. The Secretary said he was against peace at any price as much as anyone but that one cannot be blind to the fact that the scales are more heavily weighted against war than at any time in history. The sacrifices that are called for to save peace are greater. No one is suggesting that Israel do anything that would cripple it. But it is necessary for us to know whether there is flexibility in Israel's immediate answer and he hoped that he would not give him a negative answer. The consequences to everyone concerned would be most serious.

The Secretary said he wished to say that the views of the United States and the United Kingdom are very close. He had not seen Eden's speech until a few hours before it was given. He would not have put things in just the way that Eden did but he did not want Mr. Sharett to think that there is any sharp divergence that could be exploited to advantage. Mr. Sharett said that it was not a question of exploiting a difference, it was a question of whether the United States concurred in Eden's idea of a compromise. The Secretary said that we are not engaged in an intellectual dialectic. We are faced with a very practical situation and that it was a matter of importance for him to know whether, to make possible a settlement that could be of infinite value to Israel, Israel would be willing to give up something of comparatively little value. Mr. Sharett said that if it was a question of give and take, of exchanging territory on a small scale on the principle of mutuality, it could be discussed but that Israel could not give up vital points, such as Elat, nor could it agree to something that would result in cutting Israel in two.

The Secretary said that he would like to have the Israel Government's answer in writing. Mr. Sharett said that it would take two or three days.

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[3] Dated May 17, 1939. (*Palestine: Statement of Policy. Cmd. 6019*)

422. Editorial Note

On November 21, at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, Secretary Dulles, in the course of his report to the National Security Council about the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, offered the following analysis of the Near Eastern situation:

"Lastly, Secretary Dulles said that he would touch on the problems of the Near East. In the main, our policies toward that area had been run from Washington by Under Secretary Hoover, although Secretary Dulles had likewise been involved while at Geneva.

"Secretary Dulles expressed the view that there could be little doubt but that the Soviets had deliberately opened a new cold war front in the Near East. Molotov had been very evasive when the Secretary had questioned him on Soviet policy toward that area, and had kept insisting that the arms deal with Egypt was a simple commercial transaction from which no serious political repercussions were to be expected. It was obvious, continued Secretary Dulles, that the Soviet moves in the Near East confronted the West with a very grave situation. . . . We needed to watch this situation very carefully. For some 25 years we had observed the Communists going to work to bring China under their control. We had done nothing about it until it was too late. We could not afford to repeat this mistake with regard to the Middle East or Africa.

"Secretary Dulles then said he did not believe that the Arab governments were entirely happy over the prospect of possible future dependence on the USSR. It was obvious that they wanted to play off the West against the Soviet bloc, but if they were compelled to choose one or another, they wouldn't be very happy to choose the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, they might be forced to make such a choice if the West became identified with Israel in active hostilities between Israel and the Arab States. The only solution that Secretary Dulles could perceive for the short-range problem was a general solution of the quarrel between the Israelis and the Arabs. Such a solution he believed by no means impossible. Our policies and those of the UK were pretty much alike, though Secretary Dulles expressed some distaste for Prime Minister Eden's recent speech on the Near East situation. He said that Eden had tried to drag him into supporting this speech at the very last minute, but that he, Secretary Dulles, had bucked at full endorsement. After all, Secretary Dulles pointed out, his own speech of August 26 on this situation had been discussed for weeks in advance with the British and his proposals cleared with them before the speech was made.

"Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles said that no significant cleavage between the U.S. and the UK on Near Eastern policy could be permitted. It was plain enough that the United Kingdom was trying very hard to swing support over to the side of the Arabs and to regain the lost British position with the Arab States. While this was understandable, it was simply impossible to ignore the position of the Israeli Government. If we did so the Israelis might move in such a way as to bring down the whole house.

"This reminded Secretary Dulles that he had had a serious talk with Foreign Minister Sharett at the State Department this morning. [See *supra*] Secretary Dulles had urged Sharett to remain calm and to avoid incidents involving the Arabs even if provocation existed. It had been a good talk. The Israelis had presented us with a large request for arms. Accordingly, in the course of his conversation Secretary Dulles had referred to the fact that the U.S., along with the UK, was setting up a group to exchange views on arms requests from Middle Eastern countries before any action was taken. [See Document 418] Apropos of the Israeli-Arab situation as a whole, Secretary Dulles said that while he regarded it as extremely dangerous, it was not more so than other difficulties which we have encountered and surmounted." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

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423. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 22, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Financing of the High Aswan Dam and Related Problems

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Kaissouni, Egyptian Minister of Finance
Mr. Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador
U—Mr. Hoover
E—Mr. Prochnow
NEA—Mr. Allen
NE—Mr. Gay

Mr. Hoover in describing our great interest in the High Aswan Dam project illustrated its tremendous magnitude by pointing out that relative to the size of the respective economies it is larger than the total of all US public works of this type produced since 1900. This underlined the importance of ample technical preparation and solid financing. The World Bank he thought is the logical institution for a project of this magnitude and best equipped to handle the job efficiently and economically. He said we would keep in touch with the Bank and encourage it all we could. Mr. Kaissouni responded by saying that the magnitude of the economic problems facing Egypt require bold action; "if Egypt could build the Pyramids alone it could with outside help handle the High Dam." He referred to his

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[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Gay on November 23.

conversation with Mr. Black of the World Bank [2] mentioning that the principal questions raised by Mr. Black had to do with the source of financing external costs and the division of the Nile waters. The nature of these problems he thought underlined the importance of US help.

Referring to the division of Nile waters, Mr. Hoover said we would do all we could to help toward a settlement but the temporary absence of a government in the Sudan made progress difficult. [3] He was hopeful this would soon be resolved but we needed more facts to be of real assistance. He thought the British were in a better position to help. Considerable discussion followed concerning the details of this problem and the 50–50 offer which the Egyptians recently made to the Sudanese. He felt the 50–50 offer was generous; it would provide the Sudanese more water than they could use for many years. The discussion on this point clarified the meaning of Egypt's proposal. All the Egyptians want is a Sudanese guarantee not to use up within the Sudan more than half the water presently "wasted" into the sea.

In response to the opinion that a settlement with the Sudanese of this matter was prerequisite to a Bank decision, Mr. Kaissouni expressed hope that enough "prospect of settlement" could be reached to persuade the Bank to move on the first stages of the project. He felt that the Sudanese position was now an internal political affair. It was pointed out that if the Dam project were started prior to reasonably firm settlement the Sudanese might later demand an even higher price for an agreement. In response to question Mr. Kaissouni felt the present Sudanese Government could ratify an agreement and that, in the absence of agreement, a mutually accepted decision to arbitrate the matter should enable Egypt to go ahead with the Dam. Ambassador Hussein pointed out that under the terms of a 1929 agreement [4] the present Sudanese Government was bound to accept arbitration of such matters as this.

Mr. Kaissouni, reporting on his conversation with Mr. Black, said the latter thought the Bank might be able to put up about $200 million of his estimated $600 million required for external costs of the project. It was the large difference between these two figures which required outside assistance from other sources over a period of approximately a decade. In response to Mr. Hoover's query

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[2] No record of this conversation, which apparently took place on November 21, has been found in Department of State files.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 405.

[4] On May 7, 1929, representatives of the Governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom signed a treaty that provided for the regulation of the supply of Nile water to Egypt and, at the same time, safeguarded the interests of the population of the Sudan. For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1929, Part I*, volume 130, pp. 104–106.

regarding the possibility of short term credits as a possible offset to long term loans, Mr. Kaissouni referred to the British, French and German Consortium's offer of medium term export credits approximating 5 million pounds each. Mr. Butler told him in London [5] this figure could be enlarged. Mr. Black, however, took the position that short term financing was incompatible with long term financing by the Bank. If Egypt could handle a $400 million loan of any type, the Bank itself would be able to provide credit; this type of financing would only reduce Egypt's credit worthiness in the Bank's eyes. Mr. Hoover added in this connection that long term financing by facilitating cash payments to contractors was in his experience the most efficient procedure, offering possibilities of savings and fuller competitive bidding.

In regard to competitive bidding Mr. Hoover stressed that all the US desired was that American firms be given an opportunity to bid equal to that offered any other firms. Mr. Kaissouni seemed to imply that competitive bidding was synonymous with splitting up or proliferation of contracts. He felt that dealing with one group offered greater efficiency; it would permit going ahead before details of the whole project were ready. Mr. Hoover replied that the employment of able consulting engineers to handle the planning and coordinating of the total project should meet this difficulty; he thought that the Bank's method of operation would permit going ahead on parts of the project before the completion of all detailed plans or bidding on all phases.

In response to the question whether or not Egypt itself could finance and otherwise go ahead with the coffer dam and tunnels, Mr. Kaissouni replied in the affirmative but stressed that Egypt wanted assurance that the whole project could be carried forward before launching this first phase. He expressed great hope that he could reach an understanding with the Bank before he returned to Cairo. He got the impression, however, that the Bank wants a US commitment as a prerequisite to its own decision.

Following Mr. Hoover's observation that more information re basic figures is needed before commitments are possible, Mr. Kaissouni alleged that Egypt would be able from its own resources to handle the additional requirements over and above what the Bank, the US and the UK might provide. No specific amounts, however, were mentioned in this connection. In the course of discussing the dangers of inflation Mr. Kaissouni recognized the importance of how Egypt raised its own funds. He thought there was considerable scope for public borrowing and for tapping potential investment funds of

[5] For Aldrich's summary of Kaissouni's conversation with Butler, as related to Aldrich by Eden, see Document 399.

insurance companies and other local institutions without significant inflationary impact. He alleged there were large amounts of funds available in Egypt for investment in government bonds.

Mr. Hoover alluded to the possibility that American agriculture will fear expanded output of cotton in Egypt as a result of the increase in cultivable land. He hoped that we could meet this problem or that natural developments will have erased it by the time the Dam is built. We have been under great pressures from the cotton growers to subsidize export of our surplus cotton. He was hopeful we could continue to resist these pressures. Mr. Kaissouni observed that Egypt was cutting back cotton production next year and that he had talked to Ambassador Byroade about a possible international agreement to control cotton planting. He said if the US imposed an export subsidy Egypt would have to respond by reducing its cotton prices at great loss to itself. Egypt's cotton exports were off about 10 million pounds this year due largely to the uncertainty of the cotton market. Egypt was much concerned that this instability be eliminated.

In concluding the conversation Mr. Kaissouni did not appear to be highly encouraged from his conversation with Mr. Black; apparently the contrary was the case in respect to his earlier conversations with Mr. Butler in London. He again stressed his hope that the project should go ahead without waiting for final agreement with the Sudan; otherwise, since the Sudanese were not in a hurry, there might be long delay. In this connection Mr. Hoover thought the British could give positive assistance. He expressed his conviction that Mr. Black personally was very hopeful regarding the High Aswan Dam project. As an international servant, however, and as a banker he should quite properly be meticulous and cautious in an enterprise of this magnitude. He hoped Mr. Kaissouni would keep in touch with Mr. Prochnow and Mr. Allen and that following his talks with the Bank there might be ways in which we could be helpful. We would follow the matter closely with the Bank. [6]

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[6] The Department on November 23 transmitted a summary of this conversation to the Embassy in Cairo. (Telegram 1067 to Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/11-2355)

424. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, November 22, 1955—3:32 p.m.

1051. Secretary gave Sharett Nov 21 aide-mémoire quoted below. Separate telegram follows reporting conversation. [2] You may discuss matter with British. Otherwise you should not reveal fact or substance of meeting in any way.

"In the opinion of the United States Government a settlement of the principal issues of the Israel-Arab dispute is essential if Israel is in the long run to survive. This has become more urgent in view of the apparent intention of the Soviet Government now to seek for its own purposes to implement Arab hostility to Israel.

The United States Government believes that a settlement may be possible if the Governments concerned accept the approach outlined by Secretary Dulles in his August 26th speech, an approach which involves concessions by Arab States as well as by Israel.

It is, however, in our opinion, of the utmost importance that the Governments concerned do everything in their power to maintain calm along the armistice lines, even in the face of provocations. They should cooperate to the fullest with General Burns. Israel, for example, would not seek to compel the settlement of specific issues by force, such as the right of transit in the Gulf of Aqaba.

We believe that it should be recognized that the territorial adjustments referred to in Secretary Dulles' August 26th speech may have to include concessions in the Negev to provide an Arab area joining Egypt with the rest of the Arab world. These concessions need not, as we see it, involve loss of any appreciably populated land or land of any substantial economic value.

The settlement, outlined by Secretary Dulles' August 26th speech, would, as there indicated, involve very considerable contributions, both political and economic, by the United States. We believe, however, that it is indispensable that the Governments directly concerned should also be prepared to make contributions. The positive value to Israel of such a settlement, in terms of a prosperous and viable existence, would be incomparably greater than what it is suggested might be required of Israel to procure that settlement.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2255. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Approved by Russell, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Tel Aviv and repeated to London.

[2] Telegram 1062 to Cairo, November 23, also sent to London and Tel Aviv. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11–2355)

If the Government of Israel is in accord with the foregoing, it would greatly encourage the United States in its effort to seek a settlement using fully to that end the peaceful influences of which it disposes, and which we believe are not inconsiderable."

Dulles

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425. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, November 23, 1955—2 p.m.

541. Pass Army Navy Air. Reference Deptel 349 [2] and Embtel 523. [3] French Counselor [4] here informed me that French Government has made no commitment to GOI re deliveries Mystere Mark IVs. He said Israel defense force no longer interested in acquiring Mark II because of doubt that it can compete with MIG 15 but has been making strenuous efforts obtain French Government concurrence delivery Mark IV Fs. Dayan, on recent trip Paris, obtained support French Minister of Defense [5] but Middle East experts in Quai d'Orsay strongly oppose deliveries to Israel and so far Pinay has followed their advice. French Counselor opined that next step GOI would be to enlist support in French political circles of "powerful friends of Israel".

White

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/11–2355. Secret. Received at 6:14 p.m. Repeated to Paris, Rome, Cairo, Ankara, and London.

[2] The Department in telegram 349, November 16, requested the Embassy in Tel Aviv to comment on reports that Israel had received from the French 12 Ouragan jet fighters, purchased 12 Mysteres Mark IVs, and ordered 15 Mysteres Mark IIs. (*Ibid.*, 784A.56/11–1655)

[3] The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported in telegram 523, November 18, that it was reasonable to conclude that the Israelis at that moment had only 12 Ouragans. Precise figures were difficult to obtain, since the Israeli military authorities refused to reveal the number of aircraft they had on hand and had failed to honor the requests of the U.S. Air Attaché to visit Israeli air bases. (*Ibid.*, 784A.56/11–1855)

[4] Jean Fernand-Laurent.

[5] General Pierre Billotte.

426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, November 23, 1955—8:26 p.m.

1072. Secretary took advantage of visit by Sharett to Washington November 21 [2] to speak to him in strongest terms re importance of calm along armistice lines. He said it was imperative that Israel do its utmost to preserve such calm and avoid aggressive or "retaliatory" measures. He also stressed importance of cooperating with Burns. Sharett declared that Israel would act only to defend its territory and had no thought of "preventive war".

Please let Nasser know that Secretary has spoken to Sharett in these terms and that he is disturbed by reports of Fedayeen activity from Jordan. Egypt for its part must take all possible steps including discontinuance of guerilla activities to avoid incidents along frontiers with Israel if calm is to be preserved. [3]

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–2355. Secret. Drafted by Allen and Wilkins, cleared by the Secretary, and approved by Allen, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to London and Tel Aviv.

[2] See Document 421.

[3] Byroade reported on November 27 that he had a long conversation with Nasser the previous day on the subject of fedayeen operations inside Israel and had conveyed to Nasser the Secretary's concern about such activity. According to Byroade, Nasser stated emphatically that Egypt was not directing operations of a guerilla nature into "Israel." He declared that a great deal of the trouble was spontaneous and was not directed by his representatives, but he admitted "that there was an organization [in Egypt] for such operations and he supposed knowledge of this might be being used as evidence of Egypt's complicity in present operations." (Telegram 1028 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–2755)

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427. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, November 24, 1955—8 p.m.

422. Verbatim text. Re Palestine. SYG Hammarskjold called meeting of France, UK and US this morning at which he proposed

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–2455. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:06 p.m.

report to us on latest developments in Palestine. When meeting opened Hammarskjold passed 6-page memorandum (pouched today) [2] relating General Burns' efforts to arrive at an agreement on his 3-point program for the El Auja Demilitarized Zone [3] and the attitudes of Egypt and Israel. The concluding paragraphs of the memorandum state that Egypt "While not rejecting the proposals, have suggested certain additional points for consideration. Egypt feels that the special character of the Kibbutz and of the civil police which they consider military in character, taken together with the presence of Israeli forces in the defensive area east of the DZ, constitute a direct threat to the security of Egyptian forces, and that consequently Egypt needs defensive positions at the western end of the defensive area west of the DZ. As regards the marking of the western boundary of the DZ, Egypt has proposed the marking of all sides of the zone both to distinguish clearly between the zone and the adjacent areas as well as to rebut the contention of Israel that the DZ is its sovereign territory".

The report goes on to say that "the Government of Israel, while stating that they accept the proposals in principle, have likewise advanced certain conditions with regard to their implementation . . . . [4] Furthermore, the Israelis have attempted to introduce into the discussion regarding the three-point program the allegation that Egypt is responsible for organizing raids into Israel territory in areas other than the DZ; they have, thus, tended to make it a condition of Israeli acceptance of the proposals that Egypt should give satisfactory guarantees that such raids would cease. In recent public statements, the Israeli press has attempted to link together the allegation that Egypt has rejected the proposals with accusations that Egypt is responsible for organizing these raids. This development presents a parallel to the press build-up which preceded the Israeli military action of 2 November." [5]

. . . . . .

Cordier stated that Israel is now relating the problem of the DZ to raids from Jordan. He read from a report which had just come in that the *Jerusalem Post* was making much of the fact that there had in recent days been 21 raids from Jordan with no return fire from Israel. Cordier also said that Burns is putting three questions to Israel as follows:

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[2] Barco sent Hammarskjöld's memorandum to Ludlow. A copy is *ibid.*, UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224, Palestine.

[3] For General Burns' program, see Documents 376 and 382.

[4] Ellipsis in the source text.

[5] See footnote 6, Document 381.

1. Israeli withdrawal from the DZ and limitation of truly civilian police to 30;
2. Withdrawal of checkposts from a distance of 1,000 meters from Egyptian posts (this is a change from the old idea of a straight 500 meter withdrawal zone, and is probably more practical since it avoids any impression of making more permanent the temporary frontier);
3. Freedom of movement of UN observers.

Hammarskjold said that all initiative for the present was in Burns' hands and that he did not propose to approach the Egyptians or Israelis in New York.

Hammarskjold then said that he proposed to raise the question of Palestine at tomorrow's monthly luncheon of the SC members and to circulate to the members at the luncheon his above memorandum. He said he felt that the information it contained should be made available to members of the SC and it was preferable for him to do so at a private meeting of all the members rather than to inform them individually.

Wadsworth told Hammarskjold that we had reservations about desirability of raising this question at an informal meeting of the SC members. Hammarskjold argued that since the information he planned to give the Council members was appropriate for him to give them individually or to use in a report to a public meeting of the SC, he could see no basis for any objection. Wadsworth pointed out that some of the language of the report indicated conclusions as to the intent of the parties and questioned the wisdom of circulating such conclusions at such a meeting.

Dixon was not present during this part of the discussion and Ramsbotham, speaking for the UK, suggested that Hammarskjold might make an oral report at the luncheon meeting, basing his remarks on the memorandum and then, if a member should ask for a memorandum, he could supply it. Hammarskjold quickly accepted this suggestion and said that he would act accordingly. Barco again for the US raised the question of the desirability of a discussion of the Palestine question at an informal meeting of SC members (with Soviets present) and reiterated our reservations regarding the utilization of informal luncheons of the SC for such business. Hammarskjold said this would reopen the whole question of the purpose of the luncheons, that he had a clear understanding with the members of the SC that this was indeed the purpose of the monthly luncheons and that on the basis of this understanding he intended to proceed as he had indicated. He also stated that he intended his report to be simply information for the members and that no "discussion" should or would ensue. We doubt that this is a very realistic expectation.

It should be pointed out that the Secretary General is tending to his original proposal for private, informal SC business meetings which he proposed in July, and to which we took exception. I am under the impression that we do not wish at this time to provide any opportunity for Soviets to contend that they are entering into discussions with us, outside the regular public meetings of the UN, on the Middle East, and on this basis I feel that I should object to Hammarskjold's raising the Palestine question in this way at a luncheon to be attended by the Soviet representative.

Lodge

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428. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, November 27, 1955—noon.

1027. In yesterday's session with Nasser I raised subject of Alpha in order ascertain Nasser's personal position as requested Deptel 1035. [2] He aware of talks of Trevelyan and I with Fawzi and took same general line. Wishing however be more specific, stated felt it important that I be able report he fully aware of and stood behind specific positions given by Fawzi on November 16. He said he thought so, but perhaps I had better outline for him my understanding of Fawzi's position.

I thereupon read to him full contents of paragraphs on tactics and substance of Embtel 976 [3] (omitting only sentences enclosed in parentheses in subparagraph c on subject Eilath). We went through contents sentence by sentence discussing their implications in sufficient detail to insure against lack of understanding. Nasser agreed message accurate and expressed his own views with one reservation on subject of refugees.

He agreed majority of refugees would no longer desire return Israel or would not remain after they saw present conditions. (He referred to lot of the Arab in Israel as that of "Class B" citizens.) He thought however it would be most difficult for any Arab leader to take a position which deprived the refugee of his right to return. He

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2755. Top Secret; Priority, Alpha. Received at 1:16 p.m. Repeated to London.

[2] Dated November 19, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11–1955)

[3] Document 416.

therefore favored an approach which would allow the refugee to make his own decision about repatriation vis-à-vis resettlement and compensation. He agreed that this would be most difficult for Israel and wondered whether some impartial sensing of the real refugee opinion was possible through an agency such as UNRWA which could relieve both Israel and Arabs of difficult political problem. Told him I feared any such poll would indicate a far greater desire to return to Israel than would be actual case if opportunity were in fact presented.

It is probably academic to attempt pursue this particular question much farther at moment. I found it encouraging however that Nasser would endorse, with this reservation, such a specifically worded message to Department. It is hardly a surprise however as both Trevelyan and I felt Fawzi would not have been so forthcoming on his own.

Byroade

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429. Message From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower [1]

London, November 27, 1955.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Harold has telegraphed to Foster details of very disturbing information which we have just received about the likelihood of an Egyptian-Russian deal over the Aswan Dam. If the Russians were to succeed in this they would of course be ruthless with the Sudan and abuse their control of the Nile Waters. The outlook for Africa would then be grim indeed. Kaissouni and Hilmi [2] are now in Washington negotiating with the International Bank for a loan to enable a Western consortium to build the Dam. A preliminary contract has been signed with Alexander Gibb, a British firm, as consultant engineers. [3] I understand that the main difficulty the International Bank has in helping the Egyptians is that they

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Ambassador Makins forwarded Prime Minister Eden's message to President Eisenhower and sent a copy to the Department of State. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eden to Eisenhower Correspondence 1955–1956 Vol. I)

[2] Samir Hilmy, Secretary General of the High Dam Board.

[3] The Embassy in Cairo reported on October 30 that the Government of Egypt had signed a contract on October 29 with Alexander Gibb. (Telegram 838 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/10–3055)

should pay some regard to their usual rule of international tendering. If this is insisted upon and the Egyptians leave Washington without agreement, I fear the Russians are certain to get the contract. Poland will act as a stooge in this case as Czechoslovakia did for the arms. The Bank are not unnaturally anxious about the position of the Egyptian economy over the next thirty year outlook and want to be assured that there is some outside finance in addition to the money which the Bank will themselves put up. We are prepared to do our small part in supporting our share of the consortium and there is also the question of the other two Governments involved namely the French and the German Governments. We believe that they will play their part. It would be invaluable to get the help of your Government, it being always understood that in that event an American firm would take part in the operation.

I hate to trouble you with this but I am convinced that on our joint success in excluding the Russians from this contract may depend the future of Africa. I hope to have the chance of a talk with you when it suits you about the whole of this situation but meanwhile we must avert the disaster of the two Egyptians leaving Washington without the conviction that agreement is going to be reached.

Yours ever,

Anthony [4]

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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430. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, November 28, 1955.

The President called me on the telephone this morning.

He asked me to tell you upon your return [2] that he would have

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Secret. The source text bears a notation indicating that Secretary Dulles saw this memorandum.

[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, he was vacationing at his retreat on Duck Island in Lake Ontario from the afternoon of November 23 until the early afternoon of November 28. Upon his arrival in Washington, he went to the Department of State, where he met with Hoover. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

no objection to Eden's coming over in January.[3] In making arrangements he preferred that Eden would not be there during a weekend, as he finds it desirable to rest up. I told him that Ambassador Makins had hinted that Eden might like to come over earlier, and would be ready to come at any time we called for him. The President did not indicate that he thought an earlier meeting was necessary, though he had no objection if you thought it desirable.

The President raised the matter of the Aswan Dam and I told him that we were fairly well agreed to proceed with the project, and that we were now endeavoring to assess our position and how far we would be committed.

In regard to the Middle East situation generally, I told the President that we had many disquieting developments within the last few days. I said that I was going to recommend that Bob Anderson should go to Cairo within about the next week, after we had cleared our own position on the Aswan Dam, in order to try our best to arrive at an understanding with Nasser.[4] The President suggested that Milton Eisenhower[5] might be useful in such a capacity. I said I felt sure he could be at a suitable opportunity, but we were trying to keep the matter confidential during the earlier stages and I thought Bob Anderson would probably attract less attention than Milton.

I said that the Aswan Dam project was the largest single project yet undertaken anywhere in the world, and the complications were almost unbelievable. He said he had no appreciation before of the magnitude of the proposal and he could well see that it was not a thing where a solution could be found on short notice; nevertheless, we were hopeful that we would be able to make a commitment to go ahead on a general basis within the next week or 10 days.

The President suggested that late tomorrow morning when he goes to the office in Gettysburg you might wish to call him on the secret telephone from the White House. A definite time should be set up in advance.[6]

H.

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[3] Eden suggested such a visit in a personal message of November 23 to Eisenhower, stating that the main purpose would be "to talk over the world scene together." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

[4] No documentation has been found in Department of State files to indicate that Anderson journeyed to Cairo at that time.

[5] The President's brother, who was President of Pennsylvania State University.

[6] The Secretary spoke with the President late in the afternoon of November 29 about Eden's projected visit, and Eisenhower reiterated his approval. (Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Bernau; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

431. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, November 29, 1955—3 p.m.

555. In the course of separate conversations yesterday with Eytan, Kollek and Herzog, I was informed as follows:

1. Distribution Eban's 1500-word telegraphic report Sharett's talk with Secretary on November 21 has been limited to foregoing plus Ben-Gurion and Myerson. Sharett was characterized as having been taken by surprise and as having submitted no recommendations on the talk. When Herzog and, later, Kollek commenced discuss substance of talk, I informed them I was under injunction not to discuss the matter.

2. Was given impression that government had made no decision to retaliate for recent incidents and that no reprisals were planned unless new incidents involving mortalities created unusual public pressure for action. Consensus GOI thinking is that arms aid problem greatly overshadowed all others and was serving to restrain IDF behavior in less vital matters.

3. Tolkowsky, Chief IDF Air Force, yesterday gave Ben-Gurion intelligence estimate of Egyptian receipts Soviet aircraft and their impact on Israel's security position. According to Kollek, IDF has photographs "substantial number" of MIG's on an airfield near Alexandria and also several MIG's located airfield Suez area. IDF also has tentatively identified 5 to 7 Ilyushin two-motor jet bombers in Egyptian possession. Kollek said GOI was banking heavily on French promises deliveries Mysteres but added French had "crossed them up" in past (General Dayan told me last night IDF wanted Mystere IV; that the II was no good).

4. Herzog said that key question future Israel course of action would arise when Dayan informs Cabinet that Egyptian receipts Soviet arms were reaching point where IDF could no longer be responsible for the security of the state. He added his judgment that IDF would be satisfied if it could obtain from US enough planes and other items to cope successfully with the rapid increment in Egyptian strength. On this point Kollek made surprising statement that US policy should be to maintain arms situation between Egypt and Israel under which neither party could successfully launch an offensive war. He thought Israel would be satisfied with a smaller number of planes then Egypt was receiving provided the discrepancy was not

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2955. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 9:45 a.m.

greater than could be compensated by superior Israel techniques and maintenance.

5. *Comment*: While I have no means of knowing whether information regarding Egyptian plane receipts is substantially correct, I believe the GOI will press vigorously for rapid compensating deliveries Mystere IV's and F–86's from France and US. Israeli's mood now that they are faced with the fact rather than the theory of survival is one of less truculence and less belligerency. Reports from several sources indicate that Ben-Gurion is allergic to preventive war concept and would like to find a practicable alternative.

White

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432. Memorandum of a Discussion at the 268th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, December 1, 1955, 2:30 p.m. [1]

Present at the 268th NSC meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Acting Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; Special Assistants to the President Anderson and Dodge; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Robert C. Sprague, NSC Consultant; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows a report by the Director of Central Intelligence about the internal situation in Afghanistan, the Soviets' recent

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on December 2. The time was taken from the President's Daily Appointments.

explosion of a nuclear device, and the evolving political situations in France, Berlin, and Thailand.]

2. Assistance to Egypt in Financing the High Aswan Dam

Mr. Dillon Anderson said that before getting on to the second scheduled item on the agenda, the Secretary of State wished to make a report to the National Security Council on the subject of financing the High Aswan Dam in Egypt.

Secretary Dulles expressed the belief that while the forthcoming proposal for U.S. assistance in the financing of this Dam fell within existing national security policy for the area, such large funds were involved that he had believed it right to report the plan to the National Security Council. He said that he would ask Under Secretary Hoover to report on the main provisions of the plan.

Secretary Hoover explained that the State Department had reached the conclusion that it was essential to go ahead with the plan for assisting the Egyptians to construct this Dam. Conversations had been going on both with the International Bank and with the British. The latter had committed themselves to go along with us in helping to finance the project, and had also agreed to go along with our proposal to bring in the International Bank. They had abandoned their previous view of the desirability of a consortium. Secretary Hoover then proceeded to summarize the three major steps which would be taken in developing the program for providing assistance to the Egyptians.

At the conclusion of Secretary Hoover's exposition, Secretary Dulles pointed out that while we have been busy working on our own plan for assisting the Egyptians with this Dam, there were strong indications that the Soviet Union in turn was doing its best to bring off a deal with the Egyptians on the Dam. Accordingly, even if the United States made the generous proposal outlined by Secretary Hoover, the Russians might duplicate it, and it was possible that the Egyptians would take the Soviet offer. Nevertheless, it seemed essential to make this serious and liberal offer to the Egyptian Government. If the Egyptians accepted, it would certainly be highly impractical for Egypt to switch to a Soviet satellite status, at least while the project was in the course of construction. Moreover, the presence of so many engineers, technicians, and other people from the free world in Egypt, would constitute a strong influence in keeping Egypt on the side of the free world.

Secretary Humphrey said that without expressing a judgment as to whether or not it was wise to make this offer to the Egyptian Government, he believed that there were a certain number of basic facts which he wished to bring out in order that the National

Security Council would have a clear understanding of the implications of the proposed offer to Egypt. In the first place, the over-all cost figure of $1.3 billion for completing the project, said Secretary Humphrey, was just a beginning. To complete this project over a period of from 20 to 25 years would, in his opinion, cost $2 billion. After going into further details to substantiate this cost estimate, Secretary Humphrey pointed out that for the next 12 to 15 years the United States Government was going to have to bear down on the Egyptians in order to induce them to live on the austere basis which would be necessary if this project were to be carried to completion. This was going to be very tough on the Egyptian people, but the austerity was essential if the project was to be brought into production. The United States in turn was going to be under constant Egyptian pressure to provide additional economic assistance in order to cushion the austerity. Accordingly, it was Secretary Humphrey's guess that we would never get out of this business without additional annual contributions to Egypt above the foreign exchange figure of some $200 million which we would provide by way of foreign exchange for carrying out the project.

Secretary Humphrey then said that there was another fundamental fact which the National Security Council would do well to ponder. All of us here were believers in a free society based on free economic competition. But what we would be doing in Egypt would be tantamount to creating a completely nationalized project which would have the effect of handing over the economy of Egypt entirely into the hands of the Egyptian Government. In Secretary Humphrey's view, the results of this move could not be more completely Communistic if it had been the deliberate attempt of the United States to make it so. Moreover, the by-product, in the shape of additional cotton and other products from the newly developed agricultural lands, would result in additional competition with the U.S. for markets.

In any event, continued Secretary Humphrey, these were certain fundamentals which the Council should keep in mind. This fashion of assisting in the building of the High Aswan Dam amounted to a terrific example of the United States devoting itself to building up a socialized economy in Egypt for all the world to look at. All this was bound to have enduring repercussions. Is this, inquired Secretary Humphrey, how we propose to compete with the Soviet Union in the forthcoming economic struggle? Of course, Secretary Humphrey admitted, Russia could very well make all kinds of promises to Egypt to finance the projected Dam. If accepted, Russia would send in her people in large numbers. They would run all over Egypt, ultimately Communize it, and then say they were unable to go through with the project. This, said Secretary Humphrey, seemed to

be the alternative we face; but nevertheless real difficulties were going to be raised for us if we adopted the proposal for assistance which had been outlined earlier.

At the conclusion of Secretary Humphrey's comment, the President said he would like to reply first to the point raised by Secretary Humphrey regarding the increased competition between U.S. and Egyptian cotton raisers which would result from the completion of the High Aswan Dam. The President pointed out that the building of the Dam would inevitably take a good many years. In less than fifty years the population of the United States would increase by something more than 50,000 [*50,000,000?*] people. This population increase would help our own farmers and soften any blow which might result from increased Egyptian production.

Secondly, the President said he would comment on Secretary Humphrey's point about contributing to the development of a socialized economy in Egypt. The President pointed out that the United States itself had never and would never venture on any enterprise of the scale of the High Aswan Dam except through the instrumentality of the Government and Government financing. This had been true of the Hoover Dam and a great many similar projects, all of which had been financed with Federal funds. Accordingly, it did not seem to the President that the United States was actually departing from its traditional principles in assisting the Egyptians with their project, although he admitted that this was a sobering decision for the Government to make.

Secretary Wilson wondered whether it might not be possible to enlist a certain amount of private Egyptian capital to assist in financing the Dam. If this were done, a certain number, at least, of private citizens in Egypt would have a stake in the completed project.

In reply to Secretary Wilson's inquiry, Secretary Hoover repeated that the basic cost of the enterprise was $1.3 billion. The new land made available for cultivation as a result of the construction of the Dam, would be privately and not collectively worked. Of this total of $1.3 billion, the sum of $400 million or $500 million would be necessary to provide foreign exchange. This sum would be provided by the International Bank, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The other $900 million would have to be raised by the Egyptians in Egypt. It was bound to include a certain percentage of private capital. Moreover, continued Secretary Hoover, the Egyptians appeared to be aware of the heavy burden they are facing for the future, although Secretary Hoover admitted that the United States would probably have to intervene from time to time with additional assistance if the Egyptians were to carry this burden.

Secretary Dulles said that there was one other important aspect of this proposal which needed to be brought out. He felt that implicit in this proposed program of assistance would be the fact that the Egyptians were going to reach some genuine understanding with Israel. Certainly the Egyptians could never undertake so large and costly an enterprise as this and simultaneously carry on a great armament competition or a war with Israel. The necessity for this understanding with the Israelis couldn't be explicitly stated by us as a part of our assistance agreement, but Secretary Dulles was sure that it could be made obvious in the course of development.

As far as the question of money was concerned, Secretary Dulles said the amount to be contributed by the United States did not really involve a great deal larger contribution than the United States would probably be obliged to spend in this area if we continued the present level of our existing assistance programs. It merely meant that our expenditures to assist Egypt would serve a more useful and fruitful end. His one great worry, said Secretary Dulles, was that a number of other nations would expect help from the United States similar to that which would be given to Egypt. Secretary Humphrey broke in to express hearty agreement with Secretary Dulles' fears. Nevertheless, said Secretary Dulles, there was no sound reason why the United States could not assist in financing projects similar to the Dam in various other underdeveloped countries—provided the International Bank would assist, provided our contribution was no greater proportionately, and provided the projects which we were to undertake to assist in construction were as sound and useful as this Dam in Egypt. There was a certain obvious advantage to the United States in undertaking such conspicuous and useful projects as the Dam, and all in all, he believed the outlook not as forbidding as might now appear at first glance.

Secretary Humphrey expressed grave doubts as to whether other projects in other underdeveloped countries would be as meritorious as the High Aswan Dam. Moreover, he said he would prophesy that at least a half dozen other countries would insist that the projects for which they sought U.S. assistance were every bit as meritorious as the Egyptian project.

The President intervened to point out his view that the International Bank would be of great help to us in screening the various projects suggested by other countries. If these projects seemed of doubtful value and U.S. assistance had to be refused, some of the onus would fall on the Bank and not all of it on the United States Government. . . . It all seemed to Secretary Humphrey a case of "damned if you do and damned if you don't."

Secretary Wilson spoke in support of the proposed plan of U.S. assistance, and said that the only thing that really worried him about

it was the "socialistic aspect". Secretary Dulles added that what really worried him was the fear that Egypt would turn down our proposal and accept a Soviet counter-proposal.

Secretary Hoover said he felt compelled to point out to the Council one very discouraging aspect of this proposal. When the High Aswan Dam project was finally completed and in operation, the arable land available to Egypt would be increased by 30%. On the other hand, by that time the population of Egypt will have increased to such a point that the addition of the new arable land would accomplish no appreciable improvement in the Egyptian standard of living.

At this point the President, smiling, turned to Secretary Humphrey and asked him if he remembered the famous World War I cartoon: "If you knows a better 'ole, go to it." Secretary Humphrey replied that he guessed he "died hard".

The National Security Council: [2]

a. Noted:

(1) The statement by the Secretary of State of his conclusion that the United States must contribute substantially to the financing of the proposed High Aswan Dam in Egypt and of the reasons therefor.

(2) The statement by the Under Secretary of State outlining the plans for contributing to the financing of the High Aswan Dam which would involve, in addition to an IBRD loan of about $200 million, assistance by the US and UK of the order of $200 million over a period estimated at about 10 years with the hope that the UK share would represent about 20 percent.

b. Noted the President's approval, after discussion of the U.S. policy implications, of proceeding with the above-mentioned plans.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State.

[Here follows discussion of the foreign policy implications of United States and Soviet missiles, and the status of the United States intercontinental ballistic and intermediate range ballistic missile programs.]

S. Everett Gleason

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[2] The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1482. (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its Meeting held on December 1, 1955, and approved by the President on December 21, 1955; Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

433. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, December 2, 1955.

U.S. POLICY ON FINANCING HIGH ASWAN DAM IN EGYPT

The Egyptian Finance Minister, Kaissouni, has been discussing the financing of the High Aswan Dam with the IBRD and representatives of the United States and United Kingdom Governments. The Egyptian Government attaches great importance to this project. The dam would provide Egypt a one-third increase in cultivable area, more food, and a higher national income; it would control Nile floods and provide power for future industrialization. It has been the subject of a political commitment by the present government to the Egyptian people. The total cost of the dam and other investment projects is estimated at $1.8 billion of which the cost attributable to the dam is $1.1 billion. Ten years would be required to complete the project. The Egyptian Government is determined to advance this project and would probably accept a Soviet offer of assistance if help cannot be obtained from the West. Western financing of the project is therefore necessary if the threat of Soviet penetration is to be avoided.

The IBRD has already informed Dr. Kaissouni that it would lend Egypt $200 million of the foreign exchange component estimated at $500 million provided Egypt could raise sufficient local currency, agree on division of the Nile waters with the Sudan, establish appropriate administrative procedures, and contract no other foreign debts.

It is recommended that the following course of action be undertaken:

1. Before going ahead with the project, the United States should obtain an agreement with the United Kingdom providing that:

(a) Of the total financing by the U.K. and the U.S., the U.K. share should be not less than 20 per cent;

(b) The U.K. is prepared to join with the U.S., the IBRD, and the Egyptian Government in support of the arrangement set forth in this statement.

2. The U.S. and the U.K. would present separate but coordinated letters of intent to the Egyptians stating that the U.S. and the U.K. are prepared to aid in the financing of the High Aswan Dam, as follows:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/12–255. Secret. The following handwritten notation by Dulles appears on the source text: "I concur JFD 2 Dec 1955".

(a) By making a joint grant contribution towards the foreign exchange cost—estimated at $30.8 to $42 million—of the initial phase of the project comprising construction of the several cofferdams and diversion tunnels over the period 1956–1961.

(b) By making a grant aid contribution of $200 million spread over the 10-year period of the construction of the project. (On the part of the U.S. the Administration will actively seek Congressional approval of the funds required by the project.)

3. The U.S. and the U.K. should exert every effort to see that an agreement is reached between Egypt and the Sudan for a fair division of the Nile waters in a manner agreeable to the contracting parties.

4. The U.S. and the U.K. will inform the Egyptians that we do not believe that their proposal to negotiate an over-all contract with a consortium would be desirable. It is our view that a procedure involving competitive bidding of the type normally required by the International Bank would insure the most expeditious and economic execution of the project.

5. The IBRD would give the Egyptian Government a letter of intent stating its willingness to proceed with the financing of the project subject to certain conditions which would be specified, including an agreement on the Nile waters. The IBRD as a mark of its intent to move ahead with the financing would propose to Egypt the formation of a working group consisting of representatives of the Bank and Egypt to study financing and technical questions in connection with the construction of the dam.

6. In view of the magnitude of the undertaking and the great strains it will inevitably impose on the resources of Egypt, the Bank will make clear to the Egyptians that in order to mobilize the funds required and to maintain economic stability it will be essential to follow sound fiscal and monetary policies and establish firm priorities for development expenditures. The Government of Egypt would be expected to agree not to assume any other foreign debts which would impair its ability to discharge its obligation to the IBRD.

7. In return for the IBRD loan, and the U.S. and the U.K. assistance in meeting a substantial part of the foreign exchange requirements of the project, Egypt would be informed that she must finance the remaining costs of the dam out of Egyptian resources.

8. The U.S. would inform Egypt that wherever possible the U.S. will continue to aid Egypt to improve its economy through a continuation of the mutual assistance program. [2]

Herbert Hoover, Jr.

[2] The Department of State on December 2 transmitted a summary of this policy paper to the Embassies in Cairo and London. (Telegram 1139 to Cairo and telegram 3087 to London; *ibid.*, 874.2614/11–3055)

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434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, December 5, 1955—8:09 p.m.

3132. Embtel 2170. [2] Deliver following message to Macmillan from Secretary:

"Dear Harold: I appreciate very much your message of November 19 [3] and also your first-hand account of the Baghdad Pact meeting with your impressions of the current atmosphere in the Near East. All the participants at the meeting are to be congratulated on the businesslike manner in which the new organization was launched.

"We certainly should not lose the impetus which has been developed. At the same time we need to keep in mind our present plans to make another try through Egypt towards an Arab-Israel settlement. I am encouraged by your assessment that the Arabs appear receptive to concrete moves towards a settlement and also by a report from Byroade of a conversation with Na[illegible]n in which the latter endorsed Fawzi's encouraging remarks to our two Ambassadors. [4] Accordingly, I think that the next order of business should be another major effort to secure Egypt's cooperation in moving to-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–2555. Secret. Drafted by Burdett; cleared with Russell, Allen, Elbrick, and Horsey; and approved and signed by Dulles.

[2] In telegram 2170, November 25, Macmillan described what had occurred at the inaugural sessions of the Baghdad Pact, which began on November 21, and he furnished Dulles with his impressions, in general, of the situation in the Near East. With respect to the prospects for an Arab-Israeli settlement, Macmillan believed that "they [the Arabs] are now ready to accept the fact that they will have to live with an Israel state." (*Ibid.*)

[3] See footnote 3, Document 416.

[4] See Document 428.

wards a settlement. Sharett is calling on me again on December 6[5] and I shall stress anew the essentiality of Israel making its contribution to a settlement.

"An immediate move to expand the Baghdad Pact would probably deny us Nasser's cooperation. Therefore, I think we should wait a little before trying to bring in Jordan and Lebanon. If we are not successful in Egypt, we should endeavor to secure the adherence of those two states as soon as possible.

"US adherence to the Pact would probably have to be coupled with a security guarantee for Israel. My thought is that such a guarantee should not be extended prior to agreement on Israel's permanent frontiers at least on the part of the northern Arab States. Otherwise, we would be giving up our strongest lever for use with Israel in obtaining a settlement.

"I was pleased that you mentioned the Buraimi incident as a matter of our mutual concern. I am disturbed by the possibility of this becoming another issue to be seized upon by nations in the area to attack the West and I believe a solution is urgently needed, possibly through a resumption of arbitration with an effective neutral supervisory commission in the zone of dispute.

. . . . . .

"I am convinced as you are of the necessity of our continuing to work together closely in dealing with our problems in the Near East.

"Sincerely yours, Foster"

Dulles

[5] See Document 437.

435. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State[1]

Tel Aviv, December 5, 1955—4 p.m.

576. Herzog told me this morning that Ben Gurion had adopted a consistent position with Cabinet that solution to Egyptian threat was along lines of Israel arms procurement rather than preventive

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–555. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 5:25 a.m., December 6. Repeated to London and Cairo.

action. Ben Gurion thought if enough arms could be obtained from West to offset "most" of Egypt's Soviet arms, Nasser in time would realize futility devotion his resources to munitions instead of to economic development. When I asked Herzog whether Cabinet agreed with Ben Gurion's position he replied: "I think so, but temper of people is such that if no arms are forthcoming things will be very serious indeed".

In commenting to Herzog re foregoing, I stressed the following:

1. Whether Nasser in time loses interest in arms and arrives at "futility" conclusion depends in large part on Israel behavior pattern.

2. In my first few months in Israel relations with Egypt were relatively tranquil and USG through Russell (Embassy telegram 212 August 30, 1954 [2]) had stressed to Sharett need for gradual and careful work, leading towards peaceful settlement.

3. Instead Israel had taken two measures which worked in opposite direction. Firstly Bat Galim test case was entirely unnecessary. It would be three or four years before any economic need send Israel flagships through Suez. In interim concentration should have been through diplomatic channels on clearing up problem getting Middle East oil through Suez in foreign bottoms.

4. Secondly, Israel defense force in summer 1954 for no good purpose had activated sabotage group in Egypt. Their activities had been very amateurish; agents had been apprehended; and once members Muslim Brotherhood had been executed by RCC it was inevitable that some of Jews would meet same fate.

5. Hanging Jewish spies and Bat Galim case (coupled with IDF revenge complex) had so inflamed Israel public opinion that Gaza incident followed shortly. This in turn had concentrated concern Nasser and RCC on Israel threat and was largely, although not totally, responsible for Egyptian efforts obtain arms superiority.

6. It was ironical but of importance in determining future policy that IDF in efforts improve Israel's security had stirred Egypt out of its military lethargy, thus creating additional insecurity for Israel.

Herzog's reply to foregoing was that "some people in Government" also attached importance to factors I mentioned but they also interpreted Nasser's recent behavior as being due to neutralism "found at Bandung" and his "dreams of empire".

White

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, p. 1635.

436. Aide-Mémoire From the Israeli Embassy to the Department of State [1]

Washington, December 6, 1955.

The Government of Israel has always upheld the necessity of a settlement with the neighboring Arab States.

2. It notes that the Secretary of State, in his Aide-Mémoire of November 21, [2] advocates an "approach which involves concessions by Arab states as well as Israel". While the Israel Government believes that the legitimate interests of Israel and the Arab States are reconcilable as they stand, it holds that if concessions are to be made they must be based on equality and reciprocity. The Aide-Mémoire of November 21, however, discusses a territorial concession by Israel, without indicating the need for any specific territorial concession to be made by any Arab State.

3. If the Arab States prevent violence from their side of the demarcation line, Israel will maintain complete calm on its side. Israel's policy is, also, to avoid reaction to provocation, except when such abstention imperils the security of its population or the integrity of its territory. The assistance of the United States would be welcomed in securing the cessation of "commando" raids and other violent actions now being carried out against Israel on various fronts, principally on Egypt's responsibility.

4. Israel's only intentions in the Gulf of Aqaba are those of free passage in conformity with its elementary rights under international law. If Egypt does not use force to impede passage in the Gulf, there is no reason to anticipate the use of force by Israel to ensure it. Moreover, if negotiations with Egypt prove feasible, Israel will abstain from any action in the Gulf likely to prejudice them.

5. The Government of Israel was interested to hear the view expressed by the Secretary of State on November 21, that there is now a chance of a settlement. Unfortunately, this impression is not borne out by the current acts and statements of Arab Governments. Encroachments continue into Israel, on the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian fronts. There is still no certainty of Arab acceptance of Ambassador Johnston's plan, which may well serve as a test of Arab sincerity. Arms from Soviet sources continue to flow into Egypt. In these circumstances, it is likely that the Egyptian regime is merely attempting to give an illusory impression of peaceful intent, in order

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–655. Secret. According to a memorandum from Allen to Dulles, December 6, the Israeli Embassy sent the Aide-Mémoire to the Department in advance of Sharett's meeting with Dulles. See *infra*. (*Ibid.*, 784A.13/12–655)

[2] See Document 424.

to gain time for strengthening its forces in preparation for intimidation or aggression when the time is ripe. At any rate, the Government of Israel is unaware of any concrete evidence which would disprove this analysis of Egyptian intentions.

6. Nevertheless, in order to assist the Secretary in his exploration, the Government of Israel submits its confidential views on the contribution which Israel might make in the context of a peace settlement. The settlement to which Israel aspires is one which would benefit both parties, by inaugurating an era of development and social progress; by enabling a reduction of defence expenditures; and by initiating processes of political, economic and cultural cooperation. Israel does not advance a claim to any of the territory held by Arab States under the General Armistice Agreements. On the other hand, Israel sees no reason for ceding any of its territory to any of the neighboring Arab States, and cannot see its way to discussing a settlement on such a prejudicial basis.

7. The following is the general outline of a settlement which Israel would envisage:

(i) The Government of Israel is ready to authorize a meeting at any appropriate level between its representatives and those of the Government of Egypt, to discuss progress towards a settlement, it being clearly understood that the basis for such a meeting would not include the cession of any part of Israel territory to a neighboring state.

(ii) Israel is prepared to discuss mutual adjustments of the armistice frontier for the benefit of both parties, on the understanding that the integrity and continuity of Israel's territory is not impaired.

(iii) Israel would be willing, in the context of a peace settlement, to contribute substantially to the opening of freer communications between all the States of the Near East, so as to enhance the economic strength and commercial enterprise of the region, and promote political and cultural understanding. These measures, which would in each case be effected without change of the existing territorial jurisdiction, might include on Israel's part:

(a) Provision for communication by air and railway between Egypt and Lebanon;

(b) Port facilities in Haifa for the Kingdom of Jordan, including transit rights by road to and from the Port;

(c) A transit arrangement to be agreed to by Israel for communication between Egypt and the Kingdom of Jordan, it being clearly understood that Israel will not cede territory, whether populated or unpopulated, in the Negev.

(iv) The Government of Israel recalls that it has already conveyed its affirmative attitude, subject to certain reservations, to the proposal on refugee compensation contained in Secretary Dulles' speech of August 26, 1955.

(v) The United States is also aware of Israel's readiness to cooperate in an agreed plan for the coordinated use of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers, as elaborated by Ambassador Johnston. The Government of Israel would welcome information on the attitude of Arab Governments to this project.

8. The subjects proposed above for discussion and action represent a significant contribution by Israel to the establishment of peace with the Arab States. These States would, of course, have to make a corresponding contribution in order to ensure fair conditions for a peaceful settlement on the basis of mutuality. Thus, freedom of transit for Arab traffic between Egypt and Lebanon would entail corresponding freedom for Israeli traffic northwards over Lebanon and southward over Egypt. Similarly, if the Kingdom of Jordan is to have free access to and from Haifa and port facilities therein, it should agree to restore free access to the Wailing Wall, the Mount of Olives and Mount Scopus. Similarly, there should be a broad element of mutuality in any territorial adjustments agreed upon in accordance with Paragraph 2. Egypt should abstain from blockades and practices of maritime interception. Indeed, this duty is incumbent upon her under the Armistice Agreement, whether or not a settlement is achieved. In the context of a settlement such as that discussed here, all Governments should undertake to abstain from pressure and intimidation against governments or agencies wishing to trade with any state in the Middle East.

9. In discussing the prospect of a peaceful settlement, the Government of Israel cannot ignore the prejudicial effects of the increasing preponderance of the Arab States, and especially of Egypt, in armed strength. Unless prompt steps are taken to reduce this perilous disparity, by providing Israel with additional arms for self-defence, such as would be matched in quality and effectiveness to the arms now obtained by Egypt, there will be an inevitable aggravation of Arab intransigeance and of Israel's apprehensions. In such circumstances the Israel Government finds it difficult to conceive any hopeful discussion of progress towards peace.

437. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 6, 1955, 2:30 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Israel-Arab Settlement and Israel Request for Arms

PARTICIPANTS

Department	*Israel Government*
Secretary	Foreign Minister Sharett
Mr. Allen	Ambassador Eban
Mr. Russell	Minister Shiloah

The Israel Foreign Minister called at his request. He said that the Israel Government had given careful and searching thought to the aide-mémoire which the Secretary had handed to him on November 21[2] and to the remarks which the Secretary had made at that time.[3] Mr. Sharett said that he had exchanged messages with Prime Minister Ben Gurion and it could be assumed that the Prime Minister had consulted his principle colleagues in the Israel Government. He said that the Israel Government's reactions have been incorporated in an aide-mémoire which Mr. Sharett handed to the Secretary.[4]

Mr. Sharett said that he had been deeply impressed by the Secretary's statement in their last meeting that if there should unfortunately be head-long clashes requiring a decision on the part of the United States between supporting Israel and the Arab states, it is a foregone conclusion that the United States would support Israel. The Secretary commented that Mr. Sharett had over-simplified his remarks. He said the United States has repeatedly reaffirmed its position under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and, if a clash in the Middle East occurred through any aggression by Israel, it would be necessary for us to oppose it. What the Secretary had intended to say in the remarks Mr. Sharett referred to was that if, despite all of our best efforts, a struggle developed in the Middle East between a Soviet-supported Arab world and a democratic Israel, our sympathy, at the very least, would be with Israel.

Mr. Sharett said that he intended to speak seriously and frankly. He hoped the Secretary would also regard his remarks as friendly. The most vital and crucial interests of Israel are at stake. Israel wants

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 16, Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Russell on December 8.

[2] See Document 424.

[3] See Document 421.

[4] *Supra.*

to differ as little as possible from the United States, but it was necessary to state Israel's position clearly. First, Mr. Sharett said, he had been taken aback by the upsurging of a wave of optimism at the possibility of an early settlement. He had seen the wave rising in press reports from Cairo and later from Washington. The previous day a reporter had quoted Vice President Nixon as being optimistic. Mr. Sharett said he saw no change of heart in Nasser nor any change in the provocatory activities along the borders. The Israel Government has had indirect contacts with Nasser, in part through American Jews traveling through Egypt, but none of the reports had been encouraging. In reply to a question from the Secretary, Mr. Sharett said that none of these contacts had been very recent. The most significant factor of all, Mr. Sharett said, was the Egyptian-Czech arms deal. With all Israel's passionate desire for peace, it was necessary for the Israelis to exercise prudence in appraising the present situation. It does more harm to be unduly optimistic than to be healthily skeptical. Apart from an evaluation of the concrete prospects Israel is faced with, the Israel Government has noticed a certain departure, indicated in the speeches of the British Prime Minister at the Guild Hall and in Parliament and also in the suggestion by the Secretary that it may be inevitable for Israel to make territorial concessions to Egypt and possibly to others. There seemed to be a significant chronological sequence and the Israel Government could not help from believing that there had been cause and effect. It believes the new departure is the result of the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal. Before the deal, Israel had sought clarification of passages in the Secretary's August 26 speech relating to boundaries. What the Israelis were told was reassuring. Macmillan told Ambassador Elath that "nothing drastic" was contemplated, only "minor adjustments". Ambassador Eban had gathered the same thing here in Washington. So Israel is forced to conclude that this insistence upon the indispensability of concessions is new and stems from the turn of events in Egypt. If this is so, then it is nothing less than a premium upon doing business with the Kremlin. The Israel public will regard the reported prospect of a loan to Egypt for the Aswan Dam as an additional premium. It will appear that if any country wants a loan or support for concessions the thing to do is to strike a deal with the Soviet Bloc. The Egyptian junta is getting the best of both worlds: arms from Russia, loans from the United States and the United Kingdom, and support for concessions from Israel. These public impressions will inevitably evoke the ghost of Munich. Nasser is out to gain time and to outwit both the West and Israel. What he wants would be at the expense of Israel's security and ultimate survival. He is creating the impression of willingness to talk settlement in order to get the Aswan loan and also to gain time to absorb

his new arms and to achieve military confidence. Mr. Sharett said that he wished the crux of his remarks to be that there is no question of Israel agreeing to cede territory. It is essential to differentiate between adjustments which would be reciprocal, mutual, minor, and the result of give and take on the one hand, and cession of territory on the other. This is not a difference in degree but a difference in kind. What is now suggested is a cession of territory and that is not something that Israel can accept. Aside from a question of statesmanship, there would be no chance of such a cession being approved by the Israel Parliament or ratified by its electorate.

Mr. Sharett said he regarded Eden's speech not only as a blunder but as a disaster. He said he was driven to the conclusion that Eden did it to improve Britain's position with the Arab world. It was a "disaster" because it was bound to strengthen Arab intransigence. If Nasser has Britain upholding his claims, why should he settle for any less? Since Israel will not concede, it makes the absence of a settlement a certainty. Mr. Sharett said that he believed the most charitable hypothesis is that Eden is committed to certain ruts of thought carried over from previous days. The Bernadotte Plan had carried a "Made in Britain" label. Mr. Sharett commented that Eden's speeches had not earned him any support in the British press, with the sole exception of the *London Times*. Most of the papers had been scathing in their attacks. The American press had also found the speeches revolting in their suggestion that Israel, which is so small, should give up land to the Arab states who already have so much.

Mr. Sharett said that he wished to be constructive as well as critical and he hoped the aide-mémoire that he had handed the Secretary would be regarded in that light. If the Arabs want a settlement they should agree to the Jordan Valley Plan. It has been worked out on the concept of reciprocity. The Israel Government prefers to approach the question of a settlement through direct negotiation but it is not opposed in principle to mediation, as it has indicated by its cooperation with Ambassador Johnston. But a mediator should not take up a position on a question such as the Negev in advance. Eden had, therefore, disqualified himself as a mediator. The question for Israel is whether it can embark upon negotiations from a position of weakness while Egypt does so from strength. Does the United States believe it is wise or fair to begin negotiations at a time when Nasser has planes and tanks in increasing quantities and when he knows that Israel has no definite prospect of getting them. Is not Israel's claims for a similar number of weapons an irresistible one? Should Israel trust that nothing untoward will happen? For its part, Israel cannot put such trust in Nasser.

With respect to the Secretary's request on November 21 that Israel not force the issue of the Gulf of Aqaba at the present time, Mr. Sharett said that all Israel is doing is to use its own port. It is not encroaching on anyone. It is Egypt that has declared that it is going to use violence to prevent this use. What the United States is doing is asking Israel to submit to violence, to stay put, to submit to brutal force. There is, of course, always the question of political sagacity. If Israel were actually negotiating a settlement, it would not force the Aqaba issue. But unless and until negotiations begin or appear practical, Israel cannot renounce its elementary rights. It would be reducing its strength of negotiation. Israel, by renouncing its right to use its own port, would merely be giving additional strength to Nasser's position. With what prospect would Israel be starting negotiations? It is being undermined at all points. This is not the general theory of the democracies in their efforts to cope with the Communist threat. The Secretary remarked that he did not believe the two situations were parallel.

Mr. Sharett said that, as his last point, he wanted to suggest the advisability of concentrating on the Johnston mission. This is concrete and tangible and on this issue Nasser is on trial. He promised Ambassador Johnston that he would use his efforts to overcome the objections of Syria and other Arab states. Would it not be advisable to wait a couple of months and see if he carries out his pledge? Two years have been spent on the negotiations on the Jordan Valley Plan, which is a U.S. undertaking. If it succeeds, there will be grounds for encouragement. If it fails, then it will be necessary to strengthen Israel and wait for a better mood.

In comment upon Mr. Sharett's protest at the encouraging state of mind, he found in certain quarters about the prospects of a settlement, the Secretary said he had set forth his position in his press conference that morning.[5] He read the following from the transcript: "We continue to feel very strongly that there should be a solution of that problem. I can only go back in these matters to my comprehensive statement of August 26 on this subject, which was very thoroughly and carefully prepared, which emphasizes what we believe to be the imperative need of a solution to prevent, as I then said, the development of an arms race which would sap the economic strength of these countries. The gains to come out of a settlement from both sides are immense. We continue to hope that both sides will see the possibilities of such gains in the situation. I would not say that there are any concrete developments which could be ad-

[5] For excerpts from the transcript of Secretary Dulles' news conference of December 6, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 19, 1955, p. 1007.

duced as proof that they had been so convinced as yet. But the possibilities in our opinion still exist."

With respect to Mr. Sharett's point that the U.K. and possibly the U.S. had changed its position with respect to territorial adjustments and with respect to aid on the Aswan Dam as a result of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal, the Secretary said that such was not the case. As far as the U.S. is concerned, its views with respect to possible territorial adjustments had been in formulation for more than a year, ever since the Secretary had told Eban in the fall of 1954 that he was studying the question. The views we hold today are the same as those we had six months ago. The Secretary said that he had asked Francis Russell to work with him in seeing what the U.S. could do to help in making a settlement possible. He hoped that some day it would be possible for him to tell Mr. Sharett or some of his colleagues more in detail what our views were. We have been studying the possibility of assisting in the construction of the Aswan Dam for over two years. Our attitude on what constitutes a fair agreement with respect to territorial adjustments and our attitude on economic development in the area has not altered as a result of the Soviet arms deal.

On the question of "cession" of territory in the Negev, the Secretary said that the Israel-Egyptian Armistice Agreement provides that the armistice lines were to be without prejudice to the question of ultimate boundary decisions. Israel's present title to territory in that area is provisional, not final. The Secretary said that Mr. Sharett had mentioned a lot of evil things that would flow from a willingness on the part of Israel to regard the Negev boundaries as negotiable: loss of access to Elat, loss of valuable mineral products, loss of population, and dismemberment of Israel. The Secretary said that he believes there are ways of avoiding this chamber of horrors and still provide land communication between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. Mr. Sharett remarked that Israel had offered to provide a right of transit. The Secretary commented that that was not enough, in his best judgment, to obtain a settlement.

The Secretary said that, in his opinion, any possibility of a settlement must be carried forward by the mediation approach. He said we are not offering ourselves in that role but we are exploring simultaneously on both sides what the attitudes toward a settlement are. The Secretary said that he believes the time for a special effort at settlement is right here now. Today and for some months, the position of Israel will be one of military superiority. It will take time for Egypt to assimilate any arms it acquires. Egypt has always taken the position that it could not negotiate from weakness but it may feel that the prospect of an increase in its actual armed strength will suffice to enable it to contemplate a settlement. It is not probable

that we shall ever find a time of perfect equilibrium. Mr. Sharett said he must deny that Israel has military superiority. The Secretary said that all he could do was to take the advice of this Government's military experts who believe that Israel has current military superiority. Mr. Sharett said that if Israel has superiority, it is the result of factors unrelated to equipment. The Secretary said it was quite true that this superiority may be less decisive in the future than it is now. The present is, therefore, a good opportunity to make a serious effort at a settlement.

Mr. Sharett said that the mood in Israel now is one of tense calm in the face of a grave danger. He pointed to the fact that there had been no recent reactions to border provocations because the public knows that the Government is attempting to deal with the larger danger. The Secretary said that he thought it doubtful that efforts by both sides to increase armaments would produce a better situation.

The Secretary said he had only had an opportunity to read very hastily the aide-mémoire which Mr. Sharett had just handed to him but it was his impression that it was not adequately responsive to the Secretary's requests of November 21. Nevertheless, it does indicate a certain willingness to negotiate. Mr. Sharett interpolated, "provided the cession of territory is not made the starting point." The Secretary said that he had not suggested it as a starting point. The Secretary said that whatever merit there may be in Israel's attitude toward the question of the use of the Gulf of Aqaba, it was necessary to bear in mind the practical fact which Mr. Sharett had mentioned, namely, that a raising of the issue [6] at this time would be most unfortunate with respect to the prospect of a settlement. The Secretary referred to Mr. Sharett's suggestion that negotiations be delayed for a couple of months to see whether there might be agreement at the end of that time on the Jordan Valley Plan. The Secretary said that those two months are too valuable to spend in waiting. That may be the very time when a rough military equilibrium will best provide an opportunity for moving toward a settlement. Mr. Sharett asked whether the impression his colleagues had obtained at the time of the Secretary's speech last August that territorial adjustments would be mutual and not drastic was accurate. The Secretary said that Francis Russell had studied the problem intensively last spring and that, from a review of the situation with him, the Secretary's impression had been that Israel would have less in terms of square miles but that it would not involve areas that were heavily populated or had great strategic value. With respect to Mr.

[6] At this point in the text, the word "forcible" is inserted in Secretary Dulles' handwriting.

Sharett's comment that it was one thing to negotiate and another thing to have a pre-judged plan, the Secretary said that he was not sure which category he would put our present thinking into. We have tried to satisfy ourselves that there is a solution that would not involve real loss to Israel but out of which would come some very real gains. The Secretary said that he believed there is a possibility of an equitable settlement and he hopes that Israel will not foreclose it.

Mr. Sharett said that he expected to be leaving the United States in a week and that it would be most important for him to have some indication of the United States' answer to Israel's request for arms. The Secretary said that the Department expected to receive from Defense by the end of this week a report with respect to availability and cost. Mr. Sharett said that what he would be most interested in would be not the details but a general understanding with respect to availability and especially the possibility of acquiring jet aircraft.

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438. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 6, 1955, 4:45 p.m. [1]

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Sir Roger Makins
Mr. Merchant
Mr. MacArthur

SUBJECT

Arab-Israeli Situation

During the course of a call on the Secretary by Sir Roger Makins about other matters, the Secretary mentioned that he had had an hour-and-a-half conversation with Israel Foreign Minister Sharett today. [2]

The Secretary said that the general tenor of Sharett's remarks had not been good and that the latter had insisted that Israel could not give up any territory and could never enter into negotiations

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–655. Secret. Drafted by MacArthur. The time is taken from Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[2] See *supra*.

committed in advance to territorial concessions. The Secretary said he had commented to Sharett that it was not necessary to be committed in advance to territorial concessions and that what was important was the results achieved at the conclusion of negotiations.

Sharett had charged that the US and UK had changed their position as a result of the Egyptian arms deal, to which the Secretary had replied that there had been no change in our position over the last six months and that if he were put on the stand he could produce documents and charts, drawn up long before the Egyptian arms deal, indicating that our position then was the same as it is now. Based on this position, he had made his statement on August 26, 1955 on our policy with respect to the Arab-Israel settlement.

Returning to Sharett's comments, the Secretary said Sharett had insisted throughout the conversation that Israel could not give up any of its economic assets and could most certainly not give up access to the Port of Eilat, to which the Secretary had replied that we were not asking Israel to give up its economic assets or access to Eilat, but that there would have to be territorial adjustments and that when the negotiations were over, Israel would probably possess less square miles than before. However, this would be compensated, because what Israel might lose in territory it would gain in real security if a settlement were reached.

Sir Roger asked how Sharett had reacted to this, and the Secretary replied that he had not reacted badly. However, Sharett had taken the position that the present moment was inopportune to enter into negotiations and that it would be better to wait two or three months to see how the Egyptians reacted to Eric Johnston's proposals with respect to the Jordan Waters. The Secretary had replied by saying we could not afford to waste time. In the next two or three months the Egyptians will not have assimilated the arms which they are receiving, and if progress towards a settlement could be made, it might head off an arms race and possibly keep the Soviet arms deal to a one-shot operation. If, on the other hand, we simply waited, the situation could deteriorate further, and therefore we believed it was essential to try to make progress now and not to lose two vital months. The Secretary added that Sharett had indicated that when the time was ripe, Israel would be willing to negotiate either directly with the Arabs or through a mediator. Sharett had added, however, that Eden had disqualified himself as a mediator by reason of the recent position he had taken.

In conclusion, the Secretary said that while Sharett had said many uncompromising things, the Secretary felt that there might be some give in the Israeli position. Therefore, his over-all reaction to his talk with Sharett was not one of discouragement. He added that Sharett had given him an aide-mémoire which he had not had time

to study.[3] Also, Sharett had pressed him for a U.S. reply on the Israeli arms request, and it seemed probable that we would have to give this reply next week. Sir Roger asked whether he had understood the Secretary correctly to say that the reply would have to be given next week. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and said that actually the Department of Defense had staffed the Israeli arms request, and although he had not seen the Defense paper since he had asked that it not be sent him until after his talk today with Sharett, he understood that most of the arms requested were available and that price tags had been put on them. The Secretary indicated that the nature of our reply would have to be studied very carefully but that he felt it would probably have to be given next week. He added that Sharett had indicated he would be willing to remain on in the U.S. for a few extra days if this would enable him to receive the reply directly.

[3] Document 436.

439. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State[1]

Jerusalem, December 6, 1955—1 p.m.

180. General Burns saw Ben-Gurion December 5. He is going Cairo December 7.[2]

According Burns Ben-Gurion stressed point that prerequisite any agreements about El Auja area or elsewhere must be cessation by Egypt of shooting and raiding across border. If that condition met Ben-Gurion would agree to UNTSO marking old international frontier El Auja D/Z, but not all D/Z boundaries as Nasser has proposed. He also expressed willingness remove troops from D/Z provided Egyptians move their position from zone opposite (Article 8, paragraph 3 GAA).[3]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/12–655. Confidential; Priority. Received at 11:17 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, and Paris, and to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, and Tel Aviv.

[2] See Document 445.

[3] Article 8(3) of the Egypt–Israel General Armistice Agreement (U.N. doc. S/1264/–Corr. 1 and Add. 1) reads as follows:

"On the Egyptian side of the frontier, facing the El Auja area, no Egyptian defensive positions shall be closer to El Auja than El Qouseima and Abou Aoueigila."

Burns raised question of Kibbutz in D/Z, pointing out military characteristics this settlement. Ben-Gurion countered by arguing that all settlers near borders had to be organized for self-defense, et cetera. Burns observed that situation D/Z not exactly comparable that elsewhere. However, Ben-Gurion gave no indication that Israelis might be prepared under any circumstances consider removal Kibbutz or police force.

Burns said he is preparing report of above interview for UNSYG. He offered send me copy. Will telegraph summary when available. In discussing above with me Burns commented that matter of Kibbutz D/Z is "a farce", since it is clearly a military-type establishment. He said Ben-Gurion does not appear to be in good health and expressed doubt that latter would remain in office long under difficult circumstances. Burns is not optimistic regarding outcome his current efforts improve matters.

Cole

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440. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, December 6, 1955—8:09 p.m.

1181. For Byroade from Secretary. In long talk with Sharett today, [2] I probed deeply into question of possible settlement along lines of my talks with Fawzi in San Francisco [3] and Washington. [4] While discussion was inconclusive and Sharett took stubborn attitude on territorial matters, I did not get impression he closed doors irrevocably. His repeated emphasis was against "territorial cessions" but was willing to talk about "mutual adjustments" and did not insist that Israeli losses had to be matched acre for acre by gains.

I think it would be useful for you to let Nasser or Fawzi know that my talk was in consequence of our discussions with them and that I am doing everything possible to achieve early progress. [5]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/12–655. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Allen; approved and signed by Dulles.

[2] See Document 437.

[3] See Document 138.

[4] See footnote 3, Document 150.

[5] Byroade reported in telegram 1098 from Cairo, December 8, that he had told Fawzi about Dulles' talk with Sharett along the lines suggested in this telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–855)

FYI I have in mind that press may give impression, perhaps through information by Israeli Embassy, that I have been discussing settlement with Sharett behind Egypt's back. Summary of discussion will follow in subsequent telegram. [6]

Dulles

[6] Transmitted in telegram 1229 to Cairo, December 10, also sent to Tel Aviv and London; not printed. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/12–1055)

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441. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, December 7, 1955—5:57 p.m.

3172. For Ambassador from Under Secretary. Secretary has had discussions with Robert B. Anderson [2] former Deputy Secretary of Defense concerning a number of the current problems in Middle East particularly Israel-Arab dispute. If preliminary discussions indicate useful purpose would be served, President may request Anderson assist in mediatory capacity in area. Anderson arriving in London Saturday December 10, 9:30 a.m. for three days on personal business trip. Believe it would be helpful if he could have brief discussion with Macmillan over weekend or on Monday for general exchange of ideas. Information of Anderson relation to Israel-Arab settlement should be confined to two or three people in embassy and UK Government. [3]

Dulles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–755. Secret. Drafted by Russell and approved by Hoover.

[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, he met with Anderson on November 30 from 11:35 a.m. until 1:51 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[3] Ambassador Aldrich responded on December 8 that he had spoken to Shuckburgh about Anderson's impending visit, and had been told that Macmillan would see Anderson at 6 p.m., London time, on Monday, December 12. (Telegram 2364 from London; Department of State, Central files, 032 Anderson, Robert B./12–855)

The Department informed the Embassy on December 9 that, due to illness, Anderson was canceling his trip to London. (Telegram 3233 to London; *ibid.*, 110.11/12–955)

442. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Camp David, Maryland, December 8, 1955 [1]

I walked with the President from his living lodge to the lodge where the NSC meeting is held. [2] We discussed the question of arms to Israel. I said that we would probably have the Defense Department's list on availability and costing within the next day or two, and we would then have to reach a policy decision. [3]

I said that in general our thought was to concentrate on primarily defensive items, although the big problem would be the jet planes which, while essentially fighter and interceptor planes, could be used offensively to drop bombs.

The President expressed the view that we could not very well refuse to let the Israelis buy some defensive weapons.

I pointed out that I was looking into the question of whether we could limit the list to the same type of equipment which we were prepared to sell Egypt last June. This would at least in principle make our action less subject to criticism by the Arabs. Also, I hoped we could announce some program for Iraq and Saudi Arabia at the same time and possibly something about the Aswan Dam. However, I said that undoubtedly any sale of arms to Israel would be misinterpreted in the Arab world as support for Israel against her Arab neighbors and would have bad political repercussions, tending to drive the Arabs more and more into the arms of the Soviet Union.

JFD

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers; Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles on December 9.

[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, the NSC meeting that day at Camp David began at 10 a.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[3] In a memorandum, December 7, Russell and Allen informed the Secretary that the Department of Defense would be providing this data in the near future. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/12–755)

443. Editorial Note

At luncheon on December 8 at Camp David, President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, Secretary of Defense Wilson, and Dr. Howard Snyder, the President's

personal physician, reviewed several matters, among them the problem of financing the Aswan Dam. On this subject, Dulles recorded the following:

"There then ensued some general conversation. Secretary Humphrey expressed the view that if we went to Congress for specific authorization on a project like the Aswan Dam, it would probably be defeated on the grounds that it would ultimately increase agriculture production and also that every Congressman who wanted a dam for his district would press against giving a big dam to the Egyptians.

"I said that I did not think that Congressmen ought to be called upon to vote on specific projects which involved these difficulties for them but that the responsibility should be taken by the national administration and Congress merely asked for general authority. However, this needed to be such as to permit of supporting projects which had several years to run; only thus could we dependably support major projects which were of a character to catch the popular imagination and produce the psychological results we sought.

"The idea then developed that we might ask Congress for authority to use not more than 100 million dollars a year for 10 years for 'soft' local currency loans, subject, however, to appropriations to be made on an annual basis. This would be somewhat like the policy adopted to finance the Marshall Plan where there was an authorization for 4 or 5 years but with only annual appropriations.

"The net result of the proposal would be to enable the Administration to undertake long-term projects, aggregating in value one billion dollars.

"The President thought this was an interesting idea to be explored." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

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444. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, December 8, 1955—1 p.m.

584. At suggestion of Foreign Ministry yesterday afternoon I made what I thought was to be a courtesy call on Acting Foreign Minister. In an 80-minute conversation Myerson made following points:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–855. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 1:39 a.m. Repeated to London and Cairo.

1. Nasser's recent protestations about wanting peace were designed to mislead western powers and were made to gain time.

2. His real intentions were set forth in his *New York Post* interview (October 13) when he "declared war on international Jewry, especially American Jewry, as well as on Israel".

3. Nasser's ultimate objective was destruction of Israel, but he might be planning to do this in stages by taking Negev first.

4. Could not understand Britain's support of Nasser's objective to link up Egypt and Jordan. He was already engaged subversion in Jordan and territorial contiguity would hasten Egyptian takeover to Britain's detriment.

5. Myerson next said Soviet move into Egypt was directed at western powers; Soviets were not supplying arms to Egypt for purpose of destroying Israel but if in process Israel was destroyed Soviets would not mind. She added: "Who knows, if we had requested Soviet arms we might have received them, but we have made no such request."

6. When I asked Myerson whether she was convinced that Nasser would attack Israel when militarily strong enough, she replied that "there is not shadow of doubt in my mind."

7. In reply to my question as to whether her views on Nasser reflected doubt as to his desire for settlement or skepticism that he would honor an agreement Myerson replied "both". Her subsequent remarks however were concentrated on latter aspect and she illustrated her views by referring to Suez settlement and subsequent "double cross" which Nasser had given United States.

8. When Myerson said that immediate problem was for Israel to get arms from west I replied this would be nothing better than stopgap and that our view which we shared with British was that definitive settlement was imperative.

Comment: Myerson's concentration on Nasser with virtually no reference to Egypt or RCC is characteristic of current Israel public and governmental thinking which personalizes Egyptian-Israel relations as fight between Nasser and Israel plus Diaspora.

In my judgment Myerson's stated conviction Nasser will attack when able represents her real belief; the overwhelming majority of Israelis share this view; and it constitutes one of most dangerous aspects of situation in months ahead.

White

445. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, December 9, 1955—5 p.m.

1107. General Burns met Foreign Minister Fawzi 7 December and sought Egyptian approval SYG proposals re El Auja D/Z. Fawzi who not particularly forthcoming indicated GOE might be willing drop proposal demarcate entire D/Z and work out formula withdrawal few meters checkpost now encroaching on D/Z if Major General Amer was satisfied maintenance of 30 police in D/Z on conditions approved by Burns did not present threat security Egyptian forces. Burns saw Amer December 8. Amer stated GOE could not accept maintenance of police in D/Z for reasons of security and because acceptance would be unfavorably received by Egyptian army as representing "concession." Amer called police "screen" preventing Egyptians obtain intelligence information re Israeli forces in Western front area and indicated such intelligence necessary view Israeli unwillingness permit movement observers when Israelis had operation in mind.

(Burns explained to us that police in his view counter-balance personnel of GOE checkposts on Western side D/Z. He noted that special committee had not yet decided their status but he felt that principle of police in D/Z depended essentially on status Kibbutz which SC has never decided. He speculated SC might eventually have to decide status police but he had observed no enthusiasm for SC consideration problem at present time.)

Burns saw Fawzi again later same day. View Amer's position Fawzi withdrew suggestions previously made re demarcation and checkpost. Burns clearly disappointed Egyptian position. He points out that by sticking to technicalities GOE in effect leaving Israelis in military occupation D/Z. Burns hopes situation will remain "fluid" and mentioned Amer had assured him Egyptian troops in region D/Z had strict orders hold fire unless attacked. However Burns fears Israelis may take advantage GOE "rejection" SYG proposals to try mark unilaterally Western side D/Z. Burns said he would forbid such action but is not hopeful Israelis will desist. In that event further clashes likely.

Comment: Problem is that each side fears attack by other but neither for political reasons seems prepared grant free movement UN observers in disturbed area. (Burns admitted Israelis still restricting movements of observers in Western front area to main roads,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/12–955. Confidential. Received at 6:17 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, and USUN.

although they are permitted move freely in D/Z. In return GOE prohibits movement observers in area west of D/Z.) This would appear best means solve problem which is essentially fear of both sides of concealed military build-up. Hope to see Nasser within next few days and will endeavor persuade him reexamine GOE position. In meantime, hope Israelis can be persuaded not to go ahead with marking and to make some progress on observer movement in Western front area.

Byroade

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446. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, December 10, 1955—6:12 p.m.

1230. Russell met with Shiloah, [2] Minister Israel Embassy, December 8 pursuant to suggestion by Secretary to Sharett (Deptel 1229 [3]) that we would be willing to indicate to IG our thinking about nature of equitable settlement of Israel-Arab dispute as result of intensive consideration which USG had given to problem starting last spring. Russell said that Egyptian-Soviet arms deal had in no way altered our ideas on elements of settlement. However, rapidly evolving events including arrival Soviet shipments in Egypt and Soviet offers to other Arab states made early attainment of settlement imperative. Time at our disposal was short and might be measured in terms of few weeks. At present Arab states appeared relatively receptive to settlement. Nuri had indicated Iraq would not oppose negotiations by another Arab state and Nasser had stated publicly he prepared to consider agreement.

Russell described elements of what we would regard as an equitable settlement and one which we hoped would sufficiently reflect vital interests of both sides so that it would be acceptable to them:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1055. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Drafted by Burdett and Russell, approved by the Secretary and Russell, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Tel Aviv and London.

[2] No other record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[3] See footnote 6, Document 440.

Refugees. Repatriation to Israel of perhaps 75,000 Arab refugees at agreed annual rate. Repatriated refugees to assume all rights and obligations of Israel citizens. Resettlement of remaining refugees in Arab states or other areas. Israel to pay compensation for real property left by refugees and to renounce counter claims for Jewish property left in Arab areas in return for renunciation by refugees of claims other than for real property. Israel and international Jewish community to raise substantial portion funds required pay compensation. US and perhaps other countries to assist Israel in meeting portion of obligation through long-term low interest loan.

Jerusalem. US would support UN review of status of Jerusalem as stated in Secretary's August 26 speech.

Boycott. Arab states to cease efforts enforce secondary boycott against Israel, defined as attempts prevent trade between Israel and non-Arab countries including termination of pressures on non-Arab firms trading with Israel. Arab states to remove all restrictions on shipping, including Israel vessels, transiting Suez Canal or entering Gulf of Aqaba. Unrealistic to endeavor at this time force direct trade between Arab states and Israel.

Termination of state of belligerency. Appropriate legal formula to be found covering Arab acknowledgment termination of state of belligerency. Unrealistic hope obtain formal peace at this time.

Communications arrangements. Israel to offer Jordan free port facilities at Haifa and free access to port. Other arrangements to be worked out, for example, overflight rights, telecommunications, use of roads.

Unified Development Jordan Valley. Parties to agree to plan presented by Ambassador Eric Johnston.

Territorial. Mutual agreement on definitive border in accordance with following principles: Division of present "Demilitarized Zones" and "No Man's Lands" created by armistice agreements. Restoration to Arab border villages of portion of adjoining farm lands upon which they dependent for livelihood and from which they cut off by existing armistice line. Cession to Israel of portion of Latrun salient making possible resumption use direct road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Adjustments in Negev to provide Arab area joining Egypt with rest of Arab world; land involved need not be appreciably populated or of any substantial economic value.

Territorial Guarantees. US and perhaps other countries to join in formal treaty engagements as stated by Secretary August 26.

Shiloah said he did not wish "negotiate" regarding any element mentioned. Although Israel would have comments, all points appeared based on decent effort approach problem from point of view of equity except suggestion regarding Negev. Negev vital to Israel

and he unable to see why Western powers thought it necessary to foster Egyptian aspirations to Arab leadership by giving Nasser slice of Negev. Russell replied settlement might stand or fall over Negev. It should be possible reconcile opposing views of Israel and Egypt without impairing vital interest of either. Major question was whether Israel would agree that Negev problem is negotiable. Would be great tragedy if either side stated it not prepared even negotiate on subject. US convinced that if settlement is to be reached it must be worked out with Egypt and Egypt would not consider settlement unless some arrangements made regarding Negev.

Shiloah stated would refer points immediately to Sharett and hoped discuss further with Department shortly.

Dulles

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447. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, December 10, 1955—6:12 p.m.

1231. Deptel 1230. [2] Shiloah called on Russell today [3] and said he had discussed at length with Sharett points made in talk with Russell on Dec 8. Sharett had authorized him to make following interim reply. Sharett not in position make definitive comments until after discussion with gov't upon return to Israel around Dec 17. Israel would have comments to make on all of elements mentioned. However, if it were not for central question of Negev, Israel willing enter into negotiations at any moment. Position with respect to Negev was communicated to Secretary by Sharett. [4] Israel is ready to enter negotiations without conditions even if it knows that the question of the Negev will be raised. There is nothing tabu on bringing up any issue. However, as now formulated Dept's proposal on Negev amounts to a pre-condition. Israel will have agreed to make concessions on Negev and only point to be negotiated will be

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1055. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha. Drafted by Russell, approved by the Secretary, and approved for transmission by Russell, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Tel Aviv and London.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] No other record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[4] See Document 437.

the size of the concession. US should not deceive Egypt into thinking Israel will enter negotiations morally bound to do something regarding Negev.

If there is any vestige of readiness on part of Arabs to reach settlement, remainder of elements provide adequate scope for negotiations. Israel has doubts regarding Arab readiness to reach settlement. Israel fears US is engaging in wishful thinking and that Arabs are following deliberate stalling tactics.

Manner of conducting negotiations will pose no problem.

Dulles

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448. Letter From Foreign Minister Sharett to Secretary of State Dulles [1]

Washington, December 12, 1955.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On the eve of my departure for Israel I wish to thank you for the opportunities which I have had of exchanging ideas with you in such a frank and earnest spirit.

Since our last meeting I have given much thought to your views on an Arab-Israel settlement. In accordance with your suggestion after our talk on December 6, [2] we have remained in touch with the Department; and we have received, through Mr. Russell, a more detailed account of your thinking on the eight main problems which arise in the consideration of a settlement. [3]

When I return home, my colleagues and I will carefully examine these ideas, which have clearly been formulated in a genuine desire to resolve the conflict. There are several points which invite comment, but in this letter I should like to dwell only on the two matters which cause us the greatest difficulty and anxiety.

The most acute of these is the territorial question. In the aide-mémoire of December 6 [4] I reiterated our willingness, in the context of a peace settlement, to consider mutual adjustments of the present borders for the benefit of both parties. Such rectification would not involve substantial changes of territory; but they might bring about improved conditions of security and communication.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1255. Confidential.
[2] See Document 437.
[3] See Documents 446 and 447.
[4] Document 436.

We continue, however, to be deeply disturbed by the Department's advocacy of a change in the Negev which would "provide an Arab area joining Egypt with the rest of the Arab world."

In our conversations on November 21[5] and December 6, I outlined the reasons which prompt us to oppose the principle of unilateral territorial sacrifice, whether in the Negev or elsewhere. Our objection is all the stronger when we reflect on the purpose which this particular sacrifice is to serve. There is something wholly artificial about the idea of Arab inter-communication between one wilderness and another wilderness, across a part of Israel where no lateral communications exist or have ever existed. On December 6 I told you of my deep apprehension that in order to achieve this dubious purpose, which responds to no essential needs of the region, Israel would be called upon either to amputate itself, or to cut itself in two and find Elath severed from its main body. I also expressed the fear that such a change would impede vital development work. In reply, you indicated that you had none of these consequences in mind, and believed that a way could be found of avoiding them.

Mr. Russell has since acquainted us with methods whereby it is proposed to reconcile Israel's vital interests to maintain its territorial integrity and hold Elath with the assumed need for providing "an Arab area joining Egypt with the rest of the Arab world." For example, he has described the idea of triangles of territory in the southern Negev, one to be ceded to Egypt, the other to Jordan, meeting at a point of intersection through which Israel's communications would run. I understand that amongst the various solutions discussed this is considered the most favorable to Israel's interests.

I must tell you in all candor that this kind of proposal does not allay any of our apprehensions.

(1) It involves a considerable cession of territory to two countries which have no right to expand beyond their present frontiers at Israel's expense. (Indeed, they both gained territory beyond their 1947 positions as a result of their invasion of Israel and occupation of parts of former Palestine.)

(2) The Department seems to understand that Israel's outlet to the sea at its own port of Elath is a vital national asset which Israel cannot be called upon to renounce. But under the proposal in question this vital asset would be left hanging at the end of a slender thread, which the Egyptians and the Jordanians would be in a position to snap at any moment from the scissor-like position which they would acquire. In the insecurity thus created, communication with Elath would be utterly precarious. Economic development at Elath, or in the parts of the Negev adjoining the Arab triangles, would be discouraged and, indeed, paralyzed by the proximity of these two wedges of foreign territory. Prospecting for

[5] See Document 421.

mineral and other resources would be a hopeless venture amidst such a medley of interlocking frontier lines. Thus, although the map might indicate that Israel would not technically be losing Elath, the actual consequences of the proposed arrangement would amount to its loss, and indeed, to the prevention of our effective control and development of a major part of the southern Negev.

(3) In an effort to get an immediate settlement, complications are created by this proposal which hold the seed of future conflicts. In this case, there is not even the prospect of a short-term settlement arising from such an unacceptable proposal. The whole arrangement is one which, if it existed under the Armistice, should be removed by a peace settlement. It is certainly not the function of a settlement to create new and dangerous sources of friction and clash.

(4) The suggested imbroglio of interlocking frontiers is unnecessary even in terms of the problem which it purports to solve. For this problem there is a simple and rational solution. I refer to our agreement to consider a transit arrangement across this part of Israel territory without affecting the existing territorial jurisdiction. Objective world opinion would surely regard such a solution as more just, more stable and more conducive to long-term peace than the explosive situation which would be created by the drawing of lines on a map, without adequate thought to their effect on everyday life in the region concerned, and on the fate of the assets which it contains.

In this connection I would again urge the fullest consideration for the proposals contained in paragraph 7 of our aide-mémoire of December 6. A settlement established on such principles of reciprocity would transform the situation in the Middle East beyond recognition, without imposing any sacrifice of national interest or honor on any of the parties concerned. It would thus meet the definition which you formulated on August 26. It is not usual for a country which has been subjected for eight years to attack, siege and other forms of implacable hostility to offer its adversaries such tangible advantages as those enumerated in our aide-mémoire. I fear, however, that dogmatic insistence on the need for "an Arab area joining Egypt with the rest of the Arab world" would thwart any prospect of settlement which might now exist or subsequently arise.

The second problem on which I desire to comment is that of Arab refugees. The welfare of the refugees themselves, the interests of the Arab countries, and the stability of the region all require a solution by resettlement in Arab lands. To such a solution Israel can contribute significantly by the payment of compensation; and by accepting Ambassador Johnston's project, under which the major portion of the waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers would be available to Arab States for new agricultural development.

The measures of inter-communication and economic cooperation outlined in our aide-mémoire of December 6 would also assist the refugees, by increasing the viability of the countries absorbing them, especially of Jordan where 500,000 refugees now live as citizens of

the Kingdom. You will also recall what we have done and are doing in releasing blocked accounts, reuniting separated families and resettling in Israel, at our own expense, tens of thousands of Arabs displaced by the vicissitudes of war. All this together proves that we neglect no opportunity of contributing to the solution of a problem which would never have arisen at all, but for the folly of Arab governments in attempting the violent destruction of our State.

I must, however, say in all frankness that I cannot envisage how an Israel Government, in addition to all these burdens and contributions, can undertake to settle tens of thousands of Arab families in Israel. The economic and financial difficulties are grave enough: but even they are overshadowed by political and security considerations of the most compelling character. We cannot forget that these people have for eight years been heavily indoctrinated by Arab governments with hatred of Israel and denial of its statehood. It would not be conducive to their welfare or to our security for them to be resettled in Israel. Indeed, the very logic which moves you to uphold resettlement in Arab lands as the best solution for the vast majority, applies with equally compelling force to the minority. It cannot seriously be argued, for example, that it is possible for the vast Arab countries to absorb, say, 750,000 refugees and impossible for them to absorb 800,000. If there is a resettlement scheme, these relatively small differences of dimension would not prejudice its feasibility. For Israel, on the other hand, an undertaking to resettle Arabs would be a political and human impossibility. Moreover, the mere holding out of a prospect of repatriation, even for a fraction of the total number, would strengthen the resistance of all refugees to any resettlement at all. I therefore hope that you may see your way to pursue your thinking on this problem to its final outcome, and advocate resettlement and compensation as its total solution.

I presume that we shall continue to discuss these matters through our diplomatic channels in the coming days and weeks.

I cannot conclude without reference to the main preoccupation now weighing on my mind. It is difficult for us, in the absence of tangible supporting evidence, to assume that we are on the verge of negotiations with Arab States genuinely desirous of a settlement. Even if negotiations were to begin, there is no assurance that they would end in agreement. In the meantime, arms from Soviet sources continue to reach Egypt, while no corresponding increase in defensive strength has yet been made available to Israel. It is inconceivable to us that any friendly country should desire Israel to face its hostile neighbors from a position of growing weakness and vulnerability.

It was therefore my strong hope—especially in the light of what I heard from you on December 6—that I might receive an affirma-

tive answer to our request for the sale of arms before my departure. This problem continues to dominate our thoughts and I earnestly hope that we may soon have news which will alleviate our anxious suspense.

On leaving American soil I should like again to thank you and the Department for the unfailing courtesy which I have encountered during my stay in the United States.

I am, dear Mr. Secretary,

Yours sincerely,

M. Sharett

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449. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, December 12, 1955.

A matter of major importance which may come to a head while I am away [2] is what we say to Sharett about the Israelis' request for arms.

I suggested to George Allen that we might divide the list into two parts, namely, part one being items which are available for immediate delivery and item 2 matters which are not available for immediate delivery. The latter two include the tanks and planes which will only be available for delivery next year at various stages, beginning with the spring and running through several years.

The items available for immediate delivery are the less expensive items and items which are more distinctively of exclusive defensive use.

I am wondering whether, in view of the provision of the law and corresponding agreement with Israel that items shall not be used for aggression, we could not say to Israel that we will sell her now the presently available items which, broadly speaking, are not utilized before aggression, but that in view of the danger that there will be aggression, we are not prepared to commit ourselves now for the items which could be used for this purpose. We are, however,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/12–1255. Secret. Drafted by Dulles.

[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, he left Washington on December 13 for Paris to attend meetings of the North Atlantic Council. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

prepared to start to put these items in a state of readiness subject to the condition that intervening events or the then situation do not create a presumption of reasonable danger that the items will if then delivered be used for aggressive purposes.

It is quite true that these items such as tanks and planes could also be used for defensive purposes. However, we believe that our 1950 Declaration gives Israel reasonable assurance against itself being the victim of aggression and that under these circumstances we must be very careful in the delivery of dual purpose weapons, i.e., weapons almost equally available either for offense or defense.

Another phase of this matter was raised by Mr. Allen, who suggested we might ask Congress to pass a resolution endorsing the 1950 policy statement and authorizing the President to implement it.

This is, I think, worth considering, although I have a notion that it would arouse very considerable Arab antagonisms.

John Foster Dulles [3]

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

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450. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 12, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Aswan Dam Negotiations with UK

PRESENT

The British Ambassador, Sir Roger Makins
Viscount Harcourt, Economic Minister
Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey
Under Secretary of the Treasury Burgess
U—Mr. Hoover
E—Mr. Prochnow

I outlined to Ambassador Makins the United States Government's willingness (subject to informal Congressional approval) to enter into an agreement to aid in building the Aswan Dam. It is

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 640. Secret. Drafted by Hoover. A note attached to the source text reads: "Mr. H[oover] wants Sec to read before he sees Macmillan."

anticipated that an arrangement could be worked out along the following lines:

1. The US and UK would together make a grant aid contribution of $70 million to cover the foreign exchange cost of the first phase of the construction, estimated to require about four years. The Egyptians would put up $65 million for local expenditures, toward which the US could contribute about $20 million in P.L. 480 wheat.

2. The World Bank would supervise the first phase of the program as the agent for the expenditure of the US–UK funds. During the first two years of the initial period, the Bank would proceed with plans and negotiations looking toward the financing of the second phase—the main dam and the electrical works.

3. The World Bank would give the Egyptians a letter of intent, stating its readiness to consider a loan of $200 to $250 million for the foreign exchange costs of the second phase, subject to the following points being worked out:

a. Agreement on division of the Nile waters with Sudan.

b. Agreement with Egypt on internal financing of the local costs and stabilization of the local economy.

c. Agreement for additional outside financing of foreign exchange costs (present estimate of Bank is $80 to $130 million, which must obviously be largely supplied by US and UK).

4. The US and UK would advise Egypt that they would give "sympathetic and urgent consideration" to a long-term loan to help in financing the foreign exchange costs of the second phase over and above the World Bank loan. Decision would be dependent upon the satisfactory working out of details between Egypt and the Bank in (3) above.

5. After thorough consideration, the US finds that if Public Funds are to be used on either a grant aid or a loan basis, a direct negotiated contract with the Consortium is not feasible, and competitive bidding is required. The procedures normally employed by the World Bank would be satisfactory. Contrary to the opinion of the Egyptians, some of whom are strongly in favor of a closed deal with the Consortium, the Bank does not believe that competitive bidding will delay the project.

6. In order to make funds immediately available for the first phase, the US contribution would have to come out of current FY 1956 MSA appropriations. This will require application of at least $20 million out of the total of $30 million of funds programmed for Egyptian aid in the current year. The balance would have to come from contingency reserves, etc. It may even be necessary to draw on some of the funds scheduled for Egypt in FY 1957. The Egyptians would have to understand this clearly at the outset. Furthermore, contrary to the desires of the Egyptians, we cannot guarantee what

the level of grant aid programs might be in future years. These funds are authorized by Congress on a year-to-year basis, and there is no assurance that Congress will not take the large amount of appropriations devoted to the Aswan Dam project into consideration in determining such future authorizations.

7. A confidential agreement between the US and the UK as to their respective shares should be reached immediately, both for the first and second phases—the latter to be determined on a percentage basis inasmuch as the total amount is not yet firm.

Ambassador Makins stated that, based on the original estimate of $40 million, the UK was ready to put up $10 million. Now that the foreign exchange cost of the first phase has been determined to be $70 million, he doubted that his Government was prepared to maintain the 25% ratio. Secretary Humphrey and I urged him strongly to do so, due to (a) difficulties we would certainly encounter in Congress, and (b) the added $20 million of wheat which we were contributing. He promised to obtain instructions on this point, as well as the percentage of participation by the UK in the second phase, by December 13.

We agreed to apply all possible speed in arriving at a decision in an attempt to give the Egyptians a firm proposal by December 16.

A working group was set up to prepare drafts of aide-mémoires, etc.

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451. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, December 12, 1955—5 p.m.

1124. General tenor United States-Egyptian relations, including press treatment, on definite trend towards improvement. This believed largely due to present favorable publicity regarding forecast that United States will help on High Dam plus absence as yet of any word that United States may supply arms to Israel.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/12–1255. Secret. Received at 5:19 p.m. Repeated to London and Paris.

It may be helpful for Department to have again in capsule form what we think would be results of furnishing Israel with substantial military equipment.

1. Israeli security would not be enhanced but perhaps more seriously threatened. Egypt sure to increase orders to Czechoslovakia. Probability of flow of Soviet arms, either through Egypt or directly to other Arab States, particularly Syria and perhaps Saudi Arabia would increase. Pressure on Iraq adopt "Arab" policy would be resumed.

2. As more arms are obtained from Soviet source, Arab feeling of gratitude for help of USSR will become more pronounced. This in contrast to bitterness that will be thrown at United States, because GOE and other Arabs will be convinced it our policy try to keep Israel stronger than Egypt. This could reach point where United States lives and property would be in jeopardy.

3. Economic hold of Soviet bloc upon Egypt and perhaps other Arab States will be increased as result of further long range commitment Egyptian resources as per (1) above.

4. Good effects of United States assistance on High Dam will be completely over-balanced, at least in short run, by supply of military equipment to Israel. While from viewpoint development of Egypt and standard of living of people High Dam is essential, emotions involved in what Arabs view as immediate security problem would take precedence over probably more vital but much less dramatic long-range economic considerations.

Am certain Department will keep factors such as above in mind in facing up to extremely difficult decision that has been forced upon us.

Byroade

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452. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, December 12, 1955—8 p.m.

597. When talking this morning to Tekoah, in charge armistice affairs Foreign Ministry, he gave me the same official version last night's action against Syria as reported Embassy telegram 592. [2] I

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/12–1255. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:30 p.m., December 13. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, London, and Paris.

[2] Dated December 12; not printed. (*Ibid.*)

replied that an action of this magnitude could not be planned and placed in operation over night; that the alleged incident had not been serious and that Lake Tiberias situation had been less troublesome this year than last. I did not accept the Israel explanation of last night's aggression and doubted whether world opinion would. Tekoah then said that the action was more of a preventive than punitive nature. With the fishing season beginning it was necessary to teach the Syrians that they could not interfere with Israel activities on the lake. I replied that opinion abroad would regard the action taken and casualties inflicted as disproportionate to the objective he had mentioned. In a subsequent conversation with Herzog I reminded him of our talk last week when I ventured the opinion that the worst thing Israel could do at this juncture was to stir up trouble with any of its northern neighbors and he had expressed himself as being in full agreement with this view.

Comment: Although the official GOI explanation is adequate to justify last night's action to the Israel public, already conditioned by prolonged detention Israeli prisoners in Damascus (Embassy telegram 403 [3]) and statement by Amer that Egypt and Syria ready to open war against Israel (Embassy telegram 559 [4]), it neither explains nor justifies timing or magnitude Israel operation. Coming on the eve of US decision re arms availability for Israel this operation is explicable only as (a) a first class Israel blunder or, (b) a decision by GOI "to GOI alone [*go it*] alone" dealing with the Arabs. It is known that GOI has been apprehensive about efforts to complete its encirclement by bringing Lebanon and possibly Jordan into network of alliances directed from Cairo (Embassy despatch 387 [5]). It is possible that Israel wants a showdown on the Syro-Egyptian military pact at this time either to prove to Syria and the other Arabs States that Nasser cannot be relied on for assistance or, if he does respond in the south, to deal him a telling blow.

I am dining with Walter Eytan, Director General of the Foreign Ministry, tomorrow evening. If there are any representations which

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[3] Dated October 24, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 683.84A/10–2455)

[4] In telegram 559, November 30, Lawson catalogued a series of recent press despatches that had served to intensify Israeli concern with their "'survival' problem." Among these was a statement attributed to Amer that "Egypt and Syria are ready to open wars of liberation against Israel moment public opinion in both countries demands it." (*Ibid.*, 784A.5/11–3055)

[5] In despatch 387, December 12, the Embassy in Tel Aviv informed the Department of State that on December 7 Israel's government-controlled radio station, Kol Israel, broadcast a warning to Lebanon to avoid involvement with Syria in a military pact. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/12–1255)

Department desires me to make beyond those already set forth above, please instruct.

White

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453. Editorial Note

On December 13, the Representative of Syria informed the President of the Security Council of the Israeli attack on December 11–12 in the area east of Lake Tiberias and called for a meeting of the Security Council. (U.N. doc. S/3505)

The Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, in a report dated December 15 and in a supplementary statement dated December 30, observed that Israel had linked the Lake Tiberias attack with the shelling of Israeli fishing boats and their police escorts in the lake, but concluded that there was a striking disparity between the scale of retaliation and the provocation that the Israeli Government had cited. (U.N. doc. S/3516 and Add. 1, and Add. 1/Corr. 1)

The Security Council considered the Syrian complaint on December 16 and 22 and at six meetings between January 9 and 19, 1956. (U.N. docs. S/PV. 707-715) On December 22, the Representative of Syria introduced a draft resolution in which the Security Council would: 1) condemn Israel for the "outrageous attack"; 2) decide that the attack constituted aggression under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter; 3) call upon Members to apply economic sanctions and to expel Israel from the United Nations; and 4) decide that Israel should pay adequate compensation. (U.N. doc. S/3519) On January 9, 1956, the Representative of the Soviet Union submitted amendments to replace paragraphs 2) and 3) with paragraphs calling upon Israel to take all necessary measures to prevent such actions and warning Israel that their recurrence would require the Security Council to consider the application of Article 39 of the Charter. (U.N. doc. S/3528)

On January 11, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted a draft resolution, by which the Security Council would note that, according to the reports of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the attack deliberately violated the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, including those relating to the Demilitarized Zone. It would also

note that there had been interference by the Syrian authorities with Israeli activities on Lake Tiberias, in contravention of the Armistice Agreement. By the operative part of this draft resolution, the Security Council would: 1) remind Israel that it had already condemned military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreements and had called upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent such actions; 2) condemn the attack of December 11, 1955, as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of July 15, 1948 (U.N. doc. S/902), of the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and of Israel's obligations under the United Nations Charter; 3) express its grave concern at Israel's failure to comply with its obligations; 4) call upon Israel to do so in the future, in default of which the Council would have to consider what further measures were required to maintain or restore peace; 5) call upon the parties to comply with their obligations under the terms of the General Armistice Agreement to respect the Armistice Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone; 6) request the Chief of Staff to pursue suggestions for improving the situation in the area of Lake Tiberias; and 7) call upon both parties to cooperate with the Chief of Staff in this and all other respects, to carry out the provisions of the Armistice Agreement in good faith, and in particular to make full use of the Mixed Armistice Commission's machinery in the interpretation and application of its provisions. (U.N. doc. S/3530 and Corr. 1)

On January 12, Iran proposed amendments to the three-power draft resolution that would: delete the reference in the preamble about Syrian interference on Lake Tiberias; replace paragraph 4) of the operative part with a paragraph declaring that such actions in the future would constitute a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 requiring consideration by the Council of the measures provided for in Chapter VII; delete paragraph 5); and add a new paragraph requiring Israel to pay adequate compensation. (U.N. doc. S/3532)

The sponsors of the three-power draft resolution revised their text on January 17 and again on January 18. (U.N. docs. S/3530/Rev. 2 and S/3530/Rev. 3) New paragraphs were added whereby the Council would hold that Syrian interference with Israeli activities on Lake Tiberias in no way justified Israel's action and call upon the parties to arrange with the Chief of Staff for an immediate exchange of all military prisoners.

On January 18, Yugoslavia submitted another draft resolution. According to it, the Security Council would: 1) condemn the attack of December 11–12, 1955; 2) call upon Israel to refrain from such military action in the future; 3) consider that Syria was entitled to compensation; and 4) request the Chief of Staff to take appropriate

steps for the release of prisoners taken in this action. (U.N. doc. S/3536)

The Security Council, by 8 votes to 2, with 1 abstention, decided to grant priority in voting to the revised three-power draft resolution of January 18. (U.N. doc. S/3530/Rev. 3) The Council unanimously adopted this measure on January 19. (U.N. doc. S/3538) The Council did not vote on the other draft resolutions.

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454. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 13, 1955 [1]

SUBJECT

Israel Arms Request; Israel Position re Territorial Concessions

PARTICIPANTS

Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Yohanon Meroz, First Secretary, Israel Embassy
NEA—George V. Allen
NE—Donald C. Bergus

Mr. Eban called at Mr. Allen's request. Mr. Allen said he had been asked to express to Foreign Minister Sharett, through Ambassador Eban, the Secretary's regret that he had been unable to fulfill the hope which he had expressed last week that a reply concerning Israel's arms request could be given to Mr. Sharett before the latter left the United States. Several factors had prevented such an answer, prominent among them being the recent incident in Syria. The U.S. was awaiting reports from the UN in the latter regard.

Mr. Eban said he would convey this to Mr. Sharett. He could understand the position of the U.S. in the situation which had been created. There still remained the fundamental problem of the imbalance which existed in the area. The problem of an Arab-Israel settlement still existed. He hoped the U.S. would not fail to carry out undertakings to bring effort to bear on these problems because of "sporadic outbreaks."

Mr. Allen pointed out that the timing of the incident in Syria could not possibly have been worse, even from the viewpoint of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1455. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Burgess on December 14. The Department transmitted a circular telegram to Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Paris which summarized this conversation. (Circular telegram 386; *ibid.*, 784A.56/11–1355)

Israel's own national interests. Mr. Eban admitted "off the record" that he had not read the news reports of the incident with enthusiasm.

Mr. Eban turned to the recent informal discussions between Messrs. Russell and Shiloah concerning the elements of a peace settlement.[2] In a lengthy discussion, he made the following points: 1) the double triangle proposal, while attractive on the map, meant in effect the loss of the Southern Negev to Israel. This Israel could not accept. 2) Israel would be coming to us with a counter-proposal whereby Egypt would be given transit rights across the Negev, not on "suffrance" but as a result of "international statutory procedures." 3) He made much of the fact Mr. John Foster Dulles, as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the UN General Assembly in 1948, had, according to Eban, led the opposition to the Bernadotte proposals which would have confirmed Israel's possession of Western Galilee in return for the grant of the Negev, from Beersheba southwards, to Jordan.

Mr. Allen replied that while we would be glad to look at any counter-suggestion which the Israelis brought forward, his own best judgment was that such a proposal as the Israelis envisaged making would be inadequate to meet the need for a settlement. He mentioned recent news reports about two Algerian pilgrims being shot as they attempted, unknowingly, to walk across Israel territory en route home from the pilgrimage to Mecca. Incidents such as these would dramatize to the Arabs the need for land communications between the Arab states. He emphasized to Mr. Eban that the U.S. was not putting forward suggestions regarding possible territorial adjustments in the Negev because we thought that such adjustments were in themselves good things. Our interest in the matter was in getting a settlement.

Mr. Eban asked, on behalf of his Foreign Minister, how serious was Arab willingness to work toward a peace settlement. Mr. Allen said that the amount of time and discussion on the subject we had spent with Arab leaders about equalled the time we had spent with Israelis. The Secretary's best estimate was that there was a sufficiently serious desire on both sides to work toward a settlement to justify an all-out effort, and that until the Syrian incident, the Secretary had felt that the next two or three weeks offered the best opportunity to do so.

Mr. Allen suggested that both he and Mr. Eban tell the press, in case questions should be asked, that Mr. Eban's visit had been "for periodic consultation." Mr. Eban indicated assent.

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[2] Documents 446 and 447.

455. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, December 13, 1955—8 p.m.

1136. Although decision place Gallilee affair before SC would seem indicate lack Arab intention retaliate, called on Fawzi tonight to urge restraint. GOE of course insist delicate position over this attack for obvious reasons. Took advantage this occasion use substance Department telegram 1245 [2] as authorized by last sentence thereof which most helpful here as British and French protests on record very quickly and received headlines here yesterday morning.

Fawzi, who interrupted meeting of Council of Ministers to receive me, said Egypt was aware of her moral and formal responsibilities as well as the importance of restraint. He added that Egypt had advised Syria to take matter to SC as support this policy and had as well used moderate press. They had tried to keep press treatment such as to play down emotions but of course not belittle seriousness of attack.

Fawzi stated result to SC at this stage was only "lesser evil" than other possible alternatives as this route could in itself hold great dangers. He was very concerned as to what mischief the USSR might make of this opportunity and he feared others might play into Russia's hands. He felt it of utmost importance that Israelis not be allowed to continue the issue by introducing as many other items as possible. He felt there might as well be an effort by others to raise whole question of Palestine. The SC could of course not conduct itself as if closing its eyes to broader problems but he hoped this particular incident could be kept to forefront as the matter of urgency (and for action) before Council.

Embassy fully concurs in Fawzi's concern regarding dangers that may be encountered in SC considerations but highly gratified that this route chosen rather than military action. Believe what Fawzi fears most is some dramatic gesture by Russians as to lines of settlement, which would be impossible to obtain, but would practi-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/12–1355. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:53 p.m., December 14. Repeated to London, Paris, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 683.84A/12–1255)

cally preclude any Arab leaders from taking positions which might make settlement possible. [3]

Byroade

[3] In telegram 1138 from Cairo, December 15, Byroade informed the Department that the "Last sentence Embtel 1136 should be interpreted to mean that Fawzi [fears] Russians might take line that would make it impossible for GOE to adhere to principles for settlement already given us by Egypt." (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/12–1555)

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456. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, December 14, 1955—noon.

188. During conversation at social gathering yesterday General Burns expressed himself as somewhat worried over possibility renewed Israeli attacks, presumably against Egyptian forces.

Referring his interview with Ben Gurion Sunday afternoon (Contel 184 [2]) Burns said Ben Gurion of course well aware then of impending attack on Syrian positions same night. He added that Ben Gurion insisted on seeing him Sunday on short notice to discuss his visit Cairo, which Burns had expected take up with Eytan following day. While Burns then somewhat puzzled at urgency Ben Gurion's wish see him, he now assumes latter wanted information about Egyptian attitude prior commencement operation against Syrians. Burns speculated that Ben Gurion probably had some idea in mind of calling off the attack if he could have reported Egyptian acceptance United Nations proposals or indication they likely accept near future. . . .

Other factors adding Burns concern future prospects are series Israeli charges about "wave Egyptian aggressions" and article December 13 *Jerusalem Post* by "diplomatic correspondent" which refers Sunday night's attack and states inter alia Egyptian-Syrian Defense

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/12–1455. Confidential. Received at 12:04 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Amman.

[2] Dated December 12, in it, Cole reported that Burns had told him about his visit to Cairo and summarized his conversation with Ben Gurion the previous day. (*Ibid.*)

Pact may now appear "to some Syrians as an added danger rather than a protective device".

Cole

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457. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, December 14, 1955—8:32 p.m.

3346. Acting Secretary held meeting today [2] attended by British Ambassador, Black of IBRD, Egyptian Ambassador, Kaissouni and Egyptian engineers, purpose of which to inform Egyptians status US–UK–IBRD consideration Aswan Dam project. Following substance information conveyed orally by Actg Secy and supported by British Ambassador and Black:

Begin summary: After careful study of how US and UK Governments, in conjunction IBRD, might assist Egypt build Dam, we have now reached point in thinking which would render it useful to tell Egyptian officials how matters developing. British and US Governments expect within next few days to be prepared document offers in form aide-mémoire. [3] Third document will be given Egyptians by IBRD, [4] the three communications being interrelated. We hope they will render it possible for Egypt to proceed with project. We do not yet have draft aide-mémoire, which we will discuss with Kaissouni before their delivery; however following is general outline main points of arrangement which we think it might be possible undertake:

A. Re first stage, US and UK would together make grant aid contributions to preliminary Dam works aggregating $70 million covering necessary foreign exchange costs. Understood that Egyptian

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/12–1455. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Rountree, who signed for Hoover. Also sent to Cairo.

[2] No other record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Document 461.

[4] The referenced document, "Draft of Proposed Letter from the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the Prime Minister of Egypt," is the IBRD's letter of intent. (Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/12–1655) For portions of the letter, see vol. XV, footnote 2, p. 1. According to a memorandum of December 19 from the Secretary of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to Under Secretary of State Hoover, Black handed this document to Kaissouni on December 17. (*Ibid.*)

Government would put up remainder required for foreign exchange costs as well as for local costs this stage of project. Re local costs US might be in position provide additional assistance through utilization of substantial amounts Egyptian currency representing proceeds of sale to Egypt of wheat under P.L. 480. To extent such monies might be used burden upon Egyptian Government of raising local funds would of course be lessened.

B. Re second stage US and UK Governments would undertake cooperate with Egypt other Governments which might be interested and IBRD by lending their further support toward execution of project. While not empowered to speak for IBRD it our understanding that IBRD is contemplating letter of intent stating its readiness consider loan to Egypt of up to $200 million for foreign exchange costs of second stage subject to there having been worked out satisfactorily such points as internal financing, agreement with Sudan on division of Nile Waters, stability of local economy and arrangements for additional outside financing which will be needed.

C. Certain aspects of mechanics of implementing project are of considerable importance within context of assistance from US and UK:

(1) We will propose that disbursement of grant funds for first stage be handled by IBRD on basis of criteria normally applicable to Bank's own funds. In other words, from outset IBRD would assume responsibility for handling foreign exchange provided for project by US and UK Governments.

(2) After thorough consideration USG finds that if US public funds are to be used on either grant aid or loan basis, directly negotiated contract with consortium is not feasible. We aware of Egyptian desire to enter into such a negotiated contract, in belief that only this course would permit initiation of work on project in 1957. On basis our discussions with IBRD however believe if procedures normally employed by Bank are used in this instance project will not be delayed. By following method of "invitational bidding" not only will legal difficulties relating to the American aid be overcome but we will avoid severe criticism which inevitably would follow any endeavor to make an American contribution on basis excluding competition. Our objection to negotiate contract is based on a principle and would not be overcome by for example adding American firm to consortium. Objection would be equally strong if American firm alone were being considered for contract. We have no objection to consortium as such and in fact consider it quite possible it will win contract under competitive bidding.

D. Again turning to question US grant assistance for stage one, in order make funds immediately available American contribution will necessarily come out of current FY 56 MSA appropriations. This contribution will far exceed FY 56 program which might have been undertaken in Egypt in absence of Dam project. Our going ahead with latter project will therefore have effect of reducing substantially other elements of FY 56 Program for Egypt, although it is not expected that FY 55 program of which greatest part still unexpended

will be affected. Indeed latter funds should provide important support to Egyptian economy during calendar year 56.

E. Should be understood that in establishing magnitude economic programs for Egypt in subsequent fiscal years Congress undoubtedly will take into account sums committed by US to Dam project. Assistance to Egypt as well as to other countries provided for by annual Congressional action, and in calling these matters to attention Egyptian officials we not endeavoring to predict amounts that will in fact be available in future years. *End summary.*

Egyptians expressed great appreciation this evidence US UK and Bank desire help with project of such importance to Egypt, and main discussion centered around two points: a) whether US and UK might be prepared now make firm commitment re assistance in phase 2 of project and b) requirement for competitive bidding.

While Egyptians seemed disappointed that firm phase 2 commitment could not be made, they were reasonably satisfied with explanation given. Re second point, however, Egyptians and particularly Hilmi urged strongly reconsideration so that negotiated contract can be given consortium. They expressed belief that delays which would inevitably accompany bidding for contract would result in postponement initiation of work beyond July 57, which is present target date. They suggested that in order avoid any criticism that US funds being spent for negotiated contract, Egypt would assume financial responsibility for consortium services (amounting approximately $23 million) with understanding full $70 million contributed by US and UK would be utilized under Bank procedures for purchases made on basis of competitive bids. Acting Secretary, British Ambassador and Black undertook consider Egyptian suggestion, but made it clear it unlikely that US could agree proceed with project on this basis.

FYI: Believe US must insist on competitive bidding for contract although we hope that simple and expeditious means meeting this requirement can be devised. Department shares IBRD view that bidding on "invitational" basis would be possible without causing undue difficulties or delays.

We will keep you informed of further developments.

Hoover

458. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France [1]

Washington, December 15, 1955—12:02 p.m.

Tedul 2. Re Aswan Dam. At meeting yesterday afternoon [2] with Egyptian Delegation, Ambassador Makins, and Black of IBRD, I verbally outlined details of proposed financing for project along lines my memorandum to you of December 12. [3] Egyptians appeared to welcome proposal warmly in all details except US requirement for competition in awarding contract. They reacted violently to suggestion that US public funds could not be used for purpose of a "negotiated" contract between Egypt and UK-French-German combine of contractors claiming that such procedure would cause delay of at least a year in initiation of project. Black countered by stating that IBRD did not believe any such delay would result.

Egyptians then proposed that they would pay for portion of contract embodying "fees and services" to consortium out of own funds amounting to $20 million on condition US would divert equivalent amount toward auxiliary irrigation aspects of project and thereby avoid direct expenditure of US funds on this item. Meeting adjourned with our promise to consider this proposal although I stated we were most doubtful this was a feasible solution, as it would be considered a subterfuge.

After the meeting Makins told me he already had instructions to make a strong démarche on US today in favor of negotiated contract with consortium. I explained to him that there would be violent reaction in Congress to such a procedure, especially where it involved payment of US public funds without competition to a British-French-German combine of contractors with a foreign government in which the US would have no opportunity to evaluate soundness or propriety of the deal. We were, furthermore, getting unfavorable impression of the Egyptians' insistence on such procedure together with their refusal even to consider ways whereby competitive procedure could be expedited. Black firmly supports the US position regarding competitive procedure and has advised me privately he feels that our acquiescence in "negotiated" contract would have serious repercussions. It is his opinion and mine that Egyptians and UK will eventually agree to our position if we remain firm. There is not slightest question in my mind that Egyptians are

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/12–1555. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted and signed by Hoover. Sent Eyes Only for Ambassadors in Cairo and London.

[2] See *supra*.

[3] Document 450.

being strongly pressured by the UK in their present attitude of demanding a closed contract for the consortium.

ICA and others in Washington also feel we would be under great criticism by Congress and public generally if we acquiesced to such a proposal. You will remember ICA difficulties on grain elevator contract in Pakistan last year. I discussed the matter with Governor Adams and we are considering discussion with the President later this morning.[4] We do not doubt that Eden will again approach the President on behalf of the consortium.

I intend to continue a firm but courteous line on this aspect of the negotiations if you agree, and in such event I would appreciate your taking a parallel position with Macmillan in Paris. You may wish to discuss this matter with Humphrey and Hollister, both of whom I understand feel strongly on the subject.

Hoover

[4] See *infra*.

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459. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France [1]

Washington, December 15, 1955—4:58 p.m.

Tedul 3. Re Aswan Dam. At Adams' suggestion I forwarded copy of my Tedul 2 [2] of this morning to President in Gettysburg. He called me by phone a few minutes ago, making the following points.

1. We cannot violate our basic procedures and customs of handling US Government funds by eliminating competition for the Aswan Dam contract, such as by awarding it to the consortium on a "negotiated" basis.

2. While we would be glad to see a US contractor included in the consortium, as proposed in Eden's message to him of November 27,[3] that does not in itself satisfy the requirement of competitive procedures.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/12–1555. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted and signed by Hoover.

[2] *Supra*.

[3] Document 429.

3. He proposed that we draft a courteous but firm note from himself to Eden along the lines of (1) and (2) above so that there would be no misunderstanding of our position in the matter. [4]

I outlined to the President the normal procedures followed by the IBRD in calling for "invitational bids" from a few responsible contractors, which in this case would of course include the consortium, whether or not a US contractor was added to their partnership. The President expected that some US companies would have an opportunity to bid, although it was quite possible that the consortium, due to its familiarization with the project, would come in with the best bid. We could have no objection if this proved the case since competitive procedures would have been complied with.

He said he would appreciate your advice before actually despatching such a note to Eden in order to head off further opposition by the UK. [5] Personally I think this action is desirable. While Makins gives every appearance of being fully cognizant of the problem, he is of course following Eden's orders. As an alternative it has been suggested that if we were to advise Makins of the President's position, this might do the trick, leaving the President's message available if necessary.

Hoover

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[4] Hoover prepared the draft of a message from Eisenhower to Eden which encompassed the President's recommendations and transmitted it to Dulles. (Tedul 4 to Paris, December 15; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/12–1555)

[5] Dulles subsequently advised against having the President send the proposed message to Eden, since it would "bring current conduct of foreign affairs into direct Eden–Eisenhower channel. This would throw an intolerable burden upon the President." Moreover, Dulles indicated "that UK assume that there would have to be competitive bidding on invitation." (Dulte 2 from Paris, December 16, *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 639)

460. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, December 15, 1955—1 p.m.

582. Embassy telegrams 570 [2] and 576. [3] Information available here from UN and GOS sources indicates no foundation exists for Israeli charge that December 11 attacks on Syria provoked by Syrian attacks on Israeli fishing vessels (Tel Aviv's 110 [4]). Syrian Army aware its vulnerability and, since October 22 Israeli raid (Embassy telegram 410 [5]), has followed policy of restraint. Syrian withdrawal reinforcements from frontier area five days before attack can hardly be reconciled with allegation of aggressive intentions.

ISMAC chairman states situation on Lake Tiberias exceptionally quiet since early November, during which period sole complaint involved routine exchange of fire between Syrian shore position and Israeli police boat December 10. Each side claimed other fired first and it virtually impossible for UNTSO to establish responsibility. In chairman's opinion, December 11 Israeli attack required minimum of one week's planning and training by special troops. As pointed out in Tel Aviv's 597 to Department, [6] it therefore appears December 10 exchange of fire, whether fortuitous or provoked by Israelis, provided excuse, not cause, for December 11 attack.

UNTSO description of attack as "retaliatory action" (Jerusalem's 186 to Department [7]) of doubtful validity.

GOS attempting hide extent defeat by portraying incident as Syrian repulse of Israeli attempt capture high ground east of Lake Tiberias and by featuring false report of 100 Israeli casualties.

Comment: This attack appears to combine two patterns: That of Qibya, Nahhalin, [8] Gaza and Khan Yunis, also that of several previous incidents on the Sea of Galilee where Israelis have pro-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1555. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:09 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Cairo, Baghdad, London, Paris, Jidda, Ankara, Jerusalem, Tripoli, and Moscow.

[2] Dated December 12, it reported the Syrian account of the Israeli raid the previous night. (*Ibid.*, 683.84A/12–1255)

[3] Dated December 14, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/12–1455)

[4] Sent as telegram 592 from Tel Aviv; see footnote 2, Document 452.

[5] Dated October 24, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/10–2455)

[6] Document 452.

[7] Dated December 13, it transmitted the text of a UNTSO press release of December 12 which used this expression. (Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/12–1355)

[8] For information concerning the Nahhalin incident of March 28, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, footnote 1, p. 1500.

voked exchanges of fire while endeavoring to deprive Syrians of their traditional and treaty rights to fish therein.

Tel Aviv Embassy is perhaps in best position appraise Israeli motives and timing of attack. Israeli action has wrought havoc on any plans for peace or tranquility in NE which involve willing Syrian cooperation. In this sense, Israeli attack served also as attack on the recent efforts of the President, the Secretary and British Prime Minister. The Department may wish to treat Israeli raid in this light.

Full repercussions here of December 11 attack cannot yet be appraised. Public emotions have been deeply stirred. Unless satisfaction can be obtained through UN or other processes, there is real danger present government may be faced with the choice of suicidal military action or of abdicating authority in favor of hot heads, largely left wing. Further Israeli attacks will increase this danger. Neither course will promote US interests in Syria or NE.

Prodded by left-wing propagandists and encouraged by left-wingers and others in military and civil offices, many Syrians assume that US approves or acquieseces in Israeli violence, and they are unlikely to be disabused of such ideas without positive and firm action on US part.

Effect of attack on Syrian desire purchase US military vehicles unpredictable but in all probability conflict in Syrian army between leftists and groups relatively but only relatively favorable to West will be exacerbated. Embassy considers it fortunate that note offering sell vehicles was delivered to Syrian Prime Minister Saturday [9] before shooting began on Sea of Galilee.

When I called on Prime Minister Ghazzi December 14 to convey message contained in Deptel 436, [10] he referred to my conversation of the same day with Foreign Office Secretary General re Syrian protest to Security Council and said he hoped Syria could count on US support in Security Council. I replied I would transmit his request to Department.

In pursuance of declared aims of the President and the Secretary, and with view to (1) restoring measure of Syrian confidence in US, (2) assisting conservative elements in Syrian Government to resist left-wing pressures, and (3) convincing Israelis that sneak attacks are unprofitable, the Department may wish to consider (1) public statement in Washington condemning Israeli aggression, (2) full US support for unequivocal Security Council resolution con-

[9] December 10.

[10] Dated December 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1355)

demning Israeli attack (3) disapproval of sale of US arms to Israel and (4) effective reduction US bilateral aid to Israel.

Syrians are convinced more firmly than ever that any arms in Israeli hands are offensive arms. Should US now approve the proposed sale of arms to Israel, I believe the resentment here will be so profound that for all practical purposes Syria can thereafter be considered an unfriendly country, whether the Communists take over or not.

Moose

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461. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, December 16, 1955—8:53 p.m.

1282. Following is text US aide-mémoire handed Kaissouni Dec 16 at meeting [2] attended by British Ambassador and Black of IBRD:

Begin Text: US Government has followed with special interest long felt desire of Egypt to bring into realization High Dam Project which you have described to us as follows:

Project consists of a dam to be built across Nile about 4⅓ miles south of present Aswan dam; powerhouse at dam with initial installed capacity of 720,000 kilowatts which can later be doubled; transmission line to Cairo and necessary inter-connections; conversion of 700,000 acres from basin to perennial irrigation; and reclamation, irrigation, settlement of additional 1,300,000 acres, including provision of necessary roads and other public facilities. Dam will be 364 feet high and 3⅑₁₀ miles long across crest. Reservoir will have storage capacity about 45,890,000 million cubic feet, sufficient to regulate Nile flow throughout year. Construction dam and initial power facilities, including transmission lines and connecting links, expected commence July 1957. Preparatory work will commence earlier.

First stage will take four to five years to complete. Total cost this stage estimated at $275 million of which equivalent $110 million

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/12–1655. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Rountree, who signed for Hoover. Repeated to London.

[2] No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

represents expenditures in foreign currencies. Work during this period will include (A) construction of diversion tunnels and permanent coffer dams, which will be incorporated in main dam, and consolidation and sealing of foundations of dam, and (B) relocation of population from reservoir area, conversion from basin to perennial irrigation of lands above-described, and irrigation facilities for about 500,000 new acres principally for food production in order meet needs of rapidly growing population.

Second stage will consist of remainder of Project described above.

View request of Egypt that US assist, USG has studied surveys and reports respecting Project made by World Bank. USG agrees that Project holds great promise for future of Egyptian people. USG desires cooperate in realization.

Bank, USG and UKG have conferred with GOE re manner in which each may assist in financing Project, and UKG and Bank intend to submit proposals, drafts of which have been delivered to USG.

USG for its part proposes to assist in following manner:

1. USG will provide $54.6 million grant, toward financing foreign exchange costs of that portion first stage described in (A) above, on condition proposals of UKG and Bank mentioned above are made and accepted, and on conditions hereinafter set forth.

2. USG in cooperation with GOE, UKG, Bank and other member governments of Bank which may desire participate, will be prepared in due course to consider sympathetically lending its further support through participation in financing of remaining foreign exchange costs of Project, in light of conditions then existing and of progress and performance during first stage of construction, and subject to necessary legislative action. Among conditions referred to will be satisfactory resolution of Nile water rights matter, USG prepared use its good offices this regard.

These proposals made on conditions that:

a) UKG will provide pounds 5.5 million, grant toward foreign exchange costs of that portion of first stage of Project described in (A) above, UKG in cooperation with GOE, USG, Bank and other member governments of Bank which may desire participate, will be prepared in due course consider sympathetically lending its further support through participation in financing remaining foreign exchange costs of Project, in light of conditions then existing and of progress and performance during first stage of construction, and subject to necessary Parliamentary action. Among conditions referred to will be satisfactory resolution of Nile water rights matter; UKG is prepared to use its good offices in this regard.

b) Funds provided by USG and UKG will be made available to Bank, and will be expended under its supervision, in accordance arrangements between GOE and Bank deemed satisfacto-

ry by USG and UKG. These arrangements will be embodied in written agreements, USG has requested Bank to enter into discussions with GOE to this end at earliest possible time. GOE will give appropriate publicity to sources and nature of financing, and will furnish to participants such information regarding use of such funds as they may request.

c) Bank will agree to participate in financing of external foreign exchange requirements of Project in amount equivalent to $200 million, on basis of loan agreements to be negotiated from time to time, substantially as set forth in draft of Bank's proposal mentioned above.

d) GOE will carry out Project expeditiously and economically in cooperation with Bank and will allocate its resources in manner designed to assure high priority to development, carrying on, and completion of Project, and will ensure that necessary local currency costs of Project are met. This connection, USG relies upon assurances which GOE is giving to Bank regarding maintenance of sound and stable economy and avoidance of inflation.

e) International competition under procedures developed by Bank will be method used for selecting contractor or contractors who will perform work on or related to that portion of Project described in (A) above, and for procurement all supplies and equipment for which foreign exchange required for its completion.

These proposals are, of course, subject to review by USG in event extraordinary circumstances intervene. *End text*

UK Ambassador delivered similar aide-mémoire. [3] IBRD letter of intent will be delivered after approval Bank Board. [4]

Kaissouni expressed deep gratitude and he, Ambassador and engineers seemed highly pleased outcome negotiations. When informed US had given further consideration question negotiated contract with consortium but concluded it could not agree on any basis other than competitive bidding, Egyptians said they accepted this and would do their best to work out their problems accordingly. They said they considered it possible meet tight schedule necessary if project is to begin in 1957 provided they can with own resources spend approximately $200,000 on preliminary work making preparations for initial operations of contractor when selected. They were assured that Bank, under whose procedures US and UK grants would be disbursed, would be entirely reasonable in considering Egyptian proposals for meeting this problem.

Hoover

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[3] No copy of the British aide-mémoire has been found in Department of State files.

[4] For portions of the text of the IBRD's letter of intent, see vol. XV, footnote 2, p. 1.

462. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, December 16, 1955—5 p.m.

614. USIA Director Streibert met Wednesday and Thursday [2] with Ben-Gurion. Herzog and Chargé were present at conversations.

Principal points made by Streibert were:

1. As result his conversations Cairo he greatly impressed with possibilities for peace settlement. For first time an Arab country admitted existence of Israel as state through public statements made by Egyptian Government regarding Eden's November 9 speech. Secondly, Nasser had told him he interested in settlement; that Eden's statement point from which matters could proceed and he prepared to discuss boundaries and compensation. Finally Streibert said in conversation Baghdad Nuri Said had also indicated this was good time for settlement.

2. He emphasized incidents such as Tiberias action put off peace and made its achievement more difficult. He pointed this up (with visible effect on Ben-Gurion) by describing funeral cortege, flowers on caskets and solemnity of crowds watching procession which he saw in Damascus.

3. Streibert added that some people in Arab States had doubts whether Israel really wanted peace and had suggested it interested in stirring up trouble to obtain funds from abroad.

Ben-Gurion in reply made following principal points:

1. Allegation to 3 was untrue. Israel wanted peace which apart from its intrinsic worth was essential to enable state to meet its two great problems of receiving immigrants and of integrating them into nation.

2. As regards 2 above Ben-Gurion restated traditional rationalization of doctrine of retaliation but avoided any reference to specific incident to which Streibert had alluded.

3. Larger part Ben-Gurion's comments devoted to Streibert's appraisal situation in Cairo. Firstly, he doubted whether Nasser really wanted settlement. Israel had made numerous approaches beginning with Naguib and continuing throughout Nasser's regime with negative results. Referring to Sunday's [3] conversation with General Burns and Cairo radio reports Ben-Gurion gave as example Egyptian "rejection" UN Secretary General's Nitzana proposals.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/12–1655. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:28 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, and Cairo on December 17.

[2] December 14 and 15.

[3] December 11.

"Nasser is smiling at the US but he doesn't smile at Israel". He, Ben-Gurion, had to take into account possibility of attack by Egyptians when they ready. His position was similar to Eisenhower's if Russia possessed atomic bomb but US did not. Would we under those circumstances believe peaceful remarks of Molotov? Ben-Gurion said "we are deadly afraid". Nasser will have 200 Migs and 50 Ilyushin bombers. Egypt already has superiority in heavy equipment. Israel has slight superiority in quality of her men. All this means "I have to think of possibilities of our settlements (border) being destroyed, of tens of thousands of flower of our youth losing their lives and of Tel Aviv and Haifa being destroyed in half hour from air". (Ben-Gurion expressed doubt whether Egyptians would destroy Jerusalem mentioning holy places.) Ben-Gurion added "nevertheless I do not believe they could completely destroy us. We would fight too hard for them but results would be . . . "[4] (He then repeated statements above re destruction of cities, settlements and loss of youth.)

When Streibert inquired whether he could not rely on UN to prevent such an aggression Ben-Gurion replied he could not. In 1948 when the UN was not as divided as it is today not finger lifted to help Israel meet onslaught of six Arab armies. Furthermore damage would be done before any action could be taken.

Ben-Gurion turned to question peace settlement and said he prepared to talk with Nasser immediately. He proposed following specific steps:

1. Cease-fire by Egypt and Israel. Ben-Gurion undertook during week or so which USG would require to get reply from Nasser to his proposal to abstain from retaliations even in face of provocation.
2. Strict observance of armistice agreement.
3. Once these prerequisites had been met discussions could commence. He was prepared to work for peace in stages.
4. He accepted agenda which Nasser suggested to Streibert. He prepared to talk about compensation also about boundaries "on give and take basis". Ben-Gurion several times used expression "give and take" relative to boundaries.
5. When Streibert mentioned Nasser's apparent condition re using Eden's statement as starting point Ben-Gurion said Nasser free to interpret Eden's statement as he wished; but he, Ben-Gurion, also free to place his own interpretation on it or to use any starting point he desired and that important thing was start talking.

When Streibert pointed out that direct conversations between Nasser and Ben-Gurion probably impracticable at this moment Ben-Gurion said he had no objection in earlier stages of negotiation to use of intermediaries; he believed however that before negotiations

[4] Ellipsis in the source text.

could really be productive direct talks would be necessary; but such direct talks if that stage reached could be held with some Israeli other than himself.

Comment: In my judgment Ben-Gurion's proposals mark some advance from similar overtures which he made in past. Firstly, on territorial question he has proceeded from "not an inch of territory" to "mutual minor border adjustments" to process of "give and take". Checking my notes of conversation this morning with Herzog he indicated his belief that Ben-Gurion's position on territorial question been modified somewhat by his statement to Streibert.

Secondly, his undertaking to abstain from retaliatory actions against Egypt irrespective of provocation while given for only short period gives some evidence seriousness of purpose when considered relative to public mood here and political hazards which he would encounter in adhering to commitment should one or two Israelis lose their lives during next week along Egyptian border. Streibert and I undertook to transmit his proposals to US Government but gave him no assurance Department would transmit them to Nasser.

I anticipate by Tuesday next [5] Foreign Ministry will inquire whether Nasser has received proposals and by end of next week will be pressing for his reply. [6]

White

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[5] December 20.

[6] White informed the Department of State on December 17 that "Streibert in discussions with Ben-Gurion was unaware subject matter Washington discussions Secretary–Sharett and Russell–Shiloah," and White said that he had not informed Streibert of these conversations. (Telegram 617 from Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/12–1755)

The Department on December 20 informed the Embassy in Tel Aviv that it had "advised Shiloah that . . . Streibert . . . was unaware of conversations initiated by Secretary and Sharett and carried forward by Russell and Shiloah. Shiloah indicated he would so advise IG." (Telegram 431 to Tel Aviv; *ibid.*, 674.84A/12–1655)

463. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, December 17, 1955—1 a.m.

Secto 8. Tripartite meeting at Quai d'Orsay December 15 [2] opened by Pinay, who stressed gravity of problems in Middle East and necessity for common policy by three governments in that area. Following general review of Soviet methods of penetration in area by Secretary, discussion took place on following subjects:

Control of Arms to Middle East.

Secretary recalled agreement at Geneva 3 countries would cooperate on delivery of arms as between Israel and immediate neighbors. [3] Said US has received IG request for considerable quantity ($55 million) of arms, greater part for planes and tanks. US intends bring matter before Ambassadorial Committee. Said that Department has informed IG in view attack on Syria it does not wish decide on request now. [4] Under US legislation cannot sell to country carrying on acts of aggression. Although Israel has signed reimbursable aid agreement that it will not use arms for aggression, we must take into account its actions as well as its words. May decide sell $10 million of defensive type weapons and delay on remainder to see what IG area policies are.

Pinay said French Government being constantly pressed by IG to make deliveries of planes and found position very difficult. He stressed need for common policy respecting deliveries. Macmillan said UK had held up delivery of Meteors and urged that plane deliveries to Israel be suspended until Ambassadorial Committee had been established and had had opportunity to consider problem. He pointed out that introduction of such new types of equipment as French Mystere would alter entire character of armaments situation in area and felt that this should be studied by Ambassadorial Committee before any decision taken. It was agreed by three Ministers that plan [*e?*] deliveries to Israel should be suspended pending consideration by Ambassadorial Committee and that IG would be informed that cessation of deliveries had been made in light of Syrian incident. It was further agreed that existence of Ambassadorial Committee would be kept secret.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.56/12–1755. Secret. Drafted by Russell and Reinstein. Received at 2:14 a.m. Repeated to London, Cairo, and Tel Aviv.

[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, this meeting began at 6 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[3] See Documents 404 and 409.

[4] See Document 454.

French stressed difficulties caused in North Africa by illegal imports of light arms from Arab countries in area and urged that Ambassadorial Committee should have jurisdiction over such shipments. Macmillan pointed out that problem of illicit arms traffic was different problem from that for which Ambassadorial Committee created, i.e., implementation of tripartite declaration to prevent arms race between Israel and Arab countries. Both Secretary and Macmillan pointed out practical difficulty of three governments trying to control trade in small arms in view of number of other countries which manufacture such arms and highly organized illicit arms traffic. After lengthy discussion it was agreed to instruct Ambassadorial Committee to establish sub-committee to study problem.

Aswan Dam.

French raised this point, stating they were in dark as to exactly where matter stands. They had been informed that they would be given opportunity to participate but had no information as to what exact arrangements were. Therefore, found it difficult to consider financial aspects and how they might take part. Secretary and Macmillan reviewed developments to date and present status of discussions in Washington. Macmillan explained that British-French-German consortium had been unable arrange financing of project and that IBRD procedures required competitive bidding. He said that it appears likely, however, that some form of invitational bidding can be devised which will exclude Iron Curtain countries. He thought consortium, which he hoped would be expanded to include American participation, would have excellent chance of getting contract. Massigli indicated that French desire to be associated with project for political reasons, i.e., relations with Egypt and Arab countries, and wished to obtain information in sufficient time to permit them to make decision on participation.

Dulles

464. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, December 17, 1955—1 a.m.

Secto 9. At luncheon meeting this noon [2] Secretary told Macmillan of his recent meeting with Sharett. [3] Said he had planned tell Sharett re IG arms request that U.S. prepared sell equipment Defense had reported as available, which came to about $10 million and was essentially defensive in nature, but that balance of IG request, including planes and tanks, not available for immediate delivery; that as to latter, would try to get ready for delivery but final decision would depend on conditions at time including any IG use of aggressive tactics. As result of Israel retaliatory raid on Syria past week, however, Department had informed Sharett no decisions on arms request possible at this time. [4] Secretary said we will in any event discuss any proposed arms sales to area with Ambassadorial Committee. Macmillan said U.K. had agreed with IG to deliver Meteors around this time but will inform IG that it intends hold up delivery at least until UN acts on Syrian complaint following last week's IDF raid. Secretary said we had just been informed by French that they would like to sell to IG twelve Mystere 4–A planes which they would like take from 225 being produced under Off-Shore Procurement and which would have effect of delaying these planes for NATO somewhat. Secretary said if anyone going to sell jet planes to Israel perhaps preferable have French do it. In any event should be taken up in Ambassadorial Committee.

With respect to possible Israel-Arab settlement Secretary said IG ambiguous re what it will do on question of Negev. Sharett had started out by saying IG would make no concessions but his final words had been IG not willing enter negotiations prepared to yield on issue but is prepared to have Negev on agenda for negotiations. Secretary said Israel is in desperate plight in long run and it may precipitate war hoping we will back them. Secretary referred to Sharett suggestion we wait for two months to see whether Nasser carried out promise to obtain Arab agreement on Jordan Valley plan. Secretary said he had told Sharett that two months was too long to

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[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 638. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell and repeated to London, Cairo, and Tel Aviv. Received at 4:27 a.m.

[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, this luncheon meeting with Macmillan on December 15 began at 1:15 p.m. and adjourned at 2:15 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[3] Document 437.

[4] Document 454.

wait. There will be two months of quasi-balance with IG having force in being and Egypt hope of favorable change in ratio of power. After that, one side or other may decide to attack.

Secretary said he had been visited on Saturday [5] by group of Arab Ambassadors [6] and had informed them U.S. might give Israel some arms though not all it was asking for, pointing out we were selling arms to Syria, Saudi-Arabia and Iraq. Ambassadors made no particular protest. They urged U.S. not give special security treaty to Israel and Secretary had informed them we had no intention of doing so.

In response to Macmillan's query as to next steps in obtaining Israel-Arab settlement, Secretary said probably desirable to work through present staffs for time being as essential to maintain secrecy; if we can obtain assent of two sides to negotiate, time may come when full-time mediator necessary.

Macmillan said it appears then that immediate problem is obtaining IG willingness to discuss Negev; then we can approach Nasser through our Ambassadors in Cairo; and thereafter decide how best handle negotiations.

Secretary expressed hope U.K. would contribute $20 million of $70 million which U.S.–U.K. must provide for preliminary construction on Aswan Dam. Macmillan said he had already wired U.K. Embassy in Washington stating U.K. would provide $15 million and thought matter could be worked out. Secretary said Aswan Dam important not only to meet Soviet efforts at penetration but also as anchor to windward re peace in area as Egypt could not have dam with war going on. Macmillan said French and Germans had offered to help in financing dam as they anxious to participate in construction and realize it would probably work out that countries that put up money will, in rough and ready way, get contracts.

Secretary said that problems in the Arabian Peninsula were causing us concern as of course they were U.K. also. We felt U.K. had been taking important actions without advance consultation with us and that two governments ought to work out some way of concerting action. Macmillan said U.S. and U.K. in close collaboration on many problems in Middle East and he is sure we can work out similar cooperation on these problems. We need joint appreciation of situation, appraisal of our assets and sources of strength in area and decisions on how best use them. Among assets is U.K. position in Persian Gulf. Arab leaders in Gulf area must have

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[5] December 10.

[6] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, he and Fraser Wilkins met with the Arab Ambassadors on Monday, December 12, at 11:02 a.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) Wilkins' memorandum of this conversation, not printed, is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.86/12–1255.

confidence in U.K. If not they will be prey to Communist efforts. If U.K. had not taken action in Buraimi it would have lost its influence in entire Gulf area. Secretary pointed out assets of West include U.S. position in Saudi Arabia which must be balanced against those of U.K. Secretary said important to have joint study group working on Middle East problems and attempting to work out joint position before Eden visit. Macmillan said Shuckburgh could come to Washington in January.

Dulles

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465. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, December 21, 1955—8 p.m.

632. Following comments are submitted in regard to Alpha project as set forth Deptel 411 to Tel Aviv: [2]

1. Proposals, with modifications, appear reasonable and to have some chance of acceptance by Israel after a period of direct or indirect negotiations extending over three or four years. Conclusion regarding time required is based on following:

(A) Negotiating experience with Israeli Government on many subjects past two years, including Johnston water plan, has convinced me that in cases where real concessions required, Israelis are . . . incapable of moving rapidly. In present case GOI is convinced that Arab objectives destructive and Arab tactics Machiavellian. This distrust compounded by traditional suspicion of GOE motives, already reflected in this exercise by virtual rejection of UK as participating mediator. These suspicions were best exemplified by Sharett's own comment, inadvertently published, that Dulles proposal was a "mine field" (through which Israel must tread slowly and with extreme caution). Another strong characteristic of GOI in negotiations is propensity to remain adamant on a specific point until convinced that other party has made best offer. As Eric Johnston can testify this requires a lot of conviction.

(B) Second element in time period is present power framework within Israel. The Alpha proposals are of such a character that on each facet of the territorial and repatriation questions the Israeli

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–2155. Top Secret; Priority; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:24 a.m., December 22. Repeated to London and Cairo.

[2] Printed as Document 446.

negotiators would be looking over one shoulder at the Israel defense force and over the other at the Herut and General Zionist opposition, as well as at important militant elements in the Mapai and Achdut Avoda Government parties. Each proposed bolder adjustment from Metulla to Hebron would be minutely examined by the IDF to ascertain whether from military standpoint it increases or decreases Israel's defensibility. In latter-type cases resistances to change would be great. Re refugee problem, each small increment in proposed repatriation quota beyond token reunion family level would result increased internal resistances on grounds economic liability and increased security (fifth column) crisis.

When Negev reached Israeli negotiators would be looking over both shoulders. If southernmost triangulation proposed, IDF would say Eilat becomes indefensible; if two double triangles, that area between the two likewise indefensible. Opposition groups would make most of emotional issue and GOI would find itself, as it already dimly perceives, victim of its own propaganda.

2. Am convinced that present trends in this area are running so strongly against us that US Government cannot afford the luxury of the time period required to lead Israel to a settlement through the voluntary negotiation process now envisaged; and that long before agreement reached we would be faced with problem negotiation new armistice rather than a peace agreement.

3. Conclusion reached is that if there is to be a quick settlement, it must be of an imposed character.

4. One possible approach would be to maintain an arms embargo, particularly jet aircraft, on Israel until such time as Egyptian (and other Arab) acquisition and absorption Soviet (and Western) arms reaches point Israel required to make quick peace on any terms. Have explored this approach relative to current psychology here, making every effort distinguish what Israelis really believe from that which they want us to believe.

In my judgment, the Israelis have no intention of permitting situation to develop along lines set forth preceding paragraph. They are convinced they have their backs to the wall (or sea) and they will not hesitate to use every possible instrument at their command during the next few months when they believe they still retain some freedom of action.

Firstly, they are preparing greatest possible mobilization friends in the United States. While they recognize their leverage if President to be a candidate, they do not have same feeling in case prospect is for close election. Arms procurement to equate Soviet arms will be the issue raised and should it become complicated by outbreak hostilities in some form, prospects would be good for another "China controversy".

Secondly, it is only two months since question was posed in Cabinet of (1) preventive action against Egypt or (2) arms procure-

ment. [3] Department can draw its own conclusions what happens re latter approach rendered abortive by concurrence. Other Western powers in Macmillan's contention (Secto 8 [4]) that plane deliveries to Israel should be suspended because introduction new types of equipment e.g. [garble] [Mystere 4–A?] (would alter character of armaments situation in area). I had assumed that alteration armament situation this area was already a fact, deriving from Soviet sales to Egypt MIG 15's and jet bombers.

Finally, am unconvinced, in spite of Nasser's protestations to the contrary, that, if by some miracle we could hold Israelis in check, Egyptians could be relied on to exercise restraint once new weapons have created the necessary confidence in their officer corps.

5. Although present Alpha approach appears self-[garble—defeating?] because of time element and a settlement imposed by arms embargo impracticable, I do believe that an expeditious settlement is possible. This would require a framework of extraordinary collection of incentives and disincentives and a revised approach which, while requiring larger modifications basic Israel position than does Alpha, would be more acceptable to Israelis for reasons which I hope will become apparent on study suggestions to be transmitted subsequent telegram. [5]

White

[3] Document 350.
[4] Document 463.
[5] Document 469.

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466. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, December 22, 1955—2 p.m.

635. With reference Embtel 633, [2] British Ambassador has called on me to explain background Myerson's comments in New York

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–2255. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 5:22 a.m., December 23.

[2] In telegram 635, December 22, the Embassy in Tel Aviv summarized Israeli press treatment of Minister of Labor Myerson's speech on December 19 in New York in which she asserted that the British Ambassador had hinted to her that the United Kingdom hoped Israel would be willing to make territorial concessions in the Negev as part of a peace settlement. (*Ibid.*, 641.84A/12–2255)

concerning territorial concessions in the Negev. Nicholls said that he called on Myerson on November 23 (in her capacity as Acting Foreign Minister) to urge that the Israel Government abandon its adamant position on territorial adjustments. He told her that if real progress was to be made toward a settlement, Israel would have to be more realistic on the territorial question. When Myerson inquired as to what specific concessions he thought Israel should make, he answered that he did not know but would illustrate the principle. He asked whether Israel would reject a proposal that at a certain point Arab farmers on the Jordan side be united with their water supply a hundred meters inside Israel territory. When Myerson replied in the negative, the British Ambassador pointed out that if someone on the other hand demanded of Israel a transfer of land ten miles inside her territory it would obviously be rejected. Through this process a settlement of outstanding territorial problems might be reached.

Nicholls said that when the Foreign Ministry's British desk officer, who was present at the meeting, brought to the British Embassy a draft of the memorandum of conversation, he was horrified to find himself quoted as urging the cession of a 200 meter strip of territory. He requested that the record be corrected.

Comment: Although would agree that before real progress can be made settlement negotiations, it will be necessary for appropriate intermediaries to sit down with principal Israel political leaders, possibly the triumvirate of Ben-Gurion, Sharett and Eshkol, to discuss a well-conceived plan. I am most dubious that the British can serve effectively in this role. Some Israel leaders, such as Ben-Gurion, really believe that the United Kingdom wants a hold on a portion of the Negev either for airbases or for land connection between Akaba and Suez. Others, who do not go along with this thesis, are convinced the British position in the Arab world is so vital to them that their mediation would be subject to prejudice. The foregoing considerations probably account for Sharett's view that the United Kingdom had disqualified itself as a result of Eden's address of November 9.

White

467. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, December 23, 1955—10 a.m.

641. Following represents mosaic of events leading up to and following Tiberias action which I have put together from following sources (A) source personally and officially close to Ben Gurion (B) source officially close to Sharett and (C) IDF general officer. Although to some extent their comments dealt with separate phases of developments to extent they overlapped there appeared to be no inconsistencies.

1. On Friday December 9 Ben Gurion met with Dayan and members of general staff in Tel Aviv to discuss steps to be taken to protect settlers during coming fishing season. Use of artillery to shell Syrian gun positions (this done last year) considered but rejected in part because civilian casualties would result. Plan provisionally adopted on that date a limited one and while directed at area in which action finally took place envisaged Syrian casualties and prisoners of same magnitude as earlier Syrian ambushes (Embtel 403 [2]). (It will be noted this discussion and preliminary decision made December 9 one day before alleged shelling of Israel patrol boat given officially by GOI as action precipitating retaliation.)

2. On December 10 Chief of Staff Dayan went to Ben Gurion in Jerusalem and explained giving reasons therefore that plan authorized day before which based on limited Syrian casualties and avoidance civilian casualties dangerous one and would probably result in heavy Israel losses. Ben Gurion then authorized shift of plans to one put in operation following evening.

3. Golda Myerson left for US morning of December 11. Some time between Ben Gurion's first conference with IDF on December 9 and her departure December 11 he could have notified her of proposed operation in her capacity as Acting Foreign Minister and had she known she would have called in Eshkol and Aranne for consultation with Ben Gurion re advisability such operation in light its impact world opinion and effect on arms procurement negotiations. Ben Gurion however failed to consult any of his Mapai colleagues.

4. When Eban heard of Tiberias action he sent strong telegram to Foreign Ministry listing seven reasons why incident mistake. Three reasons given specifically to me were: Effect on Arab question

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/12–2355. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 10:08 a.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Damascus, and Cairo.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 452.

adverse impact on US public opinion and effect on British Parliamentary debate Middle East issues. Telegram referred to Ben Gurion who replied in personal letter to Eban setting forth his justification which along lines (A) invasion Arab territory no more horrendous than denying to Israelis use their own territory, and (B) necessary to assure to settlers their complete security.

5. On December 14 Minister of Religion Shapira (religious parties) in his capacity as Chairman convened meeting of Cabinet Foreign Affairs Committee. Supported by Rosen (Progressive) and Ben Tov (Mapam) he took most critical line of Tiberias action claiming Ben Gurion's decision unconstitutional because it had not been approved by his committee and stating he taking matter to Cabinet. Aranne (Mapai) out of embarrassment absented himself from meeting. Eshkol (Mapai) attended and out of party loyalty defended Ben Gurion's action. Mapai Central Committee is to debate issue coming weekend.

6. Apparently Ben Gurion had some second thoughts because on December 16 he convened at Ministry of Defense IDF General Staff and all senior officers. At this meeting he laid down line that in next months (according to one version he said "two or three months" and according to another "three or four months") it would be necessary for IDF to exercise uninterrupted restraint along border irrespective of difficulties of provocations. These months would be decisive in determining arms procurement and Israel's future. When one officer asked "what do we do if we don't get arms" Ben Gurion replied "we will deal with that barrier when we meet it". [3] (Last week Congresswoman Frances Bolton at my suggestion asked Ben Gurion what would happen if Israel failed to get additional arms. She said he replied he would cross that bridge when he reached it.)

7. According to associates Sharett returned to Israel more discouraged and depressed than outraged. With reference to Tiberias action he asked question: "How can I ever face Dulles again? He will either believe me guilty of duplicity; that I am not important enough to have been consulted; or my position so weak that having been consulted my advice rejected".

Comment: Sources cited above all in position to have had in their possession information imparted to me. Question I cannot answer is why they spoke as freely as they did.

Although possibly not factor in Ben Gurion's Tiberias action decision have reason to believe that element in IDF's proposal for

[3] An apparent transcript of Ben Gurion's address to the General Staff is in Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc. during Eden talks: Dec. 11 to Feb. 15, 1956.

action was Army's unrelenting efforts obtain release their four soldiers imprisoned Damascus. It is basic moral tenet IDF that Army in no case will "let down" its soldiers. Furthermore recent letters to families indicate prisoners "cracking up" mentally.

Re paragraph 6 above this conference followed immediately after two discussions which Streibert and I had with Prime Minister. [4] Streibert deserves high marks for effectiveness shock treatment he gave Ben Gurion re Tiberias action and for conviction with which he stated his belief Nasser really wanted settlement.

White

[4] See Document 462.

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468. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France [1]

Washington, December 23, 1955—7:18 p.m.

2389. Paris tels 2929, 2867. [2] In Paris three Ministers agreed plane deliveries to Israel should be suspended pending consideration by Ambassadorial Committee and that IG would be informed cessation deliveries made in light of Syrian incident (Secto 8 [3]).

Ambassadorial Committee discussed December 21. [4] Four members agreed that decision re deliveries of planes and other equipment to Israel should be suspended pending SC consideration current question Israeli action Syria. Thereafter Ambassadorial Committee would discuss again. American representative noted Israelis had

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/12–2155. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins and approved by Allen, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to London and Rome.

[2] Ambassador Dillon reported in telegram 2867, December 16, that Margerie the previous day had handed him an aide-mémoire stating that the French Government had decided to meet an Israeli request for 12 Mystere IV–A planes as soon as possible "provided Washington interallied agency agrees." The French aide-mémoire further pointed out that "Delivery can only be made if 12 planes taken from production series filling offshore order. French Government would like as quickly as possible US agreement to this." (*Ibid.*, 484A.518/12–1655)

Achilles in telegram 2929, December 21, reported from Paris that the French were pressing for a prompt reply and requested guidance. (*Ibid.*, 784A.56/12–2155)

[3] Document 463.

[4] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 480.008/12–2155)

already been informed their request for US equipment had been suspended for time being.

In light foregoing Department does not anticipate agreement in near future by Ambassadorial Committee to supply aircraft for Israel, especially latest type jets such as Mystere 4. For political reasons Department does not believe it desirable divert US-financed planes to Israel at this time. Discussions and decisions Ambassadorial Committee are to be kept strictly confidential.

Dulles

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469. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, December 24, 1955—4 p.m.

643. Reference: Deptel 411. [2] Following is continuation subject matter Embtel 632. [3]

Believe it reasonable assumption that, after period coyness and indecision, GOI may indicate willingness to negotiate trade simple overpass or underpass land connection Jordan–Egypt for cession to Israel Gaza Strip without the refugees. Also may be willing accept repatriation very small number these refugees. Within framework present Alpha project doubt whether Israel prepared to go much further. Assume neither Nasser nor US and UK would regard foregoing as satisfactory concessions. If so we could get fast and satisfactory performance out of Israelis only if we can come up with a revised program which they will view as a real answer to their security and economic problems. Firstly believe we should aim at a definitive final settlement between Israel and Egypt. With current judgments here re Nasser, any program falling short of this will be regarded by Israel as no settlement at all. Secondly, believe territorial question should be aimed at creating maximum buffer of sand and stone between populations and armies two countries and elimination or reduction two prongs which extend along each other's territory. Unlike present approach such an arrangement would effectively

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–2455. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:09 a.m., December 25. Repeated to Cairo and London.

[2] Printed as Document 446.

[3] Document 465.

reduce rather than increase defense problems two countries. Finally if we are going to offer Israel a way out of her disguised economic insolvency it can not be done by increasing her already heavy financial burden or by failing to make provision opening up nearby Arab markets. This would require US to raise its sights re financial participation and, as in case of territorial changes, objective of a complete rather than partial settlement between Israel and Egypt.

In pursuance foregoing suggest following possible modifications Alpha project:

. . . . . .

2. Agreement by Israel to repatriate over a period of five years one-half Gaza refugees, i.e., 114,000 persons, with other half to be resettled Sinai project and elsewhere.

3. Israel–Egypt treaty of commerce and navigation with most-favored-nation provision (to contractually end blockade and boycott, primary and secondary).

4. Notification to Israel that present form of economic aid will end as of July 1, 1956.

5. USG and UJA to take policy decisions to spend in Israel next five years as much as they have spent past five; defined as average $60 million per annum for each.

6. Economic and development program concentrated on following:

(a) Completion Israel's agricultural development through USG–UJA acceptance financial responsibility Israel segment unified water plan. This would require sum $30 million from USG per annum for five years for reservoirs, Jordan power and diversion works, and primary and secondary canals, and a similar amount from UJA for agricultural settlement i.e. agricultural equipment, tools, housing and land preparation. (Assume Israel's own local currency expenditures would take care of secondary agricultural projects.)

(b) UJA continued participation in moving existing settlements toward economic viability.

(c) USG financing participation in developing mining and communications facilities in Negev areas remaining in Israel, possibly including roadstead and other facilities Gazokui Askelon for potash and phosphate rock to compensate for loss of Eilat.

(d) Possibly USG financial assistance to supplement reparation deliveries in completing Israel's industrial plant.

7. US–UK guarantee new boundaries.

While above approach raises sights regarding land concessions by Israel and in volume repatriation refugees by Israel, assume this is necessary because of considerations Arab side. It does have several overriding advantages from Israel's standpoint: Names [*Means?*] im-

proved defense; real hope of an economic solution; and above all a real rather than vague hope of peace. Larger absorption refugees and loss Eilat are two obstacles (largely psychological) which would have to be overcome in this country. Believe that after analysis Israelis will conclude refugees by thousands are less of a security threat with definitive settlement than by tens with a partial solution which, under current circumstances, would be regarded by Israelis as no settlement at all. Eilat problem will be viewed here in both economic and emotional terms. Its economic attractiveness is largely a mirage and could be neutralized by alternative program suggested. While I believe the foregoing has advantages which may offset emotional problem of Eilat . . . Israelis are so reluctant to make serious concessions that in my judgment settlement can only be brought about by clear and firm presentation of alternatives.

One prong of the alternative would be the recommendation of notification that regular US economic aid will cease next year. The other prong is in the hands of the leaders of the UJA. I recommend bypassing the professional Zionist leaders in the US, Nahum Goldmann et al, who by aptitude and disposition can exert pressures for but not on Israel. On other hand, the UJA is an important and possibly decisive element in our ability to deal effectively with Israel in this matter. With bond revenues as well as regular donations in the hands of that organization the Israeli Government knows full well that, while it might stagger along without USG aid, the UJA is indispensable to Israel's future existence.

Those UJA leaders whom I have met, . . . impressed me . . . possibly, as having some reservations about where Israel's political and economic policies will lead it. Suggest examination desirability White House call in key group of these leaders with a view to enlisting their assistance through detailed examination of problem and proposed solutions, as well as patriotic duties inherent in relationship Arab-Israel problem to threat to America's entire position in the Middle East. Not only would Israelis listen carefully to them for financial reasons but they would view with less suspicion and more confidence people of their own religion who have amply demonstrated their interest in Israel's survival.

Ambassador Lawson is returning to Tel Aviv this evening and may wish to transmit other or additional views this matter.

White

470. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, December 28, 1955.

SUBJECT

Robert Anderson's Trip to Middle East

The following are my suggestions with respect to some of the points raised at the meeting yesterday [2] in connection with Bob Anderson's Israel-Arab negotiations:

1. *Informing the British*—I suggest that next Tuesday afternoon (January 3) after you have definite word from Bob Anderson that he will be able to leave in a week or so for the Middle East, you call Roger Makins and tell him that conversations that we have been having with both the Israelis and the Egyptians through various channels here and in the area, including your own talks with Sharett, lead you to believe that it would be worthwhile to have someone of stature hold some conversations with Nasser and Ben Gurion. You might say that we are doing everything we can to maintain it as a covert operation but that we will, of course, inform them from time to time how the talks are progressing and discuss with them any questions of area policy that arise. (In view of the British desire to direct the course of events in the Middle East and the lengths to which this has recently driven them, . . . I would be inclined not to go further with them at this time.) [3]

2. *Staff Assistance*—Bob Anderson said he had raised with you the possibility of my accompanying him on the trip. In view of my involvement in the Shuckburgh visit here the week of January 9th and in the preparation of position papers for Eden's visit, I would suggest that I plan to spend the week of January 9th here in the Shuckburgh conversations, fly to the Middle East the following week to give Bob Anderson your latest thinking as a result of those talks and spend a week there, returning in time for the final preparation of papers on the Middle East for Eden's visit.

Anderson will, in any event, need a small staff of experts. As suggestions: William Burdett (NEA) has worked on all aspects of the Alpha problems and is thoroughly knowledgeable on the Palestine question; Oliver Troxel (NEA) knows the economic aspects of the refugee question and would be helpful on the compensation problem: . . . . It would not be necessary for all the experts to be there

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 16. Top Secret; Alpha. According to a notation on the source text, Robert Anderson was furnished a copy of this memorandum.

[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, he met on December 27 at 11:32 a.m. with Anderson, Allen, and Russell, and at 5:20 p.m. with Anderson and Russell. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) No record of these meetings have been found in Department of State files.

[3] According to a notation on the source text, which Russell initialed, Russell, at the Secretary's request, informed Ronald Bailey of the British Embassy on January 3, 1956, of the contents of this paragraph.

all the time. They could be ready here to leave when Anderson found their services would be helpful. [4]

[4] Dulles initialed his approval of the following two recommendations: "1. Will inform British" and "2. Approve staff plans subject to Anderson's approval".

471. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, December 29, 1955—2:33 p.m.

445. Please convey to FonMin text following message from Secretary:

"Dear Mr. Minister: I received your letter of December 12 just as I was departing for Paris. With regard to request of the Israel Government for purchase of arms in this country, which you mention, Mr. Allen informed Ambassador Eban on December 13 [2] that we were unable reach decision this time for number of reasons, prominent among them being recent incident on Syrian border.

"In your letter you also give Israel Government's views with respect to some of questions involved in an Arab-Israel settlement. I hope the Israel Government will continue to give its most careful consideration to solution at this time of the various issues between Israel and her Arab neighbors. I am convinced that a resolution of this conflict would be of the greatest benefit to Israel and go far to remove a threat that otherwise must be of the gravest concern to all who are interested in its welfare.

"With kindest personal regards, sincerely yours, John Foster Dulles."

Signed original enroute Tel Aviv by pouch. [3]

Dulles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/12–2955. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Russell, who signed for Dulles.

[2] See Document 454.

[3] Dulles signed this message on December 23.

472. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles' Residence, Washington, December 30, 1955, 5 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Proposed Israel-Arab Negotiations Through an Intermediary

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*Israel Government*
The Secretary	Ambassador Eban
F. H. Russell	Minister Shiloah

The Israel Ambassador called at his request and said that Mr. Sharett had received on December 23 the message (Tab A [2]) . . . and had just cabled to Mr. Eban instructing him to give an affirmative reply. Mr. Eban handed the Secretary a copy of Sharett's message (Tab B [3]).

Mr. Eban said that he wished to supplement the message with some oral remarks. He said that both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister had asked him to express their appreciation for the effort that the United States Government was making to initiate negotiations and that if they were brought about it would be a historic achievement. Mr. Eban said that the second sentence was the crux of the message.[4] The Israel Government hopes that there might be direct negotiations as soon as possible but, until it is possible, is willing to work through an intermediary. He said that the IG would hope that the intermediary would concentrate on bringing about a direct meeting of the heads of State and not on the substance of the various issues. Mr. Eban said that the Israel Government especially hoped that the envoy would not identify

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 16. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Russell on December 31.

[2] The message stated, in part, that the "Secretary [of State] desires proceed rapidly and proposes that high-level special envoy be appointed to facilitate negotiations". Additionally, "It is Secretary's view that if the negotiations move sufficiently rapidly, then arms [for Israel] issue will fall into different pattern." The message concluded: "Tentative inquiries addressed to N[asser] during the past few days give encouragement that he will be prepared to enter negotiations."

[3] The message said, in part, that "it would appear that N.[asser] has not yet given a definite reply to inquiries on his readiness to meet. We [Israel] should like to have his clear answer without delay." Moreover, "B[en] G[urion] is willing to meet with N.[asser] to negotiate, without prior conditions. . . . We [Israel] are strongly interested in the earliest possible commencement of the negotiations and their swift conclusion." The message also stated that "Any refusal to respond favorably to our November 16 request for arms would, in our view, constitute a serious danger to Israel's very survival, and to the peace of the Middle East."

[4] The second sentence reads: "We should like to have his [Nasser's] clear answer without delay."

himself with any special positions on matters of substance. Egypt could ask for anything and the Israel Government would respond. The negotiations, however, should begin free of substantive commitments. Mr. Eban said that with respect to the final paragraph of the message, on arms, there would be alarm in Israel if no arms arrived during the period of negotiations which might well take several months. It would be an invidious situation for Israel to face negotiations with a steadily weakening military position.

The Secretary said that while he agreed that the negotiations should commence free of substantive commitments, he was not sure that it would be possible to achieve any progress if the intermediary was not to help in developing an exchange of information on the substantive position of the two sides. Upon Mr. Eban interjecting that Ralph Bunche had always insisted that the parties had to win each other over and not to convince him, the Secretary said that he agreed that that would, of course, be the situation here but that the positions of the two sides would have to be developed through covert channels at least during the first stages. This was particularly true as Nasser would have a dual task, speaking for himself and lining up the other Arab countries. The Secretary said he envisaged the negotiations as commencing with frank talks by the intermediary with the head of State first of one government and then the other in their own countries and then engaging in an effort to get agreement on the various principle issues. He would also have as one of his objectives bringing about a meeting of the two heads of State at some feasible time. Ambassador Eban said he agreed.

The Secretary stressed that it was important to take advantage of the present period prior to Egypt's achieving any change in the ratio of military power. The Secretary said that he knows that Israel is counting on getting arms to off-set those which the Arabs are obtaining, or may obtain, from the Soviet Bloc but that he wanted to emphasize that in his opinion the time is past when Israel can count on over-matching, or even continuing to match, Arab capacity to get and absorb arms. The West is no longer the only source of arms for the Arabs. They appear to have an unlimited call on military equipment from the Soviet Bloc. Israel's capacity to absorb arms cannot match that of 40 million Arabs. Israel must rely more than ever before upon the good will which would make available outside strength and not on its own strength alone. Given present Soviet policies in the area, Israel could not win an arms race nor could it find any security in such a race. Ambassador Eban said that he agreed that Israel cannot rely exclusively on its own arms. Israel's concurrence in this point of view had been demonstrated by its interest in a settlement and by its efforts to obtain a security guarantee from the United States. Israel, however, believes that its

greatest security would lie in a position half-way between attempting to keep up in an arms race and sitting back and doing nothing. It makes a difference whether the ratio of power is 5–1 or 3–1. The Secretary said that he was not sure that there was very much difference. He said that Israel will not be swept away unless, by appearing to be aggressive, it ties the hands of those who would help it. Mr. Eban said that the trouble for Israel is that at present it has no assurance that it would get help and that it must, therefore, be in a position to carry the brunt of its own defense. He said, therefore, that he hoped the question of the U.S. making arms available to Israel was not closed. He said the French Government has agreed to release twelve Mysteres to Israel but because of the connection of French Mystere production with NATO it had informed Israel that it would have to contact the United States. Mr. Eban expressed the hope that the United States would approve the release of the Mysteres. The Secretary said that the question of arms would, of course, never be completely closed. We should in any event have to wait for the Security Council to act on the matter of the attack on Syria. With respect to the Mysteres, he assumed that it might involve questions of off-shore procurement and it might, therefore, be a matter for General Gruenther. He said that he thought that the fact should not be disguised that Israel's peril has mounted in the last few months as a result of the new Soviet policies in the area. The critical question is how best to deal with Soviet efforts to exploit the Israel-Arab controversy. The Secretary said he was convinced it could not be met by supplying arms to Israel. The only real way of removing the threat and obtaining security is by settling the controversy itself.

JFD

473. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, December 30, 1955—5 p.m.

219. Re Contel 217. [2] General Burns gave me following comments today recent developments Israeli-Egyptian affairs:

He considers Israeli communiqué December 27 [3] possibly as warning signal of some kind, but does not take it too seriously for time being since earlier press statements paving way for Israeli "retaliation" attacks have been followed by action almost immediately. In any event communiqué could prepare public opinion for some eventual further moves, which presumably unpredictable in view Ben Gurion's . . . apparent domination Israeli political scene. Communiqué might, on other hand, serve primary purpose of justifying retention Israeli forces in EL Auja D/Z and closing door on efforts negotiate their removal. . . .

Burns saw Eytan December 29 but discussion rather futile. Eytan insisted that GOI has accepted "unconditionally" UNSYG proposals for EL Auja although acceptance in fact always predicated on prior acceptance by GOE of "cease-fire" and implementation Article VIII paragraph 3 GAA [4] (Contel 180 [5]). Burns suggestion that Eytan write him a letter confirming Israel's "unconditional acceptance" terminated discussion this topic. Burns said that in view Israelis reiterated complaints about alleged Egyptian firing across Gaza D/L he urged again upon Eytan advisability discontinuing motor patrols few meters from armistice line. He told Eytan he would like discuss this and other matters with Ben Gurion, but has not seen latter recently.

Referring his meeting with Gohar December 28, Burns said Gohar seemed more affable than formerly but had nothing very fundamental to say. Gohar stated that Egyptian position UNSYG proposals unchanged. Egyptians not willing consider the matter further until after SC had concluded consideration Israeli aggression

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/12–3055. Confidential. Received at 8:53 a.m., December 31. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Dated December 29; it reported a conversation with UNTSO political adviser Lucas. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/12–2955)

[3] A Foreign Ministry press release of that date recounted from Israel's perspective the D/Z negotiations which had initiated with Hammarskjöld's November 3 suggestions. Telegram 650 from Tel Aviv, December 28, reported that the Foreign Ministry had told the Embassy that the purpose of the release was "to apprise Israel public of GOI's unconditional acceptance of Secretary General's proposals by contrast with Egypt's persistent refusal." (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/12–2855)

[4] See Documents 376 and 382.

[5] Document 439.

Lake Tiberias. They might modify their position on proposals later on. Meanwhile, they regarded subject as still open, since UNSYG had not set time limit.

Burns said UNSYG proposals have served purpose of giving him some concrete points to keep before parties, but he regards their usefulness as probably now slight. He expressed idea that it might be better for UNTSO to return to more broadly based theme of implementation provisions GAA itself including freedom movement observers.

Cole

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